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Arsyad al-Banjari's Dialectical Model for Integrating Indonesian Traditional

Uses into Islamic Law Arguments on Manyanggar, Membuang Pasilih and
Lahang

Preprint · May 2019

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 1

Arsyad al-Banjari’s Dialectical Model for Integrating Indonesian

Traditional Uses into Islamic Law
Arguments on Manyanggar, Membuang Pasilih and Lahang

MUHAMMAD IQBAL
Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France; and
Islamic University Antasari, Banjarmasin, Indonesia
iqbal.ego@gmail.com

SHAHID RAHMAN
Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France
shahid.rahman@univ-lille3.fr

Abstract:

Despite the fact that the spread of Islam in Indonesia can perhaps be traced
back to the 9th century, it had to wait until the 17th and 18th centuries to reach
its full cultural, scientific and institutional outcomes. One crucial challenge was
one that nowadays rises up in our modern society, namely finding out ways of
cultural integration.

In Borneo, strategies of integration involved pondering the legal status of

uses of the Banjarese tradition, which were the dominant tribe in these times.
Particularly so, since as in every legal system, Islamic Law contained the
principle that what is not explicitly forbidden is allowed. It is here where the
work of Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (in English Arshad al-Banjari)
who lived from 1721 to 1810, becomes relevant. Indeed, Arsyad al-Banjari, of
Banjarese origins himself, and whose writings were in Banjarese, applied a
model of integration based on a dialectical constitution of qiyās, the legal
argumentation theory for parallel reasoning and analogy, he learned from the
Shāfi‘ī-school of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh).

Our paper focuses in the model of integration proposed and practiced by

al-Banjari, a rational debate grounded on a dynamic view on legal systems. We
will illustrate the method with the help of two different kinds of qiyās deployed
by al-Banjari in order to argue for the rejection of some traditional Banjaresse
offering-rituals for avoiding disease or calamities (Manyanggar and
Membuang Pasilih), and for the acceptance of the use of consumming the
traditional drink called Lahang made of the juice of sugar-palm. As we see
from our dialogical reconstruction the debates, particularly the one concerning
Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih are quite sophisticated, with a Banjarese
opponent that does not surrender easily to the rejection of his use of those
rituals.
 2

More generally, the point is that Arsyad al-Banjari’s sets a paradigm on

how to implement the idea that Law is largely a matter of practice, and that one
of the most suitable instruments for legal practice is a dialectical framework
that calls for a collective act of understanding.

The paper will also provide the first translation from the Indonesian of the
Relevant texts and a study of the dialectical structure of the qiyās involved.

Introduction

Despite the fact that the spread of Islam in Indonesia can perhaps be traced
back to the 9th century, it had to wait until the 17th and 18th centuries to reach
its full cultural, scientific and institutional outcomes. One crucial challenge was
one that nowadays rises up in our modern society, namely finding out ways of
cultural integration.

In Borneo, integration committed to the task of pondering the legal status

of uses of the Banjarese tradition, which were the dominant tribe in these
times. 1 Particularly so, since as in every legal system, Islamic Law contained
the principle that what is not explicitly forbidden is allowed. 2

It is here where the work of Sheikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (in

English Arsyad al-Banjari) who lived from 1721 to 1810, becomes relevant.
Indeed, Arsyad al-Banjari, of Banjarese origins himself, and whose writings
were in Banjarese-language, applied a model of integration based on a
dialectical understanding of qiyās, the legal theory for parallel reasoning and
analogy known as correlational inference,.

Al-Banjari learned the theory and practice of qiyās from the Shāfi‘ī-school
of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) including the work of one the most important
masters of that school, namely, Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (393H/1003-
476CE/1083CE); but he also integrated some further developments of the qiyās
as the ones of al-Ghazālī. 3

1
The Banjarese represent one of the largest tribe in Indonesia. Nowadays they are more than 4
million, mostly living in South Kalimantan.
2
That is, the principle that “the original state of things is permissibility except for what the Law
proscribes” (al-aṣl fi’l-ashyā’ al-ibāḥa illā mā ḥaẓarahu al-Sharʿ). See Ibn Ḥazm (1928-1933),
vol. 1, p. 177. See Rahman/Zidani/Young (2019, section V.
3
Whereas al-Ghazālī defended vehemently the use of qiyās, he did not share the opinion that the
occasioning factor can be identified by pure epistemological means. Epistemological methods
must be coupled with insights coming from revelation. Cf. al-Ghazālī (1324H, pp. 307-308) and
Hallaq (1987b, pp. 61-62).This seems to be the interpretation of al-Ghazālī' followed by al-
Banjari. Perhaps, one way to put al-Ghazālī's point is as stressing the fact that the epistemological
means provided by qiyās pave the way for understanding the intention of the norms by the
Lawgiver. Once the way has been opened by epistemological means, revelation can bring the
deeper insight required for approaching certainty. Keeping in mind the due differences, we might
 3

Let us point out that al-Banjari endorsement of a dialectical understanding

of drawing inferences by qiyās is not only crucial for the model of integration
he puts into practice but it also relates to two main hallmarks of legal reasoning
within Islamic Law highlighted and developed by Walter Edward Young
(2017) in his work The Dialectical Forge. In a nutshell: the shaping of qiyās by
means of Jadal, the Islamic framework for Argumentation, allows to
implement the stances that (1) legal reasoning is largely a matter of practice,
and that (2) the openness of the domain of application of a Law requires a
dynamic instrument for extending this domain.

In this context, one cannot overestimate the work of al-Banjari, who sets a
paradigm on how to apply a dialectical constitution of qiyās in order to
integrate new cultural contexts into the scope of Islamic Law.

We will illustrate the method of integration applied by al-Banjari with the

help of two different kind of qiyās deployed by al-Banjari, namely,

the argument for the interdiction of the traditional Banjaresse offering-

rituals for avoiding disease or calamities called respectively Manyanggar
and Membuang Pasilih,

the argument for the allowance of consuming the traditional drink called
Lahang (even when fermented) made of the juice of sugar-palm.

Whereas the debate on the former takes the form of qiyās al-shabah
(argument by analogy), the second one is shaped by qiyās al-‘illa –
argumentation-schemes based on establishing the occasioning factor (or ratio
legis) that grounds the juridical decision at stake.

As we shall see from our dialogical reconstruction, the debate concerning

Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih is quite sophisticated, with a Banjarese
opponent that does not surrender easily to the rejection of his use of those
rituals.

The paper will also provide the first translation from the Indonesian of the
Relevant texts and a study of the dialectical structure of the qiyās involved.

In the next section we will briefly recall the main notions involving the
objectives and feature of the dialectical constitution of qiyās,

parallel al-Ghazālī's point with Freg'es view that though concepts are ontological independent of
the logical analysis that makes them explicit and therefore publically accessible to human
understanding, this analysis clears the way to the grasping of those concepts. Nevertheless,
different to al-Ghazālī, Frege thinks that logical analysis is the only way.
 4

2 Basics on Qiyās,

Let us recall that one of the finest outcomes of the argumentative approach
to legal reasoning within fiqh (Islamic Law) is the notion of qiyās, known as
correlational inference. 4

The aim of co-relational inferences is to provide a rational ground for the

application of a juridical ruling to a given case not yet considered by the original
juridical sources. It proceeds by combining heuristic (and/or hermeneutic) moves
with logical inferences. The simplest form follows the following pattern:

• In order to establish if a given juridical ruling applies or not to a given

case, called the branch-case, we look for a case we already know that
falls under that ruling – the so-called root-case. Then we search for
the property or set of properties upon which the application of the
ruling to the root-case is grounded (the ratio legis or legal cause for
that juridical decision).

If that grounding property (or set of them) is known, we ponder if

it can also be asserted of the new case under consideration. In the
case of an affirmative answer, it is inferred that the new case also
falls under the juridical ruling at stake, and so the range of its
application is extended. When the legal cause is explicitly known
(by the sources) or made explicit by specifying a relevant set of
properties, we are in present of an inference by qiyās al-‘illa or
correlational inference by the occasioning factor.

When the grounds behind a given juridical ruling are neither

explicit nor can they be made explicit we are in presence of
correlational inferences by indication (qiyās al-dalāla) or by
resemblance (qiyās al-shabah). Whereas the former are based on
pinpointing at specific relevant parallelisms between rulings (qiyās
al-dalāla), the latter are based on resemblances between properties
(qiyās al-shabah).

Thus, qiyās al-dalāla and qiyās al-shabah, sometimes broadly referred as

arguments by analogy (or better by the Latin denomination arguments a pari) are
put into action when there is absence of knowledge of the occasioning factor
grounding the application of a given ruling. The plausibility of a conclusion
attained by parallelism between rulings (qiyās al-dalāla) is considered to be of a
higher epistemic degree than the conclusion obtained by resemblance of the

4
Cf. Young (2017, p. 10). The term has quite often a broader meaning encompassing legal
reasoning in general. However, Young’s choice for its translation renders a narrower sense that
stems from approach of the Shafi‘ī’s.
 5

branch-case and the root-case in relation to some set of (relevant) properties

(qiyās al-shabah). Conclusions obtained by either qiyās al-dalāla or qiyās al-
shabah, have a lower degree of epistemic plausibility as conclusions inferred by
the deployment of qiyās al-‘illa, where the occasioning factor can be pinpointed.

One cardinal feature of al-Shīrāzī’s take on qiyās al-‘illa, is the

development of the test of efficiency or taʾthīr, that provides the means to test
whether the property P purported to be relevant for the juridical sanction at stake
is indeed so. The test declines into two complementary procedures:

testing co-extensiveness or ṭard (if the property is present then the

sanction too), and

testing co-exclusiveness or ʿaks (if the property is absent then so is

the juridical sanction. While co-extensiveness examines whether
sanction H follows from the verification of the presence of the
property P, co-exclusiveness examines whether exemption from
the sanction H follows from the verification of the absence of P. 5

The method of efficiency is largely used by al-Banjari, particularly so in

his argument for the legal validity of consuming Lahang.

Interesting is, that whereas in order to reject the traditional Banjaresse

offering-ceremonies Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih, al-Banjari deploys
qiyās al-shabah, which yields the lowest form of epistemic certainty, he deploys
qiyās al-‘illa, which provides the highest form of epistemic certainty, for the
acceptance of the use of consuming Lahang.

Let us now display the dialogues based on the arguments of the texts and
shaped by the structure of the Islamic argumentation form.

