REYES VS.

JOSON
G.R. No. 143111
Petitioner: Loreto Reyes
Respondents: Spouses Honorio and Josefina B. Joson, Dominador Masangkay, and
Renato Robles

Facts:

In 1963, Loreto Reyes, the petitioner, was hired by Hilarion Caragay to be the caretaker
of a fishpond situated in Doña Francisca, Balanga, Bataan. Apolonio Aguirre was the
owner where Mr. Caragay lease the fishpond and expires in 1973. Before the expiration
of the Contract of Lease, the owner died therefore the son, Tomas Aguirre inherited
the property so he has the authority over it. After the expiration of contract with Mr.
Caragay, Mr. Aguirre entered a contract with Honorio Joson for 10 years. Upon
expiration in 1982, he appointed Joson to administer the fishpond that is why Mr. Joson
lease it Felizardo Malibiran for 5 years. The lease contract has the signature of
petitioner as Bantay Palaisdaan while Malibiran retained petitioner also as fishpond
caretaker. Upon the expiration of Malibiran’s lease, possession of the fishpond reverted
to Joson who allowd petitioner to continue working as caretaker.in November 1989,
Caragay re-entered the fishpond and harvested the bangus and prawns together with
Reyes. Because of what Caragay did, Joson file a complaint for forcible entry at
Municipal Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan where a compromise agreement was approved
unfortunately Caragay and his workers, including the petitioner failed to comply
therefor, the MTC issued a writ of execution. Thereupon, petitioner file at RTC Branch
3, Balanga, Bataan a petition for injuction with a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against spouses Honorio and Josefina Joson unfortunately it was dismissed due to lack
of jurisdiction. They proceed to Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to file
a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for a TRO, fortunately,
Reyes was declared as the lawful tenant over the landholding and affirmed by the
DARAB. Respondents filed a petition for review at Court of Appeals alleging that the
DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural tenant, thus, the CA granted
the respondent’s petition and set aside the decision of DARAB.

Issue:

WON the petitioner is an agricultural tenant?

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was a mere fishpond watcher/caretaker,
there is no evidence to prove his claim on tenancy over the subject. Further, it must be
noted that there are requisites to establish a tenancy relationship, the absence of one
does not make an occupant a de jure tenant, 1. The parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2. The subject matter is agricultural land; 3. There is a
consent between parties; 4. The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;
5. Personal cultivation of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6. Harvested is being
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
DE BRIGINO VS. RAMOS
G.R. No. 130260
Petitioner: Hilaria Ramos vda. De Brigino
Respondemts: Dominador Ramos and Filomena Ramos

Facts:

On 10 July 1992, Hilaria de Brigino, the petitioner, filed a petition for Annulment and/or
Cancellation of Agricultural Leasehold Contract at Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos,
Bulacan against Dominador and Filomena Ramos, the respondents. The petitioner alleged
that they are the registered owners of the land with 11,451sqm at Malibong Bata, Pandi,
Bulacan, further, the respondent is his brother and Filomena Ramos is the surviving
spouse of her brother Pedro Ramos. The petitioner prayed that the documents entitled
Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan be declared void and the subject land as untenanted because
those documents are being forged, they do have the knowledge and consent over the
signature.

Based on the findings of the NBI, the signatures were forgeries but the PARAB said
that it cannot suffice to render said documents null and void because the petitioner’s
spouse had issued rental receipts to respondents, which receipts strongly prove that
they are occupying the subject land. Petitioner appeal at DARAB but they affirmed the
decision of PARAB. Likewise, they elevate it to CA but also they affirm the ruling of
DARAB.

Issue:

WON the respondents are bona fide tenants of the subject land holding?

Ruling:

Agricultural Tenancy is being defined at RA 1199 or Agricultural Tenancy Act of the

Philippines, as: The physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture
belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to
pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both. In this case, to prove such
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented to boost the
findings of the PARAB, DARAB and CA.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
OARDE V. CA
G.R. No. 104774-75
Petitioners: Zacarias Oarde and Presentacion Molar
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Spouses Wilfredo and Lourdes Guerrero and Spouses
Rogelio and Vilma Molar

Facts:

The plaintiffs, petitioners herein, seek to enjoin the defendants, private respondents
herein, from removing the former as tenant-tillers of the land. Plaintiff Zacarias
Oarde, testified that he began to till the land in question on April 29, 1964 when he got
married to the daughter of Francisco Molar. On the claim of plaintiff Presentation
Molar in Civil Case 7960, she alleged that she is a tenant-lessee of the land in question
previously owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land in 1965.
According to Zacarias Oarde who testified in behalf of Presentation, the latter began
tilling in 1968. She is not married and she only hires laborers to till the land. It was
Francisco Molar who distributed to his children the land they are farming. Presentation
hires laborers to prepare and plant the land. She does not actually till the land.

