Psychological Bulletin Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1999, Vol. 125, No. 3, 367-383 0033-2909/99/S3.00

Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis

James P. Byrnes, David C. Miller, and William D. Schafer
University of Maryland

The authors conducted a meta-analysis of 150 studies in which the risk-taking tendencies of male and
female participants were compared. Studies were coded with respect to type of task (e.g., self-reported
behaviors vs. observed behaviors), task content (e.g., smoking vs. sex), and 5 age levels. Results showed
that the average effects for 14 out of 16 types of risk taking were significantly larger than 0 (indicating
greater risk taking in male participants) and that nearly half of the effects were greater than .20. However,
certain topics (e.g., intellectual risk taking and physical skills) produced larger gender differences than
others (e.g., smoking). In addition, the authors found that (a) there were significant shifts in the size of
the gender gap between successive age levels, and (b) the gender gap seems to be growing smaller over
time. The discussion focuses on the meaning of the results for theories of risk taking and the need for
additional studies to clarify age trends.

Risk taking is an important form of human behavior that has
been the subject of numerous investigations, scholarly analyses,
and policy debates (Byrnes, 1998; Slovic, Lichtenstein, &
Fischhoff, 1988). To a large extent, most researchers point to the
association between risky behaviors (e.g., unprotected sex) and
serious health problems (e.g., sexually transmitted diseases) when
they provide reasons for studying the former (e.g., DiClemente,
Hansen, & Ponton, 1995). However, others have also argued that
risk taking should be studied because of its relevance to three
important issues in the field of psychology: the adaptiveness of
human behavior (Byrnes, 1998; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1993), the rationality of human thought (Baron, 1994), and the
relative importance of genes versus the environment in determin-
ing the phenotypic expression of traits (Wilson & Daly, 1985;
Zuckerman, 1991). In essence, then, researchers have examined
risk taking for a variety of reasons. Correspondingly, the literature
on risk taking is both vast and diverse.
In the present article, we review that portion of the literature that
is concerned with gender differences. From a scientific standpoint,
gender differences are of interest because they can often precipi-
tate important theoretical advances in a particular area of inquiry
(Halpern, 1992). For example, the existence of gender differences
on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) prompted many researchers
to search for possible causes of this difference. One of the most
important outcomes of this line of work was the finding that much
of the variance in SAT scores can be explained by course work and
math knowledge (e.g., Byrnes & Takahira, 1993). We hoped to
precipitate similar advances in the field of risk taking.
Our review is organized as follows. In the first section of this
article, we discuss issues related to the definition and assessment
of risk taking to provide an interpretive context for the rest of the
James P. Byrnes and David C. Miller, Department of Human Develop-
ment, University of Maryland; William D. Schafer, Department of Educa-
tional Measurement and Statistics, University of Maryland.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to James P.
Byrnes, Department of Human Development, University of Maryland,
College Park, Maryland 20742. Electronic mail may be sent to
JB119@umail.umd.edu.
article. In the second section, we consider the relevance of gender
differences for various theories of risk taking. In the third and
fourth sections, we describe our meta-analytic methodology and
the results of this analysis. In the final section, we interpret the
findings and draw conclusions.
The Nature of Risk Taking: Definition and
Assessment Issues
Researchers clearly differ in the definitions they provide for risk
taking, but most refer to constructs such as goals, values, options,
and outcomes (e.g., Byrnes, 1998; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992;
Lopes, 1987; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Goals and
values determine the kinds of outcomes that are pursued by an
individual (e.g., good grades in school vs. being popular with
friends) and also determine the kinds of options that are considered
(e.g., studying vs. socializing). The act of implementing a goal-
directed option qualifies as an instance of risk taking whenever
two things are true: (a) the behavior in question could lead to more
than one outcome and (b) some of these outcomes are undesirable
or even dangerous (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992). In essence,
then, risk taking involves the implementation of options that could
lead to negative consequences.
This somewhat standard definition implies that a wide range of
behaviors would qualify as instances of risk taking (e.g., telling a
joke, raising one's hand in class, smoking, having unprotected sex,
etc.). To some researchers (including the present authors), the
breadth of this definition is desirable because it is consistent with
their belief in the pervasiveness of risk taking in daily life. In
addition, it gives them the latitude to study risk taking in younger
age groups (e.g., one cannot ask a minor to consume alcohol). To
others, however, the definition may seem to be too broad because
it lumps fairly innocuous behaviors (e.g., spinning a roulette wheel
to win candy) together with rather dangerous ones (e.g., drunk
driving). From an assessment standpoint, this split among re-
searchers is problematic because it raises questions about the
validity of certain measures of risk taking.
One way to reconcile the two approaches is to suggest that the
category of risky behaviors is not an equivalence class (Byrnes,

