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ACCIDENT: BHOPAL
GAS TRAGEDY &
JAIPUR OIL DEPOT
FIRE
AISHWARYA RAIKAR
17334
TYBcom. C
SEM V, ISA -1
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
To study the Cause of accident of
Bhopal & Jaipur industry.
To study the after effects of the
accidents occurred, compensation
provided, and preventions taken.
METHODOLOGY
For the present study secondary data
has been collected. The data has been
collected through magazines,
documents, and information available
on the internet.
INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION
UNION CARBIDE INDIA LIMITED
( BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY)
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was a chemical
company established in 1934, eventually expanding to
employ 9,000 people working at 14 plants in five
divisions.[1][2] UCIL was 50.9% owned by Union Carbide
and Carbon Corporation (UCC) and 49.1% by Indian
investors including the Government of India and
government-controlled banks.[3] UCIL produced
batteries, carbon products, welding equipment, plastics,
industrial chemicals, pesticides and marine products.
In 1970 UCIL built a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India,
which gained worldwide attention as a result of the Bhopal
disaster. On 3 December 1984, a release of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) gas immediately killed about three
thousand people and led to the death of more than fifteen
thousand in subsequent weeks and months. The death rate
is currently about 2 or 3 people per week. At the time of
the disaster, UCIL was ranked twenty-first in size among
companies operating in India. It had revenues of Rs 2
billion (then equivalent to US$170 million).
In November 1994, UCC completed the sale of its interest
in UCIL to McLeod Russel of Calcutta. UCIL was
subsequently renamed Eveready Industries India.
INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION
Jaipur oil depot
POST-LEAKAGE SCENE
Bhopal had a population of about 8.5 lakh back in
1984 and more than half of its population was
coughing, complaining of itching in eyes, skin and
facing breathing problems. The gas caused internal
haemorrhage, pneumonia and death. The villages
and slums in the neighbouring areas of the factory
were the worst affected.
The alarm system of the Union Carbide did not
work for hours. No alarm was raised by the factory
managers. Suddenly thousands of people started
running to hospitals on the morning of December 3
with their complaints.
Unlike today, Bhopal of 1984 did not have too many
hospitals. Two government hospitals could not have
accommodated half of the population of the city.
People were suffering, finding it difficult to breathe
and confused. So were doctors, who did not
immediately know the reasons for the sudden illness
that afflicted every new rushing patient.
Patients complained of dizziness, breathlessness,
skin irritation and rashes, some others reported
sudden blindness. Doctors of Bhopal had never faced
a situation like this. They had no experience in
dealing with industrial disaster.
Symptoms of methyl isocyanate exposure were not
immediately known to them. And, the two hospitals
reportedly treated around 50,000 patients in first
two days of the Bhopal gas leak. Officially, the
government declared that the gas leakage was
contained in eight hours, but the city has is still
finding it difficult to come out of its grip even 33
years later.
The Environment Protection Act was enacted in 1986. The act defines the
environment and authorizes the central government to take all such
measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purposes of protecting
and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling
and abating environmental pollution. In this connection, the central
government has the authority to issue direct written orders including
orders to close, prohibit, or regulate any industry, operation or process or
to stop or regulate the supply of electricity, water or any other service. The
act conforms to the commitments made by the Stockholm Declaration,
1972.
The Factories Act was amended to include the list of hazardous
industries[xxiv] and the provision to locate an industry. The Central and
State Pollution Control Board laid down comprehensive industrial
standards for the control of effluents and emissions.
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 is another act with an aim to
provide immediate relief to the victims affected by accidents while handling
hazardous substances and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto. The Act incorporates a provision making it mandatory for the
industrial units that every owner shall take out before he starts handling
any hazardous substance, one or more insurance policies and renews it or
them from time to time before the expiry of validity. It will allow the
victims of such incidents to get compensation immediately, which will not
bar them to seek larger compensation. The act recognises the ‘absolute
liability or no-fault liability’ doctrine.
