G.R. No.

L-34674 October 26, 1931

MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ
of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the
Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No.
328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the
importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to
import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided,
however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding
officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country
make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and
live stock of the lands.

SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were
declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because
Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the
permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the
petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the
petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the
reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. — It shall be
unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine
Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the
department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands,
and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per
annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation,
bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided,
further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into
the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of
Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other
provinces.

"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to
provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also
may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for
the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication,
since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction
2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal.,
600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)

This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it
is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs.
Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the
statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner
would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.

But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid.
As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the
cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of
foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public
welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police
power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147,
152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and
Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did
not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts
recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was
promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature
exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act
upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best
that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that the
power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not
think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and
Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in such case:

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the
Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of
cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It
does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a
tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine
Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock,
82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs.
U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and `amendment.')"

The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.]

SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL.,
Respondents. EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellants.

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE

ORDER PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTION. — The constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in
a declaratory relief proceeding. (Hilado v. De la Costa, 83 Phil., 471).

2. ID.; APPEALS; EFFECT ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION. — It is an elementary rule of

procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a judgment. However in injunction, receivership and
patent accounting cases, a judgment shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken
or during the pendency of an appeal unless otherwise ordered by the court. (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of
Court).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE RESTS IN SOUND DISCRETION OF COURT; CASE AT BAR. — The
State’s counsel contends that while judgment could be stayed in injunction, receivership and patent
accounting cases, the present complaint, although styled "Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Injunction," is one for declaratory relief, there being no allegation sufficient to convince the
Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction. But aside from the title of the complaint,
plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, and for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court
has already held that there are only two requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the
existence of the right sought to be protected, and that the acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right (North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is
no question that in the case at bar, at least 11 of the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed to
operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is undeniable that the executive
enactments sought to be annulled are detrimental to their interests. And considering further that the
granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, rests in the sound discretion of
the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the facts of the particular case (Rodulfa v. Alfonso,
42 Off. Gaz., 2439), the trial Court committed no abuse of discretion when it treated the complaint as
one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment pursuant to the provisions of
section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

4. ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS ONE AGAINST GOVERNMENT; BOND
REQUIREMENT. — An Action against Government officials sued in their official capacity, is essentially
one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a
requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the
real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines (L. S. Moom and Co. v. Harrison, 43 Phil.,
39; Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and others). The reason for this pronouncement is
understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent (Tolentino v. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Government
of the P. I. v. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil., 157, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez Et. Al. v. Camus Et.
Al., 96 Phil., 114).
5. FISHERIES LAW; TRAWL FISHING; WHO MAY BAN OR RESTRICT TRAWL FISHING; POWER OF
PRESIDENT THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDERS, TO BAN TRAWL FISHING. — Under sections 75 and 83 of the
Fisheries Law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the
powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, in compliance with his duties may
even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders
are caught fishing with trawls in Philippine waters. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines (Section 75, Revised Administrative Code), the President can exercise the same power and
authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of
the Secretary concerned (Section 79-A, Revised Administrative Code). Hence, Executive Orders Nos. 22,
66 and 80, series of 1954, restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay (Camarines) are
valid and issued by authority of law.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature
fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or
fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the supply of sea food, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions
as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. In so far as the
protection of fish fry or fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act is complete in itself leaving only to the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the legislative intent. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people
and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means
of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard
for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern
(Section 63, Revised Administrative Code) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
The exercise of such authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers of
Congress.

FELIX, J.:

San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the
National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250 square miles and an average depth of
approximately 6 fathoms (Otter trawl explorations in Philippine waters — p. 21, Exh. B), is considered as
the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in 1950, trawl 1
operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them settling at
Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay.
On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the
depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the
inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. This move was
manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), passed by the Municipal Mayors’ League
condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and
resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it
closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the
same League of Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San
Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein (Exh. 4). The Provincial Governor also made
proper representations to this effect and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl fishermen were likewise
presented to the President by social and civic organizations as the NAMFREL (National Movement for
Free Elections) and the COMPADRE (Committee for Philippine Action in Development, Reconstruction
and Education), recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if
such inquiry would substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing method was detrimental
to the welfare of the majority of the inhabitants (Exh. 2).