Issue:

WON plaintiff Molar is a tenant of the defendants in possession of the land?

Is the award to petitioner Oarde of P5,850 as his lawful share in the harvests of his
tilled land from October 1987 to May 1991 correct?

Are petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the respondent appellate court and the
trial court that Petitioner Molar was not a tenant of Private Respondent Wilfredo
Guerrero. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there
is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical
relationship of tenancy. Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element
of personal cultivation. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Molar
herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her immediate family or farm
household. Instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm work. Even her co-
petitioner testified that she did not actually till the land and that she merely paid
laborers to perform such task. ·47 Presentation herself admitted that she has the
property tenanted on pakyaw basis meaning that she hires different persons for
harrowing, for plowing, and for harvesting and that she did not actually till the land, but
merely pays others because she is a woman

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
HILADO VS. HON. ROLANDO CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 134742
Petitioners: Melchor Hilado, Cesar Aral, Adela Aral, Arturo Villarena, Tarcelo Mirano,
Roberto Peduhan, Antonio Solito, Manuel Caniendo, Felix Ortega, Antonio Ballentos,
Salvador Mirano, Vicente Onlayao, Federico Orlano, Rogelio Semillano, Salvador de
Guzman, Pacifico Talibutab, Nestor Belliran, Salustiano Belliran, Edgardo Cabra, and
Yolanda Lestino
Respondents: Hon. Rolando Chavez, Perpetual Help Development and Realty Corp.,
represented by the Chairman of the Board Julieta C. Salgado,

Facts:

Celso Nene Zayco was the owner of a large parcel of agricultural land with an area of
540,248 square meters, located in Kabankalan Poblacion, Negros Occidental, now
Kabankalan City. The property was identified as Lot No. 343 and was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133298, and portions thereof were occupied
and cultivated by tenants. Zayco mortgaged the property to the Pacific Banking
Corporation as security for a loan; however, the bank foreclosed the mortgage upon
Zaycos failure to pay his account. When the property was sold at public auction by the
sheriff, the bank was adjudged as the highest bidder. Zayco failed to redeem the
property, and the bank consolidated its title thereon; TCT No. 115264 was issued in its
favor on March 20, 1980.

On December 21, 1984, the bank sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado, the Chairman
of the Board of the respondent, Perpetual Help Development and Realty Corporation
(PHDRC). TCT No. 133298 was, thereafter, issued in favor of PHDRC on January 18,
1985. No liens or encumbrances whatsoever or any notice that the property had been
placed under the agrarian reform laws were annotated at the dorsal portion thereof.

On August 26, 1997, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Kabankalan City. According to the respondent,
the petitioners were not agricultural tenants under the agrarian reform laws because
(a) they entered the property without its consent and did not pay any consideration for
the use of the land they occupied; and (b) the property was, as resolved by the
Sangguniang Bayan under Resolution No. 96-39 in 1996, partly for light industry and
partly residential.

The court a quo applied the Rules of Summary Procedure and rendered judgment in
favor of the respondent. It ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they were
farmers-beneficiaries on the landholding and that based on Resolution No. 96-39 of the
Municipal Council, the said property had already been reclassified as part residential
and part industrial/commercial areas. The court a quo also ruled that thirteen (13) of
the petitioners occupied portions of the landholding only by tolerance of the respondent
and its predecessors, and failed to pay any amount as consideration for their occupancy
of the petitioners’ property. It rejected the petitioners’ contention that the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had exclusive original

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, ruling that the action was one for
unlawful detainer over which it had exclusive original jurisdiction.

The petitioners then filed on April 23, 1998 a petition with the Regional Trial Court
against the respondent asserting that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action of the respondent, it being an agrarian dispute between the
petitioners, as patentees, and the respondent; hence, the court a quo’s decision was null
and void. They contended that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(PARAD) had exclusive jurisdiction over the said action.

