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Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Theories of (safety) culture revisited—An

anthropological approach
K. Haukelid *
Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo, Postbox 1108, Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

Received 23 March 2006; received in revised form 30 May 2007; accepted 30 May 2007

Abstract

Despite a great interest in the concept of ‘‘safety culture”, there is little common understanding of the concept. Anthro-
pologists disagree with management consultants, organization theorists and psychologists on important issues. In partic-
ular, much of the ‘‘management literature” seems to have a more instrumental treatment of the concept. There are several
ways of understanding culture – from the linguistic level with a focus on discourse and conflicts, to a ‘‘taken for granted”
level where ‘‘tacit knowledge” is the key phrase, whereas culture as ‘‘webs of significance” can be understood from an epis-
temological position, in short, how we grasp the world. In addition, different cultural perspectives like integration, differ-
entiation and ambiguity are important in cultural analyzes, but whether one is dealing with a single unitary culture, many
subcultures, or no culture at all, is not a theoretical question but an empirical one, as will be demonstrated using oil drilling
as a case. One implication of this is that researchers should be more sensitive to different cultural levels/perspectives and
methodological triangulation in their cultural analyses – and managers should be a little more modest in their efforts to
manage cultures.
Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keyword: Safety culture

1. Introduction

The concept of ‘‘safety culture” has generated a great deal of attention in recent years (Vaughan, 1996; Rea-
son, 1997; Pidgeon, 1998; Cooper, 2000; Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Hale, 2000; Richter and Koch, 2004). The
concept was introduced in the Norwegian oil industry in the late 1980s (Haukelid, 1991, 1st ed. 1990). Today
almost every oil and drilling company in the North Sea has a program to improve its safety culture and in this
paper I will use the history of oil drilling in the North Sea to demonstrate the theoretical points. Despite the
great interest in cultural perspectives, it is easy to agree with James Reason when he writes: ‘‘Few phrases
occur more frequently in discussions about hazardous technologies than safety culture. Few things are so
sought after and yet so little understood” (1997, p. 191).

*
Tel.: +47 22841660.
E-mail address: knut.haukelid@tik.uio.no

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2007.05.014
414 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

There are many different answers to central questions like: what do we mean by ‘‘culture” and ‘‘safety cul-
ture”? Can it be managed or controlled? Is it possible to ‘‘measure”? Do we deal with one unitary culture,
many sub-cultures or nothing that can be called culture at all? Is integration, differentiation or ambiguity
its main characteristics? (Ref. Richter and Kochs‘ paper in Safety Science volume 42, 2004, and the exchange
of letters to the Editor that followed (2004).
Much of this discussion echoes the tremendous interest in organizational culture in the 1980s (and safety
culture should naturally constitute an integrated part of an organizational culture). As I will discuss below,
anthropologists have a different understanding of culture from that of many management and organization
theorists. In particular, much of the management literature seem to have a more instrumental (and less
nuanced) understanding of the concept. Before I say anything more about safety culture, I would like to
review the key points of this debate. But first of all we need to have a closer look at what anthropologists mean
when they talk about culture, and my discussion will draw on the works of traditional anthropologists like
Clifford Geertz, Robert Keesing, Maurice Bloch and others. Mary Douglas is also an important figure in this
debate, but unlike Douglas and her ‘‘grid/group theory” (Douglas, 1970; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;
Douglas, 1996) I will suggest a more open-ended approach.

2. The anthropological concept(s) of culture

There are many definitions of culture in anthropology. One definition of culture would be the common set
of ideas, values, attitudes, and norms that characterizes a group of people. Culture used in this sense of the
word is an aspect of all sides of a society and thus influences how we approach safety, technology, politics,
economics etc., and last but not least, how we act and think in our everyday lives. In other words; culture
is ‘‘something” that has an influence on most things, perhaps everything, that we do.
Some of the culture definitions in anthropology are broad and include material and social conditions. But
others, including that of Geertz (1973), argue that such a general concept of culture would be of limited ana-
lytical value because it covers ‘‘everything”. Since some of the papers and discussions regarding safety culture
use Geertz and the symbolic approach as a starting point (Haukelid, 1998; Richter and Koch, 2004), it is wise
to read him in a little more detail.
One of the more useful ways – but far from the only one – of distinguishing between culture and social
system is to see the former as an ordered system of meaning and of symbols, in terms of which social
interaction takes place; and to see the latter as the pattern of social interaction itself (Geertz, 1973, p.
144).

Thus culture should be seen as a separate system of ideas or, more correctly, ‘‘an ordered system of mean-
ing”. Indeed, isolating culture as a separate system makes it possible to analyze changes (or lack thereof) in the
culture versus the social system. But it is important to emphasize that this is an analytical point: . . .to distin-
guish analytically between the cultural and social aspects of human life, and to treat them as independently
variable yet mutually interdependent factors.” (Geertz, 1973, p. 144). Geertz also emphasizes that ‘‘cultural
systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, else we would not call them systems. . .’ (Geertz, 1973,
p. 7).
For Geertz, then, culture becomes ‘‘the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their
experience and guide their action” (Geertz, 1973, p. 145). Or, to use his most famous remark: ‘‘Man is an ani-
mal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun; I take culture to be those webs” (Geertz, 1973, p.
5). And it is through the interpretation of various types of symbols that we can untangle these webs. These
symbols are bearers of meaning, and according to Geertz, such symbols are as public as weddings and as
observable as agriculture. The point is not to find laws in a positivistic sense, but meaning (Geertz, 1973,
p. 45 and 362).
Most anthropologists would agree that ‘‘finding meaning” is the main point in any cultural analysis, but
Geertz goes further than that, comparing culture to ‘‘a set of control mechanisms (. . .) what computer engi-
neers call programs” (Geertz, 1973, p. 44). And he sees culture as a necessity for human nature: ‘‘There is no
such thing as a human nature independent of culture (. . .) They would be unworkable monstrosities with very
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 415

few useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no intellect: mental basket cases” (Geertz, 1973, p. 49).
Viewing culture in this way may imply that it is ahistorical and static, but this is not a necessary consequence.
The point is rather that culture is a condition for creating order in the world, and that the way we think and
the way we act are culturally mediated.

