The Professional Journal of the US Army -_ --- ..

December 1986
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 THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE USARMY ‘
11
Published by

. . US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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HONORABLEJOHN
O.MARSHJR. Secretary of the Army

LIEUTENANTGENERAL GERALDT.BARTLETT Commandant

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From the Editor

Christmas is normally a time when we think of toys, gifts, and the like. I remember
as a youngster in the 1950s I thought I had arrived when I received my first metal erec­
tor set. In its day, it was state of the art in technology applied to toys. My erector set
served to stimulate imaginations large and small, acting as a springboard to new
ideas and new ways of dealing with my developing world. As a gift, the opportunity to
unlock the vault of creativity is a great one, and that erector set got a lot of use. Tech­
nology was truly one of my teachers.

In our Army today, there is sort of a rift when if comes to technology. On one side,
there are those who say techtiologists have forgotten the human factors in war. On the
other side, some well-meaning professionals point fingers and say the humanists are
nothing but old conservatives masquerading as medieval warriors and romantics.
Our question in this season of “glad tidings” is: Where is the middle ground? Have
some professionals forgotten that techn&logy does have a place in the human condi­
tion?

Technology has always had a place in the art of war, and it always will. Those who
believe otherwise deserve a great big Brons cheer. Therefore, maybe some have been :
too quick to condemn technology. Maybe we tend to look for simplistic, comfortable
solutions where there are none. And maybe, unlike the children we were in our youth,
we have been afraid to reach out and grasp technology and make it work for us. This
i
failure has served as a big roadblock and, in turn, has limited our own creativity as ,~
wartighters.

So, heresy of heresies, we at Military Review think it is time to look at the techxtolc)­
gy problem a little differently. We do not cast it as the villain in this issue. From Gem , ~
eral C&man’s article on educational technology to Major Maginnis’ piece on selecting I
emerging technologies, we offer you a look at technology as somsthing that can be ~ .
used, something that can be molded, but something that ie not a panacea.

At the same time, we at the journal wish you, our valued readers, a most happy and
joyous holiday season. As you sit down with your children and the gifts they receive,
think how far we have come since our own childhoods. Also, think how far we might
go, given the smiles and sense of excitement in the faces of our children as they play I
with their new toys.

1
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* S. L. A. Marshall Lecture Series Continues

The annual S. L. A. Myshall lecture series at Fort Leavenworth,
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and Bruce R. Pafmer.

* Where Have All the Seabees Gone?

In preparation for its seventh annual reunion to be held in Fort
Worth, Texas, during MaY 19S7, the 46th Naval Construction Seabee
Battalion is searching for approximately 400 of the 1,012 Seabees
who served with the unit during World War IL The battalion has
thus far located 360 fiving and 2SS deceased members, but the search
continuee for the remaining Seabees who served at Guadalcanal,
New Caledonia and New Guinea. Battahon members, or anyone with
information concerning a member, should contact Mary Holliway,
1893 Northwest 11, Oklahoma Ci&, OK 73106.

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Military Review

VOLUME L)(VI DECEMBER 1986 . N012

CONTENTS
4 EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
by General Paul F. German, US Army, Retired
12 WHAT IF IT WORKS?: AIR ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY FOR DEEP AITACK
by Lieutenant Co/one/David R. Mats, US Air Force, Retired
26 LHX

by Co/one/ WWiarn D. Siuru Jr., US Air Force, Refired,

and Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bus/ck, US Air Force, Retired

32 SELECTING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

by Major Robeti L. Maginnis, US Army
42 VIEWPOINTS ON TECHNOLOGY:
44 THE ARMY IN SPACE: NEW HIGH GROUND OR HOT-AIR BALLOON?
by B. Bruce-Briggs
50 MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND ROBOTICS
by Captain Ricky Lynch, US Army,

and Captain Michael R. McGee, US Army

57 WHY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WON’T WORK

by Major Kenneth H, Rose, US Army

64 CITIZEN SOLDIERS:

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD CELEBRATES 350 YEARS

66 ABUSES OF GERMAN MILITARY HISTORY

by Danie/ J. Hughas /
77 INSIGHTS

78 SUMMARIES the best from otherjournals !.

,,
80 LETTERS

86 NEWS
1’
88 BOOK REVIEWS contamporaiy reading for the professional
,
92 INDEX—VOLUME LXVI, January-December 1986
(
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 Articles to Watch For: .
Maneuver Warfare and All That
Lieutenant Colonel ’Mark R. Hamilton, US Army
�
The Operational Level of Deterrence
Major Dorn Crawford US Army

Soldier Overloading in Grenada ‘

Major (P) James M. Dubik, US Army,

and Major Terrence D. Fullerton, US Army

,
 EDUCATIONAL

TECHNOLOGY

Yesterday Today and Tomorrow

General Paul F. German, US Army, Retired 1
,@,

—.
\ -. .1, _—.— -.--— -­
‘. ,
—
> ;--—
 In a time of resource constraints, better, more efticient and more
cost-effective methods of training and education must be found.
This article was originally a paper presented to the Army Exten­
sion Training Conference sponsored by the US Army Training Sup­
port Center in May 1986. The author presents his views on how to
get better returns for the money.

N 1973, Isaac Asimov, the famous futur­
ii ist and science fiction writer, attended a
conference on educational technology. Tele­
vision (TV) cassettes were then considered
the wave of the future. A number of papers
were presented by educators enthralled
with the possibilities of storing an extensive
trove of information, readily retrievable by
a student. The TV cassette, it was held, con­
stituted the beginning of a new era in enter­
tainment and could open new vistas in
teaching. When some mishap befell one of
the scheduled speakers, Asimov was unex­
pectedly asked to speak. In an impromptu
talk, he invoked his experience in imagin­
ing the future and invited his audience to ac­
company him on an intellectual foray into
what was to come.
He began by describing the size, bulk and
expense of the apparatus that decodes the
analogue signals recorded magnetically on
the cassette tape, controls the flickering
beam which stimulated the face of the bulky
picture tube and evokes synchronous sound
from the audio amplifier and speaker sys­
tem. Obviously, he predicted, the relentless
drive of technology, aided and abetted by in­
ternational economic competition, would
assure that this auxiliary equipment be­
came progressively smaller, lighter, more
mobile and more responsive to its users’ ,1
habits and needs. Eventually, he opined, the
auxiliary equipment would be eliminated
and combined with the recording rnediuml
the cassette itself.
Asimov then turned to the considerab e
energy requirements for a 1973 TV casse$1e:
system, That 1973 audience was keenly at­
tuned to the implications of the Uni~~d
States’ dependence upon foreign-supphed
fossil fuels. Accordingly, he predicted that
our engineers would systematically rec@ce
the energy requirements for the system to
the point that its energy requirements ~
would be negligible. )
Hence, he prophesied, “we can look for-J
ward to a small, light, self-sufficient, immi­
nently portable information source. While it’
would consume energy and materials in its
manufacture, its cunning design would all

MILITARY REVIEW * December 1986 5

 but eliminate a need for a power supply.
Moreover, he thought it would be possible to
design the cassette so that systern/learner
transactions could be completely private,
with no possibility of infringing upon the ac­
tivities of others. Since it could function
anywhere, it would take learning to wher­
t ever the student desired—intothe field, into
bed or into other environments which, in no
way, resembled a classroom. Individual in­
struction on job sites would become a dis­
tinct possibility.
But, Asimov said, these were by no means
the limits of the marvels yet to come. He be­
lieved it would be possible for the cassette bi
be activated by brain waves, eliminating
the need for switches, knobs or other me­
chanical controle. In effect, the cassette
would be started at a glance and stopped
whenever the eye or attention was averted.
Further, he opined, there was no reason why
such a cassette could not be programed to
provide for random access to any of its
frames. Conceivably, some sort of index sys­
tem would be keyed to the learning experi­
ence so that very elegant mapping by educa­
tional technologists would he feasible and
the learning paced to the absorptive capaci­
ty of the student.
How many years would it take@ develop
such a learning system? How long would
tdnology take, assuming continued strong
stimulus from commercial competition, to
evolve this self-contained, energy-inde­
pendent, mobile, perfectly private, mental­
ly controlled cassette? Asimov’s answer was
“sooner than we think.” His estimate was
minus 500 years.
Asimov was describing, of course, a print­
ed book. He timed its development from Jo-
hannes Gutenberg of Mains who invented
movable type in the middle of the 15th cen­
tury. Asimov went on to extol the advan­
tages of the printed page as a medium for
teaching. He felt it was superior, for most
educational purposes, to other forms of re­
6 December 19S6
cording. With a book, the reader’s imagina­
tion was relatively free to embellish the
printed word.
Asimov did not argue that books could or
should replace TV and related forms of au­
dio-visual communication. He described
reading as an activity confined to a shrink­
ing minority, a form of communication that
had been confined to societies’ elites for all
but a fraction of recorded history. He went
onto predict that the same elites-which he
thought were less than 1 percent ~f the
world’s population—would remain wedded
to the printed word.
But, of course, the US Army’s problem lies
with the 99 percent-with the nonelite, to
use Asimov’s construct. It is abundantly
clear today that neither traditional school­
houses nor other paper-based instructional
systems will enable the Army to transcend
the dKticulties it faces. These difficulties in­
clude advanced technology and relatively il­
literate users and maintainers, constrained
budgets and ever more competition among
readiness; sustainability, modernization
and force structure.
From the perspective of educational tech­
nology, the Army’s challeng~s are more nu­
merous and demanding than those of the
other services. It is, therefore, understand­
able that the Army has led the way with the
Electronic Information Delivery System
(EIDS) which is now, according to the De­
fense Visual Information Standardization
Committee, the 12epartment of Defense vid­
eodisc standard. *
As I see it, EIDS is the culmination of a
search which began at Fort Monroe, Virgin­
ia, in 1974. It was then,-as I recall, that I first I
“ showed a videodisc at the US Army Tr~in­
.Nole, howver, that !ha AmY hiw lagged beh,nd the NW and !he Am
Force f. serious etiom lwzgade ..?1 W@.mrdand squadron] frmmg for
mdmd,~s Fort“,lanm, the USAx For@ %enca and ‘khno!.qy Prrqrm
now mc!udw an advamjd on.thwab !rahmng system, predcnkd on me {act
th.t 70 P3ma”l c.ftecimcn tmn!ng m-wrenm”ls th.! SUPWII ““II m,ssums
are rIIOt thr0U9h on.th6.job tra,”!”g and affect more than 90 Per.,”! of ,4,,
Fmce e“l(wd Lwrsnnnel.
� MILITARY REVIEW
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 7
fig and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Commanders’ Conference. I talked about
the prospective convergence oflowered costs
forstoringinformation and for processing it
interactively with students. But, just asit
took TRADOC 12 years to develop and tield
the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
System (MILES), it took us the same period
to bring EIDS to fielding. Yet, MILES is hy
no means all that needs to be done with col­
lective training. And even the most enthuei­
sstic supporter of ELDS till under@md that
it can offer no more than partial answers to
the tough questions facing those who design
and direct the Ariny’s individual training.
Let me enumerate the more important of
the pending questions on individual and col­
lective training. I believe it is imperative
that any group concerned with the future of
educational technology needs to understand
them. They have not changed much over the
past 13 years. There are at least three fun­
damental questions
e How can the Army balance readiness in
its units with individual training and edu­
cation in TRADOC institutions?
e HOWcan the Army optimize its invest-
merits in training for readiness to afford the
continuing modernization of its materiel
and force structure?
e HOWcan the Army define tasks and con­
ditions and establish standards of per­
formance both horizontally and vertically
throughout its ranks?
In the larger sense, these are all strategic
problems of educational technology. The
choices today’s leaders make will govern the
future of Army training. ‘“
Concerning the perennial tension be­
tween institutional and unit training, our
Army-one of the more robustly conserva­
tive institutions within US society-cher­
ishes its heritage of mobilization in time of
crisis. But that past is no sure guide for the
ftiture. Events in the modern world will
probably not as readily delineate peace from
8 December 1986.
war or allow the nation time to redirect its
social energy from peaceful to martial pur­
poses. For the foreseeable future, the Con­
~efis and the US electorate are going to
have to continue large expenditures to
maintain, and periodically to update, a
large standing force capable of deterring
war by being demonstrably ready to fight.
But the Army’s extensive TRADOC sys­
tem of schools has been built around our mo­
bilization heritage, designed largely to ad­
vance the training or education of indi­
viduals and, thereby, to increase their po­
tential for larger responsibilities. But an of­
ficer or noncommissioned officer in school is
not available to a unit. I believe it is true
that many of the changes in TRADOC
schools over the past two decades have in­
volved hard choices between manning the
force or providing better leaders for tomor­
row.
But I argue now, as I have over the years,
that educational technologists could free
the US Army chief of staff from having to re­
gard such choices as either-or. They can en­
able him to select from alternatives, making
it possible to train or educate, evaluate and
credit as well in units as is ‘how possible in
schools. Hence, I see a requirement for over-
arching training management which can
assess need and accomplishment. It must
deliver training or education to most of the
Army’s individual leaders who, most of the
time, serve in operations vice school assign­
ments. In the long run, nothing less will
work.
Concerning the tension between readi­
ness and modernization, I have already de­
scribed how institutional training subtracts
from readiness by diverting critical man­
power from units into an expensive training
base. There are extensive annual outlays
imputed to unit training, including training
ammunition, field ex&cises and the related
consumption of spare parts and automatize
fueis. Training costs have been rising over
MILITARY REVIEW
MILiTARY REVIEW � December 1986 9

rekent years. For an Army with a fixed end
strength which must plan for a fixed budget
(or even a reduced budget) in the years
ahead, either the,Army must tind more cost-
effective ways to train or forgo some of its
planned materiel modernization or part of
its structural upgrades, or both.
At the same time, in US Army, Europe,
traditional training methods relying on ma­
neuvers in the countryside and live fire at
major training areae are under severe at­
tack from politically potent environmental­
ists. Again, I suspect that educational tech­
nologists could supply remedies, but I am
not sure they have been brought to bear.
I have long doubted that firing live am­
munition at two-dimensional, pop-up or
moving targets continues to make much
sense in an era in which most direct-fire
weapons are equipped with infrared sight­
ing devices and many have laser range find­
ers and on-board fire control computers. I
know that robotic, freely maneuverable,
three-dimensional targets are available
and that such targets can be realistically en­
gaged with lasers with almost no loss of real­
ism unless one insists on the environmen­
tally objectionable concussion.
With the Defense Advanced Rssearch
Projects Agency’s (DARPA’s) SIMNET
project now under way at Fort Knox, Ken­
tucky, it is possible to contemplate force-on­
force engagements without even having to
position elements of a task force on the same
continent. However, I detect disconnects be­
tween such obviously related projects as
EIDS, the Integrated Training Manage­
ment System (ITMS) being fielded at Fort
Lewis, Washington, the upcoming effort to
automate the Army Training and Evalua­
tion Program (ARTEP) and SIMNET, the
up~ades contemplated for the National
Training Center (NTC), the new Joint Read­
iness Training Center, DARPA’s AirLand
Battle Management project and the Army
Research Institute’s several undertakings
10
1.
directed at training and evaluating senior
leaders or their staffs.
Were I one of the Army’s leaders, I would
be looking with urgency for a way to pull all
that disparate, largely research-oriented ef­
fort together and to focus it on the larger
question. I could conceive of an integrated
program of individual and collective train­
ing in units resting on EIDS, ITMS, SIM­
NET and NTC-like fisld exercises for bat­
talions. These could be coupled at higher
echelons with battle simulations and corps­
levsl instrumented tactical exercises with­
out troops (TEWTS) which permit evalu­
ated, opposed maneuvers over actual ter­
rain in real time. whether my vision is true
or not, somehow the Army—and the Air
Force-must find a better way to train for
the AirLand Battle without sacrificing
needed improvements.in its equipment and
structure.
Concerning standards of performance, I
am aware that the vice chief of staff of the
Army has asked perceptive questions as to
whether the Army has adequately defined
training missions horizontally across the
combat, combat support and combat service
support units of the force, ‘and vertically
from the theater echelon downward to the
lowest functioning units and detachments.
As far as I know, his questions have never
been answered.
From my own experience, I know we have
fecnsed our atten~ion, appropriately enough,
upon the combat arms and those arms and
services directly involved in aiding the
forrnerto control land and people. Moreover,
the Army has a propensity to drill repeated­
ly in the performances of units at battalion
or lower level and labors under strong budg­
etary disincentives for exercises involving
brigades, divisions or larger formations. I
These budget limitations are not all bad, for
I share the, h6resy of General Arth~r S.
‘tAce” Cbllins Jr. who wrote in his book
Common ,Sense Tmining: A Working Philos-
Dscember 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

ophy for Leaders concerning conventional
field training exercises (FTXe}
The benefits from afield-training exercise
extend to unite two levels below the highest
keadqwarters participating. In a company.
level exercise, the platoons, squads, tank
crews, andgun sections derive the most bene-
fit; a battalion exercise benefits the company
and platoon level; a brigade exercise benefits
the battalwn and company; and so on. If this
i-sa sound rule of thumb, ars~ if the training
of individuals and small units is the real key
of successful training, then field exercises
above battalien do not add much to the quali-
ty of training. The larger-unit exercises con-
sume time and resources that could better be
used to improve individzml and small-unit
training, the foundations of unit readiness.
Battalion-level exercises should not be held
too often; once a year is enough. Some
will disagree thoroughly u@h this outlook on
large.unit tmining, but there are good his-
torical precedents to argue persuasively tkat
full-scale division and brigade-level FTXS
are not essential to achieving a fully trained
status. For World War II, the Japanese
trained a formidable fighting force with no
exercises above battalion level. The training
of the Wehrrnacht emphasized small-unit
training and was dlwtefor the most part near
home kasernes. . . .
While I am sure that we should not
wholly accept the Japanese or Germans as
models-after all, they lost the war—I do
agree that, if resources and time are scarce,
.
> recemed aB.S. from the US MilifaWAcdemy
,,
4 uate of the USACGSC and the National War Col-
y kge. He has serued as commander
. ~z.
-j
;i’
j commission on Defense Management and a con­
“* *
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
EDUCATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY
giving priority to field exercises at lower ‘
echelons makes eminent common sense.
But the usual FTX will hardly do the job to-
day at any echelon. The Army has a doctri­
nal imperative for the pmficik.nt exercise of
command at higher echelone, derivative of
the speed and reach of modern weaponry
and of the ever-increasing interdependence
of the Army and the Air Force. A maladroit
corps staff can obviate very high proficiency
among tbe corps’ battalions.
AirLand Battle will be only rhetoric nn­
less there is genuine integration of air and
ground operations at the corps level. Train-,
ing for such integration now relies on simu­
lations driven by computers, using models
which are simply not credible to many gen­
erals as a measure of how the joint forces
might perform under the time-distance
stresses of actual operations. I em convinced
that the Army must now find a new format
for training for AirLand Battl~ne which
would permit, as I have indicated, an op­
posed TEWT for a corps and its air support
against a Soviet-type field army and its air.
If the Army can do so, it will be able to vali­
date, or to make more credible, its computer ‘ t
models. More important] y, it will he able to
find ways to train and evaluate its corps
commanders and their staffs to realistically!
high standards, better assuring the pre#­
dent and the Congress thai-our forces are ii&,
deed ready to discharge their wartime r$
sponsibilities.
But to find, the Army must search. %
Gene?alPafdF. Gormnn, US Army, Retired, op- >
crates a consulting seruice in Aflon, Virginia.He ,
and
an M.PA, fmm Haruard Uniuwsityand is a grad­
in chisfi US
Soutkcrn Command, Panama, and, smcc retiring,
as a commissioner on ttw Prssi&nt’s Blue Ribbon
sultnnt to tti Pre8i&nt’s Commission on Orga ­
m-zed Cn”me.
1
11
 A great amount of the literature concerning advanced technology
that is being developed for militarg ase centers on the question,
“What ifit doesn’t work?” Thti article, while concentrating on the”
US Air Force, attempts topati”ally answer the question, ‘What if
it does work?”
A LEADING US military theorist, I. B.
Hollev Jr., has postulated that “suue­
rior weapons favor victory. .’” That may
seem too obvious to bear quoting, but it was
not always so. And it may not be so today.
Both the US Army and the Nocth Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) issued modi­
fications of their doctrines in the early
1980e-the Acrny ‘{AirLand Battle” depict­
ed in the 1982 edition of Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations, and the follow-on forces
attack (FOFA) promulgated by General
Bernard W: Rogers at approximately the
same time,’ The concepts have much in com­
mon and have been subjected to a good deal
of criticism.’ Both depend heavily on new
weapons technology, and much of the criti­
cism is from skeptics who believe the tech­
nology will not work, it will cost too much to
use or it will simply be irrelevant to the out­
come.
US historian Ernest R. May has stated
that history does have a substantial impact
on policy, and that effect is often pernicious.
May argues that this is so because deci­
sionmakers tend to give that part of his­
tory through which they have lived undue
weight and that which came before their
own bicths is heavily discounted. May was
writing about political and strategic deci­
sions, but his ideas apply as well to techno­
logical choices.’
Are we so preoccupied with the technolog­
ical history of the Vietnam War that we dis­
count conflicts we cannot remember? Is it
possible thatl because the technological so­
lution did not work in Korea and Vietnam,
we are forgetting there were times when
technology was among the decisive factors?
MILITARY REVIEW � D@ember 19e6
Are we forgetting, too, that; in other in­
stances, it was potentially decisive, but the
decisionmakers were simply not ready to be­
lieve ifinot ready to exploit the technology
when it did indeed work?
1864
By the last summer of the American Civ­
il War, the Union Army had just come
through one of the bloodiest campaigns in
US histocy the Wlldecness, Spotsylvania,
Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor. At its end,
Robert E. Lee was fooled for one of the rare
times in his career. After endless weeks of
head-on attacks against the Confederates,
Ulysses S. Grant wae able to slip across the
James River to Petersburg before Lee dis­
covered it. Grant came cloee to taking this .
Rebel communications center and ending , ~
the war almoet a year earlier. But Grant’s
men just did not have the talent and,vigor to
capitalize on his stroke, and Lee was given a
reprieve to reorganize his troops arOund:P~­
tersburg. #
The bloodletting seemed destined to go I&:
forever. But an idea for a technological solfi­
tion arose in the 48th Pennsylvania Infan­
try Regiment, a unit with many coal miners.
They bun-owed a 500-foot-long mine tinder
one of the strongholds in the Confederate
fortifications. At 0440 on 30 July 1864, they.
set off 8,000 pounds of explosives, blasting ~
a 500.yard gap in the lines. It worked better~
than expected, but the Union Army simply
was not ready to exploit it. Rather than,
pouring through the gap and tearing up the
Rebel rear area, the spearhead unit ‘was
trapped in the crater and decimated. The
 .

United States continued its anguish for

eight more months.5

1915

When the ‘<Guns of August” spoke, it was

with a far louder voice than those that
roared for Grant and Lee. The bursting
shells of the Civil War days broke into two or
three pieces; those of World War I sprayed
hundreds of lethal fragments and, because
of new recoil mechanisms and breech load­
ing, they did it with deadly frequency. As
the war settled into a stalemate of trenches,
the generals began their long search for a
way out. They first tried to blast their way
through with the new artillery. In one 19­
day spell, the British tired 321 trainloads of’
artillery ammunition.e But artillery bar­
rages gave up what little chance there was
for surprise attack, and only direct hits had
much of an effect on the infantry burrowed
beneath the ground. The defenders’ ma­
chineguns guaranteed that those who at- ­

. gas drifted over the@rench

li;e; and incapacitated many while

terrorizing the rest. A 4-mile gap

appeared in the lines. In the absence

of an artillery barrage, the terrain

was still solid enough for the advance

of troops and their supply columns

behind them. However, the advance

was not made, for the technological

success was far greater than

had been expected.

(a) The SO- by 170-foot crater Iefi by the detonation of

8,000 pounds of sxplos!ves under the Confederate Ihnes,
Petersburg, Virginia. Portions of the Union mine shaft are
visible in this 1Se5 ptioto; (b) Austro-Dalmlsr 3-ton ar­
mored car with two machineguns in a revolwng turret,
1904; and (c) Early French 7Lssotgas mask, 1915.

tacked after the barrage was lifted would
not get through.
On 22 April 1915, the Germans, in a rela­
tively minor offensive at Ypres, first used
chlorine gas as a supplement to the tradi­
tional means of attack. The gas drifted over
the French lines and incapacitated many
while terrorizing the rest. A 4-mile gap ap­
peared in the lines. In the absence of an ar­
tillery barrage, the terrain was still solid
enough for the advance of troops and their
supply columns behind them. However, the
advance was not made, for the technological
success was far greater than had been ex­
pected. The reserves for exploitation were
just not available. So the war continued.’
1917
The French and British soon developed
protective masks, along with new and more
deadly gases to use against the Germans.
For the next two years, the flower of Europe­
an youth was squandered in futile attempts
to break enemy lines. At 0620 on 20 Novem­
ber 1917, a technological breakthrough al­
most occurred, but the technology used was
not particularly new. Good Gatlirzg guns
had been readily available at the end of the
Civil War and, by the turn of the century,
fully automatic machineguns bad been
widely used in the Boer and Russo-Japanese
Wars.
The Caterpillar-type track had heen in­
vented during the time of Napoleon Bona­
parte and had been used on US farm tractors
for many years. Armored cars with turrets
had been used in Europe since the first years
of the century. Still, at the Battle of Cam­
brai in 1917, the marriage ofthese technolo­
gies into a tank achieved the break in the
German lines for which the Allies had been
“bleeding for three long years. The British
tanks made a 4-mile penetration, but they
surprised themselves as much as the Ger­
mans. The mobile reserves needed to se,nd
MILITARY REVIEW � December i986
AIRARMAMENT
Most military theorists and
soldiers ask what will happen if the
technology for ‘deep operations’ does
not work. . . . There is plenty of criti­
cism . . . to warn as against being over.
reliant on technology. Is there enough
to steer as away horn being under-
reliant or to assure that we will be
ready ifit is actually the best case
that comes to pass?
through the break into the German rear
were just not available. Europe bled for an­
other full year before exhaustion and the
mobilization of US power succeeded where
technology had failed}
Most military theorists and soldiers ask
what w~li happen if the technology for “deep
operations” does not work. Almost all of our
leaders with World War II combat experi­
ence have long since retired, and our history
since then strongly tends to condition our
minds to the belief that technological supe­
riority may not, perhaps will not, yield vie- ,
tory. There is plenty of criticism, then, to
warn us against being overreliant On tech­
nology. Is there enough to steer us away{
from being underreliant or to assure that ~
will be ready if it is actually the best oa$e,
that comes to pass? ,,,
AIR SUPERIORITY ,
According to conventional theory, if the
air superiority battle is won, then all things i
are possible on land, at sea and in the air. ~
The battle, though, is more complex than it
used to be because the ground-based air de-~
fenses have become so fearsome since, the
end of World War II. Not only must one con­
sider the old-fashioned air-to-air encounter
15
.

but also attacks on the enemy’s aircraft

bases and especially the assault on his
~’ound-based air defenses—defense sup­
pression. Some of the new weaponry affect­
ing a-u superiority are:
* The AMRAAM. The advanced medi­
um-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) pro­
gram is well along in development. Several
successful tests have been accomplished,
hitting or passing within lethal range of
the targets. A companion program for a new
advanced short-range air-to-air missile
(ASRAAM) is being conducted by a Europe­
an NATO consortium. The AMRAAM will
greatly expand the air superiority capabili­
ties of US and allied air forces. It exceeds the
best of the current ALW7 Sparrows in that it
can engage multiple targets simultane­
ously, is an all-aspect weapon, has a very
high speed and is lighter and smaller than
the Sparrow (the F16 cannot carry the
AIM7). It is a %-e-and-forget” weapon that
perinits the crew to take evasive action or to
go on to the next target as soon as it is
launched.
a The DurandaG. Because of the great in­
crease in Warsaw Pact aircraft, their in­
creased range and their neti capabilities
against NATO rear areas (especially air­
fields), attack on adversary bases has taken
on a new importance. The new sophistica­
tion of Warsaw Pact air assets reliant on
complex airfields makes it possible to affect
the struggle aloft through an attack on ene­
my bases. That could so reduce the enemy
sortie rate that it would have a major impact
on air superiority.
Durandat runway penetrators are manu­
factured in France. They have been in the
US Air Force inventory since the early I

(s) Advanced medium-range air-to-a{rm!ssile (AMRAAM)

on an F16; (b) Durand@runway penetrators on an F4; and I
(c) Boosted kinetic enetgy penetrators (BKEP) and Bril­
ish-designed HB876 area denial minss inside dispenser i
(top) and after ejection (bottom),

1980s as an interim weapon until the boost­
ed kinetic energy penetrator (BKEP) is
ready for deployment. Durandals are good
weapons, but too few warheads can be deliv~
ered on a single pass. Thus, the development
of this kind of weapon continues.
e The DAACM. The direct airfield at­
tack combined munition (DAACM) takes
the Durarzdal another step. The idea is that,
while the Warsaw Pact air forces are aloft on
their initial strikes, the runways of their
main operating bases will be put out of
action by runway penetrators. The BKEP is
under development at the US Air Force Sys­
tems Command’s Armament Division to im­
prove upon the Durandal. It has a rocket
motor that will drive it all the way through
the runway surface before the warhead is
detonated, causing heaving damage that
MILITARY REVIEW . Decembsr 19e6
AIRARMAMENT
,1
will require excavation before it can be re­
paired. But the Warsaw Pact people will not
be able to get to that work quickly becaue,~
HB876 area denial mines will be scattered
over the area ready to blow up any b@­
dozers or other equipment. Those adve:s~ry
airplanep that do survive the AMRAAM
and other defenses will have to recover at”al­
ternate locations (if they can) where their
subsequent sortie rates will be much lower.
e The improved 2,000-pound bonlb. A
central concern in the NATO area and Ko:
rea has been a continuing adversary pro;
gram for hardening important structure?
such as command, control and commtinica­
tion bunkers, munitions storage facilities
and aircraft shelters. The standard 2,00@
pound bomb has been in the inventory’since
the 1950s, and the Air Force has found it to
“ 17
 be instilcient for the newly hardened tar­
gets. Therefore, an improved 2,000-pound
bomb has been developed to penetrate and
destroy such targets. Here, a relatively ob­
vious technological improvement can make
attacks on some hitherto invulnerable tar­
gets possible. For others, it can reduce the
number of sorties needed.
@ The HARM. The weapons most often
used against air defense weapons in South­
east A=ia were the AGM45 ,$hrike and the
AGM78 standard antiradiation missile
(Standard ARM). The former came on the
line in 1964 and the latter in 1969. The
Shrike did good work, but its frequency
band was limited, it was subject to counter­
measures and its speed gave the enemy mis­
silemen time to shut down their radars,
depriving the missile of the source of its
homing signal. The Standard ARM was sub­
stantially improved in that it had a broader
frequency capability, longer range, higher
,.­ speed and wae somewhat less subject to ene­
---­ . .-: ..,. .C. **.W .­ “­ .
my countermeasures. However, it was more
than double~he weight of the Shrike, and its
cost was substantially higher. ~
The high-speed antiradiation missile
,. (HARM) came on line 15 years after the
., .<!
& Standard ARM. It is quite a bit lighter \Iian
the latter but heavier than the Shrike. A
joint Navy-Air Force project, the HARM has
a substantially higher speed than its prede­
cessors, and its rocket motor emits less
smoke. These advances and other improved
capabilities reduce the enemy’s ability to
shut down his radar. Even if this happens,
.,.:
t. . . . ...’.. .,., ..” the HARM will continue on its course to
~.<:. ..
,.,..:~-... ,+ ..,,­ ..’ ,’ ”.... -
,. ..­ ,’,. .. =:.. -. ’$”’ “ . the last radar position without any out­
side guidance. All of that makes it much ,
more dit%cult for the Warsaw Pact.
The HARM received its baptism of tire
against the Libyans in the spring of 1986. A
lower cost complement for wider application

Improved 2,000-pound bomb penetrating 6 feet of rein­

forced concrete

could be useful. A self-protection weapon
(SPW) is under study. The concept is that
the SPW would be light and inexpensive
enough to include in the combat loads of
strike fighters, but the aircraft in dedi­
cated defense-suppression units would be
equipped with the HARM, or a mix, for at­
tack on the most serious ground-based
threats.
CLOSE AH? SUPPORT
AND INTERDICTION
Since tbe beginning, the purpose of
achieving air superiority was to permit air
power and the surface forces to turn to the
accomplishment of their other missions.
Among the leaders of the surface arms since
World War II, it has been an article of faith
that air superiority is a prerequisite for all
other activities. Tbe “extended battlefield”
and FOFA see interdiction as one of the
principal “other activities’’—perhaps the
principal activity.
Much of the criticism of AirLand Battle
and FOFA has concentrated on a perceived
preoccupation with the attack on the second
echelon to the neglect of the tiret. Most of
the rebuttal has been that the perception is
wrong. The advocates are stalwart in the no­
tion that the tights against both echelons
are equally important and part of the same
battle.’ In any eveut, botb sides of,the argu­
ment assert that both close ai~ support
(CAS) and interdiction are vital functiOns.
In Vietnam, the air forces performing
those two functions faced great] y improved
defenses, but their bombs were still of World
War II vintage. The rockets initially used
fm-air-te-surface attack were improved, but
not much different in concept, from those de­
veloped at China Lake late in World War II.
The gun commonly used in Air Force air­
craft then (and now) was the 20mm M61
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
AIRARMAMENT
Gatlinggun, anorderofmagnitudemoreca- ‘
pable than the .50-caliber M2 Brownings of
world War II. On the whole, though, in
1965, surface defenses had improved much
more than had the munitions for CAS and
Much of the criticism ofAirLand
Battle and FOFA has concentrated on
a perceivedpreoccupation with the
attack on the second echelon to the
neglect of the first. Most of the rebut­
tal has been that the perception is
wrong. The advocates are stalwart in
the notion that the fights against both
echelons are equally important and
part of the same battle.
interdiction. Some advanced munitions for
CAS and interdiction are:
e The LGB. One of the favored stories of :
the nonnuclear armament development
community is the tale of the Than Hoa
Bridge. A principal choke point in North j
Vietnam, it cost the lives of many aircraft z ‘
crews over the years. Finally, the infamous
bridge was destroyed with a tirst-genera­
tion laser-guided bomb (LGB).’O The bridge~
had been previously hit by Bullpup missile~~
but their warheads were insufficient. $,,
2,000-pound LGB wrecked it on the first t~.
The old LGB would have difficulties today.
Its launch basket (the air space from which
the weapon had to be released) was so small
that it limited the feasible tactics and made
the delivery aircraft more vulnerable t~an
necessary. Also, its standoff range was not .
great enough to safely use it in a European !
/
scenario.
Anew weapon is now in production and is J
far superior to the first-generation LGBs in.
that it permits a very low-level delivery., Be­
cause the launch constraints are more re­
laxed, great reductions in attrition and in­
19
 creases in weapon effectiveness are expect­
ed. The Paueway 111, a new guidance kit for
the standard 2,000-pound bomb, greatly im­
proves NATOS capability against fixed tar­
gets in ooth CAS and interdiction.
0 The Mauerick. Sine? the end of the
Vietnam War, the television (TV) -guided
Maverick has been improved in ways that
could well affect the balance between air de­
fense and attack weapons. The original ver­
sion was dependent on fairly stark con­
trasts, implying that it was a weapon for
‘good-weather, daylight operations. An in­
frared (IR) Maverick has been developed
that can be used at night. A laser-guided
model has also been created. The weapon
would be highly useful in both CAS and in­
terdiction. But it is relatively expensive,
and its warhead is too small for many tar­
gets. Adverse weather degradee the per­
formance of both the TV and IR versions,
and the laser item requires a person with a
hand-held designator who is sometimes un.
available or vulnerable.
e The TV bomb-guidance kits. No one
would want to engage the Warsaw Pact
ground defenses any more than necessary.
The US Air Force Systems Qommand has
been trying to reduce their threat in many
ways. One way has been to give ground-at­
tack weapons a standoff launch capability.
Doing that without sacrificing accuracy can
be expensive.
One solution has been to provide the
standard 2,000-pound bomb with a guided
bomb unij (GBU15) kit that gives it both a
gliding capability to extend its range and a
TV guidance system to give it accuracy. An­
other model of the weapon being tested
comes with IR guidance for nighttime and
limited adverse weather use. In both air su­

