Case Ruling

Preliminary Considerations
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santisimo
Rosario de Filipinas vs. National Coconut Corp.
Plaintiff cannot collect unpaid rentals from
defendant because defendant entered the premises
with permission from the Alien Property
Custodian, which rightfully owned the property.
Furthermore, there was no express agreement
between the Alien Property Custodian and the
defendant for the latter to pay rentals on the
property.

The above considerations show that plaintiff's

claim for rentals before it obtained the
judgment annulling the sale to the Taiwan
Tekkosho may not be predicated on any
negligence or offense of the defendant, or on
any contract, express or implied. Plaintiff has
no cause of action.
Concept of Torts
Naguiat vs. NLRC In ascertaining the liability of respondent
President of the Clark Field Taxi Inc., the court
said that jurisprudence is wanting as to the
definite scope of “corporate tort”.

Essentially, “tort” consists in the violation of a

right given or the omission of a duty imposed
by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of legal
duty.

CFTI failed to comply with the mandate of Art.

283 Labor Code to grant separation pay.
Therefore, the officer responsible for the
company's management should be held personally
liable.
Baksh vs. CA The existing rule that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

That notwithstanding, the said Code contains a

provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. First Farmers
Milling Co.
Quasi-delicts – Concept and Requisites
Cinco vs. Canonoy
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a
quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or
omissions, and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent.
Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a civil law
concept, while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept.
TORTS IS MUCH BROADER THAN QUASI-
DELICT, because it include not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts, as
well as assault and battery, false imprisonment,
and deceit.
Under the Philippine legal system, intentional
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, fall
under delicts and are punishable by the
Revised Penal Code. Negligent acts or
omissions are covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts, which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress.
In dismissing petitioner's amended and
supplemental complaint against PNB and NIDC
the court held that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action against both.
Although it is averred that defendants' acts were
done in bad faith, the complaint does not contain
an averment of facts showing that the acts were
done in a manner alleged. Such a bare statement
neither establishes any right or cause of action
on the part of the plaintiff. Besides, bad faith is
never presumed. To support a judgment for
damages, facts which would justify a lack or
absence of good faith must be alleged and
proven.
An independent civil action arising out of a
criminal case for reckless imprudence cannot be
suspended while the criminal case is pending.
The liability being predicated on quasi-delict,
the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically

Elcano vs. Hill
Safeguard Security Agency vs. Tangco
provided for in Art. 2177.
The crucial distinction between criminal
negligence and quasi-delict are:
1) the RPC in article 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple imprudence, and so if
even the slightest amount of negligence would
have to be indemnified through civil indemnity
arising from delicts, what sphere would remain
for quasi delicts?
2) proof beyond reasonable doubt is required in
a criminal case, while in a civil case, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to hold
the defendant liable
3) it is exhausting and cumbersome to exhaust
a defendant's property first, before holding the
employer liable, whereas in an action for quasi-
delict, the employer's responsibility is direct
and primary together with the employee,
allowing for a more expeditious remedy
4) an independent civil action is entirely
directed by the party wronged and his counsel
(as opposed to a prosecutor in a criminal case),
and is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.
Under Art. 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, because the liability for quasi-delict
is different from that for delict. Only double
recovery is prohibited.
Also, emancipation does not automatically relieve
the father's solidary obligation under Art. 2180.
After the security guard was convicted of
homicide, the respondents validly filed a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against both the guard
and his employer, the petitioner. Respondents
reserved the right to file a separate civil action.
This separate civil action is one for quasi-delict.
The entry of judgment in the criminal case has no
relevance in this case. It would have been entirely

Iniego vs. Hon. Purganan
Chan, Jr. vs. Iglesia ni Cristo
FGU Insurance vs. CA
Gregorio vs. CA
Vergara vs. CA
different if the cause of action was one for delicts.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery
of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendant's alleged tortious acts,
and are therefore capable of pecuniary
estimation. The total amount sought shall be the
test of jurisdiction, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or different
transactions (totality rule).
4 requisites of quasi-delict:
1) there must be an act or omission
2) such act or omission causes damage to
another
3) such act or omission is caused by fault or
negligence
4) there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties
The fact that a “Memorandum of Agreement” was
declared void does not exculpate petitioner from
liability. He is a joint tortfeasor. The MOA,
instead of exculpating him, is the very noose that
ensures that petitioner is liable. He had two of ihis
employees observe the diggings for hidden
treasure, and it was him who induced Yoro to
enter into the MOA for hidden treasure.
A rent-a-car business is not solidarily liable with a
lessee of its car in a vehicle mishap. There is no
vinculum juris between them as employer or
employee.
Petitioner filed a complaint based on quasi-delict,
and not a complaint based on malicious
prosecution.
In a complaint for malicious prosecution, bad faith
of the defendant in deliberately filing a previous
action against the plaintiff must be alleged. The
charges in the previous action must be false and
groundless, and intended to vex and humiliate the
plaintiff.
In this case, Gregorio did not allege bad faith in
respondents' filing of a BP 22 case against her.
The fact of the negligence may be deduced from

American Express vs. Cordero
Quasi-delicts – as distinguished from a Crime
LG Foods Corporation vs. Hon. Pagapong-
Agraviador
Mendoza vs. Arrieta
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People
Manliclic vs. Calaunan
the circumstances thereof
A mishap caused by defective brakes is not
fortuitous in character.
The employer must produce evidence to overcome
the disputable presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict
may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there
are exceptions. A liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. When an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delict, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort.
The fault or negligence must be the proximate
cause. Proximate cause is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not
have occurred.
In this case, it was Cordero's negligence that led to
his credit card being damaged.
Failrure to reserve the right to file an independent
civil action in the criminal action does not bar the
civil case, based on the difference between quasi-
delict and delict in Art. 2177.
Petitioner cannot appeal the civil liability arising
from a delict, because according to the rules on
criminal procedure, the right to appeal is lost if the
accused (employee) jumps bail.
Only the civil liability arising from delict is
deemed instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the filing of
the criminal action.
The extinction of the civil liability referred to in
 Rule 111 refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the RPC (delict). The
civil liability arising from the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the act
charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.

If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable

Quasi-delict – as distinguished from a Breach
of Contract
FGU Insurance Corp. vs. GP Sarmiento Trucking
Corp.
doubt, his civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. If the accused is acquitted on the basis
that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of, or that the act did not
exist, said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime. In this case, a civil
action, may be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of.
In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract, and the failure of its
compliance, justify prima facie a corresponding
right of relief. The remedy serves to protect the
interests of the promisee that may include his
“expectation interest”, which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, his “reliance
interest”, which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as
he would have been had the contract not been
made, or his “restitution interest”, which is his
interest in being restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party.

In culpa aquiliana, the claimant has to prove

negligence on the part of the defendant.

Res ipsa loquitur finds relevance whether or not

there is a contractual relationship. Nevertheless, it
may only be applied only in cases of pure (non-
contractual) tort.
Calalas vs. CA The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. In this case,

Syquia vs. CA
Saludaga vs. FEU
Spouses Batal vs. Spouses San Pedro
Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.
respondent Sunga's basis is her contract of
carriage with petitioner, and thus, it matters not
that the proximate cause was the negligence of the
truck driver who hit the jeepney Sunga was riding
on. For failure to observe extraordinary diligence,
the jeepney operator Calalas is liable to Sunga.
There was no stipulation that the vault of the
deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery
was to be waterproof. Private respondent did not
breach its obligation.
Furthermore, private respondent cannot be held
liable for quasi-delict for boring a hole on the
vault. The circumstances surrounding the assailed
act negate the allegation of negligence.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation
exists, the existence of a culpa aquiliana is not
precluded.
The school is liable for the accidental shooting of
a sophomore law student in its campus, based on
culpa contractual. There is an implicit or “built-
in” obligation in the contract between the school
and the students, for the school to provide an
atmosphere that promotes or assists learning, and
this includes protection of life and limb.
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two
different senses, either as culpa aquiliana,
which is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission which creates a vinculum juris and
gives rise to an obligation between two persons
not formally bound by any other obligation, or
as culpa contractual, which is the fault or
negligence incident in the performance of an
obligation which already existed, and which
increases the liability from such already
existing obligation.
In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive,
and independent, while in breach of contract,
negligence is merely incidental to the
performance of the contractual obligation.
In quasi-delict, the defense of “good father of a
family” is a complete and proper defense
insofar as parents, guardians, and employers
are concerned, whereas in breach of contract,
such is not a complete and proper defense in
 the selection and supervision of employees.

In quasi-delict,, there is no presumption of

negligence, while in breach of contract,
negligence is presumed so long as it can be
proved that there was breach of contract – the
rule of respondeat superior is followed.

