13. G.R. No.

L-12686 October 24, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants,

KAMLON HADJI, defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Sulu for different crimes in various cases, to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple injuries; and in Criminal Case
No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et al., for kidnapping with murder and attempted murder.

The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon, leader of the
sedition, to an indeterminate imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of prision mayor as maximum;
to pay a fine of P10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
proportionate costs.

Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby sentenced to indeterminate
imprisonment of THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as
minimum to FIVE (5) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00, each, and in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay
the proportionate costs.

Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukari Abdulialim Adin, Ulloh Urong Angkang Adiad,
Angkang Illama, Sahidula Ajad, lbbing Janah, Kakari Damboa, Akbara Abduhasman, Hatib Hala Amsajen,
Hatib Jaron alias Baito Haron, Awah Kamsa; Waliul Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili Jamli; Sinihag Salihan;
Sarahan Ibba; is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTH
IMPRISONMENT and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9)
MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P3,000.00 and in case
of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.

Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan, Taraman Adil, Kahiral Dastan, Boyongan
Sabiban, Sakkam Hussin, Baybayan Asao, Abdurahman Sahol, Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan Ladialawan
is hereby acquitted of the charges against him with the portionate costs de oficio. Their immediate
release from custody is hereby ordered.
Crim. Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered dismissed with costs de oficio. The
release from custody of all the accused in those cases, except those who are charged or convicted in
another case, is hereby ordered.

In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon to the death penalty for the
kidnapping of Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon complexed with the murder of Jamalul Alling; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000.00, without imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs.

The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which the accused, Kamlon, was found
guilty and sentenced to the death penalty. A co-accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still at large at the time
the lower court rendered its judgment.

In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated that the trial judge
recommended the commutation of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment, The trial judge based his
recommendation upon his finding that the defendant agreed to surrender principally because he was
made to believe by the authorities "that he would be paroled." In the words of the decision of the lower
court, "If the Constabulary officers concerned did not promise any condition to Kamlon for his
surrender, said officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that
Kamlon's parole would be respected or be enforced after all outlaws had surrendered. In one word, the
officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon in double talk. They were not frank.

The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following factual findings:

One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with two
other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected were
responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The search ended when the
defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity
of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with
them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at
that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the
reason for their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or responsibility
for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their protestations of
innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.

Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, they were brought to the market place and, in a store, they were made to sit on chairs,
one beside the other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to the roof by Ulluh. Thus
seated and with their hands tied to the roof, Kamlon leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and
fired, killing him instantly. Kamlon then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man whereupon
Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as he was bidden.

Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta by the shore and paddled out
far into the sea. When he returned, he no longer had with him his gruesome load.
Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he imposed on Jamalul Alling. Instead,
Ajibun was conducted back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged
participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must have caused Kamlon to doubt
Ajibun's guilt because at its end, he was merely told to raise the sum of P105.00 as fine and thereafter
he was set free.

The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court was denied, disavowed and
disputed by the defendant. He offered an entirely different version of the killing. According to Kamlon,
the deceased was shot to death, not by him, but by some relatives of a woman who, on that occasion,
Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were attempting to abduct.

The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be established by the sisters, Bariha
Imam Habilul and Muhayla Iman Habilul, who testified that one day they went to take a bath at a
watering place some 100 brazas from where they were living. While washing their clothes at the same
place and gathering water in bamboo tubes, Bariha suddenly heard Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better
run away. I am being embraced and held by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry because
Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the nearby bushes suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla
and pulled her towards the eastern part of the place, a sitio called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing the
scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran away but was able to see Ajibun and Jamalul holding the hands of
Muhayla.

Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor were her uncle, Adu, and some
other men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji and Uttung, who forthwith armed themselves with guns and
went after Ajibun and Jamalul.

Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun went
inside the vinta and pulled the hands of Muhayla as Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an effort to
place her on board. Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by pushing the vinta, and
while being engaged in this struggle, she heard her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla, duck;" Muhayla ducked by
dropping herself on the sea, face downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water, she heard bursts of
gunfire coming from the place where Adu had given out his order.

After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit Jamalul who fell on the water
almost falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired upon, but he was able to paddle himself away out to the sea.

We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted by the trial court. While the
defendant had indeed insisted that the prosecution version was false and untrue, he has failed to
demonstrate to this Tribunal exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such fallacy and untruth
obtain. This case has resolved itself into a question of who among the witness at the trial were telling
the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves in a better position to answer that than the trial judge who had
his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and just conclusion. While we have merely the
records to guide Us by, the trial judge saw the witnesses, heard them speak, watched them move. He
was, therefore, in the far advantageous position of being able to discriminate more competently than Us
the prevaricators among the witnesses from those who testified the truth. Consequently, as the
evidence on record sufficiently attest to the findings of the lower court, We shall not disturb the same.
The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between the actual commission of the
crime charged and the filing of the same in the trial court — a period of 21 months — attests to the
unreliability of the prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified for the government did
actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they would have forthwith reported the incident to
the authorities and this case would have been filed sooner. It is vigorously impressed on Us that the
delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for the prosecution.

