LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. DAVID VS. ARROYO

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat
or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way
to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo,
was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in
the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017
valid?

RULING: [The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were
NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing
t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now”and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant
to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires
that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.

2. GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA

9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal
Executive Agreements
FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
RULING: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

3. CHAVEZ VS. JBC – Legislative Power, Bicameralism

FACTS: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment
of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house
of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members
of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
for rectification of legal blunders.

ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It
is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms,
so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to
be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning
may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is
no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if
the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the
JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and
House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by
the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than
one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes
against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal
voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any
circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to
sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute
itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately
executory.

4. IMBONG VS. OCHOA

FACTS: Petition challenging RH Law

RULING: POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are separate.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades
the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer
to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the
other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of
a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of
life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts
to decide on based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO,
he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does
not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object -it is a living human being complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has
been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that the Court does
not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not
obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not
enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical
school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.
Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the
Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.

5. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS: On September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
20 days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
“barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031
repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating
the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD
recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim
NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare
without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power
to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct
16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature
hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no
standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state
of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power;
the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions
are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President
that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary
be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare
whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the legislature, can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time.

6. LA SUERTE CIGAR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Private respondent K-Line is a foreign shipping company doing biz in PH, its shipping agent is respondent
Smith, Bell & Co., Inc. It is a member of the Far East Conference, the body which fixes rates by
agreement of its member-shipowners. The conference is registered with the U.S. Federal Maritime
Commission.

Van Reekum Paper, Inc. entered into a contract of affreightment with the K-Line for the shipment of 468
rolls of container board liners from Georgia to Manila, consigned to herein petitioner La Suerte Cigar.
The contract of affreightment was embodied in Bill of Lading issued by the carrier to the shipper. The
expenses of loading and unloading were for the account of the consignee (La Suerte). The shipment was
packed in 12 container vans. At Tokyo, the cargo was transhipped on two vessels of the K-Line. Ten (10)
container vans were loaded on the 1st vessel, while two (2) were loaded on another vessel.

On June 11, the first vessel arrived at the port of Manila. La Suerte was notified in writing of the ship's
arrival, together with information that container demurrage would be charged unless the consignee
took delivery of the cargo within ten (10) days.

On June 21, the other vessel arrived and was discharged of its contents the next day. On the same day
the shipping agent Smith, Bell & Co. released the Delivery Permit for twelve (12) containers to the
broker upon payment of freight charges on the bill of lading. On June 22, La Suerte’s broker presented
the shipping documents to the Bureau of Customs. But the latter refused to act on them because the
manifest of the 1st vessel covered only 10 containers, whereas the bill of lading covered 12 containers.

The broker therefore sent back the manifest to Smith, Bell & Co with the request that the manifest be
amended. Smith, Bell & Co. refused on the ground that an amendment would violate the Tariff and
Customs Code relating to unmanifested cargo.

Later however, it agreed to add a footnote reading "Two container vans carried by other vessel to
complete the shipment of twelve containers under the bill of lading."

The manifest was approved for release only on July 3. On July 11, when the broker tried to secure the
release of the cargo, it was informed by Smith, Belle, & Co. that the free time for removing the
containers from the container yard had expired on June 26 for the first vessel, and on July 9, in the case
of the 2nd vessel, and that demurrage charges had begun to run a day after the free time, respectively.

On July 13, La Suerte paid P47,680 representing the total demurrage charges on all the containers, but it
was not able to obtain its goods. It was able to obtain only a partial release of the cargo because of the
breakdown of the arrastre's equipment at the container yard. On July 16, La Suerte sent a letter to
Smith, Bell & Co. requesting reconsideration of the demurrage charges, but was refused. Subsequently,
La Suerte refused to pay any more demurrage charges on the ground that the delay in the release of the
cargo was not due to its fault but to the breakdown of the equipment at the container yard.

La Suerte filed this suit in the RTC for specific performance to compel respondents to release 7 container
vans consigned to it free of charge.

In their answer, private respondents claimed that they were not free to waive these charges because
under the United States Shipping Act of 1916 it was unlawful for any common carrier engaged in
transportation involving the foreign commerce to charge or collect a greater or lesser compensation
that the rates and charges specified in its tariffs on file with the Federal Maritime Commission.

