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1 Chantal Bernicky, ‘Sol Lewitt Wall Drawing’ (Cons DistList, August 4, 2008; August 9, 2008) <http://cool.
conservation-us.org/byform/mailing-lists/cdl/2008/0878.html> accessed 28 October 2013.
British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 55 | Number 3 | July 2015 | pp. 285–302 DOI:10.1093/aesthj/ayv036
© British Society of Aesthetics 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics.
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the art work consists of a set of detailed instructions for making the drawings. They
were then made, to specification, by a team of technicians, assistants, whoever, but
not by the artist. Surely it misses the point to restore it? Rather than wasting valuable
conservator time here, the thing could (or indeed, should) simply be done again by a
gang of art students, or decorators.2
Another response questioned the sense of restoring a work that was already no longer an
original. Referring to the fact that the mural had been repainted in 2007, Berit Moller,
2 Mark Clarke, ‘Sol Lewitt Wall Drawing’ (Cons DistList, August 11, 2008; August 14 2008) <http://cool.
conservation-us.org/byform/mailing-lists/cdl/2008/0888.html> accessed 28 October 2013.
3 Berit Moller, ‘Sol LeWitt Wall Drawing’, (Cons DistList, August 17, 2008; August 23, 2008) <http://cool.
conservation-us.org/byform/mailing-lists/cdl/2008/0921.html> accessed 28 October 2013.
4 Jonathan Kemp, ‘Sol LeWitt Wall Drawing’, (Cons DistList, August 24, 2008; September 7, 2008) <http://cool.
conservation-us.org/byform/mailing-lists/cdl/2008/0954.html> accessed 28 October 2013.
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2. Conservation Ethics
Now what exactly was at stake in this discussion? The Carnegie Museum’s conservator
stated her problem in terms of generally accepted conservation ethics. When she won-
dered ‘if we need to be more intrusive’, she implicitly referred to the professional guide-
lines of minimal intervention and reversibility. In current ethical codes, the aims of fine
art conservation are still primarily focused on the preservation of the art object’s material
integrity.5 This means that treatment should be as restricted as possible and should not
fact been looking for new methods and strategies to preserve such works without compro-
mising their artistic integrity. There have been numerous pilot research cases, landmark
conferences and seminal publications gradually moving towards new ethical paradigms
which no longer take minimal intervention and reversibility as indisputable tenets.8
A very important publication for articulating a new paradigm was Tate conservator Pip
Laurenson’s (2006) paper on the conservation of time-based media art.9 Laurenson pro-
posed to think differently of the ontology of time-based media installations and instal-
8 Examples of collaborative research projects: Modern Art: Who Cares? (1995–7) Amsterdam: The Foundation for
the Conservation of Modern Art and the Netherlands Institute for Cultural Heritage (ICN); Inside Installations:
Preservation and Presentation of Installation Art (2005–8) funded by the European Union Culture 2000 programme
and initiated by ICN; PRACTICs—Practices, Research, Access, Collaboration, Teaching In Conservation of Contemporary
Art (2009–11); NECCAR – Network for the Conservation of Contemporary Art Research (2011–14). Platforms:
INCCA (International Network for the Conservation of Contemporary Art); DOCAM (Documentation and
Conservation of the Media Arts Heritage) Research Alliance; SBMK: Stichting Behoud Moderne Kunst.
9 Pip Laurenson, ‘Authenticity, Change and Loss in the Conservation of Time-Based Media Installations’, Tate
Papers 6 (Autumn 2006).
<http://www.tate.org.uk/research/tateresearch/tatepapers/06autumn/laurenson.htm> accessed 7 November 2014.
10 Boris Groys, ‘The Restoration of Destruction’, Witte de With Cahier 4 (1996), 155–160.
11 Laurenson, ‘Authenticity, Change and Loss in the Conservation of Time-Based Media Installations’, 4.
12 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976). When
I consider the restoration problem in terms of Goodman’s distinction, I do not discount the long list of objections,
amendments and refutations that this distinction has solicited. To name some examples which are relevant for
my argument: Jerrold Levinson, ‘Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited’, Philosophical Studies 38 (1980),
367–383; Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosopy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981), 41–44; Joseph Margolis, ‘A Farewell to Goodman and Danto’, BJA 38 (1998), 353–374.
