Republic of the Philippines qualified by treachery, as defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the
SUPREME COURT Revised Penal Code and hereby condemns the said Accused to suffer the
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 104664 August 28, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELYBOY SO Y ORBES, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XLIX in Criminal Case No. 91-95478, convicting the appellant Elyboy
So of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On 10 June 1991, Elyboy So was charged with murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila for the death of Mario Tuquero. The information reads:
That on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one Mario Tuquero y Alas by then and
there stabbing him several times with a fan knife on different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said Mario Tuquero Y Alas mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.1
On 19 July 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded "NOT
GUILTY."2
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court handed down its decision on
17 January 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Murder"
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the
law. The Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mario Tuquero
in the amount of P50,000.00. The period during which the Accused was
detained in the City Jail shall be credited to him in full provided that he agreed
in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the
City Jail of Manila. With costs against the Accused.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts established by prosecution's evidence are summarized in the People's
brief as follows:
On June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So met his lady friend, Teresita
Domingo, in a jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig. Since Elyboy's house which is
located in 2969-D Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila, is walking
distance to Teresita's house located in 2050 Abad Santos Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, Teresita requested Elyboy to bring her home (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp.
6-7; Nov. 12, 1991, p. 7).
While walking along Araullo Street on their way to Teresita's house, they
passed by the house of Elyboy's first cousin, Esteban, Edgar, and Emy, all
surnamed So (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 8-9).
When they passed by his cousins' house, he saw his cousin Edgar with Ronnie
Tan and three (3) others and noticed that a drinking spree was taking place in
front of the house (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 9-10).
Upon seeing Elyboy, Edgar greeted him by saying: "Bingbong Crisologo is
coming (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 10). He then invited Elyboy to have a drink and
requested that his lady companion be introduced to them (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991,
p. 11). Elyboy answered: "I cannot introduce her to you because she is mine."
(tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
Elyboy then proceeded to bring Teresita directly to her house (tsn, Oct. 23,
1991, p. 12).
Immediately after bringing Teresita to her house, Elyboy passed by his cousins'
house to honor their invitation (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
After an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of beer which
the latter declined because it was already past 10:00 p.m. and he was on his
way home already. Edgar convinced him to drink just a little and to stay awhile
so he could also meet his future brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero, who will arrive
later with his sister Emy. Elyboy was prevailed upon to stay on as he was also
interested in meeting Mario (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, p. 14).
Before Emy and Mario arrived, Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the
dance in the playground which was part of the fiesta celebration. At the
playground, Esteban met Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie and informed them that
Emy and Mario had arrived and instructed them to buy beer
(tsn, October 23, 1991, pp. 15-18).
Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie proceeded to buy beer while Esteban went home
ahead of them (tsn, October 23, 1991, p. 19).
After buying beer, they proceeded to the house. Upon arriving in the house,
Emy introduced Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario (tsn, Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 14-20).
Mario Tuquero worked as a manager of a restaurant in Paris, France, and
arrived in the Philippines on March 7, 1991. Emy So, who is a registered nurse,
met Mario sometime in March, 1991 and they started living in as husband and
wife in her parents' house at 1920, Araullo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, also in
the same month until June, 1991. However, Mario was legally married to a
certain Evelyn Tuquero and this fact was not known to Emy (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 37-39, 42-43, 54-55).
The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario and Emy
resumed their drinking spree. However, after the group consumed four (4)
cases of beer and before 3:00 a.m., Emy felt sleepy and went inside (tsn, Sept.
4, 1991, p. 52; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 21).
While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by the noise
coming from the group outside their house (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 59).
It turned out that Elyboy had a misunderstanding and altercation with
somebody and he was shouting loudly, disturbing the neighbors in the process
(tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 59, 63).
After pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home because his
loud voice was disturbing the neighbors (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 62-63).
After he was pacified and advised to go home, Elyboy ran towards home (tsn,
Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 62-63).
At around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991 Mario and Emy decided to leave for
Fairview Subdivision, Quezon City, in order to get papers of a vehicle owned
by Mario that they will bring out of the Bureau of Customs (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 30-31, 60).
While Mario and Emy were waiting for a taxi at the corner of Magsaysay
Avenue and Pureza Street, Elyboy suddenly appeared from behind and
stabbed Mario at the back several times with an eleven inch fan knife with a
white handle (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30, 32, 67; Sept. 9, 1991, p. 25).
Emy shouted for help (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
When Mario was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on his back.
Elyboy took advantage of this circumstance and repeatedly stabbed Mario on
the front part of his body (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
Emy pleaded to Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario but Elyboy ignored her and
continued delivering stabbing blows at Mario (tsn, Sept. 4, 1991,
p. 34).
Elyboy fled from the scene of the crime and ran to a dark alley (tsn., Sept. 4,
1991, p. 34; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 40).
Emy called for a taxi that passed by and brought Mario Tuquero to the
University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital (tsn., Sept. 1991,
p. 34).
Elyboy stayed in the alley for about thirty (30) minutes until the policemen
arrived at the scene of the crime and shouted at him to surrender. After a while,
Elyboy went out of hiding and shouted at the policemen not to fire because he
is surrendering. When Elyboy surrendered, he was blushing and uneasy and
naked from the waist up because he removed his shirt to wipe the blood on his
face (tsn, Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 6, 13; Nov. 12, 1991,
p. 3).
Elyboy was then brought by the policemen to Precinct No. 8 of the Western
Police District and the fan knife used was surrendered by Barangay Chairman
Aida de los Santos to the police authorities (tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 7, 25).
As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered several stab wounds
numbering eighteen (18) on the different parts of his body with at least four (4)
fatal wounds causing his death (tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 8-23).4
Appellant vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution. According to
him, while they were drinking and talking about France, Esteban So suddenly
stood up and said that the reason he was not able to work in France is because
his surname was "So". Appellant felt aggrieved as he recalled the time when he
lived with Esteban So and his family and was driven out by them. He was told
that his only link to them is the surname "So". Then when Esteban So pulled a
knife and Edgar So broke bottles of beer and Mario Tuquero pulled out
"something" from his socks, appellant, fearing for his life, fled. Appellant claims
that Esteban So and Mario Tuquero chased him but were not able to catch
him.5
Appellant further narrated that when he tried to go back to his cousin's house
and talk to them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So at the corner of Pureza
and Magsaysay Streets. Suddenly Mario Tuquero attacked him with a knife but
because Tuquero's thrust was slow, he was able to evade it. He grabbed the
knife and proceeded to stab Tuquero repeatedly. He ignored the pleas of Emy
So but finally stopped when four (4) persons in a jeep passed by and shouted
at him. He ran into a dark alley until the police came and brought him to the
police precinct.6
Appellant claimed self-defense and in the instant appeal assigned the following
errors:
I testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED SELF-
DEFENSE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO IS
UNDESERVING OF CREDIT, IMPROBABLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE
WAS TREACHERY IN THE INSTANT CASE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY ON THE PART OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.7
We deny the appeal.
Appellant's second assigned error, in essence, raises the issue of credibility of
witnesses. Whose testimony is more believable and reliable, prosecution
witness Emy So's narration or appellant's version? Appellant would like us to
believe that Emy So's testimony was biased in favor of her brothers and the
victim who was her common-law-husband8 and aggravated by an alleged
grudge harbored by her family against appellant's family.
We give no credence to appellant's argument. Long settled in criminal
jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.9 In
the instant case, although Emy So readily admitted that her relationship with
appellant was "not close", she explained that it was appellant who had
ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge. The defense has not shown
such degree of partiality on the part of prosecution witness Emy So as would
cast doubt on her credibility and impeach her testimony, especially when said
testimony is "not inherently improbable in itself".10 Emy So testified thus:
xxx xxx xxx
 ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
COURT:
That is because you have grudge over this person. Referring to the Accused, is
You mentioned of a grudge between your family and that of the Accused and that correct?
this referred to the surname, So. What was the trouble all about?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
No, ma'am, we are not so close that's why.
Actually, there was no grudge with respect to the family name So. They really
have a grudge in our family, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx

COURT: COURT:

What was that grudge all about? Another question. Is it your habit not to be concerned with the welfare of your
relatives?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Their family is a broken family and ours is intact, Your Honor. And they live
only from hand-outs from relatives and also from us, Your Honor. I have concern to my other relatives, Your Honor.

COURT: COURT:

So, what was the grudge about? You even help them. You even helped the How about the Accused, you are not concerned with him?
Accused. What was the grudge all about?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
No, Your Honor.
I just do not know really why they have such ill feelings towards us. I think it's
jealousy "inggit", Your Honor. COURT:

xxx xxx xxx Why, because of the fact between your family and their family?

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: WITNESS:

You are not concerned with Elyboy he being not a resident in your It could be said that way, Your Honor, because since then, he is a problem
community? child that's why my feelings towards him is not so intimate anymore.11

