LEE HONG KOK VS.

ANIANO DAVID
G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order
of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then
issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file adverse claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant?

HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.
This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the
patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.

CARIÑO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

41 PHIL 935

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as
owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title
issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question
belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine?

HELD:
No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared: “It might perhaps, be
proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the
Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
 LAUREL VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property which is located
in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done
by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion.
As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because
the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated?
HELD:
Yes. Under the Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-85322, April 30, 1991

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Petitioners applies for the registration of a land which was denied by the CA on appeal. The CA
contends in computing the thirty year period for acquisitive prescription, the period before the land is
converted into alienable public land cannot be included.
Hence, petitioner have only 17 years of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of Court of Appeals is correct?

HELD:
CA is correct. The thirty year period only begins to toll from the time the land is converted into
alienable public land. (Convertion date: January 3, 1968) Application date: (September 12, 1984)

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. KALAHI INVESTMENTS

G.R. No. 48066, January 31, 1989

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Kalahi Investment, Inc. moved for an advanced hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca
Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahi’s title was to be registered under the provisions of Act
496.
Kalahi presented evidence to support perfected mining rights over the 123 mineral claims.
These were, however, not considered by the court a quo as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the
registration of title under Act 496.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mining claims acquired, registered, perfected, and patentable under the Old
Mining Law, mature to private ownership, which would entitle the claimant-applicant to the ownership
thereof?
HELD:
No. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co., this Court ruled that while it is recognized that
the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, “this right is not absolute. It is merely a
possessory right x x x, more so where petitioner’s claims are still unpatented x x x”, viz:
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators
from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule, otherwise
would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim.
This we cannot approve or sanction, because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the
locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements
in the located mining claims.”

LAND MNGT. BUREAU VS. CA

G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed
to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf
of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of
the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent
claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango
trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by
existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the respondent is on
continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother.
Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The Court
granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has
not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit registration of
land in his favor?

HELD:
The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act providing that a person
alleging in his petition or application ownership in fee simple must present muniments of title to
substantiate his claim of ownership, presenting evidence of his possession in the concept of an owner in
a manner and number of years required by law. The manner shall be open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property known as agricultural land of the public domain for 30 years
preceding the filing of application for confirmation. (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor unless occupant
of the same is under claim of ownership for the required period. Even in the absence of opposition the
court can deny registration of land under Torrens System on ground that an applicant failed to establish
his ownership by a fee simple on the property sought to be registered.
The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue of extrajudicial
settlement and order and at the same time he filed his application for registration in 1975 thus he was in
possession of said land only for 26 years. His mere allegation that his mother was in possession of the
land since 1911 is self serving and hearsay and is admissible as evidence. The tax receipts and tax
declaration he offered as evidence do not substantiate clear proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to
prove that his predecessor-in-interest occupied the land under the condition laid down by law, he can only
establish his possession of the land from 1949. Respondent failed to prove his muniment of title for the
registration of the land under the Registration Act with failure to present convincing and positive proof of
his continuous, open, uninterrupted and notorious occupation of lot 6 in the concept of an owner for at
least 30 years.
 CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF DENR
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalia doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include
the right to alienate the same.

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was
passed creating the Public Estate Autority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands.
Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under
the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising
the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred
to AMARI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands to the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose
“object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.
 DIPIDO VS. GOZUN
485 SCRA 586

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 which empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed
into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1995, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco
Mining Co, and Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000
hectares of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy. Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR
rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is
unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No.
7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation.
They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking
provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this
adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the
government to regulate by purchase.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They
are:
(1) The expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved
but it is not without just compensation. Sec. 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as
Section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit:
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may provided for
in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant – Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining
operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above
shall be properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise
entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
 CHAVEZ VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
530 SCRA 235

POINT OF THE CASE:

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the joint
Venture Agreement between the NHA and R-II Builder’s, Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional and invalid,
and to enjoin respondents – particularly respondent NHA – from implementing and/or enforcing the said
project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Memorandum Order No. 161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive
and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered
to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb
scavengers in NHA resettlement/low cost housing projects.”
Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of
the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent
to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the plan was
submitted to President Aquino for her approval.
On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the
implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land
area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be
reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee to
oversee the implementation of the plan and an inter-agency. Technical Committee was created
composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the evaluation of the pre-
qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two
contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI
proposal which garnered the highest score.
On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards,
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10
from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR
issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 sq.m covering the Smokey
Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NHA has the authority to reclaim lands?

HELD:
Yes. While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA
had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA does not
explicitly mention “reclamation” in any of the listed powers of the agency, we rule that the NHA has an
implied power to reclaim land as this vital or incidental to effectively, logically, and successfully implement
an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.