Both Levinson and Danto, and Margolis in Danto’s wake, point out that Goodman overlooks the historically and
contextually bound (and therefore autographic) nature of all art forms.
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painting forgery of a known work (say, Rembrandt’s Nightwatch) is possible, but why there
is no such thing as a forgery of Hamlet. Forgery of the play as a text is impossible, according
to Goodman, because every correct copy of the manuscript is as genuine as the original.
When you read an exact copy of the manuscript’s text, you are actually reading Hamlet;
when you look at an exact copy of the Nightwatch, you’re not looking at the Nightwatch at
all. Painting is autographic, but literature and theatre are not: they are allographic:
Let us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between
18 Laurenson, ‘Authenticity, Change and Loss in the Conservation of Time-Based Media Installations’, 5.
19 Tina Fiske, ‘White Walls: Installations, Absence, Iteration and Difference’, in Alison Richmond and Alison
Bracker (eds), Conservation: Principles, Dilemmas and Uncomfortable Truths (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann,
2009), 229–240, at 233–234 and 239 n. 11.
20 Elbrig de Groot, Jaap Guldemond and Annick Kleizen, ‘Summary of the case study Notion Motion 2005’, in Inside
Installations: Preservation and Presentation of Installation Art (2007), 2 <www.inside-installations.org> accessed 07
November 2014.
21 Ibid., 1.
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surface, has become (with some exaggeration) common practice in the case of Sol LeWitt’s
Wall Drawings. Take Wall Drawing #801: Spiral, currently on show in the cupola of Maastricht’s
Bonnenfantenmuseum. It was first executed in 1996 and has been removed and re-executed
twice since then—the last time after LeWitt’s death, with nobody raising an eyebrow about
either its removal or its reconstruction. One of LeWitt’s most famous statements confirms
this practice: ‘In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the
work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and
22 Sol LeWitt, ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ (1967), reprinted in Béatrice Gross (ed.), Sol LeWitt (Metz: Éditions
du Centre Pompidou-Metz, 2012), 208–211, at 208.
23 From Andrea Miller-Keller, ‘Excerpts from a Correspondence, 1981–1983’, in Susanna Singer (ed.), Sol LeWitt:
Wall Drawings 1969–1984, exhibition catalogue (Amsterdam: Stedelijk Museum, 1984), quoted in Veronica
Roberts, ‘“Like a Musical Score”: Variability and Multiplicity in Sol LeWitt’s 1970s Wall Drawings’, Master
Drawings 50 (2012) 193–211, at 193.
24 Veronica Roberts, ‘“Like a Musical Score”’, 193.
25 LeWitt, ‘Doing Wall Drawings’, quoted in Béatrice Gross, ‘Order and Disorder: Where Every Wall is a Door’,
in her Sol LeWitt, 10–29, at 22.
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In allographic works, the notations decide which features of the work are constitutive of
the work and which are not—this is also the case for the LeWitts, because the instruc-
tions stipulate those features. Nevertheless, once executed, ‘the interpretive and stylistic
choices of the draftsman result in a drawing every feature of which is uniquely constitutive
of it, in which no mark on the wall can be dismissed as contingent, as is the case with
autographic painting’.33 So LeWitt’s wall drawings compromise Goodman’s distinction
because they are not either allographic or autographic but both; and because, although being
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 371–372.
35 Ibid., 372. As LeWitt himself tended to become more conservative, Pillow introduces a fictional Soll LeWitte
staying faithful to the radical version of LeWitt’s ideas.
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was a ‘perfunctory affair’, in the course of his career he in fact became increasingly precise
about who was doing the re-execution, where and how. Whereas in 1974 he still main-
tained that the execution required few technical skills, in subsequent years he
attributed increasing importance to production methods. The walls had to be pre-
pared in a particular way; the wall drawings were carried out according to strict
application techniques; new, more demanding materials made their appearance, and
the works themselves were bigger and bigger. All of these factors ultimately called for
36 Gross, ‘Order and Disorder’, 21. See also Roberts,‘“Like a Musical Score”’, and Lovatt, ‘Ideas in Transmission’.
37 Brenda Richardson, ‘Unexpected Directions: Sol LeWitt’s Wall Drawings’, in Gary Garrels (ed.), Sol LeWitt:
A Retrospective (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 37–47, at 38.
