City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil.

349 (1919)
CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion
into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said
portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further
claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons
owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff
herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire
and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. PLDT

(1969)

FACTS: Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc.,
an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s
domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone
System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered
into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply,
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before
the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the
facilities of PLDT’s telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to
restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD: “ x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may,
in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.”

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620) - Digest
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities
worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then
instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite
or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year.
The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that
the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by
consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail
over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it
held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in
this case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

AMIGABLE VS CUENCA

G.R. No. L-26400 43 SCRA 487 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case,
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.
Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said
lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot.

Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the
Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that
the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs
had no valid basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it
was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action for
the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued
without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff’s
claim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had long
prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent
to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the government under the facts of the
case.

Decisions: The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
to a citizen.
Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, “Where the government takes
away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

Rulings: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time because possession is one of
the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government
is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof
at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price
of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition,
the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court
after hearing

Philippine Press Institute Vs. COMELEC Case Digest

Philippine Press Institute Vs. COMELEC
244 SCRA 272
G.R. No. 119694
May 22, 1995
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The
Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them
to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The
Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on
the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec,
the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision
(police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment
of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking
has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to
sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but
not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency
to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing vs Guerrero and NHA Case Digest
LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON.
BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987

FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and
3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance
with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the
subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on
the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied

ISSUES: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in issuing the
Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration.
2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause,
specifically:
The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be
expropriated;
"Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really
for a public purpose;
The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court;
The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations
arbitrarily fixed by government assessors;
The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just
compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation.
HELD: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the
constitution, to wit:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9);
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the
purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people,
bereft of public character."
The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of
government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands
that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
(p. 231)
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a
public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific
provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution
goes even further by providing that:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
Manosca Vs CA Case Digest
Manosca Vs. Court Of Appeals
252 SCRA 412
G.R. No. 106440
January 29, 1996
Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national
historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The
Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation
was not for a public purpose.

Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of
the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

EPZA Vs. Dulay Case Digest

EPZA Vs. Dulay
148 SCRA 305
G.R. No. L-59603
April 29, 1987
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing
Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development
Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands
were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.
Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15
per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s
report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial

prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved
to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the justness of the decreed compensation.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market
value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the
cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata
was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance
and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest
is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law” because the terms
“ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use,
purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the
Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution
is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right
of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from “resolution” under
BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but “inferior”
domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of res
judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation
case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all
cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use whenever they
need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it
does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain
is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has
become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently
exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656) - Digest

FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the
name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the
lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the
sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11,
1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for
the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but
expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-
interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the
annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots
932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic·s failure to pay the amount
of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the
registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic.
SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment
of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as
security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lot title was issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein.
On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner
of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the
case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is
contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...”

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner
of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as
early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is
that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly,
Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to
pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In
jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation
of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and
the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however
from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership
over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years?
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to
the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent
and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover
possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed
to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all,
it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation
as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment
of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."