Article IV: Citizenship

Title of the Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

Poe-Llamansares Grace Poe was found Whether as a Yes. Foundlings are as a class,
vs.COMELEC abandoned in a church in foundling, Poe is a natural born citizens.
(2016) Jaro Iloilo sometime in natural born Citizen While the 1935
1968. Constitution is silent as to
Foundling: an Parental care was passed to foundlings, there is no
infant that has the relatives of Edgardo restrictive language that
been abandoned Militar, who is the person would exclude them
by its parents and who found the child. either. Because of silence
is discovered and The relatives then reported and ambiguity in the
cared for by others and registered the child as enumeration, there is a
a foundling with the Civil need to examine the intent
Registrar of Iloilo; she was of the framers.
then named Mary Grace The amendment to the
Militar. Constitution proposed by
The child was subsequently constitutionalist Rafols to
adopted by Fernando Poe, include foundlings as
Jr and Susan Roces natural born citizens was
sometime in 1974. not carried out, not
Necessary annotations because there was any
were placed in the child’s objection to the notion
foundling certificate but it that persons of unknown
was only in 2005 that parentage are not citizens,
Susan Roces discovered but only because their
that their lawyer failed to number was not enough to
secure a new Certificate of merit specific mention.
Live Birth indicating Poe’s There was no intent or
new name as well as the language that would
name of the adoptive permit discrimination
parents. Roces then
submitted an affidavit and
in 2006, a Certificate of
Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Poe was
released by the Civil
Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was
registered as a voter of San
Juan. In 1988, she was
issued a Philippine
passport. In 1991, Poe
married Teodoro
Llamanzares and flew to
the US right after the
wedding. She then gave
birth to her eldest child in
the US. In 2001, Poe
became a naturalized
American Citizen and she
obtained a US Passport that
same year.
In April 2004, Poe came
back to the Philippines in
order to support her
father’s candidacy. It was at
this time that she gave
birth to her youngest
daughter. She then
returned to the US in July
2004 with her two
daughters. Poe returned in
December 2004 after
against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee
the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
Likewise, domestic laws
on adoption support the
principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that
adoption confers
citizenship upon the
adoptee, rather, the
adoptee must be Filipino
in the first place to be
adopted. Recent legislation
all expressly refer to
“Filipino children” and
include foundlings as
among Filipino children
who may be adopted.
The argument that the
process to determine that
the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate are
acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship is
without merit. Hence, the
argument that as a
foundling, Poe underwent
a process in order to
learning of her father’s
deteriorating condition.
The latter died and Poe
stayed until February 2005
to take care of the funeral
arrangements.
Poe stated that she wanted
to be with her grieving
mother hence, she and her
husband decided to move
and reside permanently in
the Philippines sometime
first quarter of 2005. They
prepared for resettlement
including notification of
their children’s schools,
coordination with property
movers and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to
how they can bring their
pet dog. According to Poe,
as early as 2004, she
already quit her job in the
US.
Poe came home on May 24,
2005 and immediately
secured a TIN while her
husband stayed in the US.
She and her family stayed
with her mother until she
and husband was able to
purchase a condominium
in San Juan sometime
acquire or perfect her
Philippine citizenship, is
untenable.
“Having to perform an act”
means that the act must be
personally done by the
citizen. In this case, the
determination of foundling
status was done by
authorities, not by Poe.
Second, the object of the
process is to determine
the whereabouts of the
parents, not the
citizenship of the child and
lastly, the process is not
analogous to
naturalization
proceedings.
Under international law,
foundlings are citizens.
Generally accepted
principles of international
law which include
international customs
form part of the laws of
the land. The common
thread of the Universal
Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and
February 2006. On
February 14, 2006, Poe
returned to the US to
dispose the other family
belongings. She travelled
back in March 2006. In
early 2006, Poe and
husband acquired a
property in Corinthian Hills
in Quezon City where they
built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took
her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to
R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006,
she filed a sworn petition
to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with
petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her
three children. The Bureau
of Immigration acted in
favor of the petition on July
18, 2006. She and her
children were then
considered dual citizens.
Poe then registered as
voter in August 2006 and
secured a Philippine
passport thereafter.
On October 6, 2010, she
was appointed as
the International Convent
on Civil and Political
Rights obligates the
Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and
to ensure that no child is
stateless. The principles
stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on
Certain Questions
Relation to the
Conflict of
Nationality laws
(that a foundling is
presumed to have
the nationality of
the country of
birth) 

2. Convention on the
Reduction of
Statelessness
(foundling is
presumed born of
citizens of the
country where he is
found) 

bind the Philippines
although we are not
signatory to these
Chairperson of the MTRCB.
Before assuming her post,
she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance
to the US before a notary
public in Pasig City on
October 20, 2010. The
following day, she
submitted the Affidavit to
the Bureau of Immigration
and took her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson.
According to Poe, she
stopped using her
American passport from
then on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe
executed an
Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality
of the US before the Vice
Consul of the US Embassy
in Manila. On December 9,
2011, the US Vice Consul
issued a Certificate of Loss
of Nationality of the US
effective October 21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, Poe
filed with COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator stating that she
was a resident of the
Philippines for a period of
conventions.
Although we are not a
signatory to the Hague
Convention, we are a
signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) which
affirms Article 14 of the
Hague Convention.
Likewise, the Convention
on the Reduction of
Statelessness affirms
Article 15 of the UDHR. By
analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed
the International
Convention for the
Protection of Persons from
Enforced Disappearance,
we (the Supreme Court)
ruled that the proscription
against enforced
disappearance was
nonetheless binding as a
generally accepted
principle of international
law.
Poe’s evidence shows that
at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South
America and Europe have
6 years and 6 months passed legislation
before May 13, 2013. She recognizing foundlings as
was then proclaimed a its citizens. 166 out of 189
Senator on May 16, 2013. countries accept that
On October 15, 2015, Poe foundlings are recognized
filed her COC for the as citizens. Hence, there is
Presidency for the May a generally accepted
2016 elections. She principle of international
declared that she is a law to presume foundlings
natural born and her as having been born and a
residence in the Philippine national of the country in
up to the day before which it is found.
election would be 10 years
and 11 months counted Hence, as a foundling, Poe
from May 24, 2005. is a natural born Filipino
Several petitions were filed citizen.
against Poe alleging that
(1) she committed material
misrepresentation in her
COC when she stated that
she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10
years 11 months up to the
day before May 9, 2016
Elections, (2) she is not
natural born considering
that Poe is a foundling. It
was argued that
international law does not
confer natural born status
and Filipino citizenship to
foundlings hence, she is not
qualified to apply for
 reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A.9225
as she is not a natural
citizen to begin with.
Assuming that Poe was a
natural born citizen, she
lost it when she became a
US Citizen.