3 Two Dialogues On Integration

Arsyad al-Banjari’s own presentation takes the form of text with the
headings question, response, instead of Proponent and Oppoent, usually
deployed within the framework of Jadal. This makes al-Banjari’s texts more
difficult to follow, particulary so when counter-attacks trigger a change of roles
between respondent and challenger.

In order to facilitate the reading, before providing the text, we will first
sketch very briefly the argumentation pattern and then we will proceed by
displaying the argument in a dialogical form. After presenting the dialogue we

5
See Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2019, Preface).
 6

will provide a detailed analysis commenting the main moves from the point of
view of Islamic Argumentation theory.

Arsyad al-Banjari's Jadal

for a qiyās al-shabah on Manyanggar and Membuang Pasilih

Manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are offering-rituals practised within

the Banjarese tradition in which people give certain offerings. The manyanggar –
ceremony of offering is practiced in order appease evil spirits and their influences.
The mambuang pasilih-offerings seek to appease the so-called hidden family. The
hidden family can refer to an ancient king that passed away and to some his
descendants or followers believed to be still alive but hidden.

Banjarese believed that if these rituals are not carried out the evil or the
hidden family will do harm such as bringing in disaster or disease. See
Mujiburrahman (2014).

The argument is quite sophisticated and involves counterattacks which

induce change of burden of the proof. As mentioned above, it has the form qiyās
al-shabah and it therefore grounded on establishing analogy by the similarity of
the branch-case and the root-case. Actually the argument displays the intertwining
of several analogies and it deploys al- Ghazālī's theory or appropriateness or
relevance munāsaba – the argument deploys lack of relevance as grounds for
rejecting the similarity brought forward by the Opponent.

The complexity of the argument does not only stem from its argumentative
structure but it is also generated by important philosophical matters. Indeed, the
strongest passages of the argument set up analogies involving epistemological and
theological issues concerning causation.
The argument starts by grounding its thesis (the interdiction) in the resemblance of the
branch-case, the rituals of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih, and the root-case, acts of
wasting based on idolatry and practicing heretical innovation, which amounts to
following the steps of Satan.
This is contested by another analogy brought forward by the clever Opponent who
compares the resemblance of the belief on the healing and preventing powers of the
contested rituals with the (established) belief that the power of fire to burn dry objects and
the power of food to satiate is in fact due to Allah's power to enact those effects. In other
words the Opponent is asserting the similarity of the branch-case with some other
alternative root-case in relation to the general property of believing that it is Allah the
only one who has the power to enact effects. Thus, carrying out the contested rituals is
not idolatry. The ones carrying out those rituals endorse after all the Islamic theory of
causation which establishes Allah as the true agent of efficiency (see remark below).
This allows the Opponent to force his antagonist to concede that, under these conditions,
practicing the rituals under consideration does not entail idolatry. Morever, since
 7

deploying fire and food is not forbidden, so must manyanggar and mambuang pasilih be
integrated into Law as permissible acts.

The Proponent, accepts that under these conditions the practice of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih do not entail idolatry. However he refuses that this should lead to their
permissibility. The Opponent's argument on the permissibility of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih, is based on an irrelevant similarity between the belief entailed by
deploying fire and food and the belief entailed by the practice of those ritual. The grounds
for refusing the proposed similarity are subtle and deeply entrenched in the Islamic theory
of causation endorsed by al-Banjari just mentioned. In a nutshell, while burning and
satiation are enacted by Allah through the natural beings food and fire (in that derivative
send we can speak of them of being natural causes), the contested rituals are not present
in nature and cannot be said to be in that sense natural causes of healing and prevention
of danger enacted by Allah. Therefore food and fire are different to manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih and hence, the deployment of food and fire in order to attain their
effects (by the enacting of Allah) is also different to carrying out those rituals.

At this point of the debate, the argumentation seems to get stuck. On one
hand the Opponent managed to convince the Proponent that there is no idolatry
behind the practices in question; on the other the Proponent forces the Opponent
to concede that the analogies brought so far into the debate do not justify its
permissibility. Nevertheless, the Proponent, who has the burden of the proof, did
not prove yet his thesis on the interdiction of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih.
Accordingly, the Proponent, starts developing another angle of attack. Actually,
the moves of both Opponent and Proponent, that follow this attack, seem to be
grounded in less convincing analogies.
The Proponent claims now that manyanggar and mambuang pasilih entail wasting and
those who waste are likened to devils and therefore likened to those who follow the steps
of Satan.

The Opponent refuses to accept these rituals entail wasting by comparing feeding his own
family or friends with feeding the hidden family.
The response of the Proponent is the expected one. What is the evidence for the hidden
family profiting of the offers? Opponent's reference to the story of Elders and of a
possessed person, do not provide evidence that the offers have not been wasted.
The Opponent ends up accepting that practicing manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
entail wasting and following the footsteps of Satan.

However, surprisingly, the Opponent claims that though the practices entail following
Satan, this does not make those practices forbidden acts. The reason he brings in is that,
the objective of the practice is still a permissible one, namely being healed. Moreover, the
Opponent proposes the following: while feeding Satan with the aim of healing we can do
as if we were feeding a dog. Feeding a dog is permissible after all and so is the aim of
practicing these rituals, namely, being healed.

The expected response, is that engaging in a despicable act even in order to attain not
forbidden objectives, does not make the act less forbidden. This is indeed one of three
counterarguments brought forward by the Proponent. However, al-Banjari adds a twist to
his response. Not only engaging in a despicable act in order to attain some permissible
objective, does not change the interdiction, by doing as if the being addressed by the act
(Satan) is something else (the dog), does not help in erasing despicability of the act (and
corresponding interdiction). The Proponent's counter-examples are almost shocking:
 8

Killing a person with the belief that this killing will bring relief to his heartache, makes it
not less despicable if while during the killing the murderer does as if he is killing a
mouse. He adds a second example of the same kind: committing adultery with the belief
that the intercourse will heal his rheumatism, does not become deontically acceptable,
even if during the intercourse the man does as if he is with his wife.

The Proponent, adds two more arguments, both of them amount to pinpointing out at the
dissimilarity between feeding a dog and feeding Satan and between Medicine as
acknowledged healing practice, and the rituals at stake. According to the Proponent, the
fact that feeding a dog and feeding Satan are different is made patent by the ways the
offering are carried out, leftovers for the dog, and the finest food for Satan. The third
dissimilarity seems to be more convincing to the modern reader: Medicine is practiced by
treating the body of the sick person by inducing ingestion or by semearing or spraying it.
This treatment impacts the body in such a way that it can be felt to be either cold or
warm. Clearly, this does not liken the purported healing practice of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih. These practices are not acknowledged medical practices

Finally, these last moves leads the Opponent to concede defeat

Remark. In order to follow the argument it is necessary to take into consideration that al-
Banjari follows here the notion of causation of al-Ghazālī, according to whom; Allah is
the only agent of effects. In other words, the burning of cotton is neither inherent to fire
(it is not in the nature of fire by itself, to put in the terminology of al-Banjari), nor did
Allah constituted fire in such a way that once it contacts cotton it burns. Cotton burns
when in contact with fire because Allah constituted fire in such a way that when in
contact with cotton it is he himself who enacts the burning. 6 In the dialogue both,
Opponent and Proponent share this view on causation.

O P
Manyanggar and mambuang pasilih 0
are forbidden
1 Why ? 0? According to the sources, tabdhīr 7 or 2
wasting is forbidden, isn’t it?

3 Yes, it is forbidden According to the sources, following 4

5 Yes, it is also forbidden
the footsteps of Satan is also
forbidden, isn’t it?
Moreover, according to the sources, 6
shirk 8 (idolatry or polytheism) and
bid‘a sayyi’a (heretical innovations)
are forbidden, aren’t they?

6
See Marmura (1965). Peter Adamson (1998), who has a slightly less occasionalist reading as the
one of Marmura expresses the point as follows;
his [Al-Ghazālī] critique here imputes a very strong notion of causality to the
philosophers: namely that given the existence of a cause, the existence of its effect is
necessary. Al-Ghazālī holds that, on such a notion of causality, only God is a cause. This
is because, given the existence of miracles, and accepting the proposition that God can
do anything, no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. It is always possible that
God might will the expected effect not to proceed, or will an entirely different effect to
proceed. Al-Ghazālī defends this view against both philosophers who claim that a natural
cause, such as the fire which causes the burning of cotton, is the sole and sufficient cause
for its effect.
7
Literally, tabdhīr means wasting or squandering.
8
Literally, shirk means ascribing a partner for God in lordship and worship.
 9

