ARTICLE XI.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

A Public Office is a Public Trust

It shall not to be understood as a position of honor, prestige and power but position of
rendering services for the public good and not for public gain.

Section 1 furthermore stipulates the roles and duties of every Public Officers and
Employees. be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Lead a Modest life: Public officers and employees should not expose themselves with
extravagance. They shall live the same as an ordinary Filipino.

1118.Hipolito v. Mergas

Respondent committed acts which may be called "moonlighting" and which are contrary
to civil service rules and regulations. It is not normally considered as a serious
misconduct, However, because of the nature of his position as sheriff. It amounted to a
malfeasance in office.

1119.Bornasal, Jr. v. Montes

Deputy Sheriffs must at all times be circumspect in the performance of their duties and
must be fully aware of the responsibilities entailed in their functions and the propriety
needed afforded them.

1120.Almario v. Resus

The clerk of court is mandated to safeguard the integrity of the court and its
proceedings, and to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records. His
willful and intentional failure to obey this mandate constituted grave misconduct or
conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrants dismissal
from the service.

1121.Juan v. People

Public officer’s unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their custody,
in the pursuit of personal interests constitute fraud against the government; thus, the
present case is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.

1122. Re; AWOL of Antonio Makalintal

Habitual absenteeism causes inefficiency in the public service. One’s plight does not
excuse his total disregard of official duties. Any act which falls short of the exacting
standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.

1123.Estrella v. Sandiganbayan

An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct

evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his
accounts which he has not been able to explain the funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office.

1124.Malbas v. Blanco

The failure of sheriffs to verify complainants’ allegation that they were not parties to the
case in which the writ of execution was issued manifests blatant irresponsibility, for
which they must be meted with the appropriate penalty by their acts, the sheriffs
committed grave misconduct, oppression and conducted themselves in a manner highly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

1125.Manaois v. Leomo
Judges unjustified interference in the enforcement of a warrant of arrest constitutes
gross misconduct which can erode public confidence in the judiciary, for it is the duty of
a judge to uphold and respect the law, not to violate it.

1126.Re; Gideon Alibang

Habitual tardiness seriously impairs efficiency and hampers public service. Officials and
employees of the Judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of the
constitutional cannon that public office is a public trust.

1127.ABAKADA v. Purisima

Public officer binds himself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in
the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution, and attention
which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.

1128.Salumbides v. OMB

When a public officer takes an oath of office, one binds himself to faithfully perform the
duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that
prudence, caution and attention which careful persons use in the management of their
affairs.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.

What is the purpose of impeachment?

It is not to punish an officer but to remove an officer who does not deserve to hold
office.

Officers subject for impeachment:

President, Vice President, Members of Supreme Court, Members of Constitutional
Commission and Ombudsman.

What are the grounds for Impeachment?

Culpable Violation of the Constitution, Treason, Bribery, Graft and Corruption, Other
High Crimes or Betrayal of Public Trust.

1129. Ombudsman v. CA – 452 SCRA 714 [2005]

Article 11 Section 2 is an exclusive list and may not be increased or reduced by

legislative enactment. Ombudsman as enumerated refers to rank and not to the office.
Thus, its Deputies cannot be included in list of impeachable officer.
Impeachable Officer in a Quo Warranto Proceeding

1130.Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. 237428

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly

elected impeachable official may be removed from the office. The language of Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers. The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.

Section 3: PROCEDURE FOR IMPEACHMENT

The House of Representatives has exclusive power to INITIATE all cases of

impeachment.

Procedure:
1. Filling of verified complaint

1. Can be filed by:

1. Any member of the House of Representatives or
2. Any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member of the House or
3. By at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives

2.) Inclusion of complaint in the order of business with 10 session days

3.) Referral to proper Committee within 3 session days thereafter

4.) Submission of Committee report to the House together with corresponding

resolution

1. There should be a hearing

2. There should be a majority vote of the members
3. The report should be submitted within 60 days from referral, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of ALL its members.

5.) Calendaring of resolution for consideration by the House

Should be done within 10 session days from receipt thereof

6.) Vote of at least 1/3 of all Members of the House necessary to:

1. Affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or

2. To override its contrary resolution

Note: If the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment was filed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House, it shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment. Trial in
the Senate shall proceed.