2.1. Culture, power, and politics

Geertz has been criticized by various authors. Keesing argues that culture is not a homogeneous whole
(Keesing, 1987; Keesing, 1994). There are always conflicts between individuals and between different subcul-
tures, conflicts over power, values, knowledge and ‘‘truth”. In short, Keesing claims that culture is not merely
made up of ‘‘webs of significance” but also ideologies and power. And following Scholte’s criticism of Geertz
(Scholte, 1986), Keesing points out that few do the actual spinning while the majority is simply caught. Both
Keesing and Scholte thus believe that culture is not something that most people ‘‘make,” but rather something
we are captured in and by – that is, ideologies.
Keesing’s conclusion is that symbolic and interpretive anthropology must be put in the context of a broader
social theory, because culture is historically situated and continually produced through struggle between com-
peting sets of interests. How symbolic production is connected to power and politics is thus the most impor-
tant question for Keesing. Following Keesing, as well as authors like Foucault and Bourdieu (Foucault, 1977;
Bourdieu, 1979); power has become a central issue in many cultural studies. Keesing concludes his critique by
saying that we should talk about the ‘‘cultural” rather than culture per se. Today this is common knowledge
for most anthropologists, and they tend to speak about cultural processes rather than culture–culture as an
adjective rather than a noun.
Keesing makes some valid points, but it is questionable whether discussing ‘‘cultural conditions” instead of
‘‘culture” resolves that many problems. If one realizes that culture is not a fixed entity, but rather something
that continually changes as a result of, for instance, external influence and internal conflict, it may seem like
splitting hairs to use the term ‘‘cultural conditions.” Keesing also appears to make a logical fallacy; while on
the one hand he argues against the concept of culture, he also argues that most people are actually trapped in
‘‘webs of significance,” that is, culture. I also believe that Keesing avoids a more philosophical, metaphysical
or ontological discussion: are power, politics, and economy ‘‘givens,” while, for example, culture and beliefs
are ‘‘dependent variables”? If so, we are dealing with a type of reductionism, which in my view is not very
fruitful. This is a question to which Keesing does not attempt to provide any satisfactory answer, nor is he
interested in more epistemological questions.

2.2. Culture as tacit knowledge

Bloch argues that the concept of culture is essential for both social and cultural anthropologists. Thus
Bloch is unwilling to abandon culture as a useful concept, but rather aims to challenge certain received wisdom
related to the culture concept. A more or less underlying assumption in the field is that culture is inextricably
connected to language, either because culture is conceptual and translated as text through language, or
because culture is similar to language in the absolute sense (Bloch, 1998).
Bloch claims (somewhat paradoxically) that language is not essential for conceptual thinking, and that
much of our knowledge is non-linguistic in nature. Concepts build on networks of implicit meanings that
are formed though experience and practice. Under special circumstances this non-linguistic knowledge is
translated and takes the form of explicit discourse, but it changes character in the process. Practical, everyday
tasks are learned through imitation and participation. A linguistic model, that is, a linear and logical syntax,
cannot explain the rapidity and effectiveness that characterize our daily tasks. Language is not essential, and
constitutes only a part of what we call culture (Bloch, 1998, p. 14).
This means that we should put greater emphasis on embodied experience, and that we should treat all
knowledge that presumes an explicit linguistic form with caution, because it is special and removed from
the knowledge that is used in practical activities under normal circumstances – e.g. how we work. Bloch’s per-
spective is a interesting one, and fits nicely with a broad tradition in anthropology that focuses on ‘‘tacit
knowledge” (Polanyi, 1967).
416 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

2.3. Different perspectives – different levels

There is clearly a difference between what Geertz, Bloch and Keesing mean by ‘‘culture.” For Geertz, cul-
ture is a virtual prerequisite for action and thought, but not necessarily in an ahistorical or static form. Bloch
is primarily interested in phenomena such as experience, practice, and tacit knowledge. From Keesing’s per-
spective, power, conflict and discourse appear to have primacy – that is, social phenomena to which concep-
tualization and language are central. All the three perspectives are important, and as a consequence, cultural
analyzes should be performed at several levels: from the discursive, linguistic level, to a more tacit and ‘‘taken
for granted” level, and finally at a more basic philosophical or epistemological level, where culture is consid-
ered a prerequisite for knowledge.
A conclusion that can be drawn from this is that restriction to a single definition of culture is unlikely to be
fruitful. As demonstrated above, the concept has many meanings, and a more pragmatic approach will often
be more advisable. For analytical purposes, it can be useful to consider culture as a separate system of mean-
ing, as Geertz does. This does not necessarily mean treating it as a unitary system. Nor does it mean that we
should consider culture as isolated from social organization, technology, practice or power. Rather, it is the
relationship between these ‘‘subsystems” that is important to clarify in any good anthropological analysis.