Petitioner's change of theory from quasi-delict to

breach of contract must be repudiated.
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within
Verchez the shortest possible time. It took petitioner RCPI
25 days to deliver the telegram, causing family
troubles to respondent. Petitioner is liable for both
breach of contract (as to delivery on time) and
quasi-delict (as to disturbing filial tranquility).
Air France vs. Carrascoso Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with respect, courtesy, and
due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities, and abuses from such
employees. The act which breaks the contract
may also be a tort.
Quasi-delicts – Specific cases of liabilty –
possessor of animals
Vestil vs. IAC According to Manresa the obligation imposed by
Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity
and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.

Quasi-delicts – Sepcific cases of liability –

product liability
Coca-Cola Bottlers vs. CA The act which breaks the contract may also be a
quasi-delict.

Thus, in this case, the respondent had more than 1

remedy.

In accordance with Art. 1567, the vendee may

elect between withdrawing from the contract

Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Concept
Tison vs. Spouses Pomasin
Gaid vs. People
Gan vs. CA
and demanding a proportionate reduction of
the price, with damages in each case (remedies
for breach of warranty by the vendor).
The vendee may also ask for annulment of the
contract upon proof of fraud, in which case the
ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable
(Art. 1170-74).
Finally, the breach of contract also being a
quasi-delict, Art. 2176 may also apply.
Driving without a license is a violation of a traffic
regulation. Under Art. 2185, this gives rise to a
presumption of negligence. However, a causal
connection must exist between the injury and the
violation of the traffic regulation. Negligence is
without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of interests of
another person the degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence are:
1) lack of precaution on the part of the offender
2) the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate, or the danger is not clearly
manifest
The standard test in determining whether a person
is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of
another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued?
A corollary rule is what is known as the
emergency rule. One who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection appears

Layugan vs. IAC
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Standard of
Conduct – Ordinary Prudent Person
PNR vs. Vizcarra
to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
To determine the existence of negligence, the
time-honored test was: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.

At this age of modern transportation, it behooves

the PNR to exert serious efforts to catch up with
the trend, including the contemporary standards in
railroad safety. As an institution established to
alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of the
PNR to promote the safety and security of the
general riding public and provide for their
convenience, which to a considerable degree may
be accomplished by the installation of
precautionary warning devices.

McKee vs. IAC On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that negligence may be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and prudent man would have
tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car from where they were even if it
means moving into the opposite lane.
Furthermore, the emergency rule also applies.
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Standard of
Conduct – Children
Ylarde vs. Aquino
Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Standard of
Conduct – Professionals
Li vs. Sps. Soliman
The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult. The standard of
conduct to which a child must conform for his
own protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge, and experience under
the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this
in mind, the court could not charge the child
Ylarde with negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years
of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account,
exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from
criminal liability obtains in a case of a person
over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless
it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-
delict and required discernment as a condition
of liability, either criminal or civil, a child
under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over nine but under fifteen years
of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The
rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years
of age must be conclusively presumed incapable
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence
cases are best proved by opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from the formers
realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the
indispensability of expert testimonies.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff
must prove in a malpractice action based upon
the doctrine of informed consent:
(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks;
(2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the
failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have
consented to; and
(4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment.

Justice Brion's concurring opinion:

While he concurs in the result of the majority
opinion and the applicability of the doctrine of
informed consent, he does not agree that there was
adequate disclosure of material risks in view of a
complete absence of expert testimony.
Respondents failed to sufficiently establish the
information that should have been disclosed to
them.

Under the professional disclosure standard, the

question to be asked is, did the doctor disclose
the information that, by established medical
practice, is required to be disclosed? Under this
standard, expert medical testimony must be
produced to establish what the standard practice
would be in each case.

The realization that the professional community

standard of disclosure was inconsistent with the
patients' rights to make their own health care
decisions led to the reasonable patient standard.
Under this standard, adequate disclosure required
the physician to discuss the nature of the
proposed treatment, whether it was necessary
or merely elective, the risks, and the available
alternatives and their risks and benefits.

Cruz vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Degrees of
Negligence
GSIS vs. Pacific Airways Corp.
Bao vs. Bachelor Express
While the ponencia used the professional
disclosure standard, Justice Brion used the
reasonable patient standard. Under the second
standard, expert testimony is no longer required.
Res ipsa loquitur is only available in non-technical
medical malpractice cases where expert testimony
is not needed.
Expert testimony is essential not only to establish
the standard of care, but also the physician's
conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard.
For disregarding PALs right of way, PACs pilots
were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one
that is characterized by the want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. Respondent pilots had
the final authority to proceed, under civil aviation
rules. This means their negligence, and not that of
the air traffic command, was the proximate cause
of the collision of the planes.
In the case of Government Service Insurance
System v. Pacific Airways Corporation,7 the Court
has defined gross negligence as one that is
characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.
In the present case, records show that when bus
driver Salvana overtook the jeepney in front of
him, he was rounding a blind curve along a
descending road. Considering the road condition,
and that there was only one lane on each side of
the center line for the movement of traffic in
 opposite directions, it would have been more
prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper
place. Having thus encroached on the opposite
lane in the process of overtaking the jeepney,
without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming
traffic that resulted in the collision with the
approaching dump truck driven by deceased
Asumbrado, Salvaa was grossly negligent in
driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to
determine that the road was clear and not to
proceed if he could not do so in safety.

Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Proof of

Negligence
Anonuevo vs. CA The mere fact of violation of a statute is not
sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has
happened which was intended to be prevented
by the statute, it has been held that violation of
the statute will be deemed to be the proximate
cause of the injury. (Negligence per se)

In this case, it was held that while respondent

Villagracias was negligent per se because of riding
a bicycle while violating a municipal ordinance,
the court ruled in favor of him, as it was
Anonuevo's negligence that was the proximate
cause of the injury. The violation of the ordinance
was immaterial, because injury would have been
caused even if Villagracias wore safety gear.

Anonuevo failed to prove that the violation of the

municipal ordinance had a causal connection with
the injury. Thus, Villagracias is not even liable for
contributory negligence.

The Court also held that Art. 2185 only applies to

motor vehicles, and not to bicycles, precisely
because of the dangerous nature of motor vehicles.

Standard Insurance vs. Cuaresma Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,

and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side, and is usually synonymous with the term
“greater weight of the evidence”, or “greater
weight of the credible evidence”. Bare

Josefa vs. Manila Electric Co.
BJDC Construction vs. Lanuzo
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber vs. De Los Santos
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in
quasi-delict cases is that the defendant's
negligence is presumed. The burden of evidence
shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not
act with negligence.
For this doctrine to apply, the plaintiff must
show that:
1) the accident is of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant's
negligence,
2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of, and
3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
The present case satisfies all 3 elements. It was
unusual or extraordinary for the truck to hit the
electricity post, unless the driver Bautista, who
had exclusive management and control of the
truck, acted negligently. The electricity post was
safely installed beside the street.
In the absence of direct proof, with only
testimony from other drivers and the investigation
report, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
properly applied.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine
to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of
each case.
In this case, it did not apply, as the deceased
Balbino Lanuzo drove frequently near the
construction site before the accident happened,
and he was the one in exclusive control of the
motorcycle. Petitioner was held to be not liable.
The burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is presented on either side.
In this case, the Police Accident Report, the
 Investigation Report, and the sketch of the
accident reveal that petitioner's driver was driving
recklessly, leading to the accident. Because he
violated traffic rules, the burdent of proof shifts
upon him to prove that he is not negligent.
Mendoza vs. Soriano The driver Macasasa did not report the accident
nor did he summon a doctor. Under Art. 2185, he
was presumed negligent because of violating
traffic rules. Violation of traffic rules may be
proven by looking at police reports and
circumstantial evidence.
Del Carmen vs. Bacoy Without the testimony of witnesses and other
relevant evidence to support the defense of
unauthorized taking, the Court cannot subscribe to
Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The
evidence on record brings forth more questions
than clear-cut answers.

Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of

negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
(literally, the thing speaks for itself) should not
have been applied because he was vigilant in
securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was
parked in a well secured area not remote to the
watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.

The requisites of res ipsa loquitur are all present in

this case. First, no person just walking along the
road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over
by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge
of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the
jeep which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When
Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he
had the power to instruct him with regard to the
specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including
who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that
the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also
has the responsibility to park it safely and securely
and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the
same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing
that the death of the victims was due to any
voluntary action or contribution on their part.