7.) Trial in the Senate

1. Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment
2. For this purpose, the Senators shall be under oath or affirmation
3. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the CJ of the Supreme Court
presides. However, he/she will not vote.

In Francisco vs. House of Representatives, an impeachment case is the legal

controversy that must be decided by the Senate while an impeachment proceeding is
one that is initiated in the House of Representatives. For purposes of applying the one-
year bar rule, the proceeding is “initiated” or begins when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action
8.) Judgment of Conviction

This requires the concurrence of 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate

9.) Effect of the Impeachment

1. Removal from office of the official concerned

2. Disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines
3. Officer still liable to prosecution, trial, and punishment if the impeachable offense
committed also constitutes a felony or crime.

Section 4: SANDIGANBAYAN
Sandiganbayan = the anti-graft court

Offenses fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever the two requisites concur: (a) the offense must have been committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed for the
offense charged is higher than prision correctional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). This is true even though the information
originally filed before the RTC did not aver that the accused public officer had
committed the offense charged in relation to his office.

Sections 5: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Composition:

1.) Ombudsman/Tanodbayan

2.) Overall deputy

3.) At least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao

4.) Deputy for military establishment may be appointed

Art. 11. Sec. 6. Appointments

 The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the
deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service
Law.
 Powers of the Ombudsman over his office:
o Has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, except his deputies.
 Include the power of setting, prescribing, and administering the
standards of the officials and personnel of the Office.
o Power of administrative control and supervision of the Office.
 Authority to determine and establish the qualifications, duties,
functions, and responsibilities of various directorates and allied
services of the Office.
 Ombudsman vs. CSC, GR No. 162215, July 20, 2007
o Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
body as a guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power
to appoint all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman,
except his deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of setting,
prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel
of the Office.

Art. 11. Sec. 7. Tanodbayan as Special Prosecutor

 There are two distinct offices that were created in the Article 11 Section 7
provision. These are:
o The Ombudsman or Tanodbayan
 Inherits the title of the Tanodbayan.
 Acts as champion of the people, independent and not beholden to
the President.
 Will have persuasive powers plus the ability to require that proper
legal steps are taken by the officers concerned (final say as to
prosecution will belong to the executive department).
 May seek to compel the fiscal to prosecute by mandamus in proper
cases.
o The Special Prosecutor
 Inherits the prosecutorial responsibility of the Tanodbayanof the
1973 constitution but is no longer called Tanodbayan.

 Quimpo vs. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

o The Tanodbayan has jurisdiction to entertain and prosecute complaint
against employees of corporations which started as private corporations
but were later on acquired by the Government as subsidiaries of a
government owned corporation, e.g., Petrophil which is a subsidiary of
PNOC.

 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988)

o The incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT
GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.

 Acop v. Ombudsman, GR No. 120422, September 27, 1995

o Military deputy may investigate civilian police. The Ombudsman "may
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties" as
 Congress may prescribe through legislation. Therefore, nothing can
prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control
over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military
establishment.

 Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545

o The office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials"
and to "investigate any act or omission of any public official when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."

 Almonte v. Vasquez, GR No. 95367, May 22, 1995

o The Ombudsman and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution
“protectors of the people” and as such they are required by it “to act
promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation.”

 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997

o Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

 Camanag v. Hon Guerrero, GR No. 121017 [1997]

o The Tanodbayan’s powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of
the Tanodbayan’s/Special Prosecutor’s powers under P.D. No. 1630 or
grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution
on the Office of the Ombudsman.”

 Macalino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140199-200

o Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations; Employees and officials
of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) are not public
officers within the coverage of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, inasmuch as
PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law
on corporations, and the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them.

 BIR v. Ombudsman, GR No. 115103, April 11, 2002

o “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.”
 Laurel v. Desierto, GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
o The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he
is a public officer.

 Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, GR No. 164250 [2005]

o If the Ombudsman delegates his authority to conduct administrative
investigation to the Special Prosecutor and the latter finds that the
preventive suspension of the public official or employee subject thereof is
warranted, the Special Prosecutor may recommend to the Ombudsman,
or the designated Deputy Ombudsman if the Ombudsman inhibited
himself, to place the said public officer or employee under preventive
suspension.

 Perez v. Sandiganbayan, 503 SCRA 252

o The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.

 Calingin v. Desierto 529 SCRA 720 [2007]

o The Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders.

Art. 11. Sec. 8. Qualifications

1. Natural born citizen of the Philippines

2. At least 40 years old
3. Members of the Philippine Bar
4. Must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election
5. 10 years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines

Art. 11. Sec. 9. Appointments

 The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be:

1. Appointed by the President of at least 6 nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council.
2. From a list of 3 nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
 Appointments shall require no confirmation.
 All vacancies shall be filled within 3 months after they occur.
 Art. 11. Sec. 10. Rank

1. Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions

2. Shall receive the same salary (shall not be decreased during their term of office).

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years
without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election
immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.(Gonzales III v. OP)

Determination of Scope of the Jurisdiction of Ombusman

 A public officer is one to whom some of the sovereign function of the government
have been delegated(Laurel v. Desierto)

 Ombudsman may investigate any act or omission of any public official when suvh
act or omission appears to be illegal,unjust, improper or inefficient(Deloso
v.Domingo, Lexina v. Ombudsman)

 Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of an anonymous

letter it does not violate the equal protection clause(Almonte v. Vasquez,
Baustista v. Sandiganbayan, Roxas v. Vasquez, Kara-an v.
Sandiganbayan)
 Ombudsman has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters whenever charges of graft and corruption are involved (People v.
sandiganbayan)

 Ombudsman can act on complaints filled in any manner(Raro v. Sandiganbayan,

Uy v. Sandiganbayan)

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.(Macalino v. Sandiganbayan, Samson v.
Ombudsman)

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.(Garcia v. Miro, Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan)

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds
or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action. (Maceda v. Vasquez)

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and
with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.

POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN

1. Can investigate only officers of government owned corporations with original

charter.(Khan Jr. v. Ombudsman)
2. Jurisdiction of OMB over disciplinary cases involving public school
teachers(Ombudsman v. Estandarte)
3. Imposes penalties in Adminintrativ v. Lucero)e cases(Ombudsman v. CA,
Ombudsman
4. Special prosecutor may file an information without the authority from the
OMB(Perez v. Sandiganbayan)
5. Conferred rule making power to govern procedures under it(Buencamino v. CA)
6. Preventive suspension will only last ninety days(90), not entire duration of the
criminal case like petitioners seem to think.(Villas Nor v.Sandiganbayan)
Powers of the OMB is delegable to an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of
the OMB, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in
their regular capacities or as deputized OMB prosecutors(Honasan II v. Panel of
Investigators of the DOJ)

Note: The primary jurisdiction of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a
public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the sandiganbayan. In
cases cognizable by regular courts, the ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
other investigative agencies of government.( Ombudsman v. Rodriguez)

ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES

KHAN JR VS OMBUDSMAN
 The Ombudsman can investigate only the officers of the government owned
corporations with original charter. Pal, even when still owned by the government
did not have original charter.

OMBUDSMAN VS ESTANDARTE
 The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases involving public
school teachers has been modifies by Section 9 RA 4670, otherwise known as
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which says that such cases must first
go to a committee appointed by the Secretary of Education.

OMBUDSMAN VS LUCERO
 The Ombudsman Act authorizes the Ombudsman to impose penalties in
administrative cases.

OMBUDSMAN VS CA
 The Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalty on the
public official or employee.

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY VS PUNONG BARANGAY

 In Local Government Code, elective officials may be dismissed only by the
proper court. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend
and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove.

PEREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
 The Special Prosecutor may not file an information without the authority from the
Ombudsman. RA 6770, by conferring upon the Ombudsman the power to
prosecute, likewise grants to the Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of
information. A delegated authority to prosecute was also given to the Deputy
Ombudsman, but such delegation exists to the Special Prosecutor. Nor is there
 an implied delegation. The Special Prosecutor prosecutes when authorized by
the Ombudsman.

