Argumentation and Advocacy

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Getting to First Base: Prima Facie Arguments for

Propositions of Value

Joseph S. Tuman

To cite this article: Joseph S. Tuman (1987) Getting to First Base: Prima Facie
Arguments for Propositions of Value, Argumentation and Advocacy, 24:2, 84-94, DOI:
10.1080/00028533.1987.11951360

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.1987.11951360

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 GETTING TO FIRST BASE: PRIMA FACIE ARGUMENTS
FOR PROPOSITIONS OF VALUE

Joseph S. Tuman

Value debate too often closely imitates policy debate, and for no better reason than
that few clear and definitive standards for value debate have been articulated. This
essay offers a definition of values as either instrumental or terminal, and identifies
four prima facie burdens necessary for affirming a value resolution: value identifica-
tion, value criteria, value hierarchy, and topicality through relevance. Additionally,
this essay examines the role of presumption and burden of proof in value debate.

The growth and popularity of the Cross
Examination Debate Association
(CEDA) demonstrates a preference
among college forensic programs for
debating value propositions rather than
the National Debate Topic (NDT) use of
propositions of policy. This preference
may reflect a myriad of perceptions about
the possibilities of value argument and the
limitations of policy argument. 1 A failure
to understand the nature of values or
value theory, however, has caused many
students great difficulty debating proposi-
tions of value.
This essay begins with the observation
that value debates too often closely imitate
policy debates. Imitation may be the sin-
cerest form of flattery, but, as I shall
argue, it derives from confusion over the
nature of values as applied in the debate
setting.
Debating propositions of value is akin
to the pick-up game of baseball we may
Mr. Tuman teaches Debate and Argumentation in
the Department of Rhetoric, University of California,
Berkeley, and at San Francisco State University
1
Some may prefer value debate because they
perceive policy debate to be too heavily evidence
based, requiring a research burden unrealistic for
average students trying to balance competitive foren-
sics with a college education. They may also be
frustrated by the speed and non-communicative style
so often exhibited in the comparatively faster NDT
rounds. Instructors may also prefer teaching value
theory as it broadens the philosophical scope of the
forensic experience.
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Volume 24, Fall 1987
have played as children. Most of us used
boxtops, garbage, books, or even articles
of clothing to mark bases-although on
occasion there may not have been enough
to go around. On such occasions one
would guess where the bases were. Even
though there may have been general con-
sensus that we had to 'circle the bases' to
score a run, this was seldom achieved
since there was rarely agreement as to
where the bases might be. Value debate is
in a similar state: we all have a vague
notion of what constitutes the structure for
such a debate, but the bases are not yet
clearly marked.
To be certain, much has been written
about value debate/ but not nearly
2
See Joseph W. Wenzel and Dale J. Hample,
"Categories and Dimensions of Value Propositions:
Exploratory Studies," Journal of the American
Forensic Association 11 (1975): 122-130; Wenzel,
"Toward a Rationale for Value-Centered Argu-
ment," journal of the American Forensic Association
13 (1 977): 150-1 58; Ronald J. Matlon, "Debating
Propositions of Value," Journal of the American
Forensic Association 14 ( 1978): 194-204; J an Vasil-
ius, "Presumption, Presumption, Wherefore Art
Thou Presumption?" Perspectives on Non-Policy
Argument, ed. Don Brownlee (CEDA 1980) 22-28;
Matlon, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry Into
Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption,"
Dimensions of Agreement: Proceedings of the Second
Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. George
Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA,
Speech Communication Association, 1981) 494-512;
Barbara Warnick, "Arguing Value Propositions,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association 18
