PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
ARTICLE 22 – UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. MONTANO DIAZ (2015)
VELASCO JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner BDC (subsequently reorganized as Home Guaranty
Corporation) is the registered owner of of a lot. It entered into and
executed a Deed of Sale over the said property in favor of Spouses
Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now
deceased.[2]
A certain Nacua sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo
transferred to him their rights over the property. He further expressed
willingness to pay the outstanding obligations of Sps. Melgazo to BDC.
Before the property was fully paid, however, Nacua sold his rights to
Olivia Garcia (Garcia), through a Deed of Transfer of Rights. Later,
Garcia transferred her rights to Reyes. Reyes then transferred her rights
to Tapay, who then later sold his rights to herein respondent Diaz for
Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00).
Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property and BDC
issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then
introduced improvements on the property.
BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. However, BDC informed
Diaz that respondent Arreza was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo
sold to him the rights over the property. [4] BDC then placed Diaz’s
account in “inactive status.”
ISSUE: WON Petitioner BDC is liable to return the
amortizations paid by respondent Diaz,
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment
RULING: YES
A careful review of the records of this case reveals that Diaz, in fact,
failed to diligently inquire into the title of his predecessor before entering
into the contract of sale. As such, he cannot be considered a buyer in
good faith.
Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value, BDC is nevertheless liable to return to him the
amortizations which he already paid on the property, applying the rule
on unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code,[21] there is unjust enrichment when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. [22]
Allowing BDC to keep the amortizations paid by Diaz is tantamount to
unjust enrichment. It would result in BDC receiving amortizations twice
the amount it should have received, that is, the amortizations paid by
Diaz and Arreza. While BDC claims that it did not receive amortizations
from both Diaz and Arreza covering the same period, such a claim is
self-serving, and is not amply supported by any documentary evidence.
Even if BDC can prove that there was no overlap between the payments
made by Diaz and those made by Arreza, allowing it to keep the
amortizations paid by Diaz still amounts to unjust enrichment. As a direct
result of the final and executory ruling that Arreza is the rightful buyer
of the subject property, the buyer-seller relationship between Diaz and
BDC is rendered null and void. Consequently, there remains no valid
consideration whatsoever for the payments made by Diaz to BDC. There
being no indication of intent to donate, because such payments were
made under the impression that Diaz is the rightful buyer of the
property, it is only but just that Diaz be allowed to claim back what he
has paid. This is only a natural consequence of the final and executory
ruling that Diaz is not the rightful buyer of the subject property.
ART. 35-38 VOID MARRIAGES
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III vs. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA
(2017)
REYES, JR, J.:
FACTS:
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where
they were students and became sweethearts. When Nora became
pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975.
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that
time, they lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate,
Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in the family's
construction business. Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and
came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora
gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho).
However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments,
he chose to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of
his family. Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's
behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on Nora for their
family's needs. 5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was
during this period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and
laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their house was often dirty and
disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their
verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing
changed in their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends
and engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair
and seldom came home. He eventually left Nora and their children in
1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves
separated.7
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their
children. After Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house,
Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third
child.8
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground that he and Nora are psychologica11y
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who
testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized
by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the
cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality
Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive resistance
in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were based on her
interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora
did not participate in the psychological assessment. 10
ISSUE: WON Manuel and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage
RULING: NO
Page 1 of 10
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent
Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality
Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of the Family Code is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and
the parties' eldest child, Moncho.
In Toring v. Toring, et al., the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the
time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace
their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of
marriage.
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from
Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who
could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the
psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the
Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents
were married.
Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite
having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared
that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician, much less be subjected to psychological tests,
this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have
been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which
are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree 26 of the National Tribunal of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First
Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic
marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great
respect but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.27
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON vs. BENJAMIN L. SINGSON (2018)
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner)
filed a Petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines 6 (Family Code).
It was alleged therein that petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson
(respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St.
Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four
children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest,
unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare,
extremely vain physically and spiritually," 7 and a compulsive gambler;
that respondent was immature, and was ab1e to perform his paternal
duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and
guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him
completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and
that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from
respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family
as the sole breadwinner.
Page 2 of 10
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent
was confined at Metro Psych Facility,8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig
City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-
Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is
diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological Gambling.
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral
changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic
episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically related to
the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught"
family and had a "dysfunctional" childhood; 10that respondent had all the
love, care, and protection of his parents as the youngest child for some
time; but that these parental love, care and protection were, however,
transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was
almost five years old; and that these factors caused respondent
emotional devastation from which he never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school
student, was already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried
to adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but that she did not
attain her goal.
ISSUE: WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated
RULING: NO
Evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological
incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential
parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family
home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee
and their children.”
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part
of her evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which
enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in
the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted
to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this
amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008,
we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family
budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association
dues, and for electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided
the land upon which the family home was built.
Petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife
since their marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four
children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was
under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any
instance when respondent failed to live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself
admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during all
four instances that she gave birth to their children.
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that
respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed
the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological
gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily
translate into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled
that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal,
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." 45 "[I]t is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown
to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness."
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job,
[while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of
‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness." 48
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by
the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point
to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever
when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes
that he manifested in 2003 and 2006." 53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist who
