the

incompetent
EN BANC
MARCOSA
RIVERA, count
[G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.] er-
petitioner,AR
HENRY LITAM MINIO
, ETC., ET RIVERA, admi
AL., plaintiffs- nistrator-
appellants, vs. appellee.
REMEDIOS
R. ESPIRITU,
Sycip, Quisumbing &
as guardian
Salazar for appellants.
of the
incompetent De Los Santos & De
MARCOSA los Santos and E. L. Gonzales for
RIVERA, and appellees.
ARMINIO
RIVERA, defen
SYLLABUS
dants-
appellees.
1. PATERNITY AND
FILIATION; FAILURE TO
[G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956]
ESTABLISH STATUS OF
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BARS
IN THE CLAIM TO SHARE IN THE
MATTER OF ESTATE. — Appellants claims
THE that they are the children of the
INTESTATE OF decedent by a marriage
THE celebrated in China in 1911 with
DECEASED S.K.; that during the subsistence
RAFAEL LITA of the marriage, the decedent
M. GREGORIO had contracted in 1922 another
DY marriage with M.R.; that as
TAM, petition heirs, they are entitled to the
er- decedent's one-half share in the
appellant, vs. properties acquired during the
REMEDIOS second marriage. Held: The
R. ESPIRITU, various official and public
in her documents executed by the
capacity as decedent himself convincingly
judicial shows that he had not
guardian of contracted marriage with any
person other than M.R., and
that he had no child. Thus in
marriage certificate it was
clearly stated that he was single
when he married M.R. in 1922;
in the sworn application for
alien certificate of registration
dated July 7, 1950, he declared
under oath that no child; and in
several other documents
executed by him and presented
in evidence he had consistently
referred to M. R. alone his wife;
he had never mentioned S. K. as
his wife, or their alleged
children. On the other hand,
appellants did not present in
evidence the marriage
certificate of the decedent and
their mother, which is the best
evidence of the
marriage; or gave
explanation for the
presentation thereof or of its
loss neither have
presented any competent
secondary evidence of the
supposed marriage.
finding, therefore, of the lower
court that the appellants are
not heirs of the decedent is
correct.
2. HUSBAND
WIFE; PROPERTIES ACQUIRED
DURING MARRIAGE PRESUMED
CONJUGAL; PRESUMPTION,
HOW OVERCOME. — The
evidence shows that
properties in questions were
brought by the wife with her
separate and exclusive money,
although during her marriage
with the decedents; that the
spouse had adopted a system of
separation of properties; that
the wife had been
administering said properties,
to the exclusion of her husband;
and that said properties were
registered in her name. Thus,
the disputable presumption of
law that properties acquired
during marriage are conjugal
properties has been overcome.
3. EVIDENCE;
DECLARATION AND ADMISSION
AGAINST OWN INTEREST;
PERSON BOUND THEREBY. —
The decedent had
acknowledged the fact that he
had obtained from his wife
sums of money which belongs
alleged
exclusively to the latter and had
any
not been paid to her up to the
non-
present. He also acknowledged
that he had not given any
they
money to his wife and that they
have actually adopted a system
of separation of property, each
The
of them not having any interest
or participation whatsoever in
the property of the other. These
declarations and admission of
fact made by the decedent
AND against his interest are binding
upon him, his heirs and
successors in interests and third
persons as well.
4. DAMAGES; WHEN
the
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT BE
SENTENCED TO PAY. — The
complaint in question contains
nothing derogatory to the good
name or reputation of the
 defendants-appellees. On the
contrary, it may be surmised
from said pleading that the
defendant spouse had no
knowledge of the alleged
previous marriage of the
decedent. Moreover, there was
no showing that the plaintiffs
acted in bad faith. Hence, the
latter should not be sentenced
to pay damages.
5. SUCCESSION;
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP;
NOT PROPER IN CIVIL CASE. —
The declaration of heirship is
improper in a civil case it being
within the exclusive
competence of the court in a
Special proceedings.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an appeal
from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in the
above entitled case, which
were jointly tried.
On May 21, 1952,
Gregorio Dy Tam instituted
Special Proceeding No. 1537 of
said court, entitled "In the
matter of the Intestate Estate
of the Deceased Rafael Litam".
The petition therein filed,
dated April 24, 1952, states
that petitioner is the son of
Rafael Litam, who died in
Manila on January 10, 1951;
that the deceased was survived
by:
Li Hong Hap
40 years
Li Ho
37 years
Gregorio Dy Tam
33 years
Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho
29 years
Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian
27 years
Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee
25 years
William Litam alias Li Bun Hua
23 years
Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin
22 years
that the foregoing children of
the decedent "by a marriage
celebrated in China in 1911
with Sia Khin, now deceased";
that "after the death of
Rafael Litam, petitioner and his
co-heirs came to know" that
the decedent had, during the
subsistence of said marriage
with Sia Khin, "contracted in
1922 in the Philippines . . .
another marriage with
Marcosa Rivera, Filipino
citizen"; that "the decedent left
as his property among others,
his one-half (1/2) share valued
at P65,000 in the purported
conjugal properties between
him and Marcosa Rivera, which
. . . partnership consisted of
the following real property
acquired during the marriage
between him and Marcosa
Rivera, to wit:
(1) "
Three (3)
parcels of land
covered by
Transfer
 Certificate of
Title No. 1228
of the Registry
of Deeds of
the province
of Pampanga:
(2) "
One (1) parcel
of land
covered by
Transfer
Certificate of
Title No.
26011 of the
Registry of
Deeds of the
province of
Bulacan."
and that the decedent had left
neither a will nor debt.
Petitioner prayed, therefore,
that, after appropriate
proceedings, letters of
administration be issued to
Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving
spouse of the decedent". Soon
thereafter, Marcosa Rivera
filed a counter- petition: (1)
substantially denying the
alleged marriage of the
decedent to Sia Khin, as well as
the alleged filiation of the
persons named in the petition;
(2) asserting that the
properties described herein are
her paraphernal properties,
and that the decedent had left
unpaid debts, and certain
properties in Bulan and
Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in
Virac, Catanduanes, apart from
shares of stock in a private
corporation known by the
name of Litam Co., Inc.; and (3)
praying that her nephew,
Arminio Rivera, be appointed
administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased.
In due course, the
court granted this petition and
letters of administration were
issued to Arminio Rivera, who
assumed his duties as such,
and, later, submitted an
inventory of the alleged estate
of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as
said inventory did not include
the properties mentioned in
the petition, dated April 24,
1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the
latter filed, on November 29,
1952, a motion for the removal
of Rivera as administrator of
the aforementioned estate.
This led to a number of
incidents hinging on the
question whether said
properties belong in common
to the decedent and Marcosa
Rivera or to the latter
exclusively.
Meanwhile,
Remedios R. Espiritu was
appointed, in Special
Proceeding No. 1709 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal,
guardian of Marcosa Rivera,
who had been declared
incompetent. Thereafter, or on
April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy
Tam and his alleged brothers
and sisters aforementioned,
filed the complaint in Civil Case
No. 2071 of the same court,
against Remedios R. Espiritu, as s thereon
guardian of Marcosa Rivera, except those
and Arminio Rivera. In said expressly
complaint, plaintiffs therein noted in the
reproduced substantially the title as
allegations made in the belonging to
aforementioned petition of other persons,
Gregorio Dy Tam dated April situated in the
24. 1952, except that the Municipality
properties acquired "during the of Navotas,
existence of marriage" Province of
between Rafael Litam and Rizal, covered
Marcosa Rivera "and/or with by Transfer
their joint efforts during the Certificate of
time that they lived as husband Title No.
and wife" were said to be more 35836 of the
than those specified in said Registry of
petition, namely: Deeds for the
Province of
"(1)
Rizal, issued
3 parcels of
on October 4,
land situated
1938;
in the
Municipality "(3)
of Macabebe, 1 parcel of
Province of land situated
Pampanga, in the
covered by Municipality
Transfer of Malabon,
Certificate of Province of
Title No. 1228 Rizal, covered
of the Registry by Transfer
of Deeds for Certificate of
the Province Title No.
of Pampanga, 23248 of the
issued on July Registry of
29, 1947; Deeds for the
Province of
"(2)
Rizal, issued
2 Parcels of
on June 12,
land, together
1933;
with all
buildings and "(4)
improvement 1 parcel of
land situated "Ot
in Barrio of her properties
Kay-Badia, are located in
Municipality Bataan
of Obando, province.
Province of
"All
Bulacan,
properties
covered by
total an
Transfer
assessed
Certificate of
value of
Title No.
approximately
21809 of the
P150,000.00."
Registry of
In
Deeds for the
said
Province of
complaint,
Bulacan,
plaintiffs
issued on May
prayed that
25, 1939;
the judgment
"(5)
be rendered:
1 parcel of
"(1)
land (plan
declaring the
psu-93067,
aforesaid
swo-16049)
properties as
situated in
belonging to
Barrio of
the conjugal
Quibadia,
partnership or
Municipality
tenancy in
of Obando,
common
Province of
which existed
Bulacan,
between the
covered by
deceased
Transfer
Rafael Litam a
Certificate of
nd the
Title No.
incompetent
26011 of the
Marcosa
Registry of
Rivera;
Deeds for the
Province of "(2)
Bulacan, ordering the
issued on April defendants to
9, 1943; deliver the
aforesaid
properties to double the
the value of the
administratio fruits
n of the estate mentioned in
of the the preceding
deceased paragraph
Rafael Litam( which they
Rule 75, embezzled;
section 2, and
Rules of
"(5)
Court);
ordering the
"(3) defendants to
ordering the pay the costs.
said "The plaintiffs
defendants further pray
further to for such other
render an remedy as the
accounting of Court may
the fruits they deem just and
collected from equitable in
the aforesaid the premises."
properties
In her answer to the
and to deliver
complaint, Marcosa Rivera
the same to
reiterated, in effect, the
the
allegations in her counter-
administratio
petition, dated July 12, 1952, in
n of the estate
Special Proceeding No. 1537,
of the
and set up some affirmative
deceased
and special defenses, as well as
Rafael Litam;
a counter-claim for attorney's
fees and damages in the
aggregate sum of P110,000.00.
"(4)
ordering the Owning to the
said identity of the issue raised in
defendants to said Civil Case No. 2071 and in
pay the the aforementioned incidents
administratio in Special Proceeding No. 1537,
n of the estate both were jointly heard. Later
of the on, the court rendered a
deceased decision.
Rafael Litam d
amages in
 "(1) one-half
Dismissing undivided
Civil Case No. portion of the
2071, with fishponds,
costs against consisting of
the plaintiffs; two parcels,
situated in
"(2)
Navotas, Rizal,
Sentencing
covered by
the plaintiff in
Transfer
Civil Case No.
Certificate of
2071, under
Title No.
the
35836, the
defendants'
parcel of land
counterclaim,
with the
to pay jointly
improvement
and severally
s thereon
each of the
situated in
defendants
Malabon,
the sum of
Rizal, covered
P5,000.00 as
by Transfer
actual
Certificate of
damages and
Title No.
P25,000.00 as
23248, both
moral
of the land
damages;
records of
"(3)
Rizal, and the
Declaring that
fishponds,
the properties
consisting of
in question,
two parcels,
namely: the
situated in
fishponds,
Obando,
consisting of
Bulacan,
three parcels,
covered by
situated in
Transfer
Macabebe,
Certificates of
Pampanga,
Title Nos.
with Transfer
21809 and
certificate of
26011, both
Title No. 1228
of the land
of the land
records of
records of
Bulacan, are
Pampanga,
the exclusive,
 separate and common property of her and
paraphernal the decedent?
properties of
The first issue hinges
Marcosa
on whether Rafael Litam and
Rivera; and
Sia Khin were married in 1911,
"(4) and whether Rafael Litam is
Declaring that the father of appellants herein.
the plaintiffs In this connection, the lower
in Civil Case court had the following to say:
No. 2071 (who
". . .
are the same
the evidence
persons
weikhs very
alleged to be
heavily in
children of
favor of the
Rafael Litam i
theory of the
n the petition,
defendants in
dated April
Civil Case No.
24, 1952, filed
2071 to the
by the
effect that the
petitioner in
said deceased
Sp. Proc. No.
Rafael Litam
1537) are not
was not
the children of
married to Sia
the deceased
Khin and that
Rafael Litam,
plaintiffs, are
and that his
not the
only heir is his
children of the
surviving wife,
said
Marcosa
decedent. The
Rivera."
plaintiffs in
The two (2) Cases are Civil Case No.
now before us on appeal taken 2071 and the
by the petitioner in Special petitioner in
Proceeding No. 1537 and the Sp. Proc. No.