COMELEC ruled against the

petitioner resolving that
she is not a natural born
citizen and that she failed
to complete the 10 year
residency requirement.
Hence, the present petition
for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

David vs. Senate Senator Mary Grace Poe-
Electoral Llamanzares is a foundling
Tribunal whose biological parents
(2016) are unknown. As an infant,
she was abandoned at the
Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo. She was later
adopted and raised by
spouses FPJ and Susan
Roces. She took her college
degree in the USA. She
returns to the Philippines
frequently.
WoN Grace Poe is Yes. (voting 9-3, From the deliberations of
eligible to sit as a the Court ruled in the 1934 Constitutional
Senator favor of Poe) Convention on citizenship,
it was never the intention
of the framers to exclude
foundlings from natural-
born citizenship status.
“Children or people born
in a country of unknown
parents are citizens of this
nation” and the only
reason that there was no
specific reference to

On July 29, 1991, Senator
Poe decided to settle in the
US with her husband and
children and lived there for
some time. She was
naturalized and granted
American citizenship on
October 18, 2001. She was
subsequently given a
United States passport.
When FPJ ran for President
in 2004, she returned to
support her father's
candidacy. After the
Elections, she returned to
the United States on July 8,
2004.
On December 14, 2004, FPJ
died. She stayed in the
country until February 3,
2005 to attend her father's
funeral and to attend to the
settling of his estate.
In 2004, Senator Poe
resigned from work in the
United States and decided
to return home in 2005.
She came back on May 24,
2005.
foundlings in the 1935
provision was that these
cases “are few and far in
between.” Evident intent
was to adopt the concept
found in the Spanish Code
“wherein all children of
unknown parentage born
in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards,
because the presumption
is that a child of unknown
parentage is the son of a
Spaniard.”
Under Art. 14 of the Hague
Convention of 1930 (on
Conflict of Nationality
Laws), a foundling is
presumed to have been
born on the territory of the
State in which it was found
until the contrary is
proved. Although the
Philippines is not a
signatory to said
convention, its provisions
are binding as they form
part of the law of the land
pursuant to the
incorporation clause.
Senator Roxas in the 1934
Constitutional Convention
remarked “By

On July 7, 2006, she took
the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines
In July 2006, her Petition
for Retention and or Re-
acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship and derivative
citizenship on behalf of her
three children were
granted.
Senator Poe became a
registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City on August 31,
2006.
Senator Poe made several
trips to the United States of
America between 2006 and
2009 using her United
States Passport. She used
her passport "after having
taken her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic
on 07 July 2006, but not
after she has formally
renounced her American
citizenship on 20 October
2010.
On October 6, 2010,
international law the
principle that children or
people born in a country of
unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is
recognized…” By referring
to this rule in international
law (which was no other
than Art. 14 of the Hague
Convention of 1930), what
was effectively created in
the Constitution itself, was
an exception to the general
rule of natural-born
citizenship based on blood
descent.
Hence, foundlings
(children born in the
Philippines with unknown
parentage) were, by birth,
accorded natural-born
citizenship by the
Constitution. “natural-
born citizens by legal
fiction”The framers of the
Constitution were
sufficiently empowered to
create a class of natural-
born citizens by legal
fiction, as an exception to
the jus sanguinis rule. This
is evident from Art. 1
(State to determine who
President Aquino
appointed Senator Poe as
Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and
Classification Board
(MTRCB). On October 20,
2010, Senator Poe executed
an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance
to the United States of
America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship.
Senator Poe executed an
Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality
of the United States on July
12, 2011.
Senator Poe decided to run
as Senator in the 2013
Elections and eventually
won.
David, a losing candidate
in the 2013 Senatorial
Elections, filed before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
a Petition for Quo
Warranto on August 6,
2015. He contested the
election of Senator Poe
for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and
residency requirements
are its nationals) and Art.
2 (questions on nationality
to be determined by the
law of that State) of the
1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her
natural-born Filipino
citizenship upon taking
her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, as required
under Section 3, R.A. No.
9225. Before assuming her
position as MTRCB
Chairman, Poe executed an
affidavit of renunciation of
foreign citizenship. This
was sufficient to qualify
her for her appointive
position, and later, her
elective office as R.A. No.
9225 did not require that
her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the
U.S. Embassy be first
approved in order that she
may qualify for office.
Records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that
Poe still used her U.S.
passport after having
taken her Oath of
Allegiance but not after
she has renounced her U.S.
 mandated by the
Constitution.
On November 17, 2015, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed
Decision finding Senator
Poe to be a natural-born
citizen and, therefore,
qualified to hold office as
Senator.
Hence, this petition.
Tecson vs. Victorino X. Fornier,
COMELEC petitioner initiated a
(2004) petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify FPJ
and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when
in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish
WoN FPJ is a natural Yes.
born Filipino Citizen
Citizenship.
It is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or
not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether
or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking
after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be
national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the
allegation of the
illegitimate birth of
respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
drawn from the
presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the
Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon
his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other
evidence, could have well
been his place of residence
before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that
the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of
whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.

Valles vs. In 1992, private
COMELEC respondent Rosalind
(2000) Ybasco Lopez ran for and
was elected governor of
Davao Oriental.
Her election was contested
by her opponent, Gil
Taojo, Jr., in a petition for
quo warranto.
However, finding no
sufficient proof that Lopez
had renounced her
But while the totality of
the evidence may not
establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would
preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of
having made a material
misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of
the Omnibus Election
Code.
1. Whether 1.) Yes. 1. Yes. The Philippine law
respondent is a 2.) No. on citizenship adheres to
Filipino the principle of jus
2. If she is, whether sanguinis. Thereunder, a
she renounced her child follows the
citizenship by nationality or citizenship
applying for ACR and of the parents regardless
ICR and being issued of the place of his/her
an Australian birth, as opposed to the
passport. doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
Philippine citizenship,
COMELEC en banc
dismissed the petition.
When Lopez ran for re-
election in the 1995
elections, her opponent,
Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for
disqualification,
contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said
petition was likewise
denied by the COMELEC.
The citizenship of private
respondent was once again
raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental
in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy
was questioned by the
petitioner Cirilo Valles.
The COMELEC, however,
dismissed the petition,
ruling that Lopez is a
Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run
for a public office because
(1) her father, Telesforo
Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen,
Private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was born on May 16, 1934
in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco,
a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an
Australian. Historically,
this was a year before the
1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time,
what served as the
Constitution of the
Philippines were the
principal organic acts by
which the United States
governed the
country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August
29, 1916, also known as
the Jones Law.
Under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Jones Law, all
inhabitants of the
Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April
and by virtue of the
principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen
under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was
married to a Filipino,
thereby making her also a
Filipino citizen ipso jure
under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473;
(3) and that, she renounced
her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as
certified to by the
Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4)
furthermore, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions in
EPC No. 92-54 and SPA
Case No. 95-066, declaring
her a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the
elective position of Davao
Oriental governor.
Petitioner thus filed a
petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court,
11, 1899 and resided
therein including their
children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was
born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a
certified true copy of an
entry in the Registry
of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be
a Philippine citizen. By
virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in
force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a
citizen of the Philippines.
The principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was
subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the
herein private respondent,
maintaining that the Lopez
is an Australian citizen,
placing reliance on the
admitted facts that: a) In
1988, private respondent
registered herself with the
Bureau of Immigration as
an Australian national and
was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695
dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she
applied for the issuance of
an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and c) She
was issued Australian
Passport No. H700888 on
March 3, 1988.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having
been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is
not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus
soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
2. No. Under
Commonwealth Act No.
63, a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a
foreign country;
(2) By express
renunciation of
citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to
support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one
years of age or more;

