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NS - 2014-The Failures That Changed The Perception of Our Designs-The Bridge & Structural Engineer PDF
NS - 2014-The Failures That Changed The Perception of Our Designs-The Bridge & Structural Engineer PDF
Dr. N. Subramanian earned his PhD from IIT, Madras in 1978 and has 40 years of professional
experience which includes teaching, research, and consultancy in India and abroad. Dr.
Subramanian has authored 25 books and more than 200 technical papers, published in international
and Indian journals and conferences. He has won the Tamil Nadu Scientist Award, the Lifetime
Achievement Award from the Indian Concrete Institute (ICI) and the ACCE(I)-Nagadi best book
award for three of his books. He also served as the past vice-president of ICI and ACCE(I).
Fig.1 One of the twin 11-storey towers at Detailing 6 (10) 5 (14) 2 (1) 5 (17) 1 (11) -
Mugalivakkam near Porur, Chennai collapsed on Con- 22 (37) 12 (32) 52 (25) 6 (20) 2 (22) 11 (65)
28th June, 2014 killing 61 people struction
Maint- 1(2) - 22 (11) 1 (3) 4 (44) 1 (6)
enance
Such failures are common not only in structures
Material 1(2) - 3 (1) 2 (7) - -
built by private builders but also found in
External 16 (27) 11(30) 60 (29) 4 (13) - 1(6)
prestigious government projects. For example, a
Others - 4(11) 61 (29) - 1 (11) 3 (18)
footbridge that was built near the main stadium (NA)
for the Commonwealth Games collapsed in Sept. Total 60 37 207 30 9 (100) 17
2010, just 12 days before the opening ceremony, (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
injuring 23 construction workers. When 50m aOne case unknown
section of the overhead Andheri-Ghatkopar Metro In order that these failures do not happen in
bridge, at Mumbai came crashing down in Sept. future, we need to learn from these failures. Even
2012, one person died and eight were injured. though some committees are constituted to study
This was a joint venture between Reliance the cause of some import failures in India, most
Infrastructure, Veolia Transport and the Mumbai often the committee reports are not made public.
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority Whereas, in Western countries such reports
(MMRDA). Similarly six persons, including an are made available to the public and hence
engineer, were killed and 13 others injured all concerned agencies can learn from these
24 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
failures and will not repeat them in their projects. is a 56.4 m tall, circular, eight-story structure
In this paper some of the major failures, which made of white marble. Although intended to
changed our perception of design and detailing stand vertically, the tower began leaning to the
of structures and resulted in modification of code southeast soon after the onset of construction in
clauses are discussed. 1173 due to a poorly laid 3 m deep foundation
and weak, unstable subsoil. Prior to restoration
Foundation Failures work performed between 1990 and 2001, the
Foundations are important to any structure tower leaned at an angle of 5.5 degrees, but the
as the entire load acting on the structure tower now leans at about 3.99 degrees. This
is transmitted to the soil below through the means that the top of the tower is 3.9 m away
foundation only. Due to the complex nature of from the vertical plane through the tower (see
soils and their behaviour, a hybrid approach is Fig. 2).
usually adopted in foundation design in which Several attempts have been made to stabilize
soil bearing pressures are checked based on the foundation movement- details of these may
the working stress method and members of the be found in Subramanian and Muthukumar
foundation are designed using the limit states (1998) and Burland et al. (2009). After a decade
method (Subramanian, 2013). Foundation of corrective reconstruction and stabilization
failures are difficult to rectify and may endanger efforts, the tower was declared stable in 2008
the entire building. Hence it is important to and is expected to stand for at least another 200
design them conservatively. If the footing is not years.
of the required thickness, there is a danger of the
It may be of interest to note that in June 2010,
column piercing through the foundation. Several
the Capital Gate building in Abu Dhabi, UAE was
failures (both partial and total) in the past have
certified as the ‘World's Furthest Leaning Man-
demonstrated the importance of foundation
made Tower’; it has a 18-degree slope, almost
failures, especially in poor soils. We will just look
five times as that of the Leaning Tower of Pisa;
at two fascinating foundation failures here.
however this tower is deliberately engineered to
slant.