In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz.,
1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by
Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037), apparently in answer to a
resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during
the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz., 5198)
was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries, represented by the
Legal Adviser of said Department and a Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, answered
the complaint alleging, among other things, that of the 18 plaintiffs (Exequiel Soriano, Teodora Donato,
Felipe Concepcion, Venancio Correa, Santo Gaviana, Alfredo General, Constancio Gutierrez, Arsenio de
Guzman, Pedro Lazaro, Porfirio Lazaro, Deljie de Leon, Jose Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio
Salgado, Porfirio San Juan, Luis Sioco, Casimiro Villar and Enrique Voluntad), only 11 were issued licenses
to operate fishing boats for the year 1954 (Annex B, petition — L-8895); that the executive orders in
question were issued in accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau of Fisheries of the
use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the general welfare of the public could be
disregarded, and set up the affirmative defenses that since plaintiffs question the validity of the
executive orders issued by the President, then the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Director of Fisheries were not the real parties in interest; that said executive orders do not
constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law, and therefore prayed that the
complaint be dismissed (Exh. B, petition, L-8895).

During the trial of the case, the Governor of Camarines Sur appearing for the municipalities of Siruma,
Tinambac, Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said province, called the attention of the Court that the
Solicitor General had not been notified of the proceeding. To this manifestation, the Court ruled that in
view of the circumstances of the case, and as the Solicitor General would only be interested in
maintaining the legality of the executive orders sought to be impugned, Section 4 of Rule 66 could be
interpreted to mean that the trial could go on and the Solicitor General could be notified before
judgment is entered.
After the evidence for both parties was submitted and the Solicitor General was allowed to file his
memorandum, the Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, the last part of which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact that Congress has seen fit
to define under what conditions it may be done by the enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of
Congress must be of transcendental significance. It is primarily within the fields of legislation not of
execution; for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in definite territorial waters. The court
can not accept that Congress had intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on this matter of
national importance. To accept respondents’ view would be to sanction the exercise of legislative power
by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel Bay now, it may be Davao Gulf tomorrow, and so on. That may
be done only by Congress. This being the conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Until the
trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation. The remedy for respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to
go to the Legislature. The result will be to issue the writ prayed for, even though this be to strike at
public clamor and to annul the orders of the President issued in response therefor. This is a task
unwelcome and unpleasant; unfortunately, courts of justice use only one measure for both the rich and
poor, and are not bound by the more popular cause when they give judgments.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid; the injunction
prayed for is ordered to issue; no pronouncement as to costs."

Petitioners immediately filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of injunction which was
opposed by the Solicitor General and after the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court
issued an order dated February 19, 1955, denying respondents’ motion to set aside judgment and
ordering them to file a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955, as a condition for the
non- issuance of the injunction prayed for by petitioners pending appeal. The Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit, and the Court, acting upon the motion
for new trial filed by respondents, issued another order on March 3, 1955, denying said motion and
granting the injunction prayed for by petitioners upon the latter’s filing a bond for P30,000 unless
respondents could secure a writ of preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court on or before March
15, 1955. Respondents, therefore, brought the matter to this Court in a petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction, docketed as G. R. No. L-8895, and on the same day filed a notice
to appeal from the order of the lower court dated February 2, 1955, which appeal was docketed in this
Court as G. R. No. L-9191.

In the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners (respondents therein) contended among other
things, that the order of the respondent Judge requiring petitioners Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1,
1955, had been issued without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or at the very least with grave abuse of
discretion, because by requiring the bond, the Republic of the Philippines was in effect made a party
defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one against the Government which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to entertain; that the failure to give the Solicitor General the
opportunity to defend the validity of the challenged executive orders resulted in the receipt of
objectionable matters at the hearing; that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not empower a court of
law to pass upon the validity of an executive order in a declaratory relief proceeding; that the
respondent Judge did not have the power to grant the injunction as Section 4 of Rule 39 does not apply
to declaratory relief proceedings but only to injunction, receivership and patent accounting proceedings;
and prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from
enforcing its order of March 3, 1955, and for such other relief as may be deem just and equitable in the
premises. This petition was given due course and the hearing on the merits was set by this Court for
April 12, 1955, but no writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