(4) By accepting
commission in the
military, naval or air
service of a foreign
country;

(5) By cancellation of the

certificate of
naturalization;

(6) By having been

declared by competent
authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in
time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman,

upon her marriage, to a
foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her
husband’s country,
she acquires his
nationality.

In order that citizenship

may be lost by
renunciation, such
renunciation must be
express. The mere fact
that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an
Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts
constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship
and do not militate against
her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must
be express. As held by this
court in the case of Aznar,
an application for
an alien certificate of
registration does
not amount to an express
renunciation or
repudiation of one’s
citizenship. The applicatio
n of the herein private
respondent for
an alien certificate of
registration, and her
holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs.
Manzano, were mere acts
of assertion of her
 Australian citizenship
before she effectively
renounced the
same. Thus, at the most,
private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was
an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under
Commonwealth Act 63, the
fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born
in another country has not
been included as a ground
for losing one’s Philippine
citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitioner’s
claim that respondent
must go through the
process of repatriation
does not hold water.

The rule on formal offer of

Ong Chia vs. Ong Chia was born on WON the CA erred in No. evidence (Rule 132, §34)
Republic January 1, 1923 in Amoy, admitting the documents is clearly not applicable to
(2000) China. In 1932, as a nine- annexed by the State to the present case involving
year old boy, he arrived at its appellant’s brief on a petition for
the port of Manila on board
the vessel "Angking." Since
then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found
employment and
eventually started his own
business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had
four children. On July 4,
1989, at the age of 66, he
filed a verified petition to
be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under C.A. No. 473,
otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended.
On August 25, 1999, the
trial court granted the
petition and admitted Ong
Chia to Philippine
citizenship. The State,
however, through the
Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed
contending that petitioner:
(1) failed to state all the
names by which he is or
had been known; (2) failed
to state all his former
places of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473,
§7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and
the ground that they naturalization. The only
were not presented and instance when said rules
formally offered as may be applied by analogy
evidence or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is
"practicable and
convenient." That is not
the case here, since
reliance upon the
documents presented by
the State for the first time
on appeal, in fact, appears
to be the more practical
and convenient course of
action considering that
decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not
covered by the rule on res
judicata. 14 Consequently, a
final favorable judgment
does not preclude the
State from later on moving
for a revocation of the
grant of naturalization on
the basis of the same
documents.
The reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission
of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party
the chance to object to
irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of
§2; (4) has no known
lucrative trade or
occupation and his
previous incomes have
been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in
contravention of §2; and
(5) failed to support his
petition with the
appropriate documentary
evidence.
Annexed to the State's
appellant's brief was a copy
of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special
Committee on
Naturalization in SCN Case
No. 031767, in which
petitioner stated that in
addition to his name of
"Ong Chia," he had likewise
been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia
Ong." As petitioner,
however, failed to state this
other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization,
it was contended that his
petition must fail. The state
their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner
cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity
of the documents
submitted to the appellate
court by the State. He
could have included his
objections, as he, in fact,
did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the Court
notes that these
documents — namely, the
petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the
joint affidavit executed by
him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax
returns — are all public
documents. As such, they
have been executed under
oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner
failed to make a
satisfactory showing of
any flaw or irregularity
that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these
documents, it is our
also annexed income tax
returns allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to
1977 to show that his net
income could hardly
support himself and his
family. To prove that
petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner
during his stay in the
Philippines, the State
contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he
and Ramona Villaruel had
been married twice, once
before a judge in 1953, and
then again in church in
1977, petitioner actually
lived with his wife without
the benefit of marriage
from 1953 until they were
married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner
failed to present his 1953
marriage contract, if there
be any. The State also
annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage
contract and a Joint-
Affidavit executed by
petitioner and his wife.
These documents show
conclusion that the
appellate court did not err
in relying upon them.
One last point. petitioner's
failure to include the
address "J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A.
No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document
which forms part of the
records as Annex A of his
1989 petition for
naturalization.
Naturalization laws should
be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor
of the government and
against the applicant. 22 As
noted by the State, C.A. No.
473, §7 clearly provides
that the applicant for
naturalization shall set
forth in the petition his
present and former places
of residence. 23 This
provision and the rule of
strict application of the
law in naturalization cases
that when petitioner defeat petitioner's
married Ramona Villaruel argument of "substantial
on February 23, 1977, no compliance" with the
marriage license had been requirement under the
required in accordance Revised Naturalization
with Art.76 of the Civil Law. On this ground alone,
Code because petitioner the instant petition ought
and Ramona Villaruel had to be denied.
been living together as
husband and wife since
1953 without the benefit of
marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim
that when he started living
with his wife in 1953, they
had already been married.
The State also argued that,
as shown by petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street,
Iloilo," but he did not
include said address in his
petition.
On November 15, 1996, the
Court of Appeals rendered
its decision which, as
already noted, reversed the
trial court and denied
petitioner's application for
naturalization. It ruled that
due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from
raising questions not
presented in the lower
court and brought up for
the first time on appeal.
Ong Chia's principal
contention is that the
appellate court erred in
considering the documents
which had merely been
annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on
the basis of which, justified
the reversal of the trial
court's decision. Not having
been presented and
formally offered as
evidence, they are mere
"scrap(s) of paper devoid
of any evidentiary value,"
so it was argued, because
under Rule 132, §34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence,
the court shall consider no
evidence which has not
been formally offered.
Ong Chia admits that he
failed to mention said
address in his petition, but
argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had
been fully published, with
 the petition and the other
annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial
compliance with Section 7.