7 Yes, they are forbidden Manyanggar and mambuang pasilih 8

are shirk, in the sense that their
practice entails the belief it that sick
people cannot be cured or danger
cannot be avoided except only by
carrying them out. To put it another
way, it is believed that it is in the
nature of those acts to have the power
to cure or to avoid danger. So they
are forbidden, aren’t they?
9 No, they are not forbidden because Well, even if it is believed that they 10
we do not believe that the power to have not such a power by their own
cure or to avoid danger is in the nature, but it is believed that it is
nature of the ceremonies Allah who gave them the power to
themselves. enact healing and prevention of
danger, then they are still impious
heretic practices (bid‘a fāsiq). So they
are forbidden, aren’t they?
11 No, they are not forbidden because So, What is your view? 12
we do not have the belief that Allah
gave them the power to enact those
beneficial effects.
13 Well, it is not in the nature of fire Yes, it is. 14
and food to have by themselves the
power to burn or to satiate.
Moreover, it is not the case that
Allah gave them the power to burn
or to satiate. Indeed, it is rather the
case that Allah is the one who burns
and satiates by enacting the burning
of something dry when it is touched
by fire, and by enacting in the same
way that we become satiated when
we have food. Is it right?
15 So, there is no shirk and bid’a in Yes, I concede. 16
such belief involving the power of
Allah to enact the effects of fire and
food, right?
17 Likewise, the acts of manyanggar Yes, there is no shirk and bid’a in 18
and mambuang pasilih have no such belief.
power either by their own nature or
given by Allah to cure or avoid
danger. It is Allah who has the
power to cure and avoid danger by
enacting that if those acts are
carried out then, he himself, Allah,
cures and avoids the danger in the
time of carrying out these rituals.
So, there is no shirk and bid’a in
such a belief, right?
19 So, if deploying fire and food are No, I don’t agree. It is true that there 20
not forbidden, so must also the is no shirk and bid’a in your belief
practice of manyanggar and about manyanggar and mambuang
mambuang pasilih be not forbidden. pasilih. But, you cannot argue their
Is it right? permissibility based on the similarity
between your belief about their
effects and your belief about the
effects of deploying food and fire.
Certainly, food and fire are different
to manyanggar and mambuang
pasilih. Satiation is enacted by Allah
 10
21 Why?
23 I do not share at all the view that
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
entail tabdhīr (wasting).
Accordingly their practice does not
entail either following the footsteps
of Satan. In fact, those who practice
these rituals should not be likened
to devils.
25 Sharing food with (living) family
members with the intention of
helping each other is not forbidden,
right?
27 Manyanggar and membuang pasilih
consists in sharing food with the
invisible men who lived in the old
days with the intention that they
would relieve our troubles. So, they
are similar to sharing food with
(living) family members with the
intention of helping each other.
Hence, they do not entail wasting.
29 We have two evidences confirming
that who demands the offering of
food are the invisible men: first,
from the story the elders told us
about from generations to
generations; second, the words of a
possessed person who at the
moment of possession said: “O my
descendants give me food so that I
will help you to relieve your
difficulties and to cure your
through Food, a natural being; and
similary burning is enacted through
the natural being fire – we can say
then that in this sense fire and food
are natural causes of the effects of
burning and satiation enacted by
Allah. However, manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih are not present in
nature– we cannot say therefore that
these rituals are the natural causes of
the effects of healing and prevention
enacted by Allah. Thus, while the
deploying fire and food in order to
attain their effects involves natural
"causes", the effects of the practice of
the contested rituals does not involve
natural causes at all.
Furthermore, although according to
the belief associated to your practice
of manyanggar and mambuang
pasilih they are not to be considered
shirk, they are still forbidden
practices.
Manyanggar and mambuang pasilih 22
entail tabdhīr (wasting). Recall that
Allah strongly condemns those who
do tabdhīr and that they are likened
to devils and follow therefore Satan
footsteps by doing so. Is that right?
Can you develop your argument? 24
Yes 26
How do you know that the invisible 28
men who lived in the old days are still
alive and need to eat?
The story told by the elders 30
constitutes no valid justification for
the permissibility of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih because it is
merely based on prejudice and
delusion without evidence (dalīl)
confirming its truth. Moreover, the
words of a possessed person are not
legally valid to be evidence justifying
that who possesses the possessed
person is a man. On the contrary there
 11

illness”. is evidence from the sources that who

31 Ok, I concede manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih consists in
feeding Satan with the intention of
curing illness, but the rituals
themselves should be permissible.
33 Feeding a dog is permissible, right?
35 Healing is also permissible, right?
37 So, we suppose Satan likens a dog.
Accordingly, we feed Satan with
the intention of curing illness and in
doing so we do as if Satan is a dog.
So the feeding of Satan should not
forbidden. Don’t you agree?
39 Why?
possesses the possessed person is
Satan because some verses of Quran
and Hadith, and what jurists say
prove that only angels and devils can
enter into the body of a human […].
The difference between them is that
angels only suggest (God’s) guidance
and goodness while Satans only
suggest the wrong path and evil. So,
following the requests of a possessed
does not provide evidence that Satan
is not behind after all.
Why? 32
Yes. 34
Yes. 36
No, I do not agree. That does not 38
eliminate the tabdhīr and the
concomitant act of following the
footsteps of Satan. This kind of
feeding is forbidden.
I can bring three arguments backing 40
the interdiction.

41 Let us examine each of them Killing a mouse or having sexual 42

intercourse with your own wife is
permissible, right?
43 Yes. Curing heartache or rheumatism is 44
also permissible, right?
45 Yes. Is it permissible to kill someone with 46
the intention of healing heartache
even if while killing we do as if he is
a mouse? Is it permissible to commit
adultery in order to cure rheumatism
even if during the intercourse the
adulterous does as if he is with his
wife?
47 No, it is not permissible So, contrary to your claim feeding 48
Satan with the intention of healing,
even if when feeding you do as if you
were feeding a dog, is still a
despicable act, that must be
forbidden.

49 What is your second Feeding Satan is not similar at all to 50

counterexample? feeding a dog. What you do when
practicing manyanggar and
mammbuang pasilih indicates that
you venerate Satan. The feeding of
Satan contrasts strongly to the
feeding of a dog.

51 What is the difference? You do not give Satan leftover foods, 52

but you provide beautiful foods, and
you deliver it by putting it in
 12

decorated trays. Right?

53 Yes, it’s right. Mostly, you give a dog despicable 54
food that is put haphazardly in any
place. Right?
55 Yes, it’s right. So, what you do for Satan indicates 56
that you venerate Satan, This shows
that both kinds of feeding contrast
each other very sharply.
57 You said you have a third? Medicine is practiced by treating the 58
body of the sick person by inducing
ingestion or by semearing or spraying
it. This treatment impacts the body in
such a way that it can be felt to be
either cold or warm. Right?
59 Yes, it’s right. Thus, is the body of a sick person 60
treated in the same way in Medicine
as by means of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih?
61 No, they are not. Furtermore; is there any juridical 62
indication establishing that
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
are practices that are part of legally
acknowledged Medicine?
63 No, there is not. So, manyanggar and mambuang 64
pasilih neither by the way these
rituals are actually practiced nor by
juridical sanction can those practices
be called medicine.

[Summing up, though manyanggar

and mambuang pasilihe do not
involve idolatry they are not different
to wasteful practices and therefore,
who practices them is following the
footsteps of Satan. Every such an act
is to be thus forbidden].

Argumentative Analysis of the Dialogue

To be completed for September

Al-Banjari (1983) On the Interdiction of

Manyanggar and Mambuang pasilihe

O students! You should know that some �‫ﻫﻨﺪﻗ� اڠﻜﻮﻛﳤﻮى ﱔ ﻃﺎﻟﺐ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺘ‬
deeds that have become a custom in
some “lands below the wind” (Malay:
‫�ﺮ�ﺎدت ﻓﺪ ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ نڬﺮى �وﻩ ا�ﲔ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﳑﺒﻮاڠ‬

negeri bawah angin) 9 such as
mambuang pasilih, manyanggar and the
like are innovations (bid‘a) which are in
opposition to the quran, the hadith,
companion’s opinion (qawl ṣaḥāba) and
consensus of jurists (ijmā‘). Thus, they
are heretical innovations (bid‘at al-
ḍalāla), so that it is obligatory for those
who carried them out to repent. It is
also obligatory for kings and leaders to
abolish them since they are immoral
acts in which some evils are present;
and every evil act must be interdicted
and eliminated as [we find in] the
command of Allah and His messanger
in some verses of quran and hadith.
Question : how much evil is present in
the act of mambuang pasilih and
manyanggar? Response: well, there are
many evils contained in that act. One of
them is called tabdhīr that means
wasting by spending money/resources;
and a person that wastes and spends
money/resources is called mubadhdhir.
This is the evil that Allah and His
Prophet prohibit in certain verses of
quran and hadith as Allah’s word: “wa
lā tubadhdhir tabdhīrā. inna al-
mubadhdhirīna kānū ikhwān al-
shayāṭīn”. It means: “Do not spend
wastefully. Surely, the wasteful
[people] are brothers of the devils”.
That is to say, do not spend your
money/resources for forbidden acts,
because those who spend their
money/resources for a forbidden act
become nothing but brothers of the
devils by the fact that they are deceived
and together with devils they do what is
prohibited by Allah and His Messenger.
O intelligent brothers, listen to the
prohibition of Allah to do tabdhīr; and
[recall that] Allah strongly condemns
9
It is the ancient name of Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. See
Reid (1988).
13
‫ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ دان �ﺮڠي�ﻎ ﺳأٔﳁﺎڽ )�ﺋﺖ( ﺑﺪ�ﻪ‬
‫ﻫﻦ دڠﻦ ﻗﺮآٓن دان‬۲‫ﻓﺪ ﻓﺮ ﺑﻮا�ﻦ ﳘﺐ ﯾڠﱪﺳﻼ‬
‫�ﺪﯾﺚ دان ﻗﻮل ﲱﺎﺑﺔ دان اﺟﲈع ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء )ﻣﻚ‬
‫�ﺋﺖ( ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺿﻼ� ﯾڠ أٔﻣﺖ كﺠﻰ واﺟﺐ ٔأ�ﺲ‬
‫ٔأورڠﯿﻎ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪي ﺳڬﺮا ﺗﻮﺑﺔ درﻓﺪاڽ )دان( واﺟﺐ‬
‫ دان اوراڠ �ﴪ ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠ�ﻜنﺪى‬۲ ‫ا�ﺲ ﺳڬﻞ راج‬
‫درﰷرن ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ درﻓﺪﻓﻜﺮ �أٔن ﻣﻌﺼﯿﺔ ﯾڠ‬
۲ ‫ﻣڠن�ﺪوڠ ﺑﱪاف �ڬﻲ درﻓﺪ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻜﺮ )دان( ﺗﯿﻒ‬
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﻣنﻜﺮ اﯾﺖ واﺟﺐ ﻣنڬﻬﻜنﺪى دان‬
‫ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠ�ﻜنﺪى دڠﻦ ﺳﻮرﻩ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱄ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ‬
.‫ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ‬
‫)ﺳﺆال( �ﺮاف �ڬﻲ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﺑڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن‬
‫�ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ )ﺟﻮاب( ادﻓﻮن �ڬﻰ‬
‫ﻣنﻜﺮ ﺑڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن اﯾﺖ اﻣﺖ �ﭘﻖ‬
‫)ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪڽ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ ﳕﺎڽ ٔأرﺗ� ﳑﺒﻮاڠ ارت دڠﻦ‬
‫ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪى ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺪﺣﺮاﻣﻜﻦ )اﻧﯿ�( ارت‬
‫ ارت دان ﯾڠ ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ‬۲ ‫ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ )دان( اورڠﯿڠ ﳑﺒﻮاڠ‬
‫دى ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ �أٔن ﯾڠﺪ ﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ دﳕﺎى ﻣبﺬر )ﻣﻚ‬
‫ادا�( اﯾﺖ ﺳﺴــﻮات ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان‬
(‫رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ آٓﯾﺔ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ )ﺳﻔﺮة‬
‫ ا �ن اﻟْ ُﻤ َﺒ ِّﺬ ِر َ�ﻦ َﰷﻧُﻮا‬. ً‫ﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ َ)و َﻻ ﺗُ َﺒ ِّﺬ ْر ﺗَ ْﺒ ِﺬ�ﺮا‬
�
‫اﺧ َْﻮ َان اﻟ �ﺸ� َﯿﺎ ِﻃﲔِ ( ٔأرﺗ� �ﺎڠﻨ� اڠﻜﻮ ﻣبﺬر درﰷرن‬
�
‫ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺮﯾﻚ ﯾڠ ﻣبﺬر اﯾﺖ ادا� ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ ﺳﻮدار‬
‫ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا )ﯾﻌﲎ( �ﺎڠﻦ اڠﻜﻮ ﺑﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ ار�م ﻓﺪ‬
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺣﺮام )در ﰷرن( ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺮﯾﻚ ﯾڠ‬
‫ﳑﺒﻠﻨ�ﺎ�ﻦ ار�ڽ ﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺣﺮام اﯾﺖ �ﺪى‬
‫ﺳﻮدار ﺳڬﻞ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ �ﺮﻓﺮداي دڠﻦ‬
‫ دڠﻨﺪي ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠﺪ‬۲ ‫ﻓﺮدا�ڽ )دان( �ﺮﺳﺎم‬
‫�ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ )ﱔ ﺳﳫﲔ( ﺳﻮدار ﯾڠ‬
‫�ﺎﻗﻞ دڠﺮ� نڬﻪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ درﻓﺪ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ ا�ﻦ‬