(1981):109-19; Randolph Scott and Tony Wynn,
"Avoidance of False Claims: Some Considerations
 ARGUING VALUE PROPOSITIONS
enough attention has been devoted to the
elements necessary for advocacy of a value
case: the prima facie presentation in value
debate. This essay will further the quest
for some explanation of this subject by
examining the following topics: (1) the
nature of values-and propositions of val-
ue; (2) how value arguments relate to
policy arguments; and (3), given our
understanding of these issues, the prima
facie requirements for value debate. In
short, what are the bases, and where do
they belong?
VALUES
The term 'value' has been described in
various ways, including "that property of
a thing because of which it is esteemed,
desirable or useful. " 3 Dale Hample has
said that values "are thought to typify
both people and cultures by defining
proper (or good or unacceptable) action
and belief." 4 Ronald Matlon has sug-
gested that a "proposition of value is a
qualitative judgment about a person,
object, act, situation, program, institution,
concept or idea." 5 'Desirable,' 'proper,'
and 'qualitative' are all terms used
interchangeably in defining values, but
they still appear ambiguous in use.
Noting this ambiguity, Robin Williams
for Debating and Judging Propositions of Value,"
Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of
CEDA, ed. Don Brownlee (CEDA, 1981) 25-31;
David A. Thomas and Maridell Fryar, "Value
Resolutions, Presumption, and Stock Issues,"
Dimensions of Argument, 513-531; Carl D. Flan-
ingham, "Value-Centered Argument and the Devel-
opment of Decision Rules," journal of the American
Forensic Association, 19 (1982): 107-114. Dwight
Podgurski, "Presumption in the Value Proposition
Realm," CEDA Yearbook, ed. Don Brownlee
(CEDA, 1983) 34-39; Waiter Ulrich, "Philosophi-
cal Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate," CEDA
Yearbook, ed. Don Brownlee (CEDA, 1983) 22-28;
Steven Brydon, "Presumption in Non-Policy De-
bate: In Search of a Paradigm," journal of the
American Forensic Association, 23 (1986): 15-22.
3
The American College Dictionary, (New York:
Random House, 1970), 1342.
4
Hample, "Testing a Model of Value Argument
and Evidence," Communication Monographs, 44
Uune 1977): 106.
5
Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value,"
195-196.
85
has argued that standards or criteria for
preference are the core meaning of val-
ues,6 and utilization of such standards is
an ongoing process in human behavior.
"Values merge affect and concept," he
writes. "Persons are not detached or indif-
ferent to the world; they do not stop with
a sheerly factual view of their experience.
Explicitly or implicitly, they are contin-
ually regarding things as good or bad,
pleasant or unpleasant." 7 This perspective
is surely more useful for debating proposi-
tions of value to the extent it explains our
motivation for acceptance, indifference or
rejection of values. To this end, Milton
Rokeach has concluded:
[V]alues are core conceptions of the desirable within
every individual and society. They serve as standards
or criteria to guide not only action but also judgment,
choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation,
rationalization, and, one might add, attribution of
causality.•
Alleging that the total number of human
values is small, and universal around the
world, 9 Rokeach distinguishes between
"instrumental" and "terminal" values.
Instrumental values refer to desirable
modes of conduct or behavior. Terminal
values, correspondingly, refer to desirable
end-states of existence. Instrumental
values can be conceived of as modes of
behavior which are instrumental to the
attainment of all values concerning
desired end-states of existence. For exam-
ple, personal salvation may be conceived
of as a terminal value, while personal
6
Robin Williams, "Change and Stability in Val-
ues and Value Systems," Understanding Human
Values, ed. Milton Rokeach, (London: The Free
Press, 1979), 16.
7
Williams, 16.
8
Rokeach, Understanding Human Values, 2.
9
He writes: "On various grounds-intuitive, the-
oretical and emperical-we estimate that the total
number of terminal values that a grown person may
possess is about a dozen and a half, and that the total
number of instrumental values is several times this