BUENCAMINO VS COA
 The Ombudsman has been conferred rule making power to govern procedures
under it

MEDINA VS COA
 The one who is answering an administrative complaint filed before the
Ombudsman may not appeal to the procedural rules under Civil Service
Commission.

VILLASENOR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
 Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent
the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office
to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. Preventive suspension of petitioners will
only last 90 days, not the entire duration of the criminal case The Court has thus
laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum
period of 90 days.

OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ
 Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Bayan over
administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions
below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.

OMB VS ESTENDARTE
 The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases involving public
school teachers has been modifies by Section 9 RA 4670, otherwise known as
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which says that such cases must first
go to a committee appointed by the Secretary of Education.

SALVADOR VS MAPA
 Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a
law.

OMB VS MASING
 The power of Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.

MEDINA VS COA
 The one who is answering an administrative complaint filed before the
Ombudsman may not appeal to the procedural rules under Civil Service
Commission.
BORJA VS PEOPLE
 Local water districts are GOCCs and not private corporations because their
existence do not derived from the Corporation Code, but from Presidential
Decree No. 198. Thus, Petitioner Borja is a Public Officer

Preventive Suspension and Imposition of Penalties

1201. Buenaseda vs Favier [G.R No. 106719]

The petition was dismissed, When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman
the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13
[3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the
word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil.
371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a
procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance
with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative
charges.

1202. Hagad Vs Gozo-dadole [251 SCRA]

Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends
that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree
preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it.
Said section of the law provides:
 Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.

1203. Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio – [GR. 118813] 271 SCRA 67

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of
the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected
with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the
grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long
tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to
create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers
regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise
from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee
as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office (Sec. 16, RA 6770).

Case 1204. OMB v. CA – [160675] 491 SCRA 92

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman and his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct,
or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Case 1205. OMB v. Madriaga – [164316] 503 SCRA 631

We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee – akin to
the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause,
of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in
nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be
interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of
office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer,

Case 1206. OMB v. CA 507 [167844] SCRA 593

Thus, the undeniable conclusion is that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction,

authority and power only to recommend the penalties it imposes in administrative
matters, as in the instant case. Therefore, premises considered, we find the
Ombudsman to have committed reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision
dated October 28, 2002 [and in] considering the aggravating circumstance of previous
conviction while failing to properly appreciate the mitigating circumstances. Thus, we
find petitioner only guilty of Neglect of Duty instead of Dishonesty and, accordingly,
should be penalized with suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

Case 1207. Estorija v. Ranada – [159314] 492 SCRA 652

Although petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has only the powers
enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do
not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a
government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action to the officer
concerned. The court found petitioner’s contentions without merit. Rep. Act No. 6770
provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the
power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a
more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.

Case 1208. - OMB v. Lucero – [168718] 508 SCRA 593

The Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model

whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt
and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the
people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees,
giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The
legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
actions.

Case 1209. Balbastro v. Junio – [154678] 527 SCRA 680 [2007]

The Court explicitly held in Estarija v. Ranada:

Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in section 13,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would
spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,
specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and employees, except members of the Congress, and the
Judiciary. To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No.
6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not
merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770
and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly
remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary

Case 1210- OMB v. CA – [168079] 527 SCRA 798 [2007]

The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion
that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be "an activist
watchman," not merely a passive one.

In Estarija v. Ranada,1 petitioner assailed as unconstitutional his dismissal from

the service by the Ombudsman. Petitioner in Estarija alleged that the Ombudsman did
not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective
or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of Sections 15, 21, and 25 of RA 6770, thus affirming that the powers of
the Office of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Court ruled
in Estarija that under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official,
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary

Case 1211- COA v. CA – [158672] 529 SCRA 245 [2007]

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official

1212. OMB v. Santiago

Respondent is guilty for violating AGACPA. OMB has the power to recommend the
removal respondent for his act. Even if the word “recommend” in Par. 3, Sec. 13, Art. 11
of the Constitution, the powers of the OMB are not merely recommendatory. OMB has
the constitutional power to directly remove an erring public official from his office except
a member of Congress and Judiciary.