conducted the tests. 54 And this psychologist was not presented by
petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding
respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai
alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness
having personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand.
And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed
respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in court.
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or
childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no
evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis
for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was
"distraught" and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again,
there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges
which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately,
petitioner did not at all adduce.
Petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his
father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the time
of marriage. It has been held that the parties' child is not a very
reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between his parents
until long after his birth.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KATRINA S. TOBORA-
TIONGLICO (2018)
TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico
(Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering
and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much
that they went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found
herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone. 5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until
the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on
December 30, 2000. 6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing
their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a
family.7 Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties
Page 3 of 10
and drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly
dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of
immaturity. 9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him
and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid
sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz. 10
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave
his parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated
in fact since then.12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano),
who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr.
Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is characterized by a
heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is
unique in some way.
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; 14 and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible
behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity,
respect, mutual help, and support to his wife. 15
ISSUE: WON totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the
dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
RULING: NO.
We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a
husband.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's statements. It bears to
stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the
proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being
invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and
Marilyn B. Matudan is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding
of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the
petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings
below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-
appellee's condition was based mainly on the information supplied by
her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter,
Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2)
years of age at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be
expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been
very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not
have been there when the spouses were married and could not have
been expected to know what was happening between her parents until
long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse,
Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly
be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo,
el al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological
evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more
rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there
must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on
as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward
Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on
the psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient
to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn
suffers from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on
the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The
report neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really incapable
of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted
by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological
disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the
psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis
for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart from
Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence
hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband.
Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent
night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the
"psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological
illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the
party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not
present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-
serving and had no serious evidentiary value.28
Page 4 of 10
ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN vs MARCO DAN (2018)
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian
national - met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet. They soon became
"chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them
emotionally closer to each other"7 even though petitioner was in the
Philippines while respondent lived in Italy.
xxxx
On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they
got married on 23 January 2006 X X X. During their honeymoon,
petitioner noticed that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x
[R]espondent (also) asked her where to find marijuana since he had to
sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him.
Respondent apologized later.
On 29 January 2006, X X X respondent flew back to Italy and on 26
February 2006, xxx petitioner left to join respondent in Italy. Xxx After
a few days, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude
different from that of Marco whom she had known thru the internet. He
was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on
his mother to do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who
decided where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When
they transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's mother who
managed the household.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days,
playing video games was always the first thing he does when he wakes
up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would
play video games the whole day. There was never a quality time he
spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend
with his wife.
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the
household chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes
a bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take a bath, petitioner
would literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush
with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his
underarms for he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision.
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using
marijuana. When confronted, he get mad and pushed her [hard] and hit
her in the arm, [and told] her to go back to the Philippines. X X X
In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a
separate house from his mother did not improve their marital
relationship. His addiction to video games worsened. They seldom talk
to each other as he did not want to be disturbed while playing games.
His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite his
friends to their house for pot sessions, X X X to her extreme fright and
discomfort.
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her moncy for food.
He spent most of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it
was her mother-in-law who supported them.
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified
x x x in her direct-examination that petitioner xxx was subjected to a
series of psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise
subjected the mother of the petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.
In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological
incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a xxx
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social
Trait, by his parasitic attitude, allowing other people to be the handler
of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow
distorted the notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms of
mutual understanding, communication and emotional intent. She was
able to arrive at these findings on respondent although he did not submit
himself for the same psychological tests, through the clinical
assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and the
description of the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the
respondent.
ISSUE: WON Respondent is psychologically incapacitated
RULING: NO
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and
testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr.
Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the
psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The
deterınination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was
based solely on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since
respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the
proceedings.
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and
during their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her;
that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and
caring; and that she and respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship.
This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for
marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the
couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable
differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in
culture and upbringing, and the very short period that they
spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's
claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and
appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an
incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that she
helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital
obligation to render support and aid to respondent.
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her
witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr.
Tayag's expert findings. However, her determinations were not based
on actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself - but on
personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.
x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts
should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or
psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about
the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side --- the petitioner --
whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While
this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist
for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively,
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a
third party account; she did not actually hear, see and
evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used
love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner) extended towards him.'. . .