WITNESS: The fact alone that the victim was Emy So's live-in partner does not impair her
testimony. The Court has time and again ruled that mere relationship of the
No, ma'am. witness to the victim does not automatically impair his credibility and render
the testimony less worthy of faith and credit.12 In People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and
Manolo,13 we put it thus:
. . . It is settled that the relationship of the key witness to the victim does not
necessarily disqualify him for being biased and interested. A son or a wife is
not incompetent to testify simply because of his or her relationship to the
victim. In other words, the relationship of the witnesses to the victim does not
per se affect their credibility. Their testimony must be evaluated and assessed
according to its own merit and if not otherwise offset by more credible evidence
on record or any other revealed intrinsic defect should be given credit.
Appellant's strategy to discredit Emy So on ground of bias and interest to
exculpate himself from criminal liability cannot succeed.
Appellant maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-defense and
invokes in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence claiming that,
despite his plea of self-defense, the prosecution retains the burden of proving
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.14 This argument deserves no credit in light
of the established and time-honored rule that when self-defense is invoked, the
burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified
and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence,
for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open
admission of responsibility for the killing. He must prove the essential
requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression,
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.15
In People v. Jotoy,16 we stated:
It is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However,
when the accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi is shifted and he is
duty bound to prove the elements of the plea by clear and convincing evidence
otherwise, conviction is inescapable.
We shall now proceed to determine whether or not appellant has completely
and satisfactorily proven the elements of self-defense. The initial and crucial
point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim for absent this essential element, no claim of self-defense can be
successfully interposed. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to
prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-defense would have no
basis.17
Appellant's claim that the victim, Mario Tuquero, attacked him with a knife
fails to convince us. The record reveals glaring and serious inconsistencies in
appellant's testimony that makes it totally unworthy of credence.
Appellant testified that he was able to wrest the knife from Tuquero because
the latter's thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his statement during the
same cross-examination, that the incident happened so fast and that Tuquero's
attack was sudden.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw Mario near the corner of Magsaysay and Pureza,
how far were you in relation to him the first time that you saw him?
WITNESS:
I think about 1 and 1/2 armslength, sir, because I was on the other side and
Mario was also on the other side and we exactly met at the corner, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw him bringing out something from his waistline,
what did you do?
WITNESS:
The incident happened so fast, sir. After pulling out something from his
waistline, immediately thereafter, he made a thrust on me but I was able to grab
the knife from him sir. (Emphasis ours.)18
Further, we share the incredulity of the trial court that the victim stabbed
appellant in slow motion:
Even the testimony of the Accused denigrated his claim that he acted in self-
defense. For, when he testified before the Court, the Accused claimed that
Mario Tuquero stabbed him but that Mario Tuquero failed to hit the accused
because Mario Tuquero stabbed the accused slowly and the Accused was able
to evade the thrust and that the latter, thereupon, wrested the knife from Mario
Tuquero. It is sheer lunacy for the Accused to asseverate that Mario Tuquero
stabbed the Accused in slow motion . . .19
Even if we allow appellant's contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful
aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. After appellant
successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression had
ceased. After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense
has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.20
As correctly pointed out by the trial court:
. . . More, there is no evidence in the record that, after the Accused wrested
the knife from Mario Tuquero, the latter still did any overt act to indicate that
he still tried to grab or wrest back the knife from the Accused or, in any
manner, persist in inflicting any harm on the Accused. On the contrary, after
the Accused wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero, the Accused repeatedly
stabbed Mario Tuquero in the front portions of his body even after Mario
Tuquero embraced the Accused to hang on for dear life. At the time the
Accused stabbed Mario Tuquero, the latter's initial unlawful aggression had
already ceased and that there was, therefore, no more need for the Accused to
still stab Mario Tuquero and stab him with impunity. . .21
We reiterated the same rule in People v. Gomez:22
But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused with
a knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still hold that there was no
self-defense because at that point when accused was able to catch and twist the
hand of the deceased, in effect immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had
already ended. Thus, the danger having ceased, there was no more need for
the accused to start stabbing the deceased, not just once but five (5) times.
and in People v. Gomez:23
There was no self-defense where the accused was able to obtain possession of
the weapon from the deceased and there was no necessity to stab the latter for
aggression had already ceased.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and negated by the
physical evidence on record. The victim sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds
on different parts of his body. Of the eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal stab
wounds.24 The presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim,
their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim.25
We quote with favor the observations of the trial court in this regard:
In this case, the evidence in the record buttresses the testimony of Emy So, on
the one hand, and belied and deprecated the testimony of the Accused on the
other. As can be gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Florante Baltazar,
(Exhibits "B" and "C"), the deceased sustained no less than eighteen (18) stab
wounds. Four (4) of the stab wounds sustained by the deceased were on the
posterior aspects of his body, namely, stab wounds No. 4 (Exhibit "C-4"), stab
wound No. 13 (Exhibit "B-13"), stab wound No. 15 (Exhibit "C-15") and stab
wound No. 18 (Exhibit "C-18") and the rest of the stab wounds sustained by the
victim were on the anterior portions of his body. These jibe with the testimony
of Emy So that the Accused suddenly darted from behind Mario Tuquero and
stabbed him on the posterior aspects of his body and, when Mario Tuquero
slipped because his shoe slid, and fell on the ground, face up, the Accused then
stabbed Mario Tuquero anew successively on the anterior aspects of his body.
On the other hand, if the Accused acted merely on self-defense, it is
incomprehensible that he would stab Mario Tuquero no less than eighteen (18)
times (Exhibits "B" and "C"), not only on the anterior but also on the posterior
aspects of his body.26
Considering the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by appellant on
the victim, the testimony of the prosecution witness Emy So that appellant
unexpectedly and suddenly attacked the victim from behind and the fact that
appellant suffered not a single injury, we agree with the trial court that the killing
was attended by treachery. This clearly illustrates that appellant, in the
commission of the crime, employed means, methods and form in its execution
which tended directly, and especially to ensure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.27
Not content with a self-defense plea the defense likewise seeks to exempt
appellant from criminal liability by claiming that appellant was insane at the
time he stabbed the victim.
The claim is unmeritorious.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.28
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must
be complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that
the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.29
The testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent Service
of the National Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and attending physician
of appellant when he was confined at the National Center for Mental Health
from June 8, 1985 to December 2, 1985, only established the previous
confinement of appellant at the NCMH and that appellant showed signs of
psychosis or insanity at the time. The rest of his testimony consisted merely of
assumptions, possibilities and generalities:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why did you attend to this Elyboy So?
WITNESS:
He was admitted June 8, 1985 to the service of the Child and Adolescents
Service, ma'am.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Why?
WITNESS:
He showed signs of psychosis or insanity, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
What are the characteristics of this kind of illness Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
Even this illness it is assumed that this patient will have episodes of insanity for
the rest of his life especially if he will not
take the medicines that will prevent the episodes of insanity. (Emphasis ours.)
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
And you said that this patient per your record was discharged on December 3,
1985. Do we understand that from the time of his discharge, he was already
healed or recovered from that kind of insanity?
WITNESS:
I can only say that at the time of the last check up he was doing well three (3)
months after that, he was discharged because he failed to come back for his
check-up, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.)
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
You mentioned that this will be for the rest of his life.
WITNESS:
For many patients, it is like that. It is very exceptional that they will be able to
recover or completely cured from it, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.)
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
When you say for the rest of his life, do we understand that this will be
recurrent?
WITNESS:
Yes, ma'am.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
What are the causes that will trigger the recurrency of this kind of illness?
WITNESS:
Generally, the main characteristic of this patients who are suffering from this COURT:
illness is, they are very sensitive to any kind of social censures and criticisms.
And how often is he supposed to come back for treatment in the case of the
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: Accused Elyboy So?

Could you enlighten what do you mean by social censures? WITNESS:

WITNESS: After six (6) months he failed to come. He was supposed to come every month
after his passe which was given on August 1, 1985, Your Honor.30
If they were told about a behavior that they are showing that is unacceptable,
they will react to that in a disproportionate way, ma'am. xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: Further and more importantly, the testimony of Dr. Galvez is bereft of any
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment
What do you mean by disproportionate way? at the time or at the very instant when he stabbed the victim.

WITNESS: Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of appellant should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act was
It will not be proportionate that the amount of stimulus meaning, to say that committed.31 In the present case, the testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to
they will overreact. appellant's treatment six (6) years before the incident happened.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: Moreover, Dr. Galvez admitted that after appellant's last check-up sometime
in 1985, or six (6) years before the crime was committed, he was doing well
Is violence a kind of over reaction to a given stimulus? and relieved from psychosis:

WITNESS: xxx xxx xxx

Patients who are suffering from this condition has more proclivity to violence COURT:
than the general population.
When he came back, after his discharge, was he given medication?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
COURT:
Yes, Your Honor.
Doctor, you told that he was discharged. Was he told to come back for further
treatment? COURT:

WITNESS: How did you find his behavior when he came back for medication?

Yes, Your Honor, that is standard that we tell to everybody. (Emphasis ours.) WITNESS:
 That might be misleading, Your Honor, considering that the testimony of the
As per record, he was doing well, Your Honor. (Emphasis ours.) doctor, he said that he should report six (6) months after the discharge but he
took his college degree for several years thereafter.
COURT:
COURT:
When you say doing well, what exactly do you mean by that?
The only point of the fiscal is that, is that an indication of having been cured.
WITNESS: If he was able to take and finish even college. Go ahead.

He was relieved from psychosis at that time, Your Honor. (Emphasis ours.) WITNESS:

xxx xxx xxx It would look that during that period, he would have been cured and there are
some also who although that they may not be entirely cured would be able to
FISCAL PERALTA: get a degree, make the standards of education and there are some who could
also get the standard of employment despite their craziness. "Medyo naitatago
If the Patient was discharged in 1985 and finished his college degree in four (4) or nakakaya." Psychosis is something in many patients it is very obvious. You
years, do you think that by that time he was already cured of his sickness? could see that they are really grossly disorganized "talagang sira." But there are
some who has some ability to keep it just there and maintain a proper social
WITNESS: behavior and be able to achieve socially acceptable functioning in society.

It will look like that, sir. (Emphasis ours.) COURT:

FISCAL PERALTA: In other words, that illness is dormant.

What do you mean it will look like that? WITNESS:

WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

It will look that while there are various types of clinical courses, meaning, the COURT:
development of an illness in a patient and if the patient was able to finish
college, then the outcome of the treatment that was given to him in 1985 was And it emerges in some point of time?
quite good.
WITNESS:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Yes, Your Honor.
And do you think doctor that could have been the reason why he already failed
to report on a monthly basis considering that he was already in college and COURT:
actually finished his college degree?
So, it is possible doctor that the decease is there but at the same time, the
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: patient is able to study?
WITNESS: WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor. The possibilities are these he was cured entirely cured When he was already embracing me, sir, my right hand was freed and that was
during the period or the decease is just there and it is not affecting his behavior. the time when I stabbed him at the back.
So there are two (2) possibilities.32 (Emphasis ours)
FISCAL PERALTA:
A perusal of appellant's testimony further negates his plea of insanity. His recall
of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as And how did you stab him at the back?
well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant
mind. His memory conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds WITNESS:
he inflicted on the victim. This, appellant attributes to insanity but we are far
from convinced. A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and Like this, sir. He was embracing me, my right hand was freed.
conclusively prove that he is legally so.33
INTERPRETER:
xxx xxx xxx
Witness demonstrated by stretching his right hand, swinging it from the right
FISCAL PERALTA: side to the front towards his body.