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. 1537 have
The issues for determination utterly failed
are: (1) Are appellants the to prove their
legitimate children of alleged status
Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa as children of
Rivera the exclusive owner of Rafael Litam b
the properties in question, or y a marriage
do the same constitute a with Sia Khin.
 "It that he had no
appears from child. In the
the evidence marriage
presented by certificate,
the (Exhibit 55) it
defendants in was clearly
civil Case No. stated that he
2071 and the was single wh
administrator en he married
and the Marcosa
counter- Rivera on June
petitioner in 10, 1922. In
Sp. Proc. No. the sworn
1537 that application for
there was no alien
such marriage certificate of
between the registration
deceased dated July 7,
Rafael Litam a 1950 (Exhibit
nd Sia Khin 1),
and that the Rafael Litam u
plaintiffs nequivocably
named in Civil declared
Case No. 2071 under oath
are not that he had no
children of child. In the
said several other
deceased. The documents
various official executed by
and public him and
documents presented in
executed by evidence,
Rafael Litam h (Exhibits 19,
imself 21, 22, 23, 46
convincingly and 46-A)
show that he Rafael Litam h
had not ad
contracted consistently
any marriage referred to
with any Marcosa
person other Rivera alone
than Marcosa as his wife; he
Rivera, and had never me
ntioned of Sia id not have
Khin as his any child.
wife, or of his
"On
alleged
the other
children.
hand, the
The plaintiffs in
witnesses Civil Case No.
presented by 2071 and the
the petitioner in
defendants in Sp. Proc. No.
Civil Case No. 1537
2071 and the presented in
administrator support of
and counter their theory
petitioner in the testimony
Sp. Proc. No. of their lone
1537 witness,
positively Luis Litam,
testified to and certain
the effect that documentary
they know evidence. It is
that noteworthy
Rafael Litam d that the said
id not have plaintiffs and
any child, nor said
was he petitioner did
married with not present in
Sia Khin. An evidence the
impartial and marriage
disinterested certificate of
witness, Rafael Litam a
Felipe Cruz, nd Sia Khin,
likewise which in the
testified that opinion of the
he has known Court, is the
Rafael Litam e competent
ven before his and best
marriage with evidence of
Marcosa the alleged
Rivera and marriage
that said between
Rafael Litam d them. No
explanation testimony is
has been uncorroborat
given for the ed. The court
non- noticed that
presentation the said
of said witness
marriage was only 22
certificate, years
nor has there old when he
been any testified, and
showing of its it appears in
loss. Neither the petition
have said filed by the
plaintiffs and petitioner in
said petitioner Sp. Proc. No.
presented any 1537 that said
competent witness is the
secondary youngest of
evidence of all the alleged
the supposed eight children
marriage. of
Rafael Litam.
"Th
The Court is at
e testimony of
a loss to
the lone
understand
witness,
why one or
Luis Litam,
some of the
cannot be
older alleged
given any
children of
credence and
Rafael Litam
value at all.
were not
His testimony
presented as
is mostly
witnesses in
hearsay, as
view of the
according to
unreliable
him, he was
testimony of
merely
Luis Litam,
informed by
and
Rafael Litam o
considering
f the latter's
that older
supposed
persons are
marriage with
better
Sia Khin. His
qualified to
testify on the that said
matters persons were
sought to be born in
proved which different
allegedly places, some
happened a in Amoy,
long time ago. China,
another
"Th
Fukien, China,
e birth
and the other
certificate
in Limtao,
presented by
China. It also
the plaintiff in
appears in
Civil Case No.
said birth
2071 and
certificates
petitioner in
that the
Sp. Proc. No.
children's
1537 cannot
mothers
be given even
named
little
therein are
consideration,
different,
because the
some being
name of the
Sia Khim,
father of the
others Sia
children
Quien, the
appearing
other Sia
therein is not
Khun, and still
Rafael Litam,
another Sia
but different
Kian. These
persons. It is
documents do
very
not establish
significant to
the identity of
note that the
the deceased
names of the
Rafael Litam a
father of the
nd the
persons
persons
appearing in
named
said birth
therein as
certificates
father.
are Dy Tham,
Besides, it
Li Tam, Lee
does not
Tham, Rafael
appear in the
Dy Tam, and
said
certificates of Case No. 2071
birth that are not heirs
Rafael Litam h of the said
ad in any decedent, his
manner only heir
intervened in being his
the surviving wife,
preparation Marcosa
and filing Rivera."
thereof. (Emphasis
ours.)
"Th
e other The findings of fact
documentary thus made in the decision
evidence appealed from are borne out
presented by by the records and the
the said conclusion drawn from said
plaintiffs and facts is, to our mind,
petitioner are substantially correct.
entirely
Appellants' evidence
immaterial
on this point consists of the
and highly
testimony of appellant Li Bun
insufficient to
Lin, who said that he is, also
prove the
known as Luis Litam; that his
alleged
co-appellants are his brothers
marriage
and sisters; that their parents
between the
are the decedent and Sia Khin,
deceased
who were married in China in
Rafael Litam a
1911; and that Sia Khin died in
nd Sia Khin
Manila during the Japanese
and the
occupation. He likewise,
alleged statue
identified several pictures,
of the
marked Exhibits I to S, which
plaintiffs as
were claimed to be family
children of
portraits, but the lower court
said
rejected their admission in
decedent.
evidence. Although we agree
"It with herein appellants that this
is, therefore, was an error, it is clear to us
the finding of that said pictures and the
this Court that testimony of Luis Litam, as well
the plaintiffs as the other evidence adverted
named in Civil to in the above-quoted portion
of the decision appealed from,
are far from sufficient to
outweigh, or even offset, the
evidence in favor of the
appellees.
It should be noted
that the decedent had
admittedly married Marcosa
Rivera in 1922. In the very
petition of appellant Gregorio
Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding
No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952,
he alleged that Marcosa Rivera
is "the surviving spouse of the
decedent". In their complaint
in Civil Case No. 2071,
appellants specifically admitted
and averred "the existence of
the marriage between said
Rafael Litam and Marcosa
Rivera" — which would have
been void ab initio, and, hence,
inexistent legally, if appellants'
pretense were true or they
believed it to be so — and that
they had "lived as husband and
wife". Again, although Gregorio
Dy Tam, asserted, in his
aforementioned petition, that
he and his co-heirs "came to
know" about the marriage of
the decedent and Marcosa
Rivera "after the death of
Rafael Litam", the very
testimony of Li Bun Lin, as
witness for the appellants,
show, beyond doubt, that said
appellants knew, during the
lifetime of Rafael Litam that he
and Marcosa Rivera were living
in Malabon, Rizal, openly and
publicly, as husband and wife,
and regarded her as his lawful
wife. Indeed, in the course of
his testimony, said Li Bun Lin
alluded to her as his "mother".
In other words, aside from the
circumstance that the wedding
and marital life of Marcosa
Rivera and Rafael Litam is
undisputed, it is, also, an
established fact that they had
the general reputation of being
legally married and were so
regarded by the community
and by appellants herein,
during the lifetime of
Rafael Litam.
Upon the other hand,
appellants maintain, in effect,
that Rafael Litam was guilty of
the crime of bigamy; that he
had, likewise, willfully and
maliciously falsified public and
official documents; and that,
although appellants and Sia
Khin were living in Manila and
Marcosa Rivera — whom
appellants knew — resided
only a few kilometers away, in
Malabon, Rizal where
Rafael Litam returned daily,
after attending to his business
in Manila, the decedent had
succeeded, for about thirty
(30) years, in keeping each
party in complete ignorance of
the nature of his alleged
relations with the other. Apart
from the highly improbable
nature of the last part of
appellants' pretense, it is
obvious that the same can not
be sustained unless the
evidence in support thereof is portion of the
of the strongest possible kind, fishponds
not only because it entails the situated in
commission by RafaelLitam of Navotas, Rizal
grave criminal offenses which with Transfer
are derogatory to his honor, Certificate of
but, also, because death has Title No.
sealed his lips, thus depriving 35836, and
him of the most effective the property
means of defense. The proof situated in
for appellants herein does not Hulong-
satisfy such requirement. Duhat,
Malabon,
As regards the title to
Rizal, with
the properties in dispute, the
Transfer
evidence thereon was analyzed
Certificate of
by the lower court in the
Title No.
following language:
23248 were
"It
all purchased
has been
by Marcosa
established by
Rivera with
the evidence
the money
that the
she earned
properties in
and
question were
accumulated
bought by
while she was
Marcosa
still single;
Rivera with
while the
her separate
fishponds
and exclusive
situated in
money. The
Macabebe,
fishponds
Pampanga
situated in
with Transfer
Obando,
Certificate of
Bulacan,
Title No. 1228
covered by
were
Transfer
purchased by
Certificate of
her with the
Title Nos.
money she
21809 and
inherited from
26011, the
her late sister,
one-half (1/2)
Rafaela Rivera
undivided
and with the
money she should be
received from given to the
the proceeds documentary
of the sale of evidence, vis:
the pieces of Exhibits 21,
jewelry she 22, 23, 19, 46
inherited from and 46-A,
her father presented by
Eduardo the
Rivera and her defendants, in
sister Rafaela Civil Case No.
Rivera. The 2071 and the
properties in administrator
question, and counter-
having been petitioner in
bought by Sp. Proc. No.
Marcosa 1537, which
Rivera, prove beyond
although peradventure
during her of any doubt
marriage with that the
Rafael Litam, properties in
with her question are
exclusive and the
separate paraphernal
money, said properties of
properties are Marcosa
undeniably Rivera. In
her Exhibit
paraphernal 21, Rafael Lita
properties. m unequivoca
(Art. bly declared
1396, Spanish under his oath
Civil Code, that the
which is the money paid by
same as Art. Marcosa
148 of the Rivera for the
Civil Code of fishponds in
the Phil.) Obando,
Bulacan
"Gr
was her
eat
exclusive and
importance
separate
money which dged the fact
was earned by that he had
her while she obtained,
was still before the
single. In outbreak of
Exhibits 22 the second
and 23, both world war,
dated June 16, from Marcosa
1947, Rivera the
same Rafael Li sum of
tam, also P135,000.00
under oath, which belongs
acknowledge exclusively to
the fact that the latter, and
the sums of that after the
P13,000.00 liberation, or
and more
P10,000.00 specifically,
loaned by on January 4,
Marcosa 1946, he stole
Rivera to the from Marcosa
spouses Rivera the
Catalino further sum of
Pascual and P62,000.00,
Juliana also
Pascual, and belonging excl
to Juliana usively to the
Pascual, latter, which
respectively, amounts,
are totalling
the separate P197,000.00,
and exclusive exclusive of
money of interests,
Marcosa have not,
Rivera, in according to
which money the evidence,
Rafael Litam h been paid to
ad no her up to the
interest whats present. In
oever. In Exhibits 46
Exhibit 19, and 46-A, it
same Rafael Li was
tam acknowle acknowledge
d in question
by Rafael Lita are
m that he had paraphernal
not given any properties of
money to his Marcosa
wife, Marcosa Rivera, having
Rivera, and been bought
that they by her with
have actually her separate
adopted a and exclusive
system of money, is
separation of further
property, strengthened
each of them by the fact
not having any that, as it is
interest or clearly
participation disclosed by
whatsoever in the
the property evidence whe
of the other. n Marcosa
These Rivera
declarations married
and admission Rafael Litam i
of fact made n 1922, she
by was already
Rafael Litam a rich, she
gainst his having already
interest are earned and
binding upon saved money
him, his heirs as
and 'consignataria
successors in ' while she
interests and was still
third persons single. It also
as well. (Secs. appears that
7 & 29, Rule she was born
123, Rules of of a rich
Court). family, her
father,
"Th
Eduardo
e finding of
Rivera, being
this Court that
the owner of
the properties
fishponds,
commercial latter died
and single on July
residential 2,
lands and 1943, Marcos
buildings, a Rivera
(Exhibits 5 to inherited her
18, inclusive), cash
with an amounting to
assessed P150,000.00,
value of Philippine
around currency, and
P150,000.00 and her pieces
(Exhibits 25 of jewelry. It is
and 42, with this
inclusive), amount and
now worth with the
approximately proceeds of
a million the sale of
pesos, and some of said
most of which pieces of
properties as jewelry that
may be seen Marcosa
from the Rivera
certificates of purchased the
title fishponds in
were acquired question,
by him way situated in
back in the Macabebe,
years 1916 Pampanga.
and 1919.