those who do it so [tabdhīr] that they
are likened to devils that are the most
evil creatures. Should we appreciate the
tabdhīr, but Allah prohibit and
condemn it?
One of the evils present in the act of
mambuang pasilih and manyanggar is
ittibā‘ al-shayāṭīn wa ghurūrihim that
means following the footsteps of Satans
by doing what they [the devils] ask and
expecting what they promised. That is a
heinous evil act that Allah and His
Messanger prohibits it in certain verses
of quran and hadith as Allah’s word:
“wa lā tattabi‘ū khuṭuwāt al-shayṭān
innahu lakum ‘aduwwun mubīn.
Innamā ya’murukum bi-l-sū’ wa al-
faḥshā’ ”. That means, do not follow
the footsteps of devil, namely his deceit
because he is to you a clear enemy. He
only orders you to evil acts and
immorality. As well, Allah’s word: “wa
man yattakhidhu al-shayṭāna waliyyan
min dūnillāh faqad khasira khusrānan
mubīnā”. That means, whoever takes
devil as an ally that he/she follow
instead Allah has certainly sustained a
clear loss. Devil promises humans and
arouses desire in them. But devil does
not promise them except delusion.
The other evils in the act of mambuang
pasilih and manyanggar are shirk and
bid‘a sayyi’a (heretical innovations).
Those are the biggest and the very
heinous evils. If it is believed that sick
people cannot be cured or danger
14
‫اورڠﯿڠ ﻣبﺬر )دان( �ﻼ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ا�ﻦ اورڠﯿڠ ﻣبﺬر‬
‫ دﺳﲈ�ﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ اﻛﻨﺪي دڠﻦ ﺳڬﻞ‬۲ ‫ﺳﻜﱪ‬
‫ ﳐﻠﻮق ادﻛﻪ ﻓﺎﺗﺖ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ اﯾﺖ‬۲ ‫ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﯾڠ ﲭﺎﻫﺖ‬
‫دﻓﺮﻣﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ دان د�ﴪ�ﻦ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻣنڬﻪ دان‬
‫ﻣن�ﻼدي‬
‫)دان ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪ �ڬﻰ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ‬
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ اﺗﺒﺎع‬
‫اﻟﺸ�ﯿﺎﻃﲔ و ﻏﺮورﱒ ٔأرﺗ� ﻣڠﯿﻜﻮت ﺳڬﻞ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن‬
۲ ‫دڠﻦ ﻣڠ�ﺎﺻﻠﻜﻦ �رڠ ﻓﺮﻣنﺘأٔنڽ )دان( ﻣڠﻬﺎرف‬
‫ﯾڠﺪﺟنﺠﯿﻜ� اﯾﺖ ﺳﻮات ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ كﺠﻰ‬
(‫ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دان رﺳﻮﻟڽ دداﱂ ﺑﱪاف )آٓﯾﺔ‬
‫ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ َ)و َﻻ ﺗَت � ِب ُﻌﻮا‬
‫ اﻧ � َﻤﺎ ﯾَأ� ُﻣ ُﺮُﰼ‬. ‫ﺧ ُُﻄ َﻮ ِات اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ ِﺎن اﻧ � ُﻪ ﻟَ ُ ْﲂ �َﺪُ �و �ﻣب ٌِﲔ‬
� �
‫ِ� �ﻟﺴﻮ ِء َواﻟْ َﻔ ْﺤﺸَ ﺎء( ٔأرﺗ� دان �ﺎڠﻦ ﰷم ا�ﻜﻮت ا�ﻦ‬
‫ﺳڬﻞ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن )ﯾﻌﲏ( ﻓﺮﻫﯿﺎﺳ� دان ﻓﺮدا�ڽ‬
‫در ﰷرن ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺑڬ ﰷم ﺳﱰو ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ‬
‫ﭘﺎت ﻫﺎڽ ﺳڽ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﻮرﻫﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ اﻛﻨﲀم‬
‫ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ دڠﻦ �ﺮﺑﻮاة كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ دان ﺳڬﻞ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن‬
‫ ﺟﻮا دان ﻻڬﻲ ﻓﺮﻣﺎنڽ ) َو َﻣﻦ ﯾَﺘ� ِ� ِﺬ‬۲‫ﯾڠﻜﺠﻲ‬
‫ُﴪا�ً �ﻣبِﯿﻨًﺎ‬ َ ِ ‫ا� ﻓَﻘَﺪْ ﺧ‬
َ ْ ‫َﴪ ﺧ‬ ِ � ‫ُون‬ ِ ‫اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ َﺎن َو ِﻟﯿ�ﺎ ِّﻣﻦ د‬
�‫ ﯾ َ ِﻌﺪُ ُ ْﱒ َوﯾُ َﻤ ِﻨّ ِﳱ ْﻢ َو َﻣﺎ ﯾ َ ِﻌﺪُ ُ ُﱒ اﻟ �ﺸ� ْﯿ َﻄ ُﺎن ا �ﻻ ُﻏ ُﺮ ًورا ( ٔأرﺗ‬.
�
�‫�رڠ ﺳ�ﯿﺎف ﻣن�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ اي ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ وﻟ‬
(‫ﯾڠﺪ ا�ﻜﻮ�ڽ اﻛﻨﺪي ﻻ�ﻦ درﻓﺪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﻣﻚ ﺳڽ‬
‫�ﺮاو� �ﺮوڬﯿﻨ� اي دڠﻦ روڬﻲ ﯾڠ اﻣﺖ ﭘﺎت‬
‫ﻣنﺠﻨﺠﯿﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ا�ﻦ ﺳڬﻞ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ دان‬
‫ اي ا�ﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ دڠﻦ ﯾڠﺪﺟنﺤﯿﻜ� دان‬۲ ‫ﻣڠﻬﺎرف‬
‫ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣنﺠﻨﺠﯿﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ا�ﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ‬
...‫ا�ﻦ ﻓﺮد� ﺟﻮا‬
‫)دان ﺳ�ﺘڠﻪ( درﻓﺪ �ڬﻰ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻛﻨﺪوڠ دداﱂ‬
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دان ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ �ﺋﺖ ﴍك‬
‫دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺳيئﺔ اﻧﯿ� ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﱰﻟﺒﻪ �ﴪ دان ﯾڠ ﺳﺎ�ﺔ‬
‫كﺠﻲ )درﰷرن( �ﻚ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﲠﻮ ﺗﯿﺎد ﲰﺒﻪ ﯾڠ‬
 15

cannot be avoided except only by ‫ﺳﺎ�ﺖ درﻓﺪ ﻓڽﺎ�ﯿﺖ )اﺗﻮ( ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﺗﻮﻟﻖ درﻓﺪ ﲠﺎي‬
carrying out manyanggar or mambuang
pasilih, in the sense that those acts have
�‫ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ دڠﻦ ﻣڽڠڬﺮ اﺗﻮ �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� )ﻣﻚ( دﺗﯿ‬
the power (to cure or to avoid danger) ‫�ﻚ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ‬
in their own nature, so the one who has ‫ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻣﻚ اورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺎدي ﰷﻓﺮ )دڠﻦ( ﺗﯿﺎد‬
such belief is heathen (kāfir). There is
no disagreement of jurists on that case ‫�ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد �ڬ� ﺗﻮﺣيﺪ ﻓﺪ‬
because that is going against oneness of ‫ٔأﻓﻌﺎل ﷲ )دان �ﻚ( ﺗﯿﺎد داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ‬
Allah’s deeds (tauhīd af‘āl). If it is
believed that they [those acts] have no
‫ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻫﺎڽ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� اﻛﻨﺪي‬
power in their nature, but it is believed ‫ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة ﯾڠﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ‬
that they have the power [to cure or to ‫)ﻣﻚ( اورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺪي ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﻓﺎﺳﻖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ‬
avoid danger] given by Allah to their
nature, then the jurists agree that the ‫ﺳﳫﲔ �ﻠﲈء دان ﻛﻔﺮڽ �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ )ﰷت‬
one who believes so is the impious (‫�ﻠﲈء( ﻣﺎ وراء ا�ﳯﺮ أٔورڠ اﯾﺖ �ﺎدي ﰷﻓﺮ ﺟﻮ )دان‬
heretic (bid‘a fāsiq); and jurists
disagree on his/her heathenism (kufr). ‫�ﻚ ﺗﯿﺎد داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ دڠﻦ‬
According to the jurists of [the region] ‫ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة‬
“what lies beyond the river” (arabic: mā
warā’ al-nahr) 10 he/she is also heathen
‫ﯾڠﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ ﻫﺎڽ داﻋﺘﻘﺎدﻛ� ﲠﻮﺳڽ‬
(kāfir). If it is believed that they have ‫ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ ﻓﺪ ﻣڽﻤﳢﻜﻦ دان ﻣنﻮﻟﻘﻜﻦ ﲠﺎي اﯾﺖ‬
no power [to cure or to avoid danger] ‫ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺟﻮا دڠﻦ د�ﺎد�ﻜ� اﻓبﯿﻞ د�ﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﺳڠڬﺮ‬
either in their own nature or given by
Allah to their nature, but it is believed ‫اﺗﻮ ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ )ﻣﻚ( د�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﲰﺒﻪ درﻓﺪ‬
that only Allah who has the power to ‫ﻓڽﺎ�ﯿﺖ )دان( دﺗﻮﻟﻘﻜ� ﺳڬﻞ ﲠﺎي ﻓﺪ ﻛﺘﯿﻚ اﯾﺖ‬
cure and avoid danger by enacting that
if those acts are carried out then Allah
‫)ﻛﺘﺎڽ( اد� ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪﯾڠ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة اﰲ‬
cures and avoids the danger in that time. ‫دان ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي دڠﻦ ﻃﺒﯿﻌ� ﻓﺪ‬
It is said that analogy and comparison ‫ﻣڠﻬﺎڠﺴﻜﻦ دان ﻣڠﭙڠﻲ دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي �ﻜﺲ اي‬
for that is like [the deployment of] fire
and food. They do not have the power ‫دڠﻦ ﻗﻮاة ﯾڠﺪ�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ دداﳌڽ ﻫﺎڽ ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي‬
in their own nature to burn or to satiate, ‫�ﻜﺲ ﻓﺪ ﻣڠﻬﺎڠﺴﻜﻦ دان ﻣڠﭙڠﻲ اﯾﺖ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺟﻮا‬
as well they do have neither the power
[to burn or to satiate] given by Allah. It
‫دڠﻨﺪ�ﺎد�ﻜ� ﻣن�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﻫﺎڠﺲ )ﺗﺘﲀل( �ﺮﺳنتﻪ اﰲ‬
is only Allah who burns and satiates ‫دڠﻦ ﺳﻮات ﯾڠﻜﺮڠ )دان( د�ﺎد�ﻜ� ﻛﻨﭙڠ ﺗﺘﲀل‬
enacting that when fire touches ‫ﳑﺎ�ﻦ ا�ﻦ ﻣﳫﲍ )ﻛﺘﺎڽ( دﻣﻜيﻨ� ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ‬
something dry, then it becomes burned,
and enacting that when we eat food then ‫ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� )ﻣﻚ( اورڠﯿڠ �ﺮاﻋﺘﻘﺪ دﻣﻜﲔ‬
we are satisfied. It is said that this is the (‫اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺪي ﰷﻓﺮ دڠﻦ ﳎﺮد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد اﯾﺖ )ﻫﺎڽ‬
analogy and the comparison of
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih. ‫�ﺎدي ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺟﻮا )ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( �ﺪي ﰷﻓﺮ اي �ﻚ‬
10
It is the arabic name of Transoxania, historical region of Turkistan in Central Asia east of
the Amu Darya (Oxus River) and west of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes River), roughly corresponding to
present-day Uzbekistan and parts of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. See "Transoxania
(historical region, Asia)". Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed 05-10-2018. See also Svat Soucek
(2000, p. 25).
 16