Board of Yes, Gatchalian is

Commissioners On July 12, 1960, Santiago Whether or not a Filipino Citizen. The very basis of the
vs. De la Rosa Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian is a Board of Commissioners
(197 SCRA 853) William Gatchalian, was Filipino citizen. in reversing the decision
recognized by the Bureau of the Board of Special
of Immigration as a native Inquiry was due to a
born Filipino citizen forged cablegram by the
following the citizenship then Secretary of Foreign
of his natural born Affairs, which was
mother, Marciana dispatched to the
Gatchalian. Philippine Consulate in
Hong Kong authorizing
On June 27, 1961, William the registration
Gatchalian, then a twelve- of applicants as P.I.
year old minor, arrived in citizens.
Manila from Hongkong
together with In matters of
Gloria, Francisco and implementing the
Johnson Gatchalian. They Immigration Act insofar
had with them Certificate as deportation
of Registration and of aliensare concerned,
Identity issued by the the Commissioner of
Philippine Consulate in Immigration may issue
Hongkong based on a warrants of arrest only
cablegram bearing the after a determination by
signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino
citizens. After
investigation, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1
rendered a decision dated
July 5, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and
his companions as Filipino
citizens and was issued
Identification Certificates.
On January 24, 1962, the
then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No.
9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to
have been rendered by the
Board of Commissioners
on appeal or on review
motu proprio of decisions
of the Board of Special
Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the
Board of Commissioners
to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the
ground that
the entrant was a who is admittedly a
Philippine citizen. Among
those cases was that of
the Board of
Commissioners of the
existence of the ground
for deportation as
charged against the alien.
A warrant of arrest issued
by the Commissioner of
Immigration for the
purpose of investigation
only, as in the case at bar,
is null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Philippine law, following
lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a
marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid
everywhere. Having
declared the assailed
marriages as valid,
respondent William
Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his
father Francisco, a
Filipino, as a legitimate
child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn,
is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child
of Santiago Gatchalian
Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was
William and others.On recognized by the Bureau
July 6, 1962, the new of Immigration in an
Board of Commissioners, order dated July 12, 1960.
reversed the decision of
the Board of Special Finally, respondent
Inquiry and ordered William Gatchalian
the exclusion of, among belongs to the class of
others, respondent Filipino citizens
Gatchalian. contemplated under
Sometime in 1973, Section 1, Article IV of the
respondent Gatchalian, as Consititution.
well as the others covered
by the July 6, 1961
warrant of exclusion, filed
a motion for re-hearing
with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the
deportation case against
them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973,

Acting Commissioner Nitu
da issued an order
reaffirming the July 6,
1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby
admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino
citizen and recalled the
warrant of arrest issued
against him.
On June 7, 1990, the
acting director of the
National Bureau of
Investigation wrote the
Secretary of Justice
recommending that the
respondent Gatchalian
along with the
other applicants covered
by the warrant
of exclusion be charged
with violation against the
Immigration Act of 1940.

On August 1, 1990, the

Secretary of Justice
indorsed the
recommendation of the
NBI to
the Commissioner of
Immigration for
investigation and
immediate action.
On August 15, 1990,
petitioner Domingo of the
Commission of
Immigration and
Deportation issued a
mission order
commanding the arrest of
respondent William
Gatchalian. The latter
appeared
before Commissioner Do
mingo on August 20, 1990
and was released on the
same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990,

William Gatchalian filed a
petition for certiorari and
prohibition with
injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of
Manila, presided by
respondent
Judge dela Rosa. On
September 4, 1990,
petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss the case
alleging that respondent
judge has no jurisdiction
over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the
Board of Special Inquiry.

On September 6, 1990,
respondent’s wife and
minor children filed
before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela for
injunction with writ of
preliminary injunction.
That petitioners acted
without or in excess of
jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation
proceedings against
William. Respondent
Capulong issued the
 questioned temporary
restraining order
restraining petitioners
from continuing with the
deportation proceedings
against William
Gatchalian.
Co. vs. Electoral This case arose when the
Tribunal petitioner, Antonio Y, Co
(199 SCRA 692) filed an election protest on
the grounds that Jose Ong,
Jr is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines
and not a resident of
second district of Northern
Samar.Prior to this, the
Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives
declared that respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The
congressional election for
the second district of
Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who
vied for the position of
representative in the
WoN Jose Ong, Jr. is a Yes. Yes. In the year 1895, the
citizen of the respondent’s grandfather,
Philippines Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China
and established his
residence in the
municipality of Laoang,
Samar. The father of the
respondent, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China
in 1905 but was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the
year 1915, he filed with
the court an application
for naturalization and was
declared a Filipino citizen.
In 1984, the private
respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree
Lim. For the elections of
1984 and1986, Jose Ong,
Jr. registered himself as a
voter of Laoang, Samar,
second legislative district
are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio
Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the
second district of Northern
Samar.
and voted there during
those elections. Under the
1973 Constitution, those
born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien
father were placed on
equal footing. They were
both considered as natural
born citizens. Besides,
respondent did more than
merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has
established his life here in
the Philippines. On the
issue of residence, it is not
required that a person
should have a house in
order to establish his
residence and domicile. It
is enough that he should
live in the municipality or
in a rented house or in that
of friend or relative. To
require him to own
property in order to be
eligible to run for Congress
would be the same as to a
property qualification. The
Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet
the age, citizenship, voting
and residence

Frivaldo vs. Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo
COMELEC was proclaimed governor-
(174 SCRA 245) elect and assume office in
due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of Frivaldo’s
election and proclamation
on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in
the United States. Frivaldo
admitted the allegation but
pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that
his naturalization was
merely forced upon himself
as a means of survival
against the unrelenting
prosecution by the Martial
Law Dictator’s agent
abroad.
requirements.
WoN Frivaldo was a No. No. Section 117 of the
citizen of the Omnibus Election Code
Philippines at the provides that a qualified
time of his election voter must be, among
other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines,
this being an
indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
Even if he did lose his
naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have
the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in
the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public
office are continuing
requirements and must be
possessed not only at the
time of appointment or
election or assumption of
office but during the
officer’s entire tenure.
Frivaldo declared not a