38 Stephen Persing, ‘Climbing the Walls for Art’, Art in America (2005), 146–151, 215.
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areas and lined with paper gutters made of cash register tape to catch drips and prevent
leakage. The unmasked segments were painted with several layers of paint; when painted,
they were covered and the adjacent segments painted. There was a complicated working
system:
The acrylics are applied in rotation, so that each of us applies one coat of every color
to every segment. After each coat we wait 15 or 20 minutes to allow it to dry before
starting the next. During each hiatus Tak and Jesse [LeWitt’s assistants] study the
39 Ibid., 149.
40 Ibid., 150.
41 Bénédicte Ramade, ‘Sol LeWitt: Les coulisses du montage’, L’oeil (2012), 66–71, at 68.
42 Ibid., 69.
43 Ibid.
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means that one has to invite his crew, which has its price. Returning to our conservation
problem, we may conclude that the Carnegie Museum might have had good reasons not
to redo the wall drawing again, in particular taking into account that it had already been
repainted in 2007: a gang of students would have been neither equipped nor authorized,
to do so—and going back to the LeWitt studio might have been far too expensive.
44 Sherri Irvin, ‘The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (2005),
315–326.
45 The distinction between the work as a physical object and the work as a work of art has a long history; for
an elaborate discussion, see Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). In
conservation theory, see Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, ed. Giuseppe Basile, trans. Cynthia Rockwell
(Rome: Instituto Centrale de Restauro/Nardini Editore 2005).
46 Sherri Irvin, ‘The Ontological Diversity of Visual Artworks’, in Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones
(eds), New Waves in Aesthetics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 1–19, at 5.
47 The public nature of these sanctioning actions and communications distinguish them from mere intentions
(Irvin, The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art, 320–322).
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supposedly allographic two-stage visual artworks on the other: not only are murals more
solid and less entrenched in conventional and codified execution practices than musical
or theatrical performances, but their ontological ‘make up’ is far more dependent on the
artist’s authorization. Although there are famous instances, like the Beckett estate that
exerts tight control over the performances of Beckett’s plays, this does not mean that an
illegitimate performance of Waiting for Godot is not—ontologically speaking—an instance
of the work. With a LeWitt Wall Drawing, it is ultimately the artist who decides—even if
Abstract expressionist action painters like Pollock and De Kooning had elevated this logic
of continual redefinition to the status of an all-determining artistic method, a practice
LeWitt rejected by eliminating what he called ‘the arbitrary, the capricious, and the sub-
jective’ from his own decision-making (even if he granted some leeway for other people’s
decisions). By formulating the instructions beforehand and leaving the execution wholly
to others, LeWitt acted more like Benjamin Baker, the designer of the Forth Bridge, to
whose working methods Baxandall contrasted Picasso’s. This is not without consequence
53 Corrections of mistakes and improvements happened in later works or later executions of the same work.
For instance, for a specific wall drawing LeWitt used instructions of an earlier print, but phrased them more
precisely to prevent misunderstandings (Roberts, ‘“Like a Musical Score”’, 199); or he substituted acrylic for ink
in the re-execution of certain wall drawings. The same would also go for Baxandall’s Picasso, whose painting of
Kahnweiler ‘appears as one episode in a serial performance of problem-stating and problem-solving’ (Baxandall,
Patterns of Intention, 66).
54 Irvin, ‘The Ontological Diversity of Visual Artworks’, 1.
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Ibid.
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algorithm for inferring the artwork based on the physical object’—and, I would like to
add, not from the initial concept either. Therefore, ‘one must attend directly to the details
of what the artist has sanctioned in the particular case’.57
Although I agree with Irvin that we need to look at individual artworks each time, I would
not wish to give up the attempt to transcend sheer individuality and look for more general
patterns and tendencies.58 Moreover, Irvin’s focus on critical practice as the defining constraint
informing claims about artworks tends to pinpoint an artwork’s ontology to the time of its
57 Ibid., 15.
58 Sally Wyatt and Brian Balmer, ‘Home on the Range: What and Where is the Middle in Science and Technology
Studies?’, Science, Technology, and Human Values 32 (2007), 619–626.