Page 5 of 10
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-
depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report -- i.e., that the respondent suffered
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable’- is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her
previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent.
While the various tests administered on the petitioner could
have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made
with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence. 25
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARTIN NIKOLAI Z.
JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER (2018)
REYES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Martin and Michelle were married. Martin filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Martin alleged that both he and Michelle
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.6 He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child, Amanda M.
Javier. 7
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his
own behalf,8 and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D.
Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin
and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle). 9
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos
diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 10 Likewise,
Dr. Adamos concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin
suffered from the same disorder. 11 Their disorder was considered grave
and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further
testified before the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that
with respect to the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, the
informants were Martin and the respondents' common friend, Jose
Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente ). 12 He was unable to evaluate Michelle
because she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in
for psychological evaluation. 13
ISSUE: WON both spouses are psychologically incapacitated
RULING:
WIFE IS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the
trial court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of
childhood trauma and defective child-rearing practices. 39 This disorder
was supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin, who she
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
constantly lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological Impression
Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of
Michelle was the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente. Jose
Vicente was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them
to each other before their marriage.41 Jose Vicente was also allegedly a
regular confidant of Michelle. 42
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or
evaluated for purposes of the psychological report, the trial
court was incorrect in ruling that Dr. Adamos' findings were
based solely on the interview with Martin.43 Even if that were
the case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately
invalidated for this reason alone. Because a marriage
necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who
witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the
pattern of behavior to the psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's
findings that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We
cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on
Michelle. There were no other independent evidence establishing the
root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological
incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand
observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos
a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The
records do not show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood
friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle
during their adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons
outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about her
childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her
family.45 Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma,
Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he
may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and
persistent disorder that is grave and incurable.
The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua judiciously
discussed the dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-spouse
to the psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's
conclusions about the respondent's psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her
by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in
favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set
of standards in the manner we discussed
above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of
a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to
the doctor's probes.
xxxx
We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to
prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
Page 6 of 10
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
- i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable" - is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information
fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such
evidence. 47 (Citations omitted and emphasis Ours)
HUSBAND IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
The totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of
evidence to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He
testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse,
Michelle. In particular, he stated that Michelle was confrontational even
before their marriage.36 He alleged that Michelle always challenged his
opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he insisted on because he
witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his biological
father. 37 He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and
easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that
Michelle acted recklessly and without consideration of his feelings. 38
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also
subjected to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos
diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 48 Additionally, the
diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who
underwent several-or to be accurate, more than 10-counselling sessions
with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009.49 These facts were uncontroverted
by the Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose
self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards
ideal love and ideal marriage."50 Dr. Adamos also found that Martin
lacked empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of
Michelle.51
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
with tendencies toward sadism. 52 Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests
administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic
experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up
around a violent father who was abusive of his mother. 53 This adversely
affected Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and
standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual
practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would
not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on
her. 54 Other manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-
entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.55
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential
characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin.
As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is
concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ
(2018)
GESMUNDO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent and Liezl were married. In the course of their relationship,
Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6) months. The
couple got married after Liezl returned home. They lived for some time
in Manila where respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where
Liezl again secured a contract as an entertainer and respondent found
work as a construction worker. It was while living in Japan when
respondent noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house
without respondent's permission and started giving respondent the cold
treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at respondent for no reason.
The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was released from
detention due to overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed
to respondent her romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the
confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused
respondent such stress that he was hospitalized. Respondent expressed
her willingness to forgive Liezl but she chose to walk away from their
marriage.
The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back.
One day, however, respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their
house. To respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her
elder brother. Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed
Liezl to share her bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their
home. Liezl went on with her partying ways, and continued working in
a Manila nightclub despite respondent's offer for her to start a business.
ISSUE: WON Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations was sufficiently established by the totality of evidence
presented by respondent.
RULING: YES
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that
both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently
established the link between Liezl's actions showing her psychological
incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and her
histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects the RTC's appreciation
of respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired before and
during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."23 In addition, Dr. Tudla was
able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her
psychological evaluation of both spouses and her interview of Liezl's
sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description of histrionic personality
disorder, and correlated the characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's
behavior from her formative years through he course of her marriage to
petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such
probative force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the
courts to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was
based.24
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that
occurred after the marriage was celebrated does not mean, as
,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological incapacity to speak of.
As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,25 psychological incapacity may
manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it
already exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly,
Art. 36 of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated as void
even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage
was celebrated.26
Page 7 of 10
The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the
cause of her inability to discharge her marital obligations to love, respect
and give concern, support and fidelity to her husband. The CA also
narrated how the disorder was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the
marriage was celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner lived
together in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating
the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was unable to
accommodate the fact that she was already married into the way she
wanted to live her life, and essentially treated petitioner as a
manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede
to her desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital
responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an
adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's
psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her
disorder. Together with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since her
teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any medical
or behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and
abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and cannot be used
as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio. According to petitioner, Liezl
cheated on and abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and
not because she is psychologically incapacitated.
It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal
separation. It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly
connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her
histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was
characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate
gratification. 30 These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly
unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital
abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat
of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity
of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person
who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of
marriage.
ARTICLE 41 NECESSITY RE OBTAINING DECREE OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS vs REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (2018)
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias RTC a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).
Purpose: not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the
benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended
The RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition.
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic)
WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming
financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
ISSUE: WON trial court erred in declaring of the Presumptive Death of
Wilfredo Article 41 of the FC
RULING: YES
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision,
granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively
dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression
that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC. 9 This is
wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the
application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption
of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose
of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration
of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In
her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner
categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638
a amended.10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death
was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly
relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article
41 of the FC.
A Petition Whose Sole Objective is To Declare a Person
Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the
Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have
dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our
jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code
is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to
take cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re:
Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In
the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death 13 is
merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or
proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the
evidence which permits the court to presume that
a person had been unheard from in seven years
had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an
action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked,
nor can it be made the subject of an action
or special proceeding. In this case, there is no
right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her
absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for
the final determination of his right or status or for
the ascertainment of particular fact, for the
Page 8 of 10
petition does not pray for the declaration that the
petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for
a declaration that he be presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years. If there
is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The
petition is for a declaration, even if judicially
made, would not improve the petitioner's
situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is
for that reason that it cannot be the subject
of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if
it is the only question or matter involved in
a case, or upon which a competent court has
to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine
finally the right or status of a party or establish
finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights
and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final decree, then the
judgement on the subject of the controversy, or
the decree upon the right or status of a party or
upon the existence of a particular fact,
becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral
attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage
of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively,
we are able to ascertain the considerations why a petition for
declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that only allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a
person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express
rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare
a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents no actual controversy that a
court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual
rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status
to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively
dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an
action exclusively based thereon, would never really become
"final" as the same only confirms the existence of a prima
facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to
render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be
unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is
already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any
authority to take cognizance of a petition that-like the one filed
by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM
person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such
a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and
eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration
of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing
jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside
the RTC's decision.
The Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-
culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-
to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with
claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the
petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of
a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce
a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In
such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination,
on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the
presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may
be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need
of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the
said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to
further secure a court declaration in order to establish the
presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and
contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter. 20
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need
only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as
the case may be, ANY "EVIDENCE"21 which shows that the concerned
soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration
of presumptive death.
3. IF PVAO OR AFP FIND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO APPLY
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH - The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may
be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and
determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions
specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the
presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines
that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they
should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay
the latter's claim.
4. IF PVAO OR AFP DO NOT FIND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
APPLY PRESUMPTION OF DEATH - If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient
to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the
latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an APPEAL WITH
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) pursuant to the PRINCIPLE
OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via A
PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE CA under RULE 43 OF THE
RULES OF THE COURT. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the
claimant may file an appeal by CERTIORARI WITH THE SUPREME
COURT.
REMEDY:
1. APPEAL WITH THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP)
2. A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE CA under RULE 43 OF THE
RULES OF THE COURT
3. CERTIORARI WITH THE SUPREME COURT.
Page 9 of 10
ARTICLE 130 – NATURE OF DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL
ASSETS AFTER DEATH OF ONE SPOUSE WITHOUT
LIQUIDATION
SPOUSES JULIETA B. CARLOS and FERNANDO P. CARLOS vs.
JUAN CRUZ TOLENTINO (2018)
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land registered in the
name of Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes Tolentino.
Without Juan's knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff, who
were then residing in the subject property, allegedly forged a Deed of
Donation 7 dated February 15, 2011, thereby making it appear that
Juan and Mercedes donated the subject property to Kristoff.
In April 2011, Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property Felix.
When Felix informed Julieta of the availability of the subject property,
Spouses Carlos then asked him to negotiate for its purchase with
Kristoff.
After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta executed a
Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) dated April 12, 2011 stating that
Kristoff is selling the subject property to Julieta. A Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta.
Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim which was annotated on TCT No. 004-2011003320 on
July 15, 2011, to wit:
ISSUE: Who, between Juan and Spouses Carlos, has the better to right
to claim ownership over the subject property
RULING:
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. There being no indication that
they have adopted a different property regime, the presumption is that
their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
Likewise, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal
partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal
partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code
states:
Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 1967 (Civil
Code) during the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part of their
conjugal partnership. 29 It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the
absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest,
respectively, over the subject property.
Meanwhile, as in any other property relations between husband and
wife, the conjugal partnership is terminated upon the death of either of
the spouses.
In retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property then covered
by TCT No. RT-90746 (116229), Juan and Mercedes may validly exercise
rights of ownership by executing deeds which transfer title thereto such
as, in this case, the Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 in favor
of their grandson, Kristoff.
With regard to Juan's consent to the afore-stated donation, the RTC,
however, found that such was lacking since his signature therein was
 PERSONS REVIEW 2019 1ST EXAM