367
368 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
1998). In an equivalence class, any two members of the class are
equally good examples of the category (e.g., the numbers 3 and
217 in the case of numbers). Clearly, actions that are likely to lead
to distressing outcomes (e.g., reckless driving, unprotected sex) are
generally thought to be more representative of the category of
risky behaviors than actions that are significantly less likely to
produce such outcomes (e.g., driving within the speed limit, pro-
tected sex) or actions in which seemingly trivial outcomes are at
stake (e.g., voicing one's opinion, not carrying an umbrella on a
cloudy day). Thus, one could say that researchers who prefer a
more restrictive definition would admit only the prototypical cases
into the category of risky behaviors. In contrast, those who prefer
the less restrictive definition would admit both prototypical and
less prototypical cases into the category.
A second issue that would affect a researcher's judgment of
validity is the distinction between an individual's subjective per-
ception of risk and the perceptions of the larger community (Furby
& Beyth-Marom, 1992). Consider the case of an unmarried ado-
lescent girl who values pregnancy. Although many observers
would argue that she has taken a risk when she engages in
unprotected sex, the teenager might argue that she has not. Con-
versely, consider the case of an 8-year-old girl who does not want
to lose a small amount of candy that she has won on early trials of
a risk-taking game. Losing candy may seem trivial to an adult, but
it may be very undesirable to the child. As a result, the task would
be subjectively risky to the child but not very risky to adult
onlookers. Some researchers have argued that subjective percep-
tions of risk constitute the minimum standard to be met in any
study of risk taking. Others, however, seem to require higher and
more objective standards (Slovic, 1964). Either way, the subjec-
tivity criterion implies that people take risks only when they are
aware of the fact that they are taking risks. However, there are
many behaviors that seem to qualify as prototypical instances of
risk taking that are performed out of naivete (e.g., unprotected sex
in uninformed teens; a young child playing in the street; etc.).
Thus, we agree with Furby and Beyth-Marom's (1992) suggestion
that behaviors can be appropriately define'd as risky even when the
person performing these actions is unaware of possible negative
consequences.
A third factor that affects judgments of validity is the relation
between a person's skill level and risk taking. By definition, a
highly skilled individual fails less often than an unskilled peer on
tasks relevant to that skill. As a result, skill-related actions might
only be risky for the latter. This analysis implies, therefore, that a
researcher could not use the tendency to engage in skilled behav-
iors as the only evidence of risk taking in a particular study (Miller
& Byrnes, 1997). As we indicate later, however, many researchers
have done so.
A fourth and final issue pertains to the contextualization of
behaviors. Clearly, there are ways to perform an action and situ-
ations in which it is performed that make it more or less risky. For
example, drinking a small amount of alcohol is less risky than
drinking a large amount of alcohol. Similarly, having unprotected
sex with a stranger is riskier than having unprotected sex with a
spouse who has been tested for sexually transmitted diseases.
Hence, responding "yes" to decontextualized questions regarding
alcohol consumption and unprotected sex may or may not indicate
risk taking.
Collectively, these four issues illustrate the problems associated
with assessing someone's risk taking that have to be considered
when the results of a study are interpreted. Note that these prob-
lems should not preclude the possibility of conducting a meaning-
ful review because the standard of unquestioned validity is impos-
sible to be fully met. That is, all measures of competence have
been questioned at one time or another (e.g., IQ tests, achievement
tests, etc.). Questions of validity do, however, affect the degree of
concern generated by a particular set of findings. For obvious
reasons, gender differences on a valid and widely accepted mea-
sure would tend to generate more concern than gender differences
on an ambiguous or controversial measure. We return to the issues
of measurement and validity when we describe our inclusion
criteria and discuss the implications of our results.
For now, it is important to point out an important implication of
the foregoing analysis: Risk taking can either be adaptive or
maladaptive. It is maladaptive whenever the benefits of some
activity are far less likely to occur than the potential hazards. It is
adaptive whenever the converse is true. In other words, people do
not successfully adapt to their surroundings by avoiding all the
risks they face. In fact, it would be impossible to do so. Instead,
they successfully adapt by systematically pursuing certain risks
while avoiding others (Baumrind, 1991; Byrnes, 1998). The study
of gender differences, then, has the potential for demonstrating
greater or lesser degrees of environmental adaptation in women
versus men.
Theories and Expectations Regarding Gender Differences
in Risk Taking
Theories are often judged to be adequate to the extent that they
can explain similarities or differences in performance among var-
ious groups (e.g., male vs. female participants, younger vs. older
students, experimental vs. control groups). All things being equal,
a theory that can explain gender differences is more adequate than
a theory that cannot. Our reading of the risk-taking literature
reveals that researchers have not been particularly interested in
explaining or uncovering gender differences using the most widely
cited theoretical models of risk taking. Instead, they have tended to
examine gender differences in an ancillary manner (presumably
because it would prove interesting to the reader). Nevertheless, it
is useful to briefly consider the types of results that would be more
or less consistent with particular types of theoretical approaches.
At a general level, theories of risk taking fall into one of three
categories (Lopes, 1987). The first category consists of theories
that are equipped to explain the differences between people who
regularly take risks and people who regularly avoid risks. Two
examples of such theories are Zuckerman's (1991) account of the
sensation-seeking personality and the "Risk as Value" hypothesis
as described by Kelling, Zirkes, and Myerowitz (1976). Here, a
single factor such as (a) a naturally lower level of arousal in men
or (b) a socially instilled belief that risk taking is a highly valued
masculine tendency motivates high levels of risk taking across
contexts in men. In their simplest form, such theories predict that
the size and direction of gender differences would not vary by
context (i.e., men would always take more risks than women and
the gap would remain relatively the same across contexts). More-
over, one need not be concerned about the type of task used
because most risk-taking tasks would probably tap into this ten-
 RISK TAKING
dency. In more elaborated forms of these theories, however, a
greater degree of context specificity might be predicted (e.g., see
Arnett's model below).
The second category consists of theories that are equipped to
explain the differences between situations that promote risk taking
(in most people) and situations that promote risk aversion. An
example would be Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect the-
ory. Prospect theory was designed, in part, to account for the fact
that most people seem to prefer a risky option over a sure thing
when the choices are framed in a positive way (e.g., the number of
people who would be saved by a medication), but they shift their
preferences when the same choices are framed in a negative way
(e.g., the number who would not be saved). There are, of course,
participants in each study of framing who fail to demonstrate this
shift, but prospect theory was not designed to account for such
individual differences (Lopes, 1987). As such, situation-based
theories would have to predict a constant effect size of d = 0
across contexts (i.e., no gender differences).
The third category consists of theories that are equipped to
explain differences among people and situations that promote risk
taking. In other words, these models could explain why only
certain people take risks in certain situations. To illustrate, con-
sider multifactor models that include expectations and values in
their formulation. According to these models, people take risks in
a particular context because they (a) believe they will be successful
and (b) value success in that context (Atkinson, 1983; Byrnes,
1998; Irwin & Millstein, 1991; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). As
people move from one context to another, however, they generally
hold different expectations and values. As a result, these models
suggest that gender differences would vary by context and that
some contexts would promote greater risk taking on the part of
women. For example, if there was reason to believe that women
might feel more confident in a particular situation than men, and it
mattered more to women to be successful in that situation (e.g.,
volunteering to coordinate a crucial fundraiser for their children's
school), expectancy-value models would support an expectation of
greater risk taking on the part of women.
Other multifactor models also support the idea of context spec-
ificity, but for other reasons. For example, Arnett's (1992) theory
of broad and narrow socialization suggests that the level of risk
taking manifested by an individual depends on two factors: (a)
endogenous tendencies such as sensation seeking and (b) the
restrictions placed on risk taking by the individual's culture (e.g.,
laws, norms, parenting practices, etc.). Whereas cultural restric-
tions dampen a sensation seeker's tendency to take risks, these
restrictions do not entirely eliminate the tendency. As such, Ar-
nett's model leads to the prediction that men would take more risks
than women in most cultures (because sensation seeking is found
more often in men than women). However, the size of the gender
gap would vary as a function of a culture's restrictiveness and the
norms for appropriate gender role behaviors. Our reading of Ar-
nett's model is that it would not necessarily predict negative effect
sizes (i.e., more risk taking in women, using the conventional
approach of subtracting the female mean from the male mean), but
given the fact that some sensation seekers are women, negative
effect sizes would not be out of the question.
In the same way, Wilson and Daly's (1985) sociobiological
model suggests that gender differences would not be found for all
contexts, but that it would be men who take more risks when
369
gender differences do occur. These authors have argued that risk
taking is an "attribute of the masculine psychology" (p. 66) that
evolved in response to the competitive demands of primate soci-
eties. According to this view, competition forces dominant indi-
viduals to engage in risk taking to gain their positions of power.
The greater the spread in rewards between winners and losers, the
greater the incentive to take risks. This account suggests that men
would only be more likely to take risks than women when a
context involves both competition and a large spread in rewards
between winners and losers. For all other contexts, the gap would
presumably be smaller (though Wilson and Daly do not explicitly
make this claim). Moreover, their account provides little room for
the possibility of greater risk taking on the part of women. One
could, however, construct a different sociobiological model to
explain risky behaviors that are clearly more common in women
than in men (e.g., binge eating). So, the existence of negative effect
sizes is more of a problem for Wilson and Daly's model than for
sociobiological models generally.
In sum, then, there are three primary patterns of gender differ-
ences that would be more or less consistent with the claims of
particular theories of risk taking. For Pattern 1, effect sizes would
show a constant gender difference across contexts favoring men.
Pattern 2 would consist of varying gender differences across
contexts, but the distribution of effect sizes would include only
zeros and positive values (i.e., it would be men who take more
risks when gender differences occur). Pattern 3 would be a distri-
bution of effect sizes that includes a full range of values (i.e.,
negatives, positives, and zeros).
In addition to considering the issue of context specificity, we
also considered whether the size of the gender gap would change
with age. In so doing, we hoped to narrow the field of plausible
theories even further (beyond that suggested by the findings for
context specificity). Note that relatively few theories of risk taking
could explain a pattern in which the gender gap increases mono-
tonically from d = 0 in young children to d = .40 in young adults.
Similarly, relatively few theories could explain a pattern in which
the gender gap increases between childhood and adolescence (e.g.,
d = 0 to d = .20), and then decreases between adolescence and
adulthood (e.g., d = .20 to d = 0). In the final section of this
article, we describe the extent to which existing theories of risk
taking are consistent with the age trends that we reveal. For now,
we move on to a consideration of our meta-analytic techniques.
Method
Overview
A total of 150 studies were retrieved in five steps. The first step involved
an extensive computerized search of the PsycLIT and PsycINFO databases
to find empirical studies in which the researchers examined gender differ-
ences in risk taking. Within this search, we crossed the keywords risk and
risk taking with the keywords gender differences and sex differences using
the Boolean operator AND. Such an approach retrieved all articles pub-
lished between 1967 and 1994 that contained both of the crossed keywords
somewhere in the title, abstract, or subject identifier list. However, only 49
of these articles involved a direct comparison of men and women (or boys
and girls) on some risk-taking measure. The rest were of four types: (a)
policy-oriented commentaries, (b) studies in which men and women were
analyzed separately (no means were reported), (c) studies of risk percep-
tions, and (d) articles on the risk factors for various diseases (e.g., heart
370 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
disease). Note that we included all empirical articles that were character-
ized by their authors as involving risk taking (using either the broad or
narrow definitions that we discussed earlier). We did so for two reasons.
First, we favor the broad definition because we believe that risk taking
extends beyond the class of prototypical behaviors. Second, including both
types of risk taking allowed us to provide useful information to researchers
in both camps (e.g., average effect sizes for both prototypical and less
prototypical types of risk taking).
During the second step, we conducted another search on an updated and
greatly expanded version of PsycINFO that became available to us shortly
after the first step had been completed. The new version used a relevance-
based approach that can be used instead of a Boolean approach. In the
relevance-based approach, articles that contained both keywords (e.g., risk
taking and gender differences) were given higher ranks than articles that
contained only one of these terms. However, articles with only one term
(e.g., just risk taking) were not excluded as they would be in a Boolean
approach. Two new searches were conducted using the relevance method:
one in which the terms risk taking and gender differences were crossed, and
another in which the terms risk taking and sex differences were crossed.
Each of these searches generated a rank-ordered list of 250 articles pub-
lished between 1967 and 1997 that contained the original 49 articles plus
many others (note: the system limited searches to 250 of the highest ranked
articles). The titles and abstracts of all 500 of these articles were scanned
to limit the selection to just those that were empirical studies. This process
yielded 66 articles that mentioned gender comparisons in their abstracts
and another 125 studies on risk taking that failed to indicate whether
gender comparisons were made. All 191 of these articles were retrieved
and read in the event that the latter examined gender differences but failed
to mention this fact in their abstracts. It turned out, however, that only the
articles that mentioned gender differences in the abstract actually made
gender comparisons.
In the third step, we conducted a search using the names of the authors
who were found during the first two steps. This was done because we found
that PsycINFO occasionally did not always place similar articles in the
same category. In addition, we searched the MEDLINE system to discover
epidemiological and other studies not indexed by PsycINFO. In each case,
the searches included articles that had dates ranging from 1967 to 1997.
The net result of the second and third steps was that 78 additional articles
were added to the 49 that were identified in the first step.
During the fourth step, we entered the terms associated with specific
types of risky choices such as smoking, driving, and framing effects. In the
case of framing, we located 103 studies conducted after 1981 (when
Kahneman and Tversky originally identified the phenomenon). Although
none of these studies mentioned gender differences in their abstracts, we
retrieved them anyway and found that 8 had conducted analyses of gender
differences. The effects from the latter 8 studies were added to the data-
base. Our search of other specific types of risk taking failed to locate
additional studies that involved gender comparisons.
In the fifth and final step, we conducted a computerized search of
Dissertation Abstracts. This system, which only allows a Boolean ap-
proach of dissertations conducted after 1979, generated a list of 23 disser-
tations that examined gender differences in risk taking. All 23 were
requested through the interlibrary loan services of our university, but
only 15 were sent by their home institutions. Recall that a Boolean search
only retrieves studies in which all of the requested terms are present in the
titles or abstracts. Given our primary interest in issues of context specificity
and age trends, we did not request additional dissertations to check for the
possibility that some authors analyzed gender differences but failed to
indicate this fact in their abstracts. We leave that task to the interested
reader. For now, it is sufficient to note that the means that we report for
dissertations could be somewhat biased (i.e., probably too high given our
experience with journal articles in which the nonreported comparisons
tended to yield very small effects).
In total, then, we ended up analyzing data from 150 (40%) of the 374
publications that we retrieved and read. The remaining 224 (60%) publi-
cations investigated risk taking but did not provide data on gender differ-
ences. There were 135 published studies and 15 dissertations in the final
database. Collectively, these studies comprised a total N of over 100,000
participants.
In most studies, more than one gender comparison was made. As a
result, we were able to compute a total of 322 effects (M = 2.15 effects per
study). When a large number of comparisons were made in a given study
and all comparisons involved the same content (e.g., gender differences in
smoking rates for 22 countries), a single average effect size was computed
for that study. Effects were not averaged in a study when they pertained to
different contents (e.g., smoking rates and drinking rates). For each gender
comparison, we primarily computed Cohen's d in one of two ways: (a)
directly from the means and standard deviations if they were provided or
(b) indirectly, by converting parametric statistics (e.g., F or t) or chi-square
statistics using standard conversion formulas (e.g., Rosenthal, 1994). Once
computed, each d was corrected for bias and weighted according to the
inverse of its variance using the approaches described by Hedges (1994)
and Hedges and OUan (1985). In 9% of the cases (i.e., 30 effects), d had
to be estimated from a probability level (e.g., p < .05) or assigned to a
value of zero if the authors merely reported that no significant difference
was observed.
Coding Studies According to Task and Content
After the studies were retrieved, they were coded primarily according to
the type of task used by the researchers. Three types of tasks were
identified. In the first type (hypothetical choice), participants were asked to
choose between two imaginary options (e.g., two fictitious gambles) or
choose a level of risk that they would tolerate in a hypothetical situation
(e.g., take a risk if they were 70% sure that things would work out).
Participants were not asked in these studies if they ever engaged in the
behaviors described. In addition, they did not have to experience the
consequences of their choices. Hypothetical choice tasks (coded 1) were
used in 23% of the published studies (n = 31) and 53% of the dissertations
(n = 8).
In the second type (self-reported behavior), participants reported how
often they engaged in various risky behaviors (e.g., used drugs or had
unprotected sex). A sample item would be, "In the last 12 months, have you
had sex without a condom?" Hence, whereas hypothetical choice tasks
involved questions of the form "How would you behave in this situation?"
self-report tasks involved questions of the form "How have you behaved in
this situation?" Self-report tasks (coded 2) were used in 45% of the
published studies (n = 61) and 33% of the dissertations (n = 5).
In the third type (observed behavior), participants were observed by
researchers as they engaged in various activities that were judged by the
researchers to have some degree of risk (e.g., making a left turn in front of
oncoming traffic). Observed behavior tasks (coded 3) were used in 33% of
the published studies (n = 45) and 20% of the dissertations (n = 3).
After studies were coded with respect to the type of task used, they were
next coded according to the content of the task. We created a content
category within a particular task category if at least 10% of the effect sizes
pertained to that content. Contents that were composed of less than 10% of
the effect sizes for a given task were placed into an other category. For
hypothetical choice studies, three content categories emerged: choice di-
lemma tasks (Kogan & Wallach, 1964), framing tasks (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1981), and other. Choice dilemma tasks (coded 1) consist of
presenting participants with 12 scenarios (e.g., a man who is thinking about
a risky medical procedure; a woman thinking about her career options;
etc.). After being given a certain amount of information about several
options, participants are asked to state the minimum level of uncertainty
that they would accept before the main character should choose the riskiest
option. An example item (from Kogan & Wallach, 1964, p. 257) is the
following:
 RISK TAKING
Mr. B., a 45-year-old accountant, has recently been informed by his
physician that he has developed a severe heart ailment. The disease
would be sufficiently serious to force Mr. B. to change many of his
strongest life habits—reducing his work load, drastically changing his
diet, giving up his favorite leisure-time pursuits. The physician sug-
gests that a delicate medical operation could be attempted which, if
successful, would completely relieve the heart condition. But its
success could not be assured, and in fact, the operation might prove
fatal. Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that the operation will prove successful. Please
check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable for
the operation to be performed:
Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not have the
operation no matter what the probability.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
On this task, any respondent who consistently selects low probabilities
across the 12 scenarios (e.g., 3 in 10) is said to have a preference for risk
taking. In contrast, the tendency to choose the highest odds of success
(e.g., 9 in 10) across the scenarios is taken to indicate a high level of
conservatism. In a sense, then, the 12-item questionnaire that contains these
scenarios (i.e., the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire or CDQ) is comparable
to personality questionnaires in its assumption that risk taking is a trait-like
disposition that would be expressed across many contexts. The CDQ was
used in 18 (46%) of the studies that used a hypothetical choice task.
On framing tasks (coded 2), participants are also presented with a
hypothetical scenario such as the following from Tversky and Kahneman