Frivaldo vs. Frivaldo J. was elected as
COMELEC Governor of the province of
(257 SCRA 727) Sorsogon on January 22,
1988. On October 27, 1988
the League of Cities of
Sorsogon President,
Salvador Estuye, filed a
petition to COMELEC
requesting to disqualify
Frivaldo from his office on
the grounds that he was a
naturalized citizen of the
USA.
Frivaldo admitted, but said
that he was only forced to
do so since during the time
of the Marcos Regime, he
was considered as an
enemy and he went to the
USA seeking refuge and his
naturalization is not
impressed with
voluntariness as he went
back after the Marcos
Regime to the country to
help the restoration of
WoN Juan G. Frivaldo No.
was a citizen of the
Philippines at the
time of his election on
January 18, 1988
citizen of the Philippines
and therefore disqualified
from serving as a
Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon.
Petition denied. Frivaldo is
NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and is
disqualified from serving
as the Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon;
vacancy shall be filled by
the elected Vice-Governor.
Local Government Code
Section 42 indicates that a
candidate for local elective
office must be a citizen of
the philippines and a
qualified voter of the
constituency where he is
running.
Omnibus Election Code
section 117 states that a
qualified voter, among
other qualifications, must
be a citizen of the
Philippines.
The Court rules that
Frivaldo was NOT a citizen
 democracy.
He implies that he
reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by participating
in the election.
The case was approved by
COMELEC and a motion to
dismiss was filed by
Frivaldo. Although such
motion was denied; to
which Frivaldo filed a
motion for certiorari and
prohibition to the court.
Tabasa vs. CA When he was 7 years old,
(2006) Joevanie A. Tabasa
acquired American
citizenship when his father
became a naturalized
citizen of the US. In 1995,
he arrived in the
Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan";
thereafter, he was arrested
and detained by the agent
of the Philippines at the
time of his election as
the evidence shown from
the certification of the
US District Court of
North California.
Frivaldo’s argument that
he reacquired his
Philippine citizenship
through the participation
in the election which in his
view repatriated him to
which the Court refutes
that there are proper
methods to which one can
reacquire citizenship;
either through direct act of
Congress, Naturalization
or Repatriation, to which
Frivaldo did not access to.
WoN he has validly No. Such act no No. Petitioner is not
reacquired Philippine longer applies to qualified to avail himself of
Citizenship under RA Tabasa since he is repatriation under RA
No. 8171 and no longer a minor. 8171. The only person
therefore, is not an Petitioner was entitled to repatriation
undocumented alien already 35 years under RA 8171 is either a
subject to deportation of age when he Filipino woman who lost
filed for her Philippine citizenship
repatriation. by marriage to an alien, or
a natural-born Filipino,
including his minor
 of BIR. Th Consul General
of the US embassy of
Manila filed a request with
the BID that his passport
has been revoked and that
Tabasa had a standing
warrant for several federal
charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he
acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation
in accordance with the RA
No. 8171, and that because
he is now a Filipino citizen,
he cannot be deported or
detained by the BID.
Labo, Jr. vs. In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr.
COMELEC was elected as mayor of
(176 SCRA 1) Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition
for quo warranto against
Labo as Lardizabal asserts
that Labo is an Australian
citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as
an Australian after he
married an Australian.
Labo avers that his
marriage with an
Australian did not make
him an Australian; that at
WoN Labo can retain No.
his public office due to
his citizenship
children who lost
Philippine citizenship on
account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35
years old when he filed for
repatriation. The act
cannot be applied in his
case because he is no
longer a minor at the time
of his repatriation in 1996.
The privilege under RA
8171 only belongs to
children who are of minor
age at the time of filing of
the petition for
repatriation.
No. Labo did not question
the authenticity of
evidence presented
against him. He was
naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was
not his marriage to an
Australian that made him
an Australian. It was his
act of subsequently
swearing by taking an oath
of allegiance to the
government of Australia.
He did not dispute that he
needed an Australian
best he has dual
citizenship, Australian and
Filipino; that even if he
indeed became an
Australian when he
married an Australian
citizen, such citizenship
was lost when his marriage
with the Australian was
later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo
further asserts that even if
he’s considered as an
Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere
technicality which should
not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio who
voted for him by a vast
majority.
passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and
that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot
be said also that he is a
dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when
he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also
claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino.
To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated
or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress
– none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner,
cannot serve public office.
His claim that his lack of
citizenship should not
overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable.
The people of Baguio could
not have, even
unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local
Government Code and the

Labo, Jr. vs. For the second time
COMELEC around, believing that he is
(211 SCRA 297) a Filipino ctizen, Ramon
Labo, Jr filed his COC for
mayor of Baguio City on
March 23, 1992 for the May
11, 1992 elections.
Petitioner Roberto Ortega
on other hand, also filed his
COC for the same office on
March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992,
WoN petitioner Labo, No.
who had the highest
number of votes, is
qualified to assume as
Mayor of Baguio City
Constitution simply by
electing a foreigner
(curiously, would Baguio
have voted for Labo had
they known he is
Australian). The electorate
had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing
no allegiance to the
Republic of the
Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of
the Philippines have that
privilege over their
countrymen.
No. At the time petitioner
Labo filed his petition on
May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec
cancelling his (Labo’s)
certificate of candidacy
had already become final
and executory a day
earlier, or on May 14,
1992, said resolution
having been received by
petitioner Labo on the
petitioner Ortega filed a
disqualification proceeding
against Labo before the
COMELEC on the ground
that Labo is not a Filipino
citizen.
On May 9, 1992,
respondent Comelec issued
the assailed resolution
denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992,
respondent Comelec issued
an Order which reads:
Acting on the “Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for
Clarification”, filed by
respondent (Labo) on May
9, 1992, the Commission
resolves that the decision
promulgated on May 9,
1992 disqualifying
respondent Ramon L. Labo,
Jr., shall become final and
executory only after five
(5) days from
promulgation pursuant to
Rule 18, Section 13,
Paragraph (b) of the
Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
same day it was
promulgated, i.e., May 9,
1992 and in the interim no
restraining order was
issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling
Labo’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground
that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired
finality on May 14, 1992
constrains the SC to rule
against his proclamation
as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides
that an elective local
official must be a citizen of
the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner
Labo, not being a Filipino
citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification
for the contested office.
Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement
for holding an elective
office. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of
the electorate is of no
moment.
Accordingly, respondent
(Labo) may still continue to
be voted upon as candidate
for City Mayor of Baguio
City on May 11, 1992
subject to the final outcome
of this case in the event the
issue is elevated to the
Supreme Court either on
appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992,

respondent Comelec
resolved, motu proprio to
suspend the proclamation
of Labo in the event he
wins in the elections for the
City Mayor of Baguio.

On May 15, 1992,

petitioner Labo filed the
instant petition for review
with prayer, among others,
for the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order to set aside the May
9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to
render judgment declaring
him as a Filipino citizen;
and to direct respondent
Comelec to proceed with
his proclamation in the
event he wins in the
contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues

that respondent Comelec
committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused
to implement its May 9,
1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact
that said resolution
disqualifying Labo has
already become final and
executory.