The RTC issued an Order declaring that the case involved only questions of law and not
of facts, and on May 26, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition on
the ground that the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the plaintiff
and over the persons of the defendants therein. The RTC also held that the petitioners
failed to file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and even participated in
the proceedings therein; hence, they were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the MTCC.

Instead of appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals by writ of error, the
petitioners filed their petition with the Supreme Court, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, assailing the decision of the RTC on questions of law.

Issue:

WON MTCC had exclusive Jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

While it is true that MTC, MCTC MTCC have exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful
detainer cases, they however, have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure
issued by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and
appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with
the DARAB after August 29, 1987.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and
other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative
of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein.In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc.
v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, the SC ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.

In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if
the answer with motion to dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are
considered, the DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and original jurisdiction over
the action of the respondent. The latter alleged, in its complaint, that seven (7) of the
petitioners were issued Emancipation Patents which were annotated at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. 133298, a copy of which is appended to the complaint.

The foregoing annotation confirmed the claim of the petitioners in their answer with
motion to dismiss that the entirety of the landholding had been placed under the
Operation Land Transfer program under P.D. No. 27 and that the petitioners to whom
the said patents were granted by the government became the owners of the property
covered by the said patents. In fact, TCT No. 133298 had been partially cancelled by
the said patents. Consequently, the petitioners who were the beneficiaries under the
Emancipation Patents are entitled to possess the property covered by said patents. It
must be underscored that the said patents were already annotated at the dorsal portion
of TCT No. 133298 long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC
against the petitioners.

The petitioners appended to their petition in the RTC a Certification of the Register
of Deeds indicating that thirteen (13) of the petitioners were issued transfer
certificates of title based on the Emancipation Patents filed with said office, made of
record in the Primary Entry Book on September 16, 20, and 22, 1998; and an LBP
certificate stating that eighteen (18) of the petitioners had made advance payments
for the portions of the landholding occupied by them. And yet, the RTC dismissed the
petition and affirmed the ruling of the MTCC that it had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint.

It is evident from the face of the complaint and the pleadings of the parties and the
appendages thereof that the issue of possession of the subject property was
inextricably interwoven with the issue of whether the Emancipation Patents issued by
the DAR to the petitioners were valid. Under the DAR Rules of Procedure, the DARAB
has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance and
cancellation of Emancipation Patents. Moreover, the respondent claimed possession over
the property based on TCT No. 133298, which had already been partially cancelled by
the Emancipation Patents and Torrens titles issued to the petitioners.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
DAR VS. SACI
G.R. No. 165547
Petitioner: DAR, as represented by its Secretary, Rene C. Villa
Respondents: Sarangani Agricultural Co., Inc., Acil Corp, Nicasio Alcantara and Tomas
Alcantara

Facts:

Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified from
agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning ordinance (MZO),
and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel,
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani. A portion of the area involving
376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARL commercial farms deferment
scheme.

On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an

application for land use conversion of various parcels of land with an aggregate area of
1,005 hectares covering lot No. 1-C, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 2, 39, 53, 806 and 807.
Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc.
(SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the application for land
use conversion filed by SACI. They alleged that its members were merely forced to
sign the waiver of rights. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use
Conversion Application of Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI.

The PLUTC, recommended the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares planted with bananas
and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable
for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with opposition
from SARBAI. SACI contended among others that 1) the banana plantations will be
transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to the
displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 2) at the time the
application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever issued by
DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular because the same
may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion;
and 3) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an
application for land use conversion.

DAR Secretary denied SACI's application for land use conversion. The Office of the
President dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, elevated the case with the Court
of Appeals on petition for review raising substantially the same issues. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition, the assailed Decision and Order of
the Office of the President, as well as the Orders of the DAR Secretary were reversed
and set aside insofar as the DAR directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed
with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998
Notice of Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform was directed
to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid area under the terms and conditions
as provided in pertinent guidelines of the department. As to the rest of the area applied

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
for conversion, action on which has been deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR
Region No. XI) is hereby DIRECTED to expedite the processing and evaluation of
petitioners' land use conversion application in accordance with the provisions of DAR
AO No. 7, Series of 1997, and DAR AO No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of the latter
issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its effectivity.
It also enjoined the DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf
from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners' lands under compulsory
acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657. Actions already taken in pursuance of
the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage under CARP are also nullified for DAR's failure
to observe due process therein.