(a) Pavsway /// laser-guided bomb (LGB); (b) Laser-

guided AGM65E Maverick Ori an A4M attack aircra~ (c)
GBU15 TV-gu]dsd bomb on an F4: and (d) AGM130
power-gu]ded bombonanF111.

p&iority missions and other ground attack
roles, the GB Ul 5 will reduce attrition and
the number of rounds required for a given
target. When added to the improved 2,000­
pound bomb, it will give NATO a new stand­
off capability. It will also provide precision
guidance against tough targets on Warsaw
Pact air bases, on the battlefield and along
the route of the second-echelon units headed
for the fight.
e The AGM130. The GB U15 achieved its
additional standoff range by adding airfoils
to the standard bomb. Adding some power
was only a natural next step. The powered
guided bomb, the AGM130, is the followon
to the GB U15 TV bomb. The rocket power
unit gives NATO aircraft even greater
safety from local defenses when attacking
Warsaw Pact airfields or lines of communi­
cations. Now in full-scale development, it
provides kits for the standard and improved
2,000-pound bombs.
@ Aircraft guns. The air-to-air gun re­
ceived a premature requiem several times
since World War II. Both the F89 Scorpion
and the F86D Sabre were put aloft without
guns of their own. Shortly, though, the
splendid 20mm M61 Vulcan appeared and
was designed into the 3’105 and others in the
late 1950s. However, the AIM7 Sparrow
and the AIM9 Sidecoirzder were coming
along so well that the early versions of both
the Navy and Air Force F4 Phantoms were
designed without guns.
But the combined effects in Vietnam of
rules of engagement requiring visual iden­
tification before opening fire and the mini­
mum release ranges of both missiles se­
verely constrained US fighters. The North
Vietnamese MzGs, with their internal guns,
got a better break than they deserved. A
quick fix was putting the M61 Gatling gun
into pods to hang on the pylons of the F4s al­
ready in service. That hurt their perform­
ance and range. The F4E was designed with
ita own internal gun, making life for the
MILITARY REVIEW � December 19S6
AIRARMAMENT
MiGs more dangerous when at close ranges. ‘
Both of the subsequent fighters, theF15 and
F16, were designed with the same internal
gun.
During the waning days of World War II,
air-to-surface rockets seemed to limit the fu­
ture of the gun in that role. True, they could
not achieve the muzzle velocities of guns,
but the warhead could be made so much
bigger that the impact speed did not mat­
ter that much. Once the rockets were ex­
pended, the weight of the plane was greatly
reduced, but the gun had to be carried back
to base. The M61 did some yeoman work
against ground targets in Vietnam. That
and the growing Warsaw Pact armor ad­
vantage led to designing the A1O T/umder­
bolt around an advanced 30mm gun simi-
During the waning days of
World War 11, air-to-surAace rockets
seemed to limit the future of the gun in :
that role. . . . [but the] M61 did some
yeoman work agaiast ground targets
,!
in Vietnam. That and the growing
Warsaw Pact armor advantages led
to designing the AlO Thunderbolt
around an advanced 30mm gun ~
similar to the M61. ~
Iar to the M61. The result was the 30mtu
GAU8, with a new series of rounds havi,~g
alum:num cases and giving an impresswe
performance.
e A new gun pod. The F15 andF16 ~ere
designed primarily as a high-low mix to ~
achieve air superiority. Once such superior- ~
ity is achieved, the task would be to exploit:
it through CAS and interdiction against
both the first and second echelons. Both air-,
planes have the internal 20mm’ Vulcan, a
good weapon but not quite stout enough
against the adversary’s improving armor.
21
 The new 30mm ammunition was designed
epecillcally against that problem. The GAU8
having proven so successful, it was only nat-’
ural to wish to extend the benefits of the
30mm to other aircraft. Since aircrat% per­
formance is not quite as crucial in CAS and
interdiction as it is in defensive counterair .,
work, it has proven possible to create a
30mm gun pod (the GPU51A) containing a
four-barrel weapon based on the same tech­ ~
nology as the GAU8.
One of the airplanes that can be swung
from the air superiority to the ground attack
mission is theF16. One pod can be mounted
on the centerline of the F16, while the F4
and A 7 can carry two beneath their wings.
The pod gives NATO commanders a new
flexibility to meet changing conditions
along the front lines or to increase the
weight of the assault on the inbound second
echelon. The gun pod is already in the inven­
tory.
e The GATOR mine. The 30mm guns are
intended to serve primarily against moving
hard targets—armor. Another weapon is
aimed at the defeat of the same targets that
are fodder for the 30mm. The GA Z’OR mine
comes in two versions. The standard dis­

(a) GF’u5,4 gun pod and an F76A; (b) F4 with SIX GATOR 1‘
mme dispensers; (c) Combined effects bomblets (CEBS);
and (d) Detonation of one CEB dispenser load over test
vehicles I

,,
..%
‘.0 &
., ..., ... w

penser contains 72 m i nes (BLU91B) with
~haped charges that are aimed straight up­
ward as the mine lies on the ground. As the
tank rolls over it, the fuze is actuated by the
magnetic tield, and the charge bores a hole
in the thin underside armor. There are 22
other GA TORS (BLU92BS) in the dispenser
that are fragmentation weapons. The prob­
lem for Warsaw Pact soldiers is that it is dif­
ficult to visually tell the difference. Trip
wires set the BL U92BS off. It is enough to
complicate sweeping and at least put a delay
on the follow-on forces.
e CEBS. If the second-echelon troops be­
come so concerned with the GATOR threat
that they do not lift their eyes off the ground,
their tanks are liable to get hit from the oth­
er direction. An alternate load for an F’4 (or
other aircraft in varying numbers) would be
six dispensers, each one loaded with 202 of
the combined effects bomblets (CEBs)—
.1,212 delivered by each F4. The CEB has a
contact fnze. When it hits the ground or the
top of a tank or truck, its shaped charge tires
downward. At the same time, the casing
bursts, sending a huge shower of fragments
to punch holes in gas tanks, or whatever else
they hit, and incendiary material to set the
fuel on tire.
e SFWS. The CEB is a free-fall item, de­
pendent wholly on the pilot’s aim. Many of
the CEBS will miss tanks—though they
might still damage other vehicles and
troops in the column moving toward the bat­
tlefield. Something more is needed. The
new BLU108 sensor-fnzed weapon (SFW),
known as the Skeet, comes in tactical muni­
tions dispensers having 10 submunitions,
each of which contains four warheads (40 for
the dispenser).
The submunitions are ejected some dis­
tance above the ground. They descend on
parachutes until a radar altimeter triggers
a rocket motor that propels them back up­
ward and spins them. The spin throws out
the warheads, themselves spinning. Their
?
MILITARY REVIEW � Dscember 1986
AIRARMAMENT
IR sensors describe a track over the ground, ‘
leaving little chance for a hot engine to
escape. Once it is detected, the warhead
charge is instantly detonated, forging a slug
out of a concave copperplate mounted on its
bottom. That slug is propelled downward
through the top of the tank. NATO aircraft
can deliver four or more of these dispensers,
amounting to 160 warheads per sortie. It
has been said that it would take eight con­
secutive miracles for one of the warheads to
work. Two recent tests resulted in direct
hits on target tanks for all four of the war­
heads in each submunition,
Ijveryone knows that it is a long way from
the test range to the battlefield and, unlike
the GAZ’OR and the CEB, the SFW is still
some way from entering the invqntory. The
technology entailed is fairly well-matured,
and it is likely to multiply the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, com­
‘mander’s options against follow-on forces.
SPECULATIONS
,i
Mostof the weapons technology so far dis­
cussed is mature. Theee weapons are either
already in the Air Force inventory or clase td
it. There e many other munitions p$­
grams that e more esoteric, and those th&
work out wiY 1have their own multiplying if­
fects. The Army and Navy also have plaris
afoot that will add to the weight of the
NATO air forces’ assault. Recall, toq, that
the proven effectiveness of many of the @m­
unitions can also enhance the power ofar­
tillery or ground-launched missiles. That:
redundancy could, in the end, prove a hedge j
for the FOFA in the face of the continuing)
improvement in Warsaw Pact air defenses.
It is also worth remembering that we
have consideredjust one pap of the military
power equation—nonnuclear armament
technolo~. The impact of the airherne warn­
\
23

(a) A Royal Air Force operations room from wh!ch fighters
were controlled from the ground by radar and radio during
the Batile of &itaIIY (inset) Air Chief Marshal Hugh C.
Dowding; and (b) !% airborne early warmng and control
system (AWACS).
ing and control system (AWACS), the Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Sys­
tems (JSTARS), improvements in aircraft
and engine performance, the Low-Altitude
Navigation and Targeting Infrared Night
System (LANTIRN) and the Global-Posi­
tioning System will add to that capability.
The outcome could well amount to more
than the sum of the parts.
A combination of fairly mature aerody­
namics technology in the Spi@e and Hur­
ricane, with eight well-matured Browning
machineguns, thoroughly matured com­
munications technology and immature ra­
dar technology, had dramatic results in the
summer of 1940. But all that would certain­
24
ly have gone for naught except f~r the per­
ceptiveness of one mfiitary m-averick and a
few bold civilians. Had Air Chief Marshal
High C. Dowding and his civilian sup­
porters shrunk from making a substantial
investment in immature radar technology,
then all of the sacrifices of the “few” in 1940
would not have made any difference. If
Dowdinghad not foreseen the synergy of the
combination of technologies and built his
elaborate command and control system to
integrate them, the ‘<narrow margin” might
not haye been there at all.”
Still, Karl von Clausewitz taught us that
war is uncertainty. He wrete that pure chsnce
can decide momentous events. Everything
in war, he said, is simple, but even the sim­
ple is very difficult. As inspiring as the Bat­
tle of Britain still is, we cannot forget what
happened to our marvelous Flying Fortress,
its Norden bombsight and its picklebarrel
bombing when it found itself over Schwein­
furt with a flight of four Messersdwiitts fly­
ing straight at its windscreen. That and the
memory of the seeming impotency of tech­
nology in Korea and Vietnam are too pain­
ful to permit us to easily put ail of our egge in
the technological basket.
Many would argue that it was a failure of
will (or judgment) and not technology that
led to the sad outcome in Vietnam. With
FOFA, it would certainly be a different case. I
There can be no question that NATO would
be on the defensive, fighting for its own turf
and not for some abstract voting right for an
alien people. In that context, technology
might be more determinate.
Most critics are not advocating surren­
der—farfrom it. Some say that the technolo­
gy will not work or is too expensive but that
deterrence or victoi-y can be had through
some strategic or tactical changes. Others
hold that, if only the military can improve
the teeth-to-tail ratio through some reor­
ganization, the problem will be solved.”
Maybe there is something in that, but some
December 19e6 . MILITARY REVIEW
 AIR ARMAMENT

would fear that what they really imply is and guided by a valid strategy, really does ‘
the substitution of bodies ~or bucks. “ - produce an outcome greater than the sum of
What if technology does work? Honey was the parts, will there be enough of the arraa,
all too correct when he said that superior ments to carry it through? Will there be
weapons “favor” victory. They cmmot guaran- enough fully trained operators and main-
tee it, for there are many other factors in- tainers? Do we have ihe policies necessary
volved. Lieutenant General Leo Marquez has to till the ranks with people who can absorb
recently written that our tendency to see a that training? Have our leaders pondered
coutlict as a ‘“short war” is liable to inhibit the their choices should our technology and
proper filling of our supply bins to sustain a strategy work out better than expected?
longer one.” Rogers has complained that Have our decisionmakers pondered in ad-
shortages in ammunition stocks and other vance what they would do if it suddenly be-
conventional deficiencies are liable to drive came possible and seemingly easy to thrust
bimearly on to recommend tbe nuclear option across into Czechoslovakia or East Germa­
to avoid surrender.” ny to grasp the values that might move their
If the new armament technology, com- opposite numbers to an early and uncle.
bined with all of the other improvements manding peace conference? ~

NOTES
1 I S Honey J, Ideas and WeWo”s, Arch.” SC&s, Hmldm Cm” 10 CQlonel De[berl Co,”m, L,EulwIanl Colonel Gten” G,,{WI. L,e”!enanl
1971, P14. CQlo”el James Jones, L,e”le”mt CO1O.I,I Ke,lh Kra”sq L,e”!e”mt CO!.”.(

2 General Bernard W Rww$, Tati,u and Technotoqy,, NATO’, S,x- Ronald Lord, L,wte”ml C4to”el Robe” Msfl,”, L,euleha”t CO],,,] Malcalm

teen NaOom, F@ 1985. PP 1622, end General Don. A Start)’, ExlenO,ng W<”!,, and L,eute”anl Colonel Da”,d Young, The Tat, of Two Br,dge,

the SSli@l,eld. Mrlrtam fiewew. March 7987. LID37.50 USAF SOICIW8S1 ASI. Monograph S,..s, Volume 1,Mmqr.sPh 1, US 0.9”.

3 !.@@ Jo. s Powell, A,rLand Ban!. ‘the Wrong Doctrine Ior the emnen! Pnntmg OffIce, Weshlngmn, D C, ?976, m ?.96

Wrong Reman AJ,U”WWSIVRW,,W, May+”. !985, w 15-22, Steven L. T 1 Derek Wood and Derek DernPsle,, The Na,mw Mwqr”, McG’aw.H,ll

Cmby, II, Convent,o”a! D,!,”,. 01 Eu,oPe The OPeref,ona! L,mit, of S.mk Co, NY, t961, pP409.i6

EmemJ”g Tmhnoimy: Wor!sng PaPe, N“mt.e, 55, W,!,.” Center, Wesh. 12 Elmer D,.,,, and Paddy Gr,ti,fh No! 0“,, by Chn.wnm NA TO, C,..
!nubn, D C., remnted m Cumenl Maws, Soec,d Ed,l,o”. 17 Sm!embe, ! 965. w Fmnlm Wmfd Wwnl, Hwxmne Seas, N Y, 1983 though not hlngmg

a% D, JetfrL?; Record, Oefend,”g Eu,oPe Cxmve”t,onally An Anmman Ihe,r ,rg”ment o“ any a“\,l@motwy Ihes,s, da POP.,. that a conventm”al

Persmctr”e 0“ Needed Reforms. A!r Unwers,?.’ Rw,ew Seotembe,-Oc!o defense E Poss,ble ,1 only tha s{,alegy w,!! be nwd,l,ed {o Prav>de {m the

....’0.,.
... .. .....
“. . . . . .

9rasP,.9.1 some Wamaw Pact values fhat wit ,.ducefhe other sde to wsh !.

4 Ernest R. May, Le.s.sO”Sof H(skmy The Use and M!wm 0$ {ha Pass ,“ lerm,nale a war w)thml gwmg m 10 m ,mdef)n$!eslalemate Cmby, q al ,s

A7ne”cm Fore,gn Pol,cy, Oxford Ltn<vers,iy Press, N Y !973 W<c.late ,s h,, argument that {he Wnerg,”g technology ca”nd be !unded

5 me Wesr mm! Ams of A?mncm INars, ed!ted by Colonel Vmce”f J ,“0 !s !0. unreliable ,“ any w,”:. [n M,, P?ecs, hwwl,es {hat the answer he,

Ewostlo, Pram.’ Publ>$hem, N.YY, 1959, volume t, Pmt. ?39 ,“ sImPl,l,cat,on d the orga”?mt,on and a ,. -an@?.,,, cm Ihe ,altack c.” {he

!. Brw’m, .?m Crassbow M H.Somb, Ind,. IUS{ eche!o” wh,ch t, eas.!er ,.6 mom rel<able lnan the follow+” 1o,c,$ ,1+

leek Elsewhere, Slew” L Cmby, M,l,la,y Reform end the A“ 01 War, ~ur­
“)”,1, M,”-dune t 983, w 120-27, IS ,x!JI,c!l m wqng that moqan,zat,on ~d
wno!xl$cat!on, along wth less mm... on techwlosw w?t$result In a SUHIC .t
,“crease ,“ the ,leelh 10,.”0., the Nofih A!18”I,c Tree!, Om.mm!,cm s“t e-,
.. ....... ..... . “or tothe WarsawPact
:;
00 crt . 0.197-99’ and T,?, West Pam! Ada. of ?3 L,e,!enmt General Leo Mm”.,, The Shwl War Strategy I& ~
1,s,, A,, Force Jmlmal 01 Lows*.,, Winter 1986, PP 24
i 4 James Moray Sew.., Conventmnd Defmce Irnwovemenls whim J
!s tne All,ance Got”g?, NATO .%vmw, AP”l 1985, L)2

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, US ,4ir

Force, Retired, is a historian wzth the Armament
Dtw.non, US Aw Force S.ystenw Command, Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida. He recewed a B.S. from
thz US Navel Academy, an MA. fmm Columbza
Uniuersityanda PhD. fmm the UnwersltyofDen­
ver. Whale on ac~me duty, he taught military h&o­
ryat both the US MilitawAcademy and the US Air
Force Academy and commanded an AC130 gun.
ship squadron in Thailand.

MILITARY REVIEW � Dscsmber 1986 25

1,
 .
:,g.:
-~_ ..
AS new techuologg becomes available, new equipmeat fbrst in- -’X.
creases the capabi[itq of indiuidaals is dreamed OC desigued, de­ -=
-=
ueloped and, if all else goes wel[, fielded. The USA my’s new gen­ ‘.
eration of helicopters, the light, helicopter experimental (LHX),
promises to provide significant increased capabilities in the aot­
too-distant future.
e
.

Colonel William D. $iuru Jr., US Air Force, Retired,

$

F E helicopter is a major ingredient in

today’s US Army operations, with mis­
sions ranging from scouting and reconnais­
sance to aerial assault and antitank war­
fare. In the past few years, the Army has in­
troduced potent new helicopters such as the
AH64 Apache attack helicopter and the
UH60 Black Hauk utillty helicopter. Now,
the Army is starting a very ambitious pro­
gram to replace its huge fleet of light heli­
copters.
Studies such as A /rLandBattle 2000 have
presented an imposing challenge—over­
coming forces superior in number and pro­
jected to be equipped with sophisticated.
densely deployed weapons. Other studies
have shown that the current light helicop­
ters lack the capability to perform effective­
ly in the combat environment of the post­
1990s.
‘The new helicopter program is called the
light helicopter experimental fLHXJ and
promises to be the largest aircraft purchase
in the Army’s history. An important objec­
tive of this development is the use of ad­
vanced technology to produce helicopters,
that will be in service well into the 21st cen­
tury. Advanced technology is being applied
not only to make the LHX capable of per­
forming its missions but also to make it
more reIiable, simpler to maintain, more sw­
vivable on, tbe battlefield and easier to fly—
in most cases. by a single pilot, The Army is
quick to point out that. whileit may beusmg
and Lieutenant Colonel John D.
state-of-the-art technology. it is technology
that 1sfeasible today and, in many cases, al­
ready demonstrated and available.
Current Deficiencies
Currently, the Army’s light helicopters
include the UH1 H({c:Y, the AH1 Hue.Y Co­
bra, the 0H6 Cayuse and the 0H58 Kloua.
These hehcopters come up short in perform­
ance when compared to projected require­
ments and threats. For example, in the Mid­
dle East, with its high altitude and hot tem­
peratures, current systems are severely
limited in their load-carrying ability. The
Busick, US Air Force, Retired ,1
AHI, with Its two-man crew and an hour’s ~
worth of fuel, can carry only two Tow mis7
siles. The UHI can only c&rry a single Pasa
senger besides its three crewmen, Th(
0H58cannot carry any payload beyond a pi:,
lot and fuel.
TO survive in a hostile environment, heli~
copters must use nap-of-the-earth tactics.
“popping up” only momentarily to perf0rp3
their miss]ons, These helicopters are se­
verely limited in this type of flying, thus ex­
posing them to ground fire from small arms.
These light helicopters were designed with­
out much radar, infrared, acoustic or “isual
signature-reduction technology. What sig­
natlme-reduction techniques they possess
have been added as afterthoughts. The pro­
.,
jetted battle environment of the 1990s and
beyond is what is called a “dirty” battlefield.
Current light helicopters are limited when
it comes to surviving in nuclear, biological
and chemical (NBC) warfare.
There is also the matter ofbeing able to fly
and tight at night and under adverse weath­
er conditions. Cm-rent systems are limited
in navigation and target acquisition when
. . . the Army has set down the
basic characteristics it wants in the
LHX systems. The Army is looking qt
two versions+ scoutlattack (SCAT)
version and alight utility model. The
goal is to have 70-pereent commonality
between the two. Common design
would be in the areas of mission equip­
ment, propulsion and rotor systems.
Major differences would be found
in the basic fuselage.
a
visibility is restricted. They rely on map and
compass technique and navigational sen­
sors that will be obsolete by the year 2000.
The Army has a global mission requiring
rapid deployment anywhere in the world.
Current light helicopters are’ neither self-
deployable nor are they easily transported
by US Air Force aircraft.
Then, there is the logistics problem. The
current variety of helicopters means a large
inventory of spare parts must be kept to sup­
port operations. These systems are costly to
maintain and will get more expensive as
they get older.
The AHl, UH1, 0H6, and 0H58 are get­
ting old. By the time the LHX is expected to
reach operational status, the Vietnam-era
helicopters will be approaching an average
age of 20 years. Furthermore, they were de­
signed using 1950s technology.
With these deficiencies identified, the Ar­
28
my has set down the basic characteristics it
wants in the LHX systems. The Army is
looking at two versions—a scout/attack
(SCAT) version and a light utility model.
The goal is to have 70-percent commonality
between the two. Common design would be
in the areas of mission equipment, propul­
sion and rotor systems. Major differences
would be found in the basic fuselage. The
light utility version would be used for trans­
porting less than full-squad-size combat
groups as well as the myriad ofjobs the term
utility implies. The SCAT version would be
designed fox
o Surveillance and reconnaissance. ~~
o Local area security.
o Air defense suppression against air and
ground threats.
* Area suppression escort duty.
@ Antiarrnor.
e Containment, interdiction and harass­
ment.
To perform these duties, the SCAT could ,
be equipped with existing weapons such as
Hellfire and Stinger, 2.75-inch rockets and a
turret-mounted gun. The specifications call
for a mission gross weight of 7,500 to 8,50d
pounds to be used in a Middk! East-type en­
vironment-that is, at 4,000 feet in altitude
on a 95-degree day. The cruise speed is speci­
fied at 160 knots for the light utility version
and 170 knots for the SCAT. A rate of climb
of 500 feet per minute will greatly enhance
nap-of-the-earth flying capability.
The utility version will carry six to eight
troops and a two-man crew. The SCAT will
require only a pilot.
The LHXwillbe designed to minimize de­
tection and, if detected, limit damage by en­
emy fire. For survivability, ballistic toler­
ance and protection are important, To sur­
vive ground fire, the ability to fly nap of the
earth is a must. The helicopter’s combat op­
erating envelope extends from the ground to
150 feet in altitude. If all of this fails, the,
LHX must be crashv. .hy. It must also be
December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW
 To survive in a hostile
emrironment, helicopters
mast use nap-ofithe-earth
tactics, ‘popping up’ ontg mo­
mentarily to petiorm their
missions. [Current] helicop­
ters are severelg limited in
this tgpe of flging, thas ex­
posiag them tognxmdtire. . .
[and] were designed without
much radar, infi-ared,
acoastic or visual signature­
reduetion technology.
able to operate in an NBC environment.
The LHX will have an adverse-weather,
day-night capability not only to fly but also
to tight. Strategic deployment from the Con­
tinental United States (CONUS) to any­
where in the world is of significant impor­
9 tance. The LHX requirement is self-deploy­
ment for distances up to 1,260 nautical
miles. This means the LHX could be flown
from CONUS to Europe. Also, the LHX ceir
be transported in Cl 7, C141 or C5 aircraft.
Just two light helicopter models bring all of
the advantages of standardization in logis­
tics and training,
The Single Pilot
enemy weapons ranging from small-arms
and Advanced Technology
fl-e to sophisticated air defenses.
One of the major changes in the LHX
SCAT is the elimination of the co-pilot. This
has been a subject ofsome controversy in Ar­
my aviation circles. The main motivation is
cost. Studies have shown that a single-pilot
LHXcan lead to dramatic reductions in life-
cycle costs over an expected 20-year life
span. Also, using a single pilot conserves fu­
ture manpower resources which are project-
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
ed to become critical. However, tbe success
of a single-pilot LHX hinges on the fruition
of advanced technology and will require
even more highly trained pilots.
During combat, pilot tasks can be divided
into four areas. A pilot must cwiate, or fly the :
aircraft and maneuver is required. He rptmt
nauigate so he knows where he is, where he
is going and how to get there. He must corn- ~
nzunicate to receive and transmit informs- , 1
tion. And, finally, he must operate to man­
age and use all defensive and offensive sys­
tems, All of these tasks must he done while I
flying within a few hundred feet of th~
ground among hills, buildings and tree<
There may be wires to worry about as weIl as
There q-e two approaches tb handle, thk
tremendous work load. As has been done in
the past, two or more crewmen can be uskd
to prevent task saturation. Or, as is being
proposed for the LHX, advanced electronic
technology can take the place of additional
crew. The Army has been sponsoring sev­
eral major helicopter manufacturers in in­
vestigating the feasibility of a single-pilot
LHX.
Items identified for reducing pilot work
29
 AdvancedTechnologiesApplied
� Mwreed @mpmite sttuctums o ~805Eirghre * AdWncedRotorDesign
� Fiyby-ughtFfightControlSystem o Advanced?@$ionEquipment
� DragReduction * fntecratedf~utimated
Cockpit

,­

Mx versus 8!ackHawk/ApaGhe
* 43.perCentL8SSEnginePowerRequired * 62.psrcentimprovement in pa~ioa~~rossweightRatios
* &-PerZentLighterEmp~weight e 43-perceMLighterDesignGrossWeight
* %?-percenf
!-essMissionFuelRequired e Siinn! e-SeaiSChT(scouVaffack)

tion, the vast amount of information that

The fAiX will have urz
adverse.weather, day.alght eapabilitg
not onlg to #g but &o to @ght.
Strategic deployment from the Conti­
nental United States (CONUS) to
angwhere in the world is of significant
importance. The JJIX requirement is
$e[fideplogment for di8tance8
must be processd and the rqultitude of sys­
tems the pilot must controi require consid­
erable computer capability. Thus, the use of
emerging very. high-speed inte~ated cir­
cuit technolo~ is a must.
The Electro-Optical Target Acquisition
Desi~ation System (EOTADS) is anoth­
er important technology for the LffX.

ZZPto 1,260 nauticai mites. EOTADS is an evo~utionmy improvmen$

This mea~ the LHX could be flown on systems used in the AH64 Apache.

ti-om CY?NUSto l?uro~e. EQTADSwm&nes a forward-looking infra­

red sensor with a day Iight television and a

ia8errange finder/desi@atir, plus tbecapa­

bility for automatic scanning and semiauto­
load include an inte~ated cockpit, auto- matic reco~ition,

mabd navigation and targeting, digital To further reduce pilot work load, an au­
rnapa, interactive voice controls, sensor fu- tomated %irt.ual cockpit’> with a helmet­
sion, wide-fieId-of-view optics and digitaI mounted dispIay (RMD) will be used. With

flight controls. This high Ievel of automa- the HMD, the pilot is presenkd key infor­

30
December 1988 � MILITARY REVIW

m“ation superimposed on his field of view.
The display may be produced by miniature
cathode ray tubes mounted on the pilot’s
helmet and projected through visor optics.
The LHX system is also likely to include in­
teractive voice control technology for con­
trolling many functions. Head-tracking
technology could determine where the pilot
is looking at any time so sensors could be
pointed in that direction.
The LHX will be powered by twin T800
turboshaft engines producing some 1,200
horsepower each. Composite materials will
be used extensively. They offer significant
cost and weight e’avings aswell as providing
superior crash and ballistic protection, In
the maintenance area, the emphasis will be
on advanced techniques such as self-testing,
fault-tolerant and self-healing electronic
repairs. Training equipment and instruc­
tional material will be purchased from the
prime contractor as part of the total system.
Some 5,oOO units are planned at a project­
ed cost of $6 million (1984 dollars) for each
SCAT and $4 million for the utility version.
While procurement costs are significant,
the total life-cycle cost for an LHX fleet is a
driving force. The objective is to make the
LHX only half as expensive to operate and
maintain as the light helicopters it will re­
place.
Colonel Wdliam D Smru Jr., US AwForce, Re­
t,red, is a senior research assoc,ate, Unzuersit.v of
i
Colorado, and a free-lance writer. He recelued a
B. S,MJ7. from Wayne State Unwerszly, an
M. S.A-S. from iheAtrForceInstdute of Technolo­
gy and a Ph.D. from Aruona State University. On
actwe duty, he commanded the Frank J. Seder Re­
search Laboratoq. US Au’ Force Academy.
/
MILITARY REVIEW � December 19e6’
LHX
. . . the elimination of the co-pilof. . .
has been a subject of some controvers~
in Army aviation circles. The main
motivation is cost. Studies have shown
that a single-pilot I.,HX can lead to
dramatic reductions in life:cycle costs
over an expected20-year lifespan.
Atso, using a single pilot conserves
future manpower resources which are
projected to become critical.
The current schedule calls for full-scale
development of the LHX aircraft system to
start in Fiscal Year 1987. The first LHXS
should be reaching t,he. field in the mid­
1990s.
Like all new weapon systems, the LHXS
tactical use will be developed mainly by the
experienced pilots who will fly it and not by
engineers at the drawing board or by plan- ‘
ners in a headquarters. As the LHX is actu­
ally deployed, it will be put to new and yet ,
undreamed of uses. Tactics will evolve ,?
around its new capabilities. The use of a sin­
gle pilot, in itself, will require the develop­
?:-.
,..­
ment of new tactics as will the abundance of
new technology with which the pilot will ~
have to work. % ?,
$
Cl “~
3A
*,”, -i
, --
I
‘Y.— (
Lw&vmnl Colonel John 1). Busick, US Air
Force, Retired, is a free-lance writer spt-cuzlizmg L?I
auwtion topw.s. He recemeda B.G.S. from the UII ­
um.ity of Omuha, an MA.O.M, from the Unmer­
sity of Southern Califonua and an M.Diu. from ,
Denum Seminary. Whale on actme duty, he served
as a /ighter pLlot and was involued m flying safety
and amcmft mamtenance,
31
B IUTISH Major General J. F. C. Fuller
wrote
. . . tools, or weapons, ifonly the rightonm
can be discovered, form 99percent of uictory.
. strategy, corpmand, leadership, tour.
age, discipliaz, supply, organization, and all
the moral andphysicalparaphanalia of war
are as nothing to a high superiority of weap­
ons-at most they go to form the one percent
which makes the whole pes.sibie.’
The general’s enthusiasm for technolo­
gy’s role in modern warfare is overstated.
However, technology is a significant dis­
criminator on the modem battlefield.
Technology’s objective is to elevate man
to higher tasks while machines take over
mundane work. Throughout civilized histo­
ry, technological changes have progressive­
ly elevated man’s tasks, thus altering the
nature of war. For example, through the
ages, technokigy has influenced tactics and
the organization of armies. It has caused
war to spread from localized settings to
widespread confrontations. Modem war re­
quires a higher cost in terms of lives and na­
tional tinancial resources. Finally, modern
technological innovation provides a short-
Iived advantage to its authors.
War-making technologies too quickly be­
come available to potential adversaries. The
hemorrhaging of valuable military applica­
tions has resulted in a world power techno­
logical stalemate. The Soviet nuclear build­
up in the 1960s and 1970s essentially neu­
tralized tbe superiority the United States
enjoyed in the 1950s. The United States
soon recognized that a point of sharply di­
minishing marginal returns on the strate­
gic nuclear level had been reached. This re­
sulted in the decline in expenditures for
strategic weapons. Congress subsequently
switched its emphasis to conventional forces
technologies. That, too, pitted US technical
prowess against the Soviets and has also re­
sulted in a tendency toward technological
deadiock as evidenced in Vietnam, the Mid-
MILITARY REVIEW : December 1986
dle East and in sundry “wars ofnationallib­
eration.”
The Soviets’ technological parity with the
United States innumerous significant tech­
nologies results from their enormous invest­
ment in research and development (R&D).
The Soviets have nearly 900,000 scientists
and engineers dedicated to the furtherance
of military technologies. They more than
double the United States’ annual R&D in­
vestments. They complement this effort
with a special coordinating staff of nearly
20,000 tasked to acquire Western technolo­
gy through espionage, theft and director in­
direct purchasing.’
The United States will never totally etop
the unauthorized transfer of military tech­
nologies. However, it can increase its corn-’
bat readiness and effectiveness by more pm­
dently applying emerging technologies. A
prudent selection process includes an appre.
ciation for military technology’s influence
through history, an understanding of the fu­
ture threat and a methodology for selecting
emerging military technologies.
,j
Technolo~Through
Miiitaw Histo~ ,
,!
\,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower wisely~ ~
said, “the futwe will belong not to the faint-\
hearted but to those who believe in it and,
plan for it.” Konrad Kyeser, a 15th-centq
German military engineer, anticipated the’
future and planned accordingly. His ma~u­
script of future military technology dd­
scribes a battlefield with vehicles of war, .
guns and gunpowder, battering rams, lift- [
ing gear and hot-air balloons. His clairvoy- ~
ante is testimony to the fact that technolo­
gy’s future military applications can be an­
ticipated.
Learned anticipation of future technolo­
gies and their implications requires an ap­
33

preciation for technology’s in6uence through
history. A. study of war and technological
progress demonstrates that simple innova­
tions spawn refinements and counterinno­
vations.
The Bronze Age introduced superior
weapons. In 3000 B. C., bronze swords, hel­
mets and shields provided their bearers
with a decisive edge over an equally capable
warrior equipped with weapons of stone and
wood. In the .12th century, the Mycenaean
Greeks, equipped with bronze weapons,
were invaded and defeated by Dorians car­
rying iron swords. Once again, technologi­
cal superiority was the decisive factor.
The ancient bow and arrow was refined
through the centuries, and the crossbow wse
a significant advance. During the Battle of
Hastings in 1066, the crossbow was promi­
nent. King Richard I admired the weapon so
34
Advzncsd bmputers Seizsd during a
joint US-West Gennaflcustomsaction
much that he took 1,000 crossbow-bearing
soldiers on the Crusades. Pope Innocent II so
despised the weapon that he labeled it the
“most barbarous and cruel weapon.’”
The English lcmgbow outperformed the
crossbow at the Battle of,Cr6cy (during the
Hundred Years’ War), defeating the French
knights. The longbow’s countertechnologi­
cal superiority put an end to the age of
knights in armor.
High walls had long provided a safe haven
from marauding armies. With the possible
exception of Jericho and Divine interven­
tion and the ruse of a sacrifice to the Greek
goddess Athena (the Trojan Horse), the high
wall provided an adequate defense.
The siege weapon was a countertechnolo­
gy that successfully conquered the high
wall. These weapons used principles of me­
chanical elasticity, torsion and momentum.
The catapult operated on a winch and twist­
ed rope system. The trebuchet depended on
a heavy counterweight, throwing stones
as heavy ss 600 pounds up to 1,000 yards.
(They were also used to fling flaming projec­
tiles, dead horses and live men.) The ballista
was an exaggerated crossbow, using winch­
es to increase tension. It coulti throw a spear
orjavelin 450 to 500 yards with force and ac­
curacy.
The cannon depended upon the invention
of gunpowder. Black powder, whether in­
vented by German Berthold Schwarz (in the
14th century), the Chinese or the Muslims,
changed the face df war. The first historical­
ly substantiated occasion when gunpowder
was used to fire a projectile was during the
reign of Alfonso X, king of Castile and Le6n
(1252-84).
The siege machhes eventually gave way
to the’more advanced cannon. The tirst can- ,
nons were long and thin and were made with
iron staves or were cast in iron and copper.
Their first serious use occurred at Ravenna
in 1512, and artillery played an important
rule in Melegnano in 1515. Since theee crude
Dzcsmber 19S6 � MILITARY REVIEW
 TECHNOLOGIES

beginnhgs, siege technology has come a long
way. The modern assortment of projectiles
and cannons (and howitzers) has signifi­
cantly altered the tactics and organisation
of armies.
The first portable firearms were the har­
quebuses. These weapons were first carried
by the victorious army of Charles V (Charles
I of SPain) against the mighty French army
in the Battle of Pavia. His weapons fired
stone balls at the intended targets. Stone
was eventually replaced with cast iron and
even bronze balls during the 15th century.
The portable firearm (or musket) was later
improved with the introduction of a spirally
gmeved or ‘W%&’ barrel which imparted to
a bullet a spinning motion which improved
the accuracy of fire. The introduction of
breechloaders, smokeless gunpowder and
cartridge magasines improved the individ­
ual weapon.
The technology of repeating weapons
(like the Gatling gun) and barbed wire sig­
nifkantly influenced World War I. It took
the countertechnological invention of the
tanktoknockdownthe wire endtoprovide a
moving wall of steel ts protect the attacking
ini%ntrymen.
m
,/, -,
5* Crossbow, circs
lZthcentury
L
The tank was first used in the swampy ‘
shell-pocked terrain of the Somme on 15
September 1916. It was initially a failure
because of the unfavorable terrain. Unfor­
tunately, many armies did not recognice the
tank’s future role. These nations wrongly
interpreted the lessons of World War I. The .
tank played a significant role in World War
II. Itsroleonthemodernbattletieldwas con­
firmed when German tank units blitzed to
the English Channel and east into the
USSR.
At the beginning of the Korean War, the
aggressor North Korean army further dem.
onstrated the superiority of tank-equipped
units over lightly armed forces. The North
Koreans used 150 tanks to push the ‘lahk­
less” South Koreanforces into the Pusan F%­
rimeter. The lesson was clem—inautticient
matching technology can be disastrous.
To counter the likes of the modem tank,
antitank weapon systems were ‘developed.
In World War II, the best tank killer was an­
other tank. Yet, interestingly, the Wehr­
nu-cchtawarded 10,000 antitank close-com­
bat badges to gallant infantry soldiers for .
killing or disabling tanks} Today, the tech­ ,1
nologies to kill tanks have improved to the
point that a tank is no longer an invincible
monster. J
The airplane (horn the triumphs of th~
Wright brothers’ first flight, to Brigadier?