Meanwhile, the appeal (G. R. No. L-9191) was heard on October 3, 1956, wherein respondents-
appellants ascribed to the lower court the commission of the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1. In ruling that the President has no authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 banning the
operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;

2. In holding that the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes has not been delegated to the
President of the Philippines under the Fisheries Act;

3. In not considering Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 as declaring a closed season pursuant to
Section 7, Act 4003, as amended, otherwise known as the Fisheries Act;

4. In holding that to uphold the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 22 and 80 would be to sanction the
exercise of legislative power by executive decrees;

5. In its suggestion that the only remedy for respondents and the people of the coastal towns of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the Legislature; and

6. In declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid and in ordering the injunction prayed for to
issue.

As Our decision in the prohibition and certiorari case (G. R. No. L-8895) would depend, in the last
analysis, on Our ruling in the appeal of the respondents in case G. R. No. L-9191, We shall first proceed
to dispose of the latter case.

It is indisputable that the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 in response to the clamor
of the inhabitants of the municipalities along the coastline of San Miguel Bay. They read as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22

"PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN

SAN MIGUEL BAY"

"In order to effectively protect the municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other aquatic resources of the area, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Fishing by means of trawls (utase, otter and/or perenzella) of any kind, in the waters comprised
within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited.

"2. Trawl shall mean, for the purpose of this Order, a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the
mouth kept open by a device, the whole affair being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom
of the sea to capture demersal, ground or bottom species.

"3. Violation of the provisions of this Order shall subject the offender to the penalty provided under
Section 83 of Act 4993, or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of April, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the eighth." (50 Off. Gaz. 1421).

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 66

"AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, ENTITLED ‘PROHIBITING THE USE OF
TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY’

"By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines, do
hereby amend Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as
defined in said Executive Order, within that portion of San Miguel Bay north of a straight line drawn
from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur. Fishing by means of
trawls south of said line shall still be absolutely prohibited.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of September, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and
fifty-four, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 4037).

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 80

"FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 66, DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 1954

"By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines, do
hereby amend Executive Order No. 66, dated September 23, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of
trawls, as defined in Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, within that portion of San Miguel Bay
north of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality of Mercedes, Province of
Camarines Norte to Balocbaloc Point in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur, until
December 31, 1954, only.

Thereafter, the provisions of said Executive Order No. 22 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of
trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full force and
effect as originally provided therein.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
fifty-four and of the Independence of the Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 5198)

It is likewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity of said executive orders in their petition for a
writ of injunction and/or declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that the
lower court, upon declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid, issued an order requiring the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond for P30,000
if the writ of injunction restraining them from enforcing the executive orders in question must be
stayed.

The Solicitor General avers that the constitutionality of an executive order cannot be ventilated in a
declaratory relief proceeding. We find this untenable, for this Court taking cognizance of an appeal from
the decision of the lower court in the case of Hilado v. De la Costa Et. Al., 83 Phil., 471, which involves
the constitutionality of another executive order presented in an action for declaratory relief, in effect
accepted the propriety of such action.

This question being eliminated, the main issues left for Our determination with respect to defendants’
appeal (G. R. No. L-9191), are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their
capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against
them;

(2) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80,
banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other words, whether said Executive
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were issued in accordance with law; and

(3) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

Counsel for both parties presented commendable exhaustive defenses in support of their respective
stands. Certainly, these cases deserve such efforts, not only because the constitutionality of an act of a
coordinate branch in our tripartite system of Government is in issue, but also because of the number of
inhabitants, admittedly classified as "subsistence fishermen", that may be affected by any ruling that We
may promulgate herein.