Macalinao vs. Ong Despite the lack of testimonial evidence, the

physical evidence (such as photographs) allowed

Batiquin vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses –
Plaintiff's Negligence
Ramos vs. COL Realty
Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo
the court to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should only be
applied if no direct evidence is available.
In this case, the piece of rubber could not have
been in the uterus, had it not been for Dr.
Batiquin's negligence.
Aquilino's act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. There was a barrier created
by the MMDA because of a construction project.
Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the
accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any
damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
The principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was the reckless and negligent act of
the deceased Magno in swinging the galvanized
iron sheet, without first taking a look back at the
wire to avoid it from contact with the sheet,
considering it was 6 feet long.
The Court, however, encouraged Meralco to

PLDT vs. CA
Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses –
Fortuitous Event
Real vs. Belo
Southeastern Colleges vs. CA
Perla Compania de Seguros vs. Sps. Sarangaya III The second and third requisites of caso fortuito are
not present. Petitioner, being the caretaker of the
car, had responsibility for its maintenance. The
increase safety measures, but the case against
Meralco was dismissed.
The negligence of respondent Esteban was not
merely contributory, but the proximate cause of
the accident.He already knew of the of the
presence of the excavation. It was not the lack of
warning signs, but the sudden swerving that
caused his accident.
Ray, at the time of the mishap: 1) was driving at a
high speed, 2) tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney, 3)
has imbibed one or two bottles of beer, and 4) was
not wearing a protective helmet.
Although it was not proven that this negligence
was the proximate cause, he was guilty of
contributory negligence, which mitigates
damages.
While the proximate cause was the bank's lack of
supervision over it's employee, Ms. Mabayad,
respondent Lipana was guilty of contributory
negligence by failing to look at the statements of
account that the bank gives him, which would
have allowed him to detect anomalies.
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a
“fortuitous event” as follows:
1) the cause of the unforseen and unexpected
occurrence must be independent of human will
2) it must be impossible to see the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoud
3) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner
4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
An act of god cannot be invoked for the
protection of a person who has been guilty of
gross negligence in not trying to forestall its
possible adverse consquences.

Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses –
Assumption of Risk
Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses –
Emergency Rule
Valenzuela vs. CA
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses – Due
Diligence
Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
Quasi-delicts – Negligence – Defenses –
Prescription
Sps. Santos vs. Hon. Pizardo
respondents had no responsibility to maintain the
car even if it was parked in a building they owned.
While it is true that typhoons are acts of god, it
was not true that the typhoon was the direct cause
of the victim's death. It was throught the
intervention of the petitioner's negligence that
death took place. Prior to the typhoon, the
engineer saw that there was no INELCO lineman
to fix the grounded and disconnected wires.
The conduct of an individual is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event
which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but
even by the over-all nature of the
circumstances.
In this case, the emergency rule was applied even
if petitioner's circumstances were not very sudden.
She had a flat tire on a rainy night and did what
she could best do to avoid injury.
Pepsi-Cola exercised due diligence in the selection
of its driver Bonifacio, by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experiences, physical examination, and
later on, taking the usual driver's examination.
Petitioners expressly reserved their right to file an
independent civil action in a criminal case of
reckless imprudence.
While under the Civil Code, the prescription for
actions based on quasi-delict is 4 years, petitioners
may still pursue the action based on delict as it has
not yet prescribed, especially since the petitioners
reserved their right to file a separate action.
The prescription of the action based on quasi-
delict does not bar the subsidiary liability
under delict.
Causation
Proximate Cause
Sps. Vergara vs. Torrecampo
Ruks Konsult vs. Adworld
Cagayan II Electric Cooperative vs. Rapanan
While the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by the house of respondents was the act
of petitioners in dumping gravel and soil upon
their property, the respondent is guilty of
contributory negligence (Art. 2179), by failing to
observe the two-meter setback rule under the
National Building Code, and disregarding the
legal easements (PROPERTY!!!! Art. 637 –
Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters
which naturally and without the intervention of
man flow from the higher estates...) constituted
over their property.
Thus, moral damages and attorney's fees in favor
of respondents should be deleted.
Petitioner Ruks, and the owner of the collapsed
billboard Transworld, are both to blame for the
damage caused to Adworld's billboard.
While Ruks and Transworld did not construct the
foundation, neither took a positive step in
reinforcing the same, despite the fact both were
fully aware of the weakness of the foundation.
Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all
or any of the causes, and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons.
The elements of quasi-delicts are the following:
1) damage to the plaintiff
2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant
or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty
3) the connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
In this case, the first element was present (death of
the driver Camilo and injuries to Rapanan).
However, the second and third elements are
lacking. The police report shows that the electric
poles were 4 or 5 meters from the shoulder of the
highways. An employee of petitioner, Rasos,
testified that the wires damaged by the typhoon

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
Quezon City Government vs. Dacara
were safely rolled and placed beside the poles.
Thus, there is no negligence on the part of the
petitioner that it was allegedly the proximate
cause of Camilo's death and Rapanan's injuries. If
the victims were strangled by the wires, it only
means that either the motorcycle careened towards
the shoulder, or even more likely, the three
passengers were thrown off the motorcycle due to
overspeeding, and they were caught up with the
wires.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and
of respondent Dionisio's injuries was the negligent
manner in which petitioner's dump truck was
parked.
Nevertheless, Dioniso was contributorily
negligent beacause he was driving faster than he
should have been, he extinguished his headlights
at or near the intersection of Gen. Lacuna and
Gen. Santos streets, and he was intoxicated after a
cocktail meeting with his boss.
The truck driver's negligence, far from being a
“passive and static condition”, was an
indispensable and efficient cause. The truck driver
Carbonel had a duty not to position his truck in
such a manner as to pose a risk to drivers in the
area. The risk created by the defendant may
include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others.
The standard of reasonable conduct may
require the defendant to protect the plaintiff
against “that occasional negligence which is one
of the ordinary incidents of human life”.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise.
Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
In this case, petitioner's negligent was the

Mendoza vs. Sps. Gomez
Remote Cause
St. Mary's Academy vs. Carpitanos
proximate cause of the accident in which
respondent's car turned turtle. No evidence was
ever presented to stress the point that sufficient
and adequate precautionary signs were placed at
Matahimik Street. Even the policeman's report
points out that none was found at the scene of the
accident. Petitioners' claim that respondent was
driving at 60 kph was only raised belatedly, and
therefore cannot be given consideration.
The Isuzu truck of respondents was in the correct
lane (and was even at a stop, having been flagged
down by a security guard of St. Ignatius
village).The petitioner, driver of the Mayamy bus,
was guilty of negligence, because he was driving
very fast and in the opposite direction.
While the bus is owned by SPO1 Enriquez under
the “kabit system”, he may be held liable by
Mayamy's owner Lim. But Lim may still be
vicariously held liable with driver Mendoza.
When an injury is caused by an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the
employer in the selection of the employee or the
supervision of him.
No responsible person or corporation could be
held for the most outrageous acts of negligence,
if they should be allowed to place a
“middleman” between them and the public,
and escape liability by the manner in which
they recompense their servants.
In this case, respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner (in allowing a minor to
drive) was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim Sherwin Carpitanos.
Respondents Daniel Spouses and the jeepney
owner Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner (in allowing minor James Daniel II to
drive), nor the reckless driving of James Daniel II,
but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.

Concurrent Causes
Sabido vs. Custodio
Efficient Intervening Cause
Teague vs. Fernandez
Urbano vs. IAC
Considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel was
an event over which petitioner St. Mary's
Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not be held liable.
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its
driver are independent, in its execution, of the
negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both
acts of negligence are the proximate cause of
Agripino Custodio, who was hanging on the left
side of the carrier LTB Bus.
When the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons acting
independently of each other are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though
his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tort-feasor.
Petitioner's violation of an ordinance was ahead of
the other events (the fire in the nearby building,
and the stampede that killed Fernandez). This
violation was a continuing one, since the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
prevent a specific situation which would pose a
dangere to the occupants of the building
(overcrowding).
The death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (CRIM
1!!!!!)
In this case, there is a likelihood that the wound
inflicted by Urbano's bolo on Javier's hand and leg
was but the remote cause, and that the subsequent
infection, for failure to take the necessary

Last Clear Chance
Pantranco North Express vs. Baesa
precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death, with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. The petitioner's
criminal liability was wiped out by the victim's
own act. However, this does not necessarily mean
that Urbano is not civilly liable.
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply
means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consquences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.

This doctrine applies only in a situation where

the plainfiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance of avoiding the impending harm
and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consquences of the accident notwithstanding
the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the doctrine of

last clear chance does not apply in this case. When
David Ico, the driver of the jeepney, saw the
Pantranco bus was in the wrong lane, he was right
to assume that the bus was returning to its lane.
His failure to swerve to the right to avoid the bus
at the last minute was due to the bus approaching
very fast.
Engada vs. CA The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the
accident.

In this case, no convincing evidence was produced

by petitioner to support his invocation of the
doctrine. What was shown was the presence of an
emergency, and the application of the emergency
rule. Petitioner's act of swerving to the Tamaraw's
lane at a distance of 30 meters denied Iran (the
driver of the Tamaraw) time and opportunity to
ponder the situation at all. There was no clear
 chance to speak of.
Consolidated Bank vs. CA The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable
in the present case, in which Solidbank allowed an
impostor to take private respondent's passbook.

Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to

negligence in the performance of its contractual
duties. This is a case of culpa contractual,
where neither the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid
the loss, would exonerate the defendant.
Persons Liable
The Tortfeasor/s
Loadmasters Customs Services vs. Glodel Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common
Brokerage carriers, are mandated from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, to
observe the extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.