Afterwards, when you got hold of the knife, you repeatedly stabbed him? FISCAL PERALTA:

WITNESS: And how many times also did you stab the back portion of the body of the
victim?
Yes, sir, because after I got hold of the knife, I was able to wrest it from him.
And with the use of my right hand, I repeatedly stabbed him. At the time his WITNESS:
left arm was embracing me and I repeatedly stabbed him with my right hand
from the left swinging it to the right in front, hitting him on the front of his I could not recall also, sir.
body, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
FISCAL PERALTA:
And when you stopped stabbing the victim when you said four (4) men
How many times did you stab him on the front portion? boarded a jeep and shouted "itigil na, itigil na"?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

I don't know, sir, because I was out of myself. It was during the time when both of us fell down. I was on top of him and I
stabbed him on his chest, sir. That was when four (4) persons arrived and
FISCAL PERALTA: shouted "itigil na, itigil na," and I stopped,
sir.34
After repeatedly stabbing the front portion of his body, you said that you also
stabbed him at the back? xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: threatened to kill him if he would see him again; at this point he "lost his senses"
and regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don't do
And what did you do when you were not hit? that", and he then found out that he had wounded Lira. If appellant was able
to recall all those incidents, We cannot understand why his memory stood still
WITNESS: at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the snap of a
finger as it were after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim . . .
By the time I evaded his thrust I was able to get hold of his palm, ma'am. (Emphasis ours.)

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: and in the later case of People v. Aquino,37 we ruled:

And when you were able to get hold of his palm, what happened? The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his
admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic
WITNESS: centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before
the commission of the crime. This admission substantially affirms his prior
Because I was so made of what he did, when I was able to grab and get hold of extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he
the knife, I hit him, ma'am. sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion there of killed her. It is,
therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental
INTERPRETER: illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his
reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
Witness demonstrating by raising his right hand upward on the level of his satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any
breast swinging his right hand towards the right.35 intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies.
The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we are not
xxx xxx xxx without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned
and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.
In People v. Renegado,36 we held thus: (Emphasis ours.)

By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
unaware or unconscious of what he was doing, that he "regained his senses" overthrow the presumption of sanity. The State, thus, continues, its guard
when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: "Loreto, don't do that," and against sane murderers who seek to escape punishment through a general plea
only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. of insanity.38
For it is most unusual for appellant's mind which was in a perfect normal state
on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at that particular WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is
moment when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.
very sanely that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to the
canteen in a jovial mood "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand"; he SO ORDERED.
saw the persons inside the canteen namely, Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco,
Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
last one, testified for the prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged
his folders on the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: "ano ka", he saw
Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair
towards him; he became "confused" because he remembered that Lira
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.

Luis Contreras for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V.
Makasiar for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and
to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was

living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines
Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went
to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of
Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters
of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in
the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The
accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo
from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the
ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in
his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and
then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who
came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her
father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written
statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was
admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have
quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of
his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit
relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him
(defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of
Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the
case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty,
but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the
provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there
was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes
he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until
forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus
with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and
that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside
into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and
therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree
with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was
suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability,
he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the
will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of
the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and
applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts;
that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence
of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or
freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be
equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without
positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was
demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it
will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are
always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person
acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his
mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming
that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his
being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar
(27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to
indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger
or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting
trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the
defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement
appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not
an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years,
he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an
opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in
school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a
side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to
take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions
were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was
not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as
that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In
addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit
D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half
brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and
his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the
house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there
nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of
Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those
unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not
been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she
fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and
lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his
loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not
exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel
the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily
admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or
repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and
expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that
the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the
crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice
of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give
him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of
this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is
feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which
thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow
beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To
this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article,
— that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit
of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of
the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the
purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246
for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however,
that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles
76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable
for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand,
article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties
whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of
reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one
applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the
act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil.
37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3
of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of
the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two
mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to
overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the
next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court
of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that
contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.)
(Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is
inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts
to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal
Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order
that a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in
order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative
vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next
lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide
case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing
defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide
as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible
penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the
said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has
exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore
under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully
invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive
clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm
the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be
credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the
two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter
penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive
who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees
fit.
Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as
alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with
the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens,
and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with
a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and
afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a
well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused
had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so
that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the
crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
defendant appealed.

There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all
as to the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the
26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual,
Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on
his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He
remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away
across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon
affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream.
He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the
stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living
in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The
accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in
which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of
the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was
working at something under a manga tree a short distance from the shack.
Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack,
the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion
of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some
contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government
witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and
the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the
accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not
invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with
him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate
the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as
follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the
wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place,
if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that day.
So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after
I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near
the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I
went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working, running
back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far
from where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa
to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because
he is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when
Tagampa heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant
within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon
where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The
accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and
they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way
toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place
where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass
where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was
concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon,
where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which
to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the
chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of
the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that
it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa
went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass
where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred
meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old
well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for
the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose
of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused
in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior
to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the
whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation
in the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the
accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on
land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no
unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There
appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime.
The Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason
that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact
of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative
by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there
having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary
unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere
accident without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is
satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life
is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154,
92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2
Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed.
Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission
of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in
the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment
and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required
to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is
a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it
was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for
the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that
it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it
is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an
accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross
case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for
homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes
an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be
negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment
of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted,
and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority in this case. I
think it proper to estate, nevertheless, that the doctrine laid down in the
somewhat loosely worded West Virginia case of State vs. Legg, cited in the
majority opinion, and in the citation from 3 L. R. A., N. S., can not be said to
be in conformity with the general doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid down in
the decisions of this court, without considerable modification and restriction
limiting its scope to cases wherein it is properly applicable.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y
LONDETE, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,

accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were
charged with tile crime of Robbery with Double Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay,

Municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together
with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky
Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking
advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their purpose, did then and there
were Ifully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and
intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the
hands of the members of his fully and on the occasion hereof, while they were
made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away,
without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following
properties, to wit:

One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00

Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been
100.00 established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY
of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, the maximum penalty provided by law.

Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00 Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00 crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50 from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00 of the aggravating circumstances present.

One aluminum Reynold kettle
One One caserola 15.00
Two pieces of pillow case 12.00
30.00 Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly
and severally Elias Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary
imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify Monica Monge
and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.

Two cans of rice 70.00 The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each. 2

One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN
PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount.
That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a
virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy
Marantal y Londete entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the
dispositive portion of which read:
The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas
follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his
house located at barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two
young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old, and
Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance
to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while
because his wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel
Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina Monge. The other occupants
present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old, and
Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the
name of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents' house.
Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said
house, Francisco Fable saw at first four men with flashlights approaching.
When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saving that there
was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was in the sala,
informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one
wearing red clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the house. When
Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him
the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in dark
sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself
near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM: pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29,
1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked
his daughter, Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias
Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused
Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came to
know about camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted to run to the
kitchen to get a bolo but she was held back by the man in dark sweater who
then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. kitchen Elias
Monge turned to look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him,
and ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl
p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13,
16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for
a glass of water arid the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but
Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala Hence, fabie himself outside
inside the house to the the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he
noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to
the sala, the man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a
sharp instrument on his neck and then he wish pushed to go inside the sala.
Once inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and recognized the man in
red clothes these to Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters,
Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the
sala as one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of
the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying
flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12,
tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on
the floor. Loreno tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's
hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with which he and Loreno used to
reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind their backs. Thereafter,
the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the
barking dog away. Loreno held Fable and brought him downstairs to drive the
barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno
happened to focus on the person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately
recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who remained on the ground
as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable, and
seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused
him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll on his
side and was hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from
the ground, and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp.
13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold
of Monica Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony.
She tried to resist but she was then still tied, Inside the room, Monica was asked
to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was none.
He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized
Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her
parents for help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able
to remove her panty and then made her he on the floor near the bed. After
undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and
shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She
felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do
anything to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When
he was through with her, she noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp.
5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for
help and the struggle she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help,
Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling them not to rise if they
wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room
and then to the teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata
Monge to open the aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he
got their contents, which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge
who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms were poured on
the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp.
17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along
Monica Monge whose hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her
joined the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a can of pineapple j
nice from the aparador and the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter,
he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room
which was then rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga
City). Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her
but she resisted and struggled although her hands were still tied behind her
back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which caused her to lose
consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she
regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then
realized that he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-
19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the
teacher's room, a third man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their
victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead a piece of lawanit with
which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and
when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth
man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias
Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied.
Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast
and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked
Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On
reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany
Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata
Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along. loreno desisted from his
plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the
Identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp.
7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier
brought by the man in dark sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor.
Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch her private parts. One of the
malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was
approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to
the sala to breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter,
the malefactors went down from the house one by one, bringing along all the
things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to the
sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her
shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise
he will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near
the fence of the house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias
Monge replied from upstairs that he was not feeling well, and Agapito left.
EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the
others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with
Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those left on
the ground as lookout for the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and
Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in dark
sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night,
they remained on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their
following personal properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets,
P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket,
P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one beach towel,
P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of
P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter
married a member of the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was
its president. Elias Monge had already known Loreno whose occupation was
catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps in his (Monge's)
place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house,
Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno because
his daughter married a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno
traverse the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he was
studying. Fable had also known Jimmy Marantal because the latter often
attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even
married one of its members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many
times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9,
tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979 AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused
that fateful evening, Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day,
Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC detachment in Sipocot, but there
was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at Camp
Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors
in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a
written recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions to have
himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was
informed that there was no need for her to submit for physical examination
because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 PM p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd
PC Company, stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10,
1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was informed by Barangay Captain Elias
Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the
robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge)
was able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio
Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on
that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up
Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. At
the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified upon
confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his
daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper Fable. During the
investigation, the two suspects refused to give their written statements. Thus,
Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias Monge,
Francisco Fable, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape
incident. Upon being Identified both said suspects told their victims ff they
could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did
that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family, The two
suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp.
18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial
Hospital at Naga City, examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray
examination's result was negative. But the doctor found him to have sustained
an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma, right cestal
region" a close wound, already spread out but and the process of healing,
located on the right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias
Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still
slight bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the
corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital
examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any
fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen, she found fresh and
incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations and,
inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her
forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was
found after laboratory examination The doctor observed that the lacerations
did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions
were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations
could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis into the
patient's vagina. The doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen
heals after five days. She also expeled that male spermatozoa stays inside the
female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated that, admitting there was
orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have already
disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which
was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7,
1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in
the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only
forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed
to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with
the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.
We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force
must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of Such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as
summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their
participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias
Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts
inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and
the man in dark sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the
house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which enabled the malefactors to
ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony,
Loreno positioned himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in
dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias Monge. Loreno admitted that, without
prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the post of the
balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the
criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with
ropes of the hammock. Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who
furnished the rattan which he got from inside the house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the
room where she was earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's
immediate reaction was to point his gun to the victims who were then lying on
the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno
brought Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he
made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents
which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted
alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after
the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno
embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the
barking dog away, the flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face
of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the approaching Fable.
Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him
(Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the
fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fable who
was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his
presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have
heard the shouts of Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that
Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions who earlier went up
the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions
effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape.
There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an
act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the
appellants. The foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of
their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest and
concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which
constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself.
6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves
and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community
of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the
existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of actual participation petition by
each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all
the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character
of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act
of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on
January 7, 1978, by more than three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with
each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and
dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable
by death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the accused cused JIMMY Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Frine C. Zaballero for
MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellee.
With costs against appellants.
Eduardo Z. Olivera for Appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la SYLLABUS
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
Appellant Jimmy Marantal is guilty of robbery only no clear proof that he know
Monge Monge was being raped and even if he did, he could not prevent it if
he was on the ground outside the house as look out.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; LACK OF
INSTRUCTION, NOT MITIGATING IN ROBBERY. — The test for the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction is not illiteracy alone, but rather
lack of sufficient intelligence (People v. Ripas Et. Al., 95 Phil., 63), and the
record discloses that far from his claim that he suffers from lack of instruction,
appellant possesses an intelligence worthy of a lawyer considering his ability,
for one unschooled, to distinguish between implications and innuendos. At any
rate, lack of instruction is not mitigating in cases of robbery (U.S. v. Pascual, 9
Phil., 491; People v. Melendrez, 59 Phil., 154; People v. De la Cruz, Et Al., 77
Phil., 44), although it might be under certain situations in cases of murder
(People v. Taluk, Et Al., 65 Phil., 696) and homicide (People v. Hubero, 61
Phil., 64).