3. Organizational culture: a popular term

The 1980s saw the growth of an intense interest in organizational culture and management. Several popular
scientific books were published, of which In Search of Excellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982)) and Corporate
Cultures (Deal and Kennedy, 1982) were two of the most well known. The books describe the qualities of suc-
cessful corporations and how they work, and were bestsellers both in the United States and Europe.
The main message in these books is that corporations with a ‘‘strong culture” do well, particularly if their
management style emphasizes basic values and common goals. By directing attention to what an important
management tool culture can be, culture can be used as a control instrument and as an alternative to other
forms of control in organizations (such as bureaucratic control).
One positive characteristic that these books have in common is an emphasis on the employees as the orga-
nization’s greatest resource. Much of the literature also emphasizes the importance of management to orga-
nizational culture. This is undoubtedly important, but at the same time there are also several reasons to remain
skeptical of some of these theories.
First of all, part of what is written about organizational culture and management in the 1980s was influ-
enced by Japanese organizational philosophy, but it is relatively obvious that many of the measures imple-
mented in Japanese industry would not be desirable or even possible in Europe, precisely because of
cultural differences. In other words, measures that are implemented to improve organizational culture neither
can nor should be considered in isolation from the national culture.
This literature also expresses a somewhat exaggerated belief in what managers can accomplish. For exam-
ple, Sørhaug claims that in this literature the potential for good management is unlimited, that it is shamelessly
uncritical and gushingly positive (Sørhaug, 1996). That management is important is one thing. That it means
everything is demonstrably wrong. Examples are plentiful of how leaders come and go, but organizational cul-
ture stays the same. A second problem with this literature is its emphasis on manipulation. Sejersted notes
after a careful reading of In Search of Excellence that ‘‘in reality, authors recommend that managers should
simultaneously brainwash their employees and treat them as individuals. The potential conflict between these
two strategies is not addressed” (Sejersted, 1993).
The more popular books about organizational culture generally operate on the most superficial register and
on what I have called the discursive level, where it is relatively easy to articulate ‘‘problems”. What charac-
terizes this level is an expressed disagreement with regard to salary conditions, goals and strategy, and conflicts
of interest between corporate divisions and their various subcultures. Moreover, there is too much focus on
the manifest cultural expressions than on the actual content of culture, and the authors of this literature will
have us to believe that changes in manifest expressions (e.g. new managers, new management systems, new
logos, interior design and other symbols or ‘‘artifacts”) imply a new organizational culture. This is naturally
not the case: changes in manifest expressions are no guarantee that norms, values, and basic assumptions have
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 417

changed in the organization. Thus, these books do not contribute to any deeper understanding of these phe-
nomena. For example, in In Search of Excellence Peters and Waterman (1982) provide a list of expressions of
‘‘excellence.” While these expressions may in themselves be adequate, they can easily become vague and gen-
eral, such as being ‘‘close to the customer.” This is a truism that no one would refute and such expressions
simply become meaningless before their content and context are described in more detail. Likewise, the stan-
dard and universal questionnaires that are so often used in such studies are so general that they become empty
of content. It is also a problem that the consultants leave the host company long before they are able to see
what kind of effects their advice, methods, or concepts have had in practice.
All in all, this understanding of organizational culture implies that culture is a variable or quality that can
be managed, changed or manipulated according to whim. This kind of instrumental approach to culture is
problematic:
Culture cannot be managed; it emerges. Leaders don’t create cultures; members of the culture do. Cul-
ture is an expression of people’s deepest needs, a means of endowing their experiences with meaning.
Even if culture in this sense could be managed, it shouldn’t be (. . .) it is naive and perhaps unethical
to speak of managing culture (Martin, 1985, p. 95).

This point is also maid by Reynolds: ‘‘Culture is not an ideological gimmick, to be imposed from above by
management-consulting firms, but a stubborn fact of human social organization that can scuttle the best of
Corporate plans if not first taken into account” (Reynolds, 1994). A number of organizational studies support
these views. As a rule, several sub-cultures compete within a single company, and those who work on the shop
floor will often have a ‘‘counterculture” that conflicts with management’s goals and values (see e.g. Krack-
hardt and Kilduff, 1990 and Tompson and Mchugh, 2002, p. 205). These studies conclude that culture cannot
be managed or controlled, but that to a certain degree, it may be influenced. Certainly, many will refute this
statement and point to cases where culture has been successfully managed – I will return to this discussion at
the end of the paper.
The extent to which it is ethically defensible to influence a culture will obviously depend on the ends
achieved and the means by which this influence takes place. When the intent is to create a good safety culture,
it is of course possible to defend extensive measures, but there is also a limit – a point that not all safety experts
and managers have understood. Some measures work against their intended purpose. If the employees do not
find a given measure meaningful, one result will be that they sabotage such measures.
I want to emphasize that organizational culture is a useful concept, but much of the management literature
(and some organization theory) often takes an instrumental and superficial approach. To achieve a deeper
understanding of this complex phenomenon, the analysis should be holistically oriented and cover various lev-
els from the manifest and discursive to the more essential ‘‘taken for granted”.
Of course, there are many interesting studies of organizational culture in which culture is treated like the
complex phenomenon that it is. In fact, the literature is overwhelming, so my intension here is to limit the
discussion to the authors discussed in Richter and Kochs‘ paper in Safety Science Volume 42, Issue 8,
2004, and the exchange of letters to the Editor (Hale) that followed in Volume 42, Issue 10, 2004. In my opin-
ion, both the paper and the letters are very interesting and give us a deeper understanding of both organiza-
tional culture and safety culture.