Successful foundation failure
The Tower of Pisa is a freestanding bell tower of 2.2 Rare Foundation Failure in China
the cathedral of the Italian city of Pisa. The tower On June 27, 2009, an unoccupied 13-storey
block of flat building, still under construction,
at Lianhuanan Road in the Minhang district of
Shanghai city, China toppled over and ended
up lying on its side in a muddy construction field
(see Fig. 3). One worker was killed.
26 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
consequently will attract much greater seismic The soft first story and weak story irregularities,
shear force. Brittle shear failures have been that are widely used by architects in their designs,
observed in the unsupported zones of such short were the cause of failure of columns in such
‘captive-columns’ during several earthquakes stories during earthquakes as demonstrated in
in the past. A mezzanine floor or a loft also Northridge, California (1994); Chichi, Taiwan,
results in the stiffening of some of the columns and Izmit, Turquía, in 1999; and Bhuj, India in
while leaving other columns of the same storey 2001 (see Fig. 6 & 7). Unfortunately buildings
unbraced over their full height. Based on these with such soft first storey/weak storey are still
observations, codes now specify that special being constructed in several parts of India. It is
confining reinforcement be provided over the full because the area enclosed by a soft first story
height in such columns to give them adequate is rewarding to the developer since it is neither
confinement and shear strength. Such confining considered as part of the maximum allowable
reinforcement is also stipulated when shear built-up area, nor for tax control, but is salable as
walls terminate over open storey columns in the car parking area.
ground floor.
Fig.6 Component and system-level seismic deficiencies found in pre-1980 concrete buildings (NIST GCR
10-917-7, 2010)
28 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
Where, Ac = area of concrete core within catastrophic collapse of a 30 story cast-in-place
perimeter transverse reinforcement, Ag= gross reinforced concrete structure. This flat-plate
area of column, Ash = total cross-sectional area structure collapsed while under construction, due
of transverse reinforcement (including cross to punching shear on the 23rd floor and resulted
hoops) with spacing s and perpendicular to in a progressive collapse (see Fig. 8).
dimension bc, bc is the cross-sectional dimension
of column core measured to the outside edges
of transverse reinforcement composing area
Ac, = specified cylinder compressive strength
of concrete, fck= specified cube compressive
strength of concrete, fyl = specified yield strength
of longitudinal reinforcement, fyt = specified yield
strength of transverse reinforcement, hx = center-
to-center horizontal spacing of cross ties or hoop
legs, n= total number of longitudinal bars, nl =
number of longitudinal bars laterally supported
by corner of hoops or by seismic hooks of Fig. 8 Progressive collapse of Skyline Plaza building
crossties that are ≥ 135 degrees; Pu = factored in Virginia, USA (Photo by Nick Carino of NIST)
load on column, and s = centre-to-centre spacing Source: Ellingwood et al. (2007)
of transverse reinforcement along column height.
In the midst of construction on March 2, 1973,
Similarly, the following confinement equation is
one apartment building and the parking garage
proposed for circular columns (Subramanian,
adjoining it collapsed. Fig. 6 shows the damage
2011):
following the collapse. The incident occurred
⎛ f ck ⎞⎛ Ag
ρ s = 0.44k p ⎜⎜ ⎟⎜
⎞
⎟⎟ (2) at around 2:30 in the afternoon and resulted in
⎟⎜
⎝ f yt ⎠⎝ Ac ⎠ the death of 14 construction workers and the
injury of 34 others. It was designed as a 26 story
Where ρs is the volumetric ratio of transverse apartment complex with a four-story basement
reinforcement, kp is as defined earlier. Note that and a penthouse level. All floor slabs were 200
the term kn is not required for circular columns, mm thick and the floor-to-floor height was 2.75
as spirals provide effective confinement than m.
rectangular hoops.
