Descartes: Meditation Three

1. Thus far Descartes has proven his own existence as a thinking thing. As a thinking thing he
has various ideas, which are basically representations of objects (just as paintings are
representations of what they picture). He cannot doubt that he has these ideas, although he
can doubt whether there are any objects independent of his mind corresponding to these ideas
(e.g., he cannot doubt that he has an idea of his own body, though he can doubt that his body
really exists). In other words, Descartes assumes that he has infallible access to the contents
of his own mind, but not anything beyond his mind.
Although philosophers nowadays tend to question Descartes’s assumption that we cannot
be mistaken about the contents of our own minds, a related and weaker claim seems to be
true. Namely, I have privileged access to the contents of my own mind which no one else
has, and I do not have such access to the contents of another person’s mind. To illustrate the
idea of privileged access: think of any number from 1 to 10. No one will be able to tell what
number you are thinking of (except by taking a random guess), except you yourself.

2. Here’s a quick sketch of what’s going on in Meditation Three. Among the ideas that he has,
Descartes isolates a special class of ideas that he calls clear and distinct, and these are self-
evident truths accessible by the “light of nature”, or what may also be called rational
intuition. But it seems that the evil genius can deceive him even about what seems to be self-
evident truths that are clearly and distinctly perceived, such as that 2 + 3 = 5. So Descartes
needs to remove the possibility of an all-powerful deceiver, and he does that by proving the
existence of God. God’s non-deceiving nature would guarantee that we cannot be mistaken
about self-evident truths which we clearly and distinctly understand. Descartes argues for the
existence of God by first observing that among the class of clear and distinct ideas we have is
the idea of God, i.e., a being who is infinite and perfect. Now the source of this idea can only
be from God himself, because the idea of infinitely perfect being cannot come from the finite
and imperfect objects of sense experience or from inward reflection upon our own finite and
imperfect powers. This argument is sometimes called the Trademark Argument, since the
idea of God we have, according to Descartes, is like a trademark logo that God has left in our
minds to show us who our Maker is. Finally, having proved the existence of God, Descartes
can establish that God will guarantee the truth of anything he clearly and distinctly perceives.
This is because God is a perfect being, and benevolence is a perfection while deception is an
imperfection.1 That is, God cannot be a deceiver. Thus God would ensure that whatever we
clearly and distinctly perceive as self-evident truths are in fact true.

3. There is a problem here which is called the Cartesian Circle. 2 Notice that Descartes
employs the clear and distinct idea of God in establishing that we cannot be mistaken or
deceived about the truth of ideas we clearly and distinctly perceive. But this seems to be
circular—Descartes is presupposing what he is arguing for. (A circular argument is one that
smuggles the conclusion into the premisses that support the conclusion. Thus the problem
with a circular argument is that it cannot convince someone who has no reason to believe in
1
Descartes relies on the assumption, which can be traced back to St. Augustine (354-430 CE), that there are degrees
of reality corresponding to degrees of excellence. So, according to Descartes and Augustine, goodness is real and
evil isn’t, and evil is merely the lack or deficiency of goodness.
2
“Cartesian” is the adjectival form of the name “Descartes”.

1
 the conclusion.) To put it in other words, if the truth of self-evident ideas are in doubt, we
cannot use a self-evident idea (i.e., of God) to remove the doubt, but that seems to be what
Descartes is doing. This worry was first noted by Antoine Arnauld (1612~1694) in the
following words:
My one remaining hesitation is about how it is possible to avoid circularity when our
author says that ‘our only guarantee that the things which we clearly and distinctly
conceive are true is the fact that God exists.’ For our only guarantee that God exists
is that we conceive very clearly and distinctly that he does exist; so before being
convinced of the existence of God we need to be convinced that everything which we
clearly and distinctly conceive is true.
Descartes himself was aware of this problem, but he, along with many Descartes scholars,
has denied that there is circularity in the argument.

The Trademark Argument

4. Descartes offers two arguments for the existence of God, the first (the Trademark Argument)
appearing in Meditation Three, and the second (the Ontological Argument) appearing in
Meditation Five. Here we discuss the Trademark Argument, the point of which is to dispel
the Evil Genius Hypothesis, or in other words, to eliminate the possibility of systematic
deception/error.

5. The Trademark Argument is so called because Descartes believes that the idea of God is
implanted in our minds by God, like a trademark logo: “…it is not astonishing that in
creating me, God should have endowed me with this idea, so that it would be like the mark of
the craftsman impressed upon his work…” (Meditations, p.34). And just as we can recognize
the maker from the logo, so we can recognize our Maker from our idea of God.

(1) I have a clear and distinct idea of perfect being, i.e., of God.
(2) Every idea has a cause, either myself or something else.
(3) A cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect.
(4) I am an imperfect being.
(5) I cannot be the cause of the idea of perfect being [follows from (3) and (4)].
(6) There is one perfect being, i.e., God, that causes my idea of perfect being
[follows from (2) and (3)].
(7) Therefore God exists.