-%
General Charles (Chuck) Yeager’s Mach 1 ‘
upset, to today’s Stealth techn~logy) has in-:
“%)

i
A
fluenced the nature of war. Initially, the
simple biplane of World War I was used for
reconnaissance and artillery spotting mhch
{

MILITARY REVIEW * -Mb-ef 19Se 35


like the hot-air balloons of the American
Civil War. Then, along came a Dutchman,
Anthony H. Fokker, who geared the ma­
chinegun to tire through the airplane’s ro­
tating propeller blades. Thi~ technical inno­
vation dramatically altered the airplane’s
war-fighting roles.
The radio locater (radar) and air defense
artillery (with proximity fuzes) countered
the airplane’s effectiveness. The first signif­
icant test of these innovations occurred dur­
ing the 1940 Battle of Britain which demon­
strated that a long-range aviation threat
could be effectively countered.
There have been other innovations and
opposing technologies. Ironclad ships met
theirtmatch with the introduction of the tor­
pedo-carrying submarine. Jamming tech­
nologies reduced the effectiveness of the
wireless radio. The United States’ Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) will oppose the So­
viets’ arsenal of intercontinental ballistic
missiles.
Indeed, the struggle to match and effec­
tively oppose technological innovation has
36
continued to influence the battlefield. The
lesson is clear—a study of the evolution of
military technology is important when se-
Iectingfutumtechnologiea
Emerging Technologies
Preparing the Army for a confrontation
requires the prudent selection of emerging
technologies. The Army should thoroughly
study the threat’s intentions and technolog­
ical capabilities and then test each new
technology against five simple questions
. Does the new technology allow the Ar­
my to do more with less? WilI it deliver more
rounda on target, travel more miles per gal­
lon, provide more punch per round, last
longer between overhauls and more? Dura­
bility, maneuverability and survivability
are key aspects of the equation for selecting
new technologies.
There are numerous examples of select­
ing technology based on this question. For
example, the US Army’s UH60A Black
Hawk is a proven combat-survivable heli­
copter that can lift a 105mm howitzer, its
crew of six and up to 30 rourkls of ammuni­
tion in a single lift. This is a eignitlcant im­
provement over the standard UH1 utility
helicopter. The MIA1 Abrarns tank was al­
so selected because it met equally demand­
ing criteria. (It is a technological phenome­
non with its 120mm smooth-bore main gun,
its countemucle~, Klological and chemical
overpressure system, low silhouette, en­
hanced survivability and maneuverability.)
The World Wer”II multiple rocket launcher
was recently reintroduced because it, too,
does more for less.
The Air Force selects its aircraft for the
same reasons. For example, the C5A Galaxy
carries three times the payload of the older
C141 SturLi@- and carries that payload
800 miles farther. The much faster, maneu­
December 1986 � MILITARY PEV~EW

verable andsurvivablelll is replacing the
B52 bomber.
� Does the new technology reduce the cur­
rent administrative and logistical require­
ments of the system to be replaced? The in­
evitable consequence of disregarding this is
an Army that is totally dependent cm a gi­
ant, complicated and vulnerable resupply
and maintenance system.
The scope of the future logistical require­
ments has a precedent during World War II.
On the Eastern Front, the We)srmacht kept
31 percent of all tanks in maintenance at
any one times Additionally, a resupply quo­
ta of three tanks was available for every 100
tanks per operational day.’ For an Army of
more than 200 divisions, this was no small
task.
Erwin Rommel bad the foresight to plan
his North African logistical support by
stockpiling large quantities of petroleum.
The lack of petroleum and other critical sup­
plies was the very thing that slowed George
S. Patton’s advance across Europe. The
Third Army would have been slowed to a
crawl without the “Red Ball Express.”
The Army should also consider standard­
izing equipment. The Soviets capitalize on
standardization by installing major system
components in different vehicles across
their combat and tactical vehicle fleets. This
simplifies the spare part eystem. US efforts
MILITARY REVIEW* Decembsr1986
TECHNOLOGIES
to standardize (especially with allied arm­
ies) are limited to a few munitions and vehi­
cles.
The Chinese provide a valuable example.
During the Korean War, they routinely res­
upplied an entire division with 40 tons of
supplies each day using only 20 of their 2­
ton trucks.’ The resupply runs were con­
ducted at night. The Chinese managed to
suetain the fight with these minimal sup­
plies because they were trained to improvise
and forage. US soldiers also have successful­
ly employed these techniques when support
was limited.
Several accounts of US improvisation oc­
curred during the World War II invasion of
Sicily. The famed 505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment commanded by Colonel James M.
Gavin provides one of the best examples.
His unit employed all available civilian and
captured vehicles and weapons to success­
fully complete the mission.
The Rangers provided a similar example
during the Tunisian and Sicilian battles.
Before landing at Arzew, they improvised
steel skids or bumpers onthe underside of
theassault landing cratls’ hulls to protect ‘
the propellers and rudders. During the Tu­
nisian combat (February-March 1943), they
improvised a thorough security and intelli- ~
gencescreen using six reels oftield tel~
phone wire. In Sicily, one company co~-.,
37
mander had the marvelous idea of killing
tanks with a 15-pound block of TNT lashed
to a grenade and dropped from the tap of
buildings. Another soldier captured a Ger­
man 77mm gun and killed 12 German
tanks.’ During the Italian mainland inva­
sion at Sorrento, the Rangers used captured
German half-tracks and command cars to
pull mrta laden with mortar ammunition to
support the attack.
Brigadier General R. Simpkin proposes in
his recent book Race to the Swift: Thoughts
on Twenty -First-Centuiy Warjlare that a
250,000-man force trained to forage, to use
Warsaw Pact weapons and to improvise
with little or no resupply is Europe’s best de­
fense against a Soviet-sponsored invasion.
His proposal acknowledges the “encum­
brance caused by significant reliance on
large, administrative-logistical systems.
o Does the new technology simplify train­
ing? The finest technology in the world is
useless unless soldiers can use it properly.
Right now, many of the Army’e young lead­
ers and their soldiers are terribly overbur­
dened by increasingly sophisticated sys­
tems and complex demands. How will these
overburdened soldiers respond in battle?
During the 1973 Areb-Israeli War, Egyp­
tian Sagger missile gunners were report­
ed~y trained with Sagger trainers just prior
to their introduction into the Sinai battles.
Their highly perishable skills were critical
to the Egyptians’ early euccesses. Thie
38
experience has ominous implications for the
US Army, especially regarding the Dragon
missile system. Constant practice with the
Dm.gon missile system (both with live mis­
siles and with the launch effects trainers),
evenjuet prior to battle, maybe necessary to
ensure reasonable success. Dragon missile
training requires attention to detail and
“steeled” nerves. This training challenge
applies to other Army systems such as the
MIA1 Abram-s, the M2 Bradley and modern
howitsers. ­
The Air Force faces a similar problem. It
began to replace the F4, in 1979, with the
F16 Fighting Falcon. This very sophisti­
cated aircrat% incorporates a~vanced tech­
nologies to make it the most maneuverable
tighter ever built. However, the aircraft’s
increased maneuverability has outdis­
tanced the pilot’s abdity to withstand high­
gTaVititiOlld forces, resuIt@ in pilot black­
out. AC a result, Air Force pilot training is
made more difticul~ and selectlve.
Manyofthe modem military technologies
require special aptitudes, physical abilities
end perishable “hard” skills. This can bees­
pecially dangerous for an Army that relies
heavily on the mobilisation of vast numbers
of partially trained reserves.
. Is the new technology independent of
organization, fi’esion and terrain? In the
1950s, the Army reorganized into “pentim­
ic” divisions and miseile commands to fim­
nish the mobile units and fire support
December 19SS * MILITARY REVIEW
 TECHNOLOGIES

deemed necessary for nuclear war. Reorgan­ ern heavy forces were no match for light ‘
ization around nuclear weapons left the Ar­ forces in certain terrain or during certain
my vulnerable to conventional coutlict. weather conditions.
The tank is a technological innovation During the Korean War, the US Army
that influenced organization. German tank was dead set on a type of mobility which was
corps commander General Heinz Guderian not adapted to Korean terrain. As a result,
recognized the error of allowing tanks to dic­ many lives were needlessly lost, and the war
tateorganization and-mission. Heeventu­ was prolonged before a different philosophy
ally abandoned tank-pure organizations in of warfare was eelected.
favor of more flexible combined arms. eIs the new technology the best use of
More recently, the US Army decided to as­ scarce resources? The American people have
sign four tanks per platoon (in lieu of five). a low tolerance for what they perceive as
This decision was accompanied by the tran­ overindulgence or waste. Report: of over­
sition to the Ml A brains tank. The implica­ priced coffee makers, toilet seats and spare
tion is that superiority in firepower and ma­ parts especially alarm them.
neuverability more than offsets the loss of
one tank. The choice suggests that the Army
prefers technology as opposed to numbers.
Unfortunately, this iscontraryto the US
World War II philosophy for countering
Germany’s advanced tanks. During that
war, the United States built tanks en masse
to defeat a technologically superior German
tank. Today, the Soviets have adopted a
similar philosophy to counter US technolo­
gy. ~
Technology frequently dictates the mis­
sion. For example, the succeesfid 1945 test of
the atomic bomb influenced the US philos­
ophy of war in the Pacific. Without the bomb’s
technological edge, the United Statesman
have settled for something less than total
eurrender, or it would have paid a much
higher price.
The United States’ air superiority and
considerable helicopter lift capability in
Vietnam were partially responsible for the
search-and-destroy missions which domi­
nated its Vietnam tactical philosophy. Con­
siderable US artillery and close air support
further supported the mission selection
process.
Finally, new technology may dictate or
limit the Army to specific types of terrain.
The,Soviets discovered this during the Finn­
ish Winter War, They recognized that mod­
.

MILITARY REVIEW � Decembsr 1986


SDI is often viewed with euch suspicion.
The president contends that his SDI goal is
ta defend the US capacity to retaliate using
an awesome array of high-technology inno­
vations (computers, lasers, space stations
and missiles). However, his critics refer to
SDI as a technological hoax or, at best, ae a
source of political leverage for strategic
talks.
The ill-fated Space Shuttle Program pro­
vides another example of the United States’
40
,
love affair with technology. For many years,
the US space program has waited and de­
pended upon the promised multicapable ~
shuttle in lieu of developing a less sophisti­
cated and less expensive unmanned fleet of
launchers (such as the Atlas, Agena and Ti- ,
tan III). Now, the January 1986 Challenger
catastrophe has crippled the US space pro­
gram for at least two years. This impacts on
the military’s expanding use of satellites
and space research.
On the positive side, the US Navy’s deci­
sion to reactivate retired battleships ap­
pearstobeaprudentuse ofscarceresources.
The Navy teak a reliable platform and out­
fitted it with an assortment of high-technol­
ogy missiles (Tomahawks, Harpoons and
Phalanx), up-to-date radar andnewcom­
munications equipment.
The Army has done much the same with
its old workhorse, the M113 armored person­
nel carrier. The Ml 13 has been employed as
a platform for antitank weapons, air defense
December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW
 TECHNOLOGIES

weapons, field artillery support systems and

more. Further investigation may reveal
other equipment that can render additional
service.
Finally, the Army’s quest to put new tech­
nologies to work must be tempered with cau­
tion. The longer the United States avoids
war and the fewer men and women with mil­
itary experience who enter Congress, the
tougher it will be to justify defense expendi­
tures. This should encourage the Army to
examine each new technology very careful­
ly.
In conclusion, the United States and the
USSR are locked in a struggle to capitalize
on military technologies. The objective is
military superiority and political leverage.
Soviet ambitions and doctrine are clear.
They are able adversaries that we must
counter.
The Army can counter the Soviets by
carefully selecting emerging technologies
using a three-part process. First, the Army
must cohsider the evolution of military
technologies. Second, it must thoroughly
consider the future threat. Finally, it must
test each technology against the five ques­
tions raised before integrating it into the

~!
I J F C Fuller, Mach,ne Walara ma !“t8”?rv Jc?”maf, 7943 w 61­ P%W. Damsk+dl GE, 1956, P 157.
..
., 6 H S&e,bm, Zwmchm Don ..6 Dow (Wwwem Don and 0.3., i, Q).
2 S..., M,l,tafy Pow,, SuPemlendent .1 Dccuments, US Government Neckargemund, GE, 1967,0 13S anti the Iollowng IE.WS
Pn.mg Ofl,ce, Was.h(ngtoo, D C., 1981, p 76 7 Franz Uhte.wailer, Baflksfida, Ce.rrd Eumoe, P 22 Th19 was taken
3 Franc6 R Allen, Technology and Sow Chenge, A$.cdeton<ent.ry fromone of e very lewautho”zad translat,om d the Gwnmn-$ anwage Ong,­
Cwa17%,N Y ,1957, P357 “.1.
4 Hwz G.6m.., Panzer Marsh (Tanks, Forw@Jd March>, Murwh, GE, 8 W,lh.sm 0 Dafby end Wmam H Bwner, w. Led fha WSK Pre@o
1957 011% Press, Nov,1o, CM 1980, P 90
5 i M,ddledorl, Taknk h??Russlandfeldz.g flawcwfhe R.ssIm Cam­

+
Major Robert L. Maginrus ISchief oftheLeader­
shtp Branch, US Army Infanhy School, Fort Ben- “i
, ning, Georgti. He received aB.S. from tb UShfili­
/
tary Academyand an M.S. from the Naual Post- J
.,, ., graduate School and is a graduate of the
USACGSC. He has served with three infantry diui­
sions in a variety ofcomm.an-d and staffpmiticm.s m 3.
Korea, Europe and the Continental United States.
, \& t His article “Harnessing Creativity” appeared in.
the March 1986MilitaryReview.

MILITARY REVIEW, � December 1986 41

,,
 UIEWPCN!ITS ~
*
CMTECHRUUIGY
The US Army has been deeply involved in the search for new tech­
nology to enhance the effectiveness of soldiers on the modern
battlefield. Due to military and civilian research efforts, science
fiction concepts concerning space, robots and superintelligent
computerq are rapidly becoming a reality. Should the A rmy be on
the leading edge of this research or waiting for the technology to
mature before attempting to use it? Here are some views on what
the Army’s role should be.
 THE FMlw m T HE “role of the US Army in space” has
generated much heat in military cir­

SPIWF NEW
cles. Enthusiasm is a commendable trait-
perhaps necessary to a combat command­
er-but it is misplaced in planning. So, it is
HIGH GW.ll!iD not mean-spirited to attempt to cool some of
the hot air of the Army’s aspiring spacemen.

Ill I-I13T-IWI “Space” is a label for an exciting idea,

pregnant with promise for mankind-the
notion of a new frontier where men will have
IMumll!i ? . . .
OPPOrtunltleS for renovation and achieve.

B. Bruce-Briggs
A ment. It is not to denigrate the vision to call
attention to its roots in science fiction. This
is especially true in popular Buck Rogers-
type ‘<space operas” featuring vigorous men
in elaborate uniforms enjoying exciting
adventures in company with exotic females.
Alas, today the prospects are mundane and
must be analyzed in commonplace terms.
Space is merely an inconceivably large
place, a forbidding and unpleasant milieu
where men can do some things they consider
useful but at high costs and considerable
risks.
Hardly was the first artificial satellite
placed in orbit when space was labeled “the
new high ground.”] What a p~werful metp­
phor that is! The importance of the high
ground to military operations is not only
part of the rudiments of the art of soldie~
but is also one of the few military principles
known to the public-at-large. In many cases,
metaphors confuse thought, but this one is
singularly appropriate and instructive.
Space is very much like the high ground,
-., only more so:
. The high ground is inherently worth­
less. It has no rich farmland, no water, no
.­ convenient or efficient transportation
routes, no factories and little or no popula­
tion. Its mineral resources, if any, are more
expensive to extract than those of the low­
land. The low giotmd is what people want,
why people fight wars.
Space is more worthless than the most
barren crag. There is nothing and nobody

December 19S6 . MILITARY REVIEW

-,,’:

there. Space enthusiasts have tried to con­
jure eftlcient economic uses for it. The heat
that can be identified is the possibility of
more efficient production of specialized
goods in the apparent weightlessness of
orbiting bodies. Trans-spac*that is, other
celestial bodieehee somewhat more po­
tential. Perhaps something wondertid will
be discovered, or something rare and expen­
sive on Earth will be so plentiful elsewhere
as to justify the transportation costs. But, so
far, manned and unmanned probes have
only seen and sniffed rocks.
o The high ground is strategically worth­
less. Even a state wishing to hoId a moun­
tain range as a frontier would concentrate
on securing the low passes. Not even the
most imaginative “geopolitics” theorist has
claimed that possession of the Alps would
dominate Enrope or that the Tibetans will
rule Eurasia from their Himalayan heights.
Similarly, space has no strategic value.
US security might be improved if all Cubans
could be put in orbit or the Soviets emi­
grated to the moon.
e The high ground is tactically valuable.
This is the real case for military space. The
high ground is desirable for military opera­
tions for two reasomx’
Obseruatien. Eyesight, like any line-of­
sight transmission of information on or near
a sphere, is given more range end coverage
by height. Space-based systems offer enor­
mously more range and coverage than the
highest peak.
Grauity. It is easier to fight downward
than to tight upward. Men, animals, vehi­
cles and munitions can be propelled down a
slope more easily and rapidly than uphill.
This effect is even more pronounced with
space. The energy required to drop some­
thing from orbit is a small fraction of that
required to carry it up.
The tactical advantages of the heights of
space do and will continue tojnetifi military
use, but these advantages are necessarily
MILITARY REVIEW � December 19S6
VIEWPOINTS
F
limited by the next parallek
. The high ground is necessarily visible
and vulnerable. That which gives line-of­
sight communication downward works in
reverse. The bill is visible. Fire can easily be
directed and concentrated against it.
Space is worse. Nothing is more visible
and potentially vulnerable than an orbiting
spacecraft. On the high ground, at least you
can dig in or h@ser down on the other side.
You cannot passively defend a spacecraft,
nor is there a military crest in space.
Consider the balloon, a device once con­
sidered of enormous military potential. It
offered height higher than the highest
ground, it was marvelous for observation
and it had terrific gravity effects. But who
would care to man a balloon under fire? Yes,
balloons were deployed once upon a time,
and a consequence of their operations was
the invention of the parachute.
e The high ground is logistically diflicult. ,
Water, food and munitions must be trans­
ported upbill. For space, add air to the provi­
sions, and multiply the problems. Although
the cost is dropping, lifting and supporting , \
men and material in space is and will be
extraordinarily expensive.
But everything is expensive thes~ days, ~
and the military benefits would seem toj~­
tify the costs. The possible military usesi @
space are weather forecasting, navigational’:
aids, reconnaissance, communications”
transport, bombardment and counters to all
of these and to civil uses.
All of these functions can be and have
been performed by other means and, despite
the commendable progress in space sys- .
terns, all of them continue to be done with {
endoatmospheric systems. Whether space is ]
used end how much it is used will be deter­
mined mostly by narrow technical questions
of feasibility, effectiveness and efficiency :”
which can only be addressed credibly’ by
technicians who are conversant with alter­
native technologies.
45
 Clearly, the trend is towerdspace systems
for many of these functions. There is a
steady downward trend in cost of weight to
orbit, and space is full of promise. Neverthe­
less, new systems usually supplement but
do not necessarily replace established sys­
tems. -AircraR have not superseded ships,
radio has not replaced landlines and radar
has not made the naked eye obsolete.
@us consider the Army’s possible uses
of space, employing the list of func+ions
Weatherforecasting. This is of great inter­
esttatheAnuybutnoteemuchaetotheNavy
and Air Force. Land warriors are slowed by
foul weather but are not incapacitated as
mariners end aviators can be.
Navigational aida. It seems to be an inevi­
table consequence of maneuvers and cam­
paigns that troops get lost, but at least they
have maps hnd landmarks. Obviously, sail­
ors and fliers have more need of external
aid.
Reconnaissance. Of course, today this is a
vital military use of spacd. Our wonderful
reconnaissance satellites permit us to view
the bowels of the Soviet Union. This is of
enormous interest, but the information
desired in the complex environment of land
warfare would seem to be less easily ob­
tained than the information needed by the
other armed services. No ship or aircraft can
move without being detected from space,
while land vehicles, not to mention men, can
camouflage their movement. We seem to be
on the verg~if we are not there already—
of a situation wherein it is impossible to
mass forces for a land offensive without
reconnaissance satellites detecting the
preparations. But we seem to be a long way
horn being able to provide useful tactical
information in lend war. This is especially
so when compared to other means-for
example, by pilotless aircraft which, by vir­
tue of being minimum-height, exoterres­
trial vebicles, are in some sense the antithe.
sis of spacecraft.
46
Communications. This is also of great
interest to the Army, but a service that can
operate on lend has the ability to use land-
Iinei which -ot be jammed or intercept­
ed. Indeed, land forces can communicate by
courier or by real human contact, so the
Army is less concerned with space commu­
nications than are the other services.
Tmnsport. How nice it would be to station
quick-reaction forces in space, ready to be
dropped tYom orbit when needed, or be able
to propel large units by giant intercontinen­
tal rocket. Clearly, thie is of great long-term
interest but is not of immediate interest
because of obvious economic reasons. And it
should not be ignored that space transport
would supplement or replace air and sea
transport-functions of other services. (A
space-based reaction force seems rather like
one based on ship-perhaps this might be
the elusive future role of the US Marine
corps.)
Bombardment. This was the original mili­
tary role of space and was the reason for the
development of high-altitude rockets by the
Oermen army and the contkcation of Ger­
man technical assets by the U13Army. (Odd­
ly, things which go up into space and come
right down again—ballistic rocket~are
not considered space systems. Therefore,
the Army-in-epace concept does not notice,
for example, the Pershing H-that is just
artillery.) Orbital bombardment systems
sound formidable on paper, but they suffer
from the inherent visibility/vulnerability
“high-ground” drawbacks discussed earlier.
The operator of US intercontinental artil­
lery-the US Air Force-has not placed its
weapons iii space but, quite properly, in
holes in the ground. Likewise, the Navy’s
weapons are in holes in the sea, end the
Army’s are in holes in the woods.
The high-ground metaphor yet again
applies. YOUplace yourspottere on the high
ground you do not emplace your guns on the
high ground.
December 1SSS . MILITARY REVIEW
$

In the long run, of course, it is possible to
conceive of orbiting, directed-energy weap­
ons replacing artillery, even mortars. But
directed energy can be directed up or down,
and energy will almost certainlp be more
abundant on the ground. Further, the grmmd­
based systems can more easily be defend­
ed.
Counters to space. Here, the Army has a
role under the existing disposition of func­
tions by virtue of obvious spin-offs from its
ballistic missile defense research activity.
Indeed, the Army’s experimental antiballis­
tic missile Nike Zeus made the first inter­
cept of a satellite in 1963, but the Air Force
shortly seized and has held the antisatellite
role.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the
apparent superiority of space-based SyS­
tema for some forms of reconnaissance and
communications today is a function of what
may be temporaxy technological and politi­
cal, factora. It may be wrong to take it for
granted that satellites will continue to be
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
VIEWPOINTS
safe from interference. Remember that the
custom of considering orbiting objects to be
in international space was established
when nothing could be done to stop them
except by taking reprieala. Neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union was
willing to do thk+.
The security of orbiting vehicles is a func­
tion of peacetime conditions. If antisatellite
(ASAT) weapons become available, these
systems may be no safer in war than the
“tattletale” Soviet ships which shadow our
fleet. Possession of effective ASATS might
prompt a nation to rediscover that ita “air
space” is being violated in peacetime.
Now, there is another problem with the
Army in space which must be faced. While
cynics and critics may make too much of
interservice rivalries, only cranks would
deny their existence and their effect on
defense policy. It has already been said that
the other services can gain relatively more
from space use than can the Army, and func- ‘
tional effects are reinforced by institutional
needs and by tradition.
The United Stabs is blessed with a highly ,1
trained and formidable military institu­
tion—the US Air Forcc+which was orga­
nized 30 years ago to fight in flying ma­
chines with on-board human operators. T?- ~
day, however, the shrinking number of fl~
ing machines has led to most of its oftlce 4..
piioting desks, devotedly designing, acqui~­
ing and operating elaborate “weapons sys­
tems” which are predominantly detection,
communication and computing devices,. The
Air Force has been doing this more than ~he
other services. The Air Force has an enor­
mous cadre of technically trained officers,
and it cares more about high-technology ~
eystems development than the other serv- !
ices.
Individuals may sacrifice themselves for i
larger interesta, but institutions never do.
‘The March of Dimes Birth Defects Founda­
tion did not liquidate itself after conquering
47
 —------- k in space and will not readily yield it.
~rbital bombardment sgstems
sound formidable on paper, but they
suffer tiom the inherent visibilityivul­
nerability ‘high-ground’ drawbacks
discussed earlier. The operator of US
intercontinental artillery-the US Air
Force—has not plticed its weapons in
space but, quite properly, in holes in
the ground. Likewise, theNavy’s weap­
ons are in holes in the sea, and the
Army’s are in holes in the wooak.
polio but discovered other diseases needful
of its succor. The cavalry jammed itself into
tanks. The US Army coast artillery became
antiaircraft artillery and then became air
defense tilllery.
Coneider the word ‘<aerospace.” While it
would be premature to write off the classic
high-performance aircrail in the immediate
future, the cost trend is foreboding, so “air”
becomes aerospace. Space is the Air Force’s
future. The Air Force already has a foothold
Conversely, the Navy sees a great future
on, over and under the sea. Yet, it has a
proud tradition and high confidence in its
ability to control all assets useful to its oper­
ations conducted in harm’s way. If space
vehicles are useful auxiliaries to ships,
those assets should be under naval control—
or so the Navy thinks.
In comparison, the Army has a consistent
record of concentrating on its field opera­
tion andyieldingperipheral functions. The
coast artillery did not seriously contest mar­
itime defense with the Navy. The Army Air
Corps did not fight for control of maritime
patrol nor ship attack end defense. Mari­
time transport was given away. Air trans­
port was given away. The Air Force seceded
without a fight. The Army did not resist the
assignment of intercontinental rocket artil­
lery to the Air Force.
When the Army dld stand and fight for
intermediate-range rocketry in the late
1950s, it was crushingly defeated. Its conso­
lation prize-antiballistic missilery-was
an embarrassment, shucked off with relief
in 1975. The intermediate-%nge ballistic
missile (IRBM) redux-the Pershing II—
was forced upon the Army for political rea­
eons and considered an annoyance rather
than an asset by much of the Army.
The Army has a very clear notion of what
business it is in—land warfare, a terribly
demanding enterprise requiring high levels
ofdiscipline, devotion and brilliance of char­
acter and judgment. Space operations, how­
ever useful, arean~.will be but a side show.
The role of the Army in space ie already
eviden>it has no role. But, despite pll of
their inherent high-ground drawbacks,
space operations tie of use to land warfare.
So, the Army-not for its own narrow insti­
tutional concerns but in the interests of
national security-must work toward maxi­
mizing the utility of space to land warfare.
In practice, this means that it must be pre-
Decembw 1986. MILITARY REVIEW
 VIEWPOINTS

pared to contest for its share of military

space resources. When the Army did stand
From the Army’s point of view, the crea­ and fight for intermediate-range
tion of the unified US Space Command is the rocketry in the late 1.950s,it was
best organisational solution that can be ex­ crashinglg defeated. Iti consolation
pe@ed. Of course, it will be dominated by the prize-antiballistic missilerg-was an
Air Force. Of course, the Navy will writhe embarrassment, shucked off with
and twist to escape its snares. Of course, relief in 1975. The intermediate-range
the Army will be a junior partner in the balhktic miiwite (IRBM) redax-the
space command. But, given the greater util­ Pershing II—was forced upon the Armg
ity of space to the other services and the forpolitieal reasons and considered an
greater demands of land warfare on the annoyance rather than an asset
Army, a junior partnership is the proper by much of the Army.
relation.
what the Army will need is not a role in
space but leverage in the space command.
The Army will require a small cadre of offl­ grounded spacemen or whether they are
cers knowledgeable about what can be done from the established technical branches is
in space. It must have oflkers in its staffs, in an important issue which must be resolved
its larger fot-mations and in its procurement by the responsible commanders. But the
apparatus who are informed about the %ar­ cadre need not be, nor should it be, very
row technical questions of feasibility, effec­ large. The 18tti-centu~ equivalent of the
tiveness and efficiency” of making space spacemen was the engineers-the technical
useful to the field armies. Presumably, that leading edge and the most bookish of the
cadre will also man the Army’s slots in the officers, but a small group and not the core
space command and in appropriate places nor the archetype of the oflicer corps. ,i
on joint staffs. The future of the Army is not in space but
Whether the cadre are permanently in the mud. %,

NOTES ,j
#
1 Thephrase has been .nnbu!ed 1. former Cc.ngressrm. F Edward fad, ti,squitetheoppsne b=usetie3pawvehlde& Lw.anacwddspwti:
Hebw! .1 Louis!+ ”.. mlv, whrle a wound lame! can only be ane.eked w wroxnm!ely hmwokan.
2 IO@mn ClmmewIQ, On War, tiledmd trans!a!ti by Michael tioward CAM,
am Paler Pam Pmnceto. uowwsm Press, Princeton, N.J,, 1976, p !352. He 3 Thequ.l!fica!mn !9 Pfudenl,al kca.sa ti !s c=mcewabls that same fbrm
lkstsa ttmd advan@w-gr8aler actwaqof fire bwa.sn of the geometrical of stinliti mew m.ld b generated mom eas,ly I. spaca than on the
relationship of the he,ght to the low gm””d WI!h W3w”SOf R@ .9-u,.w, ground-for exanwle. solar or nudeer energy tm dangerous to mk m the
shca!mg down a a Ilaner target resulu m a smaller cmcu!ar error probable atmosphere.
than shc.s!tng up al e twget on a slope Thts concept u Ikra!ev.mt 10 SWC=3. In
I

B. Bruce-Briggsw aeon.sultant andwriterresid­

ing in New York, New York. He received a BA.
tiom Union College and a. MA. from Temple
University. He has been a policy analyst at the
Hudson Institute and on the research staff of the
US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn­
sylvania. H= forthcoming analytic history of.#ra­
tsgic akfeme will bepublishd in 1987 by Simon&
Schuster, N.Y.