number, perhaps five or six dozen." Milton
Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, (London:
The Free Press, 1981) 11. See also, Rokeach, Under-
standing Human Values, 2-3.
86 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
honesty and integrity may be instrumental
values which, if adopted, lead towards the
terminal value. 10
In sum, values are more than simple
'qualitative judgments.' As instrumental
or terminal, they serve as standards or
criteria of preference and desirability
which provide a comprehensive guide for
judgment and action.
Given this broader interpretation, what
constitutes a proposition of value? Austin
Freeley has defined the term 'proposition'
as a "statement of decision the advocate
desires to have others accept or reject." 11
Propositions of fact, for example, are often
easy to understand since the advocate of
the proposition needs only to demonstrate
the existence of certain facts to 'prove' her
case to the audience. Propositions of pol-
icy are slightly more problematic, but
adhere to conventions demonstrating cer-
tain arguments to persuade the critic or
audience to adopt a course of action or
policy. Given the absence of clear stan-
dards for value propositions, however,
value advocates substitute conventions
used in debating propositions of policy to
'prove values.'
With the foregoing as a basis, a more
restrictive definition allows value proposi-
tions to be seen as statements concerning
the standards or criteria of preference and
desirability which guide human actions,
judgments, beliefs and attitudes. In specif-
ic, a proposition of value raises a question
about what may be either an instrumental
or terminal value (mode of behavior or
end-state of existence), and asks the critic
to affirm, accept or reject it.
10
Rokeach theorizes that instrumental values are
motivating for this reason, and that "[t)erminal val-
ues are [also) motivating because they represent the
supergoals beyond immediate, biologically urgent
goals. Unlike the more immediate goals, these super-
goals do not seem periodic in nature; neither do they
seem to satiate-we seem to be forever doomed to
strive for these ultimate goals without ever quite
reaching them." Rokeach, The Nature of Human
Values, 14.
11
Austin Freeley, Argumentation and Debate:
Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making,
6th ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1986) 28.
VALUE PROPOSITIONS AND
PROPOSITIONS OF POLICY
A second level of inquiry is necessary
before we can begin our examination of
prima-faciality in value propositions:
namely, what is the relationship of value
propositions to propositions of policy?
The answer to this question lends per-
spective to the role, if any, that prima
facie issues of policy can play in value
debate.
It has already been noted that values
can be considered as standards of prefer-
ence which may guide action. It should
thus be clear that a consideration of values
enters into a larger calculus resulting in
the formation of action-or for our pur-
poses, adoption of policy. Car! Flan-
ingham has noted:
[A]n important function of value-centered argument
is the production of rules permitting policy decisions
to be made. This statement has two meanings. First,
it means that, as argued, policy propositions will
contain subsumed or subsidiary value proposi-
tions .... Secondly ... that for a given value proposi-
tion, a connection can be drawn to one or more
adjacent policy propositions. 12
Propositions of value are also related to
propositions of fact in that they may
evolve or be changed by cognitive phe-
nomena. "[T)herefore it is important to
examine underlying propositions and sub-
propositions of fact before considering the
proposition of value." 13
Framed in this way, propositions of
value may be seen diagramatically as
being placed on a continuum between
questions of fact and questions of policy.
If values are influenced by facts, then
values may be used to influence policy.
Consideration of policy implications
seems all the more reasonable in light of
one's decision to accept or reject a value.
PRIMA FACIE ISSUES
Understanding values and their relation
to policy, we are now brought to a more
12
Flaningham, 109; see also Mat! on at 194.
13
Matlon, 195.
 ARGUING VALUE PROPOSITIONS 87