4. Safety culture: integration, differentiation or fragmentation?

First of all, I think it is important to stress that safety culture should not be something separate from – or in
addition to – an organizational culture, but constitute an integrated part of this culture. Or, to use Richter and
Koch’s words: ‘Safety culture is viewed as a focused aspect of the organizational culture’ (2004, p. 705). And
for most purposes, I also sympathize with their definition:
We define safety culture as the shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work
and safety – expressed partially symbolically – which guide peoples‘ actions towards risks, accidents
and prevention. Safety culture is shaped by people in the structures and social relations within and
outside the organization (2004, p. 705).
418 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

Their definition is clearly inspired by Geertz, but Richter and Koch set out to analyze safety culture in light
of Martin’s three cultural perspectives: integration, differentiation and fragmentation (Martin, 1992). Within
the integration perspective, culture is perceived as the shared understandings in a given organization and these
studies identify a consistency across cultural manifestations. Schein is mentioned as probably the most signif-
icant scholar within this perspective (Richter and Koch, 2004, p. 705). The differentiation perspective empha-
size the lack of consensus between interpretations and meanings in an organization and the focus is usually on
sub-cultures (2004, p. 706). Richter and Koch understand the fragmentation perspective as ambiguity: cultural
manifestations are ambiguous and there is a lack of clarity when it comes to interpretations and meanings
(2004, p. 707). In this perspective there seems to be no common ground, but Martin (1992) is not quite clear
on this matter. Nvestad (2006) has pointed out that Richter and Koch (2004, p. 705 and 710) unwittingly
operationalize culture in a way that excludes the fragmentation perspective, as they define and understand cul-
ture as shared understandings and meanings.
Following Alvesson, Richter and Koch (2004) try to synthesize these perspectives into the concept of multi-
ple cultural configurations understood as a combination of macro-culture, local culture and situations (Alves-
son, 1993). Alvesson, however, adopts a critical stance towards Martin’s concept of fragmentation and claims
that we do not need a particular paradigm to handle ambiguity – it is more like a research strategy (1993, p.
117). According to Nvestad, Richter and Koch seem to have missed this point, and Nvestad also comments
that an overriding paradox in analyses of cultural fragmentation is that it seems impossible to act and co-ordi-
nate activities; in short function as an organization since there is a lack of common understandings (Nvestad,
2006).
Alvesson does not neglect ambiguity – quite the contrary – but he prefers the concept of ‘‘bounded
ambiguity”:
We can thus talk about bounded ambiguity, in which cultures do not necessarily establish clarity, shared
orientations and consensus among broad groups of people, but still offer guidelines for coping with
instances of ambiguity without too much anarchy or confusion. Bounded ambiguity may mean broadly
shared rules and meanings for how to steer around tricky issues(. . .). We can thus say that it offers
‘‘meta-meanings” – clues for how to deal with tricky meanings (Alvesson, 2002, p. 166).
Bounded ambiguity implies that there are at least some broadly shared rules, which is a necessity if the con-
cept of culture is going to have any meaning at all.
Both Alvesson and Martin are skeptical to the integration perspective represented by authors like Schein.
Schein considers culture to be a pattern of fundamental assumptions for mastering external adaptations and
internal integration and his cultural analyses cover several levels, from manifest expressions and artefacts, to
more underlying themes of a more unconscious character (Schein, 1987; Schein, 1992). Schein also argues
that by definition culture has to be unitary (Schein, 2004). I will return to this discussion at the end of
the paper.
How do all this fit in with the anthropological perspectives discussed in the beginning of the paper? Alves-
son is often linked to Geertz and symbolism due to his focus on metaphors and meanings, but Alvesson also
has a lot (more) in common with Keesing, particularly his focus on sub-cultures, cultural ambiguity and
power. The same goes for Martin. If we have a closer look at Schein, it is quite clear that there is some impor-
tant similarities between him and Geertz – specially the focus on cultural integration – despite the fact that
Schein is usually labeled as a functionalist, while Geertz belongs to the interpretative school.
As we have seen; the theoretical picture is quite blurred. For my own part, I find all these perspectives to be
useful when studying safety culture, but the real test is (of course) how these perspectives fit with empirical
studies – and here we shall have a closer look at the oil industry.

4.1. Case: oil drilling in the North Sea

Methods used in this case study are historical accounts, questionnaires, interviews, fieldwork and actual
work on many different drilling rigs (the author worked 7 years in the oil industry, including 3 years as a
‘‘roughneck” in different drilling crews). The history of oil drilling in the North Sea can be divided into the
following four stages (Haukelid, 2006):
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 419

 ‘‘Texas” (1966–1980): Wild and rough ‘‘macho” culture with many accidents – but also much pride in doing
a good job. Culminated in 1980 with the Alexander Kielland disaster.
 ‘‘The Great Change” (1980–1990): The implementation of the internal control reform and other safety mea-
sures. The result was a substantial drop in accidents due to new technology, committed leadership and
employee participation.
 ‘‘The Systems” (1990–2000): Introduction of comprehensive systems like ISRS, SSS, SMS and DuPont.
The thrust in the ‘‘systems” breaks down in the late 1990’s with low oil prices and increased risk level.
 ‘‘The Cultural Solution” (2000-present): Safety Culture is the new concept. Many different measures are
introduced, with varying success.