Issues:

Whether or not the notice of coverage was illegal for failure of the DAR to observe
due process?
Whether or not DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and accompanying
ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference so as not to defeat the very
purpose of the Local Government Unit (LGU) concerned in reclassifying certain areas
to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuance to its mandate towards the general
welfare?
Whether or not DAR failed to take into consideration the basic provisions and principles
of law with special attention to the requirements or preconditions for land
classification/conversion and the basic mandate of the CARP?

Ruling:

On due process issue, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before

DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a
deferment period under the CARL or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15,
1998.

The process of acquisition of commercial farms by DAR is specifically provided under

Article III, Section 9 of A.O. 9, that in VOS and CA, the Order of Deferment
previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon the expiration of the deferment
period of the subject commercial farm, as the Notice of Coverage. It is unnecessary
for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to respondents in order to place the
properties in question under CARP coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that
due process was not duly observed by petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of
the application for conversion must be upheld.

On the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus
Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion. In connection
thereto, Sec 20 of R.A. 7160, [the Local Government Code of 1991], empowers the local
government units to reclassify agricultural lands.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A.
No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities
and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued
by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the
power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses.
With regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-agricultural uses
by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should
refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in
assessing land use conversion applications.

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated
and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are
present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR's
scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining
whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have
been complied with. This holds true in the present case where, because of the creation
of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its
provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local government has
reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus,
to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in
evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have already
been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses.

The creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was
effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the applicable
provisions of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the
reclassification of lands explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No.
6657."

The petition is partly granted insofar as the issue on due process is concerned. In
connection with this, the denial by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of
respondents' application for conversion with regard to the 154.622 [or 154.1622]
hectares, the deferment period of which has already expired, is affirmed; and the
Orders of the DAR, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the
distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of
Coverage, are reinstated.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
PBFAI VS. CA
G.R. No. 142359
Petitioner: Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc., et al.
Respondents: The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al

Facts:

Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 49363, which set aside and reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and reinstated the decision of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Trece Martirez City, which, in turn,
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for Peaceful Possession and
Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc.
(PBFAI).

Sometime in 1964, Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC, for brevity) bought a

parcel of land with an area of 753,610 square meters (75.3610 hectares) located at
Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles
(TCT) No. T- 91584 and T-91585. On September 20, 1977, the aforesaid titles were
cancelled by TCT No. T-62972 issued to and in the name of the LDC's successor, the
Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI). The property was subsequently subdivided into
two parcels of land, one of which was covered by TCT No. 116658, with an area of
365,753 square meters, and the other covered by TCT No. 116659 with an area of
387,853 square meters.

The LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and
industrial estate, where industrial sites and a low cost housing project inceptually called
the Tamanli Housing Project would be established. The property was subdivided into
728 residential lots per the consolidation subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands, each with an average area of 240 square meters.

Considering the parcel of land to be not covered by P.D. 27, it being untenanted and not
devoted to the production of palay and/or corn as reported by the Agrarian Reform
Team Leader concerned and favorably recommended for conversion by him and further,
by the Regional Director for Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, and considering further,
that the parcel of land subject hereof was found to be suitable for conversion to
residential subdivision by the Ministry of Local Government and Community
Development and considering finally, that the herein petitioner was issued a locational
clearance by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, the instant request of the
petitioner is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 3844, as amended,
and P.D. 815.

On March 14, 1980, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Cavite (Provincial Board of Cavite)
passed Resolution No. 40 declaring the midland areas composed of Carmona,
Dasmariñas, parts of Silang and Trece Martirez (where the subject property is
situated) and parts of Imus, as industrial areas.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
In 1987, the CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing
Project and contracted with E.M. Aragon Enterprises for the bulldozing of the
property. However, the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed on May 22, 1987
against the CAI in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite.

The civil case notwithstanding, the CAI decided to proceed with the third phase of its
project. It developed its eleven-hectare property into a residential property called the
Mandarin Homes. The CAI applied for and was granted a separate Order of Conversion
on January 2, 1990 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1991, the CAI
started selling the houses in its Mandarin Homes Project.

On October 27, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Barbara P. Tan issued a Temporary

Restraining Order enjoining the defendant landowner and any/all persons acting for and
in its behalf or under its authority to cease and desist from further bulldozing the
premises in question and committing acts of dispossession or tending to disturb the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the complainants of the landholdings in question.