important question: what constitutes a has been widespread confusion for value
prima-facie case in value debate? debaters, and a lack of uniformity in stan-
In modern academic debate, the term dards for evaluating propositions of value.
'prima facie' has come to be defined as "a Uniformity can be achieved by recogniz-
case which in and of itself establishes good ing four prima facie burdens which serve
and sufficient reason for adopting the as stock issues in value debate: (1) value
proposition unless it is successfully refuted identification; (2) criteria; (3) value hier-
or weakened." 14 Establishing "sufficient archy and prioritization; and (4) topicali-
reason" in modern debate has been a pro- ty.
cess of evolution for propositions of policy,
which has brought us to a series of formu~ VALUE IDENTIFICATION
lated issues which should often be consid-
The first prima facie requirement for
ered in a policy debate. These have been
the advocate of a proposition of value is
labeled as 'stock issues' in the sense they
identification of the values inherent in the
are generic in their appliation to almost
resolution. While this may seem obvious
any proposition of policy, regardless of the
to the point of being trivial, the average
topic. While they have occasionally been
proposition of value may contain multiple
labeled "stereotyped formulas," 15 they
scenarios, thereby making value identifi-
nevertheless serve a useful function in pol-
cation unclear. For example, a value reso-
icy debate to the extent they provide uni-
lution may be composed from various
form standards for composition and evalu-
propositions of fact, obscuring relevant
ation of a prima facie case. The roots of
values. 17 This is just another way of say-
such arguments can be traced back to the
ing that values may be explicitly stated in
notions of stasis and status in ancient
the wording of the topic, or may only be
Greek and Roman rhetoric. 16
implied. It is the responsibility of the
The stock issues demonstrating a prima
advocate to identify them in either event.
facie case in policy debate are well known
Correspondingly, a value resolution
and adhered to. They have been described
may make reference to several potential
as ill, blame, cost and cure-although in
values which may be explicit or implicit.
contemporary practice they have been
A beguiling example can be found in a
called significance, inherency, disadvan-
resolution making reference to "constitu-
tages and solvency. Some would also
tional rights." The constitution is filled
argue that topicality is a stock issue of
with articles and amendments promoting
prima facie concern. The absence of any
different rights for our citizenry. Suppose,
of these issues demonstrates that an advo-
however, that the founders of our resolu-
cate's presentation is not prima facie.
tion are more clever, and label these
Unfortunately, no clear statement of all
"First Amendment rights." While some
the issues necessary for a prima facie case
commentators might suggest that all First
in debating propositions of value has been
Amendment rights are interconnected,
articulated. The result, as noted earlier,
they are still distinct. If any of these rights
is to be defended or promoted, it must be
14
Freeley at 34; see also Douglas Ehninger and
Wayne Brockriede, Decision By Debate, 2d ed.,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 138: "a prima
17
facie case [is] a case a critical judge would consider Let us take an absurd example. Suppose our
strong enough to stand unless and until refutation is topic is: "Reading the San Francisco Chronicle is
offered against it." beneficial." (Undoubtedly a very difficult case for
15
Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy, (Boston: the proponent!) What is the value being discussed
Allrn and Bacon, 1964) 65. here? Perhaps it stems from the educational benefit
1
Mills at 66. Mills also notes that "some to reading? Or could it be that reading the Chronicle
influence from this tradition can be seen in the is a form of supporting the press, which in
Baker-Hunter Principles of Argumentation in 1905, turn implies a value from the promotion of a free
and later in Shaw's Art of Debate in 1922." press?
88 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
explicitly identified, differentiated, stated,
and the appropriate value must be identi-
fied.18
A corollary of the above mentioned rule
regarding explicit and implicit values is
that value judgments may also contain
concealed directives, carrying with them
an implicit command to achieve them. 19
These directives should also be identified
for the critic to avoid making the debate
nothing more than an exercise in exposi-
tion. By urging the critic to comply with
the implied directive and adopt the value
standard, the speaker becomes an advo-
cate. Needless to say, it is also necessary
for potential advocates to explicitly distin-
guish between instrumental and terminal
values. Identification in this manner will
assist the advocate in meeting the prima
facie requirements which follow.
CRITERIA
The second prima facie requirement for
an advocate of value is perhaps the best
recognized. It has been given many dif-
ferent labels, but we shall put all of them
under the rubric of "criteria" for our pur-
poses.
There is already widespread agreement
that a primary responsibility of any value
advocate is the identification of appropri-
ate criteria/0 and the application of these
criteria to the given facts of the case. 21 For
example, if our resolution suggests that
"Republicans Make Bad Presidents,"
then we must (after identifying the appro-
priate value-the value of good presi-
18
See also Beverly Merrill Kelly, "An Alternative
to NDT Debate," CEDA Yearbook, 1981, 12. A
value "must be made quite explicit" by the affirma-
tive.
19
Russel Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumen-
tation and Advocacy, (New York: Random House,
1967) 220.
20
Flaningham at 110; see also Russell Church and
Charles Wilbanks, Values and Policies in Contro-
versy, (Gorsuch Scarisbrick Publishers, Scottsdale,