4.1.1. Texas
Oil drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf began in the summer of 1966. The first drilling rigs were
American, as was the drilling equipment, the expertise, the language – and the culture. The Norwegian work-
ers jokingly referred to certain rigs as ‘‘Texas” – a metaphorical label I applied earlier to an actual rig (Hauk-
elid, 1989). Even though ‘‘Texas” was an actual rig, it remains an archetype for the North Sea rigs of the
1970s. Key features of the culture found on board these rigs were a frenetic work pace, a high degree of risk,
and numerous accidents.
Accidents are, of course, undesirable, but they can also be important in cultural and identity formation.
Broken, crushed, and severed fingers and so-called ‘‘blue-nails” were associated with work on a drill crew.
The accidents were part of the ‘‘roughneck” identity, and for many, such minor accidents were a badge of
honor, and ‘‘part of the game.” Workers were constantly reminded of accidents, either because they were fre-
quent or through stories, myths and symbols. Accident rates approached 70 accidents per 1000 rig days; since
many accidents were never reported, the actual figure was most likely higher. The accidents were caused by
sledge hammers, chains, heavy rig tongs, and other pieces of heavy equipment. The conventional wisdom
was: ‘‘take care of your self – it is your own fault if you get hurt”.
Consistent with Schein’s definition, organizational culture is a pattern of assumptions in relation to prob-
lems with external adjustments and internal integration that have functioned well enough to be perceived as
true, and are passed on to new members as the right way to conceive, think and feel (Schein, 1992). On
‘‘Texas”, all workers knew the assumptions that governed their job performance. The job had to be done
as fast as possible and a lost finger or two did not matter that much. An effective socialization process led
the ‘‘newcomers” to learn and accept these ‘‘assumptions” as true. The reason for this is simple enough: only
those who accepted the values were allowed to stay. This was a trait borrowed from the American drilling-tra-
dition: ‘‘If you can’t hack it, you can’t stay” (Lynch, 1987). In this process, power is also an important issue to
consider and in this case it is quite obvious: if you did not agree on basic assumptions you were fired.
An elimination process such as this led to a high degree of internal integration, in which both the bosses and
the roughnecks agreed on fundamental values – which again were embodied as tacit knowledge. Cultural
reproduction, not change, was the rule. ‘‘Texas” was a closed community, whose values and norms were com-
pletely at odds with Norwegian society. At odds with the nation’s wish for ‘‘Norwegianizing,” the Norwegian
drill workers were Americanized.

4.1.2. The Great change

The ‘‘Texas Period” ended with a catastrophe on the 27 March 1980. The accommodation platform Alex-
ander L. Kielland capsized on the Ekofisk field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, killing 123 oil work-
ers. The disaster came as a shock, and in line with a broad plan to Norwegianize the oil business, the
government also wanted to improve safety and the working environment in the industry.
A series of directives with requirements for education, training, safety courses, and other safety measures
for the drilling rigs was issued. Norwegian management was required to be on the rigs, and some of the tech-
nical equipment was improved. The manual and heavy drill equipment that was used on ‘‘Texas” was replaced
with new ‘‘iron roughneck” and pipe handling systems. These important technical advances eliminated much
of the heavy toil and reduced the number of accidents.
These steps represented an improvement, but several of the old ‘‘tool pushers” and rig managers, however,
remained skeptical about ‘‘Norwegianizing” and the new technology. They shared their reservations with
420 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

many of the roughnecks who still worked on Texas. They disparaged the new rigs as ‘‘Welfare”, and the
roughnecks who worked on ‘‘Welfare” were ridiculed as ‘‘softnecks.” The roughnecks were convinced that
new technology and a slower work pace were making the work too easy (the original metaphor in Norwegian
was not ‘‘Welfare”, but ”Vrna Bedrift” (Haukelid, 1989), but the metaphor ”Welfare” used by Richter and
Koch (2004) is close enough).
These opinions can be hastily written off as pure conservative nostalgia, but many of the workers on the
new rigs were glorifying the recent past. Even if most of the management and the workers on ‘‘Welfare” were
Norwegians, they had, through an extended socialization process claimed for themselves important elements
of the ‘‘Texas-culture” and their values, norms, assumptions and tacit knowledge were resistant to change.
Another paradox in the development was that, for some years, the accident rate on Welfare was compara-
ble to that of ‘‘Texas” (60–70 accidents per 1000 rig days). High expectations were placed on the mechaniza-
tion of the most dangerous drill operations. Contrary to these expectation, however, the accident rate did not
drop (Tønnesen, 1988). The new technology had reduced the likelihood of some accidents by increasing the
likelihood of others. But in 1986, the effects of the new safety measures became apparent, with a remarkable
drop in lost time accidents (LTA) on the rigs that were operating for Staoil:
As we can see LTA plunged from 55 in 1986 to 4 in 1991. The number of actual accidents fell from 72 per
year to 3 (Lindeberg, 1996) (Fig. 1). The most important factors in this remarkable decline were:

 New technology and equipment.

 Committed leadership.
 Employee cooperation and participation.