"On
When
the other
Eduardo
hand, it
Rivera died on
appears from
February 5,
the evidence
1942, his cash
that when
and jewelry
Rafael Litam
were
was on June
inherited by
10, 1922,
his eldest
married to
daughter,
Marcosa
Rafaela
Rivera, he was
Rivera, and
poor. He had
when the
to borrow absolute
from Marcosa separation of
Rivera, the property
sum of (Exhibits 46
P135,000.00 and 46-A).
belonging Besides,
exclusively to during his
her before the lifetime he
outbreak of used to go his
the war, and office in
to steal from Manila
her further everyday.
sum of
"An
P62,000.00
other
after the
circumstance
liberation
which clearly
(Exhibit 10).
proves that
The said
the properties
amounts
in question
totalling
belong
P197,000.00,
exclusively to
exclusive of
Marcosa
the stipulated
Rivera is the
interests,
established
according to
fact that
the evidence,
before she
have not been
became
paid to
incompetent
Marcosa
sometime in
Rivera up to
the early part
the present.
of the year,
Rafael Litam d
1953, she had
id not
been
contribute
administering
any amount of
said
money or
properties, to
labor to the
the exclusion
properties in
of
question, as
Rafael Litam.
he and
In fact, as may
Marcosa
be seen from
Rivera
the very
maintained an
documentary (Exhibits 43,
evidence 44 & 45.)
(Exhibit 'EE',
"Fur
same as Nxh.
ther strong
50) presented
proofs that
by the
the properties
plaintiffs in
in question
Civil Case No.
are the
2071
paraphernal
themselves
properties of
and petitioner
Marcosa
in Sp. Proc.
Rivera, are the
No. 1537, she
very Torrens
alone leased
Titles covering
the properties
said
in question,
properties. All
situated in
the said
Macabebe,
properties are
Pampanga,
registered in
and the
the name of
corresponding
'Marcosa
lease
Rivera,
contract,
married to
dated July 13,
Rafael Litam.'
1948 was
This
signed by her
circumstance
as lessor and
indicates that
by Rafael
the properties
Suarez, Jr. as
in question
lessees.
belong to the
Furthermore,
registered
the properties
owner,
in question
Marcosa
have been
Rivera, as her
declared in
paraphernal
the name of
properties, for
Marcosa
if they were
Rivera alone,
conjugal, the
and she alone
titles covering
pays the real
the same
estate taxes
should have
due thereon.
been issued in
the names of the mind of
Rafael Litam a the Court,
nd Marcosa very weak,
Rivera. The unreliable,
words and mostly
'married to incompetent,
Rafael Litam' and cannot
written after overcome the
the name of clear,
Marcosa convincing
Rivera, in each and almost
of the above conclusive
mentioned proofs
titles are presented by
merely the opposite
descriptive of party. Scant or
the civil status no
of Marcosa consideration
Rivera, the at all could be
registered given by the
owner of the Court to the
properties immaterial,
covered by incompetent
said titles. and
unbelievable
"On
testimonies of
the other
the witnesses
hand, the
presented by
evidence
the said
presented by
plaintiffs and
the plaintiffs
petitioners.
in Civil Case
The
No. 2071 and
disputable
petitioner in
presumption
Sp. Proc. No.
of law that the
1537 in
properties
support of
acquired
their
during the
contention
marriage are
that the
conjugal
properties in
properties,
question are
upon which
conjugal is, in
legal
 presumption reasons for the language used
said plaintiffs in the public and official
and petitioner documents relied upon by the
mainly rely appellees. However, it is
has been apparent to us that said
decisively evidence cannot affect the
overcome by decision in these cases.
the
The evidenciary value
overwhelming
of the testimony of said
preponderanc
witnesses would have
e of evidence
depended mainly upon their
adduced in
individual appraisal of certain
these cases
facts, upon their
that the
respective inferences therefro
properties in
m and their biases or view
question are
points, and upon a number of
the
other factors affecting their
paraphernal
credibility. At best, said
properties of
testimony could not possibly
Marcosa
prevail over the repeated
Rivera."
admissions made by the
(Emphasis
decedent against his own
ours.)
interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22,
Appellants' counsel 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in
assail the decision appealed the abovequoted portion of
from upon the ground that the the decision appealed from),
lower court had been partial to which admissions are
the appellees and had not corroborated by the fact that
accorded to the appellants a the deceased father of
fair and just hearing. Marcosa Rivera was well to do;
that aside from her share in his
As above pointed
estate, she had, likewise,
out, His Honor the trial Judge
inherited from a sister who
could have been, and should
died single and without issue;
have been, more liberal in the
that the lands in dispute were
reception of evidence.
registered, and some were,
Appellants' witnesses (Li Bun
also, leased, in her name,
Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno
instead of hers and that of the
Musni and Rafael B. Suarez)
decedent; and that the latter
should have been allowed to
lived in her house in Malabon,
testify on the alleged title of
Rizal.
Rafael Litam to certain
properties and on his alleged
 Appellants contend pleadings that Marcosa Rivera
that the transactions covered had no knowledge of the
by said Exhibits 19, 21 to 23 alleged previous marriage of
and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the decedent to Sia Khin.
the other deeds referred to in Moreover, the records do not
the decision appealed from, show that appellants have
were caused to be made in the acted in bad faith.
name of Marcosa Rivera, to the
Likewise, we are of
exclusion of her husband, in
the opinion that the lower
order to evade the
court should not have
constitutional provision
declared, in the decision
disqualifying foreigners from
appealed from, that Marcosa
the acquisition of private
Rivera is the only heir of the
agricultural lands, except by
decedent, for such declaration
succession. Apart from being
is improper in Civil Case No.
based, solely, upon a surmise,
2071, it being within the
without any evidentiary
exclusive competence of the
support, this pretense is
court in Special Proceeding No.
refuted by the fact that said
1537, in which it is not as yet,
residential property in Hulong-
in issue, and, will not be,
Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was
ordinarily, in issue until the
acquired on April 12, 1933,
presentation of the project of
or prior to the adoption of our
partition.
Constitution (see Exhibits Z and
Wherefore, with the
AA). Her transactions
elimination of the award for
subsequently thereto, merely
damages in favor of the herein
followed, therefore, the
appellees, and of said
pattern of her activities before
declaration of heirship, the
the drafting of said
decision appealed from is
fundamental law.
hereby affirmed in all other
This notwithstanding,
respects, with costs against the
we do not believe that
appellants. It is so ordered.
appellants should be sentenced
Paras, C.J., Bengzon,
to pay damages. The petition
Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista
of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special
Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.
Proceeding No. 1537 and the
L., Endencia and Felix,
complaint in Civil Case No.
JJ., concur.
2071 contain nothing
derogatory to the good name
or reputation of the herein
appellees. On the contrary, it
may be surmised from said

||| (Litam v. Espiritu, G.R. Nos. L-7644-45, [November 27,
1956], 100 PHIL 364-378)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199180. July 27, 2016.]
THELMA RODRIGUEZ, joined by her
husband, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
JAIME SIOSON AND ARMI SIOSON,
et al., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for
review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision 2 dated May 26, 2011 and
Resolution 3 dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867, which nullified
the Joint Decision 4 dated August 13, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3.
The Facts
This petition is the aftermath of a series of
sales transactions entered into by Neri delos Reyes
(Neri) over a portion of a property formerly identified
as Lot 398, with an area of 22,398 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
86275 and registered in the name of "Neri delos Reyes,
married to Violeta Lacuata." 5
Sometime in 1997, the Municipality of Orani,
Bataan (Municipality) purchased from Neri an area of
about 1.7 hectare of Lot 398, to be used for the
extension of the Municipality's public market. Among
other things, it was agreed that upon full payment of
the purchase price, Neri will surrender the mother title
to the Municipality for subdivision of the property on
the condition that Neri will equitably share in the
expense thereof. 6
Lot 398 was subsequently subdivided into 5
lots: Lot 398-A, Lot 398-B, Lot 398-C, Lot 398-D, and Lot
398-E. Lots 398-C and 398-D pertain to the portions
that were sold to the Municipality, while Lot 398-E is a
road lot. Consequently, only Lots 398-A and 398-B
were left as the remaining portions over which Neri
retained absolute title. TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-
209895 were then respectively issued over Lots 398-A
and 398-B and were both registered in the name
of "Neri delos Reyes, married to Violeta Lacuata." The
owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-
209895, however, were retained by the Municipality
pending Neri's payment of his share in the expenses
incurred for the subdivision of Lot 398. These were
placed under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer,
where they continue to remain. 7
Neri, however, alleged that then Municipal
Mayor Mario Zuñiga suggested that he sell Lot 398-A
to his aunt, petitioner Thelma Rodriguez (Thelma). The
Municipality would then expropriate the same from
Thelma. Neri agreed to the suggestion. 8
After agreeing to the amount of
P1,243,000.00 as the selling price, Thelma, on March
20, 1997, issued a check for said amount payable to
Neri. When it fell due, no sufficient funds were
available to cover the check. Consequently, it was
agreed that Thelma would pay the purchase price in
installments from March 20, 1997 to September 4,
1997. Thelma, however, was only able to pay
P442,293.50. 9
On November 12, 2001, Thelma caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. T-
209894. 10 At about the same time, Thelma saw an
announcement that a new Orani Common Terminal
would be built on Lot 398-A. As she has not yet entered
into any agreement regarding the utilization of said lot,
Thelma filed a Complaint for Injunction docketed
as Civil Case No. 7394 against then incumbent mayor
Efren Pascual, Jr. (Mayor Pascual), and the
Municipality under claim of ownership. To support her
claim, Thelma incorporated in her complaint a copy of
an undated and unnotarized deed of absolute sale
allegedly executed by Neri in her favor. 11
In their joint verified answer, Mayor Pascual
and the Municipality acknowledged that Thelma
became the owner of Lot 398-A by way of purchase
from Neri. 12
In 2002, Neri executed an affidavit claiming
that the owner's copies of TCT No. T-209894 (covering
Lot 398-A) and TCT No. T-209895 (covering Lot 398-B)
were lost, which was annotated on the original copy of
TCT No. T-209894 on May 8, 2002. 13 Two days after,
or on May 10, 2002, Neri caused the cancellation of
Thelma's adverse claim. 14 Neri also caused the
reconstitution of new owner's copies of TCT Nos. T-
209894 and T-209895. 15 Thereafter, new copies of
TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-209895 were issued, and Neri
then sold Lot 398-A to Spouses Jaime and Armi Sioson,
Spouses Joan and Joseph Camacho, and Agnes
Samonte (respondents) — in a deed of sale dated
November 27, 2002. A special power of attorney was
executed by Violeta delos Reyes (Violeta) in favor of
Neri for the purpose. Consequently, TCT No. T-209894
was cancelled, and TCT No. T-226775 was thus issued
in the respondents' names. 16 CAIHTE
 Upon the issuance of TCT No. T-226775, the [Mayor
respondents declared Lot 398-A for tax purposes and Pascual] and
paid them accordingly. They sought to take actual the
possession thereof by filling it; however, after they [Municipality]
filled said lot with about 40 truckloads of soil/fillings, are
Thelma sent two armed blue guards who entered the concerned,
premises and set up a tent therein. The respondents not only did
brought the matter to the attention of barangay they
authorities who referred them to the municipal mayor. acknowledge
As the municipal mayor did not take any action, the expressly the
respondents filed a forcible entry case against Thelma ownership of
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Orani-Samal, [Thelma] of
Bataan, docketed as Civil Case No. 843. The said Lot 398-A,
ejectment case is still pending. 17 they have
disowned the
After Thelma learned of the second sale of
commission of
Lot 398-A, she filed against the respondents a
any act in
complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of the Second
derogation of
Sale and TCT No. T-226775 on February 11, 2003,
[Thelma's]
docketed as Civil Case No. 7664. In support of her
right of
claim, Thelma once again presented a deed of absolute
ownership of
sale executed by Neri in her favor. This time, the deed
the lot and did
of sale she presented was duly signed by her and Neri,
not contest
witnessed, notarized and dated April 10, 1997. 18
anymore the
The respondents countered that they are action of
innocent purchasers for value having bought Lot 398- [Thelma] in
A at the time when Thelma's adverse claim was already said case;
cancelled. While they admit Thelma's possession of
2) In
the subject property, they, however, qualify that
sofar as Civil
possession is being contested in a separate action for
Case No. 7664
forcible entry. 19
is concerned,
The respondents also filed a verified answer- the second
in-intervention in Civil Case No. 7394 (injunction case) deed of sale
contending that they are the present registered entered into
owners of Lot 398-A, and as such, Thelma is not by [Neri] with
entitled to any relief. 20 the
[respondents]
Ruling of the RTC is hereby
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case No. 7394 and declared null
Civil Case No. 7664 and after trial, rendered judgment and void, and
in favor of Thelma. The dispositive portion of the Joint [TCT] No. T-
Decision 21dated August 13, 2009 reads: 226775 of the
Registry of
WHEREFORE, judgment Deeds of
is hereby rendered declaring that: Bataan which
1) [T was issued by
helma] is defendant
entitled to the Register of
relief of Deeds
permanent pursuant to
injunction said second
prayed for in deed of sale is
Civil Case No. likewise
7394 against declared null
the and void, and
respondents. accordingly,
Insofar as the Register of
defendants Deeds for the
Province of All counterclaims of [the
Bataan is respondents] are denied for lack of
ordered to basis in fact and in law.