I. As to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a
judgment. An exception is offered by section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. INJUNCTION, RECEIVERSHIP AND PATENT ACCOUNTING, NOT STAYED. — Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction or in a receivership action, or a judgment or
order directing an accounting in an action for infringement of letter patent, shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The trial court, however, in
its discretion, when an appeal is taken from a judgment granting, dissolving or denying an injunction,
may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction during the pendency of
an appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the
rights of the adverse party."cralaw virtua1aw library

This provision was the basis of the order of the lower court dated February 19, 1955, requiring the filing
by the respondents of a bond for P30,000 as a condition for the non-issuance of the injunction prayed
for by plaintiffs therein, and which the Solicitor General charged to have been issued in excess of
jurisdiction. The State’s counsel, however, alleges that while judgment could be stayed in injunction,
receivership and patent accounting cases and although the complaint was styled "Injunction and/or
Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction", the case is necessarily one for declaratory relief, there
being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for
injunction. But aside from the title of the complaint, We find that plaintiffs pray for the declaration of
the nullity of Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and for
such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court has already held that there are only
two requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to be
protected, and that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right
(North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question that at least 11 of
the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the
Philippines, and it is undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are detrimental to
their interests. And considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary
or permanent, rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the
facts of the particular case (Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil., 225, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439), We find no abuse of
discretion when the trial Court treated the complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief and
executed the judgment pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party defendants in Civil Case No. 24867 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila are Salvador Araneta, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and Deogracias Villadolid, as Director of Fisheries, and were sued in such capacities because
they were the officers charged with duty of carrying out the statutes, orders and regulations on fishing
and fisheries. In its order of February 19, 1955, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to set aside
judgment and they were required to file a bond for P30,000 to answer for damages that plaintiffs were
allegedly suffering at the time, as otherwise the injunction prayed for by the latter would be issued.

Because of these facts, We agree with the Solicitor General when he says that the action, being one
against herein petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, and
to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as
regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of
the Philippines (L. S. Moon and Co. v. Harrison, 43 Phil., 39; Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and
others). The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent
(Tolentino v. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
34 Phil., 157, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez Et. Al. v. Camus Et. Al. * G. R. No. L-6725, promulgated October
30, 1954). However, as the records show that herein petitioners failed to put up the bond required by
the lower court, allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor General’s Office (giving the
impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their
control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings in G. R. No. L-8895,
were enforced, if at all, 1 in accordance with section 4 of Rule 39, which We hold to be applicable to the
case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a bond,
becomes moot and academic.

II. Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial judge extending the
controversy to the determination of which between the Legislative and Executive Departments of the
Government had "the power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters" instead of limiting the
same to the real issue raised by the enactment of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, specially the first
and the last "absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all the waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay", ruled in favor of Congress, and as the closing of any definite area of the Philippine waters
is, according to His Honor, primarily within the fields of legislation and Congress had not intended to
abdicate its power to legislate on the matter, he maintained, as stated before, that "until the trawler is
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines
Sur is to go to the Legislature," and thus declared said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid."

The Solicitor General, on the contrary, asserts that the President is empowered by law to issue the
executive enactments in question.

Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003, known as the Fisheries Law, the latter two sections as amended
by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 6. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED. — Words and terms used in this Act shall be construed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

TAKE or TAKING, includes pursuing, shooting, killing, capturing, trapping, snaring, and netting fish and
other aquatic animals, and all lesser acts, such as disturbing, wounding, stupefying, or placing, setting,
drawing, or using any net or other device commonly used to take or collect fish and other aquatic
animals, whether they result in taking or not, and includes every attempt to take and every act of
assistance to every other person in taking or attempting to take or collect fish and other aquatic
animals: PROVIDED, That whenever taking is allowed by law, reference is had to taking by lawful means
and in lawful manner.

"SEC. 13. PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS. — Except for scientific or educational purpose or for
propagation, it shall be unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs and the small fish, not more than three
(3) centimeters long, known as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the Philippines. Towards this end, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be authorized to provide by regulations such restrictions as
may be deemed necessary to be imposed on THE USE OF ANY FISHING NET OR FISHING DEVICE FOR THE
PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS; Provided, however, That the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall permit the taking of young of certain species of fish known as hipon under such restrictions as may
be deemed necessary.

