Dorotea De Ocampo vs Nicolas Delizo

69 SCRA 216

FACTS:
The partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by
Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer which lasted from April 20,
1891 as her dead, and the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, until the death of
Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957. The action for partition was instituted on April 15,
1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and
Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943,
specifically, Rancivillano, Soltrifilo, Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all
surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their mother,
Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife,
Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants,
namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano,
and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.
The disputed lands situated in Caanawan were registered in the name of 'Nicolas
Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo. The phrase 'married to' is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Nicolas Delizo, the testimony of Dorotea de
Ocampo that the said lands were acquired by her and her spouse, is totally clear
and persuasive, that she and Nicolas Delizo were married in 1911, on the witness
stand that the aforesaid properties were given by Pedro Salvador to her and her
spouse in 1908, thereby leading the trial court to gather an admission that these
lands were acquired during the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo. It may likewise be
noted that as per her testimony, she and her father arrived in Caanawan, San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, when Rosa Villasfer was still alive. That would be sometime before
1911. But she admitted that her father then was not able to acquire lands from
Pedro Salvador, their grantor, because he had no more lands to distribute to
settlers. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that after Rosa's death and the subsequent
marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Dorotea de Ocampo, Pedro Salvador would still
have those 67 hectares which defendants claimed were acquired by the spouses
Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo by grant from Pedro Salvador, declaring
that Nicolas Delizo was married to defendant Dorotea de Ocampo, when he was
given lands in Caanawan by Pedro Salvador.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the property is owned as the second conjugal partnership ?

HELD:

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as
follows:
"But the trial court held that because there was no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property of the first marriage, upon the death of the first wife, 'the
conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas
Delizo and his children of the first marriage * * *. Hence, all the fruits or increase
of the properties acquired thereafter shall belong to such co-ownership.' We cannot
agree with this legal conclusion. One-half of the conjugal properties of the first
marriage constituted the separate property of the husband at the formation of the
second conjugal partnership upon his re-marriage in October 1911 (Art. 145,
NCC). Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were acquired through the
labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; and indeed, two
witnesses for the plaintiffs admitted that at the time of the death of Rosa Villasfer,
only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had been cleared and cultivated
(pp. 22-23; 113, 117, 383-4, t.s.n.). This property was practically virgin land, and
the rest thereof or about 47 hectares were therefore cleared and cultivated only
during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. This impliedly
admitted in plaintiffs' complaint that 'from the time of death of the said Rosa
Villasfer, the defendants * * * have WORKED upon, TILLED and
CULTIVATED, or otherwise offered in tenancy the whole of the agricultural lands
described' (par. 2). The Caanawan property left to itself could not produce any
fruits for they did not have any permanent improvements thereon. What was
produced according to the evidence was palay, and the production of palay requires
tilling, cultivation, seedlings, gathering, preservation and marketing. It was thru the
labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo that the Caanawan
property was able to produce fruits. Whatever it produced thru the labor and
industry of the spouses belongs to their conjugal partnership. While it is true that to
the owner of the land belongs the fruits, whether natural, industrial or civil (Art.
441, N.C.C. formerly Art. 354, Spanish Civil Code), this does not mean that all
that is produced belongs to the owner of the land. The owner, according to Art.
443, N.C.C. (formerly Art. 356, Spanish Civil Code) who receives the fruits, has
the obligation to pay the expenses made by a person in their production, gathering
and preservation. When Dorotea Ocampo admitted that the Muñoz property was
purchased partly with the fruits of the Caanawan property, she was referring to the
gross production, not deducting therefrom what could have pertained to the person
who produced the fruits. So it seems that if we are to determine with mathematical
certainty what portion of the Muñoz property and other properties acquired during
the second marriage should pertain to the first marriage as corresponding to the
value of its share in the fruits of the Caanawan property, and what should belong to
the second marriage as corresponding to the value of the labor and industry of the
spouses Delizo and Ocampo, we have to find how much was produced during the
second marriage and determine what will be the share of the owner of the land that
will correspond to the one who produced the fruits. The burden of proof lies upon
the plaintiffs under the rules of evidence. But, of course, this is an impossibility.
For no records have been kept and it is not in accordance with the Filipino customs
for the surviving spouse whether he remarries or not to keep the record of the
produce of the properties left by the deceased spouse. In addition thereto,
according to Dorotea Ocampo, part of the price used in the purchase of Muñoz
property was the proceeds of a loan which, together with the properties purchased
with it, belongs to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
Ocampo. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to determine with
mathematical precision what portion of the properties acquired during the second
marriage of Nicolas Delizo should belong to the second conjugal partnership and
what portion should belong to the heirs of the first conjugal partnership, one half of
which pertains to the husband.”

In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the fact
that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muñoz lands, while the
petitioners-appellants have been in possession of the Caanawan properties as well
as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street, Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in the
trial court's order of April 23, 1958 (Record on Appeal, pp. 76-77). Should it be
convenient for the parties, their respective shares should be taken from the
properties presently under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve the other
legal questions raised in the appeal.
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as
herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they are hereby,
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this
judgment. No costs.
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Mr. Velez
went away and Ms. Wassmer did not hear from him again. Ms. Wassmer sued Mr.
Velez and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Mr. Velez contended that
there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to
marry. However, the court did not find this defense commendable because even
though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Ms. Wassmer
still suffered frustration and public humiliation.

ISSUE:

Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?

RULING:

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not
considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a
marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the
plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the
previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff
moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses
incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in
making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push
through.
 Antonio Valdes vs RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.
Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3
siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party’s effort consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
 BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS
343 SCRA 755
FACTS:

Brenda B.Marcos and Wilson G. Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Thereafter, they became sweethearts
and got married and had 5 children. After the EDSA revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service. He become involved to different business ventures
but he failed. She always encouraged him to looks forward for work so that their children
would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family, as the pillar of home, and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have
sex with him despite her extreme tiredness. He would also inflict and physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus,
for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately. She did not want him to stay in their house anymore so
when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she condemned him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work
to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. RTC
granted the petition. CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove
psychological incapacity?

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity ?

HELD:

Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a

declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.