cancel said
No pronouncement as to
certificate of
costs.
title and to
reinstate [TCT] SO ORDERED. 22
No. T-209894
in the name of The RTC concluded that by Neri's admission
[Neri], married that he sold the subject lot to Thelma for a
to [Violeta]; consideration of P1,243,000.00, and his
acknowledgement receipt of P442,293.50 as partial
3) T payment from the latter, the transaction between
he new Thelma and Neri should be regarded as an executed
owner's copy contract of sale. Hence, Lot 398-A was subjected to a
of [TCT] No. T- double sale when Neri sold the same property to the
209894 is respondents. 23 The RTC further ruled that the
hereby contract of sale between Neri and the respondents is
declared null null and void because it was transacted and executed
and void as the at the time when Neri was no longer the owner of Lot
original 398-A. It was legally inexistent for lack of object
owner's copy certain. Thereupon, the fact that the respondents
is not lost but were able to register their acquisition first is of no
actually exists moment. Registration does not legitimize a void
and is contract and thus, TCT No. T-226775 should be
presently in cancelled. 24 DETACa
the custody of
the Municipal The respondents moved for reconsideration
Treasurer of but it was denied by the RTC per Order 25 dated
Orani, Bataan. January 13, 2010. Hence, they elevated their case to
In the CA.
consequence, Ruling of the CA
defendant
Register of On May 26, 2011, the CA promulgated the
Deeds of assailed Decision, 26 with the following dispositive
Bataan is portion:
directed to WHEREFORE, the instant
cancel said Appeal is GRANTED. The Joint
new owner's Decision dated August 13, 2009
copy of [TCT] and the Order dated January 13,
No. T-209894; 2010 of the [RTC] of Bataan are
and hereby
4) [T declaredNULL and VOID insofar as
he it (1) granted permanent
respondents] injunction in favor of [Thelma] in
are hereby Civil Case No. 7394 against [the
ordered to respondents]; (2) declared null and
jointly and void the deed of sale between
severally pay [Neri] and [the respondents] in
to [Thelma] Civil Case No. 7664; (3) declared
attorney's fees null and void the [TCT] No. T-
in the amount 226775; (4) ordered the
of Twenty[- cancellation of [TCT] No. T-226775
]Five and reinstatement of [TCT] No. T-
Thousand 209894 in the name of [Neri],
Pesos married to [Violeta]; and (5)
(P25,000.00). ordered the payment of attorney's
fees.
 Consequently, the
following are hereby
declared VALID: (1) the Deed of
Sale between [Neri] and [the
respondents]; and (2) the [TCT]
No. T-226775 in the names of [the
respondents].
This Decision is without
prejudice to any right which
[Thelma] may have against [Neri]
for the refund of the amount
of Four Hundred Forty-Two
Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-
Three and 50/100 Pesos
(P442,293.50).
The Complaints in Civil
Cases Nos. 7394 and 7664 are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED. 27 (Emphasis in the
original)
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA
found that the contract between Neri and Thelma
was a mere contract to sell and not a contract of sale;
hence, there was no double sale of Lot 938-A.
According to the CA, the question of whether or not
the respondents are buyers in good faith is unavailing
since the concept of a "buyer in good faith" finds
relevance only in cases of double sale. The CA further
stated that even if it is assumed that the contract
between Neri and Thelma was an absolute contract of
sale, the same is nonetheless void for lack of consent
of Neri's wife, Violeta, insofar as the object of the
transaction is a conjugal property.
Thelma moved for reconsideration of the CA
decision, which was denied for lack of merit in
Resolution 28 dated October 21, 2011.
Hence this petition.
Thelma argues that there was double sale
and the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision: (1) by
interpreting the sale between Thelma and Neri as a
mere contract to sell; (2) by declaring the deed of sale
in favor of Thelma as null and void due to lack of
Violeta's consent or conformity; and (3) by declaring
the respondents as buyers in good faith despite prior
registration of Thelma's notice of adverse claim in TCT
No. T-209894, and her actual possession of the subject
property. 29
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case basically rests on
the determination of whether the transaction
between Neri and Thelma is a contract of sale or a
contract to sell. The rule on double sale, as provided in
Article 1544 of the Civil Code, 30 does not apply to a
case where there was a sale to one party of the land
itself while the other contract was a mere promise to
sell the land or at most an actual assignment of the
right to repurchase the same land. 31
Both the RTC and the CA concur in the
finding that Neri agreed to sell Lot 398-A to Thelma for
an agreed price of P1,243,000.00. The RTC, however,
concluded that by Neri's admission that he sold the
subject lot to Thelma for a consideration of
P1,243,000.00, and that he acknowledged receipt of
P442,293.50 as partial payment from the latter, the
transaction between Thelma and Neri should be
regarded as an executed contract of sale, and not a
merely executory one. The RTC likewise took into
consideration Thelma's alleged possession of the
property and Neri's failure to rescind the contract as
indicative of the nature of their agreement as one of
sale. 32
On the other hand, the CA ruled that "the
contract between Thelma and Neri was a mere
contract to sell, the transfer of ownership over Lot 398-
A being conditioned on Thelma's full payment of the
purchase price." 33 As regards the existence of the two
contracts of sale, the CA concluded that Thelma
admitted on trial that the first deed of sale was only
meant to be an acknowledgment receipt for the down
payment she made on the subject lot, and the second
deed of sale was allegedly executed after Thelma pays
in full the purchase price of the lot.
A review of this case shows that the CA ruled
in accord with existing jurisprudence.
"The real character of the contract is not the
title given, but the intention of the parties." 34 In this
case, there exist two deeds of absolute sale. Though
identically worded, the first contract was undated, not
notarized, signed only by Neri, and was presented in
Civil Case No. 7394 for Injunction, 35 while the second
deed was dated April 10, 1997, notarized on
September 5, 1997, signed by both Neri and Thelma,
and was presented in Civil Case No. 7664 for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Title. 36
In determining the nature of the agreement
between Thelma and Neri, the CA took note of these
two documents, and, coupled with Thelma's own
admissions, correctly found that it was a mere contract
to sell. According to the CA:
During trial, Thelma
explained the apparent disparity
between the two (2) "deeds of
absolute sale" by testifying that
the undated and unnotarized deed
of sale served only as a "receipt"
which was signed by Neri when the
latter received the downpayment
for the lot. The dated and
 notarized deed of sale, on the installments starting from March 20, 1997 to
other hand, was signed by both September 4, 1997; and (5) Neri acknowledged receipt
Thelma and Neri upon Thelma's from Thelma the total amount of P442,293.50. 40
alleged full payment of the
To bolster her claim, Thelma insists that she
purchase price:
now holds title over the subject property after Neri
xxx xxx xxx allegedly delivered the subject lot to her right after the
execution of the sale. 41 There is, however, nothing on
Second, the execution of
record to support this claim aside from her bare
the "deed of absolute sale" dated
assertions. There was no testimony or any proof on her
August 10, 1997 and the transfer
part showing when and how she took possession of the
and delivery of the title to Thelma's
property. At best, what is extant from the records is
name covering Lot No. 398-A were
that Thelma paid taxes on the property for the years
conditioned upon full payment of
2000 and 2001, which was three years after the alleged
the purchase price.
sale. "But tax declarations, by themselves, are not
Thelma testified that the conclusive evidence of ownership of real
"deed of absolute sale" dated property." 42 Aside from this, the tax receipts showed
August 10, 1997 and which was that the property was still declared in the name of
attached to Thelma's complaint in Neri. 43
Civil Case No. 7664 was signed by
Moreover, the alleged delivery of the
her, Neri and their witnesses only
property, even if true, is irrelevant considering that in
upon full payment of the purchase
a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the
price. Thelma further testified that
registered owner in spite of the partial payment of the
she and Neri agreed to place the
purchase price and delivery of possession of the
amount of the purchase price on
property. Thus, in Roque v. Aguado, 44 the Court ruled
the deed of absolute sale only at
that since the petitioners have not paid the final
the time when Thelma had fully
installment of the purchase price, the condition which
paid the same: . . . 37 (Italics ours
would have triggered the parties' obligation to enter
and emphasis deleted) aDSIHc
into and thereby perfect a contract of sale cannot be
Despite the denomination of their deemed to have been fulfilled; consequently, they
agreement as one of sale, the circumstances tend to "cannot validly claim ownership over the subject
show that Neri agreed to sell the subject property to portion even if they had made an initial payment and
Thelma on the condition that title and ownership even took possession of the same." 45 ATICcS
would pass or be transferred upon the full payment of
Accordingly, the CA did not commit any
the purchase price. This is the very nature of a contract
reversible error in concluding that "the contract
to sell, which is a "bilateral contract whereby the
between Thelma and Neri was a mere contract to sell,
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
the transfer of ownership over Lot 398-A being
ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to
conditioned on Thelma's full payment of the purchase
the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the
price. Having failed to pay the purchase price in full,
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
Thelma cannot claim ownership over Lot 398-A and
fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, i.e., the full
Neri is not legally proscribed from alienating the same
payment of the purchase price." 38 As stated by the
lot to other buyers." 46
Court, the agreement to execute a deed of sale upon
full payment of the purchase price "shows that the Finally, while the CA correctly ruled that the
vendors reserved title to the subject property until full agreement was a contract to sell, the Court, however,
payment of the purchase price." 39 does not share its position that the subject property is
a conjugal property, and as such, the absence of
It was likewise established that Thelma was
Violeta's consent should be held as among the factors
not able to pay the full purchase price, and that she
which could have adversely affected the validity of the
was only able to pay P442,293.50 of the agreed selling
purported contract of sale between Neri and Thelma.
price of P1,243,000.00. The RTC, in fact, made the
This is due to the following reasons: first, the subject
following findings: (1) the consideration for Lot 398-A
property, Lot 398-A, is registered in the name of "Neri
was P1,243,000.00; (2) Thelma issued a check on
delos Reyes, married to Violeta Lacuata," and so was
March 20, 1997 for said amount, payable to Neri; (3)
its mother lot, Lot 398. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust
the agreement was that the check would only be held
Company v. Tan, 47 it was held that such form of
by Neri for safekeeping as it was yet unsure if there
registration is determinative of the property's nature
was ample funds to cover the check; (4) the check was
as paraphernal. That the only import of the title is that
not covered by sufficient funds when presented for
Neri is the owner of the subject property, it being
payment, so Thelma subsequently paid Neri in
 registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Violeta; and second, the record is bereft of proof that
said property was acquired during Neri and Violeta's
marriage — such that, the presumption under Article
116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot
apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 26, 2011
and Resolution dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Perez and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
||| (Rodriguez v. Spouses Sioson, G.R. No. 199180, [July 27,
2016])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 224144. June 28, 2017.]
LOLITA BAS
CAPABLANCA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS
OF PEDRO BAS, represented by
JOSEFINA BAS ESPINOSA and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
PROVINCE OF CEBU, respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
This resolves a Petition for Review 1 assailing
the Decision 2 dated March 12, 2014 and
Resolution 3 dated March 15, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals, Nineteenth Division, Cebu City. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Decision 4 dated December 26,
2007 of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and
dismissed the petitioner's complaint. aDSIHc
The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of
the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's Estate located in
"Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu" 5 with an area of
6,120 square meters. 6
Andres Bas (Andres) and Pedro Bas (Pedro)
acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No. 1724 was issued in
their names on May 12, 1937." 7
On November 28, 1939, Pedro sold to
Faustina Manreal (Faustina), married to Juan Balorio,
his portion of Lot 2535 "with a seeding capacity of four
(4) chupas of corn." 8The sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1939. 9
After the death of Faustina and her husband,
their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial
Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 13, 1963. Lot 2535 consisting of "1,000 square
meters, more or less," was conveyed to one (1) of their
heirs, Alejandra Balorio (Alejandra). 10
Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 13, 1967 to Edith N. Deen,
who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty. Deen)
on March 21, 1968. 11
Upon Atty. Deen's death on December 18,
1978, an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did
not include Lot 2535, was executed by his heirs. Later,
or on March 30, 1988, they executed an Additional
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale,
which sold the land for P10,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas
(Norberto), who took possession of and built a house
on it. 12
On December 15, 1995, Norberto died
without a will and was succeeded by his niece and only
heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita). 13
Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-96676 dated June 6,
1996 was issued in the names of Andres and Pedro on
the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance No.