MILITARY REVIEY . December 1986 49

 T HROUGHOUT its history, the Army
has been rnnnpower-inten-sive in most
of its systems. Thz combia+n of demograph­
FIPPUCFITH!E ic ehungee (fewer young men), changed bat­
tlefuld scenarios, and advanced technolo­

DF FIFITHMIL gies in improved robotics, computers, and

artificial intelligence (A?) suggests both

RiTELLJEH!iEE a need and an opportuni@ to multiply the

effectiveness of Army personnel. Not only
can these technologies reduce manpower

,. FIND lWIEDTiCEi a requirements, they can also replace person­

nel in hazardous areas, multiply combat
power, improve e#iciency, and augment ca­
pabilities.’
Captain Ricky Lynch,
The use oftechnology to gain a tactical ad­
US Army, and
vantage in war is a concept as old as man
Captain Michael R. McGee,
himself. From the first time barehanded
US Army
primitives were defeated by other primi­
tives throwing rocks or using clubs, the mil­
itary use of increasingly advanced technolo­
gy to defeat enemy forces was inevitable.
Today’s armies are no exception. A classic
examPIe of using a technological break­
through to gain a tactical advantage was
,.
.,...­ the deve~opment and subsequent use of the
atomic bomb during World War II. Possess­
ing these weapons gave the United States a
decisive tactical and strategic edge.
Since then, others have emphasized the
use of high.technology in their own weapons
systems. We must regain lost ground and
re-establish our technological prominence,
preferably in an area where a disparity in
capability already exists. The United Statee
already has a technological edge in the com­
puter arena. New applications and technol­
ogies must be sought to exploit this techno­
logical advantage. Two of today’s meet
promieing technologies are the related
fields of AI and robotics: WI) is the part of,,
computer science concerned with designing
systems that exhibit the characteristics
we aesociate with intelligence in human be­
havior. . ..’”
Applications in this area deal with how a
computer can solve problems like a human

Dscember 1986. MILITARY REVIEW

(’

being can. Robotics has been defined as “the
intelligent connection of perception to
action.”s The word intelligent in the defini­
tion implies the “hand and glove” relation­
ship that exiata between AI and robotics.
The queetion then becomes, “HOW are AI
end robotics related, and how can they be
used for military applications?”
Artificial intelligence
AI is an interdisciplinary field, integrat­
ing such things as cognitive psychology,
philosophy and computer programing. Cur­
rent research tends to aim at making com­
puters exhibit intelligent behavior in do­
mains which are sufficiently narrow to
be manageable. The problem with this ap­
proach is that these programs will not work
when moved into a “real-world” environ­
ment. Reality is much too complex for these
simple systems to cope with. The AI “pur­
ists” focus on research into those attributes
representing intelligent thought. A prime
complicating factor is that human intelli­
gence is poorly defined and even less-well­
understood. AI researchers are slowly mak­
ing progress in determining how people
think, see, remember, communicate, and so
on.
Since AI technology is not very mature,
applications developers tend to focus their
efforts upon easier problems. Unfortu­
nately, military problems are not typically
among thie group. The military operational
environment is too cluttered, or “dirty,” for
most developers to tackle at this stage. Nu­
merous potential military applications of
the technology, however, do exist.
The erirliest applications of AI to military
operational deficiencies will probably
emerge, as have those for commercial busi­
nesses, from an area called “expert sys­
tems.” Expert systems are computer pro-
MILITARY REVl~ . December 19S6
VIEWPOINTS
grams which possess extensive knowledge ‘
in a specific, typically very narrow, domain.
A great deal of effort is being focused on ap­
plications which can provide the military
commander with an expert planning aid.
‘(Al) is the part of computer
science concerned with designing . . .
systems that exhibit the characteristics
we associate with intelligence in human
behavior. . ..’ Applications in this area
deal with how a computer can solve
problems like a human being can.
Robotics has been defined as ‘the intel­
ligent connection ofperception to
action.’ The word intelligent in the
definition implies the ‘hand and
glove’ relationship that exists
between AI and robotics.
This system will know and understand the
unit’s mission, the terrain and the unit’s or­
ganizational etructure.
The expert system will also have access to ‘
whatever combat intelligence exists. When
the commander plans a mission, thtxsystem
will help by providkg software tools to do’
screen-displayed tactical overlays, fi~
support plans, obstacle plans, movemedt,,
routes, and soon. It may also aid by offeririg’
suggestions on alternative courses of actioh
and by analyzing those alternatives f@
weaknesses and strengths.
The next step is to use this know~e?ge
base to develop a real-time decision aid’ for
use in the context oftactical situations. Con­
ceptually, it is as though General George
S. Patton Jr. were sitting by your side, whis­
pering in your ear, “Don’t forget to look
for . . . “or “Remember what happened the
last time we tried that maneuver.” This,eys­
tem is much more difficult to develop be­
cause it requires not only the vast knowl-
edge base of the first system but also a very
fast, very intelligent processor. This proces­
sor must be able to simultaneously “think”
about the tactical environment and process
all information inputs from the vast array of
sensors to which it will have access. Within
this internal process, it must determine the
doctrinally appropriate response or “school
solution,” compare that response to the
unit’s current tactics, postulate the outcome
and decide if the mission will succeed.
Many professionals have a ditllcidt time
accomplishing this task promptly. Imagine
the difficulty in programing a computer to
do it. One of the major stumbling blocks in
developing the program code to allow the
computer to emulate the expert is getting
the expert to articulate the process used to
arrive at a particular decision. Many of the
tactical decisions an experienced com­
mander would make in the field are a func­
tion of past experiences and lessons learned
that even the commander is not consciously
aware of in his decisionmaking process. If
experts cannot tell the programmers how
they make decisions, the programmers cer­
tainly cannot write the machine code to do
it.
The Mygef.e air defense system, developed b French
manufacturer Thompson-CSF, allows crew to d“’eslgnate
targets using a helmet-mounted sight located up to 30
meters from the launcher
52.
Another promising subarea of AI is natu- ,
ral language understanding. This deals
with the area of computer science in which
the idea of human-voice communication
with the computer is being pursued. This is
A great deal of effort is being
fmused on applications which can
provide the military commander with
an exert planning aid. This sgstem
will know and understand the unit’s
mission, the terrain and the unit’s ‘
organizational structure. The expert
system will afso have access to what.
ever combat intelligence exists.
obviously of interest to the military user.
The ability to communicate with the ma­
chine merely by talking greatly reduces the
training time to prepare the human opera­
tor. It also allows the operator to do some­
thing else with his hands while he talks to
tbe machine. Current research is aimed bJ­
ward solving the difficulties as~ociated with
a computer comprehending the spoken word
well enough to understand the correct mean­
ing from the context of the total communi­
cation.
It is important to remember that most hu­
man communication is nonverbal—con­
veyed through gestures, inflections in the
voice or other means. This complicates nat­
ural language understanding. The com­
puter will attempt to understand the word
at face value without the benefit of other
aids. Another complication is the great deal
of ambient noise in the background of the
majority of military “operations. This noise
tends to confuse the issue by merging with
the voice of the human operator. Theee
things aside, the intent of using natural lan­
guage understanding is to produce a combat
system the crew will be able to use. With it,,
December 19W � MILITARY REVIEW
 +’? VIEWPOINTS

crew members can communicate directives

by using their vocal cords not their fingers
on typewriter keys.
~< An outgrowth of the increased natural
language processing capability will be a
computerized interface between the crew
and the logistic status of the vehicle. A com­
puter will keep track of how much fuel and
ammunition remains on board, and the in­
terface will remind the vehicle commander
when the level approaches a preselected lev­
el. By interconnecting the on-board com­
puters with other systems, logistic status
can be conveyed to the rear in a request for
logistic stipport without the commander ev­
er having to enter the network. The logistic
process in the rear can be expedited by using because it will have instant access to more
AI to process requests and to make determi­ raw data and graphics displays than any hu­
nations as to, how the requests can best be man could hope to recall much less use.
supported.
In addition, maintenance operations can
be facilitated by using AI technology—.to pro­ Robotics
vide for an on-board expert mechanic and a
self-diagnosing system. Progress in this area
will produce applications which, when placed AI lies in the realm of computer science.
inside combat systems, will make the crew’s It ie intended to give computers the ability c i
maintenance job simpler and less time-con­ to reason and, in turn, make decisions, or at
suming. Once a system problem is identi­ least give recommendations, to the human
fied, the crew can have the vehicle tell them operator. However, AI alone cannot affect ~
what is wrong and how to fix it. If necessary, its environment directly. Robotics is the ip+
the vehicle electronics can lead them telligent connection of perception to actio :‘
through a step-by-step program geared to Robotic devices ‘{perceive” something abou, ?
their collective level ofmaint.enance knowl­ their environment using external sensors;
edge and experience. They send the ‘<perception” to a computer
The technology behind AI can also be used which, in effect, digests the informatiori,
to enhance computer-aided instruction makes a decision and sends a signal to dome
(C-AI). CAI shows promise for immediate re­ type of actuator. This actuator could be
turns. The computer does not take leave, mounted on a robotic manipulator designed .
never takes breaks and never tires of reiter­ to lift something, or it could be coupled to the t
ating points to slow or unmotivated stu­ steering wheel on a car. Thus, in essence, ro- ]
dents. Bright students may proceed as fast botics forces AI to deal with the real world
as they can absorb the material, and the through a hardware connection to the envi­
computer may be able to substantially in­ ronment.
crease the depth of knowledge obtained dur­ What, then, can robotics do for the milit­
ing any given session. A computer tutor may ary? AI can process the signals to generate
be more effective, if programed properly, the commands for action, but what kind of

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 ,53

action do we want fromthe robotic device? It
is important to examine the basic intent of
robotics. They have been used in industv
for several years and are generically de­
signed to meet specific requirements.
The timt usc is to get the worker out of has­
ardoti situations. This is particularly true
in chemically haaadous envimnmente. For
example, a robotic device has been designed
and fabricated to assist in cleaning up nu­
clear reactors. Another requirement is to in­
crease production et%ciency by replacing
man who tires and makes mistakes. A ma­
chine can perform tasks in continuous oper­
ations, does not need cofiee breaks or vaca­
tions, and does not take sick leave. A robotic
device has been designed to remove the as­
sembly line worker from repetitive or mun­
dane operations such as placing typewriter
keys on a keyboard.
Current research is aimed toward
would vary from a few pounds to several
solving the difficulties associated with
thousand pounds. A robotic vehicle attemp~
a computer comprehending the spoken
ing to autonomously navig@.e cross-coun­
word well enough to understand the
try would encounter numerous obstacles,
correct meaning iiwm the contgxt of the
both natural and man-made, and would
total communication. . . . moat human
have to traverse the area fast enough to
communication is nonverbal-
conveyed through gestures, infectious
in the voice or other means. This
complicates natuml
language understanding.
These concepts for using robotic devices
can be directly transferred to the military.
For example, the covering force mission is
infamously hazardous, and certain mission
statement could be rephrased as “die in
place.” Many tasks performed by soldiers to­
day are, by nature, repetitive. Guard duty is
a perfect example. Robotic devices can per­
form guard duty, allowing the soldier to
rest, Ammunition handling is time-con­
suming and definitely labor-intensive. Ro­
botic devices could speed up the entire am-
munition-handling process. The military
use of robotic devices is only limited by the
imagination of the user.
A definite problem with the military ap­
plications of robotics does exist, however.
Although the concept of employing robotic
devices is transferable from the industrial
realm, the technology to support the trane­
fer is not available. Industrial robotic de­
vices work in well-structured, relatively
clean environments. Industrial robotic ma­
nipulators pick up small, consistent pay- ,,
loads and are fixed to the floor of the ware­
house.
The military environment is, by its very
nature, a hostile environment. A military
robotic device would be forced to operate, as
a rule, outdoors, mounted on some type of
moving platform. The payloads that a mili­
tary robotic manipulator would pick up ,1
keep up with the manned-forces. All of the
areas must be addressed and resolved prior
to the actual fielding of military robotic de­
vices.
Robotic manipulators in a military envi­
ronment encounter several problems. The
parameter invplved in evaluating the per­
formance of a robotic manipulator include
stability, speed of response, cycle time, re­
petitiveness and lift capability. Stability is,
a critical issue. The fixed base of industrial
manipulators allows the manipulator to
move through its range of motion without
regard to base motion. A military manipula~
tar would probably be mounted on a moving
platfom, depending on its mission. This
platform could range from a semitrailer to a ‘
December 19s6 . h.IILITARY REVIEW
 VIEWPOINTS

FMC Corporation versions of a tactical robotic vehicle. (Left) The prominent sensors on the vehicle gave it some obstacle
avoidance capability, and it could be controlled by a human operator uaing voice commands. (Right)A Iaterconfiguration
on the same test veh]cle performed a roote reconnaissance mission mder the ,jkeclion Ofa commander a“d driver from a
command post. The robotic vehicle was able to detect unforeseen obstacles, determine trafficability of routes, detect ene­
my activities andJocatrons, plus call for arlillety support,
,,
tank or a howitzer. The motion of the base tion of man-made barriers and alterations :
causes stability problems as the manipula­ from weather and seasonal changes. Thue,
tor attempts to move through its range of if the robotic vehicle merely follows the
motion. route planned by the computsr, it will fall in
Speed of response and cycle time are also the first hole created by an artillery shell. !.~
areas of concern. If a manipulator is to be Obviously, the robotic vehicle must have ,
used to load main gun rounds in a tank or a sensors which will allow it to pexceive
howitzer, the manipulator must operate as changes in the environment. These sensors ~
fast as a human loader, Today’s manipula­ could be visual, acoustic, laaer scanner, tack
tor control algorithms do not provide for tile, and soon. ;
those speeds. Once the sensors are in place, the problem
The development of a robotic vehicle ca­ is how to process the information generated
pable of performing milita~ missions cre­ by them so the computer can make a deci.
ates equally difficult technological prob­ sion on the route to follow. Processing capa~
lems, Regardless of the mission the vehicle bility, computer size and processing time
is intended to perform, the mission module then become important. For user utility, t~e
must be mounted on some type of chassis c;­ processing must take place at near real
pable of autonomous cross-country naviga­ time. Several current computers have proc­
tion. An intelligent machine must be able to essors which possess adequate speeds (as­
plan routes for the vehicle to follow. suming a limited application—for example,
The basic problem is that these planned solely navigation). Size constraints of the
routes are generated using a digital data computers also become a problem. Today’s
baee. This digital data baas ia only aa good state-of-the-art computer technology does
as its last entries and probably does not re­ not provide for a computer that has ade­
flect the actual environment due to the addi­ quate processing capability while, at the

I
MILITARY REVIEW . December 1986 ,$5
 ated with the military applications of ro­
botics. Programs are in place that are ad­
dressing the research issues necessary to ex­
pedite the fielding of a robotic manipulator
to perform military missions. In addition, a
great deal ofactivity is focused on the devel­
opment of a robotic vehicle capable of cross-
country, autonomous navigation.
MartmMarietta’s
fieldmateriel-handling
robot
Numerous military applications ofAl and
Many tasks petiormed by soldiers robotics do exist. The technology to support
today are, by nature, repetitive. Guard these applications is not available today but
duty is apefiect example. . . . Ammuni- may be available in the near future provid­
tion handling is time~consuming and ed that research and development efforts
definitely labor-intensive. Robotic are properly focused, The US Army can cap-
devices could speed up the entire italize on this technological lead in the area
ammunition-handiing process. of computers and signal processing. As this
technology mat,ures, it will not only in­
crease our force effectiveness but also re-
same time, being small enough to fit inside. duce manning requirements or at least al-
currently fielded weapons systems. low for the redistribution of personnel. Ag-
There is a lot of activity ongoing within gressive pursuit of the technology is the key
the Army to address the problems associ- to success. ~

NOTES I

1 Applocamm of Robot,.. mdAfafic!aI lnfef)wnce to Reduce Rmk..d Wlrge”ce, W,ll,an Kaufman 1“. bls 480s, Cal,f 1984, Volume I
lmpmve Effeco.eness A Study for the Umted States Amy, Nat$onal Acac- 3 M,chael &ady, &Dfic,al [nte!l,ge”ce and Ro&70cs, AD.A1424W, D­
emy P<,,,, Washl”gtOm D C 1983, D 1 tense Tech”,cal lnfonmal,o” Center, ,41em”dm, V.,, 19S4, PI
2 wm. Bam and Edward A F%mnb.wm me Handbook of Am flc!ti !..

r
Captain Ricky Lynch is the robotics project ofi­
cer, Directorate of Combat Developments, US A:­
my Armor School, Fort Knoz, Kentucky. He m- ,x
cewed a B.S. from the US Mihtary Aca&my and >.~ ,
an MS, fm,p tti Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
..,­
nology. Hepreuiously seruedas the commandaofa
mobde a.ssmdt bridge company and a combat mgi­
neer company, 17th Engineer Battalion, 2d Ar­
mored Dmi.sion, Fort Hind, Texas. 2

iis
Cnptam MicbaelR. McGee is wtih the Artifxiai
Intelligence Cdl, AwLand Battle Test-Bed, Direc­
torate of Combat Developments, US Army Armor
School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He receiued a B.S. ,?””
from East Tennessee State University and an M.S. \
from the Umuersity of Southern California. He
previously served us the S4, a.ssi.sta?it S3 and corn.
man&r, Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cauahy,
Fort Hood, Trxas.
[

1’

56 December 1s66 . MILITARY REVIEW

 Imaging is a vergpowerful form of

representation aad mag well rule our

WHY~

ermscioas and unconscious moments.

It is the stuffthat dreams are made of

FIRTHCML
—literatlg. It is the process that

aUaws children to place a square

peg in a square hole.

NTELUGHICE
,
Major Kenneth H. Rose,,

A RTIFICIAL intelligerwe lftf] is a se-

n“es of technologies fraught with many
difficult hurdles, and it probably won’t
‘ ‘
: US Army

work then again, maybe it will.

A lot has been said about AI, and a lot has
been promised by people who cannot deliver
the things they said they could. What can we
really expect from AI? Is it all a sham foisted
upon us by a number of self-aggrandizing
eggheads whO only want our money to suP­
port their continued happy existence in the
playgrounds of academe? Is it a smoke­
screen~a con used by scoundrels to conceal
their own maneuvering into lucrative jobs
with government contractors?
How can we hope to duplicate or even ap­
proximate human intelligence when we do
not know what it is? There are many plausi­
ble theories that seem to stand up under var­
ious proof techniques, but no one really
knows exactly how people think. Those who
study this matter believe that the way
knowledge is represented and stored in the
brain is the key to human thinking. They
suggest that knowledge representation
comprises three elements: a propositional
representation, imaging and mental model­
ing.
A propositional representation consists of
a vast number of propositions-rules, if you
will-describing how the world works. They
may be primitive rules, such as “Fire is hot,”
or complex rules, such as “On earth, objects
that are heavier than air will fall downward
through space unless they are supported by

,,
MILITARY REVIEW � Desembw 1986
 another object or acted upon by another ob­
ject or force.” People probably abstract sev­
eral rules into higher order rules as they
mature, but the rules are still there, gener­
ally hidden from conscious behavior.
Imaging is a very powerful form of repre­
sentation and may well rule our conscious
and unconscious moments. It is the stuff
that dreams are made of—literally. It is
the process that allows children to place a
square peg in a square hole. Demonstrating
this process of imaging is not ~ifficult.
Thhk of a square. Think of a circle. Think of
an elephant with a trunk at both ends. It is
really quite easy. Describing how imaging
is used in thinking is not so easy.
Mental modeling is an imaging-like proc­
ess on a very general level. When people are
trying to put heavy objects into a truck, they
may choose to push or pull them up a ramp
instead of t~ing to lift them. This choice
may result from a’ mental model dealing
with the use of inclined planes. The model is
applied to the situation at hand and trans­
formed into a real-world solution, a solution
that may generate a rule or image for future
use.
This brings up a complicating question:
How do these processes cooperate? What
‘ causes a person to reach for a screwdriver
when opening a can of paint? Is it a rule that
says, ‘<Ifyou want to pry the lid off a can, use
a screwdriver”? Is it an image of a previous­
ly observed or experienced event? Is it a
mental moddl involving levers and fulcrums
and the mechanical advantage that results?
Is it some combination of all of these? No one
knows.
These questions address another impor­
tant and closely related issue in human
thinking knowledge use. One theory sug­
gesti that people function using compiled
Imowledg+that is, they combine a great
deal of lower level knowledge, perhaps us­
ing a combination of representation proc­
esses, into a single, robust, high-level proce­
58
dure. One such procedure may control walk­
ing, a rather complex motor activity that is
accomplished without thinking through the
individual elements of knowledge required.
Another theory suggests that thinking is
an associative process-people search and
sort through their space of compiled knowl­
edge by a series of associative leaps con­
trolled by matching patterns between mem­
ory and the real world. Medical diagnosis
provides an example. When a young woman
suffering an outbreak of hives entered her
physician’s office, he was standing in the
waiting room. He took one look at her and
asked, What did you eat that’s different?”
Her reply was, “Diet soda.” His prescription
was, “Don’t drink diet soda.” This was the
end of the examination. The physician did
not search through a series of primitive
rules regarding dermatology. Instead, he I
made an associative leap from a single ob.
servation to a probable conclusion using
AI researchers consider knowl­
edge representation to b~ the current
fundamental hurdle in advancing the
state of their art. The AI subfield of
so-called expert systems is a good
medium for examining this. In expert
systems, three of the most common
forms of knowledge representation
are rules, frames and logic.
A frame is a lump of information $
thatpertains to an object or a class of
objects. It may include characteristics
of the objector descriptions of the
object’s abilities-to influence other ob­
jects. Since frames may also describe
classes ofob~ects, hierarchical taxon­
omies maybe constructed to represent
large systems of related objects.
December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

patterns common to current and previous
events.
AI researchers consider knowledge repre­
sentation to be the current fundamental
hurdle in advancing the stats of their art.
The AI subfield of so-called expert systems
is a good medium for examining this. In ex­
pert systems, three of the most common
forms of knowledge representation are
rules, fkames and logic. Rule-baaed systems
parallel propositional representation. Su­
petilcially, this seems to be a rather promis­
ing approach. It is not dit%cult to write a
number of rules and generate a procedure
for applying them. This can all be accom­
plished with a rather simple rule format and
less than a page of controlling computer
code. But, as in many things, “easy to do” is
easy to cay.
The first problem arises when writing the
rules. What” is the knowledge, and where
does it come from? It comes from experts.
Unfortunately, experts use compiled knowl­
edge. They are often unable to describe why
they do things at a level ofdetail adequate to
write rules because the details of their be­
havior are deeply buried in compiled proce­
dures.
The next problem is the stilciency of the
rules. Rules are very discrete. They are use­
ful toole in domains where knowledge tends
to conpist of isolated facts, but many do­
mains involve knowledge that consists of
highly related fack+facts that tend to de­
pend upon and intluence each other. Inter­
relating rules in a system is very difficult
because of the uncertainty of the outcome.
AIsQ, the sufficiency of the total rule base is
a problem. Rules must be included for every
possible combination of events.
Lastly, and most importantly for systems
intended to mimic human performance, peo­
ple do not really think using rules. Recall
the previous discussion of associative think­
ing. This is probably how chess is played.
TM players do not examine each piece and
MILITARY REVIEW � Decembsr 19e6
VIEWPOINTS
then apply the rules for legal moves, apply ‘
the rules for wise moves, compute some ex­
pected value for each move and then select
the best choice. Instead, they look at the
board position and associate the whole with
alike or similar position in memory. This is
the base for determining the next move. On
the other hand, not everyone plays this way.
Logic provides a form of
representation that alfows the system
to create new facta through deduction.
Typically, the syntax & based on fwst­
orderpredicate cafculus, a kind of
formal logic representation that uses
opemtors and arguments, with vari­
abtes being allowed among
the arguments.
Beginners douse rules because their experi­
ence is insut%ciently rich to d6 otherwise. It
is interesting that the behavior of novicee­
that is, the use of rules-is the model for
computer systems that are called “expert.” ,~
Rule-based systems should not be dis­
missed. If they are applied to the right prob­
lem, they can be very effective, but they,
have gone about as far as they can go.
Frames provide abetter solution for dea~
ing with domains of highly related facts; A
frame is a lump of information that pertains
to an objector a class of objects. It may in­
clude characteristics of the objector descrip­
tions of the object’s abilities to influencd oth­
er objects. Since frames may also describe
classes of objects, hierarchical taxonomies
may be constructed to represent large sys­
tems of related objects. C,ommon informa­
tion may he entered once in a high-level
frame and inherited by a lower level frame.
A frame on tanks may indicate that all
tanks have tracks. A frame on a specific
tank need not repeat this informatioru it
59
may be restricted to characteristics unique
to that tank. Frames provide a very power­
ful form of representation. They seem to
parallel compiled knowledge. The compiled
procedure that controls walking is really a
frame of facts and procedures.
There is a problem with frames-excep­
tions. People deal successfully with an envi­
ronment because they can deal with the.
The current deficiencies ofAl
work. This does not say that AI will not
show ttiat researchers have made some
work. “W1ll not work” is a matter of predic­
progress, but much remains to be done.
tion, and prediction is a risky business. AI is
Zfhuman-levelperformance is the
not something that people will discover as
measure, Af does not work. This
does not say that AZ will not work.
World. It is something that people will in­
‘Will not work’ is. . . prediction, and
m-ediction is a risky business.
myriad of exceptions that characterize the
environment, not because they apply an in­
flexible dogma of facts and procedures. It is
tempting to establish a frame for birds that
indicates all birds have feathers, lay eggs
and can fly. This is fine except for the pen­
guin. This may be solved by preventing the
few exceptions from inheriting the charac­
teristic of flight. But what”about birds with
broken wings? What about very young b~?
Neither of these can fly, but that does not
mean the species cannot fly.
Logic provides a form of representation
that allows the system to create new facts
through deduction. Typically, the syntax is
based on first-order predicate calculus, a
kind offormal logic representation that uses
operators and arguments, with variables
being allowed among the arguments. As a
much-simplified example, “Irving has
feathers” might be represented as (has­
feathers Irving). Has ::eathers is the opera­
tor, and Irving is the argument. Also, “If X
has feathers, then X is a bird might be
60
represented as if (has-feathers X) then (bird
xi. Suppose thk information was in a 10gic­
based system, but there was no explicit in­
formation about Irving being a bird. The
system would examine these two state- )
ments by way of its control procedures, de­
ducethat %vingis a bird” and add (bird Irv­
ing) to the system knowledge base.
The current deficiencies of AI show that
researchers have made some progress, but
much remains to be done. If human-level
performance is the measure, AI does not
I
Christopher Columbus discovered the New
vent as Johannes Gutenberg invented the
printing press.
When estimating the potential for inven­
tion, two types of people should be consid­
ered: those who develop the technology—
the reseaichere-and those who apply the
technology-the users. The research comnm- ,,
nity is replete with people who are bright,
energetic, innovative, enthusiastic, skepti­
cal, optimistic and pessimistic—but not all
at once. Visit any researchtcenter or attend
any conference, and you will not find a char­
latan among them. Regarding the connec­
tors between researchers and users-the
commercial community—suftlce it to say
that the classic zule ‘<Letthe buyer beware”
applies.
Technology limitations are not the only
hurdle for AI. There is another to be found in
the way we in the Army deal with new high
technology. AI is of no use if it remains in
the laborato~, it must be applied to real-
world problems. The people who do thie­
soldiers who are not researchere-consti­
tute a hurdle that would probably exist even
if technology limitations did not.
Soldiers are little different from their ci­
vilian peers when it comes to new ideae-
December 1986. MILITARY REVIEW
 VIEWPOINTS

GermanKrummlauf30-degree
curved-barrelunit
withperl.
ssops and clamp for attaching
to rifle barrele, 1945

People will not-and must not-accept the risks inherent in an

immature technology when human welfare is involved. It is all right to plag
games in the laboratory with rules of logic like John loves Mary. However, ,
it is not all right to risk lives by developing an ‘experf sgstem that does not
accurately predict the location of enemy weapons. Mistakes in the laboratory
make people start over; mistakes on the battlefield make people die. 2
,/

both resist change. Senior executives wbo the Wright brothers showed thaf peopl~

have spent their entire working lives devel­ could use machines to fly. They did not show

oping qualification in their craft do not want that airplanes could deliver mail to Milwa~­
to be told that the rules have changed. Sen­ kee, dust crops in Kansas or consign large:

ior personnel know very well how to do their naval vessels to deep, watery graves. That~s

jobs and do not need to be told how by some not what researchers do; that is what usqi-s

28-year-old hot-shot. Business will goon in do.

time-proven ways-ways that have brought The. matter of risk and the professional

success in the past. predilection for risk avoidance is the qext

When resistance to change is overcome, problem, In the Army, if something is likely,

the next problem is the “one-page executive
summary syndrome”: “Don’t waste my time
with the technical details, just give me the
bottom line. Tell me what AI can do for me.”
This abrogates the obligation of technology
users-to determine how technology may be
usefully applied in their domain. In 1903,
to fail, it is likely not to be tried. Those who,
have been around for a while understand 1
well that it is easier and safer to be critical’
than correct, especially when you are un­
sure of your subject or unsure of the outcome]
of a course of action. When dealing with
high technology, there is grest wisdom in

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1e86 61

the this-will-never-work position. Ifyou are
wrong, no one remembe~, if you are right,
you are unhurt by the failure of the project.
Younger personnel, who might be more
directly involved in technology develop­
ment, can find refuge in the never-ending
study. They pursue technology for its own
Soldiers are little different
t%m their civilian peers when it
comes to new idem—both resist
change. Senior executives who have
spent their entire working lives devel­
oping qualification in their W@ do not
want to be told that the rules have
changed. Seniorpereonnel know very
well how to do their jobs and do not
need to be told how by some
28-year-o fdhot-shot.
sake, producing one demonstration proto­
type after enother but never an application
system which might be evaluated and criti­
cized. Again, if AI is going to “work,” it must
be applied operationally to real-world prob­
lems.
The other side of caution is “go for broke.”
In the Army, there are not enough profes­
sional brass rings to go around. The survi­
vor grabs one before they are all gone. One
way to do this is to make a spectacular leap
for it. The leap often involves a product that
is beyond the currfmt capabilities of the
technology. Otherwise, it would not be spec­
tacular. Such a leap may result in spectacu­
lar failure, with disastrous consequences for
organizational support of technology devel­
opment. While failure may be highly injuri­
ous to the individual, it is lethal for the tech­
nology involved because it is the technology
that takes the blame: ‘This stuff will never
wQrk anyway.” “We’ve been sold a bill of
goods.” ‘It’s just like indust~ to promise
62
everything and deliver nothing.” People
who pick green apples should not complain
because they are sour.
High technology often means high salary
in the civilian marketplace. There is an un­
fortunate orientation present in some quar­
ters that is summed up by ‘What’s in it for
me?” when technology is developed for the
social and economic benefit of the devel­
opers, it becomes a game in which all the
players win. In a noncommercial environ­
ment such as the Army, everyone else loses.
Widows will find little comfort in the knowl­
edge that the developers of the expert sys­
tem their spouses were depending on are
carrying $800 briefcases.
The logistics system can be a hindrance.
AI development requires new, unique, ex­
pensive hardware. The Army procurement
system simply does not support the easy ac­
quisition of necessary nonstandard equip­
ment.
Recently, an Army field organization pr­
ocuredand distributed a number of personal
computer-based list processing language,
(LISP) packages to encourage self-study of
this essential programing la~guage. At first
attempt, the procurement was blocked by,
the local automation authority because
“LISP is not an approved Army language.”
The Department of the Army was contacted
directly by way of a convenient high-level
briefing, and the Army’s senior automation
authority was ca~oled into a somewhat re­
luctant approval. Unfortunately, as the ap­
proval rolled back downhill,. it knocked a
whole hierarchy of noses out of joint. In mat­
ters such as this, the job usually gets done,
but there is a better way to do business.
All of these problems can be eliminated by
a change of behavior. It is not an easy task,
but it can be done. There is another human
behavior problem that is not so simply
solved. People till not-and must not-ac­
cept the risks inherent in an immature tech­
nology when human welfare is involved. It
December 1986. MILITARY REVIEW
 VIEWPOINTS

is “all right to play games in the laboratory

with rules of logic like John loves Mary.
However, it is not all right to risk lives by
developing an “expert” system that does not
accurately predict the location of enemy
weapons. Mistakes in the laboratory make
people start oveq mistakes on the battle-
field make people die.
Why will AI not work? It will not work be-
cause of a combination of problems with the
technology and the people who apply it. The
problems with the technology can he sum­
marized as one problem—the expectation of
human-level performance. If we do not de-
mand that machines equal people, AI will
work—it already has worked. But then, that
would not really be AI or, rather, would not
fully be AI. So what? If something works,
use it. Who cares what it is called?
The problem with human-level expecta-
tions can be summarized as a need for com­
mon sense-a need for machine ability to
generate “hunches” and “gut feelings.” The
key to common sense has not yet been found.
Is the secret of a hunch in the situation, or is
it in the brain? What is it about a hook and a
ring that, when we see them, we know the
The other side ofcuution is ‘gb
for broke. ‘In the Army, there are not
enough professional brass rings to go
around. The survivor grabs one before
theg are all gone. ihse wa~ to do this is
to make a spectacular leap for it.
The leap ofien involves a product that
is beyond the current capabilities
of the technology.
learned. If it is learned by people, maybe it
can be described and taught to machines.
There are no guarantees, but there is swie­
thing about us that says we must try. The
same thing that drives us to the heights of
the Himalayas, to the depths of the seas and
to the cold, lonely, emptiness of space says
maybe—just maybe—machines can be
taught to think as we do. If and when that
happens, machines like those. that have al-
ready liberated us from the galley and the
sweatshop may also free us from the boring,
mundane, time-consuming tasks that char-
i
acterize the low end of knowledge-driven ~

hook will support the ring? What is it about work.

a row of hooks in a restaurant that, when we AI is not something that was cast in stone

see them, we know they are for ha~ging at creation. Neither success nor failure is in- ~

coats? Why do we know that we can hang trinsicorpreordained. “Machines will think

more than one coat on each hook but that when people teach them to think.” Why k? ,.

there is a limit? After three or four coats, the AI not work? Because people might no!

hook is no longer a hoolq additional coats make it work—the same people who abhor

will slide to the floor. failure. Why will AI not work? We should

Such information is not genetic; it is not ask—and we must not quit. %

\
k’faJor Kenneth H. Rose is a combat develop­
ments staff offiier for attziiciaf mtellcgence und
mbodcs, Headquarters, US Army Training and
DoctrLne Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. He re­
ceived a B.FA. /kum tkE University of Wisconsin - ,
klilwaukeeandan MA. from Ball State Unmerszty
and is agmduate of the USACGSC. He has served
in command and staffPosLtLons m tke Continental
UniledStaics, West Germany andKoma and as a­
ecutiue offier, 10lst Airborne Diui.mon (A w As­
sault), Fort Campbell:.Kentucky.

