54

G.R. NO. 154243 March 6, 2007

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS
MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO
and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, Petitioners,

vs.

P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, Respondent.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Inspector General of the PNP for
abuse of authority/harassment against the respondent. The latter allegedly obstructed police
officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the suspects in the shooting of
petitioner’s son. The complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge
investigation. When summoned, respondent did not appear but filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the
case. Meanwhile, the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the
commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against respondent. Upon approval of said
recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for
summary hearing. The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a
decision dismissing respondent from police service.

ISSUES:

· WON the respondent failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies prior to
the filing of his petition.

· WON the chief of the philippine national police has the authority or jurisdiction under
republic act no. 6975 to hear and try the citizen's complaint against respondent.

HELD:

· With regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the
courts without first going through all the administrative remedies because the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when the issue involved is
a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said issue being a purely
legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case.
· Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990, which took effect on 1 January 1991, x x x delineates the procedural framework in
pursuing administrative complaints against erring members of the police organization. Section
41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a complaint against an erring member of the
PNP may be filed. It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would
warrant dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41 should
be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the same statute. Evidently, the PNP Chief and
regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of
the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to
dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP
Chief and regional directors.

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter
shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although other disciplining authority
has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly declares this
point.

The Court further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of the
PNP Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a police officer."

Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term "applies to a

broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or
logical procedure or prescribed method." Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct
unbecoming a police officer. Clearly, the charges against respondent in this case are also
covered by paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, vesting the PNP Chief with jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the complaint against respondent.

Verily, the assistance of counsel was not required for respondent to validly waive his right to
cross-examine the witnesses in the administrative case against him.

In sum, the charges against respondent fall well within the scope of paragraph (c), Section 42
of R.A. No. 6975, thus, the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint
against respondent; and the summary hearing officer accorded respondent due process and
never deprived respondent any of his rights.

55

ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA v. TEODORO PENA, GR No. 57665,

July 2, 1990

Facts:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death,
his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement... wherein
they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir
Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.

The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was
subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.

In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later
converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their
respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and

"Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for
operation.

During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.

On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against Feliza Sibayan,
Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the Court of First

Instance, Quezon City, Branch IX. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement from which private respondents derived their... ownership and possession over the
"Ped" claim was maliciously falsified [Annex "I" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79] and prayed for
annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims.

During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-17136, the parties entered into an amicable settlement,
agreeing that: (1) private respondents will return to petitioners the disputed mining claims,
including the "Ped" claim; (2)... petitioners will reimburse private respondents all expenses, like
assessment taxes, incurred in the preservation of the claims; and (3) private respondents shall
execute the necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to petitioners [Annex "I" to the
Petition

Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the
parties to comply with the above settlement

On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint (Mines
Administrative Case No. V-784) against private respondents for alleged overlapping and
encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.

On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no
conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims

Issues:
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public respondents may not validly and
legally take cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of
the "Ped" mining claim.

Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if public
respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave abuse of discretion which
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

Private respondents argue that the documents were not filed at the proper time since they were
not formally offered in evidence when the case was still before the respondent Director, and
were

Ruling:

This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No.
463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims
[Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 463.]

Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon
recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In... accordance with the
statutory grant of rule-making power, the Department Secretary on May 17, 1975 issued the
Consolidated Mines Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which was
published in the Official Gazette on June 16, 1975.

One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent Minister of Natural Resources
relied upon in his decision to dispose of the jurisdictional issue raised by petitioners.

Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the
enabling... law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute [People v. Maceren,
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of Santo Tomas... v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953).]

In this case, petitioners were afforded the... opportunity to be heard on the validity of the "Ped"
mining claim when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal.

Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public
respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in
the protest case, even if not raised in issue.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer of Baguio City cannot prevail over the
documents clearly evidencing the petitioners' filing the application. Not only was the application
filed within the prescriptive period, it was also... duly filed with the Bureau of Mines Office in
Manila, the venue specified under Section 176 of the implementing rules.

The contention is clearly untenable. Petitioners precisely were unaware that the validity of the
"Ped" claim would be passed upon in the protest case since such was not raised as an issue.
Hence it was only after the decision... in the protest case was rendered that petitioners found
the need to present evidence on appeal relating to the validity of the "Ped" claim.

Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the rebuttal
evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of reversing
respondent Director's finding.

As to petitioners' supposed failure to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since
1952, the conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of payment of
assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the... year 1975, although not by petitioners.

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public respondents had the authority to
ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the decision
of the Director of Mines declaring petitioners to have

"abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim, respondent Minister committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Principles:

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies

the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.] In order to be valid, the administrative
regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards
that the law... prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 727
(1940); Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil 221 (1940),] and must
relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions... of the law [U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, 29
Phil 119 (1914).]... it is axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to... be
heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA
303, citing De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953).]