The Center for Building Technology of the
Failure of Slabs National Bureau of Standards (now the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST)
Since two-way slabs are three-dimensional investigated this collapse. A three-dimensional
elements, they may redistribute the overloads and finite element analysis was conducted on the
hence failures in slabs are not frequent, provided 22nd and 23rd floors to determine the magnitude
they are detailed properly. However, punching of forces exerted on the floor slabs and
failures in flat plates may be catastrophic and whether the slabs could properly handle those
may not give enough warning. Hence such flat forces. Upon completion of the analysis, it was
slabs should not be used in severe earthquake determined that moments in the column strips of
zones. When used in moderate zones, flat slabs the slab were not great enough to cause failure.
should be checked for punching stresses and On the other hand, the analysis showed that the
detailed properly near the vicinity of columns slab around few columns experienced shear
(Subramanian, 2013 & 2014). stress greater than the shear capacity of the
concrete slab. The improper and early removal
4.1 Collapse of Skyline Plaza, Virginia, U.S.A.
of forms supporting the 23rd floor resulted in
Skyline Plaza apartment building in Bailey's increased shear force around the columns. The
Crossroads, Virginia, U.S.A. is an example of a recently poured concrete had strength less than
30 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
had been placed into final position, and slabs A more recent failure is that of the six-story parking
9, 10, and 11 for the west tower had just been structure at Berkman Plaza in Jacksonville,
lifted. The entire collapse took only 5 seconds! Florida, under construction on December 6,
The collapse was one of the worst disasters in 2007, where 60% of the structure collapsed
USA. This was the first serious failure of a lift- suddenly "like a stack of pancakes", killing one
slab structure, a system that had been in use for and injuring 23 others (see Fig. 10). The structure
about 40 years. consisted of cast-in-place simple reinforced
concrete columns, cast-in-place reinforced
An unusually prompt legal settlement
and post-tensioned concrete beams, and cast-
prematurely ended all investigations of the
in-place post-tensioned concrete slabs. The
collapse. Consequently, the exact cause of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
the collapse has never been established. The
(OSHA) concluded that while the collapse was
building had a number of deficiencies; any one
due to errors made by those on the design,
of which could have triggered the collapse. The
construction, and inspection teams, the structural
report by the National Bureau of Standards
design had numerous deficiencies including one
(NBS) concluded that an overloaded steel angle
column that was barely able to support the dead
welded to a shear-head arm channel deformed,
loads of the structure. The formwork plans called
causing the jack rod and lifting nut to slip out
for the shoring and reshoring to extend all the
and caused the collapse to begin. Failure was
way to the ground. However, it was learned that
possibly due to high concrete stresses on the
the shoring and reshoring below the 3rd level had
floor slabs by the placement process, resulting
been removed shortly before the concrete on the
in cracking of the slab concrete and ending in a
6th floor was placed (www.oshrc.gov/foia/Rpt_
punching shear failure. Moreover, the ACI code
SouthernPanServCo.pdf). This failure along with
states that “a minimum of two tendons shall be
the failures of Harbour Cay Condominium Cocoa
provided in each direction through the critical
Beach, and the Turner Agri-Civil Center Arcadia
shear section over the columns”. This was not
resulted in the Florida Structural Engineers
followed in the L’Ambiance Plaza structure.
Association (FSEA) proposing legislation to
While buildings constructed by the lift-slab amend Chapter 471 of the Florida Statutes to
method are stable once they are completed, recognize the discipline of structural engineering
they may be unstable during construction, if and provide for a corresponding license. An
the following measures are not taken during engineer would apply for the SE license only
construction (Martin, http://911research.wtc7. after being licensed as a PE, and after taking
net; and Cuoco, et al, 1992) and passing the NCEES 16-hour structural
Provision of temporary lateral bracing during examination.
all stages of construction.