"SEC. 75. FISH REFUGES AND SANCTUARIES. — Upon the recommendation of the officer or chief of the
bureau, office or service concerned, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce may set aside and
establish fishery reservation or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be
prescribed by him. All streams, ponds, and waters within the game refuge, birds sanctuaries, national
parks, botanical gardens, communal forests and communal pastures are hereby declared fishing refuges
and sanctuaries. It shall be unlawful for any person, to take, destroy or kill in any of the places
aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish
eggs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Act No. 4003 further provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 83. OTHER VIOLATIONS. — Any other violation of the provisions of this Act or any rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court."cralaw
virtua1aw library
As may be seen from the just quoted provisions, the law declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the
taking (except for scientific or educational purposes or for propagation), destroying or killing of any fish
fry or fish eggs, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources) is authorized to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or fishing
device (which includes the net used by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as
to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the
manner prescribed by him, from which no person could lawfully take, destroy or kill in any of the places
aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom any small or immature fish,
fry or fish eggs. It is true that said section 75 mentions certain streams, ponds and waters within the
game refuges, . . . communal forests, etc., which the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries, but
this enumeration of places does not curtail the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside and establish fishery
reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel
Bay in Camarines.

From the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal Mayors held at Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on
December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), the following manifestation is made:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the continuous operation of said trawls even during the close season as specified in said
Executive Order No. 20 caused the wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the
millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie; in order to save the shrimps
specie from eventual extermination and in order to conserve the shrimps specie for posterity;"

In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL and addressed to the President of the Philippines (Exh. 2), in
support of the petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen (allegedly 6,175 in number), praying that trawlers
be banned from operating in San Miguel Bay, it is also stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They
destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps
scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea: algea, shell fish and star fish . . .

"The absence of some species or the apparent decline in the catch of some fishermen operating in the
bay may be due to several factors, namely: the indiscriminate catching of fry and immature sizes of
fishes, the wide spread use of explosives inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of the bay, and
the extensive operation of the trawls." (p. 9, Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A).

Extensive Operation of Trawls: — The strenuous effect of the operations of the 17 TRAWLS of the
demersal fisheries of San Miguel Bay is better appreciated when we consider the fact that out of its
about 850 square kilometers area, only about 350 square kilometers of 5 fathoms up could be trawled.
With their continuous operation, coupled with those of the numerous fishing methods, the fisheries is
greatly strained. This is shown by the fact that in view of the non- observance of the close season from
May to October, each year, majority of their catch are immature. If their operation would continue
unrestricted, the supply would be greatly depleted." (p. 11, Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A).
San Miguel Bay — can sustain 3 to 4 small trawlers (Otter Trawl Explorations in Philippine Waters,
Research Report 25 of the Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of the Interior, p. 9,
Exhibit B).

According to Annex A of the complaint filed in the lower court in Civil Case No. 24867 — G. R. No. L —
9191 (Exh. D, p. 53 of the folder of Exhibits), the 18 plaintiffs-appellees operate 29 trawling boats, and
their operation must be in a big scale considering the investments plaintiffs have made therefor,
amounting to P387,000 (Record on Appeal, p. 16-17).

In virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the manifestations just copied, We are of the
opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all
Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in
violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in Philippine waters.

Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or
ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, is obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs and frys which
should be preserved, can the President of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority?
Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 10(1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. — Administrative acts and commands of
the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the districts, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and
commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of
general concern shall be made in executive orders."cralaw virtua1aw library

Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All executive functions of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the
Executive Department subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in
matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of
the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that
each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each
Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the
Government under his control and supervision.

For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the Department Head
of the Executive Office.." . . .
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed
under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general
supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.) . Moreover, "executive
orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction
of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the
Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective
Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.) , and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned
Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive
Orders, was made a party defendant in one of the cases at bar (G. R. No. L-9191).

For the foregoing reasons We do not hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series
of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.

III. But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute an undue delegation of the
powers of Congress?

As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the
conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of the law consists in that the former necessarily
involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made (Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234, 239. See also Rubi, Et. Al. v. The
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660).

In the case of U. S. v. Ang Tang Ho., 43 Phil. 1, We also held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act
No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-
General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There
is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a
crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471,
which have been aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish
eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed
necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or
fish eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of, Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be
prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places, or
in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (Sec. 75); and (d) it
penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than
P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83).
From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the
Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the
promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the
exhibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother
shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps
specie" (Exh. F), and that "the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into
the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net
millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea" (Exh. 2).