Acknowledging the need to deal with the cases related to the environment
effectively and expeditiously, the government established a National Green
Tribunal in 2010 through the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The
tribunal exclusively deals with the cases arising out of environmental
issues.
After the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the importance of environmental regulation
became starkly evident. The inadequate measures and the vacuum in the
legal system were also exposed. The Supreme Court, in order to fill such
loopholes, applied Judicial Activism. The scope of Article 21 was
considerable widened to include the right to a clean environment. This way,
environmental concerns became the part of the constitution as well as the
rights of the citizens.
The Environment Impact Assessment Notification in 1994 was also a
significant step to calculate risks associated with any project which will
determine whether or not it is granted clearance.
Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary
Movement) Rules, 2008, provide for means of safe storage and disposal of
“hazardous waste” (which is listed in its schedules) with the help of central
and state pollution control boards.
Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response)
Rules, 1996 was also enacted, which address gas leaks and similar events.
The Chemical Accidents Rules seem to have been framed for the exact
purpose of monitoring plants or industries like the UCC in Bhopal.
The state pollution control boards are required to give the industry consent
to establish and then consent to operate. But all that the pollution boards
do is to process the consent and authorisation. They do not have time to
monitor compliance with standards for pollution or enforce their
directions.
There is also no deterrence in the system. The maximum penalty imposed
by courts under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act is Rs
10,000 and under EPA, it is Rs 1 lakh. But only courts can impose this
penalty. So, all the boards can do is to either deny the consent to operate or
issue closure notice for 30 days.
CONCLUSION
India is a developing nation and hence is open to foreign investors so as to
induce growth in its economy. Industrialization is encouraged in order to
be globalised. However, we should not lose sight of the effect these
industries have in the long run on the environment and the health of the
people. India needs to rigid when it comes to enforcement of the legislation
in place so that we do not pay such a heavy price again. UCIL got away
with such blatant violations because the enforcement was too weak to serve
as a deterrent.
Are human lives in India so disposable that we are ready to pass off the
incident as an unfortunate accident? There is no way to replace the
thousands of lives lost all that can be done is to ensure that the ones that
have been left behind can lead a comfortable life and cope up with the loss.
The industrial disaster catalysed a paradigm shift in terms of
environmental awareness, environmental policy, judicial activism and
human rights. It forced the government and public alike to treat these
issues with utmost priority.
PHOTO GALLERY
CASE STUDY
JAIPUR OIL DEPOT FIRE
Abstract
A massive fire broke out at the Indian Oil Corporation depot in
Sitapura Industrial Area of Jaipur on Thursday night. This led to
an uncontrollable fire which engulfed 12 huge tanks. Nearly one
lakh kilolitres of fuel, worth Rs 500 crore just burn out. The
flames, had thrown up huge columns of thick, black smoke
which blocked sunlight. Officials and firefighters finally decided
to wait for the burning fuel to get consumed and for the fire to
extinguish by itself, as there seemed to be no other alternative.
An area of 5 km radius had been marked as danger zone.
More than 150 persons were admitted in various hospitals for
burn and splinter injuries and eight people had been declared
dead. The fire was accompanied with several explosions that
shook the industrial area while people fled in panic. All
educational institutions and industries in the area remained shut
through the days. Even train and bus routes plying through the
area had to be changed. The Jaipur-Kota highway had been
closed down for vehicles and about 20 trains scheduled to pass
through the nearby railway line were affected. Nearby villages
had also been vacated. Residents of about ten nearby villages,
which housed an estimated five lakh people, and inmates of
hostels in 10 engineering and technical colleges and a medical
college had been evacuated in the wake of the incident after
which power supply in the area was cut off.
HOW IT OCCURED
The Jaipur oil depot fire broke out on 29 October 2009 at 7:30
PM (IST) at the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) oil depot's giant
tank holding 8,000 kilolitres (280,000 cu ft) of oil, in Sitapura
Industrial Area on the outskirts of Jaipur, Rajasthan, killing 12
people and injuring over 200. The blaze continued to rage out of
control for over a week after it started and during the period half
a million people were evacuated from the area. The oil depot is
about 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) south of the city of Jaipur.