It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost

while in the custody of Loadmasters whose
employees (truck driver and helper) were
instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the
shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be
made answerable for the damages caused by its
employees who acted within the scope of their
assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse.

Glodel is also liable because of its failure to

exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to
ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with
the undertaking to safely transport the subject
cargo to the designated destination. It should have
been more prudent in entrusting the goods to
Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures,
such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks
in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore,
be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of
force majeure is unavailing.

Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage

suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are
several causes for the resulting damages, a party is
not relieved from liability, even partially. It is
 sufficient that the negligence of a party is an
efficient cause without which the damage would
not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not
have resulted from his negligence alone, without
the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor.
Vicarious Liability
Parents
Fuellas vs. Cadano Minor Rico Fuellas was convicted of serious
physical injuries. His father contended that the
parents are not liable because under Art. 2176 and
2180, they are liable only when the harm done is
due to the “fault or negligence” of their child.

However, the Court ruled that the basis of

liability under Art. 2180 is not respondeat
superior, but the relationship of pater familias,
which bases the liability of the father ultimately
on his own negligence, and not of his minor
son. The law imposes upon parents and
guardians the duty of exercising special
vigilance over the acts of their children.
Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC The emancipation and marriage of the son does
not, as a matter of equity, render the father's
liability to be subsidiary only. Strict law should be
applied in this case, considering the son does not
have properties in the Philippines and is abroad.
Libi vs. IAC The parents of Wendell Libi are held liable, for
having been grossly negligent in preventing him
from having access to the father's gun. They also
did not know of his activities. They only found out
he was a drug informant after his death.

The civil liability of the parents for the quasi-

delicts of their children, whether due to
negligence or intentional acts, is primary.
Cuardra vs. Monfort In the present case there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.

On the contrary, his child was at school, where it

was his duty to send her and where she was, as he

Teachers and Heads of Institutions
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would
have any special reason to anticipate much less
guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little
commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated
to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no
legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the
moral compulsion of good conscience.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate
cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure
of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap
that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing
to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with
the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
 one is responsible.

xxxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.

Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the

requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following:

1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps

to avert damage and injury to its students although
it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students
during class;

2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures

to protect the students who conduct experiments
in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective

gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and

4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom

the whole time her class conducted the
experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the class, fifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Amadora vs. CA Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded
and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180;
and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. The
parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers
even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody."

After an exhaustive examination of the problem,

the Court has come to the conclusion that the
 provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic.

There is really no substantial distinction

between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the
nature of the school where he is teaching.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of

the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when
the student is actually undergoing studies during
the school term, as contended by the respondents
and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?

In the view of the Court, the student is in the

custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already ended.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes Defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for
the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of
defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room.
No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a
mere member of the school's board of directors.

In the law of torts, the governing principle is

that the protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that
of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to
provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time,
as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers
and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students.
Pasco vs. CFI The Court found no necessity of discussing the
applicability of Art. 2180 to educational
institutions (which are not schools of arts and
trades) for the issue in this petition is actually
whether or not, under the article, the school or the
university itself (as distinguished from the
teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in
the negative, for surely the provision concerned
speaks only of "teachers or heads."

J. Sarmiento and Melencio-Herrera dissenting

opinions:

School may be held liable as employer under Art.

2180 for the failure of its teachers or school heads
to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents.
Salvosa vs. IAC The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school,
as contemplated in the law.

In this case, petitioner Baguio Colleges

Foundation cannot be held liable because Jimmy
Abon shot Napoleon Castro beyond class hours,
when Abon was working in the ROTC Armory
under orders.
Soliman vs. Tuazon While a school cannot be held liable under Art.
2180 for the tortious act of its security guard
(because the security guard is not under the
substitute parental authority of the school), it may
still be held liable for breach of an obligation
under contract or under law.
Owners and Managers of Establishments
Philippine Rabbit vs. Phil-American Forwarders Although Art. 2180 mentions “owners and
managers of establishments”, the manager of Phil.
American Forwarders cannot be held liable
because the manager himself is an employee.
Employers
LRT vs. Navidad LRTA is liable because of the contract of carriage
with Navidad, who already bought a token and
was at the train station when the train hit him.

Prudent, the employer of the security guard who

had an altercation with Navidad, is not liable,

Sps. Jayme vs. Apostol
Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC
Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vasquez
because the negligence of its employee guard,
Escartin, was not proven.
Neither may the train operator Roman be held
liable, because the contractual tie was between
LRTA and Navidad, and not Roman and Navidad.
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither
Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered
owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that
will make him accountable for Marvin Apostol's
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the
time of the accident.
The true employer of Lozano was the
Municipality of Koronadal, and not Mayor Miguel
himself. Thus, Mayor Miguel cannot be held
liable.
An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for in
the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown
that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as
would prohibit any one of its employees from
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of
the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that
it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees
against the use of its vehicles by persons other
than the driver.
Petitioner school is liable even if Funtecha is
employed as a janitor and enrolled as a working
student, and not the school driver.
Acts done within the scope of the employee's
assigned tasks includes any act done by an
employee in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at
the time of the infliction of the injury or
damages.
To the mind of this Court, Abad was engaged in
affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal

Nogales vs. Capitol Medical Center
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about
2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the
normal working hours. Abad's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts,
had no connection to petitioners business; neither
had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of
the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that Abad was
acting within the scope of the functions entrusted
to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be
relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences
of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of
apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2)
where the acts of the agent create the appearance
of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the
hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in
them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially
involves two factors to determine the liability of
an independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's
manifestations and is sometimes described as an
inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner
which would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that the individual who was alleged to be
negligent was an employee or agent of the
hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not
make express representations to the patient
that the treating physician is an employee of
the hospital; rather a representation may be

State
Fontanilla vs. Hon. Maliaman
Public Officers
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco
general and implied.
Capitol Medical Center is liable for impliedly
holding out that its independent consultant Dr.
Estrada was an employee.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not
a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage
caused by the accident resulting from the
tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the
responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
such, it becomes answerable for damages.
The State, or an agency performing
governmental functions, on the other hand,
may only be held liable for the acts of a special
agent. Where the government commissions a
private individual for a special governmental task,
it is acting through a special agent within the
meaning of the provision.
Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and
unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act"
that may give rise to an action for damages against
a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment
of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the
special provision that deals specifically with
violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public
officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code,
specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a
general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
special and specific provision that holds a public
officer liable for and allows redress from a
particular class of wrongful acts that may be
committed by public officers. Compared thus with
Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which
broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of
the Civil Code is the specific provision which
must be applied in the instant case precisely filed
to seek damages for violation of constitutional

Proprietors of Buildings
Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. CA
Interference with Contractual Relations
So Ping Bun vs. CA
rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering
that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an
action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the
failure to specifically allege the same will not
amount to failure to state a cause of action. The
courts below therefore correctly denied the motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action, since it is enough that the complaint
avers a violation of a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
One who negligently creates a dangerous
condition cannot escape liability for the natural
and probable consequences thereof, although the
act of a third person, or an act of God for which he
is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the
loss.
As already discussed, the destruction was not
purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of
ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly
affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells
out the fatal difference; gross negligence and
evident bad faith, without which the damage
would not have occurred.
In this case, deviations from, and defects in the
plans caused the building in Intramuros on which
the Philippine Bar Association is housed to be
damaged by the earthquake.
The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on
the part of the third person of the existence of
contract; and (3) interference of the third
person is without legal justification or excuse.
Where there was no malice in the interference of a
contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct
lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
financially interested, and such interest motivates
his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an

Inocencio vs. Hospicio de San Jose
Go vs. Cordero
officious or malicious intermeddler.
Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically
provides also that, "Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting
party."
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So
Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
respondent corporation. Though petitioner took
interest in the property of respondent corporation
and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Hospicio de San Jose did not commit interference
of contract. The 3rd element was not present.
The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into
agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees for
purely economic reasons (payment of rentals).
HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the
sublessees upon termination of the lease contract.
It does not appear that HDSJ was motivated by
spite or ill will towards the Inocencios.
While it is true that a third person cannot
possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions,
a contracting party may sue a third person not
for breach but for inducing another to commit
such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another
to violate his contract shall be liable for damages
to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence
of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of a contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing
Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract
directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower
price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs

Lagon vs. CA
Torts with Independent Civil Action
Violation of Civil and Political Rights
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco
breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full
the commission due to Cordero and
unceremonious termination of Corderos
appointment as exclusive distributor.
The attendant circumstances demonstrated that
respondents transgressed the bounds of
permissible financial interest to benefit themselves
at the expense of Cordero. Respondents furtively
went directly to Robinson after Cordero had
worked hard to close the deal. But what is
appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and
Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the
purchase of a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson
continued to demand and receive from Cordero
their commission or cut from Corderos earned
commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25.
In this case, petitioner conducted his own personal
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no
suspicious circumstance which would have made
a prudent man watch out for any conflicting claim
over the property.The title of the property bore no
leasehold interest in favor of private respondent.
The records show that the decision of the heirs of
the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was
completely of their own volition and that
petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their
judgment. Private respondent himself did not
proffer any evidence to support his claim. In
short, even assuming that private respondent was
able to prove the renewal of his lease contract
with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was
unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore,
the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to
hold not only public officers, but also private
individuals, civilly liable under Art. 32 of the
Civil Code. It is NOT NECESSARY that the
defendant under this article acted with malice
or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main
purpose, which is the protection of individual
rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the
 constitutional right of the plaintiff.

