MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at
the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be
with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is
qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently
providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial
evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural
born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino.It ruled that
a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions
in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings are citizens under
international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo

January 19, 1962 4SCRA 1

Ponente: CJ Bengzon

Facts: December 19, 1961, Aytona was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank and took
oath and office on the same date. Noon of December 30, 1961 President elect D. Macapagal
assumed office and subsequently on December 31, 1961 issued Order No. 2, cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by the previous Chief of State. On the 1st day of January 1962, Castillo
was appointed by the incumbent president as Governor of Central Bank therefor replacing the ad
interim appointee Aytona, and the former qualified immediately. Aytona instituted a qou warranto
proceeding challenging the right of Castillo to exercise his right to the said post.

Issue: Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments made
by the previous president after they have all qualified?

Held: To quote “We are informed, it is Malacañan's practice — which we find to be logical — to
submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One
good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are
submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacañan submitted its appointments on the
same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it
foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his
predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for
confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.”

Arigo v Swift

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel
“to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship
left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast
of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
 Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically,

it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens
to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art.
31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters
and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses
of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and
deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does
not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they
will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from
the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection
of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Saguisag v. ochoa

FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court
in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that
EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section
25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they
reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the
Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT
because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it
allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA
and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The
very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive
agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in
painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal
mandate with which they are concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and
works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation
of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international
agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument
– to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter,
agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or
even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international
agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional
requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two
very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms
of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are
products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely
executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being
on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement
are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the
whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court
remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.
We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance
our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.

Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016 with former C.J. Sereno’s Dissenting Opinion
AUGUST 20, 2018
FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their capacities
as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the
Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member
of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced
disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others,
in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during
the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional
Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of
the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses
a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws.
RULING:
Justiciable controversy
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion
of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be
beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred
at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to
allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on
his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
Locus standi
Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act
complained of, such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities
as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal
standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the
wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws
or jurisprudence.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to
prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be
filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in
the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
Constitutionality
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of
not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the
ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support
their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec.
3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything
remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing.
Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.”
xxx
The petitions must be dismissed.
Note:
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:
The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this
Court must zealously protect.
Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’
enduring values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That this
is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly comported itself in its constitutional role
has been declared in various fashions by the Court itself.
See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women, children, labor,
the indigenous people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of their
human rights.
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection of
human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of kalikasan,
habeas data, and amparo.
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the
cherished values of the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be
passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But when called upon to
discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the
protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It cannot,
in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.