RTC dismissed petitioner's complaint. It cited the bill of lading which provided:

23. The ocean carrier shall have a lien on the goods, which shall survive delivery, for all freight, dead
freight, demurrage, damages, loss, charges, expenses and any other sums whatsoever payable or
chargeable to or for the account of the Merchant under this bill of lading . . . . RTC likewise invoked
clause 29 of the bill of lading which provided:

29. . . .The terms of the ocean carrier's applicable tariff, including tariffs covering intermodal
transportation on file with the Federal Maritime Commission and the Interstate Commission or any
other regulatory body which governs a portion of the carriage of goods, are incorporated herein.

18. The RTC held that the bill of lading was the contract between the parties and, therefore, petitioner
was liable for demurrage charges. It rejected petitioner's claim of force majeure in such a way that the
delay in the delivery of the containers was caused by the breaking down of the equipment of the
arrastre operator. The Court reasoned that still plaintiff has to pay the corresponding demurrage
charges. The possibility that the equipment would break down was not only foreseeable, but actually,
foreseen, and was not caso fortuito. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not La Suerte is liable for demurrage for delay in removing its cargo from the
containers - YES but only for the period July 3 - 13, 1979 with respect to ten containers and from July 10
- July 13, 1979, in respect of two other containers

HELD:

Payment of demurrage
La Suerte's contention is that the bill of lading does not provide for the payment of container
demurrage, as Clause 23 of the bill of lading only says "demurrage," i.e., damages for the detention of
vessels. Here there is no detention of vessels. It invokes a case where SC defined "demurrage" as
follows:

Demurrage, in its strict sense, is the compensation provided for in the contract of affreightment for the
detention of the vessel beyond the time agreed on for loading and unloading. Essentially, demurrage is
the claim for damages for failure to accept delivery… Whatever may be the merit of petitioner's
contention, the fact is that clause 29(a) also of the bill of lading, in relation to Rule 21 of the Far East
Conference Tariff , specifically provides for the payment by the consignee of demurrage for the
detention of containers and other equipment after the so-called "free time."

A bill of lading is both a receipt and a contract. As a contract, its terms and conditions are conclusive on
the parties, including the consignee. The enforcement of the rules of the Far East Conference and the
Federal Maritime Commission is in accordance with R.A. 1407 which declares that the Philippines, in
common with other maritime nations, recognizes the international character of shipping in foreign trade
and existing international practices in maritime transportation and that it is
part of the national policy to cooperate with other friendly nations in the maintenance and
improvement of such practices. Period of Demurrage With respect to the period of La Suerte’s liability,
La Suerte cannot be held liable for demurrage starting June 27 on the 10 containers because the delay in
obtaining release of the goods was not due to its fault.

The evidence shows that the Bureau of Customs refused to give an entry permit to petitioner because
the manifest issued by K-Line stated only 10 containers whereas the bill of lading also issued by the K-
Line showed there were 12 containers. For this reason, petitioner's broker had to see Smith, Bell & Co.
on June 22, but the latter did not immediately do something to correct the manifest. Smith, Bell & Co.
was asked to "amend" the manifest, but it refused to do so on the ground that this would violate the
law. It was only on June 29 that it thought of adding instead a footnote, by which time the "free time"
had already expired. Now June 29 was a Friday. Again it is probable the correct manifest was presented
to the Bureau of Customs only on Monday, July 2, and therefore it was only on July 3 that it was
approved.

It was therefore only from July 3 that La Suerte could have claimed its cargo and charged for any delay
With respect to the other two containers, demurrage was properly considered to have accrued on July
10 since the "free time" expired on July 9. The period of delay, however, for all the 12 containers must
be deemed to have stopped on July 13, because on this date petitioner paid P47,680.00. If it was not
able to get its cargo from the container vans, it was because of the breakdown of the shifter or cranes of
the arrastre service operation. It would be unjust to charge demurrage after July 13, since the delay in
emptying the containers was not due to the fault of La suerte In sum, we hold that petitioner can be
held liable for demurrage only for the period July 3-13, 1979 and that in accordance with the stipulation
in its bill of lading.

BICAMERALISM

1. CHAVEZ VS. JBC (SAME)

2. TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE
FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but
is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.

RULING: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law.
It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement
not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

3. GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President
of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the
2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the
questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing

that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

RULING: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even
provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with
Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure
put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is
all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
 messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases.
The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure."

EXTENT AND LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. IN RE:CUNANAN
FACTS: Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING: Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down
for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also
rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.

2. BELGICA VS. OCHOA

FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an

appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to
bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known
as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended
portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became
involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called
“Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or “hard projects” but
also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could
identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to “soft projects”
such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first
time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget
and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the
CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how,
where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i)
Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members
of Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF
required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel
benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen
by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment
of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and
release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as
the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
(“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed
and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

PORK BARREL MISUSE

 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone
into a dummy NGO.