The clear intention of the legislature was to

create a distinct cause of action in the nature of
tort for violations of constitutional rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the
defendant.

While the Chapter on Human Relations is a

general law, Art. 32 is a special and specific
provision which prevails in cases of violation of
constitutional rights, over the more general terms
of Sec. 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.

In this case, the lower courts were correct in

Defamation, Fraud, and Physical Injuries
Madeja vs. Caro
denying BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato's motion to dismiss, because malice and bad
faith are not necessary elements in an action for
damages based on violation of constitutional
rights.
The term “physical injuries” in Art. 33 of the
Civil Code does not refer to the crime of serious
physical injuries in the RPC. It INCLUDES
attempted, frustrated, and consummated
homicide, as well as crimes of reckless
imprudence and criminal negligence.

Carmen Madeja may pursue an independent civil

action against Dr. Japzon because Art. 33 includes
the death of Cleto Madeja in an appendectomy.
The civil action cannot be suspended or
dismissed pending a decision in the criminal
case for criminal negligence. Respondent judge
was wrong for dismissing the civil case.
Joaquin vs. Aniceto The employer's subsidiary liability cannot be
proved in a separate civil action while the
criminal case involving the employee is
pending.

What Art. 33 authorizes is an action against the

employee on his primary civil liability. The
employer's subsidiary liability only arises upon
the conviction of the employee in the criminal
case.

In this case, Pilar Joaquin cannot go after

 Aniceto's employer Rodelas in the separate civil
action, because the criminal case against Aniceto
was still pending appeal.
Dulay vs. CA Petitioner's action was wrongfully dismissed even
if she did not allege negligence on the part of the
defendant security guard Torzuela.

Art. 33 and 2176 includes both negligent and

intentional acts.

Respondent Superguard and/or Safeguard are not

subsidiarily liable, but are primarily liable,
because the independent action, which was filed
earlier than the criminal action, was based on
quasi-delict, and not delict.
Salta vs. Hon. De Veyra Acquittal in the criminal case does
automatically mean that the defendant in the
independent civil case for Art. 33 is not liable,
except if the judge in the criminal case makes a
finding that he is not liable not only criminally,
but also civilly.

The wisdom of Art. 33 is to protect the plaintiff

from the mishandling of the case by the public
prosecutor in the criminal case.

In this case, the acquittal of Salta under RA 3019

(graft and corrupt practices) does not mean
dismissal of the civil case under Art. 33. This is
also because Judge De Veyra did not have
jurisdiction over the independent civil action, and
jurisdiction is a substantive right.
Borjal vs. CA The petition is impressed with merit. In order to
maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable, although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but
it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.

Identification is grossly inadequate when even the

alleged offended party is himself unsure that he
was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to
note that the revelation of the identity of the
person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council
but from private respondent himself when he
supplied the information through his 4 June 1989
letter to the editor. Had private respondent not
revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT
referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would
have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity.
It is therefore clear that on the element of
identifiability alone the case falls.
Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned
writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354
of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly
observed by the appellate court, they are neither
private communications nor fair and true report
without any comments or remarks. However this
does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under
Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
speech and of the press.
Also, while generally, malice can be presumed
from defamatory words, the privileged
character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice.
Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate
by preponderant evidence that petitioner was
animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm
on his reputation, or that the articles were written
and published without good motives or justifiable
ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal
to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of
civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a
newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and
denounce what he perceived to be a public
deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for
that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good
name and reputation, but we do not consider that
petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case
nor abused his press freedom.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander,
means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to
injure reputation or to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff
or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions
about the plaintiff. It is the publication of
anything which is injurious to the good name
or reputation of another or tends to bring him
into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the opinion
which others in the community may have, or
tend to have, of the plaintiff.

It must be stressed that words which are merely

insulting are not actionable as libel or slander
per se, and mere words of general abuse
however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not constitute a
basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people

cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified
or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a
right of action without at all impairing the equally
demanding right of free speech and expression, as
well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

In the instant case, the Muslim community is too

vast as to readily ascertain who among the
Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of
the group renders the reference as indeterminate
and generic as a similar attack on Catholics,
Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The
word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are
believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying
sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the
Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon
political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is
a name which describes only a general segment of
the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so
well defined as to render it impossible for any
representative identification.

Abuse of Rights
California Clothing vs. Quinones
The Christian religion in the Philippines is
likewise divided into different sects: Catholic,
Baptist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and
other groups the essence of which may lie in an
inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a corner
house in the fringes of the countryside. As with
the Christian religion, so it is with other religions
that represent the nation's culturally diverse
people and minister to each one's spiritual needs.
The Muslim population may be divided into
smaller groups with varying agenda, from the
prayerful conservative to the passionately radical.
These divisions in the Muslim population may
still be too large and ambiguous to provide a
reasonable inference to any personality who can
bring a case in an action for libel.
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners
stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights
provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of
human relations. Respondent cried foul when
petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they
insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she
purchased from their shop despite the evidence of
payment which is the official receipt issued by the
shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding,
petitioners had the right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed made payment if they had
reason to believe that she did not.
However, the exercise of such right is not
without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise
of such right and in the performance of duty
causing damage or injury to another is
actionable under the Civil Code.
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the
victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether
done willfully or negligently, is not left without
any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into
our civil law are not only principles of equity but
also universal moral precepts which are designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and which are meant
to serve as guides for human conduct. First of
 these fundamental precepts is the principle
commonly known as "abuse of rights" under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith."

The elements of abuse of rights are as follows:

(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

Petitioners accused respondent that not only did

she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that
she deliberately took the same without paying for
it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade
payment. These accusations were made despite the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release
of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no
showing that respondent had the intention to
evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim,
respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or
the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the
Guess employees did not have a hard time looking
for her when they realized the supposed non-
payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in

sending the demand letter to respondent’s
employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for
assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to
tarnish respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her
employer. To malign respondent without
substantial evidence and despite the latter’s
possession of enough evidence in her favor, is
clearly impermissible. A person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes Article 19 is not a panacea for all human hurts and
social grievances. The 3 elements must be present.

When Art. 19 is violated, an action for damages

under Art. 20 or 21 is proper. Art. 20 does not
obtain because Ruby Lim's action was not
contrary to law.

Art. 21 refers to actions contra bonus mores

 and has the following elements: 1) there is an
act which is legal, 2) but which is contrary to
morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy, and 3) it is done with intent to injure.

In this case, Amay Bisaya (Reyes) failed to prove

that Lim acted in animosity against him. They did
not know each other until the evening of Oct. 13,
1994. Reyes offered nothing but innuendo and
conjecture (that she was single at 44, and was
influenced by her workmates, etc.).
UE vs. Jader It is the contractual obligation of the school to
timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to
whether he or she had already complied with all
the requirements for the conferment of a degree or
whether they would be included among those who
will graduate. Although commencement exercises
are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an
ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the
educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list
of those who will be conferred a degree during the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent
to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to
promptly inform the student of any problem
involving the latter's grades and performance and
also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of

the result of the removal examination, particularly
at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to
have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention
to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.
It is the school that has access to those
information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its

Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA
Yuchengco vs. The Manila Chronicle
rules, regulations and policies with respect to
the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much
less influence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and
ensuring their compliance with the school's
rules and orders. Being the party that hired
them, it is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing.
Exclusive control means that no other person
or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or
injury.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did
not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss
private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral
injury" should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes"
Petitioners abused their right by telling private
respondent that he was the company's swindler
right after coming back to work from a forced
leave for investigation. 6 criminal cases were filed
against him, and he was told that he should
confess or else a hundred more will be filed. He
was also told that “you Filipinos cannot be
trusted”.
Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised

Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Cabansag
Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
Based on this definition, this Court has held that
four elements constitute the crime of libel, namely
(a) defamatory imputation tending to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either
in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d)
identifiability of the person defamed.
Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code,
libel can also be instituted, like in the case at bar,
as a purely civil action, the cause of action for
which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
The above elements of libel were adopted as well
in a purely civil action for damages.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse
of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is
at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith
has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on
the other hand, does not simply connote bad
judgment to simple negligence, dishonest
purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty
due to some motives or interest or ill will that
 partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

In the present case, there is nothing on record

which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty.
Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending
the demand letters to respondent. In the first place,
there was ground for Nala's actions since she
believed that the property was owned by her
husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was
illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously
sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was
only after respondent filed the case for damages
against Nala that she learned of such sale. The
bare fact that respondent claims ownership over
the property does not give rise to the conclusion
that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was
done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented
by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be
attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying
to protect their interests over the property.
Acts Contrary to Law
Arco Pulp vs. Lim Persons who have the right to enter into
contractual relations must exercise that right with
honesty and good faith. Failure to do so results in
an abuse of that right, which may become the
basis of an action for damages. Article 19,
however, cannot be its sole basis:
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the
conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the
basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the
degree of care required so that an actionable tort
may arise when it is alleged together with Article
20 or Article 21.