In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and
immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any
fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to
that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines
Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters
comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were
in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations We render judgment, as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Declaring that the issues involved in case G. R. No. L-8895 have become moot, as no writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued by this Court enjoining the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIV, from enforcing his order of March 3, 1955; and

(b) Reversing the decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L- 9191; dissolving the writ of injunction
prayed for in the lower court by plaintiffs, if any has been actually issued by the court a quo; and
declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority
of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act.

Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,

vs.

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX (Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders
dated December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional
increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a denial of due
process.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies
filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases (docketed as ERB Case Nos. 90-106,
90-382 and 90-384, respectively).

On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. Maceda v. ERB, et al., G.R.
No. 95203), seeking to nullify the provisional increase. We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990,
reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8
of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:

What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does
not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final
disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to
deny the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex-parte and which are subject to the
resolution of the main case.

Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the
other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the
jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority
to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The
Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority-which
is of course, the better procedure — however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
(pp. 129-130, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the applications
for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to
appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing on October 17, 1990.
To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the ERB set the
continuation of the hearing to October 24, 1990. This was postponed to November 5, 1990, on written
notice of petitioner Maceda.

On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or admit
amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of petroleum products.

The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same
time requiring applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two newspapers of
general circulation (p. 4, Rollo and Annexes "F" and "G," pp. 60 and 62, Rollo).

Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief commenced on November 21, 1990 with ERB
ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits (p. 6, Rollo). ERB subsequently
outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence, as follows:

CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:

Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex presented its evidence-in-chief and there is an understanding
or it is the Board's wish that for purposes of good order in the presentation of the evidence considering
that these are being heard together, we will defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's witness
and ask the other applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors win have a better
Idea of what an of these will lead to because as I mentioned earlier, it has been traditional and it is the
intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept, reject,
modify or whatever, the Board win do it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way to have (sic) the
oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for is to have all the evidence-
in-chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the cross-examination will
come later. . . . (pp. 5-6, tsn., November 23, 1990, ERB Cases Nos. 90-106, 90382 and 90-384). (p. 162,
Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross-
examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of
Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.

We disagree. The Solicitor General has pointed out:

. . . The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the
general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in
permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper (88 C.J.S. 206-207).

Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of
rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such
administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings (Sec. 29, Public Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346, U.S. 389, 98 L. ed. 132, 74 S. St.
152). (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB
provides that —
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all
matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the jurisdiction of
the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except
itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.

Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial evidence on record to support the provisional
relief.

We have, in G.R. Nos. 95203-05, previously taken judicial notice of matters and events related to the oil
industry, as follows:

. . . (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen
to P28.00 to $1.00; (3) the country's balance of payments is expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade
deficit is at P2.855 Billion as of the first nine months of the year.

The Solicitor General likewise commented:

Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested provisional relief were:
(1) certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the private respondents; (2) reports
of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the peso-dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and (3)
OPSF status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs. The ERB was likewise guided in the determination of
international crude oil prices by traditional authoritative sources of information on crude oil and
petroleum products, such as Platt's Oilgram and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. (p. 158, Rollo)

Thus, We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price, as We note that the
Order of December 5, 1990 explicitly stated:

in the light, therefore, of the rise in crude oil importation costs, which as earlier mentioned, reached an
average of $30.3318 per barrel at $25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the huge OPSF deficit
which, as reported by the Office of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Billion (based on filed claims
only and net of the P5 Billion OPSF) as of September 30, 1990, and is estimated to further increase to
over P10 Billion by end December 1990; the decision of the government to discontinue subsidizing oil
prices in view of inflationary pressures; the apparent inadequacy of the proposed additional P5.1 Billion
government appropriation for the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso in relation to the US
dollar to P28/US $, this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant applicants oil companies further
relief by increasing the prices of petroleum products sold by them. (p. 161, Rollo)

Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G.R. No. 96349) also claim that the provisional
increase involved amounts over and above that sought by the petitioning oil companies.

The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the increase in crude oil prices, all the applications
of the respondent oil companies filed with the ERB covered claims from the OPSF.