ISSUE/S

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation
of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a)separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of
legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their
utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury
to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not
actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority
to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering
that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public
interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the
bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual
occurrence.

(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has
the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because
the Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the area
of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised
by individual members of Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

 (a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs
to the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in
nature. They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated

 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them
determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine.

(c) Checks and balances

 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or
the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since
it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally mandated to―assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated
by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a
Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from
any and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be
less thanP150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the
said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
 3. ABAKADA GURO PARTY-LIST VS. PURISIMA

FACTS:

Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees
of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the
President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s
implementing rules.

ISSUE:

Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?

HELD:

YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR.

That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries”
is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees
who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated
since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary
function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC.

However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the
IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

4. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PH VS. COMELEC

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush”
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING: We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not
a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any
statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of
RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic
aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

5. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for
the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
RULING: [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1 YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days
and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with
the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in
the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold
over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective
terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is
viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
 Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot
make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To
be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests
on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to
supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the
exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two
years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or
 naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political
units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides
only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on
its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Statutes and their Enactment

1. Title of Bills
a) Lidasan v. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter
for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

RULING: YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill
is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill
1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices
if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is
not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" —
projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the
province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were
actually affected by the bill.

b) PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)

FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act No. 3836
insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators
and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from
disbursing funds therefor.

According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the

Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes
“selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12)
years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case,
cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not
constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said
Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and,
therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

RULING: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence
in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos.

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress,
the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as
follows:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.

In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly
to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”.

“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation
for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.”

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.

RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision
clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby
declared unconstitutional by the SC.

c) BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477
FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or thePanganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20%
share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to

Party-List Representatives

Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of
the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections
provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately
ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country
shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.

d) Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Henry Giron assail the constitutionality of Section 12 (substitution of Candidates) and
Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of RA 9006 – Fair Election Act. Violates one-subject-one-title rule. Sec. 12
refers to treatment of votes cast for substituted candidates after official ballots have been printed. Sec
14 repeal of Sec. 67 (candidates holding elective office) of BP 881 – Omnibus Election Code – ipso facto
resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their corresponding certificate of candidacy
for an office other than which they are holding in a permanent capacity.

ISSUE: WN violates one-subject-one-title rule

RULING: No violation of one-subject-one-title rule. Well-settled is the rule that courts are to adopt a
liberal interpretation in favor of constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted
a valid, just and sensible law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a
law, has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, unequivocal breach of the Constitution, otherwise,
the petition must fail. This the petitioners failed to prove.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and title of statutes should not be narrowly
construed as to cripple or impeded the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object.
Mere details need not be set forth and the title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action, and study of
the legislators and the public.
2. Formalities
a) Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate (SAME)
b) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (SAME)
c) PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in
the discharge of their own public functions.

3. Approval of Bills
a) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486

FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel
9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of
Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of
CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his
department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by
the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation
to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-
1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly
in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there
are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot
claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the
Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation
or item in the appropriation bill.

Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation
bill, therefore, remains.

b) Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, (SAME)

4. Evidence of Due Enactment of Laws

a) Enrolled Bill Theory
i. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, L-1223, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill
by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As
a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

RULING: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and
an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis
of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not
do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that
duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

ii. Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28 1963, 7
SCRA 347
FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid
the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it
issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor
General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate
and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par
18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

xxx xxx xxx

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.

Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be
construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.

RULING: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.

The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do
not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be
conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of
“urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.

iii. Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968

FACTS: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years
but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman
and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the
designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified
other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which
Section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of
a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a
city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as
officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the
insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.”Morales went on to
support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to
him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs
of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals,
to look searchingly into the matter.

RULING: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to
the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the
SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process.

The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by
a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is
not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is
that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

iv. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268
FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House

RULING: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot beraised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

b) Journal Entry Rule

i. United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916)
FACTS: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopezarrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were
delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the
customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any
listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He
said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special
session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381
should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

RULING: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to
inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’
witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the
legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed
upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

ii. Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714
FACTS: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an
order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).

Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas
et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the
SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been
enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it
was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was
referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made
significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back
to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong
version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended
by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the
President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.

B. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

C. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

D. HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but
only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures
therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made
into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.