Article 20 and 21 of the Civil Code are as follows:

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21.Any person who wilfully causes loss or

injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
 compensate the latter for the damage.

To be actionable, Article 20 requires a violation of

law, while Article 21 only concerns with lawful
acts that are contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy:

Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as

basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the
act have been willful or negligent. Willful may
refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to
achieve the outcome which is considered by the
plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence
may refer to a situation where the act was
consciously done but without intending the result
which the plaintiff considers as injurious.

Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries

that may be caused by acts which are not
necessarily proscribed by law. This article requires
that the act be willful, that is, that there was an
intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the
outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal
issues revolve around whether such outcome
should be considered a legal injury on the part of
the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act
was done in violation of the standards of care
required in Article 19.
Garcia vs. Salvador Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct
consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She
was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of
the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been
avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical
examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis

for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation
of some legal provision. This was incorporated by
 the Code Commission to provide relief to a person
who suffers damage because another has violated
some legal provision.
Acts Contrary to Morals, Good Customs, or
Public Policy
Wassmer vs. Velez It must not be overlooked, however, that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954

plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued
(Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances
(Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then
28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
rest assured returning soon." But he never
returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of

promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Patricio vs. Hon. Leviste Private respondent's contention that there was no
bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the
face and that the incident was merely accidental is
not tenable. It was established before the court a
quo that there was an existing feud between the
families of both petitioner and private respondent
and that private respondent slapped the petitioner
without provocation in the presence of several
persons.

The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner

on the face is contrary to morals and good
customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish,
moral shock, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. Private respondent has to take full
responsibility for his act and his claim that he was
unaware of what he had done to petitioner because
of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does
not relieve him of his liability to the latter.

Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to

par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage."

The fact that no actual or compensatory

damage was proven before the trial court, does
not adversely affect petitioner's right to recover
moral damages. Moral damages may be
awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the
chapter on human relations of the Civil Code
(Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that
the wrongful act complained of had caused any
physical injury upon the complainant.
Carpio vs. Valmonte In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach
against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had
no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the
only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately
bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded

Ruiz vs. Sec. Of Defense
Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy
Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy
respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the
right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but
to malign respondent without an iota of proof that
she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is
an act which, by any standard or principle of law
is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused
injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary
to morals and good customs. Her firmness and
resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify
her acts toward respondent. She did not act with
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no
other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent.
Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she
should be held accountable.
Article 21 envisions a situation where a person
has a legal right, and such right is violated by
another in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; it presupposes losses
or injuries, material or otherwise, which one
may suffer as a result of said violation. The
pleadings do not show that damages were ever
asked or alleged, in connection with this case,
predicated upon the article aforecited. And under
the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case,
one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that
the failure or refusal to extend the recognition was
an act contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people's right
to privacy and protects them against the State's
abuse of power.
Art. 26 (1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individual's right to privacy and
provides him with a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by
other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy, and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall constitute a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other
relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
xxxx

However, civil law expert Prof. Arturo

Tolentino elucidates that Art. 26 (1) is not
confined to one's residence, but extends to
places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. It therefore covers
places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private.

In ascertaining whether or not there is a violation

of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. In Ople vs. Torres,
the Court enunciated that the reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: 1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy, and 2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable. Customs,
community norms, and practices, may, therefore,
limit or extend an individual's “reasonable
expectation of privacy”.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras

are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation
of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to
pry into the privacy of another’s residence or
business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court

understands why [petitioner] Hing was so
unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera
was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed
only a portion of the roof of the factory of [Aldo].
If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a
camera at the back is to secure the building and
 factory premises, then the camera should revolve
only towards their properties at the back.
[Respondents’] camera cannot be made to extend
the view to [petitioners’] lot. To allow the
[respondents] to do that over the objection of the
[petitioners] would violate the right of
[petitioners] as property owners. “The owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person.”
Concepcion vs. CA It is petitioners position that the act imputed to
him does not constitute any of those enumerated
in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is
clear. The violations mentioned in the codal
provisions are not exclusive but are merely
examples and do not preclude other similar or
analogous acts. Damages therefore are
allowable for actions against a persons dignity,
such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language. Under Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which
include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although
incapable of pecuniary computation, may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent
Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting
language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate
himself by claiming that he made an appointment
to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son
of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find
out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship
with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect
his nephews and nieces and the name of his late
brother (Florences husband). How he could be
convinced by some way other than a denial by
Nestor, and how he would protect his nephews
and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were
true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he
had already talked with Florence herself over the
telephone about the issue, with the latter
vehemently denying the alleged immoral
 relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest
on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law.
He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public,
to the latter's humiliation. Kyle
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his
meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent,
had never seen him before, and was unaware of
his business partnership with Florence, his
subsequent declarations on the witness stand
however belie this lack of knowledge about the
business venture for in that alleged encounter he
asked Nestor how the business was going, what
were the collection problems, and how was the
money being spent. He even knew that the name
of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by
combining the first syllables of the name Florence
and Allem, the name of Nestors wife. He said that
he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between
him and Florence which Nestor denied. Not
content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go
with him to speak to his relatives who were the
source of his information. Nestor went with him
and those they were able to talk to denied the
rumor. Kycalr
The Court cannot help noting this inordinate
interest of petitioner to know the truth about the
rumor and why he was not satisfied with the
separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He
had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the
latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him
in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors
and friends, accusing him - a married man - of
having an adulterous relationship with Florence.
This definitely caused private respondent much
shame and embarrassment that he could no longer
show himself in his neighborhood without feeling
distraught and debased. This brought dissension
and distrust in his family where before there was
none. This is why a few days after the incident, he
communicated with petitioner demanding public
apology and payment of damages, which
petitioner ignored.

Manaloto vs. Veloso III It is already settled that the public has a right to
see and copy judicial records and documents.
However, this is not a case of the public seeking
and being denied access to judicial records and
documents. The controversy is rooted in the
 dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC
judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village
homeowners, who were not involved at all in the
unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting
negatively respondents good name and reputation
among said homeowners. The unlawful detainer
case was a private dispute between petitioners and
respondent, and the MeTC decision against
respondent was then still pending appeal before
the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners
intentions for distributing copies of said MeTC
decision to non-parties in the case. While
petitioners were free to copy and distribute
such copies of the MeTC judgment to the
public, the question is whether they did so with
the intent of humiliating respondent and
destroying the latters good name and
reputation in the community.
Gregorio vs. CA A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals
that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill
the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article
26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s
rights to personal dignity, personal security,
privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in determining the identity of
the person they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault
was compounded when they failed to ascertain the
correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of
the opportunity to controvert the charges, because
she was not given proper notice. Because she was
not able to refute the charges against her,
petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was
never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City,
the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in
the criminal complaint, Gregorio was
conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the
PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family.
She suffered embarrassment and humiliation
over her sudden arrest and detention and she
had to spend time, effort, and money to clear
her tarnished name and reputation,
considering that she had held several honorable
positions in different organizations and offices
in the public service, particularly her being a
 Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her
arrest. There exists no contractual relation
between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability,
as employer, arising from the act or omission of
its employee Datuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true,

sufficiently constituted a cause of action against
Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct
when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist

that Gregorio’s complaint is based on malicious
prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were
impelled by legal malice or bad faith in
deliberately initiating an action against
Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false
and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate
her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not
allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact
that she prayed for moral damages did not change
the nature of her action based on quasi-delict. She
might have acted on the mistaken notion that she
was entitled to moral damages, considering that
she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation on account of her indictment and her
sudden arrest.
St. Louis Realty vs. CA St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent
in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in
a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any
written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It
just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification
".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor

Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering
impression that he was renting his residence from
Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and
unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution
of income and mental anguish.
Unjust Refusal of Neglect of a Public Servant
to Perform Official Duties
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that
on October 5, 1958 appellant Jose Amaro was
assaulted and shot at near the city government
building of Silay; that the following day he,
together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but
instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint
they were harassed and terrorized;" that in view
thereof they "gave up and renounced their right
and interest in the prosecution of the crime . . . .;"
that upon advice of the City Mayor given to
appellee an investigation (of said crime) was
conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay
was about to file or had already filed an
information for illegal discharge of firearm against
the assailant; and that "having finished the
investigation of the crime complained of, the
defendant chief of police is now harassing the
plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru
his police to appear in his office when he is
absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared
affidavits exempting the police from any
dereliction of duty in their case against the
perpetrator of the crime."