Provision of concrete punching shear and
connections redundancies in the structure.
Provision of temporary posts, to support the
concrete slab until it is completely attached
to the column.
Provision of sway bracing (cables which keep
the stack of floors from shifting sideways).
Though this is required, it was not used in
L’Ambiance Plaza
This failure resulted in temporary ban and tighter Fig.10 Collapsed Berkman Plaza, Jacksonville,
Florida (Source: Ratay, 2011)
design and construction requirements in some
states of USA on lift-slab construction (Ratay,
2011).
32 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
stress of about 1.4 MPa reduced the shear During the removal of shuttering of the last
capacity of the beam by 50 percent. Thus, it was bay on 26th January 1962, a sudden heavy
concluded that tensile stresses caused by the cracking sound was heard and within a few
restraint of shrinkage and thermal movements seconds the roof caved in along the ridge. The
caused the beams of Wilkins Air Force Depot to beams had cracked in the middle, and the main
fail at such low thermal shear stresses (Feld and reinforcements were pulled out. The collapsed
Carper 1997). The expansion joints locked and roof came to rest on the centering props below.
did not function as intended to relieve stresses.
This failure outlines the importance of providing
minimum shear reinforcement in beams. It has
to be noted that repeated loading will result in
failure loads which may be 50 to 70 percent of
static failure loads (ACI-ASCE committee 426,
1973).
34 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
matdl.org/failurecases/Bridge_Collapse_Cases/
Quebec_Bridge). Additionally, member stresses
were not recalculated and checked when the
center span length was increased by 61 m
during the design phase, overstressing several
members. As the bridge was erected, ironworkers
noticed significant mid-point displacements in
some of the truss compression members, but this
was not reported to the designer. Additionally,
even though it was a major bridge design, no one
proof checked the original design (The project
Fig.15 Two different views of the I-35W Bridge
suffered a second collapse in 1916, when a failure (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/)
casting in the lifting apparatus broke, causing the
center span to fall into the water, killing thirteen major factor, coupled with weight added to
workers). the bridge over the years as well as ongoing
With the collapse of New York’s I-90 over the construction that had more than 191 tons of
Schoharie Creek Bridge in 1987 and the deaths construction material piled over the failure area
of 10 people, attention was turned towards on the bridge on the day of the collapse. More
underwater inspections. This structure failed details of this bridge failure may be found in
due to scouring of the center pier. In 1988, the Subramanian (Feb 2008).
FHWA issued a technical advisory guide, “Scour Subramanian (June 2008) provides a brief
at Bridges”. In October of that same year, the report about the measures taken by engineers
NBIS was modified based upon suggestions to prevent failures similar to that of the I-35W
made in the “1987 Surface Transportation and Mississippi river bridge collapse.
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act”. The national
The collapse of shoring in the construction of a
underwater inspection frequency interval was set
highway bridge built to carry Maryland Route 198
at a maximum of 60 months. Scour critical bridge
over the Baltimore-Washington Expressway, in
inspections were initiated.
1989 injured nine workers and five motorists,
Even with these guidelines several bridge and killed one. This led to the research and
failures have occurred. Most are small bridges publication of new design specifications and
that collapsed due to overloads and many might construction practices for temporary works by
not have caused great loss of life. A recent the FHWA and to the changes in the provisions
exception however was the sudden collapse for temporary works in the AASHTO Standard
on August 1, 2007 of the I-35W Bridge over the Specifications for Highway Bridges (Ratay
Mississippi River in Minnesota killing 13 people 2010). A few more bridge failures that resulted
and injuring 145 (See Fig. 15). The findings by in changes to code and standard clausess and
the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) practices may be found in Ratay (2010).