We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990 granting a provisional price increase on
petroleum products premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims, crude cost peso differentials, forex risk
for a subsidy on sale to NPC (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies are "entitled to as much relief as the
fact alleged constituting the course of action may warrant," (Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., G.R.
No. L-28297, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 261 citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Aguilar v. Rubiato, 40
Phil. 470) as follows:
Per Liter Weighted

Petron Shell Caltex Average

Crude Cost P3.11 P3.6047 P2.9248 P3.1523

Peso Cost

Diffn'l 2.1747 1.5203 1.5669 1.8123

Forex Risk

Fee -0.1089 -0,0719 -0.0790 -0.0896

Subsidy on

Sales to NPC 0.1955 0.0685 0.0590 0.1203

Total Price

Increase

Applied for P59.3713 P5.1216 P4.4717 P4.9954

Less: September 21 Price

Relief

Actual Price Increase P1.42

Actual Tax Reduction:

Ad Valorem Tax

(per Sept. 1, 1990 price build-up) P1.3333

Specific Tax (per Oct. 5, 1990 price build-up) .6264 .7069 2.1269

Net Price Increase

Applied for 2.8685

Nonetheless, it is relevant to point out that on December 10, 1990, the ERB, in response to the
President's appeal, brought back the increases in Premium and Regular gasoline to the levels mandated
by the December 5, 1990 Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively), as follows:

Product In Pesos Per Liter

OPSF

Premium Gasoline 6.9600

Regular Gasoline 6.3900

Avturbo 4.9950

Kerosene 1.4100

Diesel Oil 1.4100

Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.2405

LPG 1.2200

Asphalt 2.5000

Thinner 2.5000

In G.R. No. 96349, petitioner Original additionally claims that if the price increase will be used to
augment the OPSF this will constitute illegal taxation. In the Maceda case, (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, supra)
this Court has already ruled that "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase
to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956,
as amended by Executive Order No. 137.

The petitions of E.O. Original et al. (G.R. No. 96349) and C.S. Povedas, Jr. (G.R. No. 96284), insofar as
they question the ERB's authority under Sec. 8 of E.O. 172, have become moot and academic.

We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional increase in oil price. We have stated that this
"is a question best judged by the political leadership" (G.R. Nos. 95203-05, G.R. Nos. 95119-21, supra).
We wish to reiterate Our previous pronouncements therein that while the government is able to justify
a provisional increase, these findings "are not final, and it is up to petitioners to demonstrate that the
present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase."

In this regard, We also note the Solicitor General's comments that "the ERB is not averse to the idea of a
presidential review of its decision," except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. Perhaps,
as pointed out by Justice Padilla, our lawmakers may see the wisdom of allowing presidential review of
the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still "an administrative body
under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the
established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies," especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost an Filipinos.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a
non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The
herein respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report
and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably
recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on
increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —

(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20
per cent without the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school fees
beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion of the DECS;

(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided that the total
schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary levels, and
P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the collegiate level. 1

The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the
respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent
Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as
recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently
on the ground that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37
dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to
15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987,
the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines urging the
suspension of the implementation of Department Order No. 37. 4 No response appears to have been
obtained from the Office of the President.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court
and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department
Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department
Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner
was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the
power to increase school fees. 5

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested
parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum,
the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due
process of law.

Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent Secretary submitted a Comment on the
Petition. 7 The respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that the increase in tuition and other school
fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character. In due
time, the petitioner submitted a Reply to the Comment. 8 Thereafter, We considered the case
submitted for resolution.

After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of merit.

We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always include
the power to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The
Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country,
to wit:

SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall:

(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with declared policy.

Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to
discharge its functions and duties under the law, to wit:

SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education and Culture, charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations.

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No
other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power
should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and
duties under the law.

We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes the due process
clause of the Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department Order. The
petitioner maintains that the due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable
for the Department Order to be validly issued.

We disagree.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity
of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. 9a

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so.
The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of its issuance.

This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and
convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without
any justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to
assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an
increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so
admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to
15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the assailed
Department Order arbitrary.

Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 10 In the
absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the
party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not
successfully disputed the presumption.