(1981):
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the program are as
follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If
Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 will be saved
and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two
programs do you favor? (p. 453)
Half of the participants received the wording above, and half received a
version in which the first three lines were the same but the two options
were stated as follows: "If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If
Program D is adopted there is a 1/3 probability that nobody would die, and
a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die." Note that Option A is identical
to Option C, and Option B is identical to Option D. Within each of the two
frames, there is a "sure thing" (e.g., Program A) contrasted with a risky
option (e.g., Program B). The primary indication of risk taking on framing
tasks is the selection of the risky option. The tendency to choose the sure
thing in the first frame is so pervasive that it has been taken to indicate a
basic aversion to risk taking in adults (Lopes, 1987). Framing tasks were
used in 28% of the hypothetical choice studies.
The other category (coded 3) for hypothetical choice tasks contained the
remaining 26% of measures that did not fit either the choice dilemma
category or framing category. In all cases, participants were presented with
a scenario and shown two or more ways one could behave in that scenario.
Some of the scenarios included (a) making friends in a new neighborhood
(Miller & Byrnes, 1997), (b) walking home from the woods (Morrongiello
& Bradley, 1997), (c) solving math problems (Foersterling, 1980), (d)
donating an organ to a sick child (Lampert & Yassour, 1992), and (d)
planting different types of crops (Wilson, Daly, Gordon, & Pratt, 1996).
371
The riskiest options always entailed the possibility of negative conse-
quences (e.g., being rejected in the case of making new friends, etc.)
For self-reported behavior studies, five content categories emerged:
drinking and drugs (coded 1), driving (coded 2), sexual activities (coded 3),
smoking (coded 4), and other (coded 5). As noted earlier, risk taking was
assessed by asking participants if they ever (or frequently) engaged in such
behaviors. Example items for the first four categories included (a) "Have
you ever smoked marijuana?"; (b) "Have you ever driven 20 miles per hour
above the speed limit?"; (c) "Have you ever had sex without a condom?";
and (d) "Do you currently smoke cigarettes?" The other category included
items that referred to behaviors such as vandalism, boating in a storm, and
hitchhiking. Too few items focused on the latter topics to warrant the
creation of additional categories. Some studies examined a single type of
behavior (e.g., use of condoms), whereas others examined a number of the
aforementioned behaviors using multi-item instruments that have under-
gone reliability and validity assessments (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck's, 1977,
Personality Questionnaire). In general, then, the self-reported-behavior
category mainly refers to behaviors that are either physically dangerous or
illegal.
For observed behavior studies, eight content categories emerged. The
category of informed guessing (coded 1) included tasks in which partici-
pants could earn points or money for correct guesses but could also lose
points or money for incorrect guesses (e.g., standardized achievement tests
that have penalties for incorrect guesses). The category of physical activity
(coded 2) included behaviors such as the following: climbing a steep
embankment, playing in the street, trying out gymnastics equipment (e.g.,
a balance beam), and taking a ride on an animal (e.g., a donkey). In
essence, the actions were risky because of the possibility of physical harm.
The category of driving (coded 3) included actions such as making a left
turn in front of oncoming traffic, gliding through a stop sign rather than
coming to a complete stop, and engaging in simulated driving tasks on a
computer. For the real-life driving behaviors, the risks include damage to
one's vehicle, physical injury, and traffic tickets. The category of physical
skills (coded 4) included such things as playing shuffleboard and tossing
rings onto pegs. In most cases, options differed in terms of their probability
of success (i.e., high, medium, and low) and the number of points that
could be won or lost (i.e., winning more points for success but losing more
points for failure on high-risk options). The category of gambling tasks
(coded 5) was similar to the category of physical skills in terms of the
varied risk/reward options. However, gambling tasks differed in the sense
that a person's skill level had no bearing on the likelihood of success.
Examples included spinning a roulette wheel and pulling cards from a
deck. The category of risky experiments (coded 6) involved an individual's
willingness to participate in an experiment that was described to them as
involving the chance of physical or psychological harm. The category of
intellectual risk taking (coded 7) involved tasks that required mathematical
or spatial reasoning skills. Participants were presented with items of
various levels of difficulty and asked to indicate their preferred level of
choice. Unlike the tasks in the informed-guessing category, points were not
subtracted for incorrect answers on the intellectual tasks. Thus, participants
were mainly concerned about getting stuck on items or exposing their lack
of skill when they fail. The final category of other (coded 8) included the
following behaviors that did not fit the other seven categories: entrepre-
neurial activities in a simulated classroom economy, lying about finding
someone else's money, cheating during a computerized game, playing a
game alone instead of teaming up, and administering an electric shock to
a confederate to increase his learning rate.
Given our earlier arguments regarding the need to take into account
factors such as context and skill levels when risk-taking competence is
assessed, we refined our coding of tasks in one additional way. In some
studies, participants pursued courses of action that were clearly not the best
way to proceed (i.e., they had better options available). In other studies,
however, the measures of risk taking were more ambiguous. In other
words, one could not definitely say whether engaging in the risky action
372 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
was a good idea or not. Two judges rated the ambiguity of the measures
used in the 150 studies and agreed 93% of the time. Differences were
resolved by discussion. The unambiguous measures (coded 1, n = 145
effects) included such things as unprotected sex with a stranger, regular
consumption of alcohol by a minor, drug use by a minor, smoking,
speeding, drunk driving, criminal activities, and laboratory tasks that
involved controls for skill level and probabilities of payoffs. The ambig-
uous measures (coded 2, n = 111 effects) included choice dilemma tasks,
framing tasks, making a left turn in front of traffic, trying alcohol once,
guessing on an objective examination, intellectual risk taking, entreprenur-
ial activities in a simulated classroom economy, lying about finding
money, and laboratory tasks that did not control for skill level or proba-
bilities of payoff.
Additional Codes
In addition to coding studies in terms of task and content, we coded them
according to the age of the participants using the following scheme: (a)
below age 9, (b) ages 10-13, (c) ages 14-17 (high-school level), (d) ages
18-21 (college level), and (e) ages 22 and older (noncollege adult). Studies
were also coded with respect to their year of publication (i.e., 1964-1980
vs. 1980-1997) and publication type (e.g., dissertation vs. journal article).
Table 1 provides the entire corpus of 150 studies that were used in the
meta-analysis. As can be seen, we provide all effect sizes generated by a
given study as well as the corresponding codes for task, content, and age
(in parentheses). We used the convention that positive effect sizes corre-
sponded to greater risk taking on the part of males. For hypothetical choice
studies, then, a positive effect size means that male participants were more
likely than female participants to choose the risky option presented in the
scenarios or accept a lower level of odds across scenarios. For self-report
studies, it means that male participants were more likely to say that they
had engaged in behaviors such as reckless driving or unprotected sex. For
observation studies, it means that experimenters saw male participants
engaging in risky behaviors more often than female participants.
Results
In what follows, we first describe the distribution of effects that
emerged from our meta-analysis, and then we consider whether the
size of the gender gap varied according to age, task, content, year
of publication, and publication type.
Distribution of Effect Sizes
For descriptive purposes, it is useful to begin by subdividing the
distribution of effect sizes into successive intervals that capture
20% of the scores (i.e., quintiles). The interval corresponding to
the first quintile was found to be —1.23 to —.09 (indicating greater
risk taking on the part of female participants). The interval for the
second quintile was -.08 to .07 (indicating essentially no differ-
ence). The intervals for the third, fourth, and fifth quintiles were
.08 to .27, .28 to .49, and .50 to 1.45, respectively (all indicating
greater risk taking on the part of male participants). Thus, the
majority (i.e., 60%) of the effects support the idea of greater risk
taking on the part of males. In fact, nearly half (48%) were larger
than .20 (the conventional cutoff point for small effects). However,
a sizable minority (i.e., 40%) were either negative or close to zero.
Across all 322 effects, the weighted mean was found to be d =
.13, with a 95% confidence interval of .12 to .14. This figure is
significantly larger than zero, ^(l) = 659.02, p < .00001. To
check for the possibility that certain effects had an undue influence
on the overall mean, we conducted three additional analyses. First,
we excluded the 12 effects that were estimated to be zero and
found the identical mean of d = .13. Hence, it cannot be said that
the estimated effects artificially deflated the overall mean. Next,
we generated a histogram for the original 322 scores (including the
estimated effects) to consider the extent to which the distribution
deviated from the characteristic shape of a normal distribution.
Because we searched for articles using general terms (e.g., risk
taking) and specific terms (e.g., framing), we were concerned that
there may be too many articles of one type that yielded too many
values in a given region (causing a spike). Inspection of the
histogram showed that the distribution had the characteristic nor-
mal shape in all regions except for the region corresponding to
values near zero. We trimmed 20 effects from that region (i.e.,
the 12 effects estimated to be zero and 8 others selected at random)
to create a more proportionate array. The resultant distribution
generated a slightly higher mean of d = .14, but note that this
value is still within the original 95% confidence interval of .12 to
.14. In the third analysis, we examined the possibility that the mean
was unduly influenced by extreme scores. Here, we excluded all
effects whose values fell two standard deviations above or below
the mean (n = 30 effects). The resultant distribution for the
remaining 292 effects generated a mean of d = .13, so outliers did
not appear to be biasing the mean in a particular direction. Overall,
then, the original mean ofd= .13 appears to be a reliable estimate
of the population value.
Partitioning Effects Into Homogeneous Subgroups
Task, content, and age effects. Homogeneity analyses revealed
that there was significant heterogeneity around the grand mean of
d = .13, ^(313) = 2457.83, p < .00001. As a result, we con-
ducted several additional analyses to partition the studies into more
homogeneous subgroups using the factors of task, content, and
age.
In the first analysis, we found that there was significant variation
associated with the task factor, ^(l) = 10.85, p < .01. The means
and confidence intervals for the three types of tasks were (a)
hypothetical choice, d = .15 (.12 to .18); (b) self-reported behav-
ior, d = .12 (.11 to .13); and (c) observed behavior, d = .19 (.16
to .22). Using the method of nonoverlapping confidence intervals
(Schafer, in press), we found that these results suggest that the only
significant contrast is between the means for self-reported behav-
ior and observed behavior. All three of the task means differed
significantly from zero (smallest x2 = 65.79, p < .001).
Further analyses revealed significant heterogeneity around each
of the task means as well. As a result, we attempted to create more
homogeneous subgroups with each task using the factor of content.
The means and confidence intervals for various contents are shown
in Table 2. As can be seen, different contents produced different
means within each task. For hypothetical choice tasks, for exam-
ple, two levels of gender differences are evident. The first level
contains the relatively small gender differences generated by
choice dilemma (d = .07) and framing tasks (d = .05). The means
for these two tasks did not differ significantly, and only the mean
for choice dilemma tasks was significantly greater than zero. The
second level consists of tasks that did not fit choice dilemma or
framing categories. The mean for this other category (d = .35)
differed significantly from the means for choice dilemma and
 RISK TAKING
framing tasks. Recall that the scenarios in the other category asked
participants how they would behave in situations that involved
such things as making friends in a new neighborhood, walking
home from the woods, solving math problems, donating an organ
to a sick child, and planting different types of crops.
For self-reported behavior, three levels of gender differences
can be observed. The first level is composed of the mean for
smoking (d = —.02), which was significantly smaller than all
other means. The next level consists of the means for drinking and
drug use (d = .04) and sexual activities (d = .07). The third level
consists of the means for driving (d = .29) and other (d = .38).
The latter two means were significantly larger than the means for
sexual activities and drinking and drug use. Earlier, we noted that
the other category included multi-item scales that referred to most
of the contents listed under self-reported behaviors (e.g., items for
drinking, smoking, and reckless driving, all on the same scale).
Individuals who engage in more than one of these behaviors would
get higher scores than individuals who engage in few of these
activities. The other category also included scores from ambiguous
single items with general wording (e.g., "I often take risks"), as
well as items addressing such things as shoplifting, vandalism,
career changes, and dangerous activities for young children (e.g.,
running into the street, standing on chairs, etc.).
For observed behaviors, distinct levels of gender differences
failed to emerge because most confidence intervals overlapped to
a certain extent. Nevertheless, there are seven contrasts in Table 2
that correspond to significant mean differences. In brief, these
contrasts amount to the differences between two of the largest
means (i.e., physical skills and intellectual risk taking) and three of
the four smallest means (i.e., physical activity, driving, and in-
formed guessing). In addition, the difference between physical
skills and other was also significant. The other category included
the following behaviors: lying about finding a lost coin, teacher
ratings of entrepreneurial activities in a simulated economy, com-
peting against two individuals in a coalition game, cheating to earn
points, providing an electric shock to a confederate to produce
faster learning of a rule, and choosing a person to date from a set
of pictures.
As for age effects, heterogeneity analyses revealed considerable
variation in the size of d for the different age groups, ^(4)
= 34.69, p < .001. The weighted means and 95% confidence
intervals (in parentheses) for these groups were as follows: (a)
ages 3 to 9, d = .19 (.14 to .24); (b) ages 10 to 13, d = .26 (.21
to .31); (c) ages 14 to 17, d = .11 (.09 to .13); (d) ages 18 to 21,
d = .24 (.22 to .26); and (e) older than 21, d = .05 (.03 to .07).
Using the method of nonoverlapping confidence intervals, we
found that the gender gap for the oldest age group is significantly
smaller than the gender gap for high-school students, which, in
turn, is significantly smaller than the gaps for children, preadoles-
cents, and college students. The means for these latter three groups
do not differ. Moreover, as indicated by the fact that none of the
confidence intervals include zero, all of the means differed signif-
icantly from zero (smallest x2 = 34.16, p < .001). Considered as
a whole, then, the results for age factor revealed the following
wave-like pattern in the relative size of the gender gap: Level 1 to
Level 2, no change; Level 2 to Level 3, significant decrease;
373
Level 3 to Level 4, significant increase; Level 4 to Level 5,
significant decrease.
However, it is possible that this wave-like pattern simply re-
flects a confounding of age and content. Note that children un-
der 10 were not asked about their driving or sexual practices.
Similarly, participants older than 10 were not asked if they would
like to play on exercise equipment, and so on. Overall, 64% of the
possible combinations of age, content, and task emerged in our
database (see Table 3). To consider whether the age trends simply
reflect content effects, we conducted a weighted least squares
regression analysis as suggested by Hedges and Olkin (1985, pp.
173-174). More specifically, we first separated the effects by task,
then entered the dummy codes for the various contents in the first
step of a hierarchical regression. In other words, we conducted
four separate regressions, one for each type of task (because
contents differed across tasks). On the second and third steps of
each of these regressions, we entered the dummy codes for the age
groups and then the Age X Content interaction terms, respectively.
For both self-reported behaviors and observed behaviors, the vari-
ation accounted for by age remained after controlling for content,
X* = 185.35 and 9.83, respectively. In addition, however, the
Age X Content interaction terms for all three tasks explained
significant variation in the effect sizes even after controlling for
content and age. These results show that the initial findings for age
were not simply the result of a confounding of age and content. A
more accurate interpretation is to say that different contents pro-
duced different patterns of age-related change (see Table 3).
Whereas some contents produced an increase in the gender gap in
college followed by a decrease (e.g., drinking and drugs, smoking),
others produced monotonic increases or decreases in the size of the
gender gap (e.g., choice dilemma, driving, sexual activities). In
any event, there was no one pattern of age trends that was true for
all contents.
As for the factor of ambiguity, the means and confidence inter-
vals for the unambiguous and ambiguous measures of risk taking
were d = .12 (.13 to .15) and d = .16 (.14 to .18), respectively.
Both means differed significantly from zero, but they did not differ
from each other.
Year of publication and publication type. To determine
whether the gender gap in risk taking has grown smaller over time,
we formed two groups of studies: (a) those conducted between
1964 and 1980 (n = 83 effects) and (b) those conducted between
1981 and 1997 (n = 235 effects). These intervals were selected to
divide the total span of 34 years into two periods of 17 years each.
The means and confidence intervals for these two periods were
d = .20 (.17 to .23) and d = .13 (.12 to .14), respectively. The
difference between these means was significant, so the gender gap
appears to be growing smaller over time.
To determine whether effect sizes covaried with the type of
publication, we created four categories. The first category con-
tained 14 studies from top-tier journals that have both a general
focus and high standards of admission (e.g., an 80% rejection rate):
Developmental Psychology, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Child De-
velopment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and
American Journal of Public Health. The second category con-
tained 98 studies from a large number of second-tier journals (e.g.,
374
Table 1
Studies Used in the Meta-Analysis
Study
Aharoni (1986)
Anderson & Mathieu (1995)
Anderson & Mathieu (1996)
Arenson (1978)
Arnett & Jensen (1994)
Bachman et al. (1991)
Barnes & Olson (1977)
Barrett (1980)
Beutell & Brenner (1986)
Bevier (1993)
Block & Keller (1995)
Bofinger (1984)
Bonnelle (1995)
Booth (1995)
Boverie et al. (1994)
Bradley et al. (1972)
Breakwell et al. (1991)
Campbell et al. (1992)
Carlson & Cooper (1974)
Cassell (1992)
Catania et al. (1994)
Catania et al. (1995)
Cecil (1972)
Chapman et al. (1980)
Choi & Catania (1996)
Chusmir & Koberg (1986)
Clifford et al. (1989)
Clifford et al. (1990)
Cochran et al. (1991)
Cochran & Peplau (1991)
Coet & McDermott (1979)
Cooper et al. (1994)
Cvetkovich (1972)
Dahlback (1991)
Deldin & Levin (1986)
Dolcini & Adler (1994)
Dwyer et al. (1994)
Ebbeson & Haney (1973)
BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
ds (nmaf, "female, task, content, age)
-.13 (54, 50, 1, 3, 1)
.12 (54, 50, 3, 2, 1)
-.57 (72, 48, 2, 3, 4)
.02 (316, 165, 2, 3, 4)
.00 (57, 57, 3, 5, 1)
-.21 (108, 125, 2, 4, 3)
-.05 (108, 125, 2, 1, 3)
.11 (108, 125,2, 3, 3)
.33 (108, 125, 2, 2, 3)
.60 (108, 125, 2, 5, 3)
.02 (8500, 8500, 2, 1, 3)
.23 (150, 150, 2, 5, 3)
.04 (419, 400, 2, 3, 4)
.43 (118, 84, 2,5,4)
-.24(12, 11, 1, 1,2)
.00 (192, 32, 1, 2, 5)
.26 (93, 74, 1, 1, 5)
.43 (93, 74, 1, 3, 5)
.28 (93, 74, 1, 3, 5)
.18 (55, 101, 2, 1, 4)
.65 (55, 101, 2, 3, 4)
.75 (55, 101, 2, 2, 4)
.55 (55, 101, 2, 5, 4)
-.05 (398, 195, 2, 3, 5)
-.24 (398, 195, 2, 3, 5)
.52 (61, 41, 2, 5, 4)
.34 (44, 63, 3, 7, 4)
.24 (240, 331, 2, 5, 4)
.08 (124, 131, 2, 3, 4)
.62 (20, 14, 3, 3, 5)
.92 (20, 14, 3, 3, 5)
.19 (154, 341, 1, 1, 5)
.04 (198, 261, 2, 3, 5)
.03 (171, 195, 2, 3, 5)
.00(119, 115, 1, 1,4)
-.17 (297, 339, 3, 2, 2)
.02 (1022, 680, 3, 2, 1)
.03 (170, 151, 3, 2, 3)
.19 (138, 132, 3, 2, 2)
.33 (145, 65, 3, 2, 3)
.35 (653, 468, 3, 2, 1)
-.13 (1167, 1063,2, 3,5)
-.35 (792, 745, 2, 3, 5)
.33 (96, 59, 2, 5, 5)
.08 (84, 116, 3,7, 1)
.14 (46, 49, 3, 7, 1)
.53 (48, 52, 3, 7, 2)
.83 (54, 52, 3, 7, 2)
-.20 (91, 97, 2, 3, 4)
-.16 (28, 44, 2, 3, 4)
.22 (97, 91, 4, 3, 4)
.25 (91, 97, 4, 3, 4)
.66 (91, 97, 4, 3, 4)
.34 (52, 48, 1, 1, 4)
.51 (52, 48, 1, 1, 4)
.14 (616, 560, 2, 3, 3)
.63 (40, 30, 3, 5, 4)
.08 (77, 86, 2, 5, 5)
.00 (12, 12, 1, 2, 4)
-.19 (88, 95, 2, 4, 2)
-.04 (88, 95, 2, 1, 2)
.60 (88, 95, 2, 3, 2)
-.15 (904, 329, 2, 1, 5)
-.15 (904, 329, 2, 3, 5)
.29 (278, 186, 3, 3, 5)
Study <k ("male, "female- &&< Content, age)
Eysenck & Eysenck (1977) .38 (709, 1398, 2, 5, 5)
Fagley & Miller (1990) -.42 (45, 51, 1, 2, 4)
-.22 (45, 51, 1, 2, 4)
-.18 (45, 51, 1, 2, 4)
-.12 (45, 51, 1, 2, 4)
.00 (45, 51, 1, 2, 4)
.00 (40, 54, 1, 2, 4)
.13 (40, 54, 1, 2, 4)
.31 (40, 54, 1, 2, 4)
.49 (40, 54, 1, 2, 4)
.49 (40, 54, 1, 2, 4)
Farrington & Kidd (1977) -.21 (49, 35, 3, 8, 5)
Finney (1984) .00 (6, 8, 3, 6, 4)
.66 (33, 51, 3, 6, 4)
Flaherty & Arenson (1978) 1.11 (131,82,2,5,4)
.02 (28, 40, 2, 5, 3)
.15 (28, 40, 2, 1, 3)
.03 (28, 40, 2, 2, 3)
.43 (28, 40, 2, 5, 3)
.18 (28, 40, 2, 3, 3)
Flisher & Chalton (1995) .15 (28, 40, 3, 1, 3)
.03 (28, 40, 3, 2, 3)
.18 (28, 40, 3, 3, 3)
.02 (28, 40, 3, 5, 3)
.43 (28, 40, 3, 5, 3)
Foersterling (1980) .15 (60, 60, 1, 3, 3)
.21 (60, 60, 1, 3, 3)
.37 (60, 60, 1, 3, 3)
.49 (60, 60, 1, 3, 3)
.67 (60, 60, 1, 3, 3)
Freeman et al. (1994) -.03 (507, 151, 2, 3, 5)
.38 (239, 74, 2, 3, 5)
-.19 (268, 77, 2, 3, 5)
Furnham & Saipe (1993) .85 (41, 29, 2, 2, 5)
Gallois et al. (1992) .01 (77, 74, 2, 3, 5)
Gibbons & Gerrard (1995) -.17 (303, 376, 2, 3, 4)
.00 (303, 376, 2, 4, 4)
.06 (303, 376, 2, 1, 4)
.48 (303, 376, 2, 2, 4)
Gibbons et al. (1995) .79 (72, 154, 1, 3, 3)
.65 (218, 214, 1, 3, 3)
Ginsburg & Miller (1982) .54 (152, 89, 3, 2, 1)
.86 (58, 25, 3, 2, 1)
.89 (67, 28, 3, 2, 1)
1.07 (45, 16, 3, 2, 1)
Grupp et al. (1971) .11 (456,849,2,5,5)
Hayes (1973) .07 (30, 30, 3, 5, 1)
Heilizer & Cutter (1971) .43 (84, 60, 3, 1, 4)
.45 (27, 27, 3, 1, 4)
.66 (27, 27, 3, 5, 4)
.77 (84, 60, 3, 5, 4)
Hudgens & Fatkin (1985) -.78 (18, 18, 3, 3, 5)
1.00 (9, 9, 3, 3, 5)
Ingersoll et al. (1993) -.22 (704, 672, 2, 5, 3)
-.10 (704, 672, 2, 4, 3)
.00 (704, 672, 2, 1, 3)
.02 (704, 672, 2, 1, 3)
.03 (704, 672, 2, 1, 3)
.06 (704, 672, 2, 2, 3)
.10 (704, 672, 2, 5, 3)
.63 (704, 672, 2, 3, 3)
Ingersoll & Orr (1989) .23 (754, 754, 2, 3, 3)
Irwin & Tolkmitt (1968) .00 (20, 20, 3, 5, 4)