2. ID.; ID.; UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR, WHEN VALID AS A

DEFENSE. — Fear of duress in order to be a valid defense, should be based
on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life of limb. It should not be
inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A person should not commit a
very serious crime on account of a flimsy fear (People v. Quilloy, 88 Phil., 53),
and the evidence on record does not show that defendant really acted by such
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 3. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, WHEN CANNOT BE
Manila CONSIDERED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — Appellant
surrendered to the authority or its agents not by reason of the commission of
EN BANC the crime for which he was prosecuted but for being a Huk who wanted to
come within the pale of the law. Held: The voluntary surrender can not be
[G.R. No. L-11361. May 26, 1958.] considered as mitigating circumstance which appellant may claim in his favor.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIX

SEMAÑADA, alias SEMANADA, alias COMMANDER DANTE, DECISION
Defendant-Appellant.
FELIX, J.:
Sometime in 1950 Félix Semañada, alias Semanada, alias Commander Dante,
a young boy of 17 years of age, joined the Hukbalahap organization, which was
composed of 4 units, namely, the organization, the contacting, the liquidation
and the courier groups, and Semañada was assigned to form part of the latter
group, whose duty was to deliver letters and messages. Apparently, Félix
Semañada was unhappy and discontented and oftenly scolded by his parents,
so he easily yielded to the propaganda of the Hukbalahap organization, for he
did not have the opportunity to obtain any academic schooling except up to
Grade II.
On or about 6 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 1952, Félix Semañada, then
19 years of age, and in company of 2 Huks, i.e., Commanders Wennie and
Heling, all armed, arrived at the house of the spouses Serapio Villate and
Nieves Magtibay, situated at barrio Sastre, Gumaca, Quezon, where they had
a store. The couple were taking their supper when Félix Semañada ordered
Serapio Villate to go down and, apparently because the latter resisted the order,
he was brought down to a distance of about an arm’s length from his house.
Once there he was seized and hogtied by Commanders Wennie and Heling
with a string used for fishing. As his companions held the victim Semañada
stabbed Villate several times with a sharp pointed bolo measuring about a
palm’s length (dangkal). The torture lasted for about 30 minutes causing the
victim to cry in agony "aroy, aroy." His wife, Nieves Magtibay, who hails from
the same barrio of Semañada, actually saw the stabbing from the opening of an
upstairs window and she ran to her husband’s aid but she was not able to help
him because of the 2 Huks that were unknown to her, one of whom blocked
her way while the other hit her with the butt of his gun on the upper lip, as a
result of which her upper lip was cut and she lost 3 front teeth.
After the killing of Serapio Villate, Félix Semañada and his companions went
up the victim’s house. There Semañada pushed Nieves Magtibay to a corner,
threatened to kill her and demanded from her the shotgun of the deceased.
The three also ransacked the couple’s wardrobe, after which they left with the
shotgun valued at P250.00 and other merchandise and money of a total value
of P900. The widow also left the place to report the incident to her brother-in-
law Daniel Villate, who in turn reported the matter to the Philippine
Constabulary, and that same evening the authorities found the deceased
Serapio Villate lying dead, face downward and hogtied.
A post-mortem examination of the cadaver disclosed that a total of 51 wounds
were inflicted on the thorax and abdomen of the deceased, 50 of which were
superficial and only one fatal, for it penetrated the abdomen, with a depth of 5
inches, one inch long and one centimeter wide (Exhibit A).
The widow, however, kept silent as to the identity of Félix Semañada as one of
the malefactors until he surrendered to the authorities in Nagcarlang, Laguna,
on December 5, 1955. Upon learning that said Huk was already in the custody
of the law, she revealed to the authorities that the person who stabbed her
husband to death in the evening of June 12, 1952, was Félix Semañada and
explained that the reason for her long silence was her fear that while Semañada
were at large living in the mountains, she might be liquidated if he would learn
that a charge for murder was filed against him by the widow of the deceased.
Due to this revelation and after the corresponding investigation a complaint for
"robbery in band with murder" was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Gumaca, Quezon, against Félix Semañada, alias Semanada, alias Commander
Dante Et. Al., without naming the said 2 other commanders who were still at
large unidentified. After proper proceedings the Justice of the Peace Court,
convinced that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
imputed to him, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon
where the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information this time
against Félix Semañada, alias Semanada, alias Commander Dante alone,
charging him with the crime of robbery with homicide, defined and punished
by Article 294 in connection with Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 18.
Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty but after hearing the Court
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide, defined and punished under Article 294, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, with the attendance of 3 aggravating circumstances with
none mitigating to offset the same, and sentenced him to die in the electric
chair, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Serapio Villate in the sum of
P6,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P900.00, value of the cash and goods
robbed from the deceased, with costs.
Defendant did not appeal from this decision but this case was nevertheless,
brought to this Court under the provisions of Section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court, for review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate.
In this instance counsel for the defense maintains that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that the accused-appellant Félix Semañada is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with murder, although the evidence
of the prosecution is wholly insufficient as it is improbable and contrary to
common experience;
2. In giving weight and merit to the evidence of the prosecution to the effect
that widow Nieves Magtibay kept silent as to identity of the assailant until the
accused surrendered to the authorities for fear that she might be liquidated also
by the accused who was living in the mountain as a Hukbalahap;
3. In concluding that the wounds have been inflicted one by one, torturing the
deceased for one half hour constituting an aggravating circumstance of cruelty,
although there is no evidence to support said conclusion;
4. In not extending to the accused-appellant the benefit of Article 12,
paragraphs 5 and 6, although the evidence shows that he acted under the
influence of uncontrollable fear or compulsion of an irresistible force;
5. In holding the accused-appellant liable for the acts of his companions when
he had neither knowledge of the intention to kill the deceased nor had he
actually participated in its commission; and
6. In not holding and extending to the accused the mitigating circumstances of
(1) lack of instruction; (2) for having acted under the influence of grave fear not
entirely uncontrollable under paragraph 1, article 13, in connection with
paragraph 6 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code; and (3) voluntary
surrender of the accused to the authorities on December 5, 1955, within
paragraph 10, of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The version of the defendant as to the execution of the crime at bar is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On or about June 12, 1952, at about 3 o’clock p.m., while Félix Semañada was
in barrio Labnig, Gumaca, Quezon, waiting for letters to be delivered,
Commanders Wennie and Heling of the liquidation unit arrived. The 2
commanders ordered him to accompany them to barrio Sastre, but he refused
on the ground that as a courier he had his own duty to do, but the said
commanders took their firearms, pointed them toward him saying that he
would be killed if he refused to guide them to the house of Serapio Villate. He
was told that they were just to visit Serapio Villate without showing any intention
of killing that man. Had he not been forced to go to with them to barrio Sastre,
he would not have gone with them. They arrived at barrio Sastre at about 6
o’clock in the evening and when they were about 20 arm-length away from the
house of Serapio Villate, the 2 commanders Wennie and Heling ordered him
to stay guard near the road; while thus guarding alone, he could have escaped
but he did not for fear that if he did so he would be liquidated by the 2
notorious commanders and, beside that, he had no reason to escape, as he was
made to believe that they were going there only for a visit. As a matter of fact,
while thus guarding the road he heard neither cries nor shouts from the house
of Villate. On the other hand, he could not have gone to town because he
would have been arrested by the army.
On December 5, 1955, in Nagcarlang, Laguna, upon realizing the evils of
communism and having grown up to understand the beauty of democracy, he
surrender voluntarily to Sgt. Regalado of the 26th B.C.T. He said that he
wanted to live peacefully and to start a new life.
In consonance with this version defendant disclaims any criminal liability for
the death of Villate and the robbery in the latter’s house. He admitted having
been at the scene of the crime at the time it was being committed, but he says
that it was so, because he was under the influence of a great fear. Consequently
— counsel for the defense argues — that in so far as the defendant is concerned,
the circumstances of treachery and cruelty cannot be appreciated against him,
because the killing was not executed by him, aside from the fact that the
testimony of the widow Nieves Magtibay, who averred to have seen the
defendant stabbing the deceased for 30 minutes deserves no credence because
from the opening of the window thru which she allegedly was peeping, she was
unable to see the defendant, specially if it is considered that her view was
intercepted by at least 3 persons.
Counsel further maintains that even if convicted of the crime charged
defendant is entitled to the benefits of the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack
of instruction; (2) having acted under the influence of fear not entirely
uncontrollable to be exempting under Article 12, paragraph 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, but coming within the purview of Article 13, paragraph 1 of the
same legal body; and (3) voluntary surrender to the authorities on December
5, 1955, which also may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, for it constitutes a
circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to the circumstance of
voluntary surrender to a person in authority or agent covered by paragraph 7
of said article 13.
Upon going over the evidence on record, We find no reason for the widow
Nieves Magtibay to testify falsely against the defendant herein and to impute to
him the commission of so heinous offense. She knew very well the defendant
and was able to identify him fully. Any way, the matter devolves into a case of
credibility of witnesses and the trial judge, who had the opportunity of
observing their demeanor while testifying in his presence and is in a better
position than the appellate Court to gauge their credibility, has given full
credence to the testimony of said widow.
As to the circumstance of lack of instruction, the Solicitor General states that
the test for the mitigating circumstance is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of
sufficient intelligence (People v. Ripas, Et. Al. * G. R. No. L-6246,
promulgated May 28, 1954), and the record discloses that far from his claim
that he suffers from lack of instruction, he possesses an intelligence worthy of
a lawyer considering his ability, for one unschooled, to distinguish between
implications and innuendos. At any rate, lack of instruction is not mitigating in
cases of robbery (U.S. v. Pascual, 9 Phil., 491; People v. Melendrez, 59 Phil.,
154; People v. De la Cruz, Et Al., 77 Phil., 44), although it might be under
certain situations in cases of murder (People v. Taluk, Et Al., 65 Phil., 696)
and homicide (People v. Hubero, 61 Phil., 64).
On the strength of the foregoing considerations We find Félix Semañada, alias
Semanada, alias Commander Dante, guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery (which include
nocturnity and aid of superior strength), dwelling and cruelty, by deliberately
and inhumanly increasing the sufferings of the victim. He should, therefore, be
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death which, however, cannot be imposed
upon him for lack of the required number of votes necessary for the imposition
of said penalty.
Wherefore, the decision of the lower Court rendered in this case and brought
to Us in consultation is hereby affirmed, although the penalty imposed upon
the defendant is lowered to life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua), in
accordance with the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, with the corresponding
accessories of the law and the payment of the costs. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