indicate under-designed gusset plates were a
7.4 Collapse of Koror - Babeldaob Bridge,
Republic of Palau, Micronesia
The importance of considering long term
deflections in the design was revealed in the
1996 collapse of the Koror-Babeldaob Bridge
(see Fig. 16). This bridge was completed in
1977, to connect the two main islands of Koror
and Babeldaob in the Republic of Palau. It
is a reinforced concrete, balanced cantilever
prestressed concrete box girder bridge with a
36 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
The failure of the bridge occurred due to the in 1973, Bouchain, France in 1979, Fiddler's
twisting of the bridge deck in mild winds of Ferry, U.K. in 1984, and in Willow Island, West
about 64 km/h (See Fig. 17). This failure mode Virginia, USA and Port Gibson, Mississippi,
is termed as torsional vibration mode (which USA in the 1980s. These failures resulted
is different from the transversal or longitudinal in the revision of building codes all over the
vibration mode). This vibration was caused by world, to include provisions regarding improved
aeroelastic fluttering (a phenomenon in which structural support, and necessity of doing wind
aerodynamic forces on an object is coupled with tunnel tests for complicated configurations and
a structure's natural mode of vibration to produce arrangements.
rapid periodic motion).
In the Tacoma Narrows bridge, instead of the
usual deep open trusses, narrow and shallow
solid I- beams were used in the decks, which
resulted in the build-up of wind loads. This bridge
collapse boosted research in the field of bridge
aerodynamics which resulted in better designs.
After the collapse, two bridges were constructed
in the same general location. The first one, now
called the Tacoma Westbound bridge is 1822
m long -12 m longer than Galloping Gertie. The
second one, the Tacoma Eastbound Bridge,
opened in 2007.
38 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
should have impact resistant walls; published in 1992 and reapproved in 1997 and
2003 cautions about creep failure of adhesive
Self-luminous exit pathway markings should
anchors and suggests pre-testing of such
be provided in all exit stairways; and
anchors. ACI Committee 355 also developed
Radio coverage systems should be available ACI 355.2-07, “Qualification of Post-Installed
within the building to allow emergency Mechanical Anchors in Concrete”.
personnel to better communicate with
New Steel Erection Final Rule by the US
the people inside the building and with
Department of Labor, Office of Safety and Health
emergency staff outside the building.
Administration (OSHA), issued on January 18,
10.0 Failure of Anchor bolts 2001, effective January 18, 2002, mandated
the use of four, rather than two, anchor bolts
On July 10, 2006, about 26 tons of concrete in structural steel column base plates, as well
and associated suspension hardware fell as a minimum design load and eccentricity in
on a passenger car when it was passing the Section 1926.755(a) General requirements for
Interstate 90 connector tunnel in Boston, USA erection stability of the Construction Industry
(This tunnel is often referred to as the “Big Dig”), Standards. This rule was "negotiated" as a result
killing a passenger and injuring the driver. A of numerous construction accidents caused by
later investigation found hundreds of dangerous the toppling of unbraced steel columns during
adhesive anchors were holding together the tiles erection (Ratay, 2011)
on the tunnel ceilings, which had to be removed.
The National Transportation Safety Board’s 11.0 Other Failures
(NTSB) investigation of that accident determined In this section we will consider other failures
that the ceiling collapse was due to the use of which prompted revision of code provisions.
an epoxy anchor adhesive with poor creep
resistance, that is, an epoxy formulation that 11.1 Collapse Due to Corrosion of Post-tensioned
was not capable of sustaining long-term loads. Steel
Over time, the epoxy deformed and fractured The Benjamin Franklin Hall, (also called Der
until several ceiling support anchors pulled out Kongresshalle or the 'pregnant oyster'), built in
and allowed a portion of the ceiling to collapse. 1957 collapsed on May 21, 1980, without any
Selection of a better adhesive could have visible deterioration prior to failure, killing one
prevented the accident. Powers Fasteners has and injuring numerous people. The 76 mm thick
increased the safety factor on its fast-setting reinforced concrete shell roof resembles an
materials by a factor of four since the Big Dig open human eye with a tension ring as the pupil
collapse. NTSB recommended federal and and the two arches at the edges representing the
state highway authorities develop standards upper and lower lids. The two arch support points
and protocols for the testing of adhesive represent the corners of the 'eye'. The thin shell
anchors used in sustained tensile load overhead roof had post-tensioning bars in ducts which had
highway applications, and consider the creep corroded partly due to poor quality of grouting,
characteristics of polymers. A mandatory tunnel and led to the collapse. The hall was rebuilt in its
inspection was also suggested. More information original style and reopened again in 1987 at the
about this failure and recommendations by NTSB 750 year’s jubilee of Berlin. More details of the
may be found at NTSB/HAR-07/02 (2007). This failure may be found in Subramanian, 1982.