1986) 54.
21
Mills at 64; see also Freeley at 51, and Maridell
Fryar and David A. Thomas, Student Congress and
Lincoln Douglas Debate, (Skogie: National Text-
book Co., 1982), 21.
dents, or the lack of worth to bad presi-
dents) establish appropriate criteria for
judging what constitutes a bad president.
The advocate would then apply her given
arguments and facts to this value criteria
in an attempt to support the claim.
Two value criteria already identified
can be labeled as definitive and designa-
tive. Ronald Matlon has suggested that
the "definitive stock issue is a statement or
justification of the standard or measure to
be used, whether criteria, a model, an
ideal, or desirable aims or objectives." 22
Correspondingly, a "designative stock
issue determines whether the subject of
the evaluation meets the criteria de-
fined."23
The process involved with value crite-
ria, whether definitive or designative, is
useful since it allows us to examine, eval-
uate and consider a value taken by itself.
Value debate, however, seldom considers
values independent of other issues-or
more specifically, other values. Criteria is
thus only a first step in consideration of
an identified value. This brings us to our
next area of prima facie concern.
VALUE HIERARCHY AND
PRIORITIZA TION
A third and very underdeveloped prima
facie responsibility for advocates of value
resolutions should be that of value hierar-
chy or prioritization; that is, given appro-
priate value identification and criteria,
prioritization of the value(s) in a hierar-
chical scheme in relation to other competi-
tive values can occur. Rokeach has noted
that:
Value hierarchies or priorities are organizations of
values enabling us to choose between alternative
goals and actions, and enabling us to resolve conflict.
At the individual level, for instance, value priorities
guide decisions about occupational goals and inter-
ests, on how to spend our money, or for whom to
vote. At the supraindividual level, value priorities
22
Matlon, 201.
23
Matlon, 201; see also Ehninger and Brockriede,
211.
 ARGUING VALUE PROPOSITIONS
guide decisions about such things as the setting of
organizational goals, the allocation of resources, and
the formation of new policies. 24
That this should be a prima facie burden
follows for two simple reasons. First, it
can allow direct comparison of different,
competitive values. Flaningham has not-
ed:
[P]rioritization ... centers on the interrelationship
among different value statements, producing rules
which determine the relative ranking of competing
values within a social system's values hierarchy ....
Prioritization arguments help determine the proba-
ble truth of the resolution by examining it against
competing values."
Without prioritization and hierarchy how
can we compare values? How does one
advocate freedom over equality, for exam-
ple, without resorting to such a scheme?
A second and equally compelling
rationale for making this a prima facie
burden concerns the relationship of the
value argument to the critic or audience.
If and when a single value is prioritized
over another value or values, there is an
implication made to the critic that this
value is the most significant or important,
and hence is worthy of acceptance. In
other words, significance from priority
implies action on the part of the critic,
arguments to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
Priority and hierarchical classifications
are crucial to value argument. As noted
earlier, "core values do not readily
change, they ... [only] shift in positions of
dominance along a value hierarchy." 26
Rokeach has added: "[ w )e thus arrive at a
conception of humans differing from one
another not so much in terms of whether
they possess particular terminal or instru-
mental values, but in the way they orga-
nize them to form value hierarchies or
priorities." 27 Such reasoning has led
24
Rokeach, Understanding Human Values, 49.
25
Flaningham, 111.
26
Matlon, 198.
v Rokeach, Understanding Human Values, 49.
89
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-
Tyteca to conclude:
Value hierarchies are, no doubt, more important to
the structure of an argument than the actual values.
Most values are indeed shared by a great number of
particular audiences, and a particular audience is
characterized less by which values it accepts than by
the way it grades them. 28
Understanding the relevance and impor-
tance of hierarchies, however, is only half
the equation. The more important ques-
tion here is: how does one prioritize these
values?
There are numerous methods for
assessing priority. The first of these can
be called priority by cause-effect: that
which is labeled as cause will be placed in
higher priority over that which is consid-
ered effect. 29 A second possible prioritiza-
tion scheme can be called priority by
quantity. Perelman has noted "there will
be true hierarchies based on the quantity
of a value: the higher rank corresponds to
a larger quantity of the chosen character-
istic. " 30
An ancillary issue related to assessing
priority concerns the significance of the
value in question. Significance is gener-
ally considered a prima facie stock issue in
propositions of policy to the extent it pre-
sents significant areas of need for the
advocate's policy to remedy. In value
propositions, significance becomes a sub-
issue of priority by quantity. Instead of
asking how large is the need to be reme-
died as in questions of policy, an advocate
of value will ask how significant is the
quantity of the chosen characteristic. Seen
in this way, significance as a variable in
priority and hierarchy can obviously be
both quantitative and/or qualitative.
Perelman also notes that an alternative
means of priority may be achieved by
reference to the concept of loci.
28
Chaim Perelman and L. Obrechts-Tyteca, The
New Rhetorzc, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1969), 81.
29
Perelman makes reference to something similar,
which he labels "anteriority," at 80.
30
Perelman, 81.
90 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION

As used by classical writers, loci are nent's arguments to those placed in the
headings under advocate's hierarchy, however; obviously,
there can and should be disagreement as
which arguments can be classified. They are asso-
ciated with a concern to help a speaker's inventive to whether other values belong in the hier-
efforts and involve the grouping of relevant material, archy as well.
so that it can be found again when required. Loci Hierarchy, then, is definitely a prima
have been accordingly defined as storehouses for facie burden where the topic explicitly or
arguments. 31
implicitly calls for the comparison of val-
ues. A logical criticism of this approach,
Perelman argues that there are numerous
however, might come from those who
such loci under which value arguments
wonder what role hierarchy would play if
may be placed. 32
the wording of the topic was such that no
When advocates engage in the process
comparison of values is overtly stated. For
of creating value hierarchies, they should
example, if the topic was: "A Free Press
additionally be careful to delineate
Promotes Justice," one might wonder
between what we have called instrumental
ex_actly where the burden of hierarchy
and terminal values. For example, the
mtght lay for the affirmative? Assuming
process or mode of affirmative action hir-
free press is our instrumental value, and
ing practices cannot and should not be
justice our terminal value, the topic does
prioritized in the same hierarchy with the
not overtly call for comparison of these
concept of equality. Affirmative action-
values with others; it merely requires
an instrumental value-refers to a mode
proving the topic true or not.
of behavior; equality-a terminal value-
Certainly, however, it must be conceded
refers to a desirable end-state of existence.
that we cannot examine or argue about
Affirmative action may be compared with
values in a vacuum. The decision to
other values referring to modes of behav-
affirm, accept or reject a value must often
ior, while equality can be contrasted with
come from consideration of alternative
other end-states of existence. This is not to
values. In considering whether a free
suggest that separate hierarchies do not
press promotes justice, we may also con-
relate to each other. Indeed, once separate
s~de~ whether or not justice is of any
hierarchies have been constructed, they
stgmficance to the critic, relative to other
can be consolidated into one value system.
terminal values.
Hierarchy and prioritization can defi-
Some would also argue that this form of
nitely promote better debate. They can
argument (relevant counter values) must
provide negative ground by allowing for
be initiated by the negative before an
direct comparison of competing values.
affirmative would be required to frame
Indeed, hierarchies can become the subject
the argument in a hierarchy. Perhaps this
of argumentation themselves: "there can
is so, but it does not mean that hierarchy
be discussion as to whether a hierarchy is
is not a prima facie concern where the
well founded and where some of its terms
topic does not call for an overt comparison
belong." 33 This should not limit an oppo-
of values; it merely means that it may not
be a burden for the affirmative (as in the
:~ Perelman, 83. lAC) until the negative has initiated the
~erelma~, 85-94. One of these is loci of quanti-
ty- affirm[mg] that one thing is better than arugment.
another for. quantitative reasons." Others include
Ion of qualzty-relating to the qualitative signifi-
cance. o~ the value argument; loci of order-"the TOPICALITY
supenonty of that which is earlier over that which is
later ... ;" and loci relatinf to the existent-
"affirm[ing] the superiority o that which exits, of A final prima facie requirement for
the actual, of the real, over the possible, the contin- value debate is the concept of topicality.
geW, or the impossible."
Perelman, 337. "The rationale for the existence of topi-
 ARGUING VALUE PROPOSITIONS
cality and extratopicality derives from the
significance of the resolution in a debate.
It functions to constrain the number of
possible areas in controversy and to create
a common frame of reference among
debaters and judges." 34 The concept of
topicality stems from its use in proposi-
tions of policy, and questions whether or
not an advocate's interpretation of a given
resolution is the correct interpretation. If,
for example, a resolution dealing with the
question of whether a policy of capital
punishment should be adopted, is inter-
preted to include death by country music,
the issue of topicality may be raised. The
opponent may ask: is this interpretation of
capital punishment correct? If not, the
approach may be non-topical.
Value debate, however, does not center
on plans or policies. As defined earlier, it
deals with modes of conduct as they relate
to desired end-states of existence. A use of
topicality in propositions of value, thus,
derives from the role that the topic or
resolution plays in value identification.
Identifying appropriate values, explicitly
stated, implied, instrumental and/or ter-
minal, is a process dependent on the pre-
cise wording of a given resolution.
Whether one's identification of such val-
ues comes from specific definition of reso-
lutional terms, or from some holistic inter-
pretation of the resolution, it is clear that
as in policy debate, there do need to be
limits to the interpretations or definitions
if there is to be a meaningful debate.
Topicality provides these limits. At its
core, it is a rule of relevance. Certainly, it
also serves the utility of fairness in debate,
by requiring only interpretations of a
resolution which are relevant to the reso-
lution. At the same time, it functions to
assure that a complete argument will be
made. In essence, when a judge votes for
or against an affirmative interpretation,
she is voting for or against the resolution
as well. Syllogistically, it may be said that
" Ehninger and Brockriede, 196.