The Court is of the opinion that the facts set out

constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's
part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code.
That appellants were "harrased and terrorized"
may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly
pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not
based on the fact of harassment and
terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give
them assistance, which it was his duty to do as
an officer of the law. The requirement under
the aforesaid provision that such refusal must
be "without just cause" is implicit in the
context of the allegation. The statement of
appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent
paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged
that "he is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of
exculpation in favor of the policemen.
Cyber Torts
Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College Petitioners failed to show a reasonable expectation
of privacy.

A profile, or even a post, with visibility set at

"Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be "very private,"
contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue

are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be
taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who
showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their

contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what
petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the
actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to
the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a
violation of the minor’s informational privacy
rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images

in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in
nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in
a conservative institution. However, the records
are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or
to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot
 now insist that they have an expectation of privacy
with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom"
setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the
particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
Disini vs. Sec. Of Justice Cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium
of communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding
certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect
on the constitutionally-protected freedom of
expression of the great masses that use it. In this
case, the particularly complex web of interaction
on social media websites would give law
enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily
or selectively enforce the law.

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who

boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by
liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or
warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is
lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the
court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s
comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while
another comment did not?

Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react

to the original posting but creates an altogether
new defamatory story against Armand like "He
beats his wife and children," then that should be
considered an original posting published on the
internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime
law clearly punish authors of defamatory
publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys
reputations that society values. Allowed to
cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships
and, under certain circumstances, will generate
enmity and tension between social or economic
groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing
tension in their relationships.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is

 unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing
the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section
5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the

commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-
related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-
related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the
exercise of the freedom of expression.

The crime of willfully attempting to commit any

of these offenses is for the same reason not
objectionable. A hacker may for instance have
done all that is necessary to illegally access
another party’s computer system but the security
employed by the system’s lawful owner could
frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have
gained access to usernames and passwords of
others but fail to use these because the system
supervisor is alerted. If Section 5 that punishes
any person who willfully attempts to commit this
specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the
username and password could not file a complaint
against him for attempted hacking. But this is not
right. The hacker should not be freed from liability
simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner
or his supervisor.
Maritime Torts
Far Eastern Shipping vs. CA Both the compulsory pilot and the master of the
vessel are liable as joint tortfeasors.

The pilot is liable because it is his responsibility to

guide the ship as it enters the harbor. The master
of the vessel is liable, because he is not supposed
to relinquish all control of the vessel to the pilot
when entering a port.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent

acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of
a single injury to a third person, it is impossible
to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarity liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V China Joy vs. There is no contract of carriage between
Asian Terminals, Inc. petitioners and respondent arrastre operator.
Respondent's contract is with the consignees and
the Philippine Ports Authority, and such contract is
not maritime in character. Notwithstanding this,
petitioner is liable to respondent under Art. 2176.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.

In the case under consideration, the parties do not

dispute the facts of damage upon ATI’s unloader,
and of such damage being the consequence of
someone’s negligence. However, the petitioners
deny liability claiming that it was not established
with reasonable certainty whose negligence had
caused the co-mingling of the metal bars with the
soybean meal cargo. The Court, on this matter,
agrees with the CA’s disquisition that the
petitioners should be held jointly and severally
liable to ATI. ATI cannot be faulted for its lack of
direct access to evidence determinative as to who
among the shipowner, Samsun,
ContiQuincyBunge and Inter-Asia should assume
liability. The CA had exhaustively discussed why
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. The metal
bars which caused damage to ATI’s unloader was
found co-mingled with the cargo inside Hold No.
 2 of the ship, which was then within the exclusive
control of the petitioners. Thus, the presumption
that it was the petitioners’ collective negligence,
which caused the damage, stands. This is,
however, without prejudice to the petitioners’
rights to seek reimbursements among themselves
from the party whose negligence primarily caused
the damage.
Toxic Torts
Fernando vs. CA Public respondent is not liable. While it may have
been remiss in its duty to empty the septic tank
annually, its negligence was not a continuing one.
Even when the tank was full, there was no report
of any casualty due to the gases.

Warning signs of toxic and noxious gas are also

not necessary, contrary to petitioner's claim.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se.

The accident wouldn't have happened had the

victims not removed the septic tank's covers.
Work was still forthcoming, and while the
winning bid was already known, it had yet to be
awarded. The victims had no business opening the
septic tanks.
Damages
Concept of Damages
Sps. Custodio vs. CA A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful
and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss
to another, as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and ordinary
manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case,
nobody can complain of having been injured,
because the inconvenience arising from said use
can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot


Estolas vs. Acena
BPI Express Card Corp. vs. CA
People vs. Jugueta
constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in damage
to another, for no legal right has been invaded.
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a
lawful purpose and though the means adopted
may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latters favor. Any injury or
damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque
injuria. The courts can give no redress for
hardship to an individual resulting from action
reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end
by lawful means.
In the case at bar, although there was damage,
there was no legal injury. There was no abuse of
right.
Damages are not presumed.
In the case of moral damages, there must be proof
of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, etc.
Invariably, in order that a plaintiff (respondent
Acena herein) may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.
It was private respondent's failure to pay his
outstanding obligation that caused the cancellation
of his credit card and its dishonor at Cafe
Adriatico.
He cannot ask for moral damages for his
embarassing and humiliating experience.
In criminal cases where the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death (in this case, murder), the
court normally awards three kinds of damages:
1) civil indemnity, 2) moral damages, and 3)
exemplary damages.
Civil indemnity is provided for in Art. 100 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is not technically a
penalty or a fine, and hence, the court is
allowed to increase it when appropriate. It is
awarded to the offended party as a kind of

Actual or Compensatory Damages
Oceaneering Contractors vs. Barretto
monetary restitution or compensation for the
infraction or damage done to the latter.
Moral damages are also compensatory in
nature. They are awarded based on mental
pain, anguish, or suffering of the offended
party. There is also no ceiling fixed by law on
moral damages.
Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive”
damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings, and as a vindication to the undue
suffering and wanton invasion of rights of the
victim. It is awarded not only due to the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, but
also highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender.
The Civil Code fixes a minimum amount, but not
a ceiling for civil indemnity.
In finding Oceaneering's petition impressed with
partial merit, uppermost in the Court's mind is the
fact that actual or compensatory damages are
those damages which the injured party is
entitled to recover for the wrong done and
injuries received when none were intended.
Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that
are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement, they are intended to put the injured
party in the position in which he was before he
was injured. Insofar as actual or compensatory
damages are concerned, Article 2199 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides as
follows:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
Conformably with the foregoing provision, the
rule is long and well settled that there must be
pleading and proof of actual damages suffered
for the same to be recovered. In addition to the
 fact that the amount of loss must be capable of
proof, it must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage
suffered is, consequently, imposed on the party
claiming the same who should adduce the best
evidence available in support thereof, like sales
and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers
and other pieces of documentary evidence of
the same nature. In the absence of corroborative
evidence, it has been held that self-serving
statements of account are not sufficient basis for
an award of actual damages. Corollary to the
principle that a claim for actual damages cannot
be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and
insubstantial proof, courts are, likewise, required
to state the factual bases of the award.

Applying the just discussed principles to the case

at bench, we find that Oceaneering correctly fault
the CA for not granting its claim for actual
damages or, more specifically, the portions thereof
which were duly pleaded and adequately proved
before the RTC. While concededly not included in
the demand letters dated 12 March 1998 and 13
July 1998, Oceaneering served Barretto, the
formers counterclaims for the value of its lost
cargo in the sum of P4,055,700.00 and salvaging
expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 were
distinctly pleaded and prayed for in the 26 January
1999 answer it filed a quo.
Magat vs. Medialdea Indisputably, the parties, both businessmen,
entered into the aforesaid contract with the evident
intention of deriving some profits therefrom.
Upon breach of the contract by either of them, the
other would necessarily suffer loss of his expected
profits. Since the loss comes into being at the very
moment of breach, such loss is real, "fixed and
vested" and, therefore, recoverable under the law.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: Those
who in the performance of their obligation are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof
are liable for damages.

The phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor"

of the obligation includes any ilicit act or omission
 which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of
the obligation and every kind of defective
performance.

The damages which the obligor is liable for

includes not only the value of the loss suffered
by the obligee [daño emergente] but also the
profits which the latter failed to obtain [lucro
cesante]. If the obligor acted in good faith, he
shall be liable for those damages that are the
natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith,
malice or wanton attitude, he shall be liable for
all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.

The same is true with respect to moral and

exemplary damages. The applicable legal
provisions on the matter, Articles 2220 and
2232 of the Civil Code, allow the award of such
damages in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted in bad faith.
Gatchalian vs. Delim Petitioner Gatchalian could not claim actual
damages based on lost employment. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional
and episodic, contingent upon the availability of
vacancies for substitute teachers. She was a
“casual employee”. The CA rightly held that she
could not be said to have lost employment at the
time of the accident.