led ACI committee 318 to work diligently on
design requirements for adhesive anchors and It has to be noted that the internally post-
include them in Appendix D of ACI 318-11. tensioned Ynys-y-Gwas Bridge in Wales
collapsed in 1985. In 1986 the bridge over the
In this connection, it is important to note that ACI Mandovi River in Goa, India collapsed after less
503.5R-92, “Guide for the Selection of Polymer than 20 years in service due to corrosion of the
Adhesives with Concrete,” which was first post-tensioning cables and the Malle Bridge over
40 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
and judgment (Smith and Epstein, 1980). The use of low toughness weld metal at the
beam-column connection;
11.4 Failure of Slender Shear Walls
Uncontrolled deposition rates;
Observed wall damage in recent M 8.8
earthquakes in Chile (2010) and New Zealand
The use of larger members than those
(2011), where modern building codes exist, previously tested;
exceeded expectations. In these earthquakes, Lack of control of basic material properties
structural wall damage included boundary (large variation of member strength from the
crushing, reinforcement fracture, and global prescribed values);
wall buckling. IN ACI 318-11, A single curtain of
Inadequate quality control during
web reinforcement is allowed if wall shear stress
construction; and
is less than 0.17√f_c^' MPa, where f_c^' is the
cylinder compressive strength of concrete. This The tri-axial restraint existing at the center
provision is acceptable for squat walls with low of beam flanges and at the beam-column
shear stress (e.g., walls with aspect ratio less interface, which inhibits yielding.
than 1.5); however, for slender walls where
A multi-billion dollar research conducted over
buckling of boundary vertical reinforcement and
10 years resulted in the development of design
lateral instability are more likely due to significant
provisions for moment resistant frames, and
tensile yielding of reinforcement under cyclic
prescribed in AISC 341-05 (Seismic provisions
loading, two curtains should always be used.
for structural steel buildings, American Institute
This recommendation applies to both Special
of Steel Construction), which was again
Structural Walls (high ductility) and Ordinary
revised in 2010. In addition, AISC developed
Structural Walls (moderate ductility). Based on
another standard, AISC 358-05 (Pre-qualified
laboratory tests it was suggested to change the
connections for special and intermediate
value of the denominator in Eqn. 21.8 of ACI 318-
steel moment frames for seismic applications
11 from 600 to 1200 (Wallace, 2012). To ensure
including Supplement No.1), which was revised
spread of plasticity consistent with the derivation
in 2010. This Standard presents materials,
of Eqn 21.8 of ACI 318-11, walls should be
design and detailing, fabrication, and inspection
designed and detailed as tension-controlled.
requirements for a series of pre-qualified moment
11.5
Failure of Welded Beam-column connections. The AISC 358-2010 contains a
Connections number of pre-qualified connections and these
are discussed in Subramanian, 2010.