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 63,

 CITIZEN

SOLDIERS

The 350th anniversary of the birth of the Army National

Guard (ARNG) will be celebrated 13 December. on that day
in 1636, the general court at Boston, Massachusetts Bay Col­
ony, issued an order creating wweral regiments of militia. Mili­
tia service was based upon the legal obligation of all male citi­
zens to defend the colony,
Militia units provided the principal defense for the English
colonies for more than 100 years. Former militiamen and
mifitia units formed the basis for the organization of the Con­
tinental Army during the Revolutionary War. Four units in
today’s Massachusetts ARNG are descended from the regi­
ments that were established in 1636 and are the oldest con­
tinuously organized military un~ts in the Western Hemi­
sphere. More than 30 modern ARNG units have Iineage$
dating to the Revolutionary War or earlier.
 The
Army National Guard
Celebrates 3s0 years
Although recognized by the Constitution, the concept of
universal military obligation gradually lapsed during the 19th­
century “era.of free sewity.” The legitimate security needs of
the states were suppmted by volunteer militia units organized
within the legal framework of the old universal militia stat­
utes. This volunteer militia, or “National GuardP was recog­
nized and given financial support by the federal government
beginning in 1903. The ARNG provided more than one-third of
the American Expe&tionary Forces during World War I and
doubled the combat strength of the Army during mobilizations
‘f
in 1940 and1950. Today’sARNGcontinuesto serveasan inte­
gral part of the nationaldefense,providingalmosthalf of the
combatunitsof the Total Army, whileprovirfingthestategover­ /
norswith securityandemergencyforces. j
Happy Birthday, and best wishes for another 350! #
: ‘:
 Daniel J. Hughes $

Within the circles of US military “thinkers,” the most often-cited

model for military professionalism and competency is the German
armg of the first half of the 20th century. However, perhaps it is
folly to advocate their “sgstem” for emulation. To do so may be
oversimplifying a verg compGex issue.
D ESCRIBINGthe openingphase of the
Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan,
Edward N. Luttwakgave the operation his
ultimate compliment. It was so good, he ar­
gaes, that it was almost like a German oper­
ation-elegant, risky and most profitable.:
Not all professionals share this respect for
the Wehrntacht although the US Army’s
doctrinal literature contains many concepts
allegedly or actually borrowed from the
Germans. These borrowings, legitimate or
not, range from various elements of the Air-
Land Battle doctrine to light infantry &lvi­
sions.z
If one is to believe much of the now-fash­
ionable literature and discussion, the study
of military history has brought military
thhkers back to such Germans as Count
Helmuth von Moltke and the ubiquitous, if
shadowy, Heinz Guderian. On the surface,
the current philosophy of war, the concept of
the operational level of war, the principles
of mobile warfare and even theories of offi­
cer education draw heavily upon the theory
and practice of the German army.’
Two fundamental problems seriously de­
tract from many otherwise laudable efforts
to use the German experience to further the
US Army’s understanding of modern war.
The first is a careless and supetilcial appli­
cation of German terms and concepts to cur­
rent practices. The second is a general fail­
ure to place individual German methods
and experiences in their proper historical
context. Hindered by superficial knowledge
and dependent upon unreliable sources, too
many writers have created false pictures of
the German army’s doctrine and methods.
Far too often, German milita~ history has
become a storehouse to be looted in search of
examples to justify current doctrinal con­
cepts.
One prominent example of the failure to
understand German terms and concepts is
the term Auftragstaktik. This was not a ba­
sic’ word used by the old Prussian army or
MILITARY REVIEW . December 19S6
the German army of World War II. It has no ‘
meaning when rendered as “mission-type
order,” probably the most common transla­
tion.’ Its use in the German army prior to
1945 was exceedingly rare.s In its current
applicatiofi, the term explains ba’sic princi­
ples of giving orders for operations. Those
who claim to have discovered the secret of
Two fundamentalproblems
seriously detract from many otherwise
laudable efforts to use the German
expen”ence to further the US Army’s
understanding of modern war.
The first is a careless andsuperticial
application of German terms and con.
cepts to current practices. T/se second is
a general failure to place individual
German methods and experiences in
theirproper historical context.
German operational success in mission-
type orders similar to thoqe now imbedded
in US doctrine should re-examine the Ger- ‘
man system. This method, which differed
substantially from current concepts, cannot
be validly explained in isolation from othei
peculiarities of the Prussian-G-erman st~e
of warfare. #
The Prussian-German concept of operk~:
tions orders differed from the current US
approach in two fundamental ways: the
place and role of the commander’s i?ltent
(Absicht) and the nature of the task (l~uf­
tmg). The US concept of mission is a poor
translation and substitute.
The German army used mission state- j
ments (although there is no German concept j
of mission precisely in the US sense) in the
form of the commander’s intent. In this, ,
German commanders saw what the US Ar­
my would call a mission. The commander
then assigned tasks {Auftruge) to subordi­
67

nate units to carry out his and his superior’s
intent. The subordinate commander decid­
ed upon a specific course of action which be­
came his resolution (Entschluss).
The German army, therefore, did not
build the cornmander’sintent into a particu­
lar miesion or vice versa.’ The primary Ger­
man field manual of World War II, Truppen ­
ftihrung, explicitly stated’that a subordi­
nate commander could change or abandon
his task within the framework of the higher
commander’s overall intent. This was a seri­
ous matter, and a commander who did this
assumed full responsibility for the decision
and its consequences. Immediate notifica­
tion of the higher commander was a strin­
gent necessity.’ This ability to separate in­
tent at higher levels from task and resolu­
tion was critical both to the Gm-znan army’s
legendary battlefield flexibility and to the ini­
tiative of its cormnanders at all levels.
68
Brmdemmh,u
The now-standard interpretation of Auf­
tragstaktik rests upon signitliant misunder­
standing of the language and how the con­
cepts fit together. This does not mean that
the current US concept of mission-oriented
orders is invalid or that it fails to meet the
Army’s needs. It simply is not an accurate
reflection of the old German system. Noth­
ing is to be gained by filling briefings and
journal articles with statements that the US
Army is using German concepts that proved
successful in World War II. Such is not the
case.
Likewise, a number of recent authors
have taken great satisfaction in describing
the similarities between the German dot-,
trine of “blitzkrieg” and the tenets or imper­
atives of the AirLand Battle doctrine} The
problem with this is that the German army
had no doctrine of blitzkrieg: That term de­
scribes a result rather than a particular the-
December 19F16 � MILITARY REVl~

orY of war peculiar to Guderian, Erich von
Manstein o; other leaders.’0
There is a disturbing and quite erroneous
view that a German doctrine of blitzkrieg
called for maneuver and deep penetration to
paralyze the enemy’s command and control
system and to produce a collapse of enemy
morale.’1 One author has recently gone so
far as to cite the great encirclement battles
in the Bialystok-Minsk area (1941) as an ex­
cellent example of using that doctrine. ”
This is sheer invention, both in theory
and in practice. The German army’s ar­
mored forces, contrary to unexamined ex­
pectations and assumptions, did not at­
tempt to disrupt the enemy’s command ap­
paratus as their primary or even secondary
objectives. Nor was paralysis of the enemy
their ultimate goal. It maybe comforting to
think in such,terms when studying, explain­
ing or justifying some elements of current
or proposed doctrine, but the historical
phenomenon so frequently described did not
exist. ”
The entire question of German doctrine
merits a lengthy study. The discussion here
must concentrate on two main points. The
single doctrinal statement for the German
army’s large formations was Heeresdienst­
uorschrift (HDv) 30011, Truppenfuhrung, a with a doctrine inherited from Fredexick
pocket-sized combined arms manual which
served the Welzrrnacht throughout World
War 11.”
Truppenfuhrung bears little resemblance
to the German army’s current manual for
operations, HDv 100/100, Fuhrung irn Ge­
fecht, available in oftlcial channels as Com­
mand and Control tn Battle. The dominant
perspective of Truppenfiihrung, was com­
bined arms warfare. Its basic principle of
mobile warfare was applicable to all arms. If
any of the individual arms held the most
prominent place in the manual, it was the
infantry. Indeed, one might reasonably ar­
gue that the German army, using its unique
system and style of waging war, was so suc-
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
GERMAN MILITARY HISTORY
There is a disturbing and quik
erroneous view that a German doctrine
of blitzkrieg called for maneuver and
deep penetration to paralyze the
enemg’s command and control system
and to produce a collapse of enemy mo­
rale. One author has recently gone so
far as to cite the great encirclement
battles in the Bialgstak-lfinsk area
(1941) as an excellent example
of using that doctrine.
The German army emphasized
mobile warAare because it was the
most eificient methoii of destroying the
opposing army. Deep attacks had the
purpose ofpreventing the enemy from
stabilizing his front and introducing
positional wadare, the horrors of
which were obvious after 1918,
cessful in its tactics and mobile operations, ,j
not because it had a body of doctrine on large
armored operations but because it did not. ”
Adolf Hitler’s army fought World War II ~
the Great, von Moltke, Count Alfred vo 7
Schlieffen and several leaders of the Wely % ..
mar period. This doctrine emphasized the,
two most enduring principles of the Prus~
sian-German approach to war the principle
(some say dogma ) of the battle of annihila­
tion and the necessity of conducting mob~
warfare-armored or otherwise. Any dis­
cussion of the German way of war must con- ~
sider these two features of German military j
thought. They were the basis of Truppen- J
ftihrung.
The German army emphasized mobile 1
warfare because it was the most efficient
method of destroying the opposing army.
Deep attacks had the purpose of preventing
69

The primarg German field man­
ual of World War 11, Truppenfiihrung,
explicitly stated that a subordinate
commander could change or abandon
his task within the framework of the
higher commander% overall intent.
This was a serious matter, and a com­
mander who did this assumed full
responsibility for the decision and
its consequences. Immediate notifica­
tion of the higher commahder
was a stringent necessitg.
the enemy from stabilizing his front and in­
troducing positional warfare, the horrors of
which were obvious after 1918. The Wehr­
macht used its famous encircling maneu­
vers to create favorable conditions for con­
ducting traditional battles of annihilation.
Despite several recent statements to the
contrary, the Germans did not embrace the
theories of J. F. C. Fuller or B. H. Liddell
Hart on paralyzing the enemy. Physical de­
struction of the opposing force remained the
goal of mobile warfare.’6
The German army’s mobile forces had as
their primary objectives the destruction or
forced dislocation of enemy artillery, not of
his command and control systems. The
great encirclement battles in the Bialystok-
Minsk area are good examples of the practi­
cal implementation of these doctrinal prin­
ciples and are quite the opposite of what
some authors have made them out to be.
The 2d Panzer Group’s Order Number 1,
dated 8June 1941, laid out the objectives for
what became one of the first encirclements
of the 1941 campaign. The task of Guder­
ian’s 2d Panzer Group was to destroy the en­
emy units in the Bialystok area and then to
move eastward toward Smolensk. Guder­
ian’s order, which repeatedly stressed the
need to clear the roads for rapid exploitation
70
to the east, mentioned neither enemy head­
quarters nor communications. Likewise,
the main targets of friendly air support
were, first, enemy artillery and, second, for­
tifications. The only mention of enemy head­
quarters was that the group’s heaviest ar­
tillery should engage enemy artillery and
staffs.”
A further point on the Bialystok-Minsk
encirclements concerns the issue of maneu-,
ver. These battles were more than simple
matters of disrupting the Red Army’s de­
fenses, forming the pockets and collecting
prisoners. Although the initial shock of the’
surprise attack created confusion in the
higher echelons of the poorly deployed ,
Western Military District, individual Sovi­
et units fought stubbornly. Although pre­
cise figures for German losses are difficult
to obtain, the stiff Soviet resistance sur­
prised and impressed the local German
commanders.’8
Aside frpm doctrine, the great attention
devoted to blitzkrieg, Auftnzgstaktik and
other German terms has obscured other im­
portant factors in the German army’s vari­
ous successes and failures. Qviously, an ar­
my’s doctrine is but one of many factors
leading to victory or defeat in war. All too of­
ten, current literature glosses over other
foundations of the Prussian-German mili­
tary system and discusses only doctrine, tac­
tics and the style of maneuver. Examination
of other basic features of the German army
might reveal other equally important fac­
tors fundamental to its operational skill.
Such studies might also answer the ques­
tion if any other army could hope to execute
that doctrine or copy it to any considerable
extent.
No comprehensive study of the sources of
German military performance in World
War II is available despite the numerous
books on strategy, high politics in the mili­
tary and operations in various campaigns.”
Martin Van Creveld’s Fighting Power is a
December 1986. MILITARY REVIEW

starting point, but it lacks depth in institu­
tional atTairs, theoretical foundations and
operational matters.’” A few of the most im­
portant issues meriting consideration di­
rectly relate to the ability of the German ar­
my to carry out its doctrine of mobile war­
fare cohesion, offlcerpersonnel policies, the
General Staff system and improvisation.
Perhaps most important, the Prussian
and German armies demanded and pro­
duced cohesive, effective fighting units.
German units of both world wars retained
their cohesion and combat effectiveness in
both offense and defense despite heavy loss­
es and substantial inferiority in firepower
and mobility. Disputes exist, of course, over
quantitative measurements of the relative
efficiency of (@-man units and those of their
enemies.” Nevertheless, the overall superi­
ority of German units in the West is hardly
open to doubt.~>This does not mean that all
German units were of equal caliber or that
they maintained the same quality through­
out the warm
The German army built effective combat
units through tough (even brutal) and real­
istic training, iron discipline and harsh pun­
ishments, an effective replacement system
and, as is well-known, effective leadership.
It was extraordinarily effective at learning
MILITARY REVIEW �, Decsmber 1986
Buwieswch,u
from its experiences.” Because of their im:
pressive cohesion under great stress and the
capabilities of their lower ranking leaders,
German units remained effective fighting
forces despite enormous 10SSI+?S
The second fundamental pillar of the
Prussian-German system was the elitist
system of officer selection, education, as­
signment and promotion.” Inseparably
coupled with this was the General Staff sys­
tem. No comprehensive treatment of either
currently exists, especially in English, de­
spite the popularity of Trevor N. Dupuy’s A
Genius for War and the work of apology byy
Walter Goerlitz.” Numerous studies in Ger:’
+
man, which, taken together, would allow a’
more thorough understanding of these corn-:
plicated subjects, have had little if any im,
pact on the US Army’s view of Hitler’s army
or its Prussian predecessor.” This is e.k,pe­
cially unfortunate because careful consider­
ation of the Prussian-German oftlcer per­
sonnel system is absolutely essential to any
effort to understand how tbe Germans de­
veloped and executed their doctrine.
As a matter of principle, the Prussian-
German army accorded quality precedence
over quantity in virtually all ofticer mit­
ters. There exists among historians no una­
nimity on the precise details of the Prus-
71
 I

then the divisional territorial recruitment

The German army built effective
system, was the most important foundation
combat units through tough (even
stone of the old Prussian system. Further,
brutal) and realistic training, iron
it formed the basis of the post-1918 army
discipline and harsh punishments, an
until rapid expansion after 1935 forced
effective replacement system and, as
changes.
is well-known, effective leadership.
Prussian and German officers held the re­
It was extraordinarily effective at
spect of their men to an impressive degree.
l~arning tlom its experiences. Because
The German army was careful not to erode
of their impressive cohesion under
the status of its officers by having too many
great stress and the capabilities of their
or by having them perform inappropriate
lower ranking leaders, German units
functions. Because of this and the army’s
remained effective fighting forces
standards of discipline, German officers
despite enormous losses.
were remarkably successful in rallying
shattered units. They were also successful
in converting groups of stragglers, men in
Tojoin the General Staff, a transit and other motley collections of indi­
German oflicer had to have both an viduals into reasonably effective ad hoc
exemplary (by Prussian standards) units for emergencies.” Initiative and inde­
military record and the recommenda­ pendence of action, as well as tactical com­
tion of his regimental commander. petence, were other hallmarks of German
He also had to compete with his peers officers of both world wars.
in examinations to determine wha The General Staff was an elitist organiza­
would win the very few and highly tion designed to ensure competent perform­
covetedpositions in the War Academy. ance in all types of operations. There was
Mere stacks ofperfect performance very little similarity between the Prussian
ratings were of no avail. . . . system and that established% the US Army
in 1903.”
To join the General Staff, a German offi­
sian-German definitions of quality. Clearly, cer had to have both an exemplary (by Prus­
however, from the time of General Hans von sian standards ) military record and the
Seeckt (1920-26) onward, the emphasis was recommendation of his regimental co
~­
primarily upon military capability as op­ mander. He also had to compete with M
posed to social acceptability.” peers in examinations to de:ermine who”
In this view, not having an officer-hav­ would win the very few and highly coveted
ing a vacant position—was preferable to positions in the War Academy. Mere stacks
granting phony commissions or promotions of perfect performance ratings were of no
to undeserving or incapable men. Both in avail if the applicant could not prove his
the Imperial Army and in the Reichswehr, competence in military subjects and a for­
regimental commanders decided upon the eign language. Many hours of private study
suitability of men aspiring to become eftl­ were essential for most officers. The en­
cers.’” The regimental commander’s most trance examiriations were, moreover, the
solemn responsibility was the selection and first of many hurdles to be overcome on the
training of his officers. This vesting of pow­ way to acceptance as a General Staff officer.
er and responsibility in individual com­ Quality always had priority over quantity
manders, closely tied to the regimental and and substance over appearance in an army

1.

72 ‘December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

1
 .
which gladly rejected candidates after one,
two or even three years at the War Acad­
emy.23
The question of whether the German Gen­
eral Staff system might be a model for the
reform of the current US Joint Chiefs of
Staff system is another matter, as are the
questions of grand strategy, militarism and
Nazism: The relevant point is that the Gen­
eral Staff was as important to the operation­
al skill of the German army as was its doc­
trine. It is as of yet an entirely open question
if an army can execute that type of doctrine
without a rigorous system of ensuring oper­
ational competence in its commanders and
key staff officers.”
The most remarkable aspect of the Prus­
sian-German system was that, by current
standards, no “system” actually existed. Im­
provisation was the key to the Prussian-
German approach which regarded the con­
duct of war as an art-a free, creative activi­
ty with scientific foundations.” According­
ly, the Prussian-German army saw war as
a unique activity lacking firm rules, lists
of precepts, facile slogans or any kmd of
rigid structure. ”
The old German army never adopted a set
of principles of war.” Although that army
was rich in tactical doctrine, techniques and unique cultural, political and social factors )
thoughtful officer/authors, it believed that that provided the overall context of the~,
successful command in war was a function Prussian and German armies.’’ Somemet~-~ ,,:
of the professional judgment of its officers ods might have been entirely suitable for
and quite beyond any rigidity or simplifica­ the Germans of those times but entirely in-:
tion through formulas. appr,Opriate for other armies. Mere militar~
The German system of military educa­ efticlency is an insufficient reason for trans­
tion, ideally if not always in practice, taught ferring policies from one ai-my to anothef.
officers how to think about problems rather Few modern armies, for example, couid
than what to think in specific cases. In offi­ hopetoduplicate thestaqdardsofdiscipline
cer education, this approach placed empha­ that characterized the Prussian-German ~
sis upon developing good reasons for resolu­ army for more than a century. J
tions rather than finding solutions which There did exist a particularly German
came close to officially endorsed courses of style of war. It defies simple description or I
action. reduction to slogans. Many factors contrib­
Fipally, those who study the Ger-mari ap­ uted to German successes and failures. Con­
proach to warfare must consider the truly sideration of any one of these in isolation is

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 ?3


~rather than upon changing meth~ds which
~ may have little or no relevance to changed
risky, especially for those who lack a solid
background in the primary sources. Study of
the German military experience will be
helpful in deepening the current under­
standing of warfare only if it proceeds in a
thorough and cautious manner. At the
present time, such procedure is too fre­
quently not the case.
Students of the German army must first
distinguish between the army (Heer) and
the armed forces (Wehrmacht). The Wehr­
macht as a whole operated inefficiently, was
torn by internal strife and exhibited numer­
ous “other shortcomings. It was hardly a
model for anyone to emulate. Nevertheless,
those who criticize the US Army’s interest
in’the German army’s operational skill miss
the point entirely when they clutter their
74
discussions with the usual lists of Nazi orga­
nizational, economic and political weak­
nesses.
For example, a recent article purporting
to examine the validity of the German army
as a model discusses not the Heer but the
WehrmachtS’ All of the inefficiencies in the
air force, the navy, the SS (Schutzstaffel)
and the Wehrmacht headquarters made
the army’s task more difficult but are not
valid tests of the army’s methods of corn­
mand, tactical doctrine, and so forth. If any­
thing, considerations of such problems
make the performance of German corps and
division commanders even more impres­
sive. US otlicers have perfectly valid rea­
sons for examining the German army’s ap­
proach to war. Historians who criticize this
interest in the Heerbecause the overall Nazi
military machine was grossly inefficient ex­
hibit little or no understanding of the cur­
rent operational and tactical concerns of the
US Army.’!
Ofllers as well as civilians who study ttie
German army must do so with an open mind
and must focus on fundamental principles
conditions. For such endeavors, unfortu­
nately, the sources currently available in
English will not suffice. Sole reliance upon
these source~an unfortunate necessity in
most cases—reduces the complexities of
German militaryhistory to slogans and su­
perficialities. Few, if any, of the authors of
the standard secondary worke on the Ger­
man army have sufficient knowledge ?f
modem tactical concerns to probe the docu­
ments for information that is essential to
the issues raised by this generation of US
officers.
These officers, on the other hand, are, for
the most part,.unable to go beyond the un­
satisfactory secondary literature and exam- s
ine the German sources. These are availa~le
in vast quantities to those with the time and
December 19S6 � MILITARY REVIEW
 GERMANMILITARYHISTORY

ability to read them. Good historical re­

search and writing require more than good Improvisation was the key
intentionehigh standards of accomplish­ to the Prussian-German approach
ment are essential.” which regarded the conduct of war as
The Prussian-German army placed great an art-a Wee, creative actiuit~ with
emphasis on language abilities, especially scientific foundations. Accordingly,
among its General Staff offkers. This is yet the Prussian-German army saw war as
another example of the deep cultural differ­ a unique activity lacking tirm rules,
ences between Germany’s society and army lists ofprecepts, facile slogans or any
and those of the United States. Dennis E. kind of rigid structure. The old
Showalter has recently pointed out in a very German army never adopteda set
thoughtful article the dangers of relying ofprinciples of war.
on the translated works of (kderian, von
Manstein and others. He further stresses Theredid exist a particularly
the need for caution and very careful consid­ German style of war. It defies simple
eration before applying the German army’s description or reduction to slogans.
experiences to the very different North At­ Many factors coreti”buted to German
lantic Treaty Organization environment.” successes and failures. Consideration of
What is to be done? Acceptable solutions any one of these in isolation is risky,
offer no cheap or simple relief. Minimal especially for those who lack a solid
standards of quality in the Army’s profes­ background in the primary sources.
sional literature require, in most cases, that Study of the German military expe­ ,
officers who write about foreign armies be rience will be helpful in deepening
able to study them in their own language. ” the current understanding of warAare
Not every potential author is capable of bal­ only if it proceeds in a thorough
anced research and judgment on foreign and cautious manner. ,i i
armies,,, If the US Army is seriously inter­
ested in incorporating thorough, historical
research into its professional literature, it guages and their professional train’ing in ,
must emphasize excellence in both research historical research. High ideals do not gec~
and writing. This means, at a minimum, essarily result in mission accomplishment?
that at least a few more officers must de­ Neither do they alone produce excellence in
velop both their abilities to read foreign lan- doctrinal or historical studies. %, ‘

NOTES
1 Edwarti N L“llwak, The Pentagon .“0 the An of War The O!I.StIO” of EI”e ae.tscne M!lra.sche Tradmon,,, E.ropasche Wehrk.”de, Jun. 1982,
M,l!lary Reform, Stmon & Scnuster. N Y 1954 P 112 PP 264.65, traces the word Aunmg to 1873 and the concept to the early $ih
2 See, lor exaI@e, Lieutenant Colonel Paul ~ber,, German VW,”% So- century Ha does not me”lm” A“firacJstahUk
.,,! Sl,lztmeg, M,l,tafy Rev(’aw, SePtember 1985, PP 63-77, and M.qor (P) 6 R,charc E Snnpkln, Race 10 the swff Thoughts 0“ Twen!y+rst Cem
Stephen T R!ppe, Leader3hlp, F#rePower mm Mane.ver The Snt,sh and 1.v Wwfare, Srasseys Delenca, London, Eng, 1985, pp 227-32
Germans. Mrlrtafy R.wew, October 1985, w 30-36 Some PUWC.IIO”S Pre- 7 HeerwSd(e”SvOrSChnH (HO”) 300!1 TmPPe”fdhrung. E. S M, filer 8
Ced& the 1982 VMSIO”. ! F,eld Manual 1GQ.5, operations see Gapte,n An- SO., 0.0,., Gee, 1941, Pa!t 1,and HDv 34011, Truppenfuhm”g, cm. EIsner
thony M. Corodles, Maneuver to WI.. A Real,st,c Altemame MJItav R.. R G Sed,n, G,, 1941, Pal II
vmw, SePtembec 1981, w 35-46 8 me”, OP Ot., m 63.64 Lleutenmt Colonel Paul T. DeVms, Mane..
3 Nearly the entire March 1986 rssue of M!l!lmv Revtew n an example vw and the OPeraUonal Level 01 War,. M,l,tary Rewew Februa? 1983, pP
4 LIEutenanl colonel John W. Mountcastle, 0. lhk Move Command 33-34, and Major Ge.eraldohn W Woodmansee Jr, Sl,tzk.eg and the Acr.
a“o Gmtrol of Armor Unltsm CmnDat, M,lttery Rev,ew, November 1985, PP land Sanle; M,lmy Rwmw, August 1984,0021.39, make the argument
24-25 9 See Samuel J. Laws Forgone. Leg!ons German .4fmY fnlano Pol­
5 O“eofthe fewexamplests$” Wtihelm sack, TakIk. E S M#Oler &S... my, ?978.1941, Praeger Publ,shecs, N. Y., 1985, m 45-55, and R,Chard T.
Berm Ger, 1908.10, volume I,P 347 Balckme.t,onsth’a tenr mas.$ngle In- Surke, The German Panzenvalle, 1920.1939 A study In 1.sl,!.! ,0.81
sw.ce%nd does ..! devote even af.11 semence to,1 m h(s follovmg dfscus- Change, “nPubltshed Ph D’ dlswlat,om NorIhwestem UnlW1$ltY, Eva..
sm. of leaders, t“matwe and <“dependence Or D,eter 0s., ,Der A.lm.g S1O”, Ill, 1969, w 223-28.

MILITARY REVIEW * December 1986 ‘ 75

 II

10 S,, Helmut Otto, E“steh””g ““d We,,” de, Bl,Qk”e@7.one de, 25 Edward A Sh,!s and Moms JanmvItz Cohes,o” and D,s!nle@o. m
de.tschen !mwmhm.s vor dem Emten We! fkneq,,, Zem.hnt /Or M;IJ­ the German Wehrmachl m world war 11, Pub!!. OfJmm. O.armrfy, summer
Mrgesch)chfe, 1967, w 40%-41 4 194S, w 280.305 Rqer A. Beaumont e“d Wll,am P Snyder, Tombs!
11 MaIorGemcge A Htg.JIu, Gem.. andUSOperat,onalA fi,AQntmst Ei+tiveness. Parad,gm and P.radoxes; Combat Eifeco.eness. Cohesrdn,
,. Maneuwr,,, M!l!tary Renew, October 1985, m 23-24 Colonel Walace P. stress, and me volunteer Mmary, .30?w by Sam C smkewn Sage P.blP
Franz, OP,,.I,O”,! ConcePls: Mll,lwy Re.mv, July 1984, w 1 ?-1 2, .1s4 ca!(ans, Beverly Hil($, Ca[$l., 1980, w 20.56
d,sc.sses pmalyas as the @ of mmm.ver. 26 B“rk.d M,Uer-H,lleb’and, Das Hew. E, S, M,tUer & Son, FrankfuII, GE,
12 H,WTS,CP .)1, PP24.25 19s9, volume Ill, p 264
13 Heinz G.dens. $.1 forlh h,s concept s,. some waltered pe..d,c.l 27 wall.! GoerlIQ, H!story of the German GnnEraI 57ati, 1657-1945.
afi(des a.d a book Burke, OP. .!1., has a Pan,al I,st of Ihes Gudenm was tmwated by B.,. BaNeIshaw, Pr.mger P.bl$shers N.Y., 1953, has earned
emphaw that lhe main .b)ect(ves of tanks were .Chlevd by fire and mat the the scmr.1 most h,slmmm The belier books,.! ‘fJvch them .,. seveml, am
destruchm fvwm.htung) 01 the enemy through the effects of tank weapons all m German
was the essence See He,nz G.dmm., f% Pa..mwaff. .nd fhr Z.sam 2S Showalter, OP. CL has a wad Ihst
menwrken rmr.nderwn wane., E S, M,n(er 8 S0., Berlin, Ger., 1937, w 22 29 U. fml.natdy, there we few adequata sem”da~ so.rcas and “o”. m
% and He,”, G“dma”, D!. Pmzer,wffe, Un,O” Deutsche Verlagqesell. En@sh o“ m>, ImIPorl.”1 quesmn. LMMd N SPIr.n, imw!eand ReafW m.
%hat, S!.kwti, Ger., 1937, PP 167-227 Ths volume vms a second edtil(on Mzkmg of the Gem.” Oi?cer, 1921.1933, Greenwcad Press, WestWrl,
of Acht”ng-Psnzw wimch We. f,rst Pubtished t“ +936 Con” ~984,,, the best PI,.. 10 start
?4 See Waldemar Ertwlh, Dre G@sch#chte de, de”tsche” Genardstabm 30 There are “o C.mnprehenw.e treatments 01 th+s prc.sess m E“@h. My
,.” 7978bts 1945, M.,temchm,dt, Gon,”ge”, GE, 1957.1’h,e US Amy Corn­ Iorlhcomng book on the Prussan army,, w“erels (The ffing,s F!”mt,
rnana and General stall school press, ForI Lewe”wmh, Kansas, p.bl,stwd PraEwr P“bl,shers N Y ] w,II offer a m,’, CzmlP!et.9 exP1.”at,O” There were
e translmo. .t volume 1, mace.m!ely Iabemd ,Troop Leading m 1936 e.cept ,.”s,, of m.rse, mcl.d,m royal!y and graduate. .f th. .ad.t ..Vs.
C.r,o.$ly, “ot even lh,sverwm has fo.nd ,!s way ml. most Merat.re 31 John A Engl,sh, 0“ l“fantw, PraeW’ P“bl,sheLs, N Y 1984, PP 113­
15 Colonel Hub. Wass de CzeW, Wow 10 Change a“ Army, M!ht.cy 14
Rev(ew, November 1984, P 3S 32 The aetatts are beyond the sc.ape 01 th,s mud. but would prov,de a
1S TmPDenl"hmng wasaSemPhatlc O"thlSPO!nt a$,lw.$ thattheQOal Ol cla?.slc example 01 s.p.d( aal mwmon of a greatly INs.ndemtcod Ioretgn
?Jlthecombmed.rms m an allacxwast.bung the mfa”trylo ,Il”aldec(s(on example. See Paul Br.nsafl . . . S.hellendorlt The owes of the Genwd
w.,”.! the enemy See HDv 300! 1, TruPpenf.hnmg, w c,f Pert 1, P 127 StaH, HIS Malesly’s Sla(,oneIY Oti!ce, London, Eng 1907
Ib,d, Pm II... 5.6, .Iearlv de f,ned the 00.1s of tanks mlhe attack 8. be,rm 33 General E“Ch Brande”be’W(, Tca,n,”g end Develwment rlf German
,den!,cal 10 time 01 !he”,nfanlv Th&e Included enemy Iofllf!callons: General st’dH Ofmers; us Ewopea” Commano Fore,gn M#l#law stud,.,.
reserves, tanks and unspec,l,ed rear sem,ces Larry H Add,n@n, The Sh@­ Repor! Number 6, The German Gemm’ Stan, US European Command
kneg Era and the Gem.” General Sfaff, 1865.7941, RUtgWS U“,”WWY OP.r.1,0..l H,S1OV Branch, Ms P-031a, volume XXX pp 40.45.
Press, New Brumvwk, N J ,1971, w 3S-37 34 Was, de Crag,, w Of, PP 36.37.
17 P.nzer-GmPPe 2, N, 307,41 g Kdos G,”me”bef,hl Nr 110, den 35 The key Phrase IS a Paraphrase of Para3raPh < d TnJPoenl”h,””!I
Ang.n fGm.p Orders Number 1 for the Ar,wkl, 8 June 1941, sgned by 3s Fmdmh von R.benau Seeckl A.s s.,”w71 Lebe., 1918.7936, Hase
Gud.rmn, 0. Roll T314 775 of the !mcrofwned German annv moral% & Kmhler, Le,P?<Q Ger .1940, P 596
18 General G.nlhec Blumenlnn, DerAnsaQ der H GI Mike be, de, ErbW­ 37 John 1 A!wr, me Ouest for tictow The H>Story of the PvncIPJes of
“u”g de, R“ssla”d.Feldz”gs mi J“”, 1941, US Eurqmm Command For. W.% Gree”wcmd Press, Westpoti, Con”, 79S2, w 132.33
q“ M, I,I?IIY Stud,,., M. P-209, Gras,. E(”kessel””gs-Sch)achte” m 7 38 Richard F. mmwns, Lesson. From the Past for NATO,,, Parameters.
Welfhneg, US E.mpe.n Comm.nd Opwat,onal HISIOW Smnch, p 52 Autumn >984, PI) 3:17
19 me mm! recentwwm !heava(lablesowces IS 0...1s E Showallw 39 Rowr A Beaumom On the Wehmacht Mymque, Mmwy Re.!ew,
Gem.. Mhtay H6tov, 7648.7982 A Cnocaf B!blowrwhy, Garland Pub- July 1986, w 4’-56
l,sh(nq N Y., 19S3 40 There are Ihnmtsas 10 which parts of the German W@ expe..nce
20 Marun Van Creveld, F,ghl!”$I Power G.ma” and U S Amy Petiom­ may be of 6trm relevance 10 m.em problems, but ob%.nng the valuable
ace, !939- 1945, Greenwood Press, Wes!pod, CO.. , 1982 van Crweld, !! .o,.ts w,th ..”,,,1 am”men!s ah.”! overall Naz !mef+le”w,erves “0 “se­
must be “olea, .Ccellts the A“Hrmmlamk Phr.%e N lace “.1”, and C,fl#C#Z~S iul putp.se” ­
US thmv and Wrimmance,. wood War 1!0. ava.etyof related and unre­ 41 C.pmn Xmothy T L.Pier, Jh@(?manvm otmxtnne The Chmges m
lated gwnds Ge,ma” Tacbcel CU.!””. D“””g the F,rst Worlti W,,, Leave”woflh Paws,
2? Trevor N DWUY, A Ge”s”s for War The Gem,” Ann y and Gem,.) Number 4, Combat St”des 1“s!,1”!,, US Amw Comrna”d and Gener.1 StaH
s!.w, 7s07- 7945, MacDmaldand Janes, London, E.9 19?7 aPPllesa,.V CJllqe, Fo!l Lea”e”worth, Km July 1981
wewonable Wltlst$cal formula to me,wre German ,Upeno.ty s,. John 42 Den”,. E Showaller, A Dub>,., Her,tqe The M,!(1.IY Legacy 01 the
Sloan Smwn, Colonel Trevor N DUII.Y and the Mymm 01 the Wehmn.chl RIJss.-Gemnan war, Au Unrverwy Re.ew, March.Apm 1985, PP 4-23
S“PMO”CI A Reconsldwat, o”, M, fhfaIY Affwrs Jm.my 79S6, w 16-20 4! TWO recent {he,es w’,lle” al !he School d Adva”md MTtaIY SludleS
Michael Howard, I.st$tut(onal!zed Excellence.” The TIm.s LJ!erav s.PP@. are example. Mqor Davrd M Tankdey, What IS the S..(.1 Owmo.na!
me”t, London, E“g ,21 Am 1978, PP433-34 Maneuver Gm”o a“d What Am 1!s fmP!Jcaoo”s for the U S Ann”. Arland
22 John Keegan, SW Anmes !“ Normandy From D-Day !. the hberaoon Bam Docfn..7, M M AS. Thes,s, US Army Command and General S!.11
of Pans Pen!q.1. soaks, N Y, $982, and Max Hawngs, Overioro D.D.Y College, FOII Lewe.worih, Km, 1985, and M.par Steven J Atwrsmwr, An
.“. the Ba~e 10, No,w.”cIv Sm.” & Sch,$ter, N Y 1984 See al,. V.. OPeralro.ti ConcePt for the Banleheld Defeat of the sow.!. Based m an
Cweld q 01, Dass>m Analys,s OIOW Sov,etDe.rstomC”de, M M.A S Thess, US AM7y Command

.,,
23 T?w German annyclassrf,ed ,i?,var, o.%k,.dsd dlvmon. bylhe,r capa­ end General Stai+ College, For! Leave”worlh, Kan, 1984. mare IS.0 am-

.......
b,l,t,es Some, forex.mple, were mns,dered .nsulteDle fordep!oyment!n the parable amount of translated nmterm ava,lable for the Gem.. mmy, espe.
east anti !h”s could be used watinst the Ont,$h ,,6 Ame”cans c,.(!Y P“O, IO 1945
24 Wd!,amm” Murray, llIe Gerrman ResPo”se t. Vntory m Poland A 44 The I.ndame”!al ,s3.. ,s that of qualliy regardless.1 whatever valrd
Case study m Pro fess!onalmm, Armed Fomes and Socrew, W,nter 19S1. reason. expls!n lhe l.ab!lty of so many oHIcers or wm.!. to re8d the lllera­
w 285.9S l.re of the amws they have chosen to study or 10 compare wdh the US An’w.

. .,—=.-._

*I
I)on,ci.1 H,mhes is the command historian. US =

I Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ,,.