With respect to the alleged "uncontrollable fear or compulsion of an irresistible

force", which appellant says the lower court did not consider in his favor, the
Government contends that the purported uncontrollable fear was a mere
fabrication and that appellant was a willing participant in the criminal design.
Moreover, fear or duress in order to be a valid defense, should be based on
real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. It should not be
inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A person should not commit a
very serious crime on account of a flimsy fear (People v. Quilloy, 88 Phil., 53),
and the evidence on record does not show that defendant really acted by such
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

Anent the circumstance of voluntary surrender or of a similar or analogous

circumstance We hold that defendant cannot claim it in his favor in the case at
bar, because he did not surrender to the authority or its agents by reason of the
commission of the crime for which he is herein prosecuted, but for being a
Huk who wanted to come within the pale of the law (see People v. Sakam, 61
Phil., 27, 33- 34).
 Hopefully, there will be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable
crime. It is committed even though the minor knew about or consented to the
act of trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the “Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.”3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No.
9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The information against accused,
dated May 5, 2008, states:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there
hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec.
4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in
Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a non-governmental
Manila organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged
in human trafficking in Cebu City.6
SECOND DIVISION
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police
operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHIRLEY A. pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM
CASIO, Accused-Appellant. provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.9

DECISION The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These
rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction
LEONEN, J.: while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.10

“Chicks mo dong?”1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities,
the fate of many desperate women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This
case resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice.
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district. Accused noticed them and called
their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with
accused went as follows:
Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests
naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be young because we have guests
waiting at the motel.)
Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get
them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found
a prospective subject.13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case.14
Accused:
Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso:
Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo
inquired how much their services would cost. Accused replied, “Tag kinientos”
(P500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to
Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the
marked money to accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call.
This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team proceeded to Room
24, arrested accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police
confiscated the marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB
“were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the representatives
from the IJM and the DSWD.”19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This
statement was supported by a copy of her certificate of live birth.20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In
March 2008 she stopped working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu
City. She stayed with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding
house. It was there where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee
Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no
longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the
money in order to help her father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first
customer. She was paid P200.00 and given an additional P500.00 as tip. For
the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee
Ann brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more
customers in that area.21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see
her pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further
testified that on May 2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer.
That was the first time that she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought
her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB went to Room
24. It was in Room 24 where the customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in
and told AAA and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her
that she was rescued and not arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along
with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She received P400.00 for every
customer who selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan,
SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made
the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they “rushed to Room 24 and arrested the
accused.”27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from
accused’s right hand “and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the
same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . .”28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM “in
conducting the operation against the accused.”29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On the
evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While walking, she was
stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew
someone named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not
Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging,
gave her a piece of paper with a number written on it, and told her to tell
Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted
Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly, she would be
given money by the two males.30
Ruling of the trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and held31 that:
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined
under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her
engage in prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the
act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been consummated for the mere
“transaction” i.e. the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust
money” of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under paragraph (a), Section
4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE
MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the
fine and awarded moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision33
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants
Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of
Appeals noted and gave due course in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014.
The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court
on March 17, 2014.37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days
from notice. This court also required the Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women to confirm the confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their
respective manifestations, stating that they would no longer file supplemental
briefs considering that all issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and
appellee’s brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated
June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed accused’s
confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since October 27,
2010.
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was able to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may
be dissected into the following:
(1)
Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid,
considering that there was no prior surveillance and the police did not know
the subject of the operation;43
(2)
Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt even though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has
a history of engaging in human trafficking;44 and
(3)
Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering
that AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.45
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated
into committing the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance
and did not even know who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know
the identities of the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted
because the prosecution did not present evidence that would prove she had a
history of engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being
a pimp and asserted that she was a laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display
herself to solicit customers.49
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of
the Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in convicting accused
because witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited
customers and received money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations
are valid and have been recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in
flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that
accused had “fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . .”53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
CTOC) was “adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession”54
on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols:
(1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components
and Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations “Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children” (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine
Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force
was on December 25, 2003.58
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:
Article 3
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at
a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation
set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the
means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child
for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even
if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this
article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the “Anti-
Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to
[the] protocol.”59
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and
described trafficking in persons as follows:
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness,
is tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the
most flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the
brunt of this insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception,
abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced
labor, and indentured servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Convention on the
Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families; and the United Nations’
Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’
Convention Against Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in
October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it
seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that
shall squarely address human trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate
Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for
an anti-trafficking law when other laws exist that cover trafficking.61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the
Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act,
and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address
issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents
and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of
recruiting, harboring or transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced
labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or some
elements of trafficking independent of their results or consequence.62
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue
of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and
approved on May 26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1)
The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders.”
(2)
The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; and
(3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise
known as the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.” Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as
follows:
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
“(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation
or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any
form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as
‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in
the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have
been expanded to include the following acts:
(1)
The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”
(2)
The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person”
(3)
The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs” (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused
when their services were peddled to the police who acted as decoys.65 AAA
was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also stated
that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused
took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need money,
as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No.
9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May
2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with
“customers” for money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is
irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking
in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at
a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal
or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as “trafficking in persons” even
if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.70
(Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even
without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is
not given out of his or her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking
in persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a), which states:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or judicial, to commit any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of
trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child;
When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise
known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for
the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as
a group;
When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercise authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed
by a public officer or employee;
When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any
member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
and When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the
offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child” as:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
....
b.
Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over
eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts
of trafficking in persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission
of the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to
decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was
also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers
waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old
when accused peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as
evidence to show that she was born on January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused
committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one
of the victims was a child. As held by the trial court:
[T]he act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been consummated for the
mere “transaction” i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the
“bust money” of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective
test to determine whether there was a valid entrapment operation:
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the “subjective”
or “origin of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine
whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the
accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts
such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities,
his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to
assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes
the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a “trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” If the accused was
found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable
opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an
unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test. . . . Here, the court
considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police
conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government
agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit
the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. The
test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was
likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready
and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that
a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime
that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective
test in determining the whether there was an entrapment operation or an
instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts
from also applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:
Applying the “subjective ” test it is worth invoking that accused-appellant
procures income from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not
shown any proof evidencing accused-appellant’s history in human trafficking
or engagement in any offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has
[sic] been apprehending human traffickers for quite some time.79 (Citations
omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior
surveillance before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment
and instigation. In Chang v. People,80 this court explained that:
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure
the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.
There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The
difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by
the police to commit the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that
she earned her living as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the
finding of the Court of Appeals:
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls
for that evening, and when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant
who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she
initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused
called out their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no
predisposition to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have
asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely
proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who
asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the
part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights.83
The marked money retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior
to the entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence.84
On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that night, the
Court of Appeals noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus,
her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a
condition for an entrapment operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this
court underscored the value of flexibility in police operations:
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or
buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its
entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been
violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The
police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the
need for prior surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons.
The urgency of rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but
deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of P2,000,000.00. Section
10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides that:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
....
c.
Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from
P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also award exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in
People v. Lalli90 where this court held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express
the hope that our people and our government unite against everything
(6) Illegal search; inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and
human trafficking.
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued.
(8) Malicious prosecution; They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what their lives have been, there is
still much good in our world.
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond
35. reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
.... and a fine of P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.92
is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be
sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:
and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a
prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, (1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified.91 (2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its
accompanying desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It SO ORDERED.
reflects the weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly
thrive in such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last
resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest
relationships. It serves as a foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys
and challenges while continually growing together with many shared
experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the world that we
create also for others.

Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we

affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence
moulding their character in environments free of the vilest motives and the
worse of other human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm
the conviction of accused in this case.
Republic of the Philippines
 SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision2 dated
July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan,
which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March
13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information
that alleges as follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @
Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed
as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province
of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting
upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr.
and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie
Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00
p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke
machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the
group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was
heard to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas makaala
caniac dayta." (This Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador
Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to
stop singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated petitioner who
remarked, "Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy,"
meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long."7
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened
at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon
mused over the drinking session on the 26th and 28th of September and the
confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga
a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really
arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later that afternoon, the group headed
to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that
they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of
Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally,
was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter
approached petitioner who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out,
"Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?]
I’m not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz
attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with
it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing
the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and
phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling
and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the
policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes
later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor,
salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy
confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of HOMICIDE defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code and after applying in his favor the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱200,000.00) PESOS, representing expenses for the wake and
burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱300,000.00) PESOS, as moral
damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND
(₱332,000.00] PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated
December 20, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the
July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch
[9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE
RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE
OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT
RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART
FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO "FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT."
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of
Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,13 petitioner insists on a review of the factual
findings of the trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not
the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court
of Appeals had wrongly inferred from, misread and overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.14
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he
implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily, he
challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning
his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns responsibility for Chy’s
demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial infarction. In
support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio15 that Chy’s
medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts
that, at most, he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none
of the blows he inflicted on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial court’s assessment of the
witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of
his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as
well as the defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioner’s appeal
with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet,
petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this
Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual
issues, save where the factual findings of the trial court do not find support in
the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was based on a
misapprehension of facts.16 Neither exception applies in the instant case as
would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-
interference with the determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points
out that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who received the
evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the situation obtains in this case,
the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F. Manauis
inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner
himself. Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged
adverse consequence his own doing might have caused. For us to allow
petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a travesty of the
Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over
the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not present during the trial,
or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.17 Here, Judge
Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge Manauis recused himself
from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the evidence
for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio
who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning,
too, is the fact that Judge Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies
of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to
decide it on the basis of the records on hand.18 He can rely on the transcripts
of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance
with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of
ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due
process of law.19
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following
injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x
2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms.,
lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the
right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage
noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show
a reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior
wall, the lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the
septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by
approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological findings show mild
fibrosis of the myocardium.

Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple.
Cut sections show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with
fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish frothy materials noted.
Histopathological examinations show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion.
Histopathological examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.1avvphi1
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other
partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated
Memorandum, however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit,
limited his liability to slight physical injuries. He argues that the superficial
wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his death.21 Quite the opposite,
however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us with the
causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that
preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of
Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is
because there was an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood
into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic
changes [in] the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave
strong conclusion that it was myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is
occlusion of the blood vessels itself. (Emphasis supplied.)22
By definition, coronary occlusion23 is the complete obstruction of an artery of
the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis24 or the thickening and loss
of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a
person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.25 Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct examination relative to this
point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering
that the patient [does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no
previous history of myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening
of the arteries, then excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction.
(Emphasis supplied.)26
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the
myocardium27 caused by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or formation
of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and thickest layer of the
victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary occlusion from sudden
emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the
victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth
and[/]or hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis,
Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much
so, that there was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.29

In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died
because of the blow that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased,
do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.30
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional
strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his
death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction
suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the
resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was
primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.31lawph!l
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and
hit him with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a
heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained in our
jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of United States v. Brobst32
that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence,
the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility.33
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez34 enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal
malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was
hastened, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the
cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted
injury. (Emphasis supplied.)35
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act
performed is different from the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa
es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave
an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal
Code.39 Nevertheless, we must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor
of petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could
not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the
latter’s heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the
minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,40or
anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years
and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,41 the trial
court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy
for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of ₱332,000. In fixing the
indemnity, the victim’s actual income at the time of death and probable life
expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose, the Court adopts the
formula used in People v. Malinao:42
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the the victim
at the annual net income which time of this death) would have been received LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
by the heirs for support.43

Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which
Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death,
Chy was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly income of ₱10,600 or a
gross annual income of ₱127,200. But, in view of the victim’s delicate
condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years. It also
deducted ₱7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However, the
records are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to
substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living
expenses, jurisprudence44 approximates net income to be 50% of the gross
income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of Manuel Chy should
be awarded ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [₱127,200 - 1/2

(₱127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x ₱63,600
= 19 1/3 x ₱63,600
= ₱1,229,600
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of ₱200,000 as stipulated
by the parties45 and civil indemnity of ₱50,000.46 Anent moral damages, the
same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation
and proof other than the death of the victim.47 However, in obedience to the
controlling case law, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to
₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution Republic of the Philippines
dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral damages is Manila
reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses SECOND DIVISION
for the wake and burial; and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
[G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004]
No pronouncement as to costs. ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
SO ORDERED. DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated January 11, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 23753, affirming the August 16, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, in
Criminal Case No. 98-1089. The RTC convicted petitioner Arturo Romera of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He was also
ordered to pay private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages and
P10,000 as attorneys fee.
The Information against petitioner reads:
On October 4, 1998, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Puntod,
Barangay Balagnan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Roy
Mangaya-ay with the use of a bolo, thus, inflicting a mortal wound on the
abdomen of the latter; accused thereby performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the felony of Homicide which was not produced
because of the timely and effective medical attendance administered on the
said victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249, in relation with Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code.[3]
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial thereafter ensued.
The facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the records,
are as follows:
In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner Arturo Romera was with the
victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men namely, Eligario Beboy Acenas,
Dennis Bobong Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin
Generol. They were all headed for Biasong to play volleyball. When they
reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to while away time at the house
of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on
Bebing Zuluetas pants and said, Theres a monkey among us. Everybody
laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol
to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and pointed a
finger at Franklin Generol and said, Even if you are stronger and older, if you
will be hit by my fist, you will crawl. Petitioner then stood up and warned
everyone, You all watch out in Balaguan. He pulled Franklin Generol to join
him and said, Lets go, there are many boastful people here. Thereafter,
petitioner and Franklin left the group.
At six oclock in the evening, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On
their way home, they passed by the house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said
house, which is about one kilometer away from petitioners own, they saw
petitioner already carrying a bolo waiting for them.
Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, Here are the
brave ones. Roy and his companions ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy
ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, Come here, brave one. He held
Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious.
When he woke up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he
underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.
After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo
Ramoso of the Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso
accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.
For his part, petitioner testified on what happened as follows:
Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven
oclock in the evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While lying in bed, they
heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for
sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy
asked for petitioner but when the latters wife told him that petitioner was
already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went down the
house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy
thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it
was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent
Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall,
petitioners wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face
Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked
him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy
in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According
to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when
petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner
was convicted of frustrated homicide. The dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
accused ARTURO ROMERA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the offense charged. Consequently, taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the provisions of the [I]ndeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to a penalty ranging from One (1) year
Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional as minimum
to Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the
private offended party as actual damages, P19,361.15 and another sum of
P10,000.00 as attorneys fee without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning to the trial court the
following assignments of error:
1. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE THEORY OF SELF DEFENSE.
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPRECIATE SPECIAL
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE
SELF DEFENSE, ARTICLE 69, REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH
LOWER THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES.
3. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE, FAILURE TO APPLY ARTICLE 62 (5)
REVISED PENAL CODE, WHICH LOWER THE PENALTY BY ONE
DEGREE LOWER WITH THE PRESENCE OF TWO OR MORE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.[5]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. It pointed out that
assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was the aggressor at the start, the
unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo
from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-
defense becomes unavailing.
The appellate court also ruled that Article 69[6] of the Revised Penal Code
finds no application in this case. It explained that there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression
against the person defending himself. It held, however, that petitioner is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as it was
established during trial that after the incident he surrendered himself to the
CAFGU and later on to the police authorities.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground
that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to apply Article
64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, which lowers the imposable penalty by one
degree when two or more mitigating circumstances are present.
Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the
latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as petitioner
opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his
house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated his
thinking and reasoning processes, says the petitioner.
For public respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation are
unavailing to petitioner since it was he who initiated the attack. The OSG insists
that it was not the victim who went to petitioners house, but petitioner who
went to where the victim was resting.
We note that while both the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
categorically state who started the attack, it can be reasonably gleaned from
their decisions that it was the victim who initiated the aggressive encounter.
This finding of fact is amply supported by the evidence on record.
Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation
present in this case?
Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the
bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage
any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of
his wife and children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of
those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view,
there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation
attended the commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two
separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two
circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as
one mitigating circumstance.[7] From the facts established in this case, it is clear
that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. SO ORDERED.
Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender is also present, Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code should be
applied, to wit:

ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.

...

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.

...

The penalty for frustrated homicide, pursuant to Article 50[8] of the Revised
Penal Code, is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for
consummated homicide. The penalty for consummated homicide is reclusion
temporal, hence the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor. There being
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, pursuant to
Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision Republic of the Philippines
correccional, is the next statutory penalty. But following the Indeterminate SUPREME COURT
Sentence Law herein applicable, the minimum term of the penalty that should Manila
be imposed on petitioner for frustrated homicide should be within the range
of arresto mayor in any of its periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day EN BANC
to six (6) months, while the maximum term should be within the range of
prision correccional in its medium period or two (2) years, four (4) months and G.R. No. L-46095 October 10, 1938
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CUSTODIA
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals ROSEL Defendants-Appellant.
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 24, is MODIFIED as far as the penalty imposed is concerned. Pedro R. Arteche for appellant.
Petitioner ARTURO ROMERA is hereby sentenced to suffer the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is also DIAZ, J.:
ORDERED to pay the private offended party P19,361.15 as actual damages,
and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Costs de oficio.
The accused-appellant Custodia Rosel was convicted of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
heirs of the offended party Francisco Baldostano in the sum of P1,000 and to
pay the costs. From said judgment of conviction he appealed to this court and,
in support of his appeal, in his brief alleges that the trial court committed the
following errors:
1. In not acquitting him on the ground that he merely acted in defense of
himself;
2. In finding that he wounded Francisco Baldostano with treachery,
notwithstanding that there is no evidence in the record showing the presence
of such circumstance; and
3. In holding that no justifying, exempting or mitigating circumstances whatever
were present in the commission of the crime.
The facts which gave rise to the prosecution of the appellant for the said crime
of murder are, according to the record, briefly as follows: On the night of
February 14, 1938 several persons, among them Francisco Baldostano, were
gathered for a small celebration in the house of Hilario Ilada in the barrio of
Guyo, municipality of Catubig, Province of Samar. Some entertained
themselves by singing when the accused Custodia Rosel, Esperato Orsolino,
Ignacio Alberne and Pedro Gorlon arrived. Appellant greeted everybody in
the house. In answer Francisco Baldostano said rather sarcastically that
strangers should leave the place, adding in the following words more or less: "It
is good I have means of livelihood. I have a rice land. You stranger (addressing
the appellant) live at the expense of your wife." There was no doubt that he
referred to the appellant because he addressed the latter when he said, "You
stranger . . . etc.", and because appellant was not a native of the place. Appellant
resented the greeting or remark which Francisco Baldostano made concerning
him demanded an explanation. Were it not for the intervention of some
persons present, he would have attacked Baldostano at the very moment. He
left for his house a little afterwards and returned about one-half hour later.
Upon seeing that Francisco Baldostano was engrossed in conversation with
some of those who still remained in the house, he propped his left arm against
the railing of the stairs and stabbed Baldostano from below in the left armpit
with the bolo with which he was armed and withdrew immediately. The wound
thus inflicted on Francisco Baldostano caused his death eight days later. So
unexpected was the attack of which he was the object on the part of the
appellant that he was not able to lower his arm to protect his armpit or to lean
forward to dodge the attack. This, undoubtedly, constitutes treachery because
the same is present when means, methods or forms are employed in the
execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its
commission without risk to the person of the aggressor resulting from the
defense which the offended party might make.
Testifying in his behalf, appellant declared that on the day after wounding
Francisco Baldostano he presented himself to policemen Melecio Melendres
and Juan whose surname he could not recall. It does not appear, however, that
he informed them of the crime he had committed for which reason they did
not place him under arrest.
The remarks of the deceased Francisco Baldostano under the circumstances
in which he made them were highly offensive to the appellant and to any other
person in his place. It is not strange that they engendered obfuscation in him
and impelled him to act, as he did, in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense.
Considering the facts proven, our conclusion is that the crime committed by
the accused and appellant is that of murder. However, there being present the
fifth mitigating circumstance in the commission thereof, without any
aggravating one to offset it, the judgment rendered against him should be
modified.
Wherefore, modifying the judgment appealed from appellant is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day prision mayor to
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. In all other
respects, said judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18792. February 28, 1964.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