So, someone who believes so does not ‫د�ﻼﻟﻜ� ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� دڠﻦ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد‬
become heathen by merely such a
belief, but they are still heretics.
(‫ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ دڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﻼف ﺳڬﻞ �ﻠﲈء )ادﻓﻮن‬
However, had he/she pronounced the ‫ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ ا�ﻦ �ﺎدي‬
permissibility of manyanggar and ‫ﻣڠ�ﻼﻟﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ )ﺳبﺐ( �ﺮ ٔ��ﻦ ﻟﯿﲍ‬
mambuang pasilih, he/she would have
been heathen (kāfir) with such belief; ‫ﺣﲂ در ﰷرن اﰲ دان ﻣﲀنﻦ اﯾﺖ ﺳ�ﺒﲊﭘﺎ� اي درﻓﺪ‬
and there is no disagreement of jurists (‫ﺳڬﻞ ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة دڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﻼف )ادﻓﻮن‬
on that case.
Concerning the analogy and the
۲ ‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﻣﻚ �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲀل‬
comparison, it is not legally valid to ‫ﺗﯿﺎد درﻓﺪ ﺳڬﻞ ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة )دان( �ﻚ ﺗﻘﺪ�ﺮ‬
pronounce the permissibility of �‫�ﻦ �ﺮﻻ�ﻮ ﻓﺪاڽ ﻛﻨﻼ�ﻮان ﺳبﺐ ﯾڠﱪ�ﺎدة دڠﻦ ﺳ�ﺒ‬
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
based on that analogy because they (‫ ﻓﺮداي ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا )ﻣﻚ‬۲ ‫)ﻣﻚ( �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲈت‬
have a different nature. Indeed, fire and ‫ﺑﺘﺎف ﻛﲑاڽ ﰠ ﻗيﺎس دان ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﱔ‬
food are natural causes [in the sense
that Allah enacts being burned and ‫)ﺳﳫﲔ( إﺧﻮان ﯾڠ �ﺎﻗﻞ ﻓيﻜﺮ�ﻦ اوﳍﻢ دڠﻦ اﻧﺼﺎف‬
being satisfied by means of the natural ‫ادﻛﻪ ﲠﺎي ﯾڠﱰﻟﺒﻪ �ﴪ درﻓﺪ ﲠﺎي ﻛﻔﺮ دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ‬
beings fire and food], whereas
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih
‫ﺳيئﺔ ﯾڠﱪﻫﺎدف ٔأ�ﺲ ﯾڠﱪﺑﻮاة دي ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ‬
certainly are not the natural cause [of ‫)ﺳﻔﺮة( ﺳ�ﺒﺪا ﻧﱯ ﺻﲆ ﷲ �ﻠﯿﻪ و ﺳﲅ )ﻣﻦ ٔأ�ﺪث‬
being cured and being prevented from ‫�ﺪ� ﻓﻌﻠﯿﻪ ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ( ٔأرﺗ� �رڠﺴ�ﯿﺎف ﻣڠﺪا�ﻦ‬
danger. In other words since
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are ‫ﺳﻮات ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﺗﯿﺎد اي در ﻓﺪ اڬﺎم )ﻣﻚ( ٔأ�ﺴڽ‬
not present in nature– we cannot say ‫ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﻛﳤﻮي اوﳍﻢ( ﱔ ﻃﺎﻟﺐ ﲠﻮﺳڽ‬
therefore that these rituals are the
natural causes of the effects of healing
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد اي در ﻓﺪ اڬﺎم‬
and prevention enacted by Allah]. If, ‫اﺳﻼم )ﻫﺎڽ( ٔأد� درﻓﺪ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﺳيئﺔ‬
saying, when they are carried out, then ‫ﯾڠﺪ�ڬﻬﻜﻦ درﻓﺪڽ )ﻣﻚ( �رڠﺴ�ﯿﺎف ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎﻛﻨﺪي‬
being cured or being avoided from
danger happens, it is nothing but the ‫ٔأ�ﺴڽ ﻟﻌﻨﺔ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﯾڠ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم دداﱂ ﻧﺺ‬
deceit of Satan. So, this analogy and .‫�ﺪﯾﺚ اﯾﺖ‬
comparison could not be legally valid.
O intelligent brothers, you should be
aware: is there any danger bigger than
the danger of heathenism (kufr) and
blameworthy innovation (bid‘a sayyi’a)
so that those who perform them are
cursed by Allah as [the] Prophet said:
man ’aḥdatha hadathan fa‘alaihi
la‘natullāh ta‘ālā. That means, whoever
commits innovation which opposes to
religion, so the curse of Allah to him. O
student! You should know that
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are
not part of religion (Islam), but they are
 17

blameworthy innovations which are [to

be] forbidden. So, those who carried
them out will be cursed by Allah as told
in the hadith.
Question: if they said that we carry out
manyanggar and mambuang pasilih not
because to share Satan food and to
follow his demand, but those whom we
share are the invisible men who lived in
the old days. Among of them are the
ancestral kings and the followers who
are still alive up to now, so we share
them food as a tribute with the intention
that they would relieve our troubles. It
is similar to sharing food with (living)
families and friends with the intention
of helping each other. This act is
permissible, not forbidden, because it is
not tabdhīr (wasting by spending
money/resources) and following Satan
nor shirk and bid‘a. Response: that is
simply invalid because that is purely
delusion without evidence from the
Quran, Hadith or what jurists say. How
can we know that those who request the
food are the invisible men living in the
old days who are still alive up to now?
So, every prejudice without evidence
(dalīl) is not permitted to be relied upon
and to be believed. Even if it is true that
who request the food are the invisible
men, the act (manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih) is still forbidden
and not permissible because it is
commiting tabdhīr and sinful
innovation. Even if the food is eaten by
human or animal, that does not
eliminate the sin of tabdhīr and
heretical innovation. It will be much
more sinful if the food is given to Satan
and its delivery containing some other
evils.
Question: if they said that we have two
evidences confirming that who demands
‫)ﺳﺆال( �ﻚ دﰷت أٔورڠ ﲠﻮا ﰷم ﻣڽڠڬﺮ دان �ﺮﺑﻮاڠ‬
‫ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰷرن ﳑﱪى ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن دان ﻣڠﯿﻜﻮت‬
‫ﻓﺮﻣنﺘأٔنڽ )ﻫﺎڽ( ﺳڽ ﯾڠﲀم �ﺮى اﯾﺖ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﺑڠ �ﺎﺋبﺐ‬
‫ دان ﺳ�ﺘڠﻬڽ‬۲ ‫دﻫﻠﻮﰷل �ﺋيﺖ ﺳ�ﺘڠﻬڽ لﻠﻮﻫﺮ راج‬
‫ﻓ�ﺴيﺴڽ ٔأدا� ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ �ﺎﯾﺐ دان ﻫﻨﺪق ﲰﻔﻲ ﻛﻔﺪ‬
‫ﺳﲀرڠ ا�ﻦ ﻣﻚ ﰷم �ﺮي ا�ﻦ ﻣﺮ�ﻜئﯿﺖ ور� �ڬﻰ‬
‫ﻣﲀن ﻣﲀنﻦ )ﰷرن( ﺣﺮﻣﺔ اﻛﻨﺪي ﺳﻔﺎي دﺗﻠﻮڠﻲ‬
‫اﻛﻨﲀم ﻓﺪ �رڠ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﰷم ﯾڠ ﺳﻮﺳﻪ )ﺳﻔﺮة( ﰷت‬
‫نﻦ ﻛﻔﺪ ﳇﻮرڬﺎ دان �ﺎﺑﺔ ﯾڠ ﺗﯿﺎد‬۲‫ﰷم ﳑﱪي ﻣﲀ‬
(‫ڠﻦ ﰷم ﻓﺪ �رڠ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن )ﻣﻚ‬۲‫�ﺎﯾﺐ ﺳﻔﺎي �ﺮﺗﻠﻮ‬
‫�ﺋيﺖ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﻫﺎرس ﺗﯿﺎد ﺣﺮام دداﳌڽ )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد‬
‫ﻓﺪڽ ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ دان ﻣڠﯿﻜﻮت ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﴍك دان‬
‫ﺑﺪ�ﺔ )ﺟﻮاب( ﲠﻮ ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن اﯾﺖ ﺑﻄﻞ ﺟﻮا اداڽ )در‬
‫ دﻋﻮى دان وﱒ دڠﻦ‬۲‫ﰷرن( ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﲈت‬
‫ﺗﯿﺎد دﻟﯿﻞ درﻓﺪ ﻗﺮآٓن ٔآﺗﻮ �ﺪﯾﺚ اﺗﻮ ﻗﻮل اﻟﻌﻠﲈء‬
ٔ‫)ﻣﻚ( دڠﻦ اف ﺟﻮا �ﯿﺖ ﻛﳤﻮي ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠ ﻣنﺘأ‬
‫ﺳڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﯾڠ �ﺎﺋﺐ دﻫﻮل ﰷل ﻫﯿﺪف ﲰﻔﻲ‬
‫ دﻋﻮي دڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد دﻟﯿﻞ‬۲‫ﺳﲀرڠ ا�ﻦ )ﻣﻚ( ﺗﯿﻒ‬
(‫اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻫﺎرس دﻓﺮﻓڬڠ دان د�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد )دان‬
‫ﺟﳫﻮ اﳁﺎڽ دﺗﻮﱒ دان دﺑﲊ�ﻦ ﲠﻮ ﯾڠ ﻣنﺘأٔﺳڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ‬
‫ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﺑڠ �ﺎﺋﺐ ﺳﳫﯿﻔﻮن ٔأدا� ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن اﯾﺖ ﺟﺮام‬
‫ﺟﻮا ﺗﯿﺎد ﻫﺎرس د�ﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد ﺳﻮﭘيﻲ درﻓﺪ‬
�‫ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ ﯾڠ ﺟﺮام )دان �ﻚ( اﳁﺎڽ دﻣﺎ�ﻦ او‬
‫ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ٔأﺗﻮ ﺑﻨﺎﺗڠ ا�ﻦ ﻣﲀنﻦ ﯾڠﺪاﻧﱰ�ﻦ ﻛﻔﺪ ﲤﻔﺖ‬
‫ﯾڠﺪﺳڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ ﺳﳫﯿﻔﻮن ﺗﯿﺎد ﺟﻮ ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠﻜﻦ ﺣﺮام‬
‫ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ دان ﺑﺪ�ﻪ )اﺳ�ﳣﯿﻮا ﻻڬﻲ( �ﻚ اد ﯾڠﺪ�ﺮي‬
‫ﻣﲀنﻦ اﯾﺖ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﴎة دﳘﻔنﻜﻦ ﻛﻔﺪڽ ﺑﱪاف‬
.‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﻣنﻜﺮ ﯾڠﻼ�ﻦ درﻓﺪ اﯾﺖ‬
‫)ﺳﺆال( �ﻚ دﰷت أٔورڠ ﲠﻮا دﻟﯿﻞ ﰷم ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ‬
‫ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮ ﯾڠ ﻣنﺘأٔ ﺳڠڬﺮ اﯾﺖ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﯾڠ �ﺎﺋﺐ دواﻓﺮﰷر‬

