Rural Bank of Anda, Inc. vs.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan 523 SCRA 301(2007)

Facts:-

Lot 736 is part of lot 3, lots 636 and 739 are also part of lot 3-Lot 3 is bounded on the noth by lot 1 nd on
south by a national road.-Lot 1 is titled in the name of the respondent-There is an annotation n the title
od lot 1 stating lot 3’s ownership is claimed byboth respondent and the municipality of Binmaley.-In 1958
the rector orders the construction of a fence separation lot 736 from thenational road to prevent carretela
from parking-The fence enclosing lot 736 has opening but no gat-In 1997, Resolutions nos 104 and 105
converted lot 736 from an institutional lotto a commercial one. And authorize the mayor to enter into a
lease contract withthe rural bank over a portion of lot 736.

-A fence was constructed enclosing a part of lot 736-The mayor and the rector agreed that the
construction of the building should bestopped.-Mayor informed the rector that the construction will
resume but they are willingto compromise.-Respondent then filed an action for abatement of illegal
constructions inunctionand damages in the RTC-RTC ruled in favor of the Respondent-CA affirmed

Issue:

WON lot 736 part of the public domain?

Held:

Yes, The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to school, theseminary, or the church,
which are all located on lots adjoined to it.-Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase
or grant or anyother mode of acquisition.-This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the State ownsall lands and waters of the public domain.-Since it is owned by the state, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded itsauthority in passing the Resolutions.-Thus lot 376 cannot be
leased to another.Republic vs. Naguiat479 SCRA 582 (2006)Facts:-Respondents filed application for
registration of title of 4 parcels of land inzambales.-Respondent claims that she is the owner of the parcels
of land having acquiredthem from her predecessors-in-interest through acquisitive prescription.

-The state opposed the application stating that neither her or her predecessors ininterest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of that lands, and that the parcels of
land are part of the publicdomain-The cour granted the application-CA affirmedIssue:-WON the parcels of
lands were alienable and disposable?Held:-No, the parcels of land were unclassified land and therefore
cannot be acquiredby adverse occupation.-The respondent never presented the required certification
from the propergovernment agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for asalienable
and disposable.-The declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and theirconversion
into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive actfrom the government.
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs ofJULIET B.
PULKERA, Petitioners, vs.CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014

Facts:

Carmeling Crisologo, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican , filed her complaint
forRecovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P.Gabriel,
Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC. Crisologo alleged, among
others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of and covered by, two (2) certificates of
title; that the properties were covered by an Assessment ofReal Property; that the payments of realty
taxes on the said properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners
unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and
knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her
daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo ,and Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded
that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and
promised to buy the said properties for; that despite several demands they were not able to pay and or
vacate.

On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products
of Civil Registration Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court., that
Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for thevalidation of
said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual,exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith.

On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo.The MTCC ruled that
Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, assuch, had declared these
properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid therealty taxes thereon. It stated that with
Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegallyoccupying the land, hence appealed was made with
the RTC which reversed and set aside the MTCC ruling. Appeal to the CA was made.

It held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels of land. It explained
that her possession was established when she acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and
when the certificates of title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her
payment of realty taxes due on the said properties since1969 further strengthened her claim of
possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican as administrator of the subject properties and her offer
to sell the lots to the petitioners showed that she had control over the same. Accordingly, the CA
concluded that Crisologo’s right to remain in possession of the subject lots should be preferred over the
petitioners’ possession regardless of the actual condition of her titles. Hence, the petitioners,
who used force in occupying her properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her lawful
possession of the subject parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over the subject
parcels of land. Both contending parties claim that they have a superior possessory right over the
disputed lands.
HELD:

The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of
land.Accion Publiciana: its nature and purposeAlso known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding todetermine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It refers to an ejectmentsuit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from theunlawful withholding of possession of the realty.The objective of the
plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.When parties, however, raise
the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue todetermine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication,nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership; it is only for thepurpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linkedto the issue of possession.