I Kansas. He recewedaPh.D.
.N.r?
. h I%ml?na
. . . . at
. Cham4
.
from the Uruuerscty of
Hill. He um.s formerlv a
al .­

I historwm with the US Air Force and ;ith the ~S

I Army Infunt?y School, Fort Bennmg, Georgia. —. ;
I k

76 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

On Establishing a Command
Climate That Fosters Initiative
In this day of eipandi~g technology, the
Army still frequently troubles itself over
the question of how to establish a command
climate that fosters initiative. In my view,
much of the difficulty rests with our per­
spective of the problem. By this, I mean we
tend to regard freedom to exercise initiative
as the subordinate’s right, and as such we
assign the superior the task of creating the
environment, or command climate, in which
initiative is to flourish.
Whereas the superior is clearly responsi­
ble for the environment, the subordinate al­
so has a duty, and it is in this area that we
have been lax. We have not done much to es­
tablish a mind-set that initiative is a re­
sponsibility the subordinate must exercise.
Perhaps the Army needs to concentrate on
developing a set ofexpectationsthat empha­
sizes this responsibility in the subordinate.
Soldiers should expect that successful ex­
ercise of personal initiative will yield high
praise. Occasional errors of commission are
expected and subject to simple correction. In
addition, however, they should also under­
stand that simple compliance with orders is
routinely expected and that failure to take
~PPrOP~iate action in the absence of orders
1s a serious matter.
A subordinate must also work to establish
the climate in which there is room for his
initiative. He must learn his boss’s expecta­
tions and standards and demonstrate the
ability to meet those standards without con­
stant supervision. He must also demon­
strate initiative in areas where it may not be
expected but will be appreciated.
“It is better to ask forgiveness than per­
mission” is a humorous slogan with some
currency in the Army. It is not the least bit
funny, however, and should be much more
MILITARY REVIEW . Decamber 1986
prevalen~ in fact, it should be a perform­
ance standard. This does not mean that offi­
cers should be free to exceed established
limits. It does mean they must willingly ac­
cept the responsibility and risk for. taking
action in the absence of guidance.
Work must continue on senior officer
awareness of the need to foster initiative.
Frequently, though, the immediate prob­
lem can be traced to the subordinate’s fail­
ure to exercise the freedom he has been
granted. Unsure of themselves personally
and often new to their jobs, junior offlcera
sometimes hesitate to exercise initiative,
even when it is clearly required. They need
to be taught that such initiative is not a
privilege; it is a responsibility.
The superior musfi
e Firmly establish the understanding :
that subordinates are expected to exercise
initiative, that errors of commission will be
corrected but that errors of omission are far ‘
,1
more serious.
e Ask “Will my subordinate accomplish
the mission?” rather than “Will he do it as I
would?’
e Ensure standards are high, clearly u~~
derstood, reasonably stable and realistic. j
e Give mission-oriented guidance bti.1+
anced by an appreciation for a subordinat~~s
capacity. Many soldiers need to be taug,ht
how as well as what to do.
@ Make clearthat exercising’initia~ive is
a requirement for successful service. ,
The subordinate must
o Assume responsibility for acting in the
absence of orders. (
e Understand that successful job per-j
formance entails accepting the risk of being
corrected for errors, of having to undo or re­
,,
do some work.
e Learn the standards and limits within
which he works.
e Adopt as a personal value the slogan, “It
,1
77
is better to ask forgiveness than permis-
sion.”
This approach differs fundamentally
from the idea that everyone is tiee to do his
own thing. It places a heavy burden on both
superior and subordinate. Superiors must
spend more time, not less, teaching and
Chemical W’;!l’~en;: A Policy
By Brad Roberts
Issues in Science& Technology,
Spring 1986
Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War
By W. Andrew Terrill Jr,
Strategic Review, Spring 1986
The US policy for dealing with chemical
weapons in which it has combined efforts to
eliminate them through arms control with
efforts to deter the use of such weapons “is
under growing stress,” according to Brad
Roberts writing in the Spring 19861ssues in
Science & Technology.
He advocates a policy “better attuned” to
the changing military, technological and
political environments around chemical
warfare and suggests “Without some sig­
nificant progress in arms control in the near
to medium term, the chemical warfare prob­
lem will likely grow dramatically worse.”
It already has according to W. Andrew
Terrill Jr, who writes in the Spring 1986
Strategic Review that the use of chemical
weapons in the Persian Gulf war between
Iran and Iraq should sound an ominous
warning for US policymakers. He says the
employment of chemical warfare “would
beckon strongly to a Third World country
engaged in direct’ confrontation” with the
United States, or other Western states. Ter­
rill concludes:
This is the contingency that the Uvited
78
guiding. Subordinates must accept the re­
sponsibility and riska of exercising initia- [
tive. we payoff is high unit performance
and exhilarating job satisfaction.
CalDavidS. B!odg8ti, USA,
ilirectw,BattleCommand
Training13rnter,tlSAGGSG
States and other Western nations must con­
sider most seriously in their plans—particu - ,
larly in the context of intensifying campaigns
against terrorist forces and the states sup­
porting them.
Roberts, in his article, says the United
States has historically followed a two-track
approach to the chemical warfare problem.
The goals are to eliminate chemical weap­
ons through arms control and to deter use of
them againsl the United States by main­
taining an arsenal of offensive chemical
weapons and defenses against chemical at­
tack.
Roberts urges a “more creatihe mix of pol­
icies and new forms of leverage” to keep the
US two-track policy effective. He suggests
@ Prompt attention to the proliferation
agenda by US policymakers.
e Ad hoc efforts with other nations to im­
prove chemical export controls.
e Bilateral efforts with the Soviet Union
to contain proliferation.
. An effort to achieve a comprehensive
chemical arms-control agreement.
o A strengthening of US deterrence.
6 Are-examination of the current US po­
sition regarding its offensive chemical de­
terrent.
Terrill examines “the kind of chemical
warfare problem that Roberts suggests will
be most troubles.orne for Up policymakers.
The Persian Gulf war marks the first time
since World War 1, according to Terrill, that
two large conventional forces have used
chemical weapons in combat.
Decsmber 19S6 . MILITARY REVIEW ~I

Besides the mere use of chemical warfare,
the problem should cause concern because of
the “truly revolutionary advances in chemi­
cal and related arms, along with the ease
and low cost of their manufacture relative to
other weapons 6f mass destruction,” writes
Terrill. He notes that Iraq has demonstrat­
ed some restraint in its use of chemical
weaponry, but he cautions against thinking
it will maintain this policy in the future.
On the contrary, Terrill says incidents
suggest Iraq would resort to the large-scale
use of chemical warfare if significant Irani­
an territorial victories carmot be turned back
with conventional attacks. “Should the mil­
itary situation deteriorate significantly,
Iraq will tight with every available weapon
to avert defeat,” he writes.
These actions cast “clear and ominous im­
plications beyond the Gulf.” The author
says there are “foreseeable circumstances”
under which chemical warfare might be
waged to a much greater extent than it al­
ready has been in the Persian Gulf.—ELH.
Star Wars: Breakthrough or
Breakdown?
By Douglas Wailer, James Bruce and
Douglas Cook
Arms Corrtro/ Today, May-June 1988
Commissioned by several senators on the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to
study the progress, changes, challenges and
problems involved with the Strategic De­
fense Initiative (SDD, the authors of this
Arms Control Today article conclude they
were:
. . . struck by myriad uncertainties and
unknowns at every turn in the program
that bear directly on the effectiveness of a
comprehensive ballistic missile defense we
might deploy in the future. , Chadwick writes in the Spring 1986 issue of ~
Douglas Wailer, James Bruce and Doug­
las Cook interviewed scientists, defense ex­
perts and program managers in the SDI ap­
paratus in preparing their report on what is
projected to be the largest military research
program the Department of Defense has ev-
MILITARY REvIEW * December 19e6
,
SUMMARIES
er undertaken. Their principal conclusions
were that:
. Congress should “maintain a healthy
skepticism” of claims of tremendous ad­
vances in SDI research.
o A closer look should be taken at wheth­
er intercepting missiles in their boost phase
“can ever be made to work and whether
space-based assets can ever be made surviv­
able.”
.e. Discriminating warheads from decoys
in midcourse is a much larger problem than ,
Congress has been led to believe.,
e Congress should be concerned about
shifts in SDI priorities. They indicate the
SDI Office “still does not have a firm idea of
how a strategic defense system might be im­
plemented,” and Congress is being asked for
billions of dollars on the promise that pro­
gram direction is clear.
e ConWess should question the rush for
an SDI deployment decision by the early
1990s. ,,
e Much more scrutiny must be given to
whether it is feasible to produce, deploy and :‘
maintain an SDI system.
Program uncertainty is everywhere, the
authors suggest. Since the United States,
even with strategic defenses in place, would , i
never be able to test the system under realis­
tic conditions, they believe “much of that
uncertainty will likely remain.’’—ELfl. ~ ,!
;
The Strategic Defense Initiative: ~,:
Meeting the Soviet Military ,
Challenge in the 21st Century
By Michael Loyal Chadwick
G/oba/ Affavs, Spring 1988 ,
Y Claiming that the Strategic Defense I~i­
tiative (SDI) “holds the promise of changing .
the course of human history,” MichaeI Loyal !
Global Affairs that the United States must ‘
develop, test and deploy a defense shield
against nuclear ballistic missiles. “It is no! .
only the wisest course, but it is the orily
course that protects the American pe~ple
from nuclear war and annihilation.” .
. .
7
79
,,
 The author examines various Soviet stra­
tegic defense programs that, he says, “dem­
onstrate the need” to press ahead with SDI-
related research and development. He con­
cludes that deterrence of aggression, as
envisioned by SDI, “is the most effective
means” of providing for the security and
common defense of the United States.
Presently, according to Chadwick, the
president has two options if deterrence
fails--retaliate with a limited number of in­
tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) or
surrender. He says the president “feels nei­
ther course is feasible or moral,” and that is
why he opted for the development of SDI.
Chadwick notes that opponents of SDI fre­
quently stand behind the 1972 “Antiballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty and proclaim that it
prohibits the development, testing and de­
ployment of ABM systems. But Chadwick
Bridging the Gap
I read with interest the August .1986 ar­
ticles, “A View of Civil Affairs in the LIC
Arena,” by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Zy­
giel Jr., and “An Army Strategy and Struc­
ture,” by Colonel William P. Johnson Jr.
and Colonel Eugene N. Russell. The call for
an active civil affairs unit in the US South­
ern Command (USSOUTHCOM) brought
back nostalgic memories of my days as the
last cc.nmander of the 3d Civil Affairs
Group (Airborne) in the Panama Canal
Zone, circa 1974.
Originally conceived as a civil affairs de­
tachment of the 8th Special Forces Group, it
split off and became a civil affairs group un­
der US Army Forces, Southern Command
(USARSO), the forerunner of the 193d In­
fantry Brigade, Canal Zone. The group com­
mander was dual-hatted as the USARSO
. G5.
80
says a treaty does not override the Constitu­
tion. “A treaty cannot take away essential
liberties secured by the Constitution to the
people or bind the United States to do what
their Constitution forbids them to do.”
Calling the Constitution “the supreme
law of the land: Chadwick suggests Con­
gress abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty and
“freely pursue” SDI development. Such a
move is justified because the Soviet Union
has repeatedly breached the treaty and has
developed a massive offensive nuclear force
that threatens the United States.
According to Chadwick, SDI is an oppor­
tunity to move away from deterrence based
solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation
and to create a defensive system that “holds
the possibility of eliminating the threat of
nuclear war and nuclear blackmail—a de­
cidedly moral and wise course.’’—ELH. ,
As an operational as well as a staff
element, ,the group did a variety of US­
SOUTHCOM-sponsored tasks outside of
Panama and the Canal Zone. In addition,
the group provided one of the few operative
links between the US military and the Pan­
amanian National Guardlgovemment. Dis­
aster relief assistance was one of the group’s
more important services to perennially di-
saster-prone Latin-American countries. It
was ironic that the 3d Civil Affairs Group
was inactivated as a manpower bill-payer
when the US Army Forces Command took
over the Army element in the Canal Zone.
This was at a time when civil affairs exper­
tise was badly needed because of the critical
Panama Canal treaty negotiations of the
mid-to-late 1970s.
Now, it seems low-intensity conflict has ,
developed renewed interest in civil affairs.
December 19S6 � MILITARY REVIEW

With all of the emphasis being placed upon
US relations with Latin America, a civil af­
fairs group on the isthmus of Panama might
be just the thing to rebuild a Y-midge” be­
tween North and South America that may
be lost when the Panama Canal and its US
bases revert to Panama in the year 2000.
L! Col ThomasD. Morgan, USA, Ret/red, our role in light of our implicit policies in
f-acey,W’ashingfon Nicaragua and Angola, for example. Fur­
LIC-Another Definition
The August 1986 issue of Mi2itaryReuiew
contained excellent articles on the recur­
ring need for definitions and doctrine on
what has been called low-intensity conflict
(LIC). The “Dialogue” between Lieutenant
Colonel Peter A. Bond (“In Search of LIC”)
and Major Mitchell M. Zais (“LIC: Matching
Missions and Forces”) was especially illumi­
nating. As stated in these articles, the offi­
cial definition of LIC reads:
Low-intensity conf7ict is u limitedpolitico­
military struggle to achieue political, social,
economic or psychological objectives. It is
often protracted and ranges from diplomat­
ic, economic, and psycho -social pressures
through terrorism and insurgency. It isgen ­
erally confined to a geographic area and is
often characterized by constraints on the
weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.
Zais points out that this definition fails to
distinguish between political and economic
competition between friendly countries and
a conflict meaningful from the military per­
spective. He also says that the line between
low- and mid-intensity war is ambiguous at
best. He concludes that the definition suf­
fers from the absence of something.
While I agree with these observations, a
close examination of the definition left me
with the impression that it was written
around what the enemies have been doing
or can do to us or to our friends and allies. It,
therefore, projects a defensive posture on
our part. It appears to be lacking in what we
or ciur allies can do to tbe enemies. An illus­
MILITARY REVIEW . December 19S6
LEllERS
tration of this point is the use of the term ‘
“terrorism” in the present definition. In all
probability, we do not want ta use terrorism,
at least not offlci~lly, as a measure or a
countermeasure.
While it is true that practicably all of our
experience in this type of war has been de­
fensive in nature, it may be time to rethink
thermore, to describe the activities in terms
of enemy capabilities may leave us ‘with a
psychological void in our thinking, which
way be one of the reasons for the difflcukies
m the development of a proper doctrine.
In the search for an alternative definition,
the premise was that we are dealing with a
war, however different from conventional
wars, and not a mere competition. What the
enemies can do to us or our allies, we can do
to them, or better. After much thought, I “
propose the following definition
A coordinated and systematic struggle,
shod of an all-ad war between states or rival
governments, for the ccmtrol of population,
territo~, resources and government by mili­
tary, political, economic, psychological, reli­
gious and civic means.
In this definition, there are certain key ,i
terms such as “a coordinated and systematic
struggle” which excludes isolated acts or
events by individuals or groups-not part of a
long-range straggle withdetinitive political)
objectives. The term “short of an all-od$
war” addresses the question df wheth@,
actions by main force elements, such as o+ :
raid on Tripoli by the 6th Fleet and the Air
Force Fill squadron, the Israeli raid on
Tunis or even the 1982 Israeli incursion into
Lebanon, should be included in this defini­
tion. In my opinion, they should.
Another exclusionary term “war betw~en
states or rival govermnente” would exclude ;
wars between belligerent states such as the j
1973 Middle East War, the current war )
between Iraq and Iran, and even the Falk-
Iande War. The war in Vietnam, under thk .
definition, could be regarded as a LIC, in
the initial phases which eventually “gradu­
ated into a war between the states, thus
81
moving this war outside the threshold of the
LIC definition. A similar approach could be
applied to the guerrilla war doctrine, where­
by the final assault phase, by now the regu­
lar forces under a rival provisional govern­
ment, would be considered outside the scope
of LIC.
The-proposed definition should meet the
apparent intent of the Joint Chiefs of Staffto
define wars of this type in adequately broad
terms. Yet, it should also establish bounda­
ries of demarcation between what may be
called conventional wars and the myriad
of unconventional wars, insurgences, re­
bellions, wars of liberation, terrorist cam­
paigns, and so forth.
The overall definition of the nature of the
war purposely does not list individual ele­
ments such as terrorism. Terrorism has al­
ways been a part of almost any war, no dif­
ferent from a bombing raid or any other act
of war. What else is war itself but terror? It
is understood that all the recent publicity
has given terrorism a status as something
different and separate, But, for the purpose
of setting military guidelines and doctrine
for years to come, it maybe best to regard
terrorism as only one element among many
in the overall concept. The same would ap­
ply to the term “insurgency” in the present
definition.
A great deal has been said aboutthe term
“low-intensity conflict” itself—most of it
critical. We are not dealing with family
quarrels but with wars in which people are
killed or maimed. As soldiers, it is our duty
to see and to speak of things as they really
are and to leave the hyperbole to the law­
yers. It would be extremely difficult to find
anyone who fought in Korea who thought of
himself as a cop on the corner or to find any­
one who took part in the battles in Vietnam
who saw the intensity as low. As Zais cor­
rectly points out, the intensity is in the eye
of the beholder.
Since we are dealing with wars, they
should be called wars. The difficulty is in
tinding the proper adjectives. Perhaps there
is ualue in the old terms “unconventional”
and “limited wars. Please note the plural in
82
wars, giving the connotation that there are
more than just one kind. My proposed defi­
nition may not be the best, but it probably is
more meaningful for those involved than
the present title.
Lt Co! Juri Raus, tlSAR,Refired,Burke,Virginia
Myth, History or Mythistory?
In an article published earlier this year, ,
one of our nation’s most distinguished histo- .
rians, William H. McNeill, commented on
the difficulty of separating myth and histo­
ry. one man’s myth, he said, is another
man’s history. Each historian accrues a
unique repertoire of facts and sources that
shapes his view of history. The situation is
further complicated by the fact that the de­
gree to which a historian communicates his
ideas depends, in some measure, on the
myths he shares with others in his culture.
Thus, what we have is neither myth nor his­
tory, but mfihistory, an amalgam of myth
and history. Of course, there is in all of this
the potential for getting one’s facts wrong.
When that happens, mythi~tory becomes
pure myth.
These views seemed particularly relevant
tome as I read Roger A. Beaumont’s article
“On the Wehrmacht Mystique” in the July
1986 edition of Military Reuiew. This piece,
along with some other recent articlee ques­
tioning the generally superior ratings given
to the German military, indicates that we
may be in the middle of a reassessment of
German military effectiveness, But, in at­
tacking what he sees as myths in the current
historical view of the Wehrtnaclzt, Beau­
mont appears to be introducing some factual
errors that could shift the revised view of
German military effectiveness away from
ruythistory toward myth.
I am currently investigating the interac­
tion between science, technology and the air
war in Europe, and I am disturbed by what
Beaumont had to say about Germany’s re­
search and development (R&D) efforts in
December 19f16 � MILITARY REVIEW
I

World War IL The Germans, it seems to me,
were ahead in many technical areas and
had the Allies worried almost to the end
of the war.
Beaumont states that the “Germans did
not put the first jets into the air or lead in ra­
dar development.” In the case of radar, he
has made a good point. By the end of the war,
the Allies were ahead of Germany m radar
development by ahout three years. But what
about jet aircraft? Beaumont does not name
the source for his statement that the first jet
aircraft did not fly in Germany. Edward V?.
Constant II’s highly acclaimed The Origins
of the Turbojet Revolution states that the
first jet flight did occur in Germany. In fact,
according to Constant, the Heinkel Corpo­
ration flew two different jet models before
the maiden flight of the British GlosterE28/
39. Furthermore, the Germans developed
their own jet engine independently of the
British and, by 1939, were two years ahead
of the work of Frank Whittle, British turbo­
jet pioneer.
The Germans were also the first to have
operational jet aircraft—the Me-262 and
the Ar-234. To the end of the war, men such
as General James H. Doolittle and General
Carl Spaatz were afraid that the Germans
would be able to produce enough Me-262s to
regain control of the skies over Germany.
What are we to make out of Beaumont’s
statement that the German “V2 program
was developed from lines of investigation
begun by an American, Dr. Robert H. God­
dard”? Does he mean to say that the Ger­
mans accomplished nothing that Goddard
had not already done? Surely he recognizes
that German work went beyond Goddards
in technology if not in theory, for Beaumont
himself notes the role of German scientists
in our own space program. Perhaps Beau­
mont does not realize that the Allied Air
Forces carried out a major program during
the war to develop a duplicate of the German
VI.
Aside from missile and aircraft develop­
ments, the Germans were also ahead in
some other significant fields of weapons
technology. According to Clay Blair Jr.’s
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
LEllERS ~
Silent Victory: The US Submarine War
Against Japan, German submarine tech­
nology was far superior to ours. Among the
more interesting experimental projects that
were under way in Germany during the war
was the development of smoothbore, tin-sta­
bilized artillery with incredible range (95
miles for a 28-centimeter gun) and high
muzzle velocity. The smoothbore cannon
still enjoys wide use as the main armament
on today’s tanks.
It may not be far off the mark to say that
the initiatives under way in the German
R&D programs more or less foreshadowed
the course that post-1945 military R&D
would follow. This would certainly seem to
be true where intercontinental ballistic
missile and aviation developments are cOn­
cerned.
All of this is to say that, if Beaumont’s
purpose was to debunk the myth of German
military prowess, he may be a little wide of
his mark. Furthermore, I suggest that,
where enterprises such as this are conc­
erned, we should proceed cautiously. In our
efforts to distinguish myth from mythistory,
we should neither introduce our own myths
into historical accounts nor discard truth
along with hyperbole. ,~
LI Col DonaldR. Saucom,USAF, AirForceOfficeofHistoy,
BollingAirForceEase,Washington,
O.C.
,,
,,,+$
Beaumont Responds
Lieutenant Colonel Baucom should re~
view the US Air Force monographs, espd;
cially Richard Suchenwir-tb’s, on how, bad
calls within the Luftwaffe, not shortag s,
led to its defeat. As regards the “genera fly
superior marks” given the German mili­
tary, there were many “A’s’’-and many
“F’s.” Should overall evidence be out­
weighed by glittering cases? Was the Wehr­
rnacht as a whole somehow less than the
sum of its parts? The US Army Air Forces
history concluded that Allied leaders’ fern-s
about German jet aircraft were excessive.
Nazi propaganda, which rated an “A plus,”
03
 had many people on both sides expecting a
comeback until the end.
My comments on first use ofjets are in last
month’s Military Review. I noted Goddard to
put one image of Nazi techno-prowess in
perspective. Albert Speer has commented
on Nazi research and development (R&D)
and-industrial maladministration, and a US
Army ordnance team reported “much dupli­
cation, waste and overemphasis on minor
details” at the Wehrmacht artillery R&D
center. The “super gun” Baucorn mentions
was one ofmany German schemes with no or
little combat effect that ate up resources.
Counterpoints to Blaire are Buchheim’s U-
Boat War and Showell’s U-Boats Under the
Srua.sttku, two of many German post-mor­
tems of the Third Reich’s rickety underpin­
nings. In the words of Martin Luther, “Hier
ich stet” (“Here I Stand”).
Roger A. Beaumont, t/istorylJepartme
fit,
TexasA &MUniversity,CollegeStation,Texas
Grant, the Higher Commander
IntheJuly 1986MR Letters, Major Robert
L. Maginnis misses the mark by a fairly
wide margin when he concludes that Ulys­
ses S. Grant owed his success to his tough­
ness and fierceness in battle. Although
Grant was indeed a tough, tenacious tight­
er, he was not alone in that respect. During
the Civil War, there were many com­
manders at all echelons more hardbitten
and just as pugnacious, yet they could not
carry Grant’s knapsack when it came to
generalship. What set him head and shoul­
ders above all others were not his tactical
skills and determination in battle, but his
talents as a higher commander and his mas­
tery of war at the operational and strategic
levels. Only a handful of commanders—
Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman, Joseph
E. Johnston and perhaps Thomas J. Jack­
son—matched his skill in conducting opera­
tions, but none of them equaled his talents
as a strategist.
84
When measuring Grant, one must always
remember that, during 1864-65, he was
not just commanding general of an army
against Lee. He was general in chief of all
the Union armies, numbering more than
half a million men in 17 different commands
scattered over the United States east of the
Mississippi. It was Grant who developed an
overall master plan (strategic in our terms)
and gave coherent directions to his field
armies to destroy the two remaining Con­
federate armies—Lee’s in Virginia and
Johnston’s in Georgia-while carrying the
war to the South.
When Grant decided to accompany the
Army of the Potomac and concentrate on
Lee, General George G. Meade was still in
command and remained so throughout the
war. Although Grant gave Meade specific
tactical and operational instructions on nu­
merous occasions, he also gave him broad
strategic direction as he had the other Un­
ion Army commanders. Grant chose to stay
with Meade because Lee’s army was the
most dangerous and largest, and he could di­
rectly intervene if necessary. He could also
have the best of two worlds. He could be out­
side of politically steamy Washington yet be
close enough to maintain ~ey communica­
tions with the government.
The campaigning of the Army of the Poto­
mac against the Army of Northern Virginia
from the Wilderness to Appomattox Court
House must be viewed in the context of the
overall Union strategic plan mentioned ear­
lier. Part and parcel of this was to place un­
relenting pressti.-e on all the Confederate
forces so they could not use their strategic
interier lines and cross-reinforce as they
had done on several occasions. Accordingly,
Grant told Meade that “wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also”; neither Lee’s army,
nor the Confederacy for that matter, was to
be allowed any rest.
As Maginnip pointed out, Grant regretted
the assault of Cold Harbor as he did the
costly one at “Vicksburg. And, although he,
like Lee after George E. Pickett’s charge at
Gettysburg, was man enough to admit his
costly error, he was also general enough to
December 1986. MILITARY REVIEW

understand that the final charge at Cold
Harbor was really a relatively minor event
when viewing the campaign as a whole.
While the North was losing 55,000 replace­
able men during the series of battles from
the Wilderness to Petersburg, the South suf­
fered 20,000 to 40,000 casualties-losses it
could not make good.
Grant’s character and generalship were
never more clearly evident than after the
bloody repulse at Cold Harbor when he be­
gan his brilliant turning movement across
the Chickahominy and the James R]vers,
the latter involving a pontoon bridge 2,100
feet long. Lee was completely fooled (no
mean accomplishment in itself) and, bad
Grant been better served by his subordi­
nates, he would have seized Petersburg and
been astride Lee’s line of communications,
thereby possibly concluding the war then
and there.
In short, Grant’s bad reputation as a gen­
eral is based upon his offensive tactics. Ad­
mittedly, they were rather pedestrian and
costly, but so were those of most other com­
manders on both sides. No one had really
solved the problem of attacking troops
armed with rifles behind field fortifications,
a problem that was to haunt armies until
the invention of the tank. Grant, however,
more than compensated for his tactical
shortcomings by his solid and often brilliant
operations, as well as his grand strategic de­
sign to end the war.
Cal Dwigll L. Adama, WA, Retired,
UShrmyWarCntlege,CarlialeEarriwka,Pennsylvania
Give Us More on Reserve
Component issues
I enjoyed tbe “Viewpoints on War” section
most of all in your September 1986 issue.
But, as a National Guard member, I would
like to see more attention given to Reserve
component readiness issues.
MajDanielL.Keys,Ar?NG,
Elomnkrgtm,
Indiana
MILITARY REVIEW . Dscsmtmr 1986
. .— --­
LETTERS
Military Review is a terrific publication,
hut articles pertaining to the Reserve com­
ponents would be most appreciated. Even
with the “one Army” talk, the division is
still very much alive and well. Include us
more often, please.
Ma]JmdanM.Hughes, ARNG, SaIILakefSty,Utah
(We, too, would like topublish mom about Reserve tom.
ponent issues, but the articles simply kaue not been
forthcoming. We knotu th,wbje.t ??@tererpm+sareo.t
there somewhere. Put thepm to paper, folks, and let us
kaar from you on Reserve component matters.-Editor.)
Give Us More History
The July 1986 issue of Militmy Reuiew
that focused on history was long overdue,
I thank you also for the comments by the
editor in chief included in “From the Editor”
at the beginning of the journal. That page
should be given to every student entering
the US Army Command and General Staff
College.
Cd Charles J. Kunzelman, USAF,Iletksd,
LnsArrgeles,
California
(Weapprecinteyoursuggestwnandarepbzraedtortport
that Wekauealready respon&d, EveWstudentatteti-
mg theCommandand GeneralSta#O@ms Courseret
ceiws MilitaryReviewfree for the 10 months he or she
spends hare. It is part of mm ded-ntiort to Army eduZw­
tLon and a way ofgettmg the Army to mad.-Ed&-r.
~..
J,
Heat Overwhelms A4R > . ~
The Kansas heat obviously overwhehped
us as we nut topether ourJulv 1986 issue be­
cause w; allo-wed an erro; to creep into
print. According to the ,National Archives, ~
the soldier with *he cigar in his hand on~
page 11 of the July issue is not Niajor George
S. Patton Jr. as we identified him. Patton, as
a lieutenant, is the fellow wearing the tie tQ“’
the left and behind General John J. Peish­
ing. Our Patton is Pershing’s censor, Major
J. L. Hines.—Editor.
85
CASELESS
AMMUNITION
RIFLE
The Australians have unveiled the
C30R, a rifle that uses conventional,
granular propellant but fires directly
from the magazine (caseless ammu­
nition). The weapon was under de­
velopment for two years by designer
Charles Giorgio who sold the weap­
on’a rights to Armtech, an Australian
firm which intends to market the
C30R to milita~ and police forces.
The C30R fires 5.56mm.caiiber
ammunition using conventional POW-
der-like,pmpellant. Thirty bullets,
along wdh their propellant charges
and primers, are arrangad in individ­
ual compartments in a disc-shaped
magazinehoused in what passss for TRIP TANK
the stock of the rifle. The magazine
positions the rounds one by one in Fast, economic conversion of any est verskm of the device within min.
On: with tha barrel and fires them US Army general cargo vehicle to utes, according to developers, and
while st!ll in the magazine. one that can transport water is now fill thetankatth rate of75gallons
Magazine’ firing eliminates feed­ possible. This ii becausa of the de. perminute. Tank%can beemptiedin
ing malfunctions normally associat­ velopmentof the TripTank,allght­ the field through gravity unloading
ed wilk mnventiona.! rifles The C30R weight, collapsible water tank that find require no special took to install
usesa gas-assisted, short-stroke re; developers see as an alternative to m vehicles.
coil system which developers say the traditional 400-aallon “water buf­ COnsbucted of a mmbination n­
will improve accuracy by generating falo: preneinylonlchlorobutyl finer anda
only a small recoil when fired. Developed by Uniroyal Plast!cs camouflage, sand-colored fabric,
Intheselective. fire version, the Company inc., the TripTankis de­ the Tnp Tankfeatures vulcanized
C30R Will have a three-round burst scribed as portable, lightweight, du­ seams and end closures. It is also
function, along with the capability of rable and easy to use. It comes w!th equipped with a manual air-bleed
firing 2,000 munda per minute, a rate all necessary fittings and accesso­ valve and single inletioutlet fitthg
considered optimal for increased hit ries in sizes capable of carrying 150, with a dust cap, US Army unitsat
probability.-lnternational Defense 250 and 500 aallons. Fort Oral, California, hav6 reportedly
Review, @ 1986. One persoh can install the small- used the tanks successfully.

OGUMTRIALS
Initial trials are under way on the
firstprototype of a new, light, trscked
srmored vehida-#e EET4 Ogun+
produced by the Srazilian mmpany
ENGESA. The Ogurn, which takas
its title from the name of an African
war god, carries dual-hardness ar­
mor to give protection from small­
arrns fire and shell splinters.
The vehicle’s suspension system
canstsf.sof four tubbsrrosd Week on
each side, addve sprccket at lhefront,
an Idlerat the rear and one track return
roller. It develops a msximum road
spead of 70 kilometers per hour and
has a mssimum ranae of 500 kilome­
ters, While combat w~ght depands on
wesponsinstailsd.
The Ogum can accept a w!de
range of weapons, incfuding a mor­
tar, antitank missiles and a 20mm
cannon. The Brazilians say the EET4
“can be used in either aground or air
defensa role as well as for battlefield
reconnaissance and command and
control.-Jane’s De fence Weekly,
01986.

86 Decembar 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 NEWS

X-WING HELlCOPTER
UNVEILED
Sikorsky Aircraft Company re­
cently unveiled its X-lWng aircraft
which combines helicopter and
fixed-wing technologies to achieve
vertical takeoff, a hover capability
and aw speeds approaching Mach
..-.
nfl
Designed under a $100 mtlllon re­
search and development effort fund­
ed by the Department of Defense,
the X-Wfng isenvisioned forusein
long-range antisubmarine wsrfare
and combat search-and-rescue mis­
sions. The sircraft is designed to
take off vertically and fly Iiks a heli­
copter up to 200 knots per hour. At
that point, the pilot can employs
clutch to tran$itionto fixed-wing flight
within 30 seconds.
Tests continue with the aircraft at
this time. Developers will fwst fly X-
Wfng without a rotor and then test it
wth the rotor in a fixed-wing position.
A rotor-cspabilittes test and a final not being built to replace convent!on­ neuvera~lity with a fixsd-wing air­
check of the conversion system will al fixed-wing or rotary aircraft. ln­ craft’s highcruising speed -TheAs­
follow. stead, It should be able to periorm sociated Press, a 1986 and De­
Sikorsky offtceds say the X-Wng IS mws!ons requmng a helicopter’s ma- fense News, 01986.

~..
ROLL OUT
THOSE ARMY
SHIPS
In a precedent-setting move, the
US Army has awarded a contract to
Lockheed Shipbuilding Company of
Seattle, Washington, to produce a
new-generation, utifity landing craft.
ThiSmarks the first time m h!story
tha~the US Army has written specift­
cattons fora major watercraftsys­
... .
fmll
Previously, the Army satisf!ed!ta
need to move material from ship to
shore and along coastal waterways
with no port facilities by using ves­
selsdesigned for and used by the US
Navy. In thfs instance, however, the
Army decided its latest operational
requirements could best be met by
modlfymg a commercial vessel de­
sign.
The vessel being built isa new
2000-class utitity Iandmg craft (LCU)
that will replace older 1400-class
LCUS and complement the 1600­
.------­
r-la<c ICI I which WII remain i“ the
Army mveotor:y. The new LCU ia
self-deployable and has a 4,500­
nautical. mile range w!th a 25-per­
cent fuel reserve. Itcaniravel fully
loaded w!lh 350 short tons of cargo
at a speed of II*I2 knots per hour,
and it carries enough On-bQard sup.
pfies to sustain its crewof13 or vOy­
agea lasting up to 18 days.
The LCU2000 will be 174 feet
long and42 feet wide with a bow
ramp 16 feet wids-large enough t@
handle the Army’s largest rollin~
stock. A bow ramp this size efimi.
nates the need for cranes to Ioadand
unload rolfing stock. Seven LCUswill
be delivered in the first two years of
the five-year contract, wtth another
la built ovsr the final three years,
The Army holda anopti#itopur­
chase another 15 vessels as well.