the food are the invisible men: first, the
elders tell us about that story from
generations to generations; second, the
words of a possessed person who at the
moment of possession said: “O my
descendants give me food so that I will
help you to relieve your difficulties and
to cure your illness”. Response: the
story that the elders tell about is not a
legally valid justification of the
permissibility of manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih because it is merely
prejudice and delusion without evidence
(dalīl) confirming its truth. Moreover,
the words of a possessed person are not
a legally valid evidence for justifying
that who possesses the possessed person
is a man, but that is proof that who
possesses the possessed person is Satan
because some verses of Quran and
Hadith, and what jurists say prove that
only angels and Satans can enter into
the body of a human because they are
created by Allah with ability to do hard
things so that they can enter into the
body of a human. However, the
difference between them is that angels
only suggest (God’s) guidance and
goodness while Satans only suggest the
wrong path and evil. It is mentioned
further in the hadith that an angel called
mulhim stays in the right side of
human’s heart, by Allah’s command,
suggesting goodness; and a Satan called
waswās stays in the left side of human’s
heart, by Allah’s command, suggesting
evil. So, all good tendencies come from
the suggestion of mulhim so his
suggestion is called ilhām (inspiration);
and all evil tendencies come from the
suggestion of waswās so his suggestion
is called waswās (evil thoughts).
Therefore, if someone recites dhikr
(remembrance) of Allah then the Satan
will go far away and disappear from his
heart, but if he neglects reciting dhikr of
18
‫ ﺗﻮرن ﲤﻮرن ﴎة اد‬۲ ‫)ﻓﺮ�م( ݘﺮ�ﺮا ٔأورڠ ﺗﻮﻫﺎ‬
‫ﻛﺘﺎڽ ﺟﲀﯾ� )ﻛﺪوا( ﻓﺮﰷر ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ﺗﺘﲀل اي ﻣڽﺎروڠ‬
‫ﻛﻔﺪ ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﻛﺘﺎڽ ﱔ اﻧﻖ ݘݘﻮ�ﻮ �ﺮي ٔأوﳍﻢ‬
‫اﻛﻨﺪا�ﻮ ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺳﻔﺎي ﻛﺘﻮﻟﻮڠ اﻛﻨﲀم ﻓﺪ �رڠ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن‬
‫ﯾڠ ﺳﻮ�ﺮ ٔأﺗﻮ ﺳﻔﺎي ﲰﺒﻪ ﯾڠ ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ درﻓﺪ اﻧﯿ� اﳁﺎ‬
‫ دان ﻛﺘﺎڽ‬۲ ‫ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ )ﺟﻮاب( ﲠﻮ ݘﺮ�ﺮا ٔأورڠ ﺗﻮﻫﺎ‬
‫ﺣﲀﯾﺔ أٔﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ �ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ ﺑڠﺪ ٔأ�ﺲ اﯾﺖ‬
‫ ﺳڠﲀ دان وﱒ دان ﺟﻮا ﺗﯿﺎد اد‬۲ ‫درﰷرن ٔأي ﺳﲈت‬
(‫ﴎ�ڽ دﻟﯿﻞ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ �ﺒﲊ انڽ )دان دﻣﻜيﻨﻼڬﻲ‬
‫ اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﰠ‬۲ ‫ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ٔأورڠﯿﻊ �ﴪوڠﻦ اﺑﺖ ﺳﲀل‬
‫�ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮ ﯾڠ ﻣڽﺎروڠ اﯾﺖ‬
‫ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ﻫﺎڽ ٔأد� ﺑڠﺪ ﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﰠ �ﺎدى دﻟﯿﻞ‬
‫ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠ ﻣڽﺎروڠ اﯾﺖ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا‬
‫ﰷرن ﺑﱪاف ﻧﺺ ﻗﺮآٓن دان �ﺪﯾﺚ دان ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﺳڬﻞ‬
‫�ﻠﲈء ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ٔأ�ﺲ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠ ﺑﻮ� ﻣڽﺎروڠ دان‬
‫ﻣﺎﺳﻖ ﻛﻔﺪ �دن اﯾﺖ ﻣﺎﻟﯿﻜﺔ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا درﰷن‬
‫ﻣﺎﻟﯿﻜﺔ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ د�ﺪ�ﻜﻦ ﷲ �ﻮاس ٔأ�ﺲ‬
‫ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ �ﻦ ﯾڠ ﺳﻮ �ﺮ ﻫڠڬ داﻓﺖ ٔأي ﻣﺎﺳﻖ ﻛﺪاﱂ‬
‫ﺗﻮﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ�ﴗ )ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( ﻓﺮ ﺑﺬ ٔأ�ڽ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﻣﻼ�ﻜﺔ اﯾﺖ‬
‫ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﺮواي )ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ( ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﻓتﻨﺠﻮق دان‬
(‫�ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ دان ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڽﺮواي )ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ‬
‫ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺎﻟﻦ ﺳﺴﺖ دان كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ )ﺷﻬﺪان( �ﺮﺳبﺖ‬
‫دداﱂ �ﺪﯾﺚ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﻼ�ﻜﺔ �ﺮ�م ﻣﻠﻬﻢ‬
‫�ﺮد�ﺮي ﻓﺪ ﻫﺎت اﻧﻖ آٓدم ﯾڠ ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﰷنﻦ دڠﻦ ﺗيتﻪ‬
(‫ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل ﻣڽﺮو اي ﻛﻔﺪ �ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ )دان‬
‫ﺳﺆرڠ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن �ﺮ�م وﺳﻮاس �ﺮد�ﺮي ﻓﺪ ﻫﺎت اﻧﻖ‬
‫آٓدم ﯾڠ ﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﻛﲑي دڠﻦ ﺗيتﻪ ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﺪ �ﺎل‬
‫ﻣڽﺮو اي ﻛﻔﺪ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ )ﻣﻚ( ﺳڬﻞ ﺧﻮاﻃﺮ �ﺒﺠﯿﻜﻦ‬
‫اﯾﺖ داﺗڠ درﻓﺪ ﻓﳱﻖ ﴎو ﻣﻠﻬﻢ )دان( دﳕﺎى ﴎوڽ‬
‫اﯾﺖ اﻟﻬﺎم )دان( ﺳڬﻞ ﺧﻮاﻃﺮ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ اﯾﺖ داﺗڠ‬
‫ﻓﳱﻖ ﴎو وﺳﻮاس دان دﳕﺎى ﴎوڽ اﯾﺖ وﺳﻮاس‬
‫)ﻣﻚ( ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﻣڽﺒﻮت ﺳﺆرڠ ﻣﺎ�ﴘ ا�ﻦ ذ�ﺮ ﷲ‬

