Antonio Carpio vs The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992
206 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Control Power – Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio,
as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the
constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the
control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus,
“control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC
and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local
police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP
and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under
the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster
a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives
and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created
under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by
the national government.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS- G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his
family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to
order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is
without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so
“within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines?
Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace.
The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate
more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is dismissed.
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No.
171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was
made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA
whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006,
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court
and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas
and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of
a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part
of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies
are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional
because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the

doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may
temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best
assurance that due process of law would be observed.