Technological improvements were (and are) important to reduce drilling accidents. Mechanization and
automation (like iron roughneck and pipe handling systems) helped remove workers from dangerous opera-
tions. This was a big step forward, but as we have seen, technological change takes time. And technological
changes alone do not produce good results, in the absence of committed and safety-conscious managers. The
drilling manager at that time in Statoil, prioritized safety and insisted that the drilling companies working for
Statoil do the same. The authorities, unions and safety delegates also demanded results. In addition, many
grassroots activities were introduced, like special safety meetings, team building, and safety competitions.
In this way ‘‘top down” programs were complemented by ‘‘bottom up” activities.
These measures, taken together, shaped the safety culture, and the drilling industry’s values, norms,
assumptions and tacit knowledge started to change – but not without conflicts. Some of the ‘‘old timers”
refused to change their habits, but most of the bosses and the roughnecks started to question the old work
ideals. Safety matters become an important issue, and unlike ‘‘Texas”, ‘‘Welfare” showed clear signs of value
differentiation. Statements like ‘‘Safety is important!” and ‘‘Work safe!” were common in the late 80’s. Differ-
ent sub-cultures (like unions and departments) had for several years challenged the old drilling managers’
authority and power and this struggle started to pay off. The work pace was still high compared to other
industries, but much of the risk taking and most of the accidents were gone.

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

Fig. 1. Accidents pr. mill work hours, drilling rigs operated by Statoil, Lindeberg (1996, p. 90).
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 421

At that time, the concept of ‘‘safety culture” was introduced (Haukelid, 1991, 1st ed. 1990) and it was a
growing awareness (at least among some managers) that good results and a sound safety culture depended
on technological improvements, leadership and participation. Still, it would take another 10 years before
safety culture became a ‘‘hot” issue in the industry.

4.1.3. The systems

At the end of the 1980s the oil companies introduced comprehensive safety management systems. The Inter-
national Safety Rating System (ISRS) was introduced and adopted by BP and partly by Statoil. Different ver-
sions of ISRS were used by Hydro (SSS) and PPCoN (SMS). Other companies used Tripod and DuPont. The
drilling companies also used these systems (specially ISRS), partly at the request of the oil companies (see
Haukelid, 1998). The safety management systems incorporated many of the measures implemented in the
1980s in addition to several new ones.
Along with these systems came the ”Loss Causation Model” and ‘‘The Iceberg theory.” These systems, and
the corresponding models and theories, gave structure and direction to the safety measures, but they also
induced much bureaucracy and – according to statistics from the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway – with
little actual reduction of LTA (se Fig. 2). ISRS was especially vulnerable to criticism (like Guastello, 1991) and
among others Hale (2001) has criticized the ‘‘Iceberg Theory.” Several of the companies tried to adapt ISRS to
Norwegian rules and regulations, but little effort was made to incorporate cultural differences (Haukelid,
1998). Some managers and consultants have attributed the decline in drilling accidents from 1986 to these sys-
tems, but this could not be the case, since most of the systems were not in effect before 1990.
Safety Management Systems are of course important, but not all comprehensive systems are synonymous
with a sound safety culture. The employees must also embrace these measures and systems as meaningful.
Within drilling especially, there was much resistance to these systems and certain measures that went with
them (reporting of incidents, use of protective gear, etc.). Many of the roughnecks did not find these measures
meaningful and they strongly disliked the bureaucracy that went with it. In short, the measures and the
bureaucracy were at odds with the tacit knowledge you will find on most drilling rigs. The result was that
the roughnecks sabotaged some measures and paid lip service to others, and in some contexts they even talked
about ‘‘the good old days” back in the ‘‘Texas”-stage with no bureaucracy. Some of the roughnecks would
also hesitate to visit the medic for smaller injuries.
Some will find all this surprising, but along with the ‘‘Systems” there was a lot of ‘‘double communication”
from the management, e.g.: ‘‘Take your time – but be quick!”, ‘‘Report incidents – but don’t do foolish
things!” ‘‘Don’t break safety rules – but use your head!” etc. Likewise, typical statements from the roughnecks
at this stage were: ‘‘Safety rules are ok – but it takes to long time if we always should follow them!”, ‘‘We
report many minor incidents – then we don’t need to report the serious ones!”, ‘‘Protective equipment is
important – but unpleasant to wear!”
At this stage, we can observe that basic assumptions change depending on the context. There are not one,
but several interpretations of social phenomena like accidents, incidents, rules, measures etc. In short, it is
ambiguity with regards to central values, a cultural perspective introduced by Martin (1992). This is not
Accidents per million work hours

2.5

1.5

0.5

0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year

Fig. 2. Serious accidents per million work hours, mobil rigs, PSA, 2004.
422 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

uncommon; the lesson learned from anthropology is that conflicting values, paradoxes and fragments are
more often the case than harmony or common values and norms. A useful term to describe this situation
is Alvesson’s term ‘‘bounded ambiguity, in which cultures do not necessarily establish clarity, shared orienta-
tions and consensus among broad groups of people, but still offer guidelines for coping with instances of ambi-
guity without too much anarchy or confusion” (Alvesson, 2002).
At the end of the 1990s the oil industry became more complacent, and the companies assumed that the sys-
tems themselves would ensure safety. In 1998 a drastic fall in oil prices resulted in belt-tightening, reorgani-
zations and downsizing. The trade unions were claiming that safety matters were getting worse and that
safety was at an all-time low. Their view was confirmed by several research communities and the Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway (PSA). At the same time, several managers claimed that safety had never been bet-
ter. The conflict peaked during the summer of 2000, and culminated in a serious accident on 24 December
2000, in which a worker was crushed to death under a pile of drilling pipes.
In response, the PSA introduced the project: ‘‘Trends in Risk Levels on the Norwegian Continental Shelf”
(TRL). The project identified the risk indicators that are critical for safety and the working environment.
Questionnaires, interviews, work shops and fieldwork form the basis for social science analyses. The PSA con-
cluded that there had been an increase in the number of oil and gas leaks, ‘‘kicks,” and collisions between sup-
ply ships and platforms. There had also been an increase in serious injuries in drilling. The report stated that
important safety matters in the oil industry were perceived very differently by the oil companies and the
unions, and that there was little trust between these parties (PSA, 2001).