Petitioner Ortega submits

that since this Court did not
issue a temporary
restraining order as
regards the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent
Comelec cancelling Labo’s
certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has already
become final and
executory. Ortega further
posits the view that as a
result of such finality, the
candidate receiving the
next highest number of
votes should be declared
Mayor of Baguio City.
Aznar vs. Osmeña On 19 November 1987,
(185 SCRA 703) private respondent filed his
certification of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the
position of Governor of
Cebu. Petitioner filed with
the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification of Osmeña
on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino
citizen.
In 27 January 1988,
Petitioner filed a Formal
Manifestation submitting a
certificate issued by the
then Immigration and
Deportation Commission
that Osmeña is an
American Citizen.
According to the evidence
presented, Osmeña
maintained that he is a
Filipino Citizen, that he is a
legitimate son of Emilio
Osmeña, a Filipino and son
of the Late President Sergio
Osmeña Sr., that he is a
holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine
passport and been
continuously residing in
the Philippines since birth
Whether or not Yes.
Osmeña remains a
Filipino and loss of his
Philippine Citizenship
cannot be presumed
Yes, Petitioner failed to
present direct proof that
Osmeña had lost his
Filipino Citizenship by any
of the modes provided for
under C.A. No. 63 these are
:
1. By naturalization in
foreign country;
2. By express renunciation
of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution
or Law of the foreign
country.
The evidence clearly
shows that Osmeña did
not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the
three (3) mentioned
hereinaboved or any other
modes of losing Philippine
citizenship.
The 1987 Constitution,
Article IV, Section 5 states
“Dual allegiance of citizens
is iniminical to the
 and that he has been a
registered voter in the
Philippines.
COMELEC dismissed the
petition for Disqualification
for not having been
timingly filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that
private respondent is not s
Filipino citizen and Osmeña
was proclaim of winning
candidates for obtaining
the highest number of
votes.
Mercado vs. Petitioner Ernesto Mercado
Manzano and Eduardo Manzano
(1999) were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the
election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of
votes. However, his
proclamation was
suspended due to the
pending petition for
disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the
ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines
national interest and shall
be dealt with by law” has
no retroactive effect.
The petition for certiorari
DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the
COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Whether or not a dual No. This is The court ruled that the
citizen is disqualified because for phrase "dual citizenship"
to hold public elective candidates with in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
office in the dual citizenship, it and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must
philippines. should suffice if, be understood as referring
upon filing of to dual allegiance. Dual
their certificates citizenship is different
of candidacy, they from dual allegiance. The
elect Philippine former arises when, as a
citizenship to result of the application of
terminate their the different laws of two
status as persons or more states, a person is
with dual simultaneously considered
citizenship a national by the said
considering that states. Dual allegiance on
their condition is the other hand, refers to a
the unavoidable situation in which a
but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it
appears that Manzano is
both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
The Commission on
Elections declared
Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent
resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, the
disqualification of the
respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to
have renounced his US
citizenship when he
attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a
voter in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually
proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
consequence of person simultaneously
conflicting laws of owes, by some positive act,
different states. loyalty to two or more
states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is a result
of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process
with respect to the
termination of their status,
for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of
candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as
persons with dual
citizenship considering
that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of
different states.

By electing Philippine
citizenship, such
candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance
to the other country of
which they are also
citizens and thereby
terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of
view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an
individual has not
effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is
of no moment.

When a person applying

for citizenship by
naturalization takes an
oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other
country or government
and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied
and complied with. The
determination whether
such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the
provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is
an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative
department of the
Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere
with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the

filing of certificate of
candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship,
effectively removing any
disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another
country; that he will
defend and support the
Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does
so without mental
reservation, private
respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American
citizenship and anything
which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private

respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the
Philippines, when
considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received
his education, practiced
his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past
elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be

taken upon the faith that
he will fulfill his
undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine
citizenship through
expatriation in
appropriate proceedings.
In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
the court sustained the
denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on
the ground that, after
taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of
his Portuguese passport
and declared in
commercial documents
executed abroad that he
was a Portuguese national.
A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who,
in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some
act constituting
renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari

is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
In re: Application Vicente D. Ching, a
to the bar of legitimate child of a
Vicente Ching Filipino mother and an
(1999) alien Chinese father, was
born on April 11, 1964 in
Tubao La Union, under the
1935 Constitution. He has
resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor
of Laws at SLU in Baguio on
July 1998, filed an
application to take the
1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this
Court, he was allowed to
take the bar if he submit to
the Court the following
documents as proof of his
Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by
the PRC Board of
Accountancy that Ching is a
certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification
issued COMELEC in Tubao
La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter
of his place; and
3. Certification showing
that Ching was elected as
member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of
WoN he has elected No. He failed to No. Ching, despite the
Philippine citizenship elect Philippine special circumstances,
within a “reasonable Citizenship within failed to elect Philippine
time” three years from citizenship within a
“upon reaching reasonable time. The
the age of reasonable time means
majority” that the election should be
made within 3 years from
"upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21
years old. Instead, he
elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of
majority which the court
considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching
offered no reason why he
delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as
procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is
not a tedious and
painstaking process. All
that is required is an
affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and
file the same with the
nearest civil registry.
Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was
one of the bar passers. The
oath taking ceremony was
scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable
status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not
allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit
further proof of his
citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor
General was required to
file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935
Constitution, was a Chinese
citizen and continue to be
so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he
elected Philippine
citizenship, under the
compliance with the
provisions of
Commonwealth Act No.
265 "an act providing for
the manner in which the
option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be
declared by a person
 whose mother is a Filipino
citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching
has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship, and
if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed
by the present
jurisprudence.
Bengson vs. The citizenship of
HRET respondent Teodoro C.
(2001) Cruz is at issue in this case,
in view of the
ad cautelam: “for constitutional requirement
security”; “to be on that "no person shall be a
the safe side” Member of the House of
Representatives unless he
is a natural-born citizen."
Respondent Cruz was a
natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985,
however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the
WoN respondent Cruz, Yes. Repatriation YES. Repatriation results
a natural-born results in the in the recovery of the
Filipino who became recovery of the original nationality. This
an American citizen, original means that a naturalized
can still be considered nationality. Filipino who lost his
a natural-born citizenship will be
Filipino upon his restored to his prior status
reacquisition of his as a naturalized Filipino
Philippine citizenship. citizen. In respondent
Cruz's case, he lost his
Filipino citizenship when
he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the
United States. However,
he subsequently
reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No.
2630. Having thus taken
the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry
Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance
to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service
to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a
foreign country."
On March 17, 1994,
respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through
repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.[3]
He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of
the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Subsequently, petitioner
filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam
with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming
that respondent Cruz was
not qualified to become a
member of the House of
of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited
provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original
status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It
bears stressing that the act
of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his
original status before he
lost his Philippine
citizenship.
As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go
through naturalization
proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship,
he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the
necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of
the House of
Representatives.
The petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
 Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article
VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
AASJS-Calilung Petitioner filed a petition
vs. Datumanong for prohibition to prevent
(2007) Justice Secretary
Datumanong from
implementing R. A. 9225
entitled "An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63,
As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." which was
signed into law by
President Gloria M. Arroyo
on August 29, 2003.
Petitioner argued that R.A.
9225 is unconstitutional as
it violates Sec. 5, Article VI
of the Constitution which
states that “dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to
national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.”
1.) WoN RA No. 9225 1.) No. 1. No. It is clear that the
is unconstitutional intent of the legislature in
2.) No. In drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
2.) WoN the Court has accordance with is to do away with the
jurisdiction to pass the doctrine of the provision in
upon the issue of dual separation of Commonwealth Act No.
allegiance powers 635 which takes away
Philippine citizenship
from natural-born
Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep.
Act No. 9225 does is allow
dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly,
Petitioner contends that RA
9225 cheapens Philippine
citizenship. He avers that
Sections 2 and 3 thereof,
together, allow dual
allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner
maintains that Section 2
allows all Filipinos, either
natural-born or
naturalized, who become
foreign citizens, to retain
their Philippine citizenship
without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3
permits dual allegiance
because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the
Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of
allegiance without
forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) claims that
Section 2 merely declares
as a state policy that
"Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another
country shall be deemed
not to have lost their
from Section 3, Rep. Act
No. 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the
issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to
the concerned foreign
country. What happens to
the other citizenship was
not made a concern of Rep.
Act No. 9225.
2. Section 5, Article IV of
the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and
it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature
still has to enact the law
on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, the framers
were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of
naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin
even after their
naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to
draft a law that would set
Philippine citizenship." The
OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not
allow dual allegiance since
the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an
effective renunciation and
repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that
the applicant taking the
oath recognizes and
accepts the supreme
authority of the Philippines
is an unmistakable and
categorical affirmation of
his undivided loyalty to the
Republic.
specific parameters of
what really constitutes
dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be
premature for the judicial
department, including this
Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual
allegiance.
Moreover, in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, we said
that the courts must
assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and
passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of
promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare
of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the
acts of the legislature are
in tune with the
fundamental law, we must
proceed with judicial
restraint and act with
caution and forbearance.
The doctrine of separation
of powers demands no