Subsequent to the January 1994 Northridge
earthquake in California and Kobe earthquake 12.0 Summary and Conclusions
in Japan in 1995, it was determined that some
damage to moment–resisting frames occurred at The earliest building code is The Code of
the beam-column connections. Failures included Hammurabi circa 1760 BC. Unlike today’s codes,
fractures of bottom beam flange-to-column the Code of
flange complete-joint-penetration groove welds, Hammurabi dealt more with the consequences
which propagated into the adjacent column of building failure rather than how to safely
flange and web and into the beam bottom flange. construct a building. For instance, Law #229
This failure was accompanied in some instances stated “If a builder builds a house for someone,
by secondary cracking of the beam web shear and does not construct it properly, and the house
plate and failure of the beam top flange weld. The which he built falls and kills its owner then the
factors that contributed to the damage included builder shall be put to death”. Modern building
the following (FEMA 2000): codes shifted from outlining the punishment for
Stress concentration at the bottom flange weld, poor construction to mandating requirements that
due to the notch effect produced by backing would make building safe and better. Today’s
strips left in place; building codes are built on the experience of
42 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer
Failures, Second Edition, Wiley- Design of Large, Wide Beams”, Concrete
Interscience, New York, 1997, 528pp. International, ACI, Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan 2004,
pp. 66-78.
[12] FEMA 426, Reference Manual to
Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks [21] MARTIN, R., “L'Ambiance Plaza Collapse,
Against Buildings, Federal Emergency Bridgeport, Connecticut, April 23, 1987”
Management Agency, Dec. 2003, 420 pp. (http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/wtc/
analysis/compare/enguab_ambiance.htm),
[13] FEMA 427, Primer for Design of
Assessed on 16th July 2014
Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist
Attacks: Providing Protection to People [22] NIST GCR 10-917-7, Program Plan for
and Buildings, Federal Emergency the Development of Collapse Assessment
Management Agency, Dec. 2003,108 pp. and Mitigation Strategies for Existing
Reinforced Concrete Buildings, NEHRP
[14] FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School
Consultants Joint Venture, National
Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and
Institute of Standards and Technology,
School Shootings, 2nd Edition, Federal
Gaithersburg, MD, Aug. 2010, 100 pp.
Emergency Management Agency, Jan.
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Requirements for Concrete Buildings,
[15] FEMA 430, Site and Urban Design for
Portland Cement Association, Skokie,
Security- Guidance Against Potential
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Performance Analysis of Reinforced [25] PRABHAKAR, N., "Building Collapses and
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Federal Emergency Management Agency,
[26] RATAY, R.T., “Changes in Codes,
Dec. 2005,296 pp.
Standards and Practices Following
[17] FEMA P-439B, Blast-Resistant Benefits Structural Failures, Part 1: Bridges”,
of Seismic Design, Phase 2 Study: Structure Magazine, ASCE, Dec.2010,
Performance Analysis of Structural pp.16-19, and “Part 2: Buildings”, Structure
Steel Strengthening Systems, Federal Magazine, ASCE, Apr.2011, pp.21-24
Emergency Management Agency Nov.
[27] SCHELLHAMMER, J., DELATTE, N.
2010, 130 pp.
J. and BOSELA, P. A. “Another Look
[18] KAMINETZKY, D., Design and at the Collapse of Skyline Plaza at
Construction Failures: Lessons from Bailey's Crossroads, Virginia”, Journal of
Forensic Investigations, McGraw-Hill, New Performance of Constructed Facilities,
York, 1991, 600 pp. ASCE, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2013, pp. 354-
361.
[19] LEYENDECKER, E.V., and FATTAL, S.G.,
Investigation of the Skyline Plaza Collapse [28] SEIM, C. "Why Bridges Have Failed
in Fairfax County, Virginia, Center for Throughout History", Civil Engineering,
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Technology, National Bureau of Standards, 71, 84–87.
Washington DC 20234, Report No. 94,
[29] SMITH, E. and EPSTEIN, H., “Hartford
Feb. 1977, 91 pp.
Coliseum Roof Collapse: Structural
[20] LUBELL, A., SHERWOOD, T., BENTZ, Collapse and Lessons Learned”, Civil
E.C. and COLLINS, M.P., “Safe Shear Engineering, ASCE, April 1980, pp. 59 62.
44 Volume 45 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer