G.R. No.

178058 July 31, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESSIE MALIAO y
MASAKIT, NORBERTO CHIONG y DISCOTIDO and LUCIANO BOHOL y GAMANA,
Accused, JESSIE MALIAO y MASAKIT, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision dated August 2, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01299 affirming with modification the Decision dated
January 29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75. The trial
court had found accused Norberto Chiong, Luciano Bohol, and accused-appellant Jessie
Maliao guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of rape with homicide.
In a Second Amended Information dated April 28, 1998, Jessie Maliao, Norberto Chiong,
and Luciano Bohol were charged of the crime of rape with homicide before the RTC of
Olongapo City, as follows:
That on or about the seventeenth (17th) day of March, 1998, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence or intimidation applied upon the person of one
AAA,4 a minor who is six (6) years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with said AAA, and in pursuance of their conspiracy and
acting simultaneously or otherwise, and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
[evident] premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and strength to
the said victim who is a minor and of tender age and with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, strangle and hit with a wooden stool
said AAA which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice
of the parents of said AAA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During arraignment on May 26, 1998, Maliao, Chiong and Bohol pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, trial proceeded.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, Senior Medico-
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Dennis Alonzo, SPO2 Norberto
Maninang, Jr., SPO3 Orlando Reyes, NBI Forensic Biologist I Pet Byron Buan, Atty. Alreuela
Bundang Ortiz, Danilo Agrabio, Armando Tadeo, and Roel Santos. It also presented the
testimonies of BBB and CCC, AAA’s mother and grandaunt, respectively. The defense
presented the testimony of accused Jessie Maliao.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
AAA was born on December 21, 1991.7 She was the daughter of BBB and DDD who reside
at Block 12, Lot 6, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City.
AAA left her house at about 8:00 p.m. on March 17, 1998 to watch a television show in
the adjacent house of her grandaunt, CCC. She was then wearing a white blouse, as
testified to by BBB, her mother. Both BBB and CCC subsequently left to go to a mini-
carnival. When CCC returned to her house, AAA was no longer there. When BBB and her
husband, DDD, returned home, AAA was not yet in the house. The spouses looked for AAA
in their neighborhood but they did not find her.
At about noontime of the following day, March 18, 1998, the naked and lifeless body of
AAA was found between two banana plants in a vacant lot near her house. The matter
was reported to the police authorities of Precinct 5, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. An
investigation was conducted by the police authorities and a cartographic sketch of the
suspect was prepared by an artist of the NBI.
On March 21, 1998, the desk officer of Police Precinct received a telephone call from a
concerned citizen reporting that a bloodstained shirt was found in a vacant lot which was
being used as a carnival. SPO2 Norberto Maninang, Jr., SPO4 Bonifacio Chavez and SPO2
Godofredo Ducut proceeded to the area and they found the t-shirt hanging on a plant. A
police officer called for BBB, the mother of AAA, and she identified the t-shirt as the one
worn by AAA in the evening of March 17, 1998. As the police officers were conducting an
investigation in the area, SPO2 Maninang noticed a man who looked like the person in the
cartographic sketch which he was carrying at the time. The police officers arrested the
man who turned out to be accused-appellant Jessie Maliao. Upon interrogation, Maliao
told the police officers that he was bothered by his conscience.
On March 21, 1998, Maliao executed an extrajudicial confession before SPO3 Orlando C.
Reyes. Before proceeding with the investigation, SPO3 Reyes advised Maliao of his
constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Areuela Bundang Ortiz. Maliao declared that
he went home at about 10:00 p.m. of March 17, 1998 after having a drinking session with
accused Bohol and Chiong and several others. After twenty minutes, Bohol and Chiong,
together with AAA, arrived in his house and they asked him if he still wanted to drink but
he declined the invitation. Bohol, Chiong and AAA then entered his house. He narrated he
went out of his house because he did not want to drink anymore. But when he heard a
groan, he went back inside his house and saw Bohol on top of AAA who was already naked
while Chiong was seated on the wooden bed watching. When Bohol stood up, Chiong laid
on top of AAA. Maliao confessed he just stood beside a cabinet and masturbated. He then
watched Chiong stand up, take a small stool and use it to hit AAA on the chest and head.
Bohol and Chiong then carried the bloodied body of AAA and told him to clean the room.
He wiped the bloodstains in the room, on the clothes of AAA, and on the wooden bed and
small stool. He threw the t-shirt of AAA at the lot behind his house and placed her short
pants inside a sack which contained garbage. He also threw the curtains he used in wiping
bloodstains at his house and hid the small stool. He did not know where Bohol and Chiong
brought the body of AAA but was aware that the body was found the following day in a
vacant lot in front of his house. After AAA was found, Bohol approached him and told him
not to say anything or else he would be killed. He saw Chiong standing near a store. Maliao
identified the t-shirt, curtains, small stool and wooden bench and human figures
representing Bohol and AAA while the former was on top of the latter.
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, performed the autopsy on the
body of AAA on March 20, 1998. He stated in his autopsy report that AAA’s cause of death
was traumatic head injury. He testified that AAA sustained numerous abrasions and
contusions on different parts of her body, hematoma on the forehead and scalp, fractures
on the skull and complete laceration of her hymen at the 3 o’clock and 6 o’clock positions.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused Bohol and Chiong filed a Motion for
Express Leave of Court to File Judgment on Demurrer which the RTC denied.
Among the accused, only Maliao put up a defense.