Allah the Satan will go back to his
heart. This is the understanding of
Allah’s words: min sharri al-waswās
al-khannaās, alladhī yuwaswisu fī
ṣudūr al-nās. That is, I seek refuge with
Him from the evil of Satan named
waswās. He will go far away and
disappear if dhikr of Allah is recited. He
is the one who gives the evil thoughts in
the hearts of people. Such is what al-
Ghazālī said in the Minhāj al-‘Ābidīn
and the others.
Question: if someone says that whom
we give the food in manyanggar and
mambuang pasilih is indeed Satan, but
our intention of carrying them out is
only to cure. Otherwise, we suppose
Satan similar to a dog, so we give the
food to Satan as if we feed a dog. It was
known that feeding a dog is permissible
and there is no prohibition of such act.
That is manyanggar and mambuang
pasilih if we put them with such
supposition and intention. Response:
such supposition and intention are
simply not helpful because they do not
eliminate the prohibition of tabdhīr,
following Satan and heretical
innovation. That comparison is similar
to someone who kills someone else with
the intention to cure heartache and
while killing he does as if the victim is
a mouse. It is also similar to someone
who commits adultery with the
intention to cure rheumatism and during
the intercourse he does as if he is with
his wife. So, those suppositions and
intentions do not eliminate the
prohibition of killing and adultery.
Furthermore, concerning what they said
that giving the food to Satan is like
feeding a dog, in fact what they said is
different from what is in their heart.
Their hearts venerate Satan, this is
indicated by the fact that they do not
19
‫�ﺮ�نﺴ�ﯿ� ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ )ﯾﻌﲏ( اﻧﺪور دان ڽﳱ� اي‬
‫درﻓﺪ ﻫﺘ� دان ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﻻﱄ اي درﻓﺪ ﻣڽﺒﻮﺗﺪي داﺗڠ‬
‫ﴍ‬ِ ّ َ ‫ﻓﻮل اي )�ﺋﺘ�( ﻣﻔﻬﻢ ﻓﺮﻣﺎن ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ) ِﻣﻦ‬
(‫ � ِا�ي ﯾُ َﻮ ْﺳ ِﻮ ُس ِﰲ ُﺻﺪُ و ِر اﻟﻨ� ِﺎس‬.‫اﻟْ َﻮ ْﺳ َﻮ ِاس اﻟْ َﺨﻨ�ﺎس‬
‫ﯾﻌﲏ �ﺮﻟﻨﺪڠ ا�ﻮ دﻋﻨﺪي درﻓﺪ كﺠﻬﺎ�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن‬
‫ﯾڠﱪ�م وﺳﻮاس اﻧﺪور دان ﭘﯿﻪ اي ) ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ( دﺳبﺖ‬
‫ذ�ﺮ ﷲ اﭘﺎ� ﯾڠ ﳑﱪي وﺳﻮاس دداﱂ ﻫﺎت ﺳڬﻞ‬
‫ﻣﺎ�ﴘ )دﻣﻜيﻨ�( ﯾڠﺪﺳبتﻜﻦ ٔأو� اﻣﺎم ﻏﺰاﱄ دداﱂ‬
.�‫ﻛﺘﺎب ﻣﳯﺎج اﻟﻌﺎﺑﺪ�ﻦ دان ﻻﯾ‬
‫)ﺳﺆال( �ﻚ �ﺮﰷت ﺳﺆرڠ ﲠﻮﺳڽ ﯾڠﲀم ﺳڠڬﺮ دان‬
‫ﺑﲊڽ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮا‬۲‫ﯾڠ ﰷم �ﺮي ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺳ�ﺒﲊ‬
‫)ﺗﺘﺎﰲ( ﻧﯿﺔ ﰷم ﻓﺪ ﻣڠﺮ�ﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن اﯾﺖ ﰷرن ا�ﻦ‬
‫اوﺑﺔ ﺟﻮا ) ٔأﺗﻮ( ﰷم ﻧيتﻜﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة اﳒﯿڠ‬
(‫ﻣﻚ ﰷم �ﺮي اﻛﻨﺪي ﻣﲀنﻦ ﺳﻔﺮة ﳑﱪي اﳒﯿڠ )دان‬
‫ﺗ� �ﺮﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﲠﻮﺳڽ �ﺮاوﺑﺖ دان ﳑﱪي ﻣﺎ�ﻦ اﳒﯿڠ اﯾﺖ‬
�‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﻫﺎرس ﺗﯿﺎد ﺣﺮام داﳌڽ دان دﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺘ‬
‫ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ دﻧيتﻜﻦ دڠﻦ ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﱰﺳبﺖ‬
‫ ﺗﯿﺎد‬۲ ‫اﯾﺖ )ﺟﻮاب( ﲠﻮ ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل‬
‫ﳑﱪي ﻓﺎﺋﺪة )ﰷرن( ﺗﯿﺎد ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠﻜﻦ ﺟﺮام ﺗﺒﺬ�ﺮ دان‬
‫ﻣڠﻜﻮت ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن داﳓﺮام ﯾﺪ�ﻪ )ﻣﻚ( ﺑﻨﺪڠ ﯾڠ دﻣﻜﲔ‬
‫اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة ٔأورڠﯿڠ ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ أٔور�ﺪڠﻦ ﺗﯿﺎد ﺳ�ﺒﲊڽ‬
‫دﻧيتﻜ� ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ ﺗﯿﻜﻮس اﺗﻮ دﻧيتﻜ� ا�ﻦ �ﺎدي اوﺑﺔ‬
�‫ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ ﻫﺎت اﳁﺎڽ )دان( ﺳﻔﺆة اورڠﯿڠ ز� دﻧيتﻜ‬
‫ﺟﲈع دڠﻦ اﺳﱰ�ڽ اﺗﻮ ا�ﻦ �ﺪي اوﺑﺔ ﺳﺎ�ﯿﺖ ﻓڠڬڠ‬
‫ ﺗﯿﺎد‬۲‫اﳁﺎڽ )ﻣﻚ( ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾڠﺪﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل‬
(‫ﻣڠﻬﯿﻠڠﻜﻦ ﺣﺮام ﳑﺒﻮﻧﻪ دان ز� )ﺳ�ﺒﺎڬﻲ ﻻڬﻲ‬
‫ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔنڽ ﰷم �ﺮي ﻣﲀنﻦ ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن اﯾﺖ ﺳﻔﺮة ﳑﱪي‬
‫ دﺳﺖ ﺟﻮا ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺮﲰأٔن ﯾڠﺪداﱂ‬۲‫اﳓﯿڠ �ﺋﺖ ﺳﲈت‬
‫ﻫﺘ� دڠﻦ ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﻟﯿﺪﻫڽ ٔأدا� ﻫﺎﺗ� ﻣڠﺤﺮﻣﺎﰐ دان‬
‫ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ ا�ﻦ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن دڠﻦ دﻟﯿﻞ ﻓﺮﺑﻮاﺗ� ﺑڬ ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن‬
‫ دان ﺗﯿﺎد‬۲ ‫اﯾﺖ ﺑﱪاف �ڬﻲ ﻣﺎ�ﻦ ﻣﺎﻛﲍ ﯾڠ اﻧﺪﻩ‬
�‫د�ﺮ�ﻜ� دﺳيﺴﺎى دان دﻟﻔﺲ ﴎة داﻧﱰﻛ� ﻛﻔﺪ ﲤﻔ‬
 20

give Satan leftovers, but they provide ‫دڠﻦ ﺑﱪاف ﳇڠﲀﻓﻦ دان ﻓﺮﻫﯿﺎﺳﻦ دان ﺑﱪاف‬
beautiful foods, and they server them in
decorated trays and by doing so they
‫ﻓﻜﺮ�أٔن ﯾڠ ﻣنﻨﺠﻘﻜﻦ ا�ﺲ ﻣڠﺤﺮﻣﺎﰐ دان ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ‬
indicate their respect for Satan. O ‫ﺷ�ﯿﻄﺎن ﺟﻮاداڽ )ﻓيﻜﺮ�ﻦ( اوﳍﻢ ﱔ ﺳﳫﲔ اﺧﻮان ﯾڠ‬
intelligent brothers, is it similar to ‫�ﺎﻗﻞ ادﻛﻪ ﺳﻔﺮة دﻣﻜﲔ اﯾﺖ ﳑﱪي ﻣﺎ�ﻦ اﳒﯿڠ ﺗﯿﺎد‬
feeding a dog? Mostly, you do not give
a dog food but despicable and leftovers ‫ﺟﻮا ﻣﲀنﻦ ﯾڠﺪ�ﺮ�ﻜﻦ ﻛﻔﺪ اﳒﯿڠ ﻓﺪ �ﺎﻟﺐ ﻣﻠﯿﻨﻜﻦ‬
that are put haphazardly in any place. ‫ﻣﲀنﻦ ﯾڠ ﻫﯿﻨﺎ ﻻڬﻲ ﺳيﺴﺎ دان د�ﺮ�ﻜﻦ ﻓﺪ ﲰﺒﺎرڠ‬
Finally, manyanggar and mambuang
pasilih should not be called Medicine
(‫ﲤﻔﺖ ا�ﺲ ��ﻮان ﯾڠ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﻠﯿﺎ�ﻦ )ﺳ�ﺒﺎڬﻲ ﻻڬﻲ‬
neither by the practice involved in these ‫ ﺗﯿﺎد ﻓﺎﺗﺖ دﳕﺎى‬۲‫ﺳڠڬﺮ دان ﻓﺴ�ﯿ� اﯾﺖ ﺳﲀل‬
rituals nor by juridical indication [there ‫اوﺑﺖ ﻓﺪ �ﺎدة اﺳ�ﳣﯿﻮا ﻓﻮل ﻓﺪ ﴍع ﻫﺎڽ ﯾڠﺪﳕﺎى‬
is no evidence from the sources at all
indicating that these practices should be ‫اوﺑﺖ ﻓﺪ �ﺎدة �ﺋﺖ �ﺮڠﯿڠ دﻛﻨﺎ�ﻦ ﻓﺪ ﺑﺪان اورڠﯿڠ‬
called Medicine]. Medicine is practiced ‫داوﺑﺔ دل دﻣﺎﻛ� اﺗﻮ دﻣيﳮڽ اﺗﻮ دﺑﺪﻗﻜﻦ اﺗﻮ‬
by treating the body of the sick person
by inducing ingestion or by semearing ‫دﲰﺒﻮر�ﻦ اﺗﻮ �رڠﺴ�ﺒﺎڬ� ﴎة ﳑﻠﳱﺎر�ﻦ ﯾڠ ﻓﺎﺗﺖ ﻓﺪ‬
or spraying it. This treatment impacts .��‫ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ ﺑﺪان اورڠﯿڠ داو�ﰐ ﻓﺪ دﯾڠ� اﺗﻮ ﻫﺎ‬
the body in such a way that it can be felt
to be either cold or warm [But the
contested rituals do not treat the body in
that way]

Al-Banjari's Jadal
for a qiyās al-‘illa on Lahang

The aim of the argumentation is to decide about the legality of the

consumption of lahang, a traditional drink of the Banjarese made of the juice of
the sugar-palm tree. 11
In fact, one expects to see an argument that follows the steps of the most
known examples of qiyās al-‘illa, namely the one that leads to the interdiction of
the consumption of wine.