Table 1 (continued)
Study
Jackson & Gray (1976)
Jamieson (1969)
lessor et al. (1995)
Karabenick & Addy (1979)
Kass (1964)
Kelling et al. (1976)
Kogan & Dorros (1978)
Kogan & Wallach (1964)
Kohler (1996)
Kopfstein (1973)
Kourilsky & Campbell (1984)
Kreitler & Zigler (1990)
Krishna (1981)
Lamm (1979)
Lampert & Yassour (1992)
Leigh et al. (1993)
Lettman (1981)
Levin & Chapman (1993)
Levin et al. (1988)
Lupfer et al. (1971)
Martinez (1995)
Martuza (1970)
McCormack et al. (1993)
McDonald (1976)
McGaffney (1976)
McKelvie & Schamer (1988)
Michaels & Getting (1979)
Miller (1987)
Miller & Byrnes (1997)
RISK TAKING 375
rfs
("male, "female, task. Content, age) Study * ("mate, "female, ^k, Content, age)
-.09 (142, 95, 3, 3, 5) .36 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2)
-.04(142, 95, 3, 3,5) .37 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2)
.22 (142, 95, 3, 3, 5) .55 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2)
.03 (142, 95, 3, 3, 5) .84 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2)
.33 (42, 42, 3, 5, 2) Miller & Fagley (1991) .00 (50, 44, 1, 2, 4)
.14 (639, 847, 2, 5, 3) Miller & Hoffman (1995) .58 (1204, 1204, 2, 5, 5)
.54 (40, 40, 3, 4, 4) Mindock (1972) -.11 (9, 9, 3, 5,4)
.80 (21, 21, 3, 5, 1) Minton & Miller (1970) .07 (26, 26, 1, 1, 4)
-.16 (57, 85, 1, 1, 3) Montgomery & Landers (1974) .07 (33, 33, 3, 5, 1)
.18 (57, 85, 1, 1, 3) .07 (33, 33, 3, 5, 1)
-.15 (80, 80, 1, 1, 4) .07 (33, 33, 3, 5, 1)
-.10 (80, 80, 1, 1, 4) Moore & Erickson (1985) .20 (202, 391, 2, 3, 4)
-.09 (80, 80, 1, 1, 4) Moore & Rosenthal (1991) .30 (263, 674, 2, 3, 4)
.00 (80, 80, 1, , 4) Moore & Rosenthal (1992) .00(71, 118,2, 3,4)
.12 (80, 80, 1, , 4) .53 (71, 118, 2,2,4)
.14 (80, 80, 1, , 4) .00(71, 118,2,4,4)
.20 (80, 80, 1, , 4) Morrongiello & Bradley (1997) .47 (20, 20, 1, 3, 1)
.23 (80, 80, 1, , 4) .32 (20, 20, 1, 3, 2)
.33 (80, 80, 1, , 4) Muldrow & Bayton (1979) .95 (100, 100, 1, 1, 5)
.33 (80, 80, 1, , 4) Neale & Bazerman (1985) .00 (50, 50, 1, 2, 5)
.02(114, 103, 1, 1,4) Ottomanelli (1993) -.01 (97, 69, 2, 1, 5)
-.05 (114, 103, 3, 5,4) -.17 (97, 69, 2, 3, 5)
-.59(114, 103, 3, 1,4) Parra (1988) .18 (30, 30, 3, 8, 4)
.57 (52, 48, 2, 5, 4) Poppen (1994) .00(105, 110,2,3,4)
-.90 (30, 30, 3, 5, 1) Poppen (1995) .30 (74, 125, 2, 3, 4)
-.14 (30, 30, 3, 5, 1) Potts et al. (1994) .98 (24, 26, 2, 5, 1)
.10 (417, 392, 3, 8, 1) Potts et al. (1995) .74 (39, 44, 2, 5, 1)
-.05 (30, 30, 3, 4, 1) .88 (39, 44, 2, 5, 1)
.17 (30, 30, 3, 4, 2) Reardon (1981) -.49(108, 118, 1, 1, 3)
-.30 (100, 100, 1, 1, 3) Reddon et al. (1996) -.09 (28, 39, 2, 5, 3)
-.45 (24, 24, 3, 5, 3) -.05 (50, 16, 2, 5, 3)
-.07 (24, 24, 3, 5, 2) Roberts (1975) .45 (101, 134, 3, 4, 4)
-.24 (181, 189, 1, 3, 5) Rotheram-Borus et al. (1992) .10 (77, 83, 2, 3, 3)
.30 (181, 184, 1, 3, 5) Rothman et al. (1993) .59 (104, 89, 1, 2, 4)
-.09 (646, 767, 2, 3, 5) Rowe (1991) .87 (99, 140, 2, 5, 3)
.27 (49, 61, 1, 3, 4) Rudolph (1996) .11 (906, 880,2,4, 3)
.00 (90, 104, 1, 2, 4) .17 (906, 880, 2, 5, 3)
.10 (50, 60, 1, 2, 4) .43 (906, 880, 2, 2, 3)
.38 (50, 60, 1, 2, 4) -.04 (906, 880, 2, 2, 3)
.31 (380, 303, 3, 5, 3) .54 (906, 880, 2, 5, 3)
-.39 (46, 44, 1, 1, 4) Rutte et al. (1987) .00 (33, 33, 1, 2, 4)
-.35 (46, 44, 1, 1, 4) Sadava & Forsyth (1976) .42 (72, 72, 1, 1, 4)
.20 (46, 44, 1, 1, 4) .56 (72, 72, 1, 1, 4)
.73 (46, 44, 1, 1, 4) Scherer (1987) .94 (195, 142, 2, 5, 4)
-.11 (68,92,3, 1,3) Schilling et al. (1991) .25 (135, 109, 2, 3, 5)
.41 (87, 65, 4, 3, 4) .10 (135, 109, 2, 3, 5)
.49 (76, 57, 2, 3, 4) Schwartz (1983) -.14 (86, 94, 1, 1, 4)
.04 (76, 57, 2, 3, 4) Seeborg et al. (1980) -.55 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.37 (28, 30, 1, 1, 4) -.41 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.27 (28, 44, 3, 8, 4) -38 (51,42, 1, 1,4)
.03 (186, 123, 3, 3, 5) -.36 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.05 (174, 117, 3, 3, 5) -.20 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.29 (75, 75, 3, 6, 4) -.14 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.43 (75, 75, 3, 6, 4) -.02(51,42, 1, 1,4)
.45 (58, 54, 1, 3, 3) .00 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.49 (33, 32, 3, 4, 2) .02 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.77 (32, 34, 3, 4, 2) .16 (51,42, 1, 1,4)
.24 (33, 32, 3, 5, 2) .21 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.26 (33, 32, 3, 5, 2) .36 (51, 42, 1, 1, 4)
.48 (32, 34, 3, 5, 2) Shaw et al. (1992) .67 (678, 673, 2, 2, 4)
1.17 (32, 34, 3, 5, 2) .30 (678, 673, 2, 2, 4)
.66 (33, 32, 3, 7, 2) .64 (678, 673, 2, 5, 4)
.71 (32, 34, 3, 7, 2) .17 (678, 673, 2, 1, 4)
.10 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2) .21 (678, 673, 2, 1, 4)
.19 (55, 60, 1, 3, 2)
(table continues)
376 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER

Table 1 (continued)

Study rfs (nmale, nfemal(!, task, content, age) Study ds (nmale, nfema!e, task, content, age)

.20 (678, 673, 2, 1, 4) Tinsley et al. (1995) -.19(139, 147, 2,4, 3)

Sheer & Cline (1995)
Sitkin & Weingart (1995)
Sivak et al. (1989)
Slakter (1967)
Slakter (1969)
Slakter et al. (1971)
Slovic (1966)
Snyder (1984)
Sorrentino et al. (1992)
Spears et al. (1992)
Speltz et al. (1990)
Stanford et al. (1996)
Stapp (1986)
Starrett (1983)
Steptoe et al. (1995)
Struckman-Johnson &
Struckman-Johnson (1996)
.24 (678, 673, 2, 3, 4)
.43 (678, 673, 2, 3, 4)
.29 (678, 673, 2, 5, 4)
.37 (678, 673, 2, 2, 4)
.49 (124, 141, 2, 3, 4)
.46 (122, 138, 2, 5, 4)
.00 (38, 25, 1, 2, 4)
.42 (90, 90, 3, 3, 5)
.57 (90, 90, 3, 3, 5)
.52 (21,31, 3, 1,4)
.59 (21, 31, 3, 1, 4)
-.17 (380, 297, 3, 1, 2)
.08 (522, 548, 3, 1, 3)
.11 (600, 691, 3, 1,4)
-.09 (89, 50, 3, 5, 1)
.11(110,40,3,5,2)
.13 (117,42, 3, 5, 2)
.21 (94, 86, 3, 5, 1)
.33 (108, 46, 3, 5, 2)
.27 (173, 49, 3, 5, 3)
.24 (44, 49, 3, 5, 3)
.32 (44, 49, 3, 5, 3)
.49 (48, 92, 3, 4, 4)
.32 (124, 190, 1, 3, 4)
.31 (129, 124, 2, 5, 1)
.08 (156, 147, 2, 1, 3)
.49 (88, 178, 2, 1, 4)
.23 (156, 147, 2, 2, 3)
.61 (88, 178, 2, 2, 4)
.38 (156, 147, 2, 2, 3)
.54 (88, 178, 2, 2, 4)
-.08 (124, 211,2,5,5)
.19(19,46, 2, 5,4)
.33 (26, 27, 2, 5, 2)
.60 (17, 28, 2, 5, 3)
.01 (7109, 9015, 2, 4, 5)
.43 (53, 54, 1, 3, 4)
Touhey (1971)
Traub & Hambleton (1972)
Trocki (1992)
Walesa (1975)
Ward et al. (1988)
Warren & Simpson (1980)
Wayment et al. (1993)
West et al. (1996)
White & Johnson (1988)
Williams (1973)
Wilson et al. (1996)
Wyatt (1988)
Yesmont (1992)
Yinon et al. (1975)
Zeff et al. (1994)
Zuckerman et al. (1990)
-.10 (139, 147, 2, 1, 3)
-.08 (139, 147, 2, 2, 3)
.06 (40, 40, 1, 1, 4)
.37 (505, 493, 3, 1, 2)
.58 (495, 487, 3, 1, 2)
-.03 (292, 326, 2, 3, 5)
.00 (18, 18, 3, 5, 2)
.00 (18, 18, 3, 5, 2)
.58 (18, 18, 3, 5, 1)
-.25 (30, 30, 3, 8, 4)
.35 (30, 30, 3, 8, 4)
.18 (7673, 1320, 3, 3, 5)
-.43 (50, 50, 2, 1, 5)
.22 (559, 373, 2, 2, 4)
.33 (559, 373, 2, 2, 4)
.02 (559, 373, 2, 2, 4)
.30 (559, 373, 2, 2, 4)
-1.23 (34, 31, 2, 3, 3)
-.96 (151, 155, 2, 3, 3)
-.77 (182, 174, 2, 3, 4)
-.36 (201, 185, 2, 4, 3)
.44 (70, 127, 1, 3, 4)
.53 (36, 68, 1, 3, 4)
-.29 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
-.15 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
-.11 (73, 129, 1,2,4)
-.08 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
-.06 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
-.03 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
.44 (73, 129, 1, 2, 4)
.41 (94, 159, 2, 3, 4)
.79 (94, 159, 2, 3, 4)
.87 (94, 159, 2, 3, 4)
1.45 (40, 29, 3, 8, 4)
-.15 (26, 19, 2, 5, 5)
-.27 (422, 649, 2, 4, 4)

Note. The codes for task, content, and age are explained in the text.

Journal of Drug Issues, Adolescence) that have a more specific
focus (e.g., just articles on drug abuse, just articles on adolescents,
etc.) and sometimes a higher acceptance rate than the top-tier
journals. The third category included 26 studies that were pub-
lished in books or journals that have lower standards for admission
than the journals in the first two tiers (i.e., Psychological Reports,
Journal of Psychology, Journal of General Psychology, Percep-
tual and Motor Skills, Research Quarterly). The fourth category
contained the 15 dissertation studies.
The means and confidence intervals for these four categories
were as follows: (a) top-tier outlets, d = .03 (.01 to .05); (b)
second-tier outlets, d = .16 (.15 to .17); (c) third-tier outlets, d =
.12 (.09 to .15); and (d) dissertations, d = .25 (.21 to .29). The
effect sizes from top-tier outlets were significantly smaller than the
effect sizes from all other outlets. In addition, the effect sizes from
second- and third-tier outlets were significantly smaller than the
effect sizes from dissertations. Thus, effect sizes seem to get
smaller as higher standards for admission are imposed (i.e., meth-
odological rigor and the need to appeal to a broad audience).
However, it is important to qualify this interpretation in two ways.
First, it should be recalled that the mean for dissertations might be
somewhat inflated because of the Boolean search process used by
the computerized system for dissertations. Second, journals and
contents were often confounded. In fact, data points were missing
for 28% of the possible combinations of journal, task, and topic.
As a result, we ran four additional analyses (one for each task) in
which we examined the role of journal quality after controlling for
content. These analyses showed that journal quality still accounted
for significant variation in the effect sizes after content was con-
trolled. However, the Quality X Content interaction terms were
often significant as well. Hence, it is more accurate to say that
certain journals (e.g., Journal of Drug Education) seem to be more
interested in publishing gender differences on certain topics (e.g.,
alcohol use) than other journals (e.g., Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology). These contents, in turn, produced relatively
larger or smaller gender differences.
 RISK TAKING 377

Table 2 taking. In what follows, we summarize and interpret our findings

Mean Effect Sizes by Task and Content Within Task in light of these issues.

Task M 95% confidence interval N effects

Overview of the Main Findings
Hypothetical choice
Choice dilemma .07* .05 to .12 44 At a general level, our results clearly support the idea that male
Framing .05 -.02 to .12 27 participants are more likely to take risks than female participants.
Other .35* .29 to .41 25 In nearly every case, the mean effect size for a given type of risk
Self-reported behavior
Smoking -.02 -.05 to .01 10 taking was significantly greater than zero (see Table 2), and almost
Drinking/drug use .04* .02 to .06 19 half of the effects (i.e., 48%) were larger than .20 (i.e., the
Sexual activities .07* .05 to .10 47 conventional cutoff for small effects). However, a more qualified
Driving .29* .26 to .32 21 interpretation of our results is to say that gender differences varied
Other .38* .35 to .41 35
Observed behavior according to context and age level. As shown in Table 3, certain
Physical activity .16* .10 to .22 11 topics were associated with nontrivial gender differences that
Driving .17* .12 to .22 14 seemed to increase with age (e.g., driving), whereas others were
Informed guessing .18* .13 to .23 11 associated with considerably smaller gender differences at most
Gambling .21* .14 to .28 33 ages (e.g., smoking), or associated with shifts from positive to
Risky experiment .41* .21 to .61 4
Intellectual risk taking .40* .25 to .55 7 negative effects as children grow older (e.g., sexual activities).
Physical skills .43* .28 to .58 7 Thus, if risk taking is, in fact, "an attribute of the masculine
Other .15* .04 to .26 7 psychology" as Wilson and Daly (1985, p. 61) suggest, it does not
seem to manifest itself in a simple or constant way across ages or
Note. The asterisk indicates that the mean differs significantly from zero.
The content labels are explained in the text. contexts.
Of course, one could argue that the variability evident in Ta-
bles 2 and 3 is largely due to the fact that we adopted an extremely
broad definition of risk taking. In other words, by including both
Discussion
prototypical and nonprototypical types of risk taking in our meta-
In the present article, we had two primary aims: (a) to determine analysis, we artificially increased our chances of finding signifi-
the average effect size for gender differences in risk taking and (b) cant fluctuations in the size of the gender gap. Note, however, that
to reveal the extent to which gender differences vary according to there is considerable variation in the size of the gender gap across
context and age level. We pursued the first aim to bring order to a age levels and topics even within the category of prototypical risk
diverse and widely scattered literature. We pursued the latter to test taking (see Table 3). Thus, whereas we agree that our results and
the explanatory adequacy of several contemporary theories of risk conclusions largely reflect our preferred definition of risk taking,