The incident occurred when petrol was being transferred from
the Indian Oil Corporation's oil depot to a pipeline. There were at
least 40 IOC employees at the terminal, situated close to the
Jaipur International Airport) when it caught fire with an
explosion.
The Met department recorded a tremor measuring 2.3 on the
Richter scale around the time the first explosion at 7:36 pm which
resulted in shattering of glass window nearly 3 kilometres (1.9 mi)
from the accident site.
The fire was a major disaster in terms of deaths, injury, loss of
business, property and man-days, displacement of people,
environmental impact in Jaipur, the capital city of the Indian
state of Rajasthan and a popular tourist destination. As per
eyewitnesses having factories and hotels around Indian Oil’s
Sitapura (Jaipur) Oil Terminal they felt presence of petrol vapor
in the atmosphere around 4:00 p.m. on 29 October 2009. Within
the next few hours the concentration of petrol vapor intensified
making it difficult to breathe. The Ayush Hotel in the vicinity of
the terminal asked all its guests to vacate the Hotel to avert any
tragedy. The police, civil administration and fire emergency
services were oblivious of the situation developing in Indian Oil
Terminal.
Around half past six the staff in the terminal had contained the
leak and flow of petrol panicked and reported the matter to
Nearby Sanganer Sadar Police Station. Within the next 30
minutes the local police chief and District Collector were on the
spot along with Indian Oil General Manager, but with no plan to
deal with the situation. The nearby industries, which were
running second shifts, were cautioned to vacate the area.
At 7:35 p.m. a huge ball of fire with loud explosion broke out
engulfing the leaking petrol tank and other nearby petrol tanks
with continuous fire with flames rising 30–35 m (98–115 ft) and
visible from a 30 km (19 mi) radius. The traffic on adjacent
National Highway No. 12 was stopped leading to a 20 km (12 mi)
long traffic jam. The Jaipur International Airport is just 5 km
(3.1 mi) away from the accident site.
Both the Army and experts from Mumbai were employed on 30
October 2009 to contain the fire, which started when an oil tanker
caught fire at the depot in the Sitapura Industrial Area. The
district administration disconnected electricity and evacuated
nearby areas to limit the damage.
The fire still raged on 31 October 2009, in the Indian Oil
Corporation Depot, at Jaipur, after a defective pipe line leak that
set fire to 50,000 kilolitres (1,800,000 cu ft) of diesel and petrol out
of the storage tanks at the IOC Depot. By then, the accident had
already claimed 11 lives and seriously injured more than 150. The
District Administration and Indian Oil Corporation had no
disaster management plan to deal with this kind of calamity. The
local fire officers were ill equipped to deal with fire accidents of
this magnitude.
CONCLUSION
An industrial accident happening in an organisation will not
only affect the industry but with that it will also cause a great
trouble to its employees/workers.
The industry should always try to maintain all the safety and
precautions needed.
Safety awareness that is spreading to all walks of life and all
types of organizations has made `Safety Management' a
potential area of research.
It is observed that industrial accidents, associated financial
losses, and compensation claims eat away considerable portion
of the profit earned by organizations. These also damage the
reputation of organization and lower the morale of the
employees.
The ultimate aim of safety management is to reduce accidents.
As the level of safety management increases, accident rate has
to reduce. This research also explored the predictive validity of
safety management practices along with comparison of safety
management practices in industrial units grouped based on
accident rate.
REFERANCES
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/850/1
5/15_chapter%208.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster
https://blog.ipleaders.in/bhopal-gas-tragedy-case-study/
http://www.icmrindia.org/free%20resources/casestudies/
The%20Bhopal%20Gas%20Tragedy1.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Jaipur_fire
https://www.slideshare.net/AbhishantBaishya/case-study-
fire-in-ioc-terminal
https://www.slideshare.net/sharmasam911/ioc-jaipur
http://www.esriindia.com/~/media/esri-
india/files/pdfs/events/uc2011/papers/DM_UCP0014.pdf