91
the resolution is the conclusion to an affir-
mative case. Affirming an affirmative
interpretation, means affirming the reso-
lution. If topicality did not require that
this interpretation had to be relevant to
the resolution, then by voting for an affir-
mative case, a critic still might not be
affirming the resolution.
Seen in this perspective, this form of
topicality, which we shall rephrase as
topical relevance, imposes on the affirma-
tive side to a value resolution, the prima
facie burden that their interpretation must
be relevant to the resolution. Obviously,
there are other standards for topicality, 35
but all invariably center around the ques-
tion of relevance to the resolution.
PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF
A final note on presumption and bur-
den of proof in value debate is necessary
before concluding. Upon completion of all
prima facie responsibilities, one may still
be drawn to a central question: why is it
necessary for an advocate of value to dem-
onstrate a prima facie case? Indeed, what
single ingredient ties all these concepts
together?
The answer to this question is the same
in a court of law and in debating a resolu-
tion of policy: namely, it is the role pre-
sumption plays in debating propositions.
Presumption as a legal concept originated
from the notion that the alleger of certain
claims or charges had to prove her claims
or charges beyond a reasonable doubt,
with evidence if necessary, before any
action could follow. Until such time, the
innocence or lack of culpability of a defen-
dant would be presumed. This standard
was employed in debating questions of
policy when policy debaters began argu-
ing that certain proofs had to be demon-
35
E.g., reasonable man standard (what would a
reasonable person consider to be a topical interpreta-
tion of the resolution); framer's intent (what did the
authors of the resolution intend topical interpreta-
tions to be); or best definitions (what are the best
definitions of resolutional terms guiding an affirma-
tive interpretation).
92 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
strated before a new policy could be
enacted. These proofs were the stock
issues alluded to earlier. Today we know
that if such proofs are not made, the pres-
ent system (a system minus the proposed
policy) will be presumed correct.
Some would argue that presumption in
value debate is surely no different. Matlon
has noted:
Definitions of presumption have undergone consid-
erable change in recent years ... [h]owever, all posi-
tions have one common theme, namely [s]he who
assumes the burden of proof must produce the pre-
ponderance of argument. 36
Perhaps, though, this is no different from
claiming that she who asserts, must prove.
While this may be correct, it does not
justify presumption in value debate, to the
extent its requisite burden of proof is one
which can apply to both the affirmative
and the negative.
Steven Brydon has denoted two types of
presumption which may describe an exist-
ing system of relationships: natural pre-
sumption, which reflects things as they
are viewed in the world around us 37 ; and
artificial presumption, "the result of
ground arbitrarily assigned, a preoccupa-
tion by agreement rather than the present
order of things." 38 With these, Brydon
merges psychological presumption, "de-
scribing the existing state of belief in an
audience." In merging the three, Brydon
writes:
[T]he term "natural presumption" will be used to
describe the state of belief actually existing in the
audience. Natural presumption can itself be divided
into general prevailing social attitudes toward a par-
ticular issue and specific attitudes of a given
audience, perhaps even a single debate judge. Pre-
sumption is artificial when we prescribe some state
of mind for the audience, e.g., the presumption of
innocence in a court of law or the presumption for
the negative in a contest debate. 39
36
Matlon, 55.
37
Brydon, 16.
38
Brydon at 16, citing to Ehninger and Brock-
riede, 83-4.
39
Brydon, 16.
Brydon concludes that natural presump-
tion (by which he means natural-psycho-
logical presumption) fails to present clear
and consistent guidelines for decision
making in value debate. Instead, he claims
we must turn to artificial presumption as
a decision rule providing that she who
asserts must prove. He notes that advo-
cates of natural presumption may be mol-
lified by his position since debate "must
recognize and adapt to audience presump-
tions and prejudices .... Which party in a
dispute is seen as the initiator and which
is the respondent is important to an
observer's perception of reality. . . . In
debate, by requiring someone to present a
case for the proposition, a psychological
presumption is implied against it. " 40 Bry-
don also argues that following his artifi-
cial decision rule allows for pragmatic
justifications: first, it provides a clear and
consistent rule for students to follow; and
second, it assures fairness since the cur-
rent CEDA format gives both first and
last speaking positions to the affirmative.
Brydon's conclusion, however, is not
necessarily unique to values. Indeed, if it
was, the result might be far more limiting.
To see this, we must return to our earlier
definitions of values.
If terminal values describe desired end
states of existence, whereas instrumental
values describe desirable modes of conduct
or behavior, then perhaps we may say that
presumption in value debate turns on the
ability of the affirmative to correctly iden-
tify the terminal and instrumental resolu-
tion values, evaluate them according to set
criteria, and place them in their correct
hierarchical status.
This can best be seen diagramatically.
If we assume (x) that an affirmative advo-
cates certain terminal and instrumental
values exist within a resolution, evaluates
them according to certain criteria, and
places them within a hierarchy to other
40
Brydon, 21.
 ARGUING VALUE PROPOSITIONS 93