forged. Notably, the CA did not overturn such finding, and in fact, no  But VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2
longer touched upon the issue of forgery. On the other hand, it must be portion belonging to Mercedes Tolentino.
pointed out that the signature of Mercedes in the Deed of Donation was
never contested and is, therefore, deemed admitted.

In the present case, while it has been settled that the congruence of the
wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal
property, 32 it cannot be ignored that Mercedes' consent to the
disposition of her one-half interest in the subject property remained
undisputed. It is apparent that Mercedes, during her lifetime,
relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of her grandson, Kristoff.

Furthermore, Mercedes' knowledge of and acquiescence to the

subsequent sale of the subject property to Spouses Carlos is evidenced
by her signature appearing in the MOA 33 dated April 12, 2011 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale34dated September 12, 2011. We are also mindful
of the fact that Spouses Carlos had already paid a valuable consideration
in the amount of Two Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,300,000.00) for the subject property before Juan's adverse claim
was annotated on Kristoff s title. The said purchase and acquisition for
valuable consideration deserves a certain degree of legal protection.

Given the foregoing, the Court is disinclined to rule that the

Deed of Donation is WHOLLY VOID AB INITIO and that the
Spouses Carlos should be totally stripped of their right over the
subject property. In consonance with justice and equity, We
deem it proper to uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation
dated February 15, 2011 but only to the extent of Mercedes'
one half share in the subject property. And rightly so, because
why invalidate Mercedes' disposition of her one-half portion of
the conjugal property that will eventually be her share after the
termination of the conjugal partnership? It will practically be
absurd, especially in the instant case, since the conjugal
partnership had already been terminated upon Mercedes'
death.

Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one-

half undivided portion that Mercedes owned. The Deed of Donation
insofar as it covered the remaining one-half undivided portion of the
subject property is null and void, Juan not having consented to the
donation of his undivided half.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Spouses Carlos' right, as

vendees in the subsequent sale of the subject property, is
confined only to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The
other undivided half still belongs to Juan.

(WHO MAY ASK FOR THE PARTITION) As owners pro indiviso of

a portion of the lot in question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan
may ask for the partition of the lot and their property rights
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to them in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.35 This
disposition is in line with the well established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so-quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum vale re potest. 36

Lastly, as a matter of fairness and in line with the principle that no

person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another, 37 Kristoff should be liable to reimburse Spouses Carlos of the
amount corresponding to one-half of the purchase price of the subject
property.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED.

 The donation and subsequent sale of the subject

property is declared NULL and VOID with respect to
the undivided 1/2 portion owned by Juan Cruz
Tolentino,
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