The argument can be understood as a disjunctive syllogism, as I suggested in my introductory

notes on Descartes. Now let’s examine each premiss individually to see if it needs any
support, and what argument Descartes provides to support the premiss.

6. Step (1) is true by definition of ‘God’. Now one might challenge Premiss (1) on grounds that
the concept of God varies from religion to religion and even from one person to another. The
word ‘God’ is ambiguous and can mean many different things to people of different
backgrounds. [Thanks to Nadim for raising this point.] In response, Descartes can say that it
does not matter that different religions have different ideas of God. If talk of God is

2
 confusing on account of the different meanings that ‘God’ has, then let’s dispense with all
talk of God and talk of the most perfect being instead. We understand the idea of a being
who is perfect in all positive aspects, e.g., perfect in wisdom, goodness, and power. So long
as we understand this idea, and thus have the idea in our minds, Descartes can (purport to)
prove that the idea can only come from a being who is perfect in all positive aspects. This
will then enable Descartes to eliminate the possibility of systematic deception.

7. Step (2) seems obvious, and Descartes does not see any need to defend it.

8. The most important, interesting and controversial premiss is Step (3). Step (3) states a
general causal principle which has the following implications:
(3a) Something cannot come from nothing. This is obvious.
(3b) Something more perfect cannot come from something less perfect. E.g., if I have less
than perfect knowledge of Descartes, then I cannot convey to you a perfect
knowledge of Descartes. Your perfect knowledge of Descartes couldn’t have come
from me. It must have come from somewhere else, such as the Meditations, a
philosophical friend, etc.
(3c) The idea of something more perfect cannot come from something less perfect. Since
ideas are representations, let me provide an example for the sister principle that the
representation of something more perfect cannot come from something less perfect.
The Mona Lisa represents a woman and her subtle smile with such great skill that it
couldn’t have come from the hands of a doodling child. According to this principle,
it is possible for Da Vinci to create a childish doodle, but impossible for a doodling
child to create a Mona Lisa.
(Terminological note: what Descartes calls “objective reality” is the reality that
representations have, which is a lower degree of reality than that possessed by actual
objects. The reality possessed by actual objects is “formal reality”, which is a lower
degree of reality than that possessed by God. God possesses what Descartes calls
“eminent reality”.)
Now, Katie has pointed out that if the theory of evolution is true, then (3b) in particular and
(3) in general must be false. That is an excellent point. Given the fact of evolution, it seems
undeniable that beings with higher intelligence (which counts as something more perfect for
Descartes) have sprung into existence from things lacking intelligence. Unless you have
good reasons for denying evolution, this seems to be a clear counterexample to (3b).
What I suggest in support of Descartes is this. He can replace the more general principle
(3) with the more specific principle (3c), and the argument will still work. Given the
principle stated in (3c), it follows that: if I have the idea of a being who is perfect in all
positive aspects, that idea could not come from an imperfect being like me, but only from a
being who is perfect in all positive aspects. The challenge to you is to find a plausible
counterexample to (3c).

9. Step (4) is obvious enough. I doubt and I desire. I doubt because I lack knowledge, and I
desire because I lack something good. If I had infinite/perfect knowledge and infinite/perfect
goodness, I wouldn’t doubt or desire. So I am a finite imperfect being.

3
10. How about (5)? Why can’t I be the cause of the idea of infinitely perfect being? Perhaps I
can form the idea of a finite imperfect being from my own finite and imperfect nature, and by
negating this idea of finite imperfection, obtain the idea of infinitely perfect being (just as I
might get the idea of darkness by negating the idea of light). In response to this objection,
Descartes claims that we think of infinity and perfection as having greater reality than
finitude and imperfection. His claim is that we understand finite imperfection as the absence
of infinite perfection, rather than the other way around (just as we regard darkness as the
absence of light, and not the other way around). So the idea of infinite perfection is prior to
the idea of finite imperfection, and we cannot have the latter idea without first having the
former idea.

11. How about Step (6)? Well, if Step (3) is true then Step (6) follows from it. The cause of the
idea of infinite perfection must be an infinitely perfect being, and nothing less. But why
must there be one infinitely perfect being? Perhaps my idea of infinite perfection can have
many causes. One cause might be a being that has infinite and perfect wisdom, but not
infinite and perfect goodness, like the evil genius. Another cause might be a being that has
infinite and perfect goodness, but not infinite and perfect power, say an impotent deity. But
Descartes considers and rules out this possibility of many causes. According to Descartes,
unity, simplicity, and the inseparability of all perfections are also perfections in their own
right, and this guarantees that there is only one infinitely perfect cause of my idea of
infinitely perfect being.