The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271
isnot absolute.Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of
titlewithin the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the
nullity,however, is not that sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of titlesissued
on or before July 31, 1973shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shallbe deemed to
have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showingproof that the land covered
by the subject title is not within any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military or
otherwise, as certified by appropriating governmentagencies; and 2) compliance by the
titleholder with the payment to the Republic of thePhilippines of the correct assessed value of
the land within the required period.In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land
were registered onAugust 24, 1967.

The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set.But whether or not
Crisologo complied with the said conditions would not matter because, thiswould be a collateral attack on
her registered titles.At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to question
the status ofthe respondent’s registered titles. The Solicitor General shall institute such actions or suits
asmay be necessary to recover possession of lands covered by all void titles not validated underthis
Decree."The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of
land
TRADERS ROYAL BANK V. CA

269 SCRA 15

FACTS:

Filriters through a Detached Agreement transferred ownership to Philfinance a Central Bank Certificate
of Indebtedness. It was only through one of its officers by which the CBCI was conveyed without
authorization from the company. Petitioner and Philfinance later entered into a Repurchase
agreement, on which petitioner bought the CBCI from Philfinance. The latter agreed to
repurchase the CBCI but failed to do so. When the petitioner tried to have it registered in its name in the
CB, the latter didn't want to recognize the transfer.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The CBCI is not a negotiable instrument. The instrument provides for a promise to pay the
registered owner Filriters. Very clearly, the instrument was only payable to Filriters. It lacked the
words of negotiability which should have served as an expression of the consent that the
instrument may be transferred by negotiation.

The language of negotiability which characterize a negotiable paper as a credit instrument is its
freedom to circulate as a substitute for money. Hence, freedom of negotiability is the touchstone
relating to the protection of holders in due course, and the freedom of negotiability is the foundation for
the protection, which the law throws around a holder in due course. This freedom in negotiability
is totally absent in a certificate of indebtedness as it merely acknowledges to pay a sum of
money to a specified person or entity for a period of time.

The transfer of the instrument from Philfinance to TRB was merely an assignment, and is not
governed by the negotiable instruments law. The pertinent question then is—was the transfer of the
CBCI from Filriters to Philfinance and subsequently from Philfinance to TRB, in accord with existing
law, so as to entitle TRB to have the CBCI registered in its name with the Central Bank? Clearly shown
in the record is the fact that Philfinance’s title over CBCI is defective since it acquired the
instrument from Filriters fictitiously. Although the deed of assignment stated that the transfer was for
‘value received‘, there was really no consideration involved. What happened was Philfinance merely
borrowed CBCI from Filriters, a sister corporation. Thus, for lack of any consideration, the
assignment made is a complete nullity. Furthermore, the transfer wasn't in conformity with the
regulations set by the CB. Giving more credence to rule that there was no valid transfer or assignment
to petitioner.
REPUBLIC VS SANTOS (G.R. NO. 160453 NOVEMBER 12, 2012)

Republic of the Philippines vs Santos

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Facts:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079
belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On
May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal
right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457
of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear
and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear
and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article
502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.
It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not
need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time
that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B
that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by
other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable
by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a
showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the
right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain
property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared
by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Republic vs. Santos

August 8, 2017Light

G.R. no. 160453

“The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property
of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person”

Facts:

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan Santos III filed for an application for land registration on the ground of
prescription. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion as the land is limited in the
southeast by the Paranaque river.

The City opposed such registration on the ground that it was only an orchard that had dried up and had
not resulted from accretion.

RTC Affirmed

CA Affirmed

Issue: Whether or not the dried up orchard belongs to the respondent by virtue of Art. 457, NCC

Held: No. Art. 457 states that “To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

Accretion is to be construed as:

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be:

(a) gradual and imperceptible;

(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers

Drying up of the bed is not a process of deposition, given that area of 1,045 square meters could not have
accumulated by a gradual and imperceptible process in the span of about 20 to 30 years.

Petition granted.