Let us recall the classical example: Date liquor intoxicates, just as (grape)
wine does, so that it is prohibited like wine. The canonical analysis identifies four
elements in such an argument: the branch-case, date liquor; the source-wine; the
character they have in common their power to intoxicate; and their common legal
qualification, prohibition. The crucial step that underlies this form of
argumentation is the identification of the occasioning factor, the ‘illa, that lies

11
More precisely lahang is made from the juice of Arenga pinnata.
 21

behind its prohibition. The point here is that applying the general principle that
drinks that have the power to induce intoxication should be forbidden, to the case
of date liquor occasions its interdiction.

Now, since lahang, even if fermented does not induce intoxication, we

should conclude, quite straightforwardly, that its consumption should be not
forbidden. However, as quite often al-Banjari adds a twist to it. According to al-
Banjari, one crucial feature of wine is that if some substance is added to it, in
order for example to accelerate the process of becoming vinegar, this substance is
impure, even after the wine became vinegar. The point is that the added substance
has been contaminated by the impurity of wine. Moreover, the contamination of
the additive spreads to the vinegar making it impure too. So, as generally
defended by the Shāfi’īs and even also by al-Ghazālī, al-Banjari considers that
wine-vinegar can become impure and interdicted. 12 Under this lens the
intoxicating nature of wine, which occasions its interdiction and impurity
qualification, also entails its capacity of contaminating with impurity whatever
substance it touches. So, on al- Banjari's view, the capacity of wine contaminating
with impurity other substances it touches is part and parcel of its interdiction.

For short; al-Banjari's argument for the lawfulness of the consumption of

lahang amounts to the observation that this drink is intoxicating neither before nor
after being fermented, and moreover, it does not contaminate substances added to
it, not even before becoming vinegar.

In order to make it apparent that the argument follows the canonical

example of qiyās al-‘illa for the interdiction of wine we will re-structure the order
of the text so that it fits the Opponent-Respondent interaction required by the
Jadal framework

Dialogue on Fermented Lahang

O P
0
The consumption of lahang is
allowed, even if fermented.
Furthermore, whatever pure
substance is added to it before the
lahang becomes vinegar rests pure
and thus the resulting vinegar is
pure and hence it's consumption is
not forbidden either.
1 Why ? 0? According to the sources the 2
consumption of wine made of
fermented grape-juice is

12
In relation to the contamination of wine-vinegar al-Benjari refers to Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ
al-Minhāj by Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī (909-974H/1504-1567), re-printed 1983 and Nihāyat al-
Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-Minhāj by al-Ramlī (919-1004H/1513-1596), re-printed 1984. Both of these
jurists were Shāfi’īs.
 22

forbidden. Right
3 Indeed !2 ?3 In a previous debate we 4
established that the occasioning
factor for its interdiction is its
intoxicating nature. Right?
5 We came to that conclusion !4 ?5 Isn't it the case that whatever pure 6
before substance is added to wine (made
of grape juice) before it becomes
vinegar, becomes contaminated by
the impurity of the wine?
Moreover, isn't it the case that this
contamination (mutanajjis) makes
thus the resulting vinegar to
become impure and that it
therefore also makes its
consumption forbidden?.
7 Yes, this follows from our !6 ?7 Now, it has been verified by 8
previous discussions on the repeated observations that if
interdiction of wine lahang is left over night and
ferments, it has no intoxicating
nature. So it has intoxicating
nature neither before nor after it
ferments. Even when it is drunk in
a large amount.
9 This can be indeed verified !8 ?9 Therefore, its vinegar is 10
intoxicating neither. Furthermore,
the vinegar cannot be
contaminated by any pure
substance added to the lahang that
vinegar is made of. Recall that the
lahang is not intoxicating before
becoming vinegar even if
fermented.
11 Yes, I see. !10 ?11 So, clearly, lahang has not the 12
factor occasioning the interdiction
of wine. Right?
13 Yes, I concede. ?13 Thus, its consumption in any form, 14
before fermentation, after
fermentation; after becoming
vinegar is to be allowed
15 Yes. I concede. !14 ?15 So my case has been closed and it 16
provides the justification for the
thesis you asked for with your first
move

Argumentative Analysis of the Dialogue

To be completed for September

Al-Banjari (1957) on the Lawfulness of Lahang

 23

It is understood from what has been
explained above that vinegar made from
lahang or the like is pure on the whole
either it becomes vinegar automatically
or because of being added with another
substance which is pure because lahang
does not turn into wine even if it is left
for one night or more. So, it is different
from grape juice and the like because
lahang that is left overnight is not
intoxicating. This [the fact that it is not
intoxication] has been observed several
times even when it is drunk in a large
amount. If wine is drunk in smaller
amount than that, then it normally
intoxicates. In the previous discussion,
it was explained that the ‘illa of the
impurity and the unlawfulness of wine
lies in its intoxicating nature. Hence, if
such ‘illa does not exist like in the case
of lahang which is left overnight, then
it is not impure and not unlawful.
Likewise, vinegar made from it is pure
and permissible to drink. Even though
another substance is added within it,
that does not change the ruling.
‫)ﺷﻬﺪان( دﻛﳤﻮي درﻓﺪ ﺳﳫﲔ ﯾڠ �ﺮﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ‬
�‫ﲠﻮﺳڽ ݘﻮك ﯾڠ �ﺪي درﻓﺪ ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ اﺗﻮ �ﺮڠﺴ�ﺒﺎڬ‬
‫ﺳﻮݘ اي ا�ﺲ اﻃﻼق ﯾﻌﲏ ﺳﲈ ادا اي �ﺪي ݘﻮك‬
‫دڠﻦ ﺳ�ﻨﺪ�ﺮ�ڽ ٔأﺗﻮ دڠﻦ دﺑﻮﺑﻪ ﺳﻮات �ﲔ ﯾڠ ﺳﻮݘ‬
‫ﻛﺪاﳌڽ درﰷرن ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ اﯾﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد �ﺪي ﲬﺮ دڠﻦ‬
‫دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ ﺳﲈﱂ اﺗﻮ ﻟﺒﻪ �ﺮﺳﻼﻫﻦ دڠﻦ ا�ﺮ ﺑﻮﻩ اڠڬﻮر‬
‫دان �ﺮڠﯿڠ ﺳﺆﳁﺎڽ ﰷرن ﻻﻫڠ ﯾڠ ﺗ� دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ اﯾﺖ‬
‫ﺗﯿﺎد اي ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﲄ دڠﻦ ﺳﻮدﻩ �ﺮݘﻮ� دﻣيﲌ ﺑﱪاف ﰷل‬
‫ﻫڠڬ ﺟﳫﻮ دﻣيﲌ اي دڠﻦ ﻗﺪر ﯾڠ �ﭘﻖ ﺳﳫﯿﻔﻮن‬
‫ �ﻚ دﻣيﲌ ﲪﺮ دڠﻦ ﻗﺪر ﯾڠ �ﺮ�ﻮرڠ درﻓﺪ‬۲‫ﺳﻜﲑا‬
‫اﯾﺖ �ﺴ�ﺎي ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﻜي� اي )دان ﺳڽ( ﺗ� �ﺮدﻫﻮل‬
‫ﻓﺮﻛﺘأٔن ﲠﻮﺳڽ �� ﳒﺲ ﲪﺮ دان �� ﺣﺮﻣڽ �ﺋﺖ‬
‫ٔ�د ٔأنڽ ﳑﺎﺑﻮﻗﲄ ﻣﻚ ٔأﻓبﯿﻞ ﺗﯿﺎد� دﻓﺮاوﻟﻬﺮ�� ﯾڠ‬
‫�ﺮﺳبﺖ اﯾﺖ ﻓﺪ ﻻﻫڠ اﻧﻮ ﯾڠ ﺗ� دﻓﺮﻣﺎﳌﻜﻦ ﺗﯿﺪ� ﳒﺲ‬
‫اي دان ﺗﯿﺎد ﺣﺮام )دان دﻣﻜيﻨﻼڬ( ݘﻮك ﯾڠ �ﺪي‬
‫درﻓﺪاڽ ﻫﺎڽ ادا� اي ﺳﻮݘ ﻫﺎرس ﳑﯿﳮﺪي دان �ﻚ‬
‫دﺑﻮﺑﻪ ﺳﻮات �ﲔ ﯾڠ ﻻ�ﻦ ﻛﺪاﳌڽ ﻣﻚ �ﺋﺖ ﺗﯿﺎد ﳑﱪي‬
‫ﻣﴬة‬

In the present paper we did not provide all the details of the dialogical-
framework underlying our reconstruction of the qiyās deployed by al-Banjari. We
present nevertheless the main elements necessary for following our study of the
dialogues. The reader interested in reading more about our take on qiyās can
consult the book Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2019) and Rahman/Iqbal (2018), though
the latter is restricted to the case of qiyās al-‘illa.

Moreover, if, as we hope, we motivated some readers to know more about

the work of Arsyad al-Banjari on qiyās they will find a systematic study in
Muhammad Iqbal’s forthcoming PHD-thesis (2019).

Conclusion
 24

In his PhD-dissertation of 1984 (published 2013) The Economy of

Certainty, that set a landmark in the field, Aroon Zysow (2013, p. 159) proposed
to study uṣūl al-fiqh (‫ )أﺻﻮل اﻟﻔﻘﻪ‬Islamic Legal Theory, under an epistemological
perspective, or more precisely as the Islamic counterpart to [contemporary]
philosophy of science. Indeed, this constitutes a fruitful perspective, since uṣūl al-
fiqh is deeply rooted in the notion of rational knowledge and understanding. On
the other hand, we should not lose sight of the point that uṣūl al-fiqh constitutes
the body of knowledge and methods of reasoning that Islamic jurists deploy in
order to provide solutions to practical legal problems linked to the dynamics of
legal systems. This acute practical feature of uṣūl al-fiqh lead to the emergence of
qiyās shaped by an argumentative stance – see Hallaq (1987a,b) Young (2017)).

In this context Arsyad al-Banjari’s sets a paradigm on how to implement

the idea that Law is largely a matter of practice, and that one of the most suitable
instruments for legal practice is a dialectical framework that calls for a collective
act of understanding.

Altogether, we can say that at the center of Arsyad al-Banjari discursive

model of integration is the idea that rationality is featured by the task of bringing
to the space of games of giving and asking for reasons, those commitments and
entitlements that structure the network of implicit beliefs and notions underlying
social practices. 13 This is a general lesson of the Elders we should not ignore.

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