However, respondent is liable for actual damages,

for the surgeries done to her.
Moral Damages
Regala vs. Carin In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery
is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral
damages are not meant to be punitive but are
designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused
to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the
 claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has
suffered damages and that the injury causing it has
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the
damages must be shown to be the proximate
result of a wrongful act or omission. The
claimant must thus establish the factual basis of
the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the
defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the

presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched
reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a
culpable act or omission factually established;
3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the
proof that the act is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, respondent failed to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries
he sustained were the proximate effect of
petitioner’s act or omission. It thus becomes
necessary to instead look into the manner by
which petitioner carried out his renovations to
determine whether this was directly responsible
for any distress respondent may have suffered
since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act
or omission must have preceded the damages
sustained by the claimant.
Expertravel & Tours vs. CA An award of moral damages would require certain
conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must
be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) second, there must be a culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219.

Under the provisions of this law, in culpa

contractual or breach of contract, moral
damages may be recovered when the defendant
 acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross
negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation
and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of
contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in
physical injuries.

By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to

Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages
may also be awarded in case the death of a
passenger results from a breach of carriage. In
culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or
omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the
defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also
applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached
by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of
physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or
concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal
arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral
damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to
in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis
rule, must be held similar to those expressly
enumerated by the law.

Although the institution of a clearly unfounded

civil suit can at times be a legal justification for
an award of attorney's fees, such filing,
however, has almost invariably been held not to
be a ground for an award of moral
damages. The rationale for the rule is that the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by
a person for having been made a defendant in a
civil suit would be no different from the usual
worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is
haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself
be a cogent reason for the award of moral
damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral
damages must every time be awarded in favor of
the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
Enervida vs. Torre The award of attorney's fees to respondents is
valid, because attorney's fees may be awarded in
case of a clearly unfounded action filed by the
plaintiff.
However, the Court deleted moral damages
because the case is not under the enumeration in
Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.

It will be observed that unlike compensatory or

actual damages which are generally
recoverable in tort cases as long as there is
satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code
has chosen to enumerate the cases in which
moral damages, may be recovered (Art. 2219).

A like enumeration is made in regard to the

recovery of attorney's fees as an item of
damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations
differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit,
which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par.
4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but
is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219
in respect to moral damages.

It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral

damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to
those enumerated, but we do not think the Code
intended" a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases
wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it
would have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as
it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208
by reference in Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219
Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries", as an instance when moral
damages may be allowed, thereby implying that
all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical
injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96
Phil. 321), excepting, of course, the special torts
referred to in Art. 309, par. 9, Art. 2219) and in
Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is

necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to
the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual
basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its causal
relation to defendant's acts. This is so because
 moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 294).

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem

to be of the opinion that the mere fact that
respondent were sued without any legal
foundation entitled them to an award of moral
damages, hence they made no definite finding as
to what the supposed moral damages suffered
consist of. Such a conclusion would make of
moral damages a penalty, which they are not,
rather than a compensation for actual injury
suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral
damages, in other words, are not corrective or
exemplary damages.
Kierulf vs. CA Petitioner's claim for additional moral damages
because of “loss of consortium” (AKA no more
loving-loving with wifey) does not prosper,
because he failed to produce evidence to that
effect. Claims for moral damages are factual in
origin, and must be proven by evidence.
Barzaga vs. CA The Court sustained the award of moral damages.
It cannot be denied that petitioner and his family
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish and
serious anxiety while keeping watch on Christmas
day over the remains of their loved one who could
not be laid to rest on the date she herself had
chosen. There is no gainsaying the inexpressible
pain and sorrow Ignacio Barzaga and his family
bore at that moment caused no less by the
ineptitude, cavalier behavior and bad faith of
respondent and his employees in the performance
of an obligation voluntarily entered into.
Francisco vs. Ferrer Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of
contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

The person claiming moral damages must prove

the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence for the law always presumes good faith.
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless
nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the
result of the actuations of the other party.
Invariably such action must be shown to have

Temperate Damages
Tan vs. OMC Carriers, Inc.
Nominal Damages
Seven Brothers vs. DMC Construction
Ventanilla vs. Centeno
been willfully done in bad faith or will ill motive.
In this case, the Court did not award moral
damages because while Francisco failed to deliver
the wedding cake, it was not done fraudulently or
in bad faith.
Petitioner Tan only had photographs as evidence
for the damage to her house, and she did not have
receipts to prove the loss of earning capacity of
her husband.
While this lack of evidence will not entitle her to
actual damages, she is entitled to temperate
damages.
A party still has the option of claiming
temperate damages, which may be allowed in
cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced although the court is convinced that
the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
loss.
Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal
right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or
where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.
In this case, the Court awarded temperate, and not
nominal, damages. This is because respondent
clearly suffered a loss – its coal conveyor facility
was damaged by petitioner's ship.
Consequently, in computing the amount of
temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left
to the discretion of the courts, but the amount
must be reasonable, bearing in mind that
temperate damages should be more than nominal
but less than compensatory.
Concerning temperate or moderate damages
claimed by the appellant, considering that he is
not entitled to actual or compensatory damages
 but has been awarded nominal damages by the
trial court, such award precludes the recovery of
temperate or moderate damages, and so the trial
court did not err in refusing to award temperate or
moderate damages to the appellant.

The assessment of nominal damages is left to the

discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of the case.7 Considering the
circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the
degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a
lawyer, in not depositing on time the appeal bond
and filing the record on appeal within the
extension period granted by the court, which
brought about the refusal by the trial court to
allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200
awarded by the trial court to the appellant as
nominal damages may seem exiguous.

Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages

are not for indemnification of loss suffered but
for the vindication or recognition of a right
violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in
civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it
was not an assurance that the appellant would
succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed
in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is
excessive. After weighing carefully all the
considerations, the amount awarded to the
appellant for nominal damages should not be
disturbed.
Exemplary Damages
PNB vs. CA Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be awarded if a party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. However, they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court has yet to
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Jurisprudence has set down the requirements

for exemplary damages to be awarded:
1. they may be imposed by way of example in
addition to compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant's right to them has been
established;
2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of

Liquidated Damages
Titan Construction vs. Uni-Field Enterprises
right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant;
3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or
done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach
of petitioner's obligation to pay private
respondents, there is no evidence that it acted in a
fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner.
Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory
damages which is a prerequisite before exemplary
damages may be awarded. Therefore, the award
by the trial court of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages is baseless.
The law allows a party to recover attorney’s fees
under a written agreement. In Barons Marketing
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
that:
[T]he attorney’s fees here are in the nature of
liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is
aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so
long as such stipulation does not contravene
law, morals, or public order, it is strictly
binding upon defendant. The attorney’s fees so
provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not
his counsel.
On the other hand, the law also allows parties to
a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to
be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on
liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the
obligor assumes a greater liability in case of
breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to
pay the stipulated amount without need for proof
on the existence and on the measure of damages
caused by the breach.
Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code
empower the courts to reduce the penalty if it is
iniquitous or unconscionable. The determination
of whether the penalty is iniquitous or
unconscionable is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and depends on several
factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of the
 penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of
breach and its consequences.

In this case, the Court lowered the liquidated

attorney's fees, because they were found to be
exorbitant.
Attorney's Fees
Francisco vs. Co Contrary to the pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals, the mere fact that petitioners were
constrained to litigate in order to protect and assert
their rights does not ipso facto entitle them to
attorney's fees. What Article 2208 (2) of the Civil
Code provides, in order that attorney's fees may be
awarded, is that "the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest". It is settled that the fact that the party
was "compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect and enforce their claim does not justify the
award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that
attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the public policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
The award of attorney's fees must be deleted
where the award of moral and exemplary damages
are eliminated."
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation The award of attorney’s fees is the exception
vs. Globe Telecom rather than the rule, and must be supported by
factual, legal and equitable justifications. In
previously decided cases, the Court awarded
attorney’s fees where a party acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the other
party’s claims and compelled the former to litigate
to protect his rights; when the action filed is
clearly unfounded, or where moral or exemplary
damages are awarded. However, in cases where
both parties have legitimate claims against each
other and no party actually prevailed, such as in
the present case where the claims of both parties
were sustained in part, an award of attorney’s fees
would not be warranted.
Industrial Insurance Co. vs. Bondad Attorney's fees may be awarded by a court if
one who claims it is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect
one's interests by reason of an unjustified act or
omission on the part of the party from whom it
is sought.
In this case, the records show that petitioner's suit
against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In
the first place, the contact between the vehicles of
respondents and of Morales was completely due to
the impact of the onrushing bus. This fact is
manifest in the police investigation report and,
significantly, in the findings of facts of both lower
courts.

The Court affirms the award of moral damages,

exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. The facts of this case clearly show that
petitioner was motivated by bad faith in
impleading respondents. Indeed, a person's right
to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized. This
right, however, must be exercised in good faith.