1213. Gobenchiong v. CA
OMB rightfully exercised its authority to place respondents under preventive
suspension. It has the full administrative disciplinary authority over erring public officials
and employees, except members of Congress and Judiciary.

1214: Marohomsalic v. Cole

Marohomsalic was validly dismissed. OMB has the disciplinary authority to investigate,
and prosecute erring public officials and employees.

1215: Ombudsman v. Lisondra

CA held that OMB has no power to impose penalty on public officers. However, SC
ruled that OMB is a constitutionally created office. Lisondra and her companions were
validly dismissed. OMB has the power to prosecute offenses committed by erring public
officials and employees.

1216: Miro v. Abugan

OMB has the power to impose administrative sanctions on erring government officials.
Its powers are not recommendatory. It has constitutional powers to impose penalties.

1217: Cesa v. Ombudsman

CA declared that the penalties that OMB can impose are only recommendatory.
However, SC ruled that Cesa is guilty because of neglect of their duty and the powers of
OMB of recommending is not merely advisory but mandatory. It has constitutional
powers to directly remove erring government officials from their office.

1218: Ombudsman v. De Sahagun

CA rules that the nature of the function of the OMB was purely recommendatory and it
did not have power to penalize erring government officials. However SC ruled that CA
erred and that the OMB has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee.

1219: Ombudsman v. Samaniego

OMB is vested with full administrative disciplinary authority including the power to
determine the appropriate penalty on erring public officials or employees.

1220: Boncalon v. Ombudsman

OMB has the power to impose penalties to public officers, such as the removal from
office in this case.

1221: Ombudsman v. Beltran

CA ruled that OMB could only recommend the removal of the erring public official or
employee. However, SC ruled that The term “recommend” in par. 3, Sec. 13, Art 11 of
Constitution is not only advisory but mandatory. OMB has the power to impose the
penalty of removal to public officials or employees found to be at fault.

1222: Ombudsman v. Apolonio

OMB has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority.

SECTION 13: Fact-finding distinguished from Preliminary Investigation

Fact-finding is the gathering of information to ascertain the facts. The fact-finding

function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the
Ombudsman. (Raro v. Sandiganbayan)

Preliminary Investigation is the determination whether a crime has been committed

and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. (Serapio v. Sandiganbayan)

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Like Judiciary (Article VIII, Sec 3), Constitutional Commission (Article IX, Sec 5) and
Commission of Human Rights (Article XIII, Sec 17), The Office of Ombudsman enjoys
Fiscal Autonomy to further enhance its independence. It does not request to the office
of the President or any Government agency for the release of its approved annual
appropriation.

Section 15. Right to Recover Properties Unlawfully Acquired

 The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
 Section 15 does not prevent prescription of the crime.

1228: Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. Sandiganbayan

The State can still recover the penalties unlawfully acquired by the defendants because
this right of the State is not barred by prescription. Thus the right to recover unlawfully
acquired properties against Licaros have not prescribed.

1229: Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Ombudsman
Petitioner’s contention is correct. Section 15 of Article 11 of the Constitution applies only
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any
business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or
controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions,
the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during
their tenure.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

OBJECTIVE:

 Strengthen the concept of public office as public trust

Section 18. Allegiance of Public Officers

 Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at
all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall
be dealt with by law.

1230: Caasi v. CA
 Section 18 does not apply to this case because Merito Miguel acquired the status
of an immigrant of the US before he was elected to public office, not “during his
tenure” as mayor.
 The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which
states that in order to be qualified to run for elective office, he must “waived his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country”
 In this case, he did not waive his status as a permanent resident of the US.
Without which, he is disqualified to run for any elective office.

1231: Sampayan v. Daza

 Daza should not be disqualified as member of the HOR because this is already
moot and academic and it is evident that the petitioners seek to unseat Daza
from his position in the HOR.
 HET has the rightful jurisdiction since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Daza.
 Appropriate remedy is to file a petition to cancel Daza’s certificate of candidacy
before the election or quo warranto case with the HET within 10 days after
Daza’s proclamation.