96-00004. 14
In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa
(Josefina) represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a
complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535
against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. 15 The conflict
between the parties was not resolved and resulted to
the issuance of a Certification to file Action. 16
On December 16, 1996, a notarized Partition
Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of
Rights was executed between the heirs of Andres and
Lolita, representing Norberto, whereby they
partitioned Lot 2535 among themselves. 17
Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot
2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Cebu,
citing the need for a court order. 18 Lolita then learned
that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially cancelled and
TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185
had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas,
represented by Josefina, on May 29, 1997. 19
 On December 16, 1997, Lolita filed a Finally, the trial court affirmed that the
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Judgement of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay in
for the cancellation of the titles with prayer for moral Civil Case No. 840 for Partition, Damages and
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation Attorney's fees was not binding on Lolita, who was not
expenses. 20 a party to the case. 32
In their Answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas The fallo of the Decision read:
claimed that "the sale between Pedro Bas and Faustina
WHEREFORE, premises
Manreal [was] fake, spurious and invalid because
considered, a judgment is hereby
[Pedro] who [was] an illiterate never learned how to
rendered in favor of the plaintiff
write his name so that the signature appearing thereon
and against the defendants,
could not have been made by Pedro Bas." 21 They
declaring as null and void and
further claimed that the cancellation of TCT No. T-
ordering the Register of Deeds of
96676 was made pursuant to a final judgment in Civil
the Province of Cebu to cancel the
Case No. 840 22 for Partition, Damages, and Attorney's
following transfer certificates of
Fees. 23
title:
After trial, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court,
1) Transfer Certificate of
Cebu City rendered a Decision 24 on December 26,
Title No. T-
2007, in favor of Lolita. The trial court held that there
100181, of the
was substantial evidence to prove that Lolita had been
Register of Deeds
in long possession of the lot under a claim of
of the Province
ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not
of Cebu, in the
necessary for her to be first declared as his heir before
name of Heirs of
filing the complaint. 25 It further ruled that to dismiss
Pedro Bas,
the case on the ground that Lolita should first be
represented by
declared an heir would be too late as the Heirs of
Josefina Bas,
Pedro Bas did not raise the issue in a motion to dismiss
covering Lot
or as an affirmative defense in their complaint. 26
2535-J, Psd-07-
On the substantive issues, the trial court 037377, being a
upheld the validity of the 1939 Deed of Sale executed portion of Lot
by Pedro in favor of Faustina. It found Josefina's 2535, Flr-133,
uncorroborated testimony of Pedro's illiteracy as self- situated in the
serving and unconvincing to contradict the regularity Barrio of
of the notarized deed. Moreover, her testimony was Dumlog, Mun. of
controverted by the notarized Assignment of Sale Talisay, Prov. of
Certificate 195, which bore the same signature of Cebu, Island of
Pedro, and by the Heirs of Pedro Bas' answers in Civil Cebu, containing
Case No. R-10602, another case which contained an area of 304
allegations that Pedro sold his share in the lot to square meters;
Faustina. 27 ETHIDa
2) Transfer Certificate of
The trial court further held that the object of Title No. T-
the sale was determinate, i.e., Pedro's share in Lot 100182, of the
2535 was specified by the boundaries indicated in the Register of Deeds
Deed of Sale. 28 It concluded that Norberto acquired of the Province
the entire share of Pedro in Lot 2535, which was found of Cebu, in the
only after survey in 1996, 29 to actually consist of name of Heirs of
3,060 square meters and not 1,000 square meters as Pedro Bas,
insisted by the Heirs of Pedro Bas. The trial court gave represented by
credence to Lolita's testimony that before the survey, Josefina Bas,
Pedro's portion was estimated to be 1,000 square covering Lot
meters; hence, the area indicated in the successive 2535-B, Psd-07-
transfers of the lot from the heirs of Faustina down to 037377, being a
Norberto was "1,000 square meters, more or portion of Lot
less." 30Consequently, with Pedro's sale of his share in 2535, Flr-133,
Lot 2535, his heirs acquired no portion by inheritance situated in the
and their titles were null and void and should be Barrio of
cancelled. 31 Dumlog, Mun. of
 Talisay, Prov. of The Regional Trial Court subsequently
Cebu, Island of denied the Heirs of Pedro Bas' motion for
Cebu, containing reconsideration. 34
an area of 1,554
Hence, the Heirs of Pedro Bas appealed to
square meters;
the Court of Appeals, making the following lone
3) Transfer Certificate of assignment of error:
Title No. T-
The trial court seriously
100183, of the
erred in not dismissing the case for
Register of Deeds
plaintiff's lack of cause of action
of the Province
pursuant to (the) doctrinal
of Cebu, in the
jurisprudential case of Guido and
name of Heirs of
Isabel Yaptinchay vs. Del
Pedro Bas,
Rosario (304 SCRA 18) considering
represented by
that plaintiff in her complaint
Josefina Bas,
alleged, she is the sole heir of
covering Lot
Norberto Bas. 35
2535-A, Psd-07-
037377, being a The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional
portion of Lot Trial Court Decision and dismissed the
2535, Flr-133, complaint. 36 According to the Court of Appeals, Lolita
situated in the must first be declared as the sole heir to the estate of
Barrio of Norberto in a proper special proceeding. Thus:
Dumlog, Mun. of
Talisay, Prov. of WHEREFORE, premises
Cebu, Island of considered, the Decision dated
Cebu, containing December 26, 2007, of the
an area of 965 Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial
square meters; Region, Branch 8, Cebu City in Civil
and Case No. CEB-21348 for
Ownership, Nullity of Deeds,
4) Transfer Certificate of Cancellation of TCT Nos. T-100181,
Title No. T- T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-
100185, of the 100185, covering portions of Lot
Register of Deeds No. 2535, damages, etc., ordering
of the Province the cancellation of Transfer
of Cebu, in the Certificates of Title Nos. T-100181,
name of Heirs of T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-
Pedro Bas, 100185 is hereby REVERSED and
represented by SET ASIDE.
Josefina Bas,
covering Lot The complaint of
2535-A Psd-07- plaintiff-appellee is hereby
037377, being a DISMISSED, without prejudice to
portion of Lot any subsequent proceeding to
2535, Flr-133, determine the lawful heirs of the
situated in the late Norberto Bas and the rights
Barrio of concomitant therewith. 37
Dumlog, Mun. of Lolita sought reconsideration but was denied
Talisay, Prov. of in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 15,
Cebu, Island of 2016.
Cebu, containing
an area of 187 Hence, Lolita filed this Petition principally
square meters. contending that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in reversing the Regional Trial Court
Costs against the Decision and dismissing the complaint.
defendants. 33
Petitioner argues that the 1999 case of
the Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario 38 cited in the
Court of Appeals Decision does not apply to this case
because the factual circumstances are different. 39 In
that case, the claims of the opposing parties were
anchored on their alleged status as heirs of the original
owner. 40 "Hence there may have been the need for a
previous judicial declaration of heirship in a special
proceeding." 41 Here, petitioner does not claim to be
an heir of Pedro, the original owner. Rather, her
interest over the property is derived from a series of
transactions starting from the sale executed by
Pedro. 42 cSEDTC
Petitioner further contends that
respondents neither raised the ground "lack of cause
of action" as an affirmative defense nor filed a motion
to dismiss before the courta quo. Instead, they allowed
the trial to proceed with their full participation all
throughout. Petitioner asserts that respondents'
action or inaction should be constituted a
waiver. 43 Otherwise, respondents' "failure to
properly act on its perceived defect" in the complaint
hampers the speedy disposition of the action "and
would only promote multiplicity of suits." 44
In their two (2)-page
Comment, 45 respondents contend that the findings
of the Court of Appeals were duly supported by
evidence and jurisprudence.
This Court grants the petition.
Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, this Court finds no need for a
separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in
order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of
titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the
heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of
the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to
Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer
transactions that culminated in the sale of the
property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the
property in 1939, it follows that there would be no
more ownership or right to property that would have
been transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the
property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on any
filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is
pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the
property which was passed to her upon the latter's
death. 46
This Court has stated that no judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an
heir may assert his or her right to the property of the
deceased. 47 In Marabilles v. Quito: 48
The right to assert a
cause of action as an heir,
although he has not been judicially
declared to be so, if duly proven, is
well settled in this jurisdiction. This
is upon the theory that the
property of a deceased person,
both real and personal, becomes
the property of the heir by the
mere fact of death of his
predecessor in interest, and as
such he can deal with it in precisely
the same way in which the
deceased could have dealt, subject
only to the limitations which by law
or by contract may be imposed
upon the deceased himself. Thus, it
has been held that "[t]here is no
legal precept or established rule
which imposes the necessity of a
previous legal declaration
regarding their status as heirs to
an intestate on those who, being
of age and with legal capacity,
consider themselves the legal heirs
of a person, in order that they may
maintain an action arising out of a
right which belonged to their
ancestor" . . . A recent case
wherein this principle was
maintained is Cabuyao vs.
[C]aagbay. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the ruling
in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario 50 was misplaced.
In that case, the motion to dismiss was filed
immediately after the second Amended Complaint was
filed. 51 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
holding that the Heirs of Yaptinchay "have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it — except the
allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-
named Yaptinchays — that they have been declared
the legal heirs of the deceased couple." 52
Here, respondents never raised their
objection to petitioner's capacity to sue either as an
affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss. 53 Rule
9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states, "[d]efenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it
was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that there was no prior
judicial declaration of petitioner's heirship to
Norberto. 54
Moreover, the pronouncement in the Heirs
of Yaptinchay that a declaration of heirship must be
made only in a special proceeding and not in an
ordinary civil action for reconveyance of property was
based on Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera 55 and Solivio v.
Court of Appeals, 56 which involved different factual
milieus.
 The facts of the case in Litam, etc., et al. v.
Rivera 57 show that during the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants
filed a civil action. They claimed that as the children of
the deceased by a previous marriage to a Chinese
woman, they were entitled to inherit his one-half (1/2)
share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera (Marcosa). 58 The trial
court in the civil case declared, among others, that the
plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased
and that Marcosa was his only heir. 59 On appeal, this
Court ruled that such declaration — that Marcosa was
the only heir of the decedent — was improper because
the determination of the issue was within the exclusive
competence of the court in the special proceedings. 60
In Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 61 the
deceased Esteban Javellana, Jr. was survived by
Celedonia Solivio (Celedonia), his maternal aunt, and
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva (Concordia), his
paternal aunt. 62 Celedonia filed the intestate
proceedings and had herself declared as sole heir and
administratrix of the estate of the decedent to
facilitate the implementation of the latter's wish to
place his estate in a foundation named after his
mother. 63 While the probate proceeding was
pending, Concordia filed a separate civil action where
she sought to be declared as co-heir and for partition
of the estate. 64 This Court held that the "separate
action was improperly filed for it is the probate court
that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate." 65 This Court further held
that "in the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's
estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court." 66 SDAaTC
In Litam and Solivio, the adverse parties
were putative heirs to a decedent's estate or parties to
the special proceedings for an estate's settlement.
Hence, this Court ruled that questions on the status
and right of the contending parties must be properly
ventilated in the appropriate special proceeding, not in
an ordinary civil action.
Here, as stated, the main issue is the
annulment of title to property, which ultimately hinges
on the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina.
Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or
seek to establish her right as his heir as against the
respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her
right over the property which has been allegedly
violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.
Furthermore, as found by the Regional Trial
Court:
The plaintiff [Lolita] has
sufficient interest to protect in the
subject portion of Lot 2535. She
had been there for around thirty
(30) years, and had been in
possession thereof under a claim
of ownership as an alleged heir of
Norberto Bas after the latter's
death on December 15, 1993, that
is: long before the issuance of TCT
Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-
100183[,] and T-100185 in 1997,
and even TCT No. T-96676 in 1996.
Moreover, it is annotated on TCT
No. T-96676 (Exhibit "G") that she,
together with the heirs of
Osmundo Bas, executed a
declaration of heirs with partition,
quitclaim, etc., dated December
16, 1996, registered on March 3,
1997 . . . wherein they adjudicated
unto themselves and partitioned
Lot No. 2535 . . . She also executed
on June 14, 1997 an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir,
declaring herself as the sole heir of
Norberto Bas and adjudicated
unto herself the subject portion
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The existence of the
questioned certificates of title, and
other related documents,
constitute clouds on said interest.