GUILLERMO BELLO, Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY; WHEN STABBING AT THE BACK DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE TREACHERY. — There is no treachery although the victim
was stabbed at the back when such wound was but a part and continuation of
the aggression; and the four wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, the stab at
the back having been inflicted as the victim was running away.
2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; WHEN CARRYING OF
BALISONG AND WATCHING VICTIM DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PREMEDITATION. — Where carrying of balisong had been done by the
accused for a long time as a precaution against drunkards without any present
plan to use it against his wife, and the daily watch of her movements merely
manifested his jealous character and there is no evidence that from this jealousy
sprouted a plan to snuff out her life, it is held that evident premeditation was
not established.
3. ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR STRENGTH; DELIBERATE INTENT
NECESSARY. — For superior strength to aggravate a crime, it must be clearly
shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it.
4. ID.; ID.; OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS; SUPPORT BY COMMON-
LAW WIFE. — No obvious ungratefulness is inferable from the fact that the
killer was penniless while the victim, was able to earn a living and occasionally
gave him money, since both lived together as husband and wife.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PASSION
AND OBFUSCATION. — The accused’s insistence that his common law wife
abandon her work as hostess and live with him again, and his rage at her
rejection of the proposal, cannot be properly termed as arising from immoral
and unworthy passions, and therefore the accused in the case at bar can be
given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having acted on a
provocation sufficiently strong to produce passion and obfuscation.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in its
Criminal Case No. 592-G, for murder.
The information filed against the accused alleged four (4) aggravating
circumstances, namely: treachery, evident premeditation, night-time, and
superior strength. The trial court made a finding of "treachery, evident
premeditation and in cold blood and without any provocation" ; however, the
dispositive portion of the appealed decision states as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the Court finds the accused Guillermo Bello guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder defined and punished by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of (1) night time, (2)
abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness (3) superior strength off-set
only by his surrender to the authorities and hereby sentences him to DIE by
electrocution in the manner provided by law ordering his heirs, after his death,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alicia Cervantes in the sum of
P3,000.00, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
The record bears out, the Office of the Solicitor-General does not challenge,
and the counsel de officio agrees with, and adopts, the following findings of fact
of the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence adduced at the hearing of the case, it has been established
to the satisfaction of the Court (1) that on September 17, 1954 the accused
Guillermo Bello, a widower, who at that time was about 54 years of age, took
a young peasant lady named Alicia Cervantes, about 24 years old, as his
common-law wife; (2) that from that day they lived together apparently in
blissful harmony as man and wife without the benefit of marriage bearing,
however no child. . . .; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had no means
of substantial livelihood except that of making "kaingin" and who apparently
was then in financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to accent an employment
as entertainer in a bar and restaurant establishment known as Maring’s Place
situated at the corner of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio Streets, Gumaca, Quezon;
(4) that Alicia Cervantes entered the service of Maring’s Place on that day as a
public hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated with his young bride used
to watch her movements in Maring’s Place everyday; (6) that on May 15 he saw
Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in Gumaca with a man whom the accused
found later was caressing his common-law wife inside the movie house; (7) that
being in love with her he took her out from the movie house and warned her
to be more discreet in her personal conduct in Gumaca; (8) that Alicia
Cervantes continued to serve at Maring’s Place as a public hostess; (9) that on
May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. the accused went to Maring’s Place to ask for some
money from Alicia; (10) that Maring, the owner of the Place, and Alicia refused
to give money, Maring telling him to forget Alicia completely because he was
already an old man, an invalid besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11)
that having failed to obtain financial assistance from his paramour, the accused
left the place somewhat despondent and went home passing Bonifacio Street;
(12) that on his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and Luis
Marasigan who greeted the accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo the
following: ‘So this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave
trade’; (13) that these remarks of Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the
accused, to drown which he sought Paty’s place in Gumaca where he drank 5
glasses of tuba; (14) that from Paty’s place he went to Realistic Studio which is
in front of Maring’s Place and from there watched the movements of Alicia;
(15) that at about 9:00 o’clock that night he entered Maring’s Place and without
much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa
strangulating its prey and with his right hand stabbed Alicia several times with
a balisong; (16) that seeing Alicia fallen on the ground and believing her to be
mortally wounded, he fled and went to the municipal building and there
surrendered himself to the police of Gumaca.."
Both the prosecution and the defense also agree that the crime committed is
not murder but only homicide, but they disagree in the qualifying or aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. The prosecution holds that the crime is
homicide, aggravated by abuse of superior strength, but off-set by voluntary
surrender. On the other hand, the defense maintains that the accused is
entitled to the additional mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
The trial court held a different conclusion, as earlier stated.
While it cannot be denied that Alicia was stabbed at the back, the wound was
but a part and continuation of the aggression. The four (4) stab wounds (the 3
others were in the breast, hypogastric region, and in the left wrist — as shown
in the certificate of the Municipal Health Officer) were inflicted
indiscriminately, without regard as to which portion of her body was the subject
of attack. The trial court itself found that the stab in the back was inflicted as
Alicia was running away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed (Peo. v.
Cañete, 44 Phil. 478).
Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused had been
carrying a balisong with him for a long time as a precaution against drunkards,
and without any present plan or intent to use it against his common-law wife.
That he watched her movements daily manifested his jealous character, but
there is no evidence that from this jealousy sprouted a plan to snuff out her
life.
The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the part of the
accused, and, not possessing it, he could not take advantage of it. True that he
was armed with a balisong, but he was old and baldado (invalid), while Alicia
was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm. The facts are not sufficient to
draw a comparison of their relative strength. Possession of a balisong gives an
aggressor a formidable advantage over the unarmed victim, but the physique of
the aggressor ought also to be considered. At any rate, taking into account the
emotional excitement of the accused, it is not clearly shown that there was
"intencion deliberada de prevalerse de la superioridad o aprovecharse
intencionadamente de la misma" (Sent. TS. 5 Oct. 1906), i.e., deliberate intent
to take advantage of superior strength.
The crime was committed at night-time, but the accused did not seek or take
advantage of it the better to accomplish his purpose. In fact, Maring’s Place was
bright and well-lighted; hence, the circumstance did not aggravate the crime.
(U.S. v. Ramos, Et Al., 2 Phil. 434; U. S. v. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958)
We can not understand how the trial court came to couple the crime with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness.
There is nothing to show that the assailant and his common-law wife reposed
in one another any special confidence that could be abused, or any gratitude
owed by one to the other that ought to be respected, and which would bear any
relation, or connection, with the crime committed. None is inferable from the
fact that the accused was much older than his victim, or that he was penniless
while she was able to earn a living and occasionally gave him money, since both
lived together as husband and wife. Neither is it shown that the accused took
advantage of any such special confidence in order to carry out the crime.
Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength, which could have qualified the crime as murder,
were not present, and since the generic aggravating circumstances of night-time
and abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness have not been established,
the accused can only be liable for homicide.
Both defense and prosecution agree that accused-appellant is entitled to the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.
The remaining area of conflict is reduced to whether the accused may lay claim
to a second mitigating circumstance, that of having acted on a provocation
sufficiently strong to cause passion and obfuscation. The defense submits that
accused is so entitled, because the deceased’s flat rejection of petitioner’s
entreaties for her to quit her calling as a hostess and return to their former
relation, aggravated by her sneering statement that the accused was penniless
and invalid (baldado), provoked the appellant, as he testified, into losing his
head and stabbing the deceased. The state disputes the claim primarily on the
strength of the rule that passion and obfuscation can not be considered when
"arising from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions" (U.S. v. Hicks, 14 Phil.
217).

We are inclined to agree with the defense, having due regard to the
circumstances disclosed by the record. It will be recalled that the lower court
found that the accused had previously reproved the deceased for allowing
herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven
home to the accused by Marasigan’s remark on the very day of the crime that
the accused was the husband "whose wife was being used by Maring for
purposes of prostitution", a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant’s
feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba) before
visiting Alicia (the deceased) to plead with her to leave her work. Alicia’s
insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was not
motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her
determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute
her favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the accused’s insistence that
she live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be
properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even
without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a higher
level than gainful promiscuity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified.
This Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2) mitigating
circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary surrender; and,
therefore, imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a
minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of
ten (10) years of prisión mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the
heirs of Alicia Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130654. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO
BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] dated April 15, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,[2] in Criminal Case No.
A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as
actual expenses.
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant
with the crime of parricide reads as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to and being then
armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said weapon
one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a
result of which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her
death immediately thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.
Contrary to law."[3]
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier
Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-appellant, and
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier
were legally married on December 18, 1954.[4] In their forty-one years of
marriage, they begotten children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived at
Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier.[5]
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three oclock in the morning,
Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen
meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta papatayen
nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard her mother
scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma
who, weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the time of
the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and Alma then
proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to
eighty meters away from their parents' house. The three then proceeded to
their parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless body of his
mother and his father, accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel
then ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital.
At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that
their father confessed to him that he killed his wife and thereafter allegedly
stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in her
own blood.[6]
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband,
Fernando, and her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help.[7]
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police
Station in La Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with SPO4
Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of June 15,
1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the barangay captain
of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The
police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod,
Sto. Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered with
blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel
told him that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered
to him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The
bolo was allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife.[8] The
medical findings indicated that the victim suffered from multiple injuries and
her neck was almost cut off from her body.[9]
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in
their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same
one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he used in
wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife
because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the
killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he
was doing.[10] He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15,
1997 rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused,
Eduardo Javier y Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to
pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for
the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and to pay the cost
of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED."[11]
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing
the death penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of
illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation.[12] While accused-
appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his
defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because
at the time of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged
period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit
relationship with another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit
the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-
appellant cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence of
a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the
absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court
rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that accused-
appellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The defense never
presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist
ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the
defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances
of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-
appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been
suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit an
act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went on
to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to support
his contentions.[13]
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the
law requires the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish
the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness should not
deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.[14]
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent
upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case,
however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank
when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented
regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely
on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power
at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he
committed. First, he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use
of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to commit
suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife;
and he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the
vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing
up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control
of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an
illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power. On the basis of the
foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by
accused-appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to
mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said
act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity.[15] The foregoing elements were not
proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's
testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
"In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced
the alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not
account how he killed his wife nor did he explain the cause why he was
prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying to
him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause which
produced it has not been established."[16]
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions
regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his
own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will
generally not be disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best
position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that it observes
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case at
bar, the trial court was able to observe the behaviour of accused-appellant and
it stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so
impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime
of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
"Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death."
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable
by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater
penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.[17]
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not
allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the
prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance.[18] Likewise, no
mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-
appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00
imposed by the trial court as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral
damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union,
Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA,
appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal
on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly
constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to
complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time
she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her
psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor
under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal
night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the
aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled
her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from
BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now
apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has already
served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal
Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds
the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity
and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds,
to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels
on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding
of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and
convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions
version of the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban
Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their
two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived
at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it,
waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo
did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the
Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which
Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo
saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house
appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig
because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise
asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a
bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her
two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the
same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the
foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban
went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from
the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through
the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked
it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell
was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on
the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the
back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada
Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the
foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1
Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his
side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only
had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an
aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long
with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a
stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had
to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr.
Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was
already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant.
She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte
but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in
their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children
who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction,
Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the
television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got
hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a
drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so
nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a
gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-
inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben
with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then
smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade
and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting
him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He
did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers
in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre
and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins.
Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and
tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he
was her constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together
with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember
when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled,
generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on
him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen
knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood.
Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked
for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex
and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens
forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled
after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben
and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.
She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already very demanding.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there
were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with
a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15,
1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband
went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had
already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was
plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They
stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank
beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque
and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and
the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can
place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the
root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will
never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent.
Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was
stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben
would always take her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time
that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right
forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her
and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and
would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk,
at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified
as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and
Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw
the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night
of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is
located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each other
then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused,
Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self
and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was
to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please
note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they
were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from
theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14
years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that
Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time,
he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would
be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was alive he
used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he
will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which
means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would
box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a
wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was
stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured
too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house
and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa
house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was
already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his
staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the house and
she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the
first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be
afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived
because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was
broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the
door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the
knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted
for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left
Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times
and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his
Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic
on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The
OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not
say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said
it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up
of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to
his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that
they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at
least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards
her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x
Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that
he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing
their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next
day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away;
that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once;
that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours
after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such
was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers
and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She
merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by
the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some
police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was
wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the
skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based on
her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify
as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17,
22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997,
22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial
date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and,
under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein
she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by
the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel
Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined
that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead
pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court
partly granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the
case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified
before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology
at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the
counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was
the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of
the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with
the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has
written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan
Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as
an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten
(10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this
marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and
also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken
homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very
low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it
comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry.
They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are
involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.
The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-
pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see
often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does
not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the
belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave
the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back
triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital
relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are
not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she
sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still
has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the
time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since
passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow
of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry
Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years.
Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans
Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and
neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years.
Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of
Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and
the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented
twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on
an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-
86.

Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo
had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified
in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family
disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In
those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse,
battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the
woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if
the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of
the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-
traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming
brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating
or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that
time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-
world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals
illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents.
As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him within the
environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he
is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing
of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just
come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview
he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-
experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that
the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come
in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed
Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence
to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was
in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless
when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a
pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court
for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that
this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of
the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative,
a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo
Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies,
along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted
by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of
the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts
consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa
were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with
a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced
from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a
gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding
that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and
her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save
the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in
this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant
acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery
attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this
Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or
modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly
dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We
note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized
the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the
testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this
Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot peremptorily
conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence
presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously
hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on
November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held
for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved
the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to
condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he
handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their
marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover,
during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of
her marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that
(1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission
was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the
marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal
consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and
the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of
his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial,
to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death. Determining
which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that
Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to
us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered
woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her
theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will
be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led
to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither
the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her
children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are
indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any
reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes
self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits
killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that
in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered
woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has
been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their
understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been
cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce
her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role;
emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal
or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman
usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior;
or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows
herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants
is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him
are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each
partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and
despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable,
the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute
battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it.
The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible
pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful
experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are
likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On
the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards
his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for
it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the
other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery
will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that
this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible
for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or
seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains
with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help
as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation
that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and
forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated.
Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the
other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as
follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested
to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after
that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A I did.
A Of course my husband.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the
Q You mean Ben Genosa? record.

A Yes, sir. A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower
eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
xxxxxxxxx
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and
[Court] /to the witness contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said? 3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted
on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was
the occurrence?
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician:
Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora; and

A Everytime he got drunk. 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
A Three times a week. attending physician, is that correct?

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you? A Yes, sir.

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me.
[32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos
Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic
battery in this manner:
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something
chart of your clinic? rough substance if force is applied.
 Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A Yes, sir.
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? patient pregnant?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left A Yes, sir.
breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is
traumatized, there is tenderness pain. Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? A Eight (8) months pregnant.

xxxxxxxxx Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

Q Were you able to talk with the patient? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about
her pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q What did she tell you?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. pregnancy.
And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
xxxxxxxxx
A One day.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime
in the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened? A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

A As per record, yes. xxxxxxxxx

Q What was the date? Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8
A It was on November 6, 1995. months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989
to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment.
She does not response when the medication was given to her, because tension
headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is
the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease.
So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic
problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous
level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas
in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times;
and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding
that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by
Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would
come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she
was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy
and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running
into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop
a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this
time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home,
where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her,
Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel
hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three
other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail
the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him,
showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in
the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached
Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second
child said, he was not home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son
arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive? Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him. A Yes, 8 months.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him? Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A Yes, sir. A Eight (8) months.

Q Did you come back to your house? Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time? Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Bilwang. A Marie Bianca.

Q Is this your house or you are renting? Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Renting. A Yes, sir.

Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang? Q What time?

A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock. A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Q What happened when you arrived in your residence? Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried
that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but Q What was he yelling all about?
she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last
year. A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you? Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else
did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was
just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I
said to him, why did you switch off the light when the children were there. At
that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments.
He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen
and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying
that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to
the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my
neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How
did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly
in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
 xxxxxxxxx
Q Where did he bring you?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
me.
A Outside.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
Q In what part of the house?
A Yes, sir.
A Dining.
Q What is there in the drawer?
Q Where were the children during that time?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
A My children were already asleep.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Q You mean they were inside the room?
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer? this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

A Yes, sir. A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer? Q Is it a flexible blade?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but A Its a cutter.
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The
one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when A Yes, because he once used it to me.
he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity Q How did he do it?
on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I
was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. A He wanted to cut my throat.

COURT INTERPRETER: Q With the same blade?

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had
met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours.
Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a
quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
laymans term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a
very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience
a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed
because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown
below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did
you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during
her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the
facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider
them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband
that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel
in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in
that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is
your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I
also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety
reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it
happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what
x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that
I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo,
testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and
examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three
years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was
fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and
was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same
time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic
claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got
drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected
that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve
years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated
relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain.
Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close
relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and
more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman,
her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot
rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is
evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court
has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary.
How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this
kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is
the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind
of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a
similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the
United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a
battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the
battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger
of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered
woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating
and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising
from the latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation
to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she
is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about
forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the
woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons
may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims
ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a situation, but
believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation
with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He
referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of beliefs or
perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont attempt to leave
the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing
they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for
the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from
pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter
is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a
means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would
be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from
her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would
support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence
that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how
the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly
described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single
incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to
acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor
abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from
developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of
the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her
mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And
that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being?
Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped
in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential
characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by
her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were
culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they
failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant
had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had
BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the
records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that
crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the
time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from
her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her
life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the
Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat
on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens
bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability
that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the
imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where
the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic
battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount
to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based
on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.[66] Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant
self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense
-- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing
of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to
evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal
liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the
parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan,
in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as
follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering
Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative]
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced
at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can
only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the
effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious
maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or
the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social
support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go
to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic
stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful
stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual
will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any
prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to
six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the
book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become
normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases
of post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and
difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will
power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was,
thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent.
Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a
mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when
a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites
should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to
kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept
a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time.
The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and
violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and
her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her
reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional
and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were
about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where
Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her
normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic
anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she
is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the
whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks of
nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person
under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during
the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal
equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is,
the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will
power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident
occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by
her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[81] In
order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be
proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances
merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed
with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. As
to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution
failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads
us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How
did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly
in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but
he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The
one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when
he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to
the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity
on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I
was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because
of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness
at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took
pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure
and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery.
There is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of
the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the
specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing,
though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of
successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought
of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the
doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of
the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating
circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one
degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended
the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower
in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
medium period of reclusion temporal. these elements were duly established.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and
proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six
(6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and
be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts
in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a
modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which
decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable
to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it
endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order
to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of
the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda,
have helped it in such learning process.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice
Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only
work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make
or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only
Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising

from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of