Cabiling Ma vs. Petitioners Felix, Jr.,
COMELEC Balgamelo and Valeriano
(2013) are 2 of the children of
Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,1 a
Taiwanese, and Dolores
Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
Records reveal that
petitioners were children
born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father.
They were all raised in the
Philippines and have
resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole
lives, studied and received
their primary and
secondary education in the
country; they do not speak
nor understand the Chinese
WoN the omission No.
negates their rights to
Filipino citizenship as
children of a Filipino
mother, and erase the
years lived and spent
as Filipinos
less. We cannot arrogate
the duty of setting the
parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance
when the Constitution
itself has clearly delegated
the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual
allegiance for study and
legislation by Congress.
The Court is guided by this
evolvement from election
of Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935
Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the
election requirement
under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express
classification of these
children as natural-born
citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the
conclusion that the
omission of the 1941
statutory requirement of
registration of the
documents of election
should not result in the
obliteration of the right to
Philippine citizenship.
language, have not set foot
in Taiwan, and do not know
any relative of their father;
they have not even traveled
abroad; and they have
already raised their
respective families in the
Philippines who executed
an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and
took their oath of
allegiance to the
government upon reaching
the age of majority, but
who failed to immediately
file the documents of
election with the nearest
civil registry, and were
considered foreign
nationals subject to
deportation as
undocumented aliens for
failure to obtain alien
certificates of registration.
Having a Filipino mother is
permanent. It is the basis
of the right of the
petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected
Philippine citizenship in
form and substance. The
failure to register the
election in the civil
registry should not defeat
the election and
resultingly negate the
permanent fact that they
have a Filipino mother.
The lacking requirements
may still be complied with
subject to the imposition
of appropriate
administrative penalties, if
any. The documents they
submitted supporting
their allegations that they
have already registered
with the civil registry,
although belatedly, should
be examined for validation
purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this
case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other
requirements embodied in
the administrative orders
 and other issuances of the
Bureau of Immigration
and the Department of
Justice shall be complied
with within a reasonable
time.

Macquiling vs. Respondent Arnado is a 1.) WoN the use of a Yes. The use of foreign passport
COMELEC natural born Filipino foreign passport after after renouncing one’s
(2013) citizen. However, as a renouncing foreign foreign citizenship is a
consequence of his citizenship amounts positive and voluntary act
subsequent to undoing a of representation as to
naturalization as a renunciation earlier one’s nationality and
citizen of the United made citizenship; it does not
States of America, he divest Filipino citizenship
lost his Filipino regained by repatriation
citizenship. Arnado but it recants the Oath of
applied for repatriation Renunciation required to
under Republic Act qualify one to run for an
(R.A.) No. 9225 before elective position.
the Consulate General
of the Philippines in San • Between 03 April 2009,
Franciso, USA and took the date he renounced his
the Oath of Allegiance foreign citizenship, and 30
to the Republic of the November 2009, the date
Philippines on 10 July he filed his COC, he used
2008. On the same day his US passport four times,
an Order of Approval of actions that run counter to
his Citizenship the affidavit of
Retention and Re- renunciation he had
acquisition was issued earlier executed. By using
his foreign passport,
in his favor.
 Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented
On 3 April 2009 himself as an American,
Arnado again took
his Oath of • Arnado’s category of dual
Allegiance to the citizenship is that by
Republic and which foreign citizenship
executed an is acquired through a
Affidavit of positive act of applying for
Renunciation of his naturalization. This is
foreign citizenship, distinct from those
which states: 
 considered dual citizens
by virtue of birth, who are
On 30 November not required by law to
2009, Arnado filed take the oath of
his Certificate of renunciation as the mere
Candidacy for filing of the certificate of
Mayor of candidacy already carries
Kauswagan, Lanao with it an implied
del Norte, On 28 renunciation of foreign
April 2010, citizenship. Dual citizens
respondent Linog C. by naturalization, on the
Balua (Balua), other hand, are required
another mayoralty to take not only the Oath
candidate, filed a of Allegiance to the
petition to Republic of the
disqualify Arnado Philippines but also to
and/or to cancel his personally renounce
certificate of foreign citizenship in
candidacy for order to qualify as a
municipal mayor of candidate for public
Kauswagan, Lanao office.
del Norte in
connection with the • By the time he filed his
10 May 2010 local certificate of candidacy on
and national 30 November 2009,
elections. Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and
Respondent Balua privileges of Filipino and
contended that American citizenship. He
Arnado is not a was qualified to vote, but
resident of by the express
Kauswagan, Lanao disqualification under
del Norte and that Section 40(d) of the Local
he is a foreigner, Government Code, he was
attaching thereto a not qualified to run for a
certification issued local elective.
by the Bureau of
Immigration dated
23 April 2010
indicating the
nationality of
Arnado as "USA-
American."10To
further bolster his
claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua
presented in his
Memorandum a
computer-generated
travel record11
dated 03 December
2009 indicating that
Arnado has been
using his US
Passport No.
057782700 in
entering and
departing the
Philippines. 