As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely administrative matters involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, and findings of fact, of the administrative agency. The exception is
when there is a clear showing that the agency... acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or when it acted in a capricious manner such that its action may amount to an excess
or lack of jurisdiction [Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture,
G.R. No. L-21167,... March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 50141, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 481.]
 56
Univerity of Sto. Tomas vs NLRC, 182 SCRA 371
G.R NO 89920 18 OCTOBER 1990
FACTS:
 University of Sto. Tomas (UST) terminated the employment of 16 union officers and directors of UST Faculty Union
for grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a faculty member on the ground
that "in publishing or causing to be published in Strike Bulletin No. 5 the libelous and defamatory attacks against
the Father Rector.
 Some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence disrupting classes in all levels at the University.
 The faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the DOLE.
 The labor arbiter, on a prima facie showing that the termination was causing a serious labor dispute, certified the
matter to the Secretary of DOLE for a possible suspension of the effects of termination.
 Secretary Franklin Drilon issued an order to accept the 16 terminated employess back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal in the interest of industrial peace.
 Secretary Drilon issued another order which certifies the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
 NLRC issued a resolution directing UST to comply and faithfully abide with the Orders of the Secretary Drilon by
immediately reinstating or readmitting the 16 faculty members under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the present dispute or merely reinstate them in the payroll.
 UST states that it has already actually reinstated 6 of the dismissed faculty members; As to 2 professors whose
teaching assignments were partially taken over by new faculty members, they were given back their remaining
teaching loads (not taken by new faculty members) but were given substantially equivalent academic assignments
corresponding to their teachings loads already taken over by new faculty members; The remaining 7 faculty
members were given substantially equivalent academic assignments in lieu of actual teaching loads because all of
their teaching loads originally assigned to them at the start of the first semester were already taken over by new
faculty members; 1 dismissed faculty had been "absent without official leave" or AWOL.
 SC issued a TRO enjoining NLRC from enforcing or executing the NLRC resolution.
 UST argues that actual reinstatement of the dismissed faculty members whose teaching assignments were
previously taken over by new faculty members is not feasible nor practicable since this would compel UST to
violate and terminate its contracts with the faculty members who were assigned to and had actually taken over the
courses.
 UST claims that to change the faculty member when the semester is about to end would seriously impair and
prejudice the welfare and interest of the students because dislocation, confusion and loss in momentum, if not
demoralization will surely ensue.
 UST contended that it has the sole and exclusive right and prerogative to determine the nature and kind of work of
its employees and to control and manage its own operations.
ISSUE: May UST comply with the NLRC readmission order by granting substantially equivalent academic
assignments, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to dismissed faculty members?
RULING:
 No. Pursuant to Article 263 (g), 1st paragraph, of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 27 of RA 6715, the
NLRC was charged with the task of implementing a valid return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. As the
implementing body, its authority did not include the power to amend the Secretary's order.
 Since the Secretary's order specifically provided that the dismissed faculty members shall be readmitted under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute, the NLRC should have directed the actual
reinstatement of the concerned faculty members. It therefore erred in granting the alternative remedy of payroll
reinstatement.
 The grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments cannot be sustained. The giving of substantially
equivalent academic assignments, without actual teaching loads, cannot be considered a reinstatement under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
 The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" contemplates actual reinstatement or the return of actual
teaching loads to the dismissed faculty members.
 Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the status quo between the workers and management in a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, pending
adjudication of the controversy. The grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments would evidently alter
the existing status quo since the temporarily reinstated teachers will not be given their usual teaching loads.
 The order of NLRC did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. Such error is merely an error of judgment which is
not correctible by a special civil action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad
hoc solution to a festering and serious problem.
 The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of employees are traditionally identified as management
prerogatives. However, these are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in law, a
collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice.
 Article 263(g) is one such limitation provided by law. To the extent that Art. 263(g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, UST is restricted from exercising its
generally unbounded right to transfer or reassign its employees.
 The first semester is about to end and to change the faculty members around the time of final examinations would
adversely affect and prejudice the students whose welfare and interest we consider to be of primordial importance
and for whom both the University and the faculty union must subordinate their claims and desires. The actual
reinstatement of the non-reinstated faculty members may take effect at the start of the second semester.
 The contracts of new professors cannot prevail over the right to reinstatement of the dismissed personnel.
Petition is denied.

MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Vs.COURT Of APPEALS

G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996

FACTS OF THE CASE

Milagros Matuguina, a sole proprietor, has a timber business named Matuguina Logging
Enterprises in Davao under the Provisional Timber License No. 30 for a certain area. During the
same time, Milagros became the majority stockholder of MIWP (Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products) by buying 70% of stock ownership. Milagros requested to the director of Forest
Development to transfer the management of the timber license no. 30, granted for MLE, to
MIWP.

Pending the approval of the transfer of the license, DAVENCOR (private respondent) submitted
a complaint regarding the encroachment of MLE in the concession area of DAVENCOR. , The
Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his decision against MLE for
illegal logging operations on the portion of the land under the concession of DAVENCOR.
DAVENCOR then requested the issuance of writ of execution for MLE and/or MIWP. MIWP, as a
defense, filed for prohibition, damages and injunction, with prayer for restraining order on the
grounds that they are a separate entity from MLE and, therefore, not a party to the complaint
by DAVENCOR. Trial Court granted the TRO. RTC ruled in favor of MIWP which was reversed by
the Court of Appeals; hence, this petition on certiorari.

ISSUE

WON the corporate veil of MIWP shall be pierced to be held liable for the acts of MLE

RULING

NO, MIWP cannot be held liable. A corporation has a separate personality. . It may not
generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it unless when the juridical
personality of the corporation is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud
or defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere association of persons. But for
the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.

It is likewise improper to state that the MIWPI is the privy or the successor-in-interest of MLE,
as the liability for the encroachment over DAVENCOR's timber concession is concerned, by
reason of the transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI. The transfer has never
become effective. More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was a valid change of name
and transfer of interest in the PTL No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of authority, from MLE to
MIWPI, to conduct logging operations in the area covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show
indubitable proof that MIWPI was a mere conduit or successor of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, as
far the latter's liability for the encroachment upon DAVENCOR's concession is concerned.

The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact,
and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the
prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent
Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which
is under scrutiny.
NOTE

The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not
empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties
concerned.[32] In Police Commission vs. Hon Judge Lood, we held that the formalities usually
attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided
that the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their evidence. The right to
notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate
the administrative proceedings.