On January 29, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced them to suffer three death penalties, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, this Court
hereby sentences them each to suffer three (3) death penalties. They are further ordered
jointly and severally to indemnify in the amount of ₱100,000.00 … the heirs of the victim;
₱100,000.00 for moral damages and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to People v. Mateo, this case was first referred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated August 2, 2006, affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC by finding accused Maliao guilty not as principal but as an accomplice
to the crime as well as modifying the damages awarded. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, by finding
accused-appellants Norberto Chiong y Discotido and Luciano Bohol y Gamana guilty as
principals in the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing each of them to two (2)
reclusion perpetua, and finding accused-appellant Jessie Maliao y Masakit guilty as
accomplice in the same crime and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The accused-appellants are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of AAA the amounts of
₱200,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱200,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with the principals being solidarily liable for ₱150,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱150,000.00 as moral damages and ₱35,000.00 as exemplary damages and
subsidiarily for the accomplice, and the accomplice being liable for ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱15,000[.]00 as exemplary damages and
subsidiarily for the civil liability of the principals.
SO ORDERED.
From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review.
In separate Manifestations, appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
and appellant Maliao, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), informed the Court that
they were no longer filing supplemental briefs and will merely adopt their briefs before the
Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
Accused-appellant Maliao raises the following issues:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
The only issue to be resolved is: Was accused-appellant Maliao’s guilt as accomplice in the
crime of rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt?
The appeal, in our view, lacks merit. Appellant Maliao’s conviction as accomplice in the
crime of rape with homicide must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that despite the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial
confession, Maliao is not entitled to an acquittal. Citing People v. Culala, the Court of
Appeals rightfully noted that the extrajudicial confession of an accused who was assisted
by a Municipal Attorney during the custodial investigation is not admissible in evidence
because the latter cannot be considered an independent attorney.
However, in spite of the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession, Maliao is not entitled
to an acquittal because when he testified on cross-examination, he admitted that all the
answers he gave to the questions propounded on him by the police investigator are true
and correct of his own personal knowledge.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court on Evidence provides that an admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Maliao admitted he saw
Bohol and Chiong rape AAA; that Chiong picked up a wooden stool and hit AAA with it on
the chest and head; that Bohol and Chiong carried the bloodied body of AAA, instructed
him to clean the floor and then they went out of the house; that he cleaned the room by
wiping the bloodstains; and that he threw the t-shirt of AAA, placed the latter’s short pants
inside a sack containing garbage, threw the curtains which he used in wiping the
bloodstains, and hid the wooden stool. He likewise admitted that he led the police officers
to the place where he threw the pieces of clothes which he used in wiping the bloodstains
in his house and that he accompanied the police officers to his house and pointed to them
the wooden stool which he hid.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of
design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design
of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
In this case, Maliao facilitated the commission of the crime by providing his own house as
the venue thereof. His presence throughout the commission of the heinous offense,
without him doing anything to prevent the malefactors or help the victim, indubitably show
community of design and cooperation, although he had no direct participation in the
execution thereof.
Having admitted his involvement in the crime and considering the weave of evidence
presented by the prosecution, seamlessly linking Maliao’s participation in the heinous
offense, as elucidated by the autopsy report and testimonies of other prosecution
witnesses, no doubt can be entertained as to Maliao’s guilt. Beyond reasonable doubt, he
is guilty as accomplice to the crime of rape with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 01299, including the sentence of guilt and the penalty imposed on accused-
appellant Jessie Maliao, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

LITO VINO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of
this Court dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding
of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged
principal in a separate proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house
at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to
watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting,
he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that
he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of
their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in
the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from
the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and
coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino
and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the
bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they
stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions.
Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo
Cacananta took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed
with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt.
Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on
March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately,
the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of
the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced
with the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in
his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which
the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, a decision was rendered by the trial
court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to
pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the
judgment of the lower court.
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS
BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON
THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN
LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE
ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL
VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS.
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the
JAGO was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He
was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a
decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted
by the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved
to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for
reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to comment. The required
comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information
as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible
for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no
doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show
that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its
commission or must have known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering
that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an
armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses,
Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which
is proved.
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there
was a mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of
the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in which case
the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him
in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense.
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission
of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense
committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the
petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence
adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted
as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right
then and there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence.
At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The
answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the
offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted
can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court
ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance
of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless
be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, where this Court held in an arson case that
the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where
it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an
accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the
petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the
commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar
who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the
identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada
identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which
testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato
Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius
Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing
Salazar as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the
identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the
shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement
agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of
the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at the crime scene
and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial court
made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law
enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of
concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the
successful prosecution of the case.
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the
prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he
was not positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard
the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime
immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime
and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established.
In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable
independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could
be tried and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission
of the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The
answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was
Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the
separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial
court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun
riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did
not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established
beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene
of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of
the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an
accessory for helping in the escape of the principal even if the latter is himself found not
guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply in the
case at bar, which is sui generis and not covered by the general principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was
named as the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for
lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the escape not of an
unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been
exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held liable for helping an innocent man,
which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should therefore be reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission
of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices,
take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is
acquitted, as where the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo
32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the
crime or the effects or instruments may be convicted if the commission of the crime has
been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or
assisted in his escape, may not be convicted unless the principal, whom he allegedly
harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19
of the Rev. Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar,
the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial separately
and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier.
The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven
the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial court
acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the killer of
Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting
in the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil.
194 cited in the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused
as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen
watch. Although the principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender
age and lack of discernment, the accessory was nevertheless convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under
paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime
of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to
and inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was
proven but the identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was acquitted
by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to
escape from the scene of the crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder,
for, as it turned out, the said passenger was not proven to be the murderer. The accessory
may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if the
alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows
the principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.