CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS.

PETRONILA CERVANTES, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. [ G.R.

No. L-28771, March 31, 1971 ]

Facts:
Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to defendant
Petronila Cervantes while both were in a common-law
relationship. After both were married, Felix died intestate.
Appellant Cornelia Matabuena claims the property by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased. Appellant maintained that a donation made while Felix
was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant was
void. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time
before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the validity
of the donation.

Issue:
Is a donation under a common-law relationship valid?

Decision:
No. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
donation between spouses during the marriage, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply
to a common-law relationship. If the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without benefit of nuptials.
HILARIO GERCIO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SUN LIFE
ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA ET AL., DEFENDANTS. SUN
LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA, APPELLANT. [ G.R. No.
23703, September 28, 1925 ]

Facts:
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada issued an insurance
policy on the life of Hilario Gercio with his lawful wife Andrea
Zialcita as beneficiary. A decree of divorce was issued which
dissolved the bonds of matrimony contracted by Hilario and
Andrea. Hilario formally notified the insurer that he had revoked
his donation in favor of Andrea, and that he had designated in her
stead his present wife, Adela Garcia de Gercio, as the beneficiary
of the policy. The insurance company refused to do such.

Issue:
Does the insured have a right to change the beneficiary of
an insurance policy?

Decision:
No. As soon as the policy was issued, the beneficiary
acquired a vested interest therein, of which she could not be
deprived without her consent, except under the terms of the
contract with the insurance company. The wife’s interest was not
affected by the decree of court which dissolved the marriage
contract between the parties. The fact that she was his wife at the
time the policy was issued may have been, and undoubtedly was,
the reason why she was named as beneficiary in the event of his
death. But her property interest in the policy after it was issued
did not in any reasonable sense arise out of the marriage
relation.
WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-
MARTINEZ AND JOSE HERMILO JOVELLANOS,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND
ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, FOR AND IN HER BEHALF, AND
IN REPRESENTATION OF HER TWO MINOR DAUGHTERS AS
NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANA MARIA AND MA. JENNETTE,
BOTH SURNAMED JOVELLANOS, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R.
No. 100728, June 18, 1992 ]

Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance
Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over a lot, including a
bungalow thereon. At that time, Daniel was married to Leonor
Dizon, with whom he had three children, petitioners Wilhelmina,
Mercy and Jose. Leonor died and married private respondent
Annette Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her co-
respondents.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife
executed to Daniel a deed of absolute sale. Daniel died. Annette
claimed that the property was acquired by her deceased husband
while their marriage was still subsisting, by virtue of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Philamlife in favor of her husband,
which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the
property was acquired by their parents during the existence of the
first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement
with Philamlife.

Issue:
Is the property covered by the lease and conditional sale
agreement a conjugal property of the second marriage?
Decision:
Yes. The contract entered into by the late Daniel and
Philamlife over the property involved is specifically denominated
as a Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement. In a lease
agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased. The right of Daniel to the property
was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen
into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership which
was contingent upon his full payment of the rentals and
compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. Since
he was already married to Annette, the property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, VS. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JESUS BERNAS AND
REMEDIOS O. BERNAS, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. 74577,
December 04, 1990 ]

Facts:
Modesto Aranas owns a parcel of land in Capiz. He was
survived by two illegitimate children Dorothea Aranas Ado and
Teodoro Aranas. These two borrowed money from Jesus Bernas.
As security therefor, they mortgaged their father’s property to
Bernas in a Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage. A
relative, Raymundo Aranas signed the agreement as witness.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result,
Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and
acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder.
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a
complaint that the lot title be cancelled and they be declared co-
owners of the land. They grounded their cause of action upon
their alleged discovery of two wills by Modesto and his wife
Victoria Comorro. Victoria’s will allegedly bequeathed to
Consolacion and Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro, all of
her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her
husband. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to
Dorothea and Teodoro all his interests in his conjugal partnership
with Victoria.

Issue:
Did Consolacion acquire any right over the property by
virtue of Victoria’s last will and testament?

Decision:
No. The land was not conjugal partnership property of
Victoria and her husband, Modesto. It was the latter’s exclusive,
private property, which he had inherited from his parents. Article
148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees that a property which is
brought to the marriage as his or her own or which each acquires,
during the marriage, by lucrative title is considered as the
exclusive property of each spouse.