4.1.4. The cultural solution

As a result of these negative developments, PSA introduced several measures. One unique measure was reg-
ulation enforcing HES-culture:
The party responsible shall encourage and promote a sound health, environment and safety culture com-
prising all activity areas and which contributes to achieving that everyone who takes part in petroleum
activities takes on responsibility in relation to health, environment and safety, including also systematic
development and improvement of health, environment and safety (PSA, The Framework Regulations,
Section 11).
Along with this regulation, ‘‘Safety Forum” and ‘‘Working Together for Safety” were implemented to
improve collaboration and confidence in the industry. The Safety Forum is the central arena for cooperation
between the industry and the authorities as regards HES. The Forum was established in 2001 to initiate, dis-
cuss and follow up relevant safety and working environment issues. ‘‘Working Together for Safety” is one of
the most extensive collaboration projects initiated within health, safety and the environment (HSE) in the oil
and gas industry. As a result, both technological and organizational undertakings were introduced.
Companies also implemented internal measures, including comprehensive programs to improve the safety
culture. The program that has received the most publicity is Statoil’s ‘‘Colleague Program,” but other oil com-
panies, such as Hydro and BP, also invested in similar programs. The drilling companies followed suit; Smed-
vig introduced ‘‘Step Change” after two fatal accidents. Here we shall have a closer look at the result of all
these measures.

4.1.5. Questionnaires 2001 and 2003

Two large surveys have been carried out in connection with the TRL-project, one in 2001 and one in 2003.
The positive change from 2001 to 2003 is indeed considerable. To illustrate this change, we shall have a closer
look at some of the questions (the questions were translated into English from Norwegian by the author and
the calculations were done by PhD. student Anne Mette Bjerkan with the TIK-Center, UiO.) Table 1.
While in 2001, 47.6% of the roughnecks agreed or partially agreed that they were occasionally pressured to
work in a way that threatened safety, this number dropped to 23.6% in 2003. And for the question of whether
safety rules are broken to finish a job quickly, there is a reduction from 51.2% to 33.0%. All in all we see an
astonishing improvement. This is not limited to the roughnecks, but includes the whole ‘‘offshore population”
despite rather large differences between groups and companies (e.g. those who are employed within well-
service are clearly less satisfied than those who work in drilling).
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 423

Table 1
Roughnecks Agree Neither/nor Disagree
Changes in % from 2001 2003 2001 2003 2001 2003
Sometimes I feel pressured to work in a unsafe way 47.6 23.6 18.3 11.1 34.1 65.2
Sometimes I break safety rules to get the job done quickly 51.2 33.0 13.4 16.0 35.4 51.0
I’d rather not discuss HSE matters with my manager 41.5 18.3 8.5 10.5 50.0 71.2
Work permits are always adhered to 75.6 83.2 12.2 7.9 12.2 8.9
Simultaneous work operations often lead to dangerous situations 52.4 31.9 15.9 14.7 31.7 53.4
Inadequate maintenance led to dangerous conditions 41.5 31.4 25.6 19.9 32.9 48.7
N (2001) = 82; N (2003) = 307. Source: PSA (2004).

Can we find an equally positive change when it comes to accidents? As we can see Fig. 2 shows a significant
decline in the number of serious accidents from 2001 to 2003/2004.

4.1.6. Factors behind the improvements

As part of the TRL-project in 2005, managers and crew members from a drilling rig which had achieved
good safety-results were interviewed. Both management and crew agreed that the improvements were linked
to the implementation of the programme ‘‘Step Change” (the management more so than the crew members).
The crew also emphasized factors like: ‘‘Getting to know the technology,” ‘‘Continuity and stability in the
work force,” ‘‘Enough time to safely carry out work tasks,” and ‘‘Better work environment.” Workers empha-
sized the fact that they believe that management is now sincere in its commitment to safety, and that safety
takes priority over efficiency. Crew members now feel, as opposed to earlier views, that they can and should
take the necessary time to ensure that work tasks are carried out safely (Haukelid, 2006).

4.1.7. Cultural changes

The interviews, questionnaires and accident rates all tell us that some important cultural changes have
taken place. And at this stage, we see a tendency to cultural integration around new values; e.g. safety takes
priority over efficiency and many drill crews have enough time to work safe. The result is that safety finally has
become an important part of the tacit knowledge in drilling. This is a new situation.
Despite these improvements, it is important to keep in mind that not all the drilling rigs have good safety
results, and the industry still experience serious accidents caused by technology and design, bad management
and stress among the workers. Some roughnecks are still risk takers and some hesitate to visit the medic for
smaller injuries Depending on the context, differentiation and ambiguity around central values are still possi-
ble to detect among the drill crews and conflicts regarding wages, work pace, organizational matters and tech-
nological improvements are still an issue.
As we have seen, power has been – and still is – an important issue; and in analyzing the cultural changes in
the oil drilling industry, it is important to combine a Geertzian perspective with power perspectives from
authors like Keesing, Bourdieu and Foucault (Haukelid, 1989; Haukelid, 1998; Collinson, 1999).