MILITARY REVIEW* December1986 87

 THE SWJIETINVASION OFAFGHANISTAN:A
StudyintheUseofForce in Soviet Foreign Policy
by Joseph J. Collins. 196 Pages. Lexington Books,
Leiington, Mass. 1985.$24.00.
Major Joseph J. Collins’ survey and analysis
of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan offers per­
haps the best brief account yet to appear in
print. The author is a career military officer
with both field and instructional experience. He
has read the relevant published materials in
English and Russian, and he is able to present
judicious conclusions on some key questions, His
book is organized to provide insight on a number
of important issues. These include Soviet
motives for invading its southern neighbor, the
conduct of the invasion, the relationship be­
tween the invasion and normai Western as­
sumptions as to Soviet behavior, and the condi­
tions under which Moscow is likely to repeat
such actions.
The first third of The Souiet Inuasion of
Afghanistan recounts the history of Soviet-
Afghan relations in the past 175 years up to the
1978 Afghan revolution. While this uprising
was not “directed by the Kremlin, the subse­
quent revolutionary leadership of Noor Moham­
mad Taraki and Hatizullah Amin seemed well
aware their plans and activities would receive
the support of Moscow. But, while the Soviets
showed a willingness to extend economic and
military aid to the new regime, they were incap­
able of blunting the more extreme revolutionary
changes enacted despite the growth of rural
resistance.
By the spring of 1979, much of the countryside
was in revolt, more than 1,000 Soviet military
‘ advisers were in Afghanistan, and security for
the large Bagram air base was in Soviet hands.
As the domestic upheaval grew, and with the
revolutionary leadership concentrating its
efforts on intraparty warfare, Soviet apprehen­
sion increased as measured by the number of
high-ranking delegations sent to survey the
scene.
By late 1979, Afghanistan was on the verge of
successful counterrevolution with any new gov­
08
ernment likely to reverse the drift toward social­
ism and Moscow. In December 1979, Soviet units
entered the country in a basic replay of the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia, But Kabul was not
Prague, and Soviet troops to this day remain in a
combat role.
For Collins, Soviet behavior suggests that
basic security interests were perceived in peril
in the event revolutionary leadership collapsed,
The invasion itself was judged a temporary
affair-a holding action until the revolutionary
elements could regroup and again take com­
mand. Soviet miscalculations here are most evi­
dent. They indicate Moscow patterned its activi­
ties upon past interventions in Czechoslovakia,
Angola and Ethiopia, not noticing the difference
in traditions and in the scope of the problem.
What this portends for Western defense
efforts remains unclear. Perhaps, Collins sug­
gests, this tl~st, direct use of Soviet troops out­
side Eastern Europe was the result of unique
factors and not part and parcel of a new Soviet
agWessiven:ss. In any event, the author con­
cludes, examination of the case of Afghanistan
five years after the invasion pf%vides no clear
proof of a “reordering of the Kremlin’s priori­
ties.” The greatest threat, Collins feels, would
come if the Afghan situation ceased tn draw
world attention as time goes on—a prelude to
the eventual if slow destruction of the resistance ,
forces. This perhaps would provide the saddest
outcome of all,
Michsel M. Boll,
Depaflment
ofHistofy,SanJoseSIaleUniversity
NEWTECHNOLOGY ANOWESTERNSECURITY
POLICY.Edited by Robert O’Neill. 178 Pages.
Shoe String Press, Hamden, Corm. 1985.$25.00.
Papers of the aimual conference of the Inter­
national Institute for Strategic Studies (11SS)
are always of deep interest to serious defense
students. Those for 1984 are as lively and in­
formative as has come to be expected from this
December 19B6 � MILITARY REVIEW

London-based institute. The theme subject was
“New Technoloev” which. with the controversial
‘Star Wars” p;;ject beginning to materialize,
makes added topical interest. The 16 papers,
read by well-known international experts from
several Western countries, are packed with
technological facts, concepts and techniques and
are forward-looking. Editor Robert O’Neill, an
Australian and director of the 11SS, comments
that “The rate of change of applied technology
ap ears to be unprecedented.”
+% e purpose of this conference was to examine
challenges that technological change poses for
all concerned with the management of security
in the West. Optimism was tempered hy caution
as it was pointed out that the opportunities that
technology provides for improving Western
defense may be great but so, too, are the uncer­
tainties. Technology affords opporttuuties for
arms control but “arms control n challenged by
technology” which creates the problem of exact­
ly what investments to make in thk field.
New Technology and Western Security Policy
is designed to clarify the subject as far as possi­
ble, set the bounds and point the way to making
rational choices. But it was admitted that most
of the committee discussions “foundered on
uncertainty, and there was difficulty in reach­
ing conclusions.” However, the necessity for con­
tinuing research programs is emphasized. West­
ern governments should not be deterred by the
high cost, as the cost of a nuclear conflict would
be so much greater. Although, at present, the
Soviets are behind the United States in some
technological aspects, they are not only seeking
to reach parity but are also striving to obtain
complete technological superiority. These
papers, which contain useful source footnotes
and explanatory charts and diagrams, are excel­
lent reference material for technological re­
searchers and planners in the military field.
Edgar O’BaNance
CHEMICAL WARFAREby Edward M. Spiers. 277
Pages. University of Illinois Press, Champaign, Ill.
1986.$24.95.
Chemical warfare (CW) bas received in­
creased attention during the laet decade. From
near oblivion in the early 1970s to the likely pro­
duction of binary nerve agents over the next few
MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986
BOOK REVIEWS
*$
years, CW has pushed its way mto both dsfen­
sive and offensive thinking by militsry planners
throughout the world. Recent certain and
alleged uses of CW by Thk’d World riations and
tbe Soviets and the deadlock in both biliteral
and multilateral negotiations on a CW treaty
demonstrate the importance of A thorough
understanding of the practical, political and
philosophical aspects of these much-maligned
weapons.
Edward M. Spiers, a defense lecturer at the-
Umversity of Leeds, makes a useful contribu­
tion to this need. Chemical Wqfare provides a~
update to the two previous standards, Chermcal
and Biological War,fareby Seymour M. Hersh
and A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story
of Gas and Germ Warfare by Jeremy Paxman
and Robert Harris. From a heavdy British point
of view, Spiers covers much of the same history
as the previous authors but with an emphasis on
the political and strategic thinking behind the
scenes. His discussion of the thinking of the men
around Franklin D, Roosevelt, Winston Church-
ill, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini gives a
solid foundation to the role of CW in World War
II.
Topics of more immediate concern, of course, :
are the proliferation of CW capability and use,
current Soviet vis-k-vis North Atlantic Treaty
Organization posture, deterrence and prospects .
for an acceptable chem]cal disarmament treaty. , ~
The author’s personal views are very evident in
discussions of these topics. Still, the chapters
contain the most thorough and inclusiwe discus.
sion I have seen on the many disparate lines of
reasoning used by the advocates and critics~f
binary production, US-Soviet c6mprehensive}r
limited treaties, the strategic and tactic+
employment of CW weapons and defensive mea­
sures, and the influence of CW on the nuclear
threshold. There has been no large-scale use of
CW weapons in almost 70 years. Therefofe,
there is no way to know for sure what policies
will be most effective at deterring Soviet C W{use
and aggression in general.
The value of this book lies in its presentation,
of the issues as complex as they are. In 1917, <
A. E. Hodgkin, a chemical adviser to the US/
Army, bitterly wrote, “Never, never will the
mysteries of gas warfare penetrate the brain of
the regular soldier.” Spiers’ extensively refer- I
enced (762 footnotes) work, especially the c,hap­
ter on current issues, should be required for mil­
itary thinkers, both theoretical and in the tield.
MajOavidN.Clark,
US.4R
89
PERSHING:General of the Armies by Donald
Smythe. 399 Pages. Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, hrd. 1986.$27.50. , good humor and animated involvement in snrall­
The living military legend which was John J.
Pershing, general of the armies, is brought into
sharper focus by Donald Smythe’s excellently re­
sexrch~dbiography. Covering the final 31 years
of Pershing’s life, the book concentrates on the
World War I p,eriod.
Smythe provides detailed insight into Persh­
ing’s selection as commander in chief of the
American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in World
War I. He also offers a survey of his postwar ca­
reer (highlighted by his appointment as chief of
statf of the Army in 1921), his retirement (1924)
and hk ensuing services to the country until his
permanent move to Walter Reed ArIuy Hospital
(1941 ) and his death seven years later. While
Smythe’s objective record points out the frailties
and shortcomings which were inherent to the
legend, the biography does nothing to diminish
the impact of Pershkg’s strong personality dur.
ing a highly critical period in US history.
Professing modest professional and personal
aims in life, Pershing was, in fact, fiercely ambi­
tious, Except for an ill-fated postwar shot at the
presidential nomination, his ambitions were ful­
filled. Even during the period of his greatest
challenge-World War I—success was certain.
Pershing had the carte blanche support of Presi­
dent Woodrow Wilson and secretary of War New­
ton D. Baker, and he was virtually independent
of the Army General Staff control. He also had
unlimited access to and the loyal support of the
cream of US AnnY leadership (George C. Mar­
shall, James G. Harhord, Tasker H. Bliss, Fox
Conne~, George S. Patton, Douglas MacArthur,
Hugh A. Drum, Hunter Liggett, William Mitch­
ell and Charles P. Summerall).
All of this, combined with Pershing’s charac­
teristic stubbornness of purpose, practically
guaranteed victory. The ultimate battlefield
contribution of the AEF, albeit at tremendous
human and materiel cost, won Pershing high
honor and life-long veneration, not all of which,
as the author underscores, was fully deserved.
This final volume of Pershing’s biography
gives interesting insight into paradoxical as­
pects of hk personal makeup. Generally consid­
ered aloof, cool, unapproachable, stem and hu­
morless, he was remembered by one doughboy as
“that sonuvabitch who roared past our column in
his big staff car, spattering every one of us with
mud and water from head to foot.” On the other
90
hand, he was intensely loyal and appreciative to
his staff and remembered by intimates for his
group social gatherings.
A widower for 31 years and “one of the world’s
most eligible bachelors,” Pershing enjoyed wom­
en and had a way with them. He married a 1,
French lady, 34 years younger than he, two years
before his death. The tenderness of their rela­
tionship over the 30 years of their affair, as re­
vealed by personal letters, messages and recol­
lections included in this biography, belie the un­
feeling facade Pershkgpresented to the world at
large,
Smythe’s Pershing is well-illustrated with
photographs and maps. The index and extensive
bibliography are helpful to both military and
nonmilitary readers. A carefully drawn per- :
trayal of the final half of Pershing’s life, it is
strongly recommended for general readership.’
t!aj Gen Stan L. McClellan, USA, Refired
STRATEGIC DEFENSE: “StarWars” in Perspec-
tiveby I(eith B. Payne, Foreword by Zbigniew Brze­
zinski. 250 Pages. Hamilton Press, Lanham, Md.
1986,$9.95.
Although there have been a plethora of arti­
cles, pamphlets and books writtt!non the Strate­
gic Defense Initiative (SDI), few adequately cov­
er the subject. Fewer still are written in a clear,
concise and thought-provoking manner. Keith
B. Payne’s treatment of this highly complex sub­
ject puts SDI in perspective and in terms under­
standable to those who want to learn more about
all of the areas having an impact on SDI,
In Strategic Defense, Payne not only examinee
the origins, scope and purpose of SDI; he also
looks at the deeper, underlying relationshipa be.
tween SDI and the concepts of deterrence, strat­
egy, stability, arumscontrol and morality. Per.
haps the most important area that Payne exam­
ines is the Soviet approach to strategic defense.
Payne observes that strategic defense cannot be
understood apart from the overall objectives of
Soviet strategic doctrine. The various programa
for defense against nuclexr attack would play an
important role in meeting the political and mili.
tary objectives of Soviet strategic doctrine.
The pivotal queetion concerning SDI is wheth­
er the United Staws ehould pursue the research
necessary to determine the defensive potential of
December 19a6 . MILITARY REVIEW

emerging technologies. Payne argues convinc­
ingly that the answer is yes
[SDII is not sornaoptional experiment to be con­
tintied or curtailed depending on short-term
budgetary or arms control considerations. It is a
uital long-tsrm effort to strengthen our ability to
prevent nuclear war.
His unmistakable conclusion is if we slow
down the research now and fail to fund the pro.
gram at levels that will allow it to develop in a
timely manner, we will not have the answers we
need to chart a long-term strategy and sustain a
credible arms-reduction policy. This is compel­
ling reading and an invaluable resource for ev­
eryone interested in SDI.
Jerome P. Gideon,
LegislativeAssistanttOrNatima/
Security
10
Congfessnfan
RobsftK.Mman, Washington,D.C.
MAKINGEUROPEUNCONIIUERAGLE: The Poten­
tial of Civilian.Based Deterrence and Oefencq by
Gene Sharp. .252 Pages. i3allinger Publishing Co.,
Cambridge, Mass. 1985.
Making Europe Unconquerable acquires credi­
bility as one reads, From the initial “mouse that
roared tone of the introduction, Gsne Sharp out­
lines a national defense strategy that rings fa­
miliar to students of history. He argues for new
policy to deter or dissuade attacks through civil­
ian-based defense in Western Europe. “Present
policies,” he asserts, “are inadequate to ensure
their objectives against thelmilitary might of the
Soviet Union.”
Throughout his opening chapter, Sharp ex­
plains Europe’s long experience in dealing,
through civilian resistance, with both invasion
and internal takeovers. Examples from history
culminate in strategy Shar$ suggests is particu­
larly appropriate today. If ~uropeans believe the
United Statss and the Sovist Union are capable
of sacrificing Europe, escah$ting a~s cOstsand
recent failures of the military to achieve nonmil-
NEW BOOKS RECEIVEO
Thm Iwtms m pmwded ti bring recently publmhed pmfession.1 books to the attention of readers Books are not offered for!
sale thmush the Mthtary Rewew I
NAPOLEONICMILITARY HISTORY A aibliogfaphy. Editsd by
Donald D. Howard. 6L19Pages. GadI nd Publislrmg. N.Y. 1986.
by Neil C. Livingston and Tsrrell E. Arnold. 26a Pages. Lex­
$74.00.
mgton Books, Lsxington, Mass. 1986. $2&O0.
THEPLOAFTERTHE LEaANONWA by EmAeF. Sahhyeh.26a
SOVIEf RAOIOELECTRONIC COMaATby OavidG. Chtzum. 125
“4
Pages. Westwew Press, Boulder, Mo. 19L36.$30.00.
MILITARY REVIEW � December 19a6
I
BOOK REVIEWS
itary objectives should conyince them oFthemer- ‘
its of a policy of their own. This policy should be
flexible, popular, nonviolent but not pacifistic,
relatively inexpensive and comforting because it
offers surcease of spiraling technologies.
If the ‘first of this book is undercut by wishful
thinking, subsequent chapters on transa$ma­
ment, deterrence antitactks of defense add mus­
cle to the argument. Sharp considers not only na­
tions like Switzerland with a unilateral and
highly developed civilian.based strategy but also
potential regional cooperatives such as Den­
mark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Sharp’s last chapter assesses socioeconomic-mil­
itary-political complexities. Sizs and location of
their countries, strength of their gross national
products and their alignments mandate consid­
erable tailoring for policymakers to achieve ac­
ceptable conventional and nonconventional ca­
pabilities. And every situation will dictati varia­
ble applications of military, civilian, guemilia,
economic, political, diplomatic, psychological
and ideological responses.
The publisher’s choice of green for th$cover of
this book may be revealing politic~lly, but it is ,
somewhat unfair to the author’s avowed pragma­
tism. Civilian-based defense demands :rgsniza- .
tion, preparation and training. In dehberating
the power and use of society’s population and in­
stitutions to resist attackers, Sharp offers a bold
and provocative approach to Westam European +
security. ,,
Sharp, a professor of political science and soci-
OIOgY associated with the Center for Internation­
al Affairs at Harvard, has written a,sensible
study that gains steam as it moves. The seve~
chapters warrant open-minded considerate@
But I wonder if an eighth chapter might not sl&iw
extensive analogies between Sharp’s deterrerice
and defense and modem terrorism which is airni­
larin many ways and dependent on similar intel­
ligence and organizational infrastructures. ~
MajGlen E. Lici+,ARNG,
Headguaftefs,
491hArnrohdDivision,Austin,texas
FIGHnNG aACfi Winning the War Againal TsfmriSm. Edftsd,.
Pagea.Westvisw Press,Boulder,Colo. 19a5. 517.00.
!,
91
 INDEX
‘ VolumeL)(VI

January-December1986

CONTENTS

93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Title Index .,

96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Author index

99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Subject index. Afiicles

107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~ . . . . . . . .. Subject index. News

111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. USACGSC Master’s Degree Theses

s

Index compiled by
Patricia H. Nomrarr, Editoria/Assistar7f

92 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

Abusesof GermanMilitaryHisto~Daniel J. Hughes ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Dec

Au-LandBattle:Tbe HistormalBackground;JohnL. Bomjue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Mar

America'sStrategicCharacter;Maj'fhomasA. Savoie,USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .’. . . . . . . . 14 Apr
Army in Space, The: New High Ground or Hot-Air Balloonfi B. Bruce-Briggs . . . 44 Dec
Army Nurse Corps,65Years Young. . . ..... ... ... .. . . . .. 58 Feb
Army Strategy and Structure, AM Col Williatn P. Johnson Jr, USA,
and Col Eugene R. Russell, USA, . . . . . . ... ... . . .. . .. . . . .. .. 69‘ Aug
'`Art' 'inthe ArtofWar, The;2d LtMichael A. Kngalla, USAK . . . . . . .. . . ... . 64 Sep
Auftmgstakfik: In Its Proper Perspective Capt Antubo J, Echevarria II, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Ott

Battle for Luzon, The...... ... .. ... .. ... ... . 97 Jan

Battle Staff Training Frogram, A Maj Peter S. Kindsvatter, USA . . . . . . . 49 May
Bbtzkneg m E“rop= Is It Std] Possible? Capt Noyes B. Livingston 111,ARNG 26 Jun
Brmtoe Station, Virginia,140ctober le63 . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 9? Ott

Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank Three Decades Later.

Gen John RGalvm, USA ..... ... .. . ... .. 4 Aug
Challenge of a Coalition in Peace and War; Lt Col Henry R. Farrell, USA . . . . . 57 Jun
Cltnen Soldiers The Army National Guard Celebrates 35o Years. 64 Dec
Clausewitz for the 20th Century The Interpretation of Raymond Arow
LtCol Rxhard M. Swain, USA., .,... 38
Clausewitz in US and German Doctrinq
LtCol Gertmann Sude, Federal RepuhlicofGermany Army 39 Jun
Close Air Planning; Capt Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF 54 Sep
Cohesion and the Vietnam Experience MaJ (P) Wdliam A. Knowlton Jr, USA .. . .. . .. . ... .. . 56 May
. . ,1
Command and Control InteroperabilitE Joe Halloran.. . .. . 36 Ott
Cost Across the FLOT, The; COIWilhmn A. Brinkley, USA .. 30 Sep
Countering Global Temor]srn Capt William H. Burgess HI, USA . . . . . . . . 72 Jun
Cou"ter]ng the Daring Thrusti Capt(P)Guy C. Swan III, USA... . . . 42‘ Sep
j

D-Day Remembered Legends and Legaciey N. John Hooper. .. ... . . . . . . . 50 Jun ~

Debate About Low-Intensity Contlct, Th% Lt Co] John S. Fulton, USA 60 Feb ‘#
Decis,onmakmg m Modern WaV M Col Timothy L. McMahcm, USA 33 Ott : ‘:
Dlalogueon Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Aug ‘,

Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrw Gen pauI F. ~~an. fJSA. Ret . 4 Dee;
Eliminate the Fdtersand Wiw LtCol Allan J. Futernick, USA ..................... 20 yov
Encirclement Operations; Maj (P) Michael H. Vernon, USA .. . . .. . 11 Sep
“Eureka” Conference, The: A Busy Time m Tehera% Col John L. Bates, USA, Ret . . .. . .. 74 oat

Farewell . . .. ... .. . . 97 Jtd j

Fire Bngr+de, Thq WakerF.Zeltmann. . . . . .. . .. ... .. . . . ... .. . .. .. 77 Sep 1
Five Functions of Land Combat, The; Capt Wade B. Becnel, USA... . . . . . . . 72 Apr ]
FM 100-5 The AirLand Battle in 1986 Gen William R. Richardson, USA . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar
FM100-5Wbo Influenced Wbom?:Lt Col Archie Galloway, USA .. .. . .. . .. .. . 46 Mar .,
Follow-On Forces Attack Joint Interdiction by Another Namq
Col Thoma. A. Cardwell III, USAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 F&b

MILITARY REVIEW � Dec8mber 1986 93

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

FoRow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A, Kevin N. Lewis and Peter A. Wilson 12 Jun
Force Integration’s Next Big Challeng% Lt Col William T. Marriott III, USA 4 Apr
Forced March: Armoq Robert E. Rogge . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Jul
Foreign Policy and Military Strategy The Civil-Military Equatiow
Maj(P)Charles D. McFetridge, USA...... . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr

Ge”ghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battlq Capt Dana J. H. Pittard, USA.. . . .. .. 18 Jul
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, Thq Marvin F. Gordon . . . . . . .. . . . . . 16 Aug

Happy Birthday, CGSC . . . . 97 May

Harnessing Creativity; Maj Robert L. Maginnis, USA . . . . . . . .. . 12 Mar
Heavy versus Light Forces A Middle Ground John A. Adams ,,, . . . . . 64 Ott
HcJla”dia ATminingVictor MMajJohnF.Shortal,USA ..................................... 40 May

In Search of a Counterterrormm Doctrine Stephen Sloan 44 Jan

In Search of LIC; LtCol Peter A. Bond, USA ,.. 79 Aug
Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes Lt Col Jonathan P. Tomes, USA 37 Nov
* Initiative inthe US Soldieq Capt(P)Lyrm W. Kaufman, USA 45 Nov
Insurgency Tfyeat and Ways to Defeat It, Thq Capt Steven E. Daskal, USAFR 28 Jan
Is War Too Important for Generalsl Ma, (P) Charles D. McFetrldge, USA . . . . . . 71 Sep

Karl von Clausewitz Analysls of FM 100-5, Maj (P) Steven J. Argersmger, USA 68 Feb ‘
Kinds of War, Capt Ralph Peters, USA.. . . . . 14 Ott
!1
Leadership Imperatwe$ Lt Co] Cecil B. CaRoway, USA 55 Nov
LeavemvmtbLmnp, The .. :...... . 113 Aug
Legacy of Liddell Hart, The, Maj (P) Jerry D MoreIock, USA .,. 65 May
LHX; Cd William D. Riur” Jr, USAF, Ret, and Lt Col John D Bwick, USAF, Ret 26 Dec
Liberation Theology;
Capt Michael T. McEwen, ARNG, and Ch ICapt) Ronald K. ReddeR, USAR 62 AUF
LIC: Matching Missions and Forces MaJ Mitchell M. Zais, USA *. 89 Aug
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict, The: Are They Losing Sight of Each Otherl
Maj Peter N. Kafkalas, USA. . . . . . . . . . . . ,,. 18 Jan ,
Light Infantry Integration m Central Europe Brig Gen Wayne A. Downing, USA 18 Sep
Low-Intensity Conflict m the 1980s The French Experience;
Lt COIMichel L. Castdlon, French Army . . . 68 Jan

Maneuver, Synchromzation and Obstacle Operation%

Maj David A. Fastabend, USA, and MaJ Ralph H. Graves, USA .......... 36 Feb
Maneuver Warf~reat Its Freest 97 Sep
Mentor, The: More Than a Teacher, More Than a Coach; Maj Gen Kenneth A. Jolemore, USA 4 Jul
Militarism in Russia: From Imper!al Roots to the Soviet Uniow MaJ Emil F. Meis 111,USA . 28 Jul
Military Apphcations of Artificial Intelbgence and Robotic%
Capt R]cky Lynch, USA, and Capt M1cbael R. McGee, USA 50 Dec
~ MilifaVReulew Salutes All US Veterans-Past, Present and Future 97 Nov 1
Militav Reuiew Salutes the Graduates of the US Mihta!y Academy ,,, 97 Mar
Military Situation in Nicaragua, T%& Col Wilham A. Depalo Jr, USA . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Aug

NATVs Anniversary .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. .. . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . 97 Apr

Of ALOs, FACsand TACSCol Ross L. Meyer, USAF, Ret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Ott,

fRTen~ive Rear Battle; Maj Glenn M. Hamed, USA . 30 Feb
Onthe Wehrmacht Mystique; Roger A. Beaumont 44 Jul

94 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 TITLE INDEX

TITLES F’AG& MONTH ,

Open Letter to GeneraI George S. Patton, Am James J. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . .

64 Jun

Operating inthe21st Centu~, LtCol Clayton R. Newell, USA, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Sep

Operation Urgent Fury and Its Critms; Capt Daniel P. Bolger, USA . . . . . . . . . . .
57 Jul

Operational Loglst~cs in SUppor+ of the Deep Attack Maj Gen Albin G. Wheeler, USA. .
12 ‘ Feb

Our Common Groun&SSgt Douglas C. Sleeth, USA .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 May

Pakistan Onthe Front Porch of Convict Edgar OBaRance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66 Mar

Perspectives on Doctrine ... . . . ...,,, ... ,.,

44 Mar

Private’s Viewpoint on”AirLand Battle, A, Pfc Mark T. Schmidt, ARNG .,,,,...,, ... . . . .
67 Sep

Profemional versus Personal Value% Capt Percher L. Taylor 111,USA

32. Nov
Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon,

Capt Michael T. McEwen, ARNG .,,..... ...................................... 59 Jan

Purpose of US Army Schools, The; Gen Bruce C, Clarke, USA, Ret . . . . . . . . 30 May

ROTC Today and Tomomo~Col Robert F. Colhns,USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36 May

Selecting Emerging Technologies; Ma] Robert L. Maginnis, USA.. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.,,.,,

32 Dec

Serve Your Soldiers to Wm; Maj Don T. Riley, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .

10 Nov

Soldier’s Beturn, AEdward G. Yorke . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .

72 NW

Some Vagrant Tho”ghtson DoctrmqJay Luvam . . . . . . .. . . . .

56 Mar

Sov,et Psychological Threat, The, Capt Thomas R. Hammett, USAR., . . . . . .

64 No”

Space Power Is’Land Power The Army’s Role in Spacq

Ma~Lmas A. Roe, USA, and Ma, Dcmglas H. WLse, USA . . . . . 4 Jan

.
Special Month, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97 Jun
Special Operations and the Law; Lt Col Rudolph C. Barnes, USAR . . .
49 Jan ‘
Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO, They Ma~ Lloyd S, Takeshlta, USA
31 Apr
Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Fore%

Congressman Richard B. Cheney and Maj (P) Thomas N. Harvey, USA

4 Ott
Synchmmzmg the An’Land Battle, Col John B. Rogers, USA
65 Apr ,i

T% = V, Col Jared L. Bates, USA, and LtCollP)JImmle B. Qu]nn, USA

21 Mar
Tactm,an, Thm Is Log,stmian. Talk to Me. Over , Maj George C Knapp Jr, USA
20 Feh
Terrorism: The Search for Working Detinitlon%
)
Lt Col Donald B. Vought USA, Ret, and Lt Col James H. Fraser Jr, USA . 70 Jul \
Theor+cal Perspective of AirLand Battle Doctrine, A: Maj Wayne M. Hall, USA 32 Ma+ ~

Through Ivan’s Eyea Maj Keith R. Titus, USAR.. . . . . . . 46 Apr~ :

Training Preparation for Combat; Gen William R. Richardson, USA 4 Jun
Training to FighLBrlg Gen Wayne A. Downing, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 May’

US F.adroads A Forgotten Mibtmy Asset; Lt Col Lewis 1,Jeffries, USA

49 Feb’

Values and the Amer,can Soldier; Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. . . . .
4 N$v
VlewofCivil Affams m the LIC Arena, A; Lt Col John J. Zygiel Jr, USAR . . . . . . .
58 . Aug
Viewpoints on Educatlonand Trammg . . . . . . . .
26 May
Vwwpomtson Europe . ... . . . . . . . ,.
48 Jun !
Viewpoi”tson Low-Intemity Cordlict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42 Jan ]
Viewpoints on Regional issues ..,...... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56 Aug
Viewpoints on Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42 Dec
Viewpoints OnValues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 Nov >
ViewpOints On War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .,, ..1.. .
62 Sep
Violence ‘Tim Alternate Political Institution;

LfCol Donald B. Vought, USA, Ret, and MajJesse M. Perez, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42 Aug

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 95

 .
r

nms r PAGE MONTH

I
VonSteubeu Ttainer,Sust.ainerandConunander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Feb

Westim MediaandReeentWarq ColHany G. SummersJr,USA,Ret . .. .. . .. .. .. 4 May

Whatiflt Works? Air ArmamentTechnologyforDeepAttack
LtCol DavidR. Mets,USAF,Ret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Dec
Why A@iticiallntel)igence Won'tWor~Mti KennethH. Rose, USA . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . 57 De.
.
WorldWarfJDivision Commanderq LtCol Gary H. Wade, USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Mar

AUTNORS PAGE MONTH

.,
Adams,JohnA.; HeavyversusLightForces A MiddleGr.!md. . 64 Ott
Argeminger,M@ (P)StevenJ.; KarlvonCIausewitzAnalysis of FM 100-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Feb

Barnes, LtCol Rudolph C. Jr SpecLal Oper~tions andthe Law !.....

49 Jan
Bates, Col Jared L.and LtCol(P)Jimmie B. Quinw TW=V . .
. . . .... . 21 Mar
Bates, Col John L.; C-Eureka” Conference, The A Busy Time in Teheran .
. . . .. . 74 Ott
Beaumont, Roger A.; On the Wehrmacht Mystique. ..; ,.
44 Jul
Becnel, Capt Wade B.; Five Functions of Land Combat, The . .
. . 72 Apr
Bolger, CaptDaniel P.; Operation UrgentFuWand IkCritics ...,,..,.
57 Jul
Bcmd, LtCol Peter A.; In Search of LIC .. . .
. . . . 79 Aug
Brinkley, Col William A,; Co’dt Across the FLOT, The
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Sep
Bruce-Briggs, B.; Army in Space, The: New High Ground or Hot-Am Balloon? 44 Dec
Burgess, Capt William H.u Countering Glohal Terrorism . . . . .. . . 7Z Jun
Bwick, LtCol John D.and Col WiUiam D. Siuru JcLHX . . 26 Dec
<
Calloway, Lt (2o1Cecil B.; Leadership Imperatives 55 Nov
Cardwell, Col Thomas A. 1~, Follow-On Forces Attack] Joint Interdiction by Another Name ..,.,. 4 Feb
Castilian, Lt Col Michel L.; Low-Intensity. Conflict in the 1980s The French Experience 68 Jan
Cheney, Congressman Richard B. and Maj (P) Thomas N. Harvey;
Strategic Underpinnings of a Future Force . . . 4 Ott
Clarke, Gen Bmce C.; FurposeofUS Army Schools, The... . . . . . . . . . . 30 May
Collins, Col RohertF.; R~CTodayand Tornotrow . .. .. . . 36 May

Daskal, Capt Skven E.; Insurgency Tbreatand Ways to Defeat R, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Jan
Depalo, Col W]lliamA. Jfi Militmy Situation in Nicaragua, The . . . . . .. . . .. . 26 Aug
Downing, Brig Gen Wayne A,;
Light Infantry Integration in CentraIEurope . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sep ‘
Training to Fight . . . . ..~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. ........................ 18 May

Echevtia, CaptAntulioJ. W, Aufiqstaktik: In Its fioper Perspective ........................ 50 Ott

Fmell, LtCol He~R.; Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and W= . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun

Fastahend, Mej David A. and vti Ralph I+. Grave%
Maneuver, Smctintition and Obs@cle Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Feb
Fraser, Lt Col James H. Jr and Lt Col Donald B. VoughG
~emrism~e&=hforWorMng Definition~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Ju1
Fdhn, LtCol John S.; Deba&About bw-h@nsity CoMict, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Feb
h@mick, LtCoIAllmJ.; Elimina@the Fil@rsmdWin ..................................... 20 Nov

96 December 1986* MILITARY REVIEW

 AUTHORINDEX

AUTHORS PAGEi MONTH ‘

Galloway, Lt Cd Archi~ FM 100.5 WhoInfluencedWhom? . . . . ,, ...,, 46 Mar

Galvin, Gen John R,; Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank Three Decades Later ..,.... 4 Aug
Gordon, Marvin F.; Geopolitics of the Carihhean Basin, The .. . . . . . .. . . . . . 16 Aug
C&man, (% Paul F.; Educational Technolom Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 4 Dec
Graves, Maj Ralph H. and Maj David A. Fastahendi
Maneuver, Synchronization and ObstacIe Operations .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . 36 Feb

Hall, Maj Wayne M.; Theoretical Perspective of A,rLand Battle Doctrine, A 32 Mar
Halloran, Jo% Comma:dand Control Interoperabillty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Ott
Hammett, Capt ThomasR.; Sov]et Psychological Threat, The 64 Nov
Harried, Ma] Glenn M.; Offenmve Rear Battle 30. Feb
Harvey, Maj (P) Thomas N. and Congressman Richard B. Cheney;
Strate@c Underpinnings of a Future Force. .. .. . . 4 Ott
Hmper, N. John; D.Day Remembered Legends and Legacies .,. 50 Jun
Hughes, Daniel J.; Ahuses of German MiIita~ History . ,,, 66 Dec

Jeffries, Lt Col Lew!s L; US Radroads A Forgotten Md,tary Asset 49 Feb

Johnson, Col William P. Jr and Col Eugene N, Russell; Army Strategy and Stmcture, A“ 69 Ang
Jolemore, M.J Gen Kenneth A.; Mentor, The More Than a Teacher, More Than B Cozch. ,,,, . . 4 Jul

Kafkalas, M?j Peter N.,

Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict, The Are They Losing S]ght of Each Other? 18 Jan
Kaufman, Capt.(P) Lynn W.; Initiative inthe US Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Nov
Kindsvatter, Ma] Peter S.; Battle Staff TYaining Program, A 49 May
Knapp, Maj George C Jn Tact]c,an, Thm Is Log,st]cian. Talk to Me. Over. 20 Feb
Knowlton, MaJ (P) William A. Jr; Cohesion and the Vietnam Experience., . . . 56 May

Lewis, Kevin N. and Peter A. Wdson: FolIow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A 12 Jun
Livingston, Capt Noyes B. 111;Bhtzkr,eg m Europe Is R Still Poss]ble7 26 Jun
Luva.?s, Jay; Some Vaqant Thoughts on Doctrine 56 Ma+ ,j
Lynch, Capt Rlcky and Capt Michael R. McGeq
Mdltary Applications of Artificial Intelhgence and Robotics 50 Dec

Magmrus, Maj Robert L.; J

Harnessing Creativity..............,.. 12 Mar,

Selecting Emergmg Technologies 32 Dec ~
Marriott, Lt Col Wdham T. III; Force Integration’s Next Big Challenge 4 Apr! ..
Marsh, Secretary of the Army John O Jr Values and the American Soldier 4 Nov :
McEwen, Capt Michael T.; Psycholo~cal Operations Against Terrorism The Unused Weapon 59 Jan
McEwen, Capt Michael T. and Ch ICaptl Ronald K. Redden; Liberation Theology 62 Aug<
McFetridge, Maj (P) Charles D.;
Foregn Policy and Military Strategy: The Civ]l-Military Equation 22 Apr
Is War Toolmportant for Generals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 71 Se

r
McGee, Capt Michael R. and Capt Ricky Lynch
Mditary Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Robotjcs 50 Dec
McMahon, Lt Col Timothy L.; Decisionmakmg m Modem War.. 33 Ott ~
Meis, Maj Emil F. IIL Md,tarism in Russia From Imperial Roots to the Soviet Union . .. 28 Jul
,/
Mets, Lt Col David R.; What ]f It Works? Am Armament Technology for Deep Attack . . . 12 Dec ,
Meyer, Col Rom+L; Of ALOs, FACsand TACS .. . . ... .. . . . . .. 57 Ott
Forelock, Maj(P)Jerry D.; Legacy of Liddell Hart, The .. . . 65 May ,

Newell,Lt Coi Clayton R.; Operatingin the Zlst Century .. .. . . .. 4 Sep

OBallance,EdgauPakistan OntheFrontPorchof Conflict 66 Mar

),

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 97

 AUTHORS PAGE MONTH
Perez, Maj Jesse M. and Lt Cal Donald B. VoughG
Violencc ~eAl&mati Political Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Aug
Peters, Capt Ralph Kinds of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Ott
Pittard, Capt Dana J. H.; Genghis Khan and 13th-Centuty AirLand Battle 18 Jul

Quinn, LtCol(P)Jimmie B.and Collared L. Batea’f%=V .................................. 21 Mar

Red&ell, Ch (Capt) Ronald K. and Capt Michael T, McEwen, Liberation Theology 62 Aug ,
Richardson, Gen William R.;
FM IOO-5Tbe AirLand Battle in1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 Mar
Training Preparation for Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Jun
Rdey, Maj Don T.; Serve Your Soldiers to Win . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nov
Roe, Maj Linas A. and Maj Douglas H. Wisq
Space Power Is Land Power Tbe Army’s Rolein Space .. . . .. . .. .. . . . . . 4 Jan
Rogalla,2d LtMichael A.; '`Art'' inthe ArtofWar, The.... . 64 Sep
Rog.ers, Col John B.; Synchronizing the AirLand Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Apr
Rogge, Robert E.; ForcedMarch Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . 38 Ju1
Romjue, John L.; AirLand BattIe~e Historical Back~"nd..., . . .. . . . .. . . . .. 52 Mar
Rose, Maj Kenneth H.; Why Artificial Intelligence Won,t Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Dec
Russell, Cd Eugene N. and Col William P. Jobnscm Jq Army Strategy and Structure, An ,....,. 69 Aug