We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised. Although it is true that undue
delay in the prosecution of criminal actions speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's claim, the
same observation cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long though it may be, was imposed on
the government by causes over which it has no control. In the premises and as explained by the Solicitor
General's Office, "the incident took place 15 days before the last military operations against Kamlon.
People in the area affected were in the grip of fear and felt no other than for their personal safety. The
witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of what they knew against Kamlon in the hope,
however, that with the military operations about to be set afoot, retributive justice would catch up with
Kamlon and his henchmen that they might perish in the battle."

The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the defendant that, by the doctrine
enunciated in the cases of People v. Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v. Geronimo, 53 O.G.
No. 1, p. 68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping with murder in spite of the
fact that said acts of violence were committed in furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in this
latter crime."

There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the defendant's claim that
acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez
and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that legal proposition since those two
cases involved the crime of rebellion and not sedition.

Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule of stare decisis, We deem
ourselves unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64,
and People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this Court held:

It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime
against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence
of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime
directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general
sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a
person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign,
with malice aforethought, express or implied.

The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of
law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses com nomine
different, but the allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of the information for
sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside
of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force
of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; that gist of the information
in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight
persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were not
necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted
of these crimes under the first information. (Emphasis supplied)

And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the government's theory that the crime
committed was rebellion complexed with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, but
rather sedition and the said common crimes, We proceeded to convict the defendants therein of the
said crime of sedition and the common crimes of murder, frustrated murder, etc. The dispositive portion
of this last cited case read: "In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson,
frustrated murder and physical injuries. . . ."

Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of the common offenses of
murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.

In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the herein defendant missed a
very significant point. When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were
absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the
rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that reason, were consequently
necessarily alleged to have been committed for political ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no allegation of political motivation, and
the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that
the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by personal vengeance."

There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of record before this Tribunal hands
down Its judgment on appeal. The defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had
been convicted for rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 763
of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon after his conviction, however, he was extended a conditional
pardon by the late President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the pardon, namely: (1)
that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon
would assist the authorities in the surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow himself to be
visited by any authority of the Government and allow him to question him freely; and (4) that he would
cooperate with the Government in the surrender and apprehension of wanted persons in Luuk.

Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon brazenly violated the same. He
did not only fail to report regularly to the authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate
government agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these lawlessness and defiance which
ultimately precipitated and resulted into the various criminal prosecutions enumerated at the start of
this decision, including this one on appeal.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the findings and judgment of the lower court.
The crime committed is kidnapping complexed with murder. We find the death penalty as well as the
indemnity in the amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law and affirm the same with costs
against the defendant
15.G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant.

CARSON, J.:

Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an information charging him with the
crime of "uttering seditious words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, committed as
follows: That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter seditious words and speeches and did write, publish, and
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others
to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies
and riots, and which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of
the community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and
inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government
established by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers
of the people of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of the public peace;
which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in Tagalog language in a
theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was presented by him and others on the
said 14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled
'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow). An exact translation of the said drama
is included in the information, and various parts thereof are specially assigned, which, in the opinion of
the prosecution, were more especially in violation of the statute in such cases made and
provided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did in fact write the drama and
the announcement thereof, substantially as set out in the information, and did, with other members of a
theatrical company, of which he was director, utter and publish the same substantially in manner and
form as charged, and as we understand it, the only question for decision is whether, in writing,
publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was in fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No.
292 of the Philippine Commission, upon which the information was based.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

This section is as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or
which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such
evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Counsel discussed at some length the question whether the drama or any part of it was of a "scurrilous"
nature in the legal acceptation of the word, but for the purposes of this decision we do not deem it
necessary to make a finding on this point. In the case of the United States vs. Fred L. Dorr and Edward F.
O'Brien, 1 decided May 19, 1903, this court said:

The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be punishable as a libel
under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one of
the results enumerated in the section, the article in question being described in the complaint as "a
scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and incites rebellious
conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the
safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands." But it is a "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to
have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in
any one of them, provide that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense." (Com. vs. Kneeland,
20 Pick. Mass. 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive
charges into which the complaint may be separated has been made out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are define in that section, viz: (1) The
uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the
writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of
the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.

In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the judgment of conviction in
this case must be sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as
charged of any one of those offenses. We are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the
drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and
intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to
the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the
present Government and setting up another in its stead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is
charged does not appear from the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary
and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by
the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of the drama took place in the month of
May, 1903, less than two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering
embers of a wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and
there throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of the
Government for their suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed of persons whose
announced purpose and object in organizing was the overthrow of the present Government, was
actively engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these Islands from peaceably accepting the
authority of that Government, and this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still able
to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it hoped to fan into open revolt and
rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions,
renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or artistic production, and
the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events
portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and
immediate application, nor should they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and
director of the play.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact guilty as charged, the court erred in
imposing an excessive and unjust penalty, and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars instead of
Philippine currency. As to the latter objection it is sufficient to say that the use of the word "dollars" was
in strict conformance with the words of the statute, and that the equivalent of that word in Philippine
currency is fixed by law. The penalty was within the limits prescribed by law, and we are not prepared to
hold that the trial court erred in the exercise of its discretion in imposing it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.