We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the public, especially the parents and the
students of the country. Its zeal in advocating the protection of the consumers in its activities should be
lauded rather than discouraged. But a more convincing case should be made out by it if it is to seek
relief from the courts some time in the future. Petitioner must establish that respondent acted without
or in excess of her jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law before the extraordinary writ of
prohibition may issue. 11

This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its judicial imprimatur to future
increases in school fees. The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to an
outrageous exercise of government authority and power. In such an eventuality, this Court will not
hesitate to exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security
providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:

Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized

Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.

Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-

up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created,
chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:

Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority

Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government

Secretary, Department of Health

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,

Administrator, Social Security System,

Administrator, National Statistics Office

Managing Director, National Computer Center.

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC
and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.

Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall
serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the
standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.

Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned
agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.

Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office
of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.

Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Six.

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO.
308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2

Respondents counter-argue:

A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;

C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;

D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3

We now resolve.

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se
and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

II

We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make
laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and
cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will
be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 11
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. 13

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance. 17

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he
has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or
interfere with the discretion of its officials.19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has
the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 20

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders. 23

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that
A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general
law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to
serve the

people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on
the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions,
Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions
and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for
the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers
both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on
private individuals or parties outside government. 27

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security,
the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President
to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject
that should be covered by law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation
and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the
established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher:
". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must
he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the
general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws." 28

III

Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the
United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right
has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:

Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees
that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married
persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to
privacy has come into its own.

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication
likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 44

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."

Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print,
signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin
number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual
holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and
turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is
stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This
technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another
method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary
pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51
Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique
combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric
achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red
cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood
vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It
is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an
individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek
its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the
fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base
through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other
basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O.
No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms
how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the
data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the
privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is
broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose,
or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology
are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on
his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the
Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63

The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an

individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a
privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its
danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a
laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if
it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the
fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the
reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings
and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of
biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.
71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology
becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer
technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of
privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations
merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.

Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual
to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS
employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and
the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming
part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason
why its enactment should be given to Congress.

Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using
the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and
speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication
of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these
purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.
76

We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the
law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his
sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No.
308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court
will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for
the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it
enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if
not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the
presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude
abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect
human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards
the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.

The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a
centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required
physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a
recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients
can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who
were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of
their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that
once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded
a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an
aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an
orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed
commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn
and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated
who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing
penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy
was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital
safeguards.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use
of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek.
Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social
objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management
of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making
accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82
The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83
introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual,
armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from
libraries and databases connected to the net.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85
and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that
any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The
reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:

The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society. 87

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th
case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of
Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his
past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too
quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being
the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district
of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards
the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and
obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6
of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as
under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of
any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of
the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry
out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of
the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did
not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December
9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23,
1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said
commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that
neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution
and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
united States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader
aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so
far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls
the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies.
If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the
entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and
judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the
contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to
be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter
shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in
the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to
its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral
instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged;
that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election
of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is
not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The
municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal council
proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is
no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another
who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to
give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz.
This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-
thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the
eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that
question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

Sr. ROXAS. "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece
que da a la Comision Electoral la "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas."
Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took
place:
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives
a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition
of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the
petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the
standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee
they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence,
together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same
manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open
one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required
to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they
pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted
elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse
vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted
under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the
same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the
existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious
that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met
with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was
the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it
"was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of
the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading
statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr.
Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England,
vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of
June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As
the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member
of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States
and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte
Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power
claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in
such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse
is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must
be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to
it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies
might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In
the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations
of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record
of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members
of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of
any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return
of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases
of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons,
and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the
same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue
of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the
particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment
of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in
the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time.
This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members
not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
[Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs.
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to
have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation
of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
LEGISLATIVE v. INTERPRETATIVE RULE:

A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to
be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION. G.R. No. 119761. August 29, 1996]

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.On
various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the
World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of
'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the
foreign brand category. Fortune also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original register
and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. RA 7654 was passed in it
was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands carrying a foreign name. Two
days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in
which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local
brands carrying a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a
motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also
denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.

RULING: NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign
brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its
amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity
were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were
subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated
under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then ignored.

The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.