On July 15, 1996, the DAR Region IV issued a Cease and Desist Order against the
respondents. The defendants, in a Letter dated July 16, 1996, informed the DAR,
Region IV Office, that the land subject of the cease and desist order was also subject
of DARAB Case No. 0285-95 and, as such, was under the jurisdiction of PARAD Barbara
Tan. The defendants, likewise, raised the issue of forum shopping, per our ruling
in Crisostomo v. SEC.

After due hearings, PARAD Barbara P. Tan rendered a Decision on August 8, 1996 in
DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 in favor of the defendants. The PARAD held that the
plaintiffs were bound by the order of dismissal of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13.
It declared that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 were the kins, siblings or
spouses of the complainants in the case before it. Moreover, the complainants had
executed deeds of quitclaim or waiver covering the portions of the property which they
purportedly occupied. Thus, the complainants had already waived their rights of
possession and cultivation over the portions of the property which they claimed to be
occupying.

On March 15, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the DARAB
and reinstating the decision of the PARAD. The CA ruled that under Section 10 of Rep.
Act No. 6657, all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act.

Aggrieved, the PBFAI filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
on April 11, 2000 before this Court. For its part, DARAB filed a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for the reversal of the decision in CA-GR SP No. 49363. The
same was docketed as G.R. No. 142980. On May 11, 2000, the DARAB manifested that
it was adopting as its own the petition for review filed by PBFAI. In our Resolution
dated June 28, 2000, we granted the motion of the DARAB and ordered the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 142980 and 142359.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
Issues:

Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)?

Whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the
petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent?

Whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the
private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit?

Whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar
to the complaint of the petitioners-members of the PBFAI?

Whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition
for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

Ruling:

The contention of the petitioners has no merit.

Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to
agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural
lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it
covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took
effect only on June 15, 1988.

When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella confirmed the reclassification of

the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land when he
approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for the
conversion of 35.80 hectares of the property covered by TCT No. 62972 into non-
agricultural land, he did so pursuant to his authority under Rep. Act No. 3844, as
amended, by P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 946.

It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the
property was not tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, and
that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the
Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and
executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property
subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB thereby reversed the
Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before,
and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-
one (21) years earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC,
the HLURB, the Ministry of Local Government and the National Planning Commission.
Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land
since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property
subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members. Consequently, the
DARAB should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject matter is

determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and the law extant at the time
of the commencement of the suit/complaint/petition. All proceedings before a tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
are null and void.

Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private
respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the
private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof
and for damages. Besides, when the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty-
seven (37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of
quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding
they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums
of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby
waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever
to still remain in possession of the same.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
ESTOLAS vs. MABALOT (DAVID)
G.R. No. 133706
Petitioner: Francisco Estolas
Respondent: Adolfo Mabalot

Facts:
On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent
over a 5,000 square meter lot located in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria,
Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent
passed on the subject land to the petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00
worth of rice. According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer, the DAR
officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance of an
Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in favor
of the petitioner. Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the
subject land and the case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On July 8, 1988, the DAR’s District Office submitted an investigation report finding
that respondent merely gave the subject land to petitioner as guarantee for the
payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent
and that the money loan be returned to petitioner.

Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the Order dated March
9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the
DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner
as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption
of the subject land.

CA ruled: The transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned
to respondent. Respondent had not effectively abandoned the property, because he
tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby making it
available to other qualified farmer-grantees?

Ruling:

There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be transferred to anyone
other than the Government. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired
pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall
not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to
the government by other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation.

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and
absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and (b)
an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is
not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another.
Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines abandonment or neglect
as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm
household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land
for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.” In
the present case, no such “willful failure” has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary,
respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land.

Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on

the ground that it was abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be
followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and that the subsequent
beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
June 26, 1998
Petitioner: Narciso Guiang
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Fernando T. Dulay et. al.

Facts:

The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife.
The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation
thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the
defect.

Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila
seeking employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty,
consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato,
respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property. Petitioners
filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the
parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed an
Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void.

Issue:

WON contract without the consent of wife is void

Ruling:

Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally
inexistent or absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondent’s consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last
element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.

Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for
trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured
an “amicable settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that
private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the
Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
SPRINGSUN VS. CAMERINO
G.R. 161029
Petitioner: Springsun Management Systems Management
Respondents: Oscar Camerino, Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco del Rosario
and Domingo Enriquez

Facts:

Three lots formerly registered in the name of Victoria homes, Inc,=. Covered by TCT
nos. S-6135, s-72244, and S-35855, with an are of 109,451sqm, 73,849sqm and
109,452sqm, respectively. That in the subsequent instances, VMI without notifying the
respondents sold the 3 lots amounting P11,545,000.00 to the petitioner without giving
prior notice to the respondents. The petition mortgaged to Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank was foreclosed because the petitioner failed to pay its loans and was
sold to BAnco Filipino being the highest bidder at public auction sale.

Issues:

WON the respondents are entitled to the redemption of the parcels of land in
litigation?

Who has the possession of the lots?

Ruling:

Respondents being an agricultural tenants of VMI has the right to redeem the same as
stated in the section 12 of R.A. No 3844 also known as the Code of Agrarian Reform of
the Philippines. Therefore, the petition is denied.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
TANPINGCO VS IAC
G.R. No. 76225
Petitioner: ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
Respondents: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.,

Facts:

Sometime in 1985, a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages

was filed by petitioner Espiridion Tanpingco against respondent Benedicto Horca, Sr.
with the Regional Trial Court. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is the
tenant-lessee in the respondent's parcel of agricultural Riceland under a leasehold
contract entered into sometime in April, 1976;

The respondent through his representative informed him to desist from working on the
subject land, having already donated the agricultural land and ordered the petitioner
to vacate the landholding. Respondent’s defense thru motion that he is not the real
party-in-interest having already donated the subject land to the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports, Region VIII, as a school site of the Buenavista Barangay High
School;

And that the donation not having in anyway benefited the respondent, no disturbance
compensation is due the petitioner since under Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform
Code as amended, disturbance compensation holds true only in cases wherein the lessor-
owner derives financial benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-
agricultural purposes. The trial court granted the respondent's Motion and
Intermediate Appellate Court rendered the decision finding no merit in the instant
appeal filed by petitioner.

Issues:

May a tenanted parcel of land be donated by the landowner so that it can be the site
of a public high school without securing the consent of the tenant-lessee?
Who bears the responsibility of paying disturbance compensation?
Is respondent a real party in interest considering he donated the land already with the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, Who stands now as a donee?

Ruling:

The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as
the party-defendant. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, as donee, became
the new lessor of the agricultural lessee by operation of law and is therefore the real
party-in-interest against whom the claim for disturbance compensation should be
directed.

Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of
disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in
question. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust
the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36
(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for
payment of disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real
party-in-interest. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance
compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position
to pay for. Therefore, the petition is denied

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
VICTORIO VS. CA
G.R. No. 110012
Petitioner: Ananstacio Victorio
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez

Facts:

Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio, the lessee, and Tomas Fernandez, the lessor, the
fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador
Fernandez, respectively entered into a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy.
Balangobon, Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired
in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but
adopting the terms and conditions of the original contract. When the second contract
expired, private respondent repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the
latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for ejectment was filed by respondent
against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract
is a civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question
and surrender peaceful possession thereof.

Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the
appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds
and holds that the agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease
and not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A. No.
3844, as amended. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and
thus entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee
whose right over the subject premises ceased upon the expiration of the contract of
lease?

Ruling:

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33
[1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals,
233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father
and private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a
"lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like
his father because "the spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was
no stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One
of the essential requisites for existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by the
landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this fact has been shown in this
case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for the
petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of
3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties
share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it becomes available, during
harvest time.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
DAEZ VS. CA
G.R. No. 133507
Petitioner: Eudosia Daez and/or Her heirs, Represented by Adriano D. Daez
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Macario Sorientes, Apolonia Mediana, Rogelio
Macatulad and Manuel Umali

Facts:

Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary
Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land
is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-
hectare limit provided by law.

The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents
stating that they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit
was merely issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were
issued to the respondents.

Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A.
No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the
subject riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares
each for failure to prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was
set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office
of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the
reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence,
this Appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject
landholdings, despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition for
exemption had long become final and executory

Ruling:

It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for

retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in
one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the
subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land
was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to

qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the
doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law
landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore
leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience
of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless
process.

The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner
from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of
the landowner's retained area.

MOHAMMAD G. NAGA
Juris doctor, 1st year
Agrarian Law