59 See Irvin’s claim that a work like Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) (1991) will continue to
exist even when the pile of candies it is made of is thrown away in between exhibitions. I am not so sure whether
that will always be the case; the candy factory may go out of business and thereby indirectly, but fundamentally,
change the nature of a next installation. Irvin, ‘The Ontological Diversity of Visual Artworks’, at 11.
60 Irvin, ‘The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art’.
61 A selection of the relevant literature: Ysbrand Hummelen and Dionne Sillé (eds), Modern Art: Who Cares? An
Interdisciplinary Research Project and an International Symposium on the Conservation of Modern and Contemporary Art
(Amsterdam: The Foundation for the Conservation of Modern Art and the Netherlands Institute for Cultural
Heritage, 1999); Glenn Wharton, ‘The Challenges of Conserving Contemporary Art’, in Bruce Altshuler (ed.),
Collecting the New: Museums and Contemporary Art (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 163–178;
Cornelia Weyer, ‘Restoration Theory Applied to Installation Art’, Beiträge zur Erhaltung von Kunst und Kulturgut,
(2006), 40–48; Rita Macedo, ‘Between the Aesthetics and the Ethics of the Ephemeral’, in Rita Macedo and
Raquel Henriques da Silva (eds), Ephemeral Art and Conservation: The Paradigm of Contemporary Art and Ethnographic
Objects (Lisbon: IHA, 2010); Jan Marontate, ‘Rethinking Permanence and Change in Contemporary Cultural
Preservation Strategies’, Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society 34 (2010), 285–305; Tatja Scholte and Glenn
Wharton (eds), Inside Installations: Theory and Practice in the Care of Complex Artworks (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2011); Vivian van Saaze, Installation Art and the Museum: Presentation and Conservation of Changing
Artworks (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).
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a case-by-case basis indeed, but this does not mean that we cannot discern commonalities
between different cases—for instance by pointing out that comparable shifts in an artist’s
stance towards the conservation of a work occur more often in certain stages of a work’s
biography, in particular after a work’s acquisition by a museum and especially after long
periods of storage.62 Embedding a work’s changing ontological characteristics within a
biography with culturally recognized stages not only provides a framework for comparison
and generalization; it also solves a problem of how to account for a work’s history in our
62 Suggesting that institutional practices may have a more decisive impact on an artist’s sanctioning than Irvin
theoretically allows for. For a discussion of the notion of a cultural biography of objects and relevant stages see
Igor Kopytoff, ‘The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as a Process’, in Arjun Appadurai (ed.) The
Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 64–91;
Chris Gosden and Yvonne Marshall, ‘The Cultural Biography of Objects’, World Archeology 31 (1999), 169–178;
Renée van de Vall et al., ‘Reflections on a Biographical Approach to Contemporary Art Conservation’, Proceedings
ICOM-CC 16th Triennial Conference: WG Theory and History in Conservation, Lisbon, September 2011.
63 Many contemporary works contain both autographic, one-stage and allographic, two-stage elements, comparable
to what Hanna Hölling has demonstrated for Nam June Paik (Re: Paik: On Time, Changeability and Identity in the
Conservation of Nam June Paiks’s Multimedia Installations, PhD thesis University of Amsterdam, 2013, 90–96).
64 Albert R. Jonson and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1988).
65 I have argued elsewhere that seen from a conservation perspective, contemporary artworks come in three broad
varieties: works that should be preserved in their original physical state as much as possible; works that should
be repeated/re-executed according to a set of instructions; works that should evolve along some previously set
rules or parameters. The autographic/allographic distinction helps to articulate the difference between the first
and the second variety. I will leave the third variety aside here, for this see Renée van de Vall, ‘Documenting
Dilemmas: On the Relevance of Ethically Ambiguous Cases’, Revista de História da Arte (forthcoming). These
varieties are paradigmatically defined (according to exemplary cases) and not mutually exclusive.
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suggest that rather than being either autographical or allographical, or both autographical
and allographical, the wall drawings hover between the two and change over time.
In this the current situation of LeWitt’s work might resemble what Goodman himself
stated about dance. At the end of his chapter on art and authenticity, Goodman concedes
that ultimately the difference between autographic and allographic arts is a pragmatic
rather than an essential one:
Initially, perhaps, all arts are autographic. Where the works are transitory, as in sing-