(x)

VALUE
(Instrumental and/or Terminal)

(E)

Dispute Value ID Concede ID & Criteria, Dispute All

but dispute Hierarchy

(B) (D)

Concede ID & Hierarchy, Concede ID, but dispute

but dispute Criteria Criteria and Hierarchy

subordinate values, we may conceive of a negative might justifiably counter that

separate scenarios arising, depicting possi-
ble negative responses (A, B, C, D, E). In
scenario (A), the negative may dispute the
existance of the value (instrumental or
terminal) by arguing against affirmative
identification. Under this response, pre-
sumption would be essentially meaning-
less, since the existence of a value in a
resolution is not a fact a judge can pre-
sume. Is it fair to presume it does not
exist, merely because the negative says
so?4t
Under scenarios (B, C, D, or E)
however, the negative would be contesting
criteria, and/or hierarchy-or possibly
identification, criteria and hierarchy (E).
Herein, presumption may indeed apply.
Beginning first with the notion of value
criteria, we may ascribe to certain criteria
arguments a sort of natural presumption.
If, for example, an affirmative attempted
to evaluate the value of national security
according to the criteria of protecting life,
41
Let us also assume for the moment that condi-
tional arguments notwithstanding, criteria and hier-
archy do not enter into this response, since the
negative has disputed the very existence of the value
in the topic. Criteria and hierarchy are irrelevant
considerations if the value is not mandated by the
topic.
the proper criteria for evaluating this
value is that which protects life within
constitutional limits. Such a counter crite-
ria might carry with it the weight of the
imprimatur of existing institutions and
laws, which are held to be presumptively
valid. In this limited instance, then, we
may say that certain types of criteria-
i.e., standards for values-may be pre-
sumptively valid, and if an affirmative
wishes to use different criteria, they must
overcome this presumption with substan-
tial justification.
Likewise where hierarchy is concerned,
we may also see some potential for pre-
sumption. If we proceed from the assump-
tion that, as stated earlier by Rokeach,
there are a small and finite number of
values in the world, and that these are
aligned in a natural set of ordering depen-
dent on cultural or societal perspective,
then artificial presumption as proposed by
Brydon may be applied, since it would
allow the negative to defend this natural
ordering or hierarchy. Indeed, by requir-
ing an affirmative to place its identified
value or values in hierarchy, we are
implicitly requiring them to persuade a
judge that such a value or values are
94 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
worthy of adoption. Of course, if the affir-
mative hierarchy of values clashes with a
natural hierarchy, then the advocate of the
altered hierarchy should be required to
persuade the critic that the new ordering
is justified. Correspondingly, if an
affirmative value hierarchy jibes with an
existing natural ordering of values, affir-
matives should still be required to
demonstrate and verify this fact.
Under such a scenario, the negative
would defend the natural order of values
in hierarchy, which the judge would pre-
sume correct unless the affirmative can
show cause to alter. 42
Seen in this light, Brydon's argument
for artificial presumption makes better
sense. His artificial decision rule requires
of the 'initiator' of a claim the burden of
proving the argument. Indeed, if the affir-
mative team attempts to use criteria which
42
The obvious criticism of this approach stems
from the idea that while there may be natural orders
of values in our society, it will be difficult for
debaters to know and anticipate these. There are two
reasons this may be of no real concern, however. In
the first place, it is possible for debaters to research
data concerning what may be called the natural
order or hierarchy of values in our culture or society.
For example, natural hierarchy may be a reflection
of majority preference in some values over others.
Public opinion polls exist in the real world to dem-
onstrate majority preference in many cases. Natural
order may also be researched by reference to rheto-
ric, philosophy, sociology and law, to name a few.
Second and equally important, even if precise
determination of a natural order is difficult, it should
still be allowable for negatives to defend this
order-in whatever nebulous form it takes. By anal-
ogy, we allow the negative in a policy debate to
defend the status quo, even without knowing pre-
cisely what it entails. The same is true for a defen-
dant in a trial; the burden to establish her innocence
is not upon her until a prima facie case has been
established.
Ay in the face of existing institutions or
laws, or reprioritize existing values to a
natural hierarchy, they can be seen as
initiators of an argument for change. The
burden of proof must be their's to meet.
Likewise, if they are working within the
natural order, it should still be their bur-
den to so demonstrate.
CoNCLUSIONS
Debating propositions of value has
acquired a very large following, yet little
guidance has been offered for determining
what constitutes the norms or rules for
advocacy of values. Values should be seen
as standards of preference or desirability
guiding action, judgment, and behavior.
They should be differentiated by modes of
behavior and end-states of existence (in-
strumental and terminal) in the sense that
so doing helps us to understand why we
accept or reject them. Propositions of val-
ues can then be seen as questions concern-
ing these standards of preference-and
they can be placed on a continuum
between questions of fact and questions of
policy.
Prima facie issues are those which must
be utilized by an advocate of value to
persuade a judge to adopt a value or
values. This essay suggests that the prima
facie requirements for an advocate of a
value resolution are: (1) value identifica-
tion; (2) criteria; (3) value hierarchy; and
(4) topicality through topical relevance.
It is the hope of this author that these
suggestions will provide guidance to the
as-yet imagined base path in this game we
call value debate.