Table 3
Age X Content Interaction Means

Age level

Task 1 2 3 4 5 Sig. contrasts

Hypothetical choice
Choice dilemma n/d -.24 -.24* .07* .38* 5>4>3
Framing n/d n/d n/d .06 .00
Other .03 .39* .53* .42* .13* 3>5
Self-reported behavior
Drinking/drugs n/d -.04 .02 .17* -.15* 4 >3 >5
Driving n/d n/d .16* .37* .85* 4,5 > 3
Sexual activities n/d .60* .22* .18* -.11* 2>3 = 4>5
Smoking n/d -.19 -.04 -.15* .01 4>3, 5
Other .55* .33 .27* .52* .29* 1 >3;4>5
Observed behavior
Informed guessing n/d .31* .06 .09 n/d 2>3, 4
Physical activity .22* -.06 .14 n/d n/d 1 >2
Driving n/d n/d n/d n/d .17*
Physical skills -.05 .48* n/d .48* n/d
Gambling .03 .27* .27* .31* n/d
Risky experiments n/d n/d n/d .41* n/d
Intellectual risk taking .10 .68* n/d .34 n/d 2> 1
Other .10 n/d n/d .38* -.21

Note. Sig. contrasts means significant contrasts (i.e., the confidence intervals for the compared age-level means
do not overlap). The asterisk indicates that the mean is significantly larger than zero, n/d stands for no data (i.e.,
gender-difference studies for that topic and age range could not be located). Age levels are defined in the text.
378 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
other definitions would not necessarily undermine our basic find-
ings. One of the reasons for supplying raw data in a meta-analysis
(Table 1) is to give researchers who hold differing perspectives the
opportunity to reorganize, truncate, or elaborate the data in ways
that might yield alternative interpretations.
One further benefit of using the broad definition is that it helped
us reveal two additional findings that might have been missed had
we limited our analysis to just prototypical forms of risk taking.
The first is an apparent lack of discernment on the part of men and
boys. In one of our analyses, we showed that males took more risks
even when it was clear that it was a bad idea to take a risk. The
same analysis revealed the opposite was true for women and girls;
that is, they seemed to be disinclined to take risks even in fairly
innocuous situations or when it was a good idea to take a risk (e.g.,
intellectual risk taking on practice SATs). Whereas the former
finding suggests that men and boys would tend to encounter failure
or other negative consequences more often than women and girls,
the latter finding suggests that women and girls would tend to
experience success less often than they should. In our view, both
of these trends are a matter of concern.
However, as we noted earlier, the issue of concern is very much
a function of the validity of the measures used (i.e., a gender
difference on a valid and widely accepted measure would tend to
generate more concern than a difference on an ambiguous or
controversial measure) as well as the consequences that could arise
from the risky behaviors in question. Some would argue, for
example, that policymakers and researchers should be more con-
cerned about a gender difference in an actual, dangerous behavior
(e.g., reckless driving) than a gender difference in hypothetical
choices. It is interesting that the means for certain observed be-
haviors were considerably larger than the means for certain hypo-
thetical choices. These findings suggest that gender differences
may be more likely to emerge when people have to actually carry
out a risky behavior than when they have to simply consider the
pros and cons of two options. If so, then the processes involved in
the translation of cognitions to behavior (e.g., fear responses) may
explain gender differences in risk taking more adequately than the
cognitive processes involved in the reflective evaluation of op-
tions. This possibility requires further study.
Another point to make is that whereas the overall mean of d =
.13 would be labeled small in some statistical circles (e.g., Cohen,
1992), it conveys a different message when it is converted into a
Binomial Effect Size Display (Rosenthal, 1994). In particular, a
mean of d = .13 corresponds to a 6% difference in the risk-taking
rates of men and women (e.g., 53% of men take risks vs. only 47%
of women). In potentially dangerous activities that are performed
by a large number of people (e.g., driving, unprotected sex, etc.),
this 6% difference would accumulate across behaviors and time to
produce a substantial gender difference in the number of expected
injuries or death (e.g., 60,000 if we assume one million female
drivers and one million male drivers). Thus, we believe that many
of the gender differences in Tables 2 and 3 are a matter of concern.
Implications of the Findings for Theories of Risk Taking
As we noted earlier, a useful way to understand the theoretical
implications of our results is to think of theories as falling into one
of three categories (Lopes, 1987). The first category consists of
theories that are equipped to explain the differences between
people who take risks and people who avoid risks (e.g., Zucker-
man, 1991). The second category consists of theories that are
equipped to explain the differences between situations that pro-
mote risk taking (in most people) and situations that promote risk
aversion (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The third category
consists of theories that are equipped to explain both types of
differences (i.e., they could explain why only certain people take
risks in certain situations).
After categorizing theories in this way, the next step is to
consider the patterns of gender differences that could be explained
by the theories in each group. Whereas Category 1 theories could
explain a pervasive pattern of gender differences across contexts,
Category 2 theories could not. Similarly, whereas Category 3
theories could explain a pattern of variable gender differences
across contexts, theories in the other two categories could not.
Given that we found the variable pattern, it seems reasonable to
assert that Category 3 theories demonstrate greater explanatory
adequacy than the theories in Categories 1 and 2. However, we
need to add that some of the theories in Category 3 (e.g., Wilson
& Daly's [1985] competition model) are not equipped to explain
two of our findings: (a) 20% of the effects were negative and (b)
some of the means in Table 3 were negative and significantly
larger than zero. Hence, our results suggest that these theories need
to be revised as well.
Of course, to say that certain theories are equipped to handle our
results is not to say that any one of these theories receives direct
confirmation by our results. The authors of the studies in Table 1
were generally not interested in providing support for specific
theories, so they did not provide the kind of data needed to show
that one theory provides a better explanation than another. For
example, they did not use measures tapping the core theoretical
constructs of more than one theory. As such, all one could do is
describe in a post hoc manner how different theories would explain
the results. For the sake of brevity, we leave that task to the
interested reader.
There is, however, one additional aspect of our results that may
ultimately determine the adequacy of specific accounts. We found
that some contents produced similar gender differences at different
ages, whereas others produced developmental increases or de-
creases in the size of the gender gap. Not all of the theories in
Category 3 could explain cyclical developmental trends such as
these. Hence, we argue that the age results narrow the field further
to the following viable theories: Byrnes's (1998) self-regulation
model, Irwin and Millstein's (1991) biopsychosocial account, and
Wigfield and Eccles's (1992) expectancy-value model.
Byrnes (1998) suggested that developmental increases in risk
taking are a function of the fact that children are more likely to find
themselves in novel, unmonitored environments as they grow older
(e.g., going away to college). Resisting the temptation to take a
risk requires a certain amount of self-regulation (i.e., a calibrated
sense of uncertainty, self-corrective strategies for dealing with
distractions and troublesome personality traits, and a tendency to
learn from mistakes). The apparent surges in the gender gap may
reflect double standards with respect to parental monitoring (e.g.,
more restrictions placed on women and girls), overconfidence in
men and boys, and less knowledge of self-correcting strategies in
men and boys. Irwin and Millstein's (1991) model was crafted to
explain the increase in risk taking that is said to occur between
childhood and adolescence. The model was not meant to explain
 RISK TAKING
gender differences per se, but it seems to suggest that surges in the
gender gap would be due to periodic changes in the following: (a)
biological maturation, (b) cognitive scope (e.g., future time per-
spective), (c) self-perceptions (e.g., self-esteem), (d) perceptions of
the social environment (e.g., parental and peer influences), (e)
personal values (e.g., independence), (f) risk perception (e.g.,
optimistic bias), and (g) characteristics of the peer group (e.g., peer
age). These factors may independently or collectively influence
males and females in different ways at different times. Wigfield
and Eccles's (1992) model suggests that gender differences would
arise whenever males and females hold different expectations and
values. Expectations and values can show dramatic shifts when-
ever children enter novel environments (e.g., children making the
transition to middle school). At present, it is not clear which of
these models provides the most accurate explanation.
Suggestions for Future Research
Several findings require further explication and analysis in
subsequent studies. The first pertains to intriguing differences in
the age trends for the four types of self-reported behaviors. Table 3
shows that the shift between high school and college seems to
promote a sharper increase in drinking and drug use in men than in
women. At present, it is not clear whether this finding reflects the
fact that men are confronted with risk-inducing contexts more
often than women (e.g., they attend a greater number of parties) or
whether women have a greater capacity to negotiate themselves
through these risk-inducing situations than men. The latter would
not appear to be the case because women seem to be significantly
more likely to smoke during their college years than men and also
seem to be more likely to drink, take drugs, or engage in risky
sexual activities in their post-college years (see Table 3). Such
findings could be interpreted in one of two ways. The first would
be that contexts make different demands on men and women at
different points in time. The second interpretation would be that
men are somewhat "precocious" (i.e., men engage in these activ-
ities earlier than women but women eventually catch up and
surpass men). Future research should determine which of these
explanations seems to be more accurate.
In addition, more work is needed to understand the reasons for
the age trends revealed for driving and gambling behaviors. At
most age levels, the effects for these two behaviors were twice as
large as the overall mean of d = .13. In the case of driving, the
findings are troubling because the gender gap appears to widen
with age. Note, however, that there was a high degree of ambiguity
in the measurement of driving risks. For example, in some studies,
participants simply rated their own riskiness. In others, experi-
menters used ambiguous indexes such as wait time before making
a turn. Hence, more studies with tighter controls are needed to
verify the age trends that we revealed for driving. In the case of
gambling, the measures were less ambiguous, but it is still not
clear why males seemed to be more inclined to take gambling risks
than females and why the gender gap does not appear to change
with age. One factor that could possibly explain both sets of
findings for driving and gambling would be a gender-linked dif-
ference in competitiveness (Miller & Byrnes, 1997; Wilson &
Daly, 1985). Future studies should explore this possibility and
others.
379
In general, then, we revealed a number of important trends that
require further explication. To add greater clarity to the study of
gender differences, researchers should (a) construct unambiguous
measures of both appropriate and inappropriate forms of risk
taking, (b) construct valid measures tapping the core constructs of
several different theories of risk taking (to see which of the
remaining viable theories is the most adequate), and (c) give these
measures to multiple age groups (to further probe the meaning of
our age trends). The findings from such studies would make an
important and much-needed contribution to the literature and
would provide important insight into possible ways to improve the
risk-taking skills of children, adolescents, and adults.
References
References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the
meta-analysis.
*Aharoni, H. (1986). Assessment of children's risk-taking behavior as
reflected in motor activity. Unpublished dissertation, Ohio State Univer-
sity.
*Anderson, P. B., & Mathieu, D. A. (1995). The relationship of alcohol
consumption as a sexual disinhibitor to high risk behavior: Gender
differences. Journal of Sex Education and Therapy, 21, 217-222.
*Anderson, P. B., & Mathieu, D. A. (1996). College students' high-risk
sexual behavior following alcohol consumption. Journal of Sex & Mar-
ital Therapy, 22, 259-264.
*Arenson, S. J. (1978). Age and sex differences in the probability prefer-
ences of children. Psychological Reports, 43, 697-698.
Arnett, J. (1992). Reckless behavior in adolescence: A developmental
perspective. Developmental Review, 12, 339-373.
*Arnett, J. J., & Jensen, L. A. (1994). Socialization and risk behavior in
two countries: Denmark and the United States, youth and Society, 26,
3-22.
Atkinson, J. W. (1983). Personality, motivation, and action: Selected
papers. New York: Praeger.
*Bachman, J. G., Wallace, J. M., O'Malley, P. O., Johnston, L. D., Kurth,
C. L., & Neighbors, H. W. (1991). Racial/ethnic differences in smoking,
drinking, and illicit drug use among American high school seniors,
1976-89. American Journal of Public Health, 81, 372-377.
*Barnes, C. P., & Olson, J. N. (1977). Usage patterns of nondrug alterna-
tives in adolescence. Journal of Drug Education, 7, 359-373.
Baron, J. (1994). Thinking and deciding (2nd ed.). Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
*Barrett, F. M. (1980). Sexual experience, birth control usage, and sex
education of unmarried Canadian university students: Changes between
1968 and 1978. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 9, 367-386.
Baumrind, D. (1991). Adolescent exploratory behavior: Precursors and
consequences. In L. P. Lipsitt & L. L. Mitnick (Eds.), Self-regulatory
behavior and risk-taking: Causes and consequences (pp. 109—141).
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
*Beutell, N. J., & Brenner, O. C. (1986). Sex differences in work values.
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 28, 29-41.
*Bevier, R. A. (1993). Risk taking and decision making behaviors of gifted
and general education adolescents. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Wayne State University.
*Block, L. G., & Keller, P. A. (1995). When to accentuate the negative:
The effects of perceived efficacy and message framing on intentions to
perform a health-related behavior. Journal of Marketing Research, 32,
192-203.
*Bofinger, C. J. (1984). Risk-taking in areas of business. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
*Bonnelle, K. P. (1995). A profile of sensation seekers: Risk taking and
380 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
risk reduction behaviors. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Memphis.
*Booth, R. E. (1995). Gender differences in high-risk sex behaviors among
heterosexual drug injectors and crack smokers. American Journal of
Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 21, 419-432.
*Boverie, P. E., Scheuffele, D. J., & Raymond, E. L. (1994). Multimeth-
odological approach to examine risk-taking. Current Psychology: De-
velopmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 13, 289-302.
*Bradley, L., Snyder, C. R., & Katahn, M. (1972). The effects of subject
race and sex and experimenter race upon classroom-related risk-taking
behavior. Psychonomic Science, 28, 362-364.
*Breakwell, G. M., Fife-Schaw, C., & Clayden, K. (1991). Risk-taking,
control over partner choice and intended use of condoms by virgins.
Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 1, 173-187.
Byrnes, J. P. (1998). The nature and development of decision-making: A
self-regulation model. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Byrnes, J. P., & Takahira, S. (1993). Explaining gender differences on
SAT-math items. Developmental Psychology, 29, 805-812.
"•Campbell, S. M., Peplau, L. A., & DeBro, S. C. (1992). Women, men, and
condoms: Attitudes and experiences of heterosexual college students.
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 16, 273-288.
*Carlson, K., & Cooper, R. E. (1974). A preliminary investigation of risk
behavior in the real world. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin, 1, 7-9.
*Cassell, M. (1992). Locus of control and propensity for risk taking as
related to achievement in higher education. Unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, Montana State University.
*Catania, J. A., Coates, T. J., & Kegeles, S. (1994). A test of the AIDS
Risk-Reduction Model: Psychosocial correlates of condom use in the
AMEN cohort survey. Health Psychology, 13, 548-555.
*Catania, J. A., Stone, V., Binson, D., & Dolcini, M. (1995). Changes in
condom use among heterosexuals in wave 3 of the AMEN survey.
Journal of Sex Research, 32, 193-200.
*Cecil, E. A. (1972). Factors affecting individual risk-taking attitudes.
Journal of Psychology, 82, 223-225.
*Chapman, A. J., Foot, H. C., & Wade, F. M. (1980). Children at play. In
D. J. Osborn & J. A. Levis (Eds.), Human factors in transport research.
Volume 2. User factors: Comfort, the environment and behaviour (pp.
380—388). London: Academic Press.
*Choi, K-H., & Catania, J. A. (1996). Changes in multiple sexual partner-
ships, HIV testing, and condom use among US heterosexuals 18 to 49
years of age, 1990 and 1992. American Journal of Public Health, 86,
554-556.
*Chusmir, L. H., & Koberg, C. (1986). Creativity differences among
managers. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 29, 240—253.
*Clifford, M. M., Chou, F. C., Mao, K.-N., Lan, W. L., & Kuo, S.-Y.
(1990). Academic risk-taking, development, and external constraint.
Journal of Experimental Education, 59, 45—64.
*Clifford, M. M., Lan, W. L., Chou, F. C., & Qi, Y. (1989). Academic
risk-taking: Developmental and cross-cultural observations. Journal of
Experimental Education, 57, 321—338.
*Cochran, S. D., Mays, V. M., & Leung, L. (1991). Sexual practices of
heterosexual Asian-American young adults: Implications for risk of HIV
infection. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 20, 381-391.
*Cochran, S. D., & Peplau, L. A. (1991). Sexual risk reduction behaviors
among young heterosexual adults. Social Science and Medicine, 33,
25-36.
*Coet, L. J., & McDermott, P. J. (1979). Sex, instructional set, and group
make-up: Organismic and situational factors influencing risk-taking.
Psychological Reports, 44, 1283-1294.
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159.