There seems, therefore, to be no
necessity that the plaintiff should
have been declared first as an heir
of Norberto Bas as a prerequisite
to this action. Her possession of
the subject lot under a claim of
ownership is a sufficient interest to
entitle her to bring this
suit. 67 (Citation omitted)
This case has gone a long way since the
complaint was filed in 1997. A full-blown trial had
taken place and judgment was rendered by the
Regional Trial Court where it thoroughly discussed,
evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of documentary
evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties. At this point, to dismiss the case and require
petitioner to institute a special proceeding to
determine her status as heir of the late Norberto
would hamper, instead of serve, justice.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 68 where
the contending parties insisted to be the legal heirs of
the decedent, this Court dispensed with the need to
institute a separate special proceeding to determine
their heirship since the parties had voluntarily
 submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence. It held:
It appearing, however,
that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of
land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to
the civil case — subject of the
present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial.
In fine, under the
circumstances of the present case,
there being no compelling reason
to still subject Portugal's estate to
administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners'
status as heirs could be achieved in
the civil case filed by petitioners,
the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented
by the parties during the trial and
render a decision
thereon[.] 69 (Citation omitted)
In this case, there is no necessity for a
separate special proceeding and to require it would be
superfluous considering that petitioner had already
presented evidence to establish her filiation and
heirship to Norberto, which respondents never
disputed. acEHCD
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated March 12, 2014 and
Resolution dated March 15, 2016 are VACATED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 26, 2007 of
Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144, [June 28,
2017])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 184148. June 9, 2014.]
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and
ELVIRA B. CALALANG, petitioners, vs.
ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA,
LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, and
CARLITO S. CALALANG, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated December 21,
2007 and Resolution 2 dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531. The CA modified the Decision 3 dated July 10, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Malolos,
Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
In a Complaint 4 for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S.
Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of
land against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and
Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square
meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333,
Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of
Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the
respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio,
through succession as the latter's compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro
Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The
first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio.
During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents
acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their
maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying
continuous possession of the land, however, their parents
failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first
marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered
into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then
gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando
Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during
this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free
patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.
Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by
claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since
1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with
his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-2871 5 in favor of Pedro Calalang
only. HCaDIS
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the
said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale 6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and
Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989, 7 Pedro Calalang
died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No.
283321 on two grounds. First, the respondents argued that
the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed
to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co-
owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents claimed that they
acquired successional rights over the land. Thus, in
alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang
allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the
property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale
was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did
not have the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in
the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer, 8 the petitioners argued that the
parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that
OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was issued in the name
of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."
Thus, the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The
petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the sale of
the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-
Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the
sale. Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did not
have a valid cause of action against them and that their
cause of action, if any, was already barred by laches,
estoppel and prescription. By way of counterclaim, the
petitioners also sought the payment to them of moral and
exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of the
clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision
in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants
in the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants
to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs,
their rightful share to three-fourth
(3/4) of one-half (1/2) or a total of
474.75 square meters at 158.25
square meters for each of the three
plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora,
and Juanito all surname[d] Calalang,
of the real property covered by TCT
No. 283321 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan corresponding to their
shares in the conjugal estate of the
late Encarnacion S. Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to
pay plaintiffs the amount of
P50,000.00 for moral damages;
P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and
another P50,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
3. Dismissing the
defendants' counterclaims.
With costs against the
defendants.
SO ORDERED. 9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land
was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it
was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of
Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the
death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the
corresponding shares to the disputed property were
acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws
of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of
the disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the
conjugal partnership and allocated the other half to the
three respondents and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally
among them. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro's
share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of
the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the
application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was
attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang
should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners
appealed the case to the CA which rendered the assailed
Decision on December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the
foregoing premises,
the Decision dated July 10, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan is hereby MODIFIED to read
as follows: SCEDAI
"WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, and against the
 defendants in the following
manner:
1. Ordering the
defendants to reconvey in
favor of the plaintiffs, their
rightful share to the
property owned by their
common father Pedro
Calalang, equivalent toone
half (1/2) portion of the
whole area or 633 square
meters to be divided
equally by the three
plaintiffs, namely: Rosario,
Leonora and Carlito, all
surnamed Calalang, each
getting an area of 211
square meters of the
property covered by TCT
No. 2883321 of the
Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan corresponding to
their shares in the property
of their late father Pedro
Calalang;
2. Ordering
defendants to pay plaintiffs
the amount of P50,000.00
for moral damages;
P50,000.00 for attorney's
fees and another
P50,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
3. Dismissing the
defendants' counterclaims.
With costs
against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED. 10
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial
court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and
exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the
parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage.
Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-
2871. It held that although the free patent was issued in the
name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
[Calalang]" this phrase was merely descriptive of the civil
status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the registration of
the disputed property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June
7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional
rights to the parcel of land which was exclusively owned by
Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of succession,
Pedro's heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora
Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan,
Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro
to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA
ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the
respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled
that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan
was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith
and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro
indiviso shares over the disputed property. As regards the
issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive
period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real
property is ten years. Since the property was registered in
the name of Nora in 1984 and the action for reconveyance
was filed in 1991, the action has not yet prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their
Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their
motion in its Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the court a
quo gravely erred in rendering its
December 21, 2007 Decision
modifying the July 10, 2001 Decision
of the trial court, and in issuing its
July 25, 2008 Resolution denying
petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 23,
2008. 11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether
Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed
property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang as
evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was issued to Pedro
Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B.
Calalang. On the other hand, the respondents claim that the
disputed property was transferred by their maternal
grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their parents, Pedro
Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latter's
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to
the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Pedro
Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the
issue in this case requires a reevaluation of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties in order to
trace the title of the disputed property. What is involved is
indeed a question of fact which is generally beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to resolve in a petition for review
oncertiorari. 12 However, a recognized exception to the
rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting findings of fact
as in this case. 13 Here, while the trial court ruled that the
disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion
Silverio, the court a quo declared that the evidence proved
the sole and exclusive ownership of the disputed property
of Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this
case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is
the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were
able to establish that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated from the
parents of Encarnacion, and therefore said property "either
became property of Encarnacion in her own right or jointly
with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the
trial court relied on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-
Garcia that her parents built a nipa house on the subject lot
and lived there before and after World War II. The trial court
further noted that Rosario's testimony was corroborated by
her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo
Calalang. 14 cAEaSC
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a
close perusal of the records of this case would show that
the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that
the subject property indeed belonged to respondents'
maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced
merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the
declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been
staying on the property as far as she can remember and that
the property was acquired by her parents through purchase
from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable
to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was
she able to present any documentary evidence such as the
tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents.
Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in
the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more
than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first
marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents'
submission that the subject property originally belonged to
the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro
Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the
petitioners that the disputed property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro
Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that the title
was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira
Berba [Calalang]."
The contents of a certificate of title are
enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of
personal circumstances in the
certificate. — Every certificate of title
shall set forth the full names of all
persons whose interests make up the
full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the
names of their respective spouses, if
married, as well as their citizenship,
residence and postal address. If the
property covered belongs to the
conjugal partnership, it shall be
issued in the names of both spouses.
A plain reading of the above provision would
clearly reveal that the phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to
Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the civil status and
identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro
Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is
conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera, 15 we declared:
Further strong proofs that
the properties in question are the
paraphernal properties of Marcosa
Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles
covering said properties. All the said
properties are registered in the name
of "Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael
Litam." This circumstance indicates
that the properties in question
belong to the registered owner,
Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal
properties, for if they were conjugal,
the titles covering the same should
have been issued in the names of
Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The
words "married to Rafael Litam"
written after the name of Marcosa
Rivera, in each of the above
mentioned titles are merely
descriptive of the civil status of
Marcosa Rivera, the registered
owner of the properties covered by
said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application
for free patent, 16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that
the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935
and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants,
caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built
his house on the subject lot. But he applied for free patent
only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already
married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the
subject land in the manner and for the period required by
law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the
second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became
private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang's
exclusive property.17 It was therefore excluded from the
conjugal partnership of gains of the second
marriage. 18 ADaSET
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang
had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February
17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro
Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over
the disputed property when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights
are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New
Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 19 we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
The principle of
transmission as of the time of the
predecessor's death is basic in
our Civil Code, and is supported by
other related articles. Thus, the
capacity of the heir is determined as
of the time the decedent died (Art.
1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908),
and so is the inofficiousness of the
donation inter vivos(Art. 771).
Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the
amount due and outstanding at the
death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant
are deemed to pertain to the legatee
(Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang
on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro
indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale
of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were
not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And
absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration
(in effect an inofficious donation inter vivos), the
respondents have no right to question the sale of the
disputed property on the ground that their father deprived
them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere
preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove
fraud. 20 The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property must therefore be
dismissed. ADaEIH
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated December
21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of the
Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-
M-91, or the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June
10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang-Garcia, G.R. No. 184148,
[June 9, 2014])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F.
BORROMEO, petitioner,vs.ANTONIE
TTA O. DESCALLAR, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
What are the rights of an alien (and his
successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in
the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in
whose sole name the properties were registered under
the Torrens system? CaAIES
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project
of the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated
mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and
asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent
agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta's
residence at a squatters' area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and
decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan
Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their
own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell
dated November 18, 1985 1 and March 10,
1986 2 covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 3 was likewise
issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before
the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrich's name was erased from the
document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside
respondent's signature as buyer on page 3, and at the
bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
over the properties were issued in respondent's name
alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted
respondent's two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, 4 and
per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City dated May 5, 1988. 5
However, the idyll lasted only until April
1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend
while Jambrich began to live with another woman in
Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent's sons for
only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo
sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real
estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats
as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for
which he became indebted to the latter for about
P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner
for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment". 6 On July 26, 1991, when petitioner
sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the
subject property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the
properties which identified both Jambrich and
respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay
a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in
fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for
the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich
was the real and absolute owner of the properties;
and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated
July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his
favor. IcSEAH
In her Answer, respondent belied the
allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she
"solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject
lots in question",and that Jambrich, being an alien, was
prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence
showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the
disputed property with money from a supposed copra
business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his
witness and documentary evidence showing the
substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found —
Evidence on hand clearly show that
at the time of the purchase and
acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was
still working and earning much. This
fact of Jambrich earning much is not
only supported by documentary
evidence but also by the admission
made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla. So that, Jambrich's financial
capacity to acquire and purchase the
properties ...is not disputed. 7
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, evidence ...clearly
show that before defendant met
Jambrich sometime in the latter part
of 1984, she was only working as a
waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with
an income of P1,000.00 a month and
was ...renting and living only in ...[a]
room at ...[a] squatter area at
Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City; that
Jambrich took pity of her and the
situation of her children that he
offered her a better life which she
readily accepted. In fact, this
miserable financial situation of hers
and her two children ...are all stated
and reflected in the Child Study
Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs.
"G" and "G-1") which facts she
supplied to the Social Worker who
prepared the same when she was
personally interviewed by her in
connection with the adoption of her
two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So
that, if such facts were not true
because these are now denied by her
...and if it was also true that during
this time she was already earning as
much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as
profit per month from her copra
business, it would be highly
unbelievable and impossible for her
to be living only in such a miserable
condition since it is the observation
of this Court that she is not only an
extravagant but also an expensive
person and not thrifty as she wanted
to impress this Court in order to have
a big saving as clearly shown by her
actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich
that according to her ...the allowance
given ...by him in the amount of
$500.00 a month is not enough to
maintain the education and
maintenance of her
children. 8 IDAESH
This being the case, it is highly
improbable and impossible that she
could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any
amount for their acquisitionwhich
according to her is worth more than
P700,000.00 when while she was
working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz
Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as
salary and tips of more or less
P2,000.00 she could not even
provide [for] the daily needs of her
family so much so that it is safe to
conclude that she was really in
financial distress when she met and
accepted the offer of Jambrich to
come and live with him because that
was a big financial opportunity for
her and her children who were
already abandoned by her
husband. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible
reason why her name appeared and
was included in [the contracts to sell
dated November 18, 1985 and March
10, 1986 and finally, the deed of
absolute sale dated November 16,
1987] as buyer is because as
observed by the Court, she being a
scheming and exploitive woman, she
has taken advantage of the goodness
of Jambrich who at that time was still
bewitched by her beauty, sweetness,
and good attitude shown by her to
him since he could still very well
provide for everything she needs, he
being earning (sic) much yet at that
time. In fact, as observed by this
Court, the acquisition of these
properties under litigation was at the
time when their relationship was still
going smoothly and
harmoniously. 10 [Emphasis
supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, ...Decision is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in
fee simple over the residential house
of strong materials and three parcels
of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3
and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in
the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar by the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name
of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar
and to issue new ones in the name of
plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now
marked as Exhibits "I","K" and "L" as
avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the
properties in question to the
defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar; ATSIED
5) Ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff attorney's fees in the
amount of P25,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of
P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs. 11
Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, 12 the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.