Savoie, MaJThomas A.; America's Strategc Ch~acter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Apr

Schmidt, Pfc Mark T.; Private’s Viewpoint m AirLand Battle, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Sep
Schneider, James J.; Open Letter to General George S. Patton, A“ . .. 64 Jun
Shortal, MaI John F.; Hollandix A Training VLctory 40 May
Siuru, Col William D. Jrand LtCol John D. BusicLLIfX ........... 26 Dec
Sleeth, SSgt Douglas C.; Our Common Ground ..: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 33 May
Sloan, StepheW1n Search ofa Co”ntertermrism Doctrine . . . . . .. . . 44 Jan
Sude, LtCol GertmanWClausewitz in USand German Doctrine 39 Jun
Summers, Col Harry G. JFWestem Media and Recent Wars...., . . . .. .. .. . 4 May
Swain, Lt Col Richard M.;
Clausewitz for the 20tt1 Century The Interpretation of Kaymond Aron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..$.. 3s Apr
Swan, Capt[P)Guy C. I1k Countering the Daring Thmst... ................................... 42 Sep

Takeshma, MaJ Lloyd S.: Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO, The . . . . . .. 31 Apr
Taylor, Capt Percher L. IIL Professional versus Personal Values . . . . . . . . 32 Nov
Tkus, Ma] Keith R.; Tbrough Ivan’s Eyes ... ... . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. 46 Apr
Tomes, Lt C.1 Jonathan P.; Indirect Responsihdity for War Crnnes 37 Nov

Vemm, Maj (P) Michael H.; Encirclem.mt Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Sep

Vought, Lt Cal Donald B. and Lt Col James H. Fraser JV
Terrorism: Tbe Search for Working Definitions . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . ..... .. 70 Jul
Vcmght, Lt Col DomiJd B. and Ma] Jesse M. Pereq Violence The Alternate Political Inst,t”tion 42 Aug

Wade, LtCol Gary H.; World War II Division Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Mar

Westenhoff, Capt Charles M.; Close Air Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Sep
Wheeler, Maj Gen Albin G,; Operational Logistics in Support of the Deep Attack .. . . ... . 12 Feb
Wilson, Peter A. and Kevin N. Lewix Follow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A .. .. .. 12 Jun
Wke, Maj Douglas H. and Maj Linas A. Row
Space Power Is Land Powec The Army’s Rolein Suace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Jan

Yorke. Edward G.; Soldier's &turn. A . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. .. ... . .. . . .. .. . . . .. . . .. 72 Nov

Zais, Maj Mitc&ll M.; LIC:Matching Mi*ionsand Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Aug

Zeltmann. Waltir F.; Fire Brigade. %e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77. Sep
Zygiel, LtCol Jobn J. JCViewofCivil Affairs inthe LIC&ena, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Aug

-98 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 TITLES PAGE MONlff

Air Power
CloseAirPlanting ........................... ........................................... 54 Sep
Of ALOs, FACsand TACS ....................................................... 57 Ott
Aircraft
LAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 26 Dec
AirLand Battle
AirLand Battle The Histrmcal Background . . . . . . 52 Mar
Close AirPlanning ...................................................................... 54 Sep
Encirclement Operations 11 Sep
FM100-5The AirLand Battle in 1988 4 Mar
Genghis Khanand13th-Century AirLand Battle .. . .. . .. 18 Jun
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 tiov
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . . ..$ . . . . 36 Feb
Operational Logistics in Support of the Deep Attack .. . .. . . . . . . .. ... 12 Feb
Private’s Viewpoint on AirLand Battle, A.... . . . .. . . .... . 67 Sep
Space Power Is Land Power: The Army’s Kole m Space ... .,,, . . . 4 Jan
Synchronizing the AirLand Battle . . . . 65 Apr
Theoretical Perspective of AmLand Battle Doctrine, A . . . . .. .. . 32 Mar
Training to Figbt.. . . .. . . . 18 May
Area Studies
Pakistan: Onthe Front Porch of Conflict. . . .. . . 68 Mar :
Armor
Forced March: Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Jul

Battalion i
Heavy versus L1gbt Forces A Middle Ground 64 Ott ~
Brigade
Fire Brigade, The . . . 77 Sep
>
Caribbean Basin
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, Tbe . . . . . . . 16 Aug\
Central Europe
+
Cost Across tbe FLOT, The . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 30 Sep ,.
Light Infantry Integration in Central Europe . . . 18 Sep ,
Civil AfTairs
ViewofCivil Affaimmtbe LICArena, A 58 Aug;
Command and Control
Battle StatTTkammg Pro.gram, A...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 49 May
Command and Control Interoperability . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . 3s Oqt
Open Letterto General George S. Paiton, An..... . 64 Jun
Synchronizingthe AmLand BattIe.. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Apr “
Communications
!
Tactician, This Is Logistician. Talkto Me. Over. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Feb ,)
Communism
M]li@Situation lnNlcara@a. ~e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Aug
Conventional Warfare 1
Five Functions of Land Combat. The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Apr

Defense
Challengeofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun

MILITARY REVIEW* December 1986 99

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

Follow.On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A . . . . . .. ...... . . . .. . . 12 Jun

Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Apr
Division
Force Integration’s Next Big Challenge., . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Apr ‘1
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict, The Are They Losing Sight of Each Other? 18 Jan .
Light fnfantry Integration in Central Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sep
World WarlIDivision Cornrnanders,... ...................................... .. . . 61 Mar
Doctrine
AirLand Battle The Historm+lBa ckgmmnd .. . . . ....................................... 52 Mar
Clausewitz in USand German Doctrim ... . .. . .. 39 Jun
Decisionm&ingin Modem War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Ott
Enci~lement Operations , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Sep
FM IOO-5The AirLayd Battle in1986 . . .& . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar
FM100.5: ~oInfl"enced ~om? ..................................... 46 Mar
Follow-On Forces Attack Joint Interdiction by Another Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 Feb
lnSearchofa Countitiemotism Docttine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jan
Karlvon Clausewitz Analysis of FM IOO-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Feb
Legacy of Liddell Hati, ~e ........................................................... 65 May
LICMatchi”g Missions and Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Aug I
Offenswe Rem Battle . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. 30 Feb
Private's Vie~ointon AirLand Battle, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Sep
Some Vaflant Thoughts on Doctrin e.... . .. . . . . . . . . 56 Mar
Synchromzingthe AirLand Battle. . 65 Apr,
Theoretical Perspective of AirLand Battle Dwtrme, A . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Mar
Througb IvmfsEyes. .. . .. . .. . . . 48 APr
Traini”g to Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 18 May

Education-Training
Battle Staff Trai”ing Program, A.... . . . 49 May
Decisionmakmg in Modern War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Ott
Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow . . . ,%. 4 Dec
HaIlandia Attaining V,ctory. .. .. . .. .. 40 May
Insurgency Threat and Waysto Defe?t It, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Jan
Our Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 May
Purpose of US Army Schools, The.... :.. . . . . 30 May
ROTC Today and Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 May
Ps=v ..................................................... . . . 21 Mar
Training Preparation for Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 4 Jun
Training tonight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 18 May
Engineers
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Feb
Equipment
Selecting Emergmg Technologies ,., . ...-,,, . 32 Dec
TW=V ............................. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. 21 Mar

Force Modernization
Operati”g inthe21st Centw-y, . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sep
Strategic Undevihningsofa Future Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Ott
France
Low.lntensity Conflict in the 1980s The French Experience . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 68 Jan

Geography
Geopoliticso ftheCarihbeanB asin,The ................................. . . .. .. . 16 Aug
Germany
Abuses of German Military Histmy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Dec

100 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 INDEXTOARTICLES
.,
!
TITLES PAGE MONTH ‘

Auftragstaktik:InItsProperPerspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Ott

Clausewitzin USand@man Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Jun
Onthe WekrmacktMystique . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jul
Grenada
OperationL+gentFuryandItsCritics . . . ... . .. .. 57 , Jul

Hollandia
HollandmATrainmg,V]ctory. . . . . . . . . . .. 40 May

Infantry
Heavyversu6LightForcexAMiddIeGround . 64 Ott
L,ghtDivislonsandbw-Intensity Conflict,The&e TheyLosingSightof EtichOther? 18 Jan
L,ghtInfantryIntegrationin CentralEurope : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sep
Infonnat,on
ClausewitzmUSand GermanDoctrine 39 J..
WesternMediaandKecentWars . . .. . . . . 4 May
Intelligence
Countering GIobal Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Jun
Militav Applications of Afiificlal In&lligence and Robotics 50 De.
Why Artificial Intelligence Won’t Work .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . 57 De.
Iran
“Eureka’’C on~erence,T heABusyTimei nTeheran . 74 Ott

Latin America ,,
Army StrateWand Structure. An..... . . . . . . . 69 Aug
Challenge and Wsponseonthe Southern Flank: Three Decades La*r . . . . . 4 Aug
Geopolitics oftbe Caribbean Basin, The 16 Aug
Liberatmn Theology . . . . 62 A“g
MdItary S,twatmn m Nmaragua, The . . 28 Aug
VlewofCwd Affamsm the fJCArena, A 58 Aug
,1
Violence’ The Alternate Pobt,cal Instltut>on 42 Aug
Law
Specml OperatLonsand the Law . . 49 , Jan
Leadership ,!
Americans Strategic Character . .. .. . . . 14 Apr ,
“Art’’intheA rtofWar,The . ........ . . .. .. . . 64 Sep ~
A@ragstakt&InI tsProperPer spective . .. . .. ... . 50 Ott ?,
Battle Staff fiainlng Pro~am. A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 May ;
Command and Control lnteroperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Ott ‘
Decm]onmakmg mModern War 33 Ott ,
ElimnmtetheFiltersandWin 20 NW
Five Functions of Land Combat, The . 72 Apr
Forei@Policy and Militaw StratemTheC lvll-M,l]=wE quation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 AP<
Harnessing Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mar
Indirect ffesponsibility f.r War Crimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Nov
Initiative inthe US Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Nov
fsWar Too Important for Generals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Sep
Karlvon Clausewitz. Analysis of FM IOO-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 68 Feb ,;
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nov
Mentor, The More Thana Teacher, More Tbana Coach ... ... . . . .. . . . . . 4 Jul
Open Letter to General George S. Patton, An . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ..... . . . 64 JwI >
OurCommon Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33 ?&y
Professional versus PersOnal Values... .. .. .. ... .. .. . . . . . .
32 No.
PuwoseofUS Army Schools. The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 May
ROTC Today andTomomow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 36 May

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 10s

 ~

TITLES
$

Sewe YowSoldlerstoWin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAGE MONTH

10 No,
SpecialOperationsandthe Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49 Jan
Syncbronizi&theAirLandBattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65 Apr ,
T%=v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21 Mar
‘TrainingPreparationforCombat. . . . . . . . .
4 Jun
,1
lYainingto Fight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16 May
WorldWarflDirision Commanders,. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .
61 ?&r
Logistics
CostAcrosstheFLOT,The . . . . . . ...’. . . . .. . .. . .... . .... .. 30 Sep
OperationalLogisticsin Supportof theDeepAttack 12 Feh
Tactician,ThisIs Logistician.Talkto Me.Over. ................................... 20 Feb
USRailroadsAForgottenMiIitaryAsset . 49 Feb
Low-IntensityConflict
ArmyStrategyandStructure,An, . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . .. .. . 69 A“g
DebateAboutLow-IntensityCcmRict, The . .. . ,., ,., 60 Feb
In Search ofa Countetimorism Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jan
In Search of LIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Aug t
lnsurgemy Threat and Waysto Defeat It, The 26 Jan
Ki”ds of War . . ... . ... .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . 14 Ott
Liberation Tbeology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 A“g
LIC: Matching Missions and Forces 79 A“g
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Contlct, The: Are They Losing Sight of Each Other? 16 Jan
Low-Intensity Cdlict in the 1980s The French Experience 68 Jan
Special Operatmnsandthe Law 49 Jan
ViewofCivd Affairs inthe LICArena, A 58 Aug

Maneuver
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand BattIe . . . . .. 18 Jul
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . 36 Feb
Manpower
%
Militarism m Russia From Imperial Roots to the Soviet Union
28 Jul
Onthe Wehrmacht Mystique . . . . . . .
44 Jul
Operatmgin the7.1st Century .. Y.. :
4 Sep
Medical
Army Nurse Corps,85Years Young . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 58 Feb
Military History
Abuses of Cerman Military History.. . . . . . . 66 Dec
AirLand Battle The Historical Background. . . .. . . . . . . 52 Mar
Auftmgstahtzh:l nItsProperP erspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Ott
D-Day Remembered Legends and Legacies . . .. . .. . . . . 50 Jun
“Eureka’’Conference,T heABusyTimem Teheran . 74 Ott
FM IOO-5Who Influenced Whom? . . . . . . . . . .. .. 46 Mar
Forced March Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Jul
Foreign Policy and Military Strategy The Civil-Mditary Equation. 22 Apr
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand Battle . . ... .. . .. . . . . 16 JuI
Hollandia A’Training Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. .. .. . 40 May
indirect Responsibility for War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., 37 NW
bitiativein the US Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 No.
Is War Too Important for Generals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,., 71 Sep
Kinds of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Ott
Legacy of LLddell Hart, The . . . .. ... . . .. .. . . . ... .. 65 May
Militarism in Russix FromlmperiaIRoot. tothe Soviet Union ... . ... .. . .. ... . 26 Jul
O“the Wehrmacht Mystique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jul

10% December 19S6 . MILITARY REVIEW

,i
 INDEXTOARTICLES

TITLES PAGE MONTH ,

Operatingin the21st Century, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sep

Operation UrgentFufy and Its Critics.. ... .... .. .. ... .. . . .. . ..:... 57 Jul
Seine Your Soldiers to Win . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nov
Soldier's Ret=. A ...................................................................... 72 Nov
Some VagTant Thoughts on Doctrine, . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 56 Mar
Theoretical Perspective of AirLand Battle Doctrine, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Mar
US Railroads AForgotten Military Asset 49 Feb
Violence The Alternate Political Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Aug
Western Med,aandRecent Wars..... ......................................... 4 May
Whatiflt Works? AirAmament Technoloufor Deep Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Dec
World WarlIDivision Commanders . . . . . .... ... .. .. . . . 61 Mar
Mihtary Police
Offensive RearBattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Feh
M,litary Schools
P“rposeofUS kmy Schools, The.. 30 May
Mobibty
Blitzkrieg in Europe Is It Still Possible? .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 26 Jun
Heavy versus Light Forcew A Middle Ground 64 Ott
Morahty
Arnerica’s Strategic Character . . . . . . . . 14 Am­

NATO
Blitzkrwg ii Europe Is It Stall Possible? . .. 26 Jun
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun
Countermgthe DaringTbrust ........... 42 Sep
FM IOO-5:The AirLand Battle m1986 . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar :
Follow-On Forces Attack Joint Interdiction by Another Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Feb
Follow.On US Echelon forNATODefense. A ................................... 12 Jun
Strategic Defense Initiatweand NATO, Tbe . 31 Apr ~
Nicaragua ,1
Mlli@~Situation lnNicaraWa, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Aug
North Afr,ca
Forced MarchArmor 38 Jul

Offense
Encirclement Operations . .
Follow-On Forces Attack. Joint InterdictIon by Another Name
. . . . . . . 11
4
30
II
Se’
Fe, ,
Feb ‘
Offensive Rear Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Logistics mSupportofthe Deep Attack . . 12 Feb
Operational Level of War
Close Air Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Sep
Cost Across the FLOT, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 30 , Sep
Countering the Daring Thrust... : fj.p
Light Infantry Integration in Central Europe . Sep
Organization
Amy Strate~and Structure. An . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Aug ~
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . .. .. .. . . . . . . 57 Jun I
Command and Control Interoperability. .. .. .. .. . . . 36 Ott, ~
Force Integration’s Next Big Challenge.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 APr
Heavy versus Light Forces: A Middle Ground . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Ott
Space Power Is Land Powe~The Army’s Rolein Space .. . 4 Jan

Pakistan
Pakistam Onthe Front Porch qfConflict ................................................... 66 Mar

MILITARY REVIEWO December 1986 103

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

Panama
Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank Three Decades Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Aug
Personalities
Clausewitz for the 20th Century The Interpretation of Raymond Aron 38 Apr
Clausewitzin USand Getman Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 JUII
“Eureka’’C onference,T hcABusyTimei nTeheran .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . .. .. 74 Ott
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand Battle 18 Jul
KarIvon Clausewitz AnaIysisofFMIOO-5 ... . .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . . 66 Feb
Legacy of Liddell Hart, The 65 May
Mentor, The: More Thana Teacher, MoreThana Coach 4 Jul
Open Letter to General George S. Patton, An . . . . . . . . 64 Jun
Personnel
Army Nurse Corps,85Years Young . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Feb
Cohesion andthe Vietnam Experience 56 May
Eliminate the Filters and Win . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 20 Nov
Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes . . . . 37 Nov
Initiative inthe US Sold]er . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Nov
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nov
Of ALOs, FACsand TACS ., 57 Ott
Operatingin the21st Century . . . . . . 4 Sep
Our Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 May
Pro sessional versus Personal Values 32 Nov
Serve Your Soldiers to Win...... 10 No.
Soldler’s Keturn, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Nov
Soviet PsycholoRcal Threat, The 64 Nov
Values andthe American Sold.er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Nov
Psychologmal Operations
Psychological Operations Against Terrorism The Unused Weapon 59 Jan
Soviet Psychological Threat, The . 64 NOV

Religion %
Liberation Theology . . 62 Aug
Research
Mihtav Applications of Artificial Intethgence and Robotics 50 Dec
ROTC
ROTC Today and Tomomow . . . . . . . . . . . 36 May

Space i
Army in Space, The: New High Ground or Hot-Air Balloon? 44 Dec
Space Power Is Land Power The Army’s Role in Space . . . . .. 4 Jan
Specml Operations
Countering Global Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. 72 Jun
Special Operations andthe Law . 49 Jan
Strategy
AmerLca's Strategic Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14 Apr
Army Strategy and Structure, An . . . . . . . . 69 Aug
Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later . . . . . . 4 Aug
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun
Clausewitz for the 20th Century The Interpretation of Raymond Aron 3S Apr
Follow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Jun
Foreign Policy and Militmy Strategy The Civil-Mihtary Equation. . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, The 16 Aug
HolIandia A Training Victory . . . . . . . . . . 40 May
In Search of LIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Aug I:

104 December 1966. MILITARY REVIEW

 .+
.
INDEXTOARTICLES

TITLES PAGE MONTN ‘

Military Situation in Nicaragua, The.... . . . . . 28 Aug

Operation Urgent Fury andItsCritics ., ..,.. . ...,, 57 Jul
Pakistan Onthe FrontPorchof ContTict,. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..... 68 Mar
StrategicDefemeInitiativeandNATO,The .. . . .. . 31 Apr
StrategicUnderpinningof a FutureForce ,. ..,,, . . . . ,., 4 Ott
Terrmmm;TheSearchforWorkingDefin,t,ons. ...,.. . . . . .. .. 70 Jul
USfZdroads.4 ForgottenMilitaryAsset . . . . . . ,, .,, 49 Feb
VmlenccTheAlternatePohtmdInst]tution ...,,,.,,.....,,,, . . . . .. .. . .... 42 Aug
supply
CostAcrossthe FLOT,Tee . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3P Sep

Tactics
f31itzkrieg
in Europe:Is ItStallPossible? ... ,.. . ... ,., . . 26 Jun
CloseAirPlanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Sep
CounteringtheDaringThrust. . . 42 Sep
EncirclementOperations 11 Sep
FireBrigade,The.. ... .. . . 77 Sep
HeavyversusLightForces A MiddleGround 64 Ott
InsurgencyThreatandWaysto DefeatIt,The 26 Jan
Manemw, SynchmmzationandObstacleOperations 36 Feb
Of ALOs,FACsandTACS . .. . 57 Ott
StrategicUnderpinningsof a FutureForce 4 Ott
SymhmnizmgtheAmLandBattle ,, .,.. 65 Apr
Tactlc>an.ThisIsLozistic,an TrdktoMe.Over. . 20 Feb
Technology
Army in Space, The: New H]gb Ground or Hot-Air Balloon? ,,, . . ,,. 44 Dec
Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow ..,. 4 Dec -
LAX,,,..., ................ ...... . 26 Dec
Mditay Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Robotxs . . . . .,. 50 Dec
Selecting Emergmg Technologies 32 Dec
i
What if It Works?. Am Armament Technology for Deep Attack . . 12 Dec ‘
Why Art,ticial Intelbgence Won’t Work 57 Dec
Terrormm
Countering Global Terrormn j2 Jun ~
In Search ofa Counterterrorism Doctrine 44 Jap
Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon . 59 .Ja~
Terrorlsnx The Search for Working Detimtlon.s... ,,. 70 J&
VkienceTheAl ternatePol%ticalIn stitution . . 42 A{g ‘“
,. Transportatmn
US Railroads: A Forgotten Military Asset 49 Fqb

Unconventional Wartare
Debate About Low-Intensity Conflict, The 60 I Feb
In Search of a Con”tertermrw,m Doctrine ,. .’.,,, 44 Jan
Inmrgency Threat and Ways to Defeat It, The ,. 26 Jan
USSR
Countering the Daring Thrust 42 Sep i
Encirclement Operations . .. 11 Sep ~
Militarism in Russia From Imperml Roots to tbe Soviet Union . . 28 JuY
Soviet Psychological Threat, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 ~OV

Through Ivan's Eyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Apr ,

20 NW
37 Nov

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 105

 c

TITLES PAGE MONTH

45 Nov
55 Nov
32 Nov
10 NW
‘4 NW
II
56 May

I
64 Sep
50 Ott
26 Jun
38 Ott
33 Ott
64 Ott
71 Sep
14 Ott
57 Ott
64 Jun
67 Sep
4 Ott

77 Sep
32 Dec
12 Dec

71 Sep

66 Dec

50 Ott

50 Jun

74 Ott

36 Jul

40 May

44 Jul

72 Nov

49 Feb

61 Mar

,1

106 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 TITLES PAGE MONTS

83 May

83 May

89 NW

88 Jul

8? APr

89 Jun

86 Jul

91 Ott

65 May

89 Sep

88 Jul

86 Mar

87 NrJv

90 Jun

105 A“g
90 Jun
90 Jun
88 Mar
67 May
87 Dec
i
,4
88 Sep
90
90
86
104
86

104 Aug
84 MST
66 Jul
90 Od
87 I Feb
$J3V
Jun
API’ .
Jan /
Jan /
Jul
Sep
Apr ;
par
Jan
Ott
Jun

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 107

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

T700EngineforH licopkrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Jun

UH60A Black Hawk Tests ADOCS (AdvancedDigital/OpticalControlSystem). . . . . . . . 85 Apr

X-Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Dec

Parachutes
Parafoils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Mar

Bridgqs
ChieftainMk-6AVLB(ArmoredVehicIeLaunchedBridge). . . . . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Nov
MobileAssaultBridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Jul

CBR Warfare
Robot Maruin Usedin Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Ott
Clothing
AN/PVS4Small Starlight Scopes .,..... . . .. . . . . .. . . . 87 Feb
AN/PVS5ANight Vision Boggles . . . . . . . 87 Feb
AN/PVS7Night Vision Goggles . .. . . . . . . . . .. 87 Feb
Hplster, Beltand Ammunition Pouch . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . 90 Ott
Holsters forthe Beretta92SB-F. 88 Jan
M12Hip Holster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Jul
NLght Combat System. .. . . . .. . 90 Jun
Commumcations
AN/MLQ34TACJAM (Tactical Jamming) System 86 Mar
Carrier Pigeon Force 85 Jul
ELF (Extremely Low Frequency) Communication System 89 Jan
Hermes Defense Communications System ., .,, 86 Maf
JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) 86 Feb
MARC (MAC Airlift Control Element Reactmn Commumcationl .-. . 85 Jul
MCS2[Maneuver Control Systeml 88 Nov
MF15Radio ................... 89 Nov
Momtor for JSTARS (Joint Survedlance and Target Attack Radar System] .. 87 Nov
MSE (Mobile Subscriber Equ]pment) Communications System 85 Mar
RV2/400Portable ffadio . . . ...}.... 90 Feb

Education-~aming
AQM37C Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 88 Jun
CkW(Cockp,t Procedures’framer) forBIB ..: . . . . . 85 May
GI 10,000 Computerized System for Pilots 87 Apr
Periscope Image Generator Simulator .. 88 Jul
RadConz Portable Firearm ~aining System . 104 Aug
SIMNETTank Simulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;..... 90 Ott
Equipment
AIMES (Avionics Integrated Maintenance Expert System) 88 Sep
AN/PVS4~mall Starlight Scopes . 87 Feb
ANlPVS5ANlght VisLon Goggles . . . . . . 87 Feb
ANIPVS6 MELIOS (Mini Eyesafe Infrared Observation Set) .. .. 89 Sep
AN/PVS7Night Vision Goggles . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . 87 Feb
BCS(Battery Computer System) . . . . . . . . 87 Jul
Camouflage Pattern Generation Facility . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 May
Computer <'Expeti Sys@m'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Jan
.Eagle Eye Search-and-Rescue Camera... .. ... . 90 Jun
GIIO,OOOComputerized Image-Generating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Apr
HVME(Hull V1brationand Monitoring Equipment) 105 Aug
lCC(Individual ConcealmentCoverl .................... ..................... 88 Jan
Light ina Tube . .... . .. ... .. . . ... .. . . . .. .. . 89 Feb

100 December 1986 � MILITARY REVIEW

 INDEXTONEWS

TITLES PAGE MONTH ‘

Lynx Gets Thermal Imaging System ... .. .. .. . ,,, ,,. ... ,., 89 Sep
Magic Mast Raises Antennas m Sensors ., .,.,, 88 Nov

MCS2(Maneuver Control System) . . . . . .. ... . .. . . . .. . . .. 88 Nov

PALs (Passive Acoustic Location System) . . . ., .,.,, ,, .,,.. 88 Sep

PCI03 Compass. . . . . 87 Jui

PC202Compass ................ ... .... . . ,,, ,.. 87 Jul

Robot for F]eld Materiel Handling “. ... ... .,, .,,, 91 Ott

Robot Maruin Usedin Tesh. .. .. .. . . . . 91 Ott

Snow Camouflage . .. 87 Sep

Steadyscope Binoculars.. . . . ... .. . . 90 Feb

Z200Pers0nal Computer . . . . . ST.. JuI

Food and Food Processing

AS2Burner .. .. . 89 Mar
Trip Tank Collapsible Water Tank ,, ...,, ., 86 Dec
Fuels
Fast Fuelinthe Field. .. . . .. . . . . . 89 Jan
HC130Refuels CH47DChmook . . . .. . 87 Feb

Infrared Dewces
LmescaII 4000 Airborne Infrared Surveillance Device for Tornado Aircrafi . . . . . 87 May

Laser Appkcations
LVIPVS6 MELIOS (Mm, Eyesafe Infrared Obsewatmn Set) 89 Sep
MULE (Modular Umversal Laser Equ]pmentl S9 Jun
Night Combat System 90 J.n
Logistics
Parafods Deliwr Cargo ., . . . . 85 Mar
Robot for F]eld Materiel Handlmg . 91 Ott

Maps and Mapping

Nawgatiorml Map Flashlight 104 A“g

~
Naval Vessels
Submarines !(
ELF {Extremely Low Frequency) Communication System ....... 89 J+
Periscope Image Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,, ,,. 88 Jul, ‘:
TridentIIFleet BaHist]c Missile . . . . . 85 Apr’,
Surface
Antwtanz Aegis 88 Ju$
HVME (Hull Vlbrat,on and Monitoring Equipment) 105 AUS!
STANDFLEX 300 Project . . . . . . . . . . 86 ‘May
2000. CIass LCU (Utility Landing Craft) 87 Dbc
Wisconsin Battleship . . . . . . ... . . . 89 Nov
Zummf Hydrofod Missde Boat 88 Mar ~

Radars ,)
JSTARS (Joint Survedlame and Target Attack Radar System) . .. . . . 86 Feb
Mcmitor for JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) . . . .. . .. 87 NLIV ,

‘?ilDRtTacticaI Defense Alert Radar) . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . .. 88 Feb

Research
APOCS (Advanced Digital/Optical Control System) Research Program 85 Apr
Robot for Field Materiel Handling . . . . . ... .. .. ... . . 91 Ott
RobotMamin Usedin Tes& . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 91 Ott

!.

MILITARY REVIEW * December 1986 109

 TITLES PAGE MONTH

Shelte~
MARC (MAC Airlitl Control Element Reaction Communication). .. .. . . . . . . .. . 85 Jul
Polyester Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Aug
Vehicle %pairand Main&nance Sheltir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Sep

Transportation
Chi@amMk-6A VLB(ArmoredV ehicleLaunchedB ridge) .................................. SS Nov
Mobile Assault Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,. 86 Jul

Chieftain Mk-6AVLB(Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge) .. . . . . ,, . . . . . . 88 No;

Counterohstacle Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Ott

Crane of Rough Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Apr t

EEZ’40gum L,ght, Tracked Armored Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Dec

Fast Fuelinthe Field . . . . . . . . . . 89 Jan

“NVHIMechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle 91 Jun

OtomatwAm Defense Gun ... .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . 89 Nov
Periscopes for Armored Vehicles . ...,, 87 Nov
Pmgrammahle Countermeasures Dispenser System for Army Vehicles . . 84 May
Snow Camouflage .’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Sep
Vehicle Reoairand Maintenance Shelter . . . . . .. . . 88 Sep

88 Nov
86 Apr
86 Sep
105 A“g
90 Ott
87 Jul
90 Ott

85 Jul
87 Jul
89 Jun
89 Nov
87 May

91 June
84 May
81 Nov
86 Dec
89 NOV
89 Mar
89 Mar
89 Mar
89 Mar

December 1986. MILITARY REVIEW

 INDEX TO NEWS

Aug ‘
Ott

Sep

Sep

Sep

Jul

May

Jun

Jun

Jan

Sep

Aug

Jun

May

Aug

Feb

Jun

Ott

May

Sep

Aug

Jun
Jun
Apr
Mar
Mar
Jul
May
May
MaY
Mar ,?
Apr
Jul
Apr

These theses were written by students of tbe 1988 class of the US AnnY Command and General Staff Offk’ers
Course and the Advanced Military Studies Course as part of their requirement for the Master of Military Art and
Science degree. All theses are entered mtm the Defense Technical Informatmn Center, Cameron Station, Alexan.
dr,a, Vm@ia 22314 wh~ch wdl prov~de copies to qualified users. Copies wiJ1 not be avaiIable until spring ~987.

African Military Capabilitie%Evolution and Implications; Maj Richard M. Saunders, lJSA

Air Force Materials Handling Equ]pment Support for Civil Reserve Am Fleet [CRAF) Wide-Body Operations ~m~
Wartime; Maj Anita Morland Arms, USAF Analysis of the Army of Excellence Heavy Dwision Cavalry Squad­
ron, An, Maj Scott F. Miller, USA
Arab-Israeli ConJlict, The The War of Attrition and Preparations Preceding the October 1973 Wan Maj Jerry R.”
Thomberry, USAF
Arms Control: Shaping the Army’s European Nuclear Arsenal; Maj Alan B. Moon, USA
Army and Space, The: Historical Perspectives on Future Prospect& Maj John R, Wood, USA

MILITARY REVIEW � December 1986 111

Batt[etieId Air Interdiction in the 1973 Middle East War and Its Significance to NATO Air Operations; Major A.
Brant, USA
Benefits of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and Subsequent Procurement Legislation Maj Sandra-
Faith J. Lamb Bunker, USAR .
Causes and Costs of Modifications to hlilitary Construction Cm@cts, Th% Maj Eric T. Mogren, USA
Dental Readiness Contingencies: Supporting the AirLand Battl~ Maj William C. Mitchell, USA
Electronic Warfare in Support of Theater Air Defense Command, Europe,; Maj Deuglas E. Sturgeon, USA
Equipp~ng the Infantry Division (L]ght) in the 1990s Maj Su Peon Shee, Singapore Armed Forces
Establishment and Evolution of Tactical Air Force Weapon System Evaluation Programs Combat Sage, Combat
Echo andCombatArche~MajDanielP. Leaf,USAF
Evolutionof the ChineseArmamentsIndustryFrom 1860to Present,The Tl+eSearchfor Self-Sufficiency,Maj
Donald A. Green, USAR
Expert System+Tools in the Commander’s Decisionmaking Process Maj William A. Teter, USA
F1llD Retention Issue, Thq Maj Michael G. Hub. USAF
Field Marshal von Manstein’s Counteroffensive of Army Group South, February-March 1943 The Last Opera­
tional-f,evel Victery of the Panzer Forces on the Eastern Front Maj David A. Shunk, USAF
Force Integration Doctrine and Division Staff Orgamzatmw Maj Douglas R. Jorrey, USA

Gunnery Training Strategy for a Bradley (M2)-Equipped Infantry Squad Maj Patrick W. Casey, USA
History of the Marine Corps Institute, Tha Maj Hugh M. Mcllroy Jr., USMC
Is the Tactical Air Force Prepared for Night Close Am Support?; Ma] William E. Rial, USAF
Kenya-Somali Boundary Dispute, Thq Maj Jeremaih M. Kianga, Kenyan Army
Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and tbe Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Motor­
ized Rifle Regiment Maj Robert L. Jordan Jr., USA
Low-Intensity Conflict & Practiced by John Singleton MosbY in the American Civil WaK MaJ Rick Gutwald, USA
Management versus Leadership as Reflected in Selected Militav Journ+ls (1970 -1985k M+ John R. Combs, USA
Managing the Near-Term Functions of Change m Medical Units Maj Ray G. Bruekmd, USA
Middle Eastern Strateoc Deploymen+Oasls or Mirage? Maj Stephen B. Howard, USA
Military Rule in Nigerlzx The Economy and Foreign Policy MaJ EIias J. B. Nyan, Nigerian Army
Military’s Peacetime Role (Implications of the Civilian Conservation Corps Experience); Maj Gerald M. Brennan,
USAF %
Model to Establish the Effectweness of a Mixed Force of H]gh and Low-Cost Fighters for the De fensme Counterair
Mission, A, Maj Terry V. Jackson, USAF
NCO Authority: Roles, Rules and Begulatlons; Maj John D. Altenburg, USA
100,000 Presidential Call-Up, The: Should R Solve Tbls NatIon’s Imtial Mobdlzation Needs? [UK Maj J. C. Dibert, ,,
USA
Rinciples of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, and Support in Counternmurgency to a Developing Natiow Col G
:,
Tejindar Singh Shergill, Indian Army
$
Responsible Soldiering in tbe Nuclear Age: Inferences From tbe Catholic Bishop’s Pastoral on Nuclear War Li c’ol I&l
q
Mason E. Smith, USA .

Selection process of US. AnnY Recruiters, Th& Maj Petter Wendelborg, NorwaY Soviet Military ‘nt er - t,om T ~
Afghanistan and Policy Options for Pakistan; Maj Manzoor Iqbal Awan, Pakistan Army
Strategic and Operational Implications of Iranian Military Operations in tbe Iran-Iraq Wa~ Ma; Donald H. #
Zacherl, USA ,g
Study of Soviet Use of Field Artillery Weapons in a Direct-Fire Role, A: Maj Larry. W. CokerJr., USA e
~
Tank Gunnery A Comparison of Evaluations Maj Kurt D. Norman, USA :
E
Unconventional Threat to the Central Army GroupwithinAlliedCommand,Europe,‘I%<MajGeorgeM.Svitak, S
USA g
Vaiiables in the Guatemala Operational Environment That AtTect Guatemala Declsionmakers Concerning ~
Relations With the United Statea Maj Donald C. Waring, USA *

112 December 1986 * MILITARY REVIEW