*Cooper, M. L., Peirce, R. S., & Huselid, R. F. (1994). Substance use and
sexual risk taking among black adolescents and white adolescents.
Health Psychology, 13, 251-262.
*Cvetkovich, G. (1972). Effects of sex on decision policies used for self
and decision policies used for other persons. Psychonomic Science, 26,
319-320.
*Dahlback, O. (1991). Saving and risk taking. Journal of Economic Psy-
chology, 12, 479-500.
*Deldin, P. J., & Levin, I. P. (1986). The effect of mood induction in a
risky decision-making task. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 24,
4-6.
DiClemente, R. J., Hansen, W. B., & Ponton, L. E. (1995). Handbook of
adolescent health risk behavior. New York: Plenum.
*Dolcini, M. M., & Adler, N. E. (1994). Perceived competencies, peer
group affiliation, and risk behavior among early adolescents. Health
Psychology, 13, 496-506.
*Dwyer, R., Richardson, D., Ross, M. W., Wodak, A., Miller, M. E., &
Gold, J. (1994). A comparison of HTV risk between women and men
who inject drugs. AIDS Education and Prevention, 6, 379-389.
*Ebbeson, E. B., & Haney, M. (1973). Flirting with death: Variables
affecting risk taking at intersections. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy, 3, 303-324.
*Eysenck, S. B. G., & Eysenck, H. J. (1977). The place of impulsiveness
in a dimensional system of personality description. British Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology, 16, 57—68.
*Fagley, N. S., & Miller, P. M. (1990). The effect of framing on choice:
Interactions with risk-taking propensity, cognitive style, and sex. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 496-510.
*Farrington, D. P., & Kidd, R. F. (1977). Is financial dishonesty a rational
decision? British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 16, 139-
146.
*Finney, P. D. (1984). Coparticipant effects on subjects' decisions to
consent for risk-involving research. Journal of Social Psychology, 124,
35-41.
*Flaherty, J. F., & Arenson, S. J. (1978). A test of two theories in the initial
process stage of coalition formation. Social Behavior and Personality, 6,
141-146.
*Flisher, A. J., & Chalton, D. O. (1995). High-school dropouts in a
working class South African community: Selected characteristics and
risk-talcing behavior. Journal of Adolescence, 18, 105-121.
*Foersterling, F. (1980). Sex differences in risk-taking: Effects of subjec-
tive and objective probability of success. Personality and Social Psy-
chology Bulletin, 6, 149-152.
*Freeman, R. C., Rodriguez, G. M., & French, J. F. (1994). A comparison
of male and female intravenous drug users' risk behaviors for HIV
infection. American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 20, 129-157.
Furby, L., & Beyth-Marom, R. (1992). Risk taking in adolescence: A
decision-making perspective. Developmental Review, 12, 1-44.
*Furnham, A., & Saipe, J. (1993). Personality correlates of convicted
drivers. Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 329-336.
*Gallois, C., Kashima, Y., Terry, D., McCamish, M., Timmons, P., &
Chauvin, A. (1992). Safe and unsafe sexual intentions and behavior: The
effects of norms and attitudes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22,
1521-1545.
*Gibbons, F. X., & Gerrard, M. (1995). Predicting young adults' health
risk behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, SOS-
SI?.
*Gibbons, F. X., Gerrard, M., & McCoy, S. B. (1995). Prototype percep-
tion predicts (lack of) pregnancy prevention. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 85-93.
*Ginsburg, H. J., & Miller, S. M. (1982). Sex differences in children's
risk-taking behavior. Child Development, 53, 426-428.
*Grupp, S. E., McCain, M. J., & Schmitt, R. L. (1971). Marijuana use in
a small college: A midwest example. International Journal of the
Addictions, 6, 463-485.
Halpern, D. F. (1992). Sex differences in cognitive abilities (2nd ed.).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
 RISK TAKING
*Hayes, C. S. (1973). Risk taking by retarded and nonretarded children.
Psychological Reports, 32, 738.
Hedges, L. V. (1994). Fixed effects models. In H. Cooper & L. V. Hedges
(Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis (pp. 285-299). New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis.
New York: Academic Press.
*Heilizer, F., & Cutter, H. S. G. (1971). Generality and correlates of risks
taking. Journal of General Psychology, 85, 259-283.
*Hudgens, G. A., & Fatkin, L. T. (1985). Sex differences in risk-taking:
Repeated sessions on a computer simulation task. Journal of Psychol-
ogy, 119, 197-206.
*Ingersoll, G. M., Grizzle, K., Beiter, M., & Orr, D. P. (1993). Frequent
somatic complaints and psychosocial risk in adolescents. Journal of
Early Adolescence, 13, 67-78.
*Ingersoll, G. M., & Orr, D. P. (1989). Behavioral and emotional risk in
early adolescents. Journal of Early Adolescence, 9, 396-408.
Irwin, C. E., & Millstein, S. G. (1991). Correlates and predictors of
risk-taking behavior. In L. P. Lipsitt & L. L. Mitnick (Eds.), Self-
regulatory behavior and risk-taking: Causes and consequences (pp.
3-21). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
*Irwin, F. W., & Tolkmitt, F. (1968). Buying insurance in an urn-scheme
experiment. Psychonomic Science, 12, 287—289.
*Jackson, T. T., & Gray, M. (1976). Field study of risk-taking behavior of
automobile drivers. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 43, 471-474.
*Jamieson, B. D. (1969). The influences of birth order, family size, and sex
differences on risk-taking behaviour. British Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, 8, 1-8.
*Jessor, R., Van den Bos, I., Vanderryn, J., Costa, F. M., & Turbin, M. S.
(1995). Protective factors in adolescent problem behavior: Moderator
effects and developmental change. Developmental Psychology, 31, 923-
933.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
*Karabenick, S. A., & Addy, M. M. (1979). Locus of control and sex
differences in skill and chance risk-taking conditions. Journal of Gen-
eral Psychology, 100, 215-228.
*Kass, N. (1964). Risk in decision making as a function of age, sex, and
probability preference. Child Development, 35, 577-582.
*Kelling, G. W., Zirkes, R., & Myerowitz, D. (1976). Risk as value: A
switch of set hypothesis. Psychological Reports, 38, 655-658.
*Kogan, N., & Dorros, K. (1978). Sex differences in risk taking and its
attribution. Sex Roles, 4, 755-765.
*Kogan, N., & Wallach, M. A. (1964). Risk-taking: A study in cognition
and personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
*Kohler, M. P. (1996). Risk-taking behavior: A cognitive approach. Psy-
chological Reports, 78, 489-490.
*Kopfstein, D. (1973). Risk-taking and cognitive style. Child Develop-
ment, 44, 190-192.
*Kourilsky, M., & Campbell, M. (1984). Sex differences in a simulated
classroom economy: Children's beliefs about entrepreneurship. Sex
Roles, 10, 53-66.
*Kreitler, S., & Zigler, E. (1990). Motivational determinants of children's
probability learning. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 151, 301-316.
"Krishna, K. P. (1981). Risk taking among Indian adolescents. Journal of
Social Psychology, 114, 293-294.
*Lamm, H. (1979). Geschlecht und alter als einfluBfaktoren der risikobe-
reitschaft bei entscheidungen fiir die eigene und eine andere person [Sex
and age effects in risk proneness when making decisions for oneself and
another person]. Zeischriftfiir experimented und angewandte psycholo-
gic, 26, 496-408.
*Lampert, A., & Yassour, J. (1992). Parental investment and risk taking in
simulated family situations. Journal of Economic Psychology, 13, 499-
507.
381
*Leigh, B. C., Temple, M. T., & Trocki, K. F. (1993). The sexual behavior
of US adults: Results from a national survey. American Journal of
Public Health, 83, 1400-1408.
*Lettman, D. S. (1981). Relationships between self-esteem, risk-taking,
involvement, certainty, sex, and college major in vocational choice.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati.
*Levin, I. P., & Chapman, D. P. (1993). Risky decision making and
allocation of resources for leukemia and AIDS programs. Health Psy-
chology, 12, 110-117.
*Levin, I. P., Snyder, M. A., & Chapman, D. P. (1988). The interaction of
experiential and situational factors and gender in a simulated risky
decision-making task. Journal of Psychology, 122, 173-181.
Lopes, L. L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20,
pp. 255-295). New York: Academic Press.
*Lupfer, M., Jones, M., & Spaulding, L. (1971). Risk-taking in cooperative
and competitive dyads. Conflict Resolution, 25, 387-394.
*Martinez, J. C. (1995). Risk taking on gender-typed tasks following an
assignment based on sex. Journal of Social Psychology, 135, 573-579.
*Marruza, V. R. (1970). An investigation of the effects of strategy avail-
ability, bankroll, and sex on risk-taking behavior measured in a psycho-
metric context. Journal of Personality, 38, 146-160.
*McCormack, A. S., Anderton, J., & Barbieri, T. (1993). Gender, HIV
awareness, and prevention among college students. College Student
Journal, 27, 514-520.
*McDonald, G. W. (1976). Sex, religion, and risk-taking behavior as
correlates of death anxiety. Omega, 7, 35-44.
*McGaffney, T. N. (1976). Motivational determinants of decision-making
in a triadic coalition game. Journal of General Psychology, 94, 167-185.
*McKelvie, S. J., & Schamer, L. A. (1988). Effects of night, passengers,
and sex on driver behavior at stop signs. Journal of Social Psychology,
128, 585-590.
*Michaels, T. F., & Getting, E. R. (1979). The informed consent dilemma:
An empirical approach. Journal of Social Psychology, 109, 223-230.
*Miller, A. S., & Hoffman, J. P. (1995). Risk and religion: An explanation
of gender differences in religiosity. Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, 34, 63-75.
*Miller, D. C., & Byrnes, J. P. (1997). The role of contextual and personal
factors in children's risk taking. Developmental Psychology, 33, 814-
823.
*Miller, K. E. (1987). Adolescents' same-sex and opposite-sex peer rela-
tions: Sex differences in popularity, social skills, and perceived social
competence. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Purdue University.
*Miller, P. M., & Fagley, N. S. (1991). The effects of framing, problem
variations, and providing rationale on choices. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 5, 517-522.
*Mindock, R. (1972). Risk taking as a function of an individual's impres-
sion of the power situation. Psychological Reports, 31, 471-474.
*Minton, H. L., & Miller, A. G. (1970). Group risk taking and internal-
external control of group members. Psychological Reports, 26, 431-
436.
"Montgomery, G. T., & Landers, W. F. (1974). Transmission of risk-taking
through modeling at two age levels. Psychological Reports, 34, 1187-
1196.
*Moore, D. S., & Erickson, P. I. (1985). Age, gender, and ethnic differ-
ences in sexual and contraceptive knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors.
Family and Community Health, 8, 38—51.
*Moore, S. M., & Rosenthal, D. A. (1991). Condoms and coitus: Adoles-
cents' attitudes to AIDS and safe sex behavior. Journal of Adoles-
cence, 14, 211-227.
*Moore, S. M., & Rosenthal, D. A. (1992). Australian adolescents' per-
ceptions of health-related risks. Journal of Adolescent Research, 7,
177-191.
*Morrongiello, B. A., & Bradley, M. D. M. (1997). Sibling power: influ-
382 BYRNES, MILLER, AND SCHAFER
ence of older siblings' persuasive appeals on younger siblings' judg-
ments about risk taking behaviours. Injury Prevention, 3, 23-28.
*Muldrow, T. W., & Bayton, J. A. (1979). Men and women executives and
processes related to decision accuracy. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, 2, 99-106.
*Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). The effects of framing and
negotiator overconfidence on bargaining behaviors and outcomes. Acad-
emy of Management Journal, 28, 34-49.
*Ottomanelli, C. (1993). Risk dimensions of HIV-tested substance abusers.
International Journal of the Addictions, 28, 1487-1495.
*Parra, M. J. (1988). Risk seeking and risk aversion in the social dating
situation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Oklahoma State University.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive
decision-maker. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
*Poppen, P. J. (1994). Adolescent contraceptive use and communication:
Changes over a decade. Adolescence, 29, 503—514.
*Poppen, P. J. (1995). Gender and patterns of sexual risk taking in college
students. Sex Roles, 32, 545-555.
*Potts, R., Doppler, M., & Hernandez, M. (1994). Effects of television
content on physical risk-taking in children. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology, 58, 321-331.
*Potts, R., Martinez, I. G., & Dedmon, A. (1995). Childhood risk taking
and injury: Self-report and informant measures. Journal of Pediatric
Psychology, 20, 5-12.
*Reardon, M. M. (1981). Alternative curriculum and risk taking. Unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut.
*Reddon, J. R., Pope, G. A., Friel, J. P., & Sinha, B. K. (1996). Leisure
motivation in relation to psychosocial adjustment and personality in
young offender and high school samples. Journal of Clinical Psychol-
ogy, 52, 679-685.
*Roberts, G. C. (1975). Sex and achievement motivation effects on risk
taking. Research Quarterly, 46, 58-67.
Rosenthal, R. (1994). Parametric measures of effect size. In H. Copper &
L. V. Hedges (Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis (pp. 231-244).
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
*Rotheram-Borus, M. J., Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F. L., Koopman, C., Rosario,
M., Exner, T. M., Henderson, R., Matthieu, M., & Gruen, R. S. (1992).
Lifetime sexual behaviors among runaway males and females. Journal
of Sex Research, 29, 15-29.
*Rothman, A. J., Salovey, P., Antone, C., Keough, K., & Martin, C. D.
(1993). The influence of message framing on intentions to perform
health behaviors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 408-
433.
*Rowe, K. E. (1991). Adolescents' perceptions of family cohesion and
family adaptability and their relationship to gender and risk-taking
behaviors. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Oklahoma State Univer-
sity.
*Rudolph, B. A. (1996). Gender differences in adolescent depression: A
consequence of exposure to adverse life circumstances and the loss of
parental support. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
*Rutte, C. G., Wilke, H. A., & Messick, D. M. (1987). The effects of
framing social dilemmas as give-some or take-some games. British
Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 103-108.
*Sadava, S. W., & Forsyth, R. (1976). Decisions about drug use: An
application of the choice-shifts paradigm. Psychological Reports, 38,
1119-1133.
Schafer, W. D. (in press). An overview of meta-analysis. Measurement and
Evaluation in Education and Development.
*Scherer, R. F. (1987). A social learning model explanation for the
development of entrepreneurial characteristics and career selection.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Mississippi.
*Schilling, R. F., El-Bassel, N., Schinke, S. P., Nichols, S., Botvin, G. J.,
& Orlandi, M. A. (1991). Sexual behavior, attitudes toward safer sex,
and gender among a cohort of 244 recovering IV drug users. Interna-
tional Journal of the Addictions, 26, 859-877.
*Schwartz, H. S. (1983). Relationships between risk-taking judgment in the
decision-making process, self-esteem and sex-role orientation of adults.
Unpublished doctoral disseration, Fordham University.
*Seeborg, I., Lafollette, W., & Belohlav, J. (1980). An exploratory analysis
of effect of sex on shift in choices. Psychological Reports, 46, 499-504.
*Shaw, D. S., Wagner, E. F., Arnett, J., & Aber, M. S. (1992). The factor
structure of the Reckless Behavior Questionnaire. Journal of Youth and
Adolescence, 21, 305-315.
*Sheer, V. C., & Cline, R. J. W. (1995). Individual differences in sensation
seeking and sexual behavior: Implications for communication interven-
tion for HIV/AIDS prevention among college students. Health Commu-
nication, 7, 205-223.
*Sitkin, S. B., & Weingart, L. R. (1995). Determinants of risky decision-
making behavior: A test of the mediating role of risk perceptions and
propensity. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1573—1592.
*Sivak, M., Soler, J., & Trankle, U. (1989). Cross-cultural differences in
driver risk-taking. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 21, 363—369.
*Slakter, M. J. (1967). Risk taking on objective examinations. American
Educational Research Journal, 4, 31-43.
*Slakter, M. J. (1969). Generality of risk taking on objective examinations.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 29, 115—128.
*Slakter, M. J., Koehler, R. A., & Hampton, S. H. (1971). Sex, grade level,
and risk taking on objective examinations. Journal of Experimental
Education, 39, 65-69.
Slovic, P. (1964). Assessment of risk taking behavior. Psychological
Bulletin, 61, 220-233.
*Slovic, P. (1966). Risk-taking in children: Age and sex differences. Child
Development, 37, 169-176.
Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1988). Decision-making. In
R. C. Atkinson et al. (Eds.), Steven's handbook of experimental psychol-
ogy. Vol. 2: Learning and cognition (pp. 673-738). New York: Wiley.
*Snyder, S. (1984). Risk taking behavior of normal and mentally handi-
capped adolescents and the relationship of this behavior to learning.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University.
*Sorrentino, R. M., Hewitt, E. C., & Raso-Knott, P. A. (1992). Risk-taking
in games of chance and skill: Informational and affective influences on
choice behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62,
522-533.
*Spears, R., Abraham, S. C. S., Abrams, D., & Sheeran, P. (1992). Framing
in terms of 'high-risk groups" versus "risky practices" and prognoses of
HIV infection. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 195-201.
*Speltz, M. L., Gonzales, N., Sulzbacher, S., & Quan, L. (1990). Assess-
ment of injury risk in young children: A preliminary study of the injury
behavior checklist. Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 15, 373-383.
*Stanford, M. S., Greve, K. W., Boudreaux, J. K., Mathias, C. W., &
Brumbelow, J. L. (1996). Impulsiveness and risk-taking behavior: Com-
parison of high school and college students using the Barratt Impulsive-
ness Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 21, 1073-1075.
*Stapp, B. C. (1986). An investigation of the characteristics of midlife
career change and midlife transition. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Texas Women's University.
*Starrett, R. H. (1983). The conceptual commonality between impulsive-
ness as a personality trait and as an ego development stage. Personality
and Individual Differences, 4, 265-274.
*Steptoe, A., Wardle, J., Smith, H., Kopp, M., Arpad, S., Vinck,}., & Zotti,
A. M. (1995). Tobacco smoking in young adults from 21 countries:
Associations with attitudes and risk awareness. Addiction, 90, 571-582.
*Struckman-Johnson, D., & Struckman-Johnson, C. (1996). Can you say
condom? It makes a difference in fear-arousing AIDS prevention public
service announcements. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26,
1068-1083.
*Tinsley, B. J., Holtgrave, D. R., Reise, S. P., Erdley, C., & Cupp, R. G.
 RISK TAKING 383