In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court's
conclusion. The circumstances
involved in the case cited by the
lower court and similar cases decided
on by the Supreme Court which
upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are
absent in the case at bar. It should be
 noted that in said cases, the title to
the subject property has been issued
in the name of the alien transferee
(Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et
al.,120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds of Manila,79 Phils.
461; United Church Board for World
Ministries vs. Sebastian,159 SCRA
446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda.
De Barsobia vs. Cuenco,113 SCRA
547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma,138 SCRA
78).In the case at bar, the title of the
subject property is not in the name of
Jambrich but in the name of
defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich
could not have transferred a
property he has no title thereto. 13
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL
ADMISSION AND OTHER
OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
JAMBRICH'S
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST
AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
AS FOUND BY THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE
TO THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION AND MAY NOT
THEREFORE TRANSFER
AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN REVERSING THE WELL-
REASONED DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AND IN
IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS
AGAINST HEREIN
PETITIONER (THEN,
PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE). 14 HTScEI
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out
by the trial court, who between respondent and
Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire
the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition
of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was
gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated
monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was
employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a
monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986,
when the parcels of land were acquired, she was
unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-trial
conference. Her allegations of income from a copra
business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra
business was actually the business of her mother and
their family, with ten siblings. She has no license to sell
copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and
the last one left standing was already scrap. Further,
the Child Study Report 15 submitted by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent's
two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to
support the children until she was
accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had
no problem with money because
most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave
good tips but towards the end of
1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in
the Philippines at that time. Her
financial problem started then. She
was even renting a small room in a
squatters area in Gorordo Ave.,Cebu
City. It was during her time of great
financial distress that she met
Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered
her a decent place for herself and her
children. 16
The DSWD Home Study Report 17 further disclosed
that:
[Jambrich] was then at the
Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
Antonietta Descallar, one of the
waitresses of the said Restaurants.
He made friends with the girl and
 asked her to tutor him in [the] English
language. Antonietta accepted the
offer because she was in need of
additional income to support [her] 2
young children who were abandoned
by their father. Their session was
agreed to be scheduled every
afternoon at the residence of
Antonietta in the squatters area in
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The
Austrian was observing the situation
of the family particularly the children
who were malnourished. After a few
months sessions, Mr. Jambrich
offered to transfer the family into a
decent place. He told Antonietta that
the place is not good for the children.
Antonietta who was miserable and
financially distressed at that time
accepted the offer for the sake of the
children. 18 aSTECA
Further, the following additional pieces of
evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used
to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct
the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed
under oath, during her re-direct examination and
during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor
children, that Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but that his name was deleted
in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal
constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in
the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject
parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks
issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any
account with any bank. Receipts of the installment
payments were also in the name of Jambrich and
respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria
with Jambrich and her two children for ten months,
where she was completely under the support of
Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and
Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the
subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer
all his rights, interests and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed
of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not
a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by
this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did
not controvert the factual findings of the trial court.
They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties
were acquired during the couple's cohabitation also
does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply.19 In the instant case,
respondent was still legally married to another when
she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion
of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply. 20 DcaCSE
Second, we dispose of the issue of
registration of the properties in the name of
respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of
the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the
properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. 21 It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large. 22Certificates of title are not a source
of right. The mere possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The
rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply
to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the
title is quiet, 23 and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. 24 However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. 25 This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time,
nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons
were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are
prohibited from acquiring private land. This is
embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, 26 which is basically a reproduction of
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, 27 and
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 28 The
capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the
capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." Private land may be transferred only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain". Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is property in dispute is already in the hands of a
owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now more public policy to be protected. The objective of
stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non- the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private Filipino hands has been achieved.
lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED.
acquisition was made by a former natural-born
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
citizen. 29
42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
SO ORDERED.
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated the consistent
ruling in a number of cases 31 that if land is invalidly ||| (Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, [February 24,
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a 2009], 599 PHIL 332-346)
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries,the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the
SECOND DIVISION
purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of
the properties under litigation [were]
void ab initio since [they were] [G.R. No. 202932. October 23, 2013.]
contrary to the Constitution of the
Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet,
the acquisition of these properties by EDILBERTO U. VENTURA,
plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from JR., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
him, has cured the flaw in the original PAULINO and EVANGELINE
transaction and the title of the ABUDA, respondents.
transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of

petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in DECISION
the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as
owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot
Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of CARPIO, J p:
Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his
name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to The Case
pay petitioner P25,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of
annul the Decision 1 dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
suit. DScTaC
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the
Resolution 2 dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed with
The rationale behind the Court's ruling modification the Decision 3dated 24 November 2008 of the
in United Church Board for World Ministries, as Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-
reiterated in subsequent cases, 32 is this — since the Manila). ICDcEA
ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land
The Facts
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved
by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those as follows:
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
 Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila.
(Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was
and Esteban never had common children, both of them had fraudulent because Esteban's signature on the deeds of sale
children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that
named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a because of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her
son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus,
(Edilberto), the petitioner in this case. neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest
over the properties purchased by Esteban and
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior respondents. 9 HTaIAC
subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she
married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of
time of Socorro's marriage to Esteban.
merit.
Esteban's prior marriage, on the other hand, was
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between
dissolved by virtue of his wife's death in 1960.
Socorro and Esteban was void from the
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, beginning. 10 Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the
Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were
Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas married, provides:
property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased
Art. 83. Any marriage
by Evangeline on her father's behalf sometime in
subsequently contracted by any
1970. 4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer
person during the lifetime of the first
Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980,
spouse of such person shall be illegal
issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to
and void from its performance
Socorro Torres." 5
unless:
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978,
1. The first
Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
marriage was annulled or
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street,
dissolved; or
Tondo, Manila (Delpan property). 6
2. The first
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and
spouse had been absent
Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino
for seven consecutive
Abuda (Paulino). 7 According to Edilberto:
years at the time of the
[w]hen Esteban was second marriage without
diagnosed with colon cancer the spouse present having
sometime in 1993, he decided to sell news of the absentee being
the Delpan and Vitas properties to alive, or if the absentee,
Evangeline. Evangeline continued though he has been absent
paying the amortizations on the two for less than seven years, is
(2) properties situated in Delpan generally considered as
Street. The amortizations, together dead and believed to be so
with the amount of Two Hundred by the spouse present at
Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), the time of contracting
which Esteban requested as advance such subsequent marriage,
payment, were considered part of or if the absentee is
the purchase price of the Delpan presumed dead according
properties. Evangeline likewise gave to articles 390 and 391. The
her father Fifty Thousand Pesos marriage so contracted
(Php50,000.00) for the purchase of shall be valid in any of the
the Vitas properties and [she] three cases until declared
shouldered his medical expenses. 8 null and void.

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997,
while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora),
the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus,
Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of
Socorro's daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In
her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a
seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35 years.
However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and
executed an Affidavit of Retraction. 11
 The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial
decree of nullity does not affect the status of the union. It
applied our ruling in Niñal v. Badayog: 12
Jurisprudence under the
Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. . .
. Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she . . .
Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which [the] fact of
marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it
will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts. 13
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and
Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit: acEHCD
Art. 144. When a man and
a woman live together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the
co-owners, in the benefits as well as
in the charges, shall be proportional
to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to
the co-owners in the co-ownership
shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective
shares of Socorro and Esteban in the properties. It found
that:
[w]ith respect to the
property located at 2492 State Alley,
Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila
covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly
Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village,
Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared
that part of it was first acquired by
[her] father Esteban Abletes
sometime in 1968 when he
purchased the right of Ampiano
bought the right to one-half of the
remaining property occupied by
Ampiano Caballegan. However,
during the survey of the National
Housing Authority, she allowed the
whole lot [to be] registered in her
father's name. As proof thereof, she
presented Exhibits "8" to "11" . . . .
[These documents prove that] that
she has been an occupant of the said
property in Vitas, Tondo even before
her father and Socorro Torres got
married in June, 1980. 14
Anent the parcels of land
and improvements thereon 903 and
905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, . .
. Evangeline professed that in 1978,
before [her] father met Socorro
Torres and before the construction of
the BLISS Project thereat, [her] father
[already had] a bodega of canvas
(lona) and a sewing machine to sew
the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan
Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she
was also operating Vangie's Canvas
Store at 905 Del Pan [Street], Tondo,
Manila, which was evidenced by
Certificate of Registration of Business
Name issued in her favor on 09
November 1998 . . . . When the BLISS
project was constructed in 1980, [the
property] became known as Unit[s]
D-9 and D-10. At first, [her] father
[paid] for the amortizations [for]
these two (2) parcels of land but
when he got sick [with] colon cancer
in 1993, he asked [respondents] to
continue paying for the
amortizations . . . . [Evangeline] paid
a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as
shown by the 37 pieces of receipts . .
. and the aggregate amount of
P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, [as
evidenced by] 36 receipts . . . . 15
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not
contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties.
Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs
cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan
properties. 16 cDAEIH
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the
CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA
sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is
hereby DENIED and the challenged
Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED. 18
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila
should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of
the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a
woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
. . . only the properties
acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is
validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on
forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 19 and held that the foregoing provision applies
"even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
occurred before the [effectivity] of the Family
Code." 20 The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that
Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan
properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any
documentation evidencing Socorro's alleged
contribution. 21
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, 22 which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated 3 August 2012. 23
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition. aATEDS
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man
and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other,
the ownership over the properties acquired during the
subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling
in Borromeo v. Descallar 24 in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not
apply. 25
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family
Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148.In cases of
cohabitation [wherein the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other],
only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is
validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
 The foregoing rules on
forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and
Delpan properties can be considered common property if:
(1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban
and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties
were acquired through the parties' actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title
covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is
co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
several months after the parties were married; and (2) title
to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
married to Socorro Torres." 26 HICEca
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas
property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married
to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status,
and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property. 27 The evidence on record also shows that
Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior
to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was
issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration
under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does
not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of
his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling
in Borromeo:
[R]egistration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world
at large. Certificates of title are not
a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make
one the true owner of the
property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name
does not necessarily, conclusively
and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility
of title likewise does not apply to
respondent. A certificate of title
implies that the title is quiet, and
that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are
well-defined exceptions to this
rule, as when the transferee is not
a holder in good faith and did not
acquire the subject properties for
a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban's actual
contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of
the amortizations. 28 Thus, the law presumes that Esteban
and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the
Delpan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto's claim. Both the
RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was
acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and
Socorro. 29Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase
price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such
payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238.Payment made
by a third person who does not
intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation,
which requires the debtor's consent.
But the payment is in any case valid
as to the creditor who has accepted
it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of
her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and registered under the
name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented
receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the
Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to
show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA: TCacIA
[s]ettled is the rule that in
civil cases . . . the burden of proof
rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts the
affirmative of an issue. . . . . Here it is
Appellant who is duty bound to prove
the allegations in the complaint
which undoubtedly, he miserably
failed to do so. 30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, G.R. No. 202932,
[October 23, 2013], 720 PHIL 575-585)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200558. July 1, 2015.]
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN and
ANNABELLA V.
BORROMEO, petitioners, vs. CRISTIN
 A DISONGLO-ALMAZORA, RENILDA
ALMAZORA-CASUBUAN, RODOLFO
CASUBUAN, SUSANA ALMAZORA-
MENDIOLA, CARLOS MENDIOLA,
CECILIO ALMAZORA and NENITA
ALMAZORA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
The present case demonstrates the legal
principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non
dormientibus jura subverniunt.
This is a petition for review
on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July
28, 2011 Decision 1 and the February 3, 2012
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV 84529, which affirmed the June 29, 2004
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259,
Parañaque City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 96-0206, a case
for damages.
The Facts
The subject property is a parcel of land with
an area of 572 square meters located in Brgy. Sto.
Domingo, Biñan, Laguna. It was registered in the name
of Aquilina Martinez (Aquilina) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18729 by the Register of
Deeds of Laguna on July 29, 1939. 4
After the liberation of Manila from the
Japanese military occupation in 1945, Aquilina and her
maternal grandmother, Leoncia Almendral (Leoncia),
learned that their house on Zabala Street, Tondo,
Manila, was ruined by the war. To rebuild their house,
they borrowed money from their relative, Conrado
Almazora (Conrado). Thus, their house was
reconstructed. In return, Leoncia entrusted to
Contrado the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
18729 covering the subject property in Biñan, Laguna.
Consequently, Conrado and his family remained in the
said property.
Following the death of Aquilina on July 19,
1949, the title of the subject property was transferred
to Aurora Morales-Vivar (Aurora), as her sole heir.