On 30 April 2010,
the COMELEC (First
Division) issued an
Order13 requiring
the respondent to
personally file his
answer and
memorandum
within three (3)
days from receipt
thereof. 


After Arnado failed

to answer the
petition, Balua
moved to declare
him in default and to
present evidence ex-
parte. 


Neither motion was

acted upon, having
been overtaken by
the 2010 elections
where Arnado
garnered the highest
number of votes and
 was subsequently
proclaimed as the
winning candidate
for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte. 


It was only after his

proclamation that
Arnado filed his
verified answer,

THE RULING OF
THE COMELEC
FIRST DIVISION: 


• Instead of treating the

Petition as an action
for the cancellation
of a certificate of
candidacy based on
misrepresentation,1
5 the COMELEC
First Division
considered it as one
for disqualification.
The First Division
disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that
he is a Filipino
citizen.The Court
ruled that Arnado’s
act of consistently
 using his US
passport after
renouncing his US
citizenship on 03
April 2009
effectively negated
his Affidavit of
Renunciation. 


• Petitioner Casan Macode

Maquiling
(Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor
of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the
second highest
number of votes in
the 2010 elections,
intervened in the
case and filed before
the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration
together with an
Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended
Motion for
Reconsideration.
Maquiling argued
that while the First
Division correctly
disqualified Arnado,
the order of
 succession under
Section 44 of the
Local Government
Code is not
applicable in this
case. Consequently,
he claimed that the
cancellation of
Arnado’s candidacy
and the nullification
of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate
who obtained the
highest number of

lawful votes,
should be
proclaimed as the
winner. RULING OF
THE COMELEC EN
BANC: ruled in
favor of arnado

• Maquiling filed the

instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring
Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his
continued use of a US
passport, There are three
questions posed by the
parties before this Court
which will be addressed
 seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the
result of the first.
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. On 8 February 1961, Lau
Commissioner of Yuen Yeung applied for a
Immigration passport visa to enter the
(1971) Philippines as a non-
immigrant, for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines. She was
permitted to come into the
Philippines on 13 March
1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed
a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau
Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of
stay in this country or
within the period as in his
discretion the
Commissioner of
Immigration. After
repeated extensions, she
was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she
WoN Lau Yuen Yeung Yes. For as long as Under Section 15 of
ipso facto became a she is not Commonwealth Act 473,
Filipino citizen upon disqualified to be an alien woman marrying
her marriage to a a citizen of the a Filipino, native born or
Filipino citizen Philippines under naturalized, becomes ipso
Section 4 of CA No. facto a Filipina provided
473. she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section
4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not
suffer from any of the
disqualifications under
said Section 4. Whether
the alien woman requires
to undergo the
naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is
a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for
contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the
contemplated action of the
Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her
arrest and immediate
deportation, after the
expiration of her
authorized stay, she
brought an action for
injunction with preliminary
injunction. The Court of
First Instance of Manila
(Civil Case 49705) denied
the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao
and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the
proceedings, is not
required to go through a
naturalization
proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino
citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a
living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege.
Everytime the citizenship
of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case,
Whatever the
corresponding court or
administrative authority
decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not
considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim
Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen of 25 January 1962.
Altarejos vs. • Petitioner Altarejos
COMELEC was a candidate for mayor
(2004) in the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May
10, 2004 national and local
elections.
• January 15, 2004 -
Private respondents Jose
Almiñe Altiche and Vernon
Versoza, registered voters
of San Jacinto, Masbate,
filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to
deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner on the ground
that he is not a Filipino
citizen and that he made a
false representation in his
certificate of candidacy that
"[he] was not a permanent
resident of or immigrant to
a foreign country." Private
respondents alleged that
based on a letter from the
Bureau of Immigration
dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a
permanent U.S. resident
visa, an Alien Certificate of
Registration issued on
November 3, 1997, and an
Immigration Certificate of
WoN registration of Yes.
petitioner’s repatriation
with the proper civil
registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration
a pre-requisite in
effecting repatriation
• Yes. Section 2 of RA
8171 is clear that
repatriation is effected "by
taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and
registration in the proper
civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration."
• As to when
citizenship would apply,
the Court's ruling in
Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of
filing of one's application
for repatriation subsists.
• Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run
for a mayoralty position in
the government in the May
10, 2004 elections.
Apparently, the COMELEC
was cognizant of this fact
since it did not implement
the assailed Resolutions
disqualifying petitioner to
run as mayor of San
Jacinto, Masbate.
(Sections 39 and 40 of
the Local Government
Code of 1991)
Residence issued on
November 3, 1997 by the
Bureau of Immigration.2
• January 26, 2004 -
Petitioner filed an Answer
stating, among others, that
he did not commit false
representation in his
application for candidacy
as mayor because as early
as December 17, 1997, he
was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation
by the Special Committee
on Naturalization, after he
filed a petition for
repatriation pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8171.
Thus, petitioner claimed
that his Filipino citizenship
was already restored, and
he was qualified to run as
mayor in the May 10, 2004
elections. Petitioner sought
the dismissal of the
petition.
• Atty. Zacarias C.
Zaragoza, Jr., regional
election director for Region
V and hearing officer of this
case, recommended that
petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a
candidate for the position
of mayor on the following
grounds:
• The Local
Government Code of 1991
requires that an elective
local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines,
and he must not have a
dual citizenship; must not
be a permanent resident in
a foreign country or must
not have acquired the right
to reside abroad
• It has been
established by clear and
convincing evidence that
respondent is a citizen of
the United States of
America. Such fact is
proven by his Alien
Certificate of Registration
and Immigration Certificate
of Residence (ICR) issued
on 3 November 1997 by
the Alien Registration
Division, Bureau of
Immigration and
Deportation. This was
further confirmed in a
letter dated 25 June 2001
of then Commissioner
ANDREA D. DOMINGO of
the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation.
• Although
respondent had petitioned
for his repatriation as a
Filipino citizen under
Republic Act No. 8171 on
17 December 1997, this did
not restore to respondent
his Filipino citizenship,
because Section 2 of the
aforecited Republic Act No.
8171 specifically provides
that “repatriation shall be
effected by taking the
necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and
registration in the proper
civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration.”
• Respondent has not
submitted any document to
prove that he has taken his
oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines
and that he has registered
his fact of repatriation in
the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of
Immigration.
• COMELEC First
Division adopted the
recommendations of Atty.
Zaragosa and disqualified
petitioner.
• Petitioner filed a
motion of reconsideration,
attaching documents that
gave proof to his
repatriation. This was
subsequently denied by
COMELEC en banc, on the
grounds that it should have
been submitted during the
hearing.
• On May 2004,
election day itself,
petitioner filed for
certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a
writ of prohibitory and
mandatory injunction, to
set aside the Resolution
promulgated by the
COMELEC.