(1995). Developmental status, gender, age, and self-reported decision-
making influences on students' risky and preventative health behaviors.
Health Education Quarterly, 22, 244-259.
*Touhey, J. C. (1971). Risk-taking preferences of college students in
Canada and the United States. Psychological Reports, 29, 512.
*Traub, R. E., & Hambleton, R. K. (1972). The effect of scoring instruc-
tions and degree of speededness on the validity and reliability of
multiple-choice tests. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 32,
737-758.
*Trocki, K. F. (1992). Patterns of sexuality and risky sexuality in the
general population of one California county. Journal of Sex Re-
search, 29, 85-94.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
*Walesa, C. (1975). Children's approaches to chance- and skill-dependent
risk. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 6, 131-138.
*Ward, D. A., Seccombe, K., & Bendel, R. (1988). Influenceability of sex
differences under conditions of risk taking. Journal of General Psychol-
ogy, 115, 247-255.
*Warren, R. A., & Simpson, H. M. (1980). Exposure and alcohol as risk
factors in the fatal nighttime collisions of men and women drivers.
Journal of Safety Research, 12, 151-156.
*Wayment, H. A., Newcomb, M. D., & Hannemanm, V. L. (1993). Female
and male intravenous drug users not-in-treatment: Are they at differen-
tial risk for AIDS? Sex Roles, 28, 111-124.
*West, G. B., Moskal, P. D., Dziuban, C. D., & Rumbough, L. P. (1996).
Gender and marital differences for risk taking among undergraduates.
Psychological Reports, 78, 315-320.
*White, H. R., & Johnson, V. (1988). Risk taking as a predictor of
adolescent sexual activity and use of contraception. Journal of Adoles-
cent Research, 3, 317-331.
Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (1992). The development of achievement task
values: A theoretical analysis. Developmental Review, 12, 265-310.
*Williams, A. F. (1973). Personality and other characteristics associated
with cigarette smoking among young teenagers. Journal of Health and
Social Behavior, 14, 374-380.
Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (1985). Competitiveness, risk-taking, and vio-
lence: The young male syndrome. Ethnology and Sociobiology, 6, 59-
73.
*Wilson, M., Daly, M., Gordon, S., & Pratt, A. (1996). Sex differences in
valuations of the environment? Population and Environment, 18, 143-
157.
*Wyatt, G. (1988). Sex and income differences in avoiding costs. Sociol-
ogy and Social Research, 72, 168-172.
*Yesmont, G. A. (1992). The relationship of assertiveness to college
students' safer sex behaviors. Adolescence, 27, 253-272.
*Yinon, Y., Jaffe, Y., & Feshbach, S. (1975). Risky aggression in individ-
uals and groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31,
808-815.
*Zeff, L. E., Fremgen, B., & Martinez, J. C. (1994). Implications of gender
differences for managers. Psychological Reports, 74, 755—763.
Zuckerman, M. (1991). Psychobiology of personality. Cambridge, En-
gland: Cambridge University Press.
*Zuckerman, M., Ball, S. A., & Black, J. (1990). Influences of sensation
seeking, gender, risk appraisal, and situational motivation on smoking.
Addictive Behaviors, 15, 209-220.
Received July 7, 1997
Revision received September 9, 1998
Accepted October 14, 1998

ORDER FORM Send me a Free Sample Issue Q

Start my 1999 subscription to Psychological Bulletin!
ISSN: 0033-2909
Q Check Enclosed (make payable to APA)
$76.00, APA Member/Affiliate Charge my: Q VISAQMasterCard Q American Express
$153.00, Individual Non-Member. Cardholder Name
$315.00, Institution Card No. Exp. date
TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED $.
Signature (Required for Charge)
Subscription orders must be prepaid. (Subscriptions are on Credit Card
a calendar basis only.) Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery of the Billing Address
first issue. Call for international subscription rates. _ State Zip.
SEND THIS ORDER FORM TO:
Daytime Phone
American Psychological Association SHIP TO:
Subscriptions Name.
750 First Street, NE Address
Washington, DC 20002-4242 Cirv State 7,in
Or call (800) 374-2721, fax (202) 336-5568. APA Customer #
TDD/TTf (202)336-6123. Email: subscriptions@apa.org GAD99_
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE - A PHOTOCOPY MAY BE USED