Accordingly, TCT No. T-35280 was issued in the name
of Aurora 5 after TCT No. T-18729 was cancelled. On
February 7, 1972, Conrado passed away.
Sometime in 1994, Aurora learned from
Cristina Almazora (Cristina), the widowed spouse of
Conrado, that the title of the subject property had long
been transferred in the name of Conrado and that the
subject property had been sold to Fullway
Development Corporation (Fullway) by the heirs of
Conrado in consideration of P4,000,000.00. 6
Aurora was shocked to learn that the subject
property was already transferred to Conrado and sold
for a meager amount. On October 30, 1995, she sent a
letter to the heirs of Conrado demanding the delivery
of the payment they received for the sale of the
subject property; but it was unheeded.
On May 9, 1996, Aurora together with her
husband, Arturo, filed a complaint for
damages 7 against Cristina and the other heirs of
Conrado (respondents) before the RTC. They
contended that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
T-18729 was only given to Conrado for safekeeping.
The complaint, however, admitted that the family of
Conrado had been staying on, and using, the subject
property since 1912 with the permission and
generosity of Aquilina and Leoncia. 8
Aurora asserted that, through the years, she
repeatedly asked Conrado to return the owner's copy
of the title but the latter procrastinated, giving all kinds
of excuses, until he died in 1972; that thereafter,
Aurora asked Cristina for the copy of the title but the
latter also ignored her request; that the subsequent
sale of the subject property to Fullway was without
Aurora's authorization, and, thus, the payment
received by respondents for the sale of the subject
property should be turned over to her; and that she
prayed for moral and exemplary damages. 9
On June 24, 1996, respondents filed their
answer with compulsory counterclaim. They
countered that the subject property was properly
transferred to Conrado under TCT No. 35282, and,
thereafter, in the names of the heirs of Conrado under
TCT No. T-114352. Respondents averred that the
imputation of fraud on the part of Conrado in the
registration of the subject property was baseless and
this assertion of fraud was not transmissible from
Conrado to his heirs, who merely acquired the
property through succession. 10 HESIcT
Respondents raised some special and
affirmatives defenses, among others, that the
complaint stated no cause of action and was barred by
prescription. A preliminary hearing for the said
defenses was set by the RTC. 11 In the Order, 12 dated
May 27, 1999, the RTC ruled that the complaint stated
a cause of action.
Respondents filed a petition
for certiorari 13 to assail the said interlocutory order
of the RTC before the CA. In its Decision, 14 dated
February 24, 1999, the CA denied the same and held
that the complaint stated a cause of action, which was
an action for damages arising from fraud committed by
Conrado, as trustee, against Aurora, as cestui que
trust. The CA further held that the complaint, on its asserting her ownership and made judicial demands to
face, did not show that the action had prescribed. return the title and the property.
Meanwhile, the RTC continued the The appellate court added that even on the
proceedings and set the case for trial on the merits. aspect of prescription of actions, the case would not
After the parties adduced their respective pieces of prosper either. It explained that the prescriptive
evidence, the RTC required them to submit their period to recover property obtained through fraud or
memoranda. Only respondents filed a mistake giving rise to an implied trust under Article
memorandum. 15 1456 of the Civil Code was 10 years, pursuant to Article
1144. This 10-year prescriptive period began from the
The RTC Ruling
time the land was registered on June 17, 1965.
In its Decision, dated June 29, 2004, the RTC Accordingly, Aurora had only until June 17, 1975 within
dismissed the complaint. The trial court held that, after which to file her action. Evidently, the suit was
a thorough evaluation of the records, Aurora miserably commenced only on May 12, 1996, beyond its
failed to prove her right to the subject property. It prescription period. The dispositive portion of the
explained that even if Aurora had a claim on the decision states:
subject property, she was guilty of laches. For many
WHEREFORE, premises
years, Aurora slept on her right over the questioned
considered, the instant petition is
property and failed to exhaust all means, legal or
DENIED and the Decision dated
administrative, to retrieve what was rightfully hers at
June 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial
the earliest possible time.
Court of Parañaque City, Branch
The RTC determined that Conrado was able 259 in Civil Case No. 96-0206 is
to transfer the title of the subject property in his name hereby AFFIRMED.
on June 17, 1965 by virtue of a document
SO ORDERED. 20
denominated as "Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a
Parcel of Registered Land," 16 dated January 9, 1949, Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
signed by Aurora and her husband. The signatures of their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
Aurora and her husband, affixed on the deed of sale, Resolution, dated February 3, 2012.
were not properly controverted by her. The trial court
Hence, this petition, raising the
found that her allegations of repeated pleas to
following: caITAC
Conrado to return the copy of the title deserved scant
consideration. It concluded that Aurora was not ISSUES
entitled to damages because there were no clear and
cogent grounds to award the same. The decretal I
portion of the decision reads: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
WHEREFORE, premises ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
considered, plaintiffs having failed DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
to prove its case for damages, the DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR
same is hereby ordered DAMAGES FILED BY AURORA
DISMISSED for lack of merit. MORALES-VIVAR, WHICH
DECISIONS ARE ALL CONTRARY TO
SO ORDERED. 17 LAW;
Aggrieved, Aurora appealed to the CA. On II
June 4, 2009, the children of Aurora, namely, Consuelo
V. Pangasinan, Lucio M. Vivar and Annabella V. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Borromeo (petitioners), filed a motion for substitution SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING
of party 18 after her death on March 26, 2008. In its THAT THE ACQUISITION OF
Resolution, 19 dated July 15, 2010, the CA granted the CONRADO ALMAZORA,
motion. RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST, OF THE SUBJECT
The CA Ruling PROPERTY, IS INVALID AND
PRODUCED NO EFFECT
In the assailed Decision, dated July 28, 2011,
WHATSOEVER BECAUSE NOT ALL
the CA denied the appeal of petitioners. It held that it
THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES, AS TO
took Aurora more than 50 years to act on Conrado's
DEPRIVE AURORA MORALES-
withholding of the title covering the subject property.
VIVAR OF HER OWNERSHIP, ARE
As early as 1945, the title was already in the possession
PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. 21
of Conrado. The CA ruled that petitioners were barred
by laches as Aurora should have been impervious in
 Petitioners assert that they are not guilty of
laches. When Aurora was told that the subject
property was already in the name of Conrado in April
1994, she immediately filed a complaint for damages
on May 2, 1996. Petitioners also claim that prescription
is not a valid defense to defeat the title of Aurora.
Section 47 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 states that no title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
On September 24, 2012, respondents filed
their Comment, 22 arguing that petitioners' assertions
were tenuous. Aurora slept on her rights for more than
50 years, impervious in asserting her ownership of the
subject property, thereby losing the same by laches.
On December 11, 2012, petitioners filed
their Reply, 23 claiming that the CA observed that
respondents might have manipulated the said title to
their benefit and advantage. Respondents' hands were
unclean because of their bad faith and
misrepresentation.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The petition raises
questions of fact
As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a
Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure
questions of law. A question of law arises when the
doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not
allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 24
Petitioners challenge the findings of laches,
prescription and lack of bad faith by the CA. To answer
these questions, the Court must review the records to
determine whether the lower courts properly
appreciated the evidence in concluding its findings.
Clearly, the questions raised are factual. On this
ground alone, the present petition under Rule 45 is
dismissible. In the interest of substantial justice,
however, the Court deems it proper to re-evaluate the
records.
Petitioners are barred by
laches
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 25
The principle of laches is a creation of equity
which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect
or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a
clearly inequitable situation. 26 The time-honored rule
anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied
to a litigant whose claim or demand has become
"stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has
slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for
peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown
stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment
to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has
become, under the circumstances, inequitable or
unfair to permit. 27
The four (4) elements of laches, as first
prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho 28 are
as follows:
(1) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is
made for which the complaint
seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the
complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or
the suit is not held to be barred. 29
In the case at bench, the CA correctly held
that all the elements of laches were
present. First, Aurora and her family entrusted to
Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title
of the subject property in 1945. In their complaint,
petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had
been staying in the subject property since
1912. 30Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to
1996, before Aurora and petitioners decided to
enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents who
lived all their lives in the disputed property apparently
were not aware that Aurora would one day come out
and claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no
question that respondents would be prejudiced in the
event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.
The contention of petitioners that they were
not in delay in claiming their rights over the subject
property is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs
did not take any legal step to uphold their claim over
the subject property, despite being fully aware that
Conrado and his family were occupying the same for a
very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-
Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the
property for 30 years 31 and that Aurora had never
shown her any evidence of ownership of the
property. 32
In their complaint, Aurora claimed that she
repeatedly reminded Conrado to return the copy of
the title. This, however, is a self-serving allegation
without any evidentiary substantiation. The two
belated demand letters, dated October 30, 1995 and
March 5, 1996, sent by Aurora's lawyer before the
institution of the present action, are the only tangible
assertions of their claim to the property. 33 Indeed,
not a scintilla of proof was presented by Aurora and
her heirs to establish that, for 50 years, they actively
manifested to reclaim the title and possession of the
subject property. cDHAES
A person, endowed with properties and
entitlements, but chose to lie quietly as decades
passed by, watching his property wither away,
allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his
unguarded trees, instead of safeguarding his rights
through the accessibly and necessary legal means,
does not deserve the protection of equity. The law aids
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
The action has prescribed
On the basis of prescription of actions, the
pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners
argue that prescription shall not lie against their action
because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529 cannot be acquired through prescription. 34 The
argument is patently erroneous.
There are two kinds of prescription provided
in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the
acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded
in paragraph 1, Article 1106. 35 Acquisitive
prescription is also known as adverse possession
and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive
prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the
lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106
and Article 1139. 36 Another name for extinctive
prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of
prescription should not be interchanged. 37
In a plethora of cases, 38 the Court has held
that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be
acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench,
however, it was extinctive prescription, and not
acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of
petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must
fail, not because respondents adversely occupied the
property, but because petitioners failed to institute
their suit within the prescriptive period under Article
1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of
extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances
of the case should be considered. According to
petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title
was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945.
Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith
when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of
a Parcel of Registered Land 39 on January 9, 1949, and
transferred the title of the land to his name with the
issuance of TCT No. 35282 40 on June 17, 1965; and
because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado
against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was
created by operation of law, with Conrado as trustee
and Aurora as cestui que trust. TCAScE
Constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands
of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. 41 Article
1456 of the Civil Codeprovides that a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes, by operation of law,
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. 42 It is now well-settled that
the prescriptive period to recover property obtained
by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the Civil Code,is 10 years
pursuant to Article 1144. 43 The prescriptive period to
enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. 44 The ten-
year prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. 45
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period
is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family,
not petitioners, were in possession of the property.
The subject property was registered in the name of
Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the
starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus,
had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust
and assert their claim over the land. As properly held
by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial
claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed, with the
lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action,
petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.
Fraud was not proven
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the
present case was not barred by laches and had not
prescribed, it must still fail on its merits. The basis of
the action for damages of petitioners would be the
fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation allegedly
 committed by Conrado in transferring the title of the
subject property to his name. Petitioners, however,
drastically failed to prove the fact of fraud with clear
and convincing evidence.
Fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and not merely by a
preponderance thereof. 46 Clear and convincing proof
is more than mere preponderance, but not to extent
of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases. 47 The imputation of fraud
in a civil case requires the presentation of clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice
to sustain the existence of fraud. The burden of
evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party
alleging fraud. 48
Here, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of
a Parcel of Registered Land, which was signed by
Aurora and her husband, transferred the ownership of
the subject property from Aurora to Conrado.
Petitioners, however, failed to assail the validity of
such deed. As written by the RTC, petitioners could
have questioned the authenticity of the document and
submitted the same to the National Bureau of
Investigation for comparison of the signatures. This,
they failed to do. 49
In fine, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of
a Parcel of Registered Land, being a notarized
document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Even
assuming that Conrado truly employed fraud, no proof
was presented that respondents, as heirs of Conrado,
were in privy and had knowledge of the
misrepresentations. In the absence of evidence of
fraud, the transfer to Conrado of the title of the subject
property, and the subsequent transfer to respondents
by virtue of succession, 50 must be upheld.
Even on the subject of ownership,
petitioners failed to substantiate their claim.
Petitioners had nothing, other than their bare
allegations, that they continuously owned the subject
property. For decades, petitioners lacked the
possession and interest to recover the subject
property. The trial court even noted that petitioners
could not present a single tax declaration receipt as
an indicia of their ownership. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners are certainly not entitled to damages on
the basis of their misplaced claim of ownership over
the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
July 28, 2011 Decision and the February 3, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
122153 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pangasinan v. Disonglo-Almazora, G.R. No. 200558 ,
[July 1, 2015])