5. Discussion

The history of oil drilling tells us that it possible to change a culture, but it takes a long time, and with this
case in mind, let us return to some of the questions asked in the introduction. Can culture be managed or con-
trolled? From an anthropological point of view, culture can hardly be managed. There is an apparent similar-
ity between Geertz’s work (especially when he speaks of culture as ‘‘a set of control mechanisms”) and much of
what is written about cultural control within management literature. But for Geertz, culture is something
much more fundamental and lasting, and something that is thus difficult to manipulate or control. In this
discussion it is also important to have in mind that cultural content is seldom if ever static. Culture changes
over time, no matter what managers or employees think or do.
Certainly, many will refute the statement that it is impossible to manage culture and point to cases where
culture has been successfully managed with references to the works of Westrum and others. In this discussion I
424 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426

thing it is import to clearify which cultural level we talk about. I agree that it is possible to change a culture in
relatively short time on what I earlier have called the discursive, linguistic level. But as mentioned in the intro-
duction: cultural analyzes should be performed at several levels: from the discursive, linguistic level, to a more
tacit and ‘‘taken for granted” level, and finally at a more basic philosophical or epistemological level, where
culture is considered a prerequisite for knowledge. The more basic levels are hard to change – an even harder
to managed.
Can culture be measured? Anthropologists and psychologists tend to disagree on this question. Many psy-
chologists seem to believe that it is possible to measure culture – or at least to measure the safety climate (see
Safety Science, volume 34, 2000). One representative for this group is Cooper (2000). He wants to create a
reciprocal model which can be used to measure and analyze safety culture. The model is connected to what
he calls a ‘‘goal-setting paradigm,” and will be used to break down culture into sub-components and obser-
vable behavior (or what he calls ‘‘the safety culture product”), which can be more easily measured: ‘‘Since each
of these safety culture components can be directly measured in their own right, or in combination, it becomes
possible to quantify culture in a meaningful way. . .” (2006, p. 121).
Cooper’s article is a thorough review of the many problems associated with the safety culture concept, and
of particular importance is his emphasis on the necessity of more than one methodological angle (so-called
triangulation). Moreover, he is critical of the many superficial safety-culture questionnaires that have been
carried out, and is more interested in ‘‘the holistic, multi-faceted nature of the safety culture” – clearly inspired
by a more anthropological way of thinking.
At the same time, he appears to be quite certain that culture can be measured and quantified, a viewpoint
that very few anthropologists share. This enthusiasm for measuring either safety culture per se, or its individ-
ual components, appears to be a regular theme in much of the safety research. But as Geertz and many other
theorists of culture have pointed out, it is doubtful whether culture and cultural phenomena can be measured;
likewise, to what extent is it possible to identify laws of cultural change in a scientific sense (that is, whether
cultural studies is a nomothetic or ideographic science). In cultural analyses, the general aim is usually to
achieve a deeper understanding of a social phenomenon that is difficult to explain from a single cause-effect
relationship, or to be measured or tested under exact conditions. When sophisticated methodologies over-
shadow the issue of what is to be measured (that is, substance and content), the methods become relatively
meaningless. The anthropological answer to ‘‘measurements” will usually be ‘‘thick descriptions” (Geertz,
1973, p. 3) and the favored method is ethnographic fieldwork. Fieldwork and participant observation are espe-
cially important when we want to map ‘‘tacit knowledge”, basic assumptions and ‘‘webs of significans” – in
short the deeper levels of any given culture. Questionnaires and interviews are seldom sufficient to reach this
level of cultural expression.

6. Conclusions and implications

We have seen that the concept of culture can be used in several ways and it is not necessarily true that we
need a single and fixed definition of culture. Such parsimony may well sacrifice more in terms of insight than is
gained in clarity. Following Geertz, the founding father of the ‘‘symbolic” approach to cultural interpretation,
many anthropologists will focus on symbols, meaning and ‘‘webs of significance”. This approach needs to be
qualified with theories about power, conflicts and discourse (Ref. Keesing, Bourdieu and Foucault). This has
been a major trend in European anthropology for the last two decades, a fact many critics of the cultural
approach have missed. In addition, we need theories about everyday practice and tacit knowledge (Bloch,
Polanyi and others). All these approaches are important when we want to understand the concept of safety
culture,
The ‘‘symbolic” approach has been successfully utilized by Richter and Koch (2004), but as I have pointed
out, there are some major differences between Geertz and Alvesson. As note; Geertz is in some ways more in
line with Schein, particularly in his focus on cultural integration and the distinction he makes between culture
and social system. Alvesson, on the other hand, has more in common with Keesing, particularly in his focus on
sub-culture and cultural ambiguity.
In any event, whether one is dealing with a single unitary culture (integration), many subcultures (differen-
tiation), or no culture at all (fragmentation), is not a theoretical question but an empirical one. One must get
 K. Haukelid / Safety Science 46 (2008) 413–426 425

out into the world of lived experience, hence the need for fieldwork. Of course, we could do as Schein (2004)
does, and conclude that if there is a culture, it has by definition to be unitary, but the lesson learned from
anthropology is that change and conflict, paradoxes and fragments are more often the order of the day than
harmony or common values and norms. This is why ‘‘bounded ambiguity” (Alvesson, 1993) is a useful term in
most cultural analyzes. Total integration is seldom the case, but as Geertz (1973) has pointed out, it is difficult
to imagine people completely without culture of some kind or another. It is through ‘‘the culture” that we
experience the world and culture is necessary for the world to be experienced at all.
The implication of all this is that researchers should be more sensitive to different cultural levels and meth-
odological triangulation in their cultural analyses – and managers should be a little more modest in their
efforts to manage cultures.

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