POSTURE STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 116TH CONGRESS

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

JANUARY 30, 2020

 Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States Southern Command

(USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs, we are focused on sustaining our

advantages in the Western Hemisphere—the most important of which are strong partnerships founded

on shared democratic values. Recent trends illustrate that the Western Hemisphere – our shared

neighborhood – is critical space in the global competition—and global challenges—posed by the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives immense benefit

from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our partnerships in the Western Hemisphere strong and

vibrant will allow us to achieve the NDS objective of maintaining a favorable regional balance of power

that reduces security threats to the homeland.

Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the region is

home to ~25% of all U.S. exports and key global infrastructure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes, and

deep water ports that provide access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to

our homeland in every domain—land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values—which makes

any threat or encroachment in this region particularly concerning. Latin America’s strategic importance

lies in its unique potential as both a vulnerability and an opportunity for our own security, prosperity,

and efforts to address global challenges.1

Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese government absorbed three more Latin American

countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative, bringing the regional total to 19 – more than half of all

countries in the region. Beijing now has 29 government exchange programs with Latin America and the

Caribbean, and continues to expand offers of professional military education, equipment donations, and

funding for infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our neighborhood, establishing

a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying (for the first time) its most advanced nuclear-capable

1
R. Evan Ellis (2016). “Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean.”
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warship; and sending a research ship capable of mapping and cutting undersea cables, as well as two

other naval research vessels to operate near our homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage,

oppression in Venezuela is ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily arrested

for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019. Between January 2018 and May 2019,

regime-aligned security forces killed more than 7,000 people, and many of these killings may constitute

extrajudicial killings.

These malign state actors are part of a vicious circle of threats that deliberately erode stability

and security in the region. This vicious circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, often

with weak governance and porous legal frameworks, exacerbated by a propensity towards patronage and

corruption that is deliberately exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external state

actors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to advance their own

ends at the expense of U.S. and partner nation security. This vicious circle continues to negatively

impact our homeland, most acutely in the form of illegal immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in

other, more harmful ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government corruption,

support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean is at its lowest

levels in 15 years,2 providing further openings for malign state actors to increase their influence. A

number of countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, with others sliding towards outright

authoritarianism.

Positive Trends. These threats are real, and they demand a sense of urgency. But so do the

opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru demonstrate that,

while democracy may be troubled, citizens are exercising democratic rights to uphold their constitutions.

2
2018/2019 AmericasBaromter report, funded by USAID. Available at: https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-slump-across-
americas-according-to-new-survey/
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Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador now recognize the Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban

officials, some even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador are

doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular migration towards our border; Jamaica and Trinidad

and Tobago regularly deploy to regional disaster response efforts, to include supporting the Bahamas

after Hurricane Dorian; and Colombia, Brazil, and Chile continue to grow their contributions to global

security.

Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of USSOUTHCOM are

moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and sustain our security advantages in the Western

Hemisphere. While doing so, we remain committed to making good use of every taxpayer dollar

Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we undertook a detailed review of all aspects of our

organization to gain efficiencies and support the Department’s reform efforts. I look forward to

discussing how we are freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our top priorities:

strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering threats, and building the readiness of our team.

Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and partnerships—which is

exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where strengthening partnerships is the best way to counter threats,

enhance our collective readiness and capability to meet global challenges, and maintain the regional

balance of power in favor of the United States. We also support the interagency, including the

Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security,

and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, reinforcing the importance of leveraging all

tools of national security.

We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other competitors by playing to our

strengths of shared values, professionalism, and equipment built to last, and by investing in education,

intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, joint operations, and security cooperation. More

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than anything else, persistent presence matters in this fight. Like athletes, we have to be present on the

field to compete, and we have to compete to win.

Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors. As the Department of Defense has

prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has aggressively turned its attention to the Western

Hemisphere, exporting corrupt business practices and disregard for international law and standards to

countries already struggling with government corruption and weak governance. The competitive space

is truly global and all-domain as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the PRC and

Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15 worldwide) still recognize Taiwan—a fact

that has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, which is engaging in persistent (and successful) dollar

diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19 Latin American and Caribbean nations now

participating in the One Belt One Road Initiative and pledges of at least $150 billion in loans, the PRC is

now the region’s largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of predatory financing and “no

strings attached” largesse it has wielded in other parts of the world. On the defense side, this includes

“gifts” of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to copy our successful military education

program.

Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host Chinese infrastructure

projects. Most concerning, certain investments have strategic value for future military uses. Chinese

investment in numerous deep water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the Panama Canal could

enable the Chinese military to threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the movement of U.S.

forces. Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the sovereign rights of coastal states

to conduct illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Latin American countries, while

Chinese mining and infrastructure projects have created lasting environmental damage. Beijing sees

immense value in South America’s strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing

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additional access to regional space infrastructure. With telecommunication projects in 16 countries,

Huawei and ZTE provide the backbone of commercial and government communication systems,

providing a backdoor for the Chinese government to monitor or intercept official information we share

with our partners. Beijing is also gaining real-time, street-level situational awareness by selling

surveillance technology through its “Smart Cities” initiative—the same technology the Chinese

Communist Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens.3

Russia continues to play the role of “spoiler,” seeking to sow disunity and discredit the United

States within our own hemisphere. As it does across the world, Russia meddles in regional affairs by

spreading false information on its media platforms and engaging in malicious cyber activity. Russia’s

ability to disseminate disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En Español’s

social media platforms received more views in 2019 than any other Spanish-language news source.

While Moscow denies having a military presence in the region, Russian “advisors” continue to prop up

the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian

governments in Cuba and Nicaragua provide Russia with footholds close to our homeland, giving Putin

strategic options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia’s access to the Western Hemisphere,

allowing Russia to collect intelligence in close proximity to the United States.

Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the Americas in the past, maintains

facilitation networks and raises funds through its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah

supporters cache weapons and raise funds, often via charitable donations, remittances, and sometimes

through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Having a footprint in the region

also allows Iran to collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible retaliatory attacks

3Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses and China’s National Intelligence Law, citizens living in democracies in the Western
Hemisphere could have their entire digital identity under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.
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against U.S. and/or Western interests.

After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for authoritarianism, an exporter of malign

ideology, and an underlying driver of instability in the region. Cuban intelligence personnel support and

counsel non-democratic leaders, including directly propping up the illegitimate Maduro regime in

Venezuela. Cuba, Russia, and the PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to

undercut U.S. initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays the thousands of Cuban medical

personnel it sends as humanitarian, such aid routinely includes intelligence collection, propagation of

Cuba's failed ideology, and advancing a distinctly anti-U.S. agenda.

The final malign actors—Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela—pose one of the most direct

threats to peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. Emboldened by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and

Cuban protection and patronage, Maduro has allowed Venezuela to become a safe haven for the ELN,

FARC dissidents, and drug traffickers while the Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020

hold, the number of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian exodus. To date,

nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant strain on Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and other

host countries in the region. Colombia bears the brunt of this crisis and has generously stepped up to

support the over 1.6 million refugees while at the same time having 7.8 million internally displaced

persons of their own, the largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan

crisis will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require significant support to help

Venezuelans address the decades of mismanagement, widespread insecurity, and corruption of defense

and other institutions in order to realize the natural richness of their resources.

What We’re Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the field to compete. And when

we are on the field, our impacts are positive and long-lasting. In the absence of an enduring U.S.

military presence, recurring rotations of small teams of Special Operations Forces, Soldiers, Sailors,

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Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and National Guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and

exchange critical expertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership Program (SPP) is

uniquely positioned based on its dual military experience to provide a persistent and sustained presence

to our partner nations by means of senior leader visits, exchanges, and cooperative training and exercises

in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo

(JTF-B) and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) build

collective response and security capability and readiness in Army and Marine Corps Reserve Forces and

partner militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru integrated into the

SPMAGTF last year, building interoperability for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three

partners also formed part of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT’s multinational team. The 2019

COMFORT mission delivered significant returns, providing world-class medical care to nearly 68,000

patients in 12 countries, reducing suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela, and enhancing

medical readiness in the U.S. Navy, our partners, and allies. JTF-B facilitates strategic access to Central

America, builds enduring relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to create

regional stability and security. JTF-B provided medical care to over 20,000 partner nation patients,

rapid response capability for a wide range of contingencies, and assigned forces to participate in

exercises.

As directed by the NDS, we’re deepening relations with “regional countries that export military

capabilities to priority regional and global security challenges.” Recently designated a Major Non-

NATO ally and the newest partner in the State Partnership Program (SPP), we work closely with Brazil

on a range of priority missions. Chile exports its security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region

and Central America, and is actively partnering with us and U.S. Army South to develop a concept for a

combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise later this year. Colombia—NATO’s only global partner

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in the region—seeks to share its humanitarian demining and counter IED expertise with NATO allies

while also serving in South Korea as part of the United Nations Command, a legacy that stems from its

participation in the Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong supporter of U.S. efforts to hold

global malign actors accountable, de-flagging numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation

of U.S. and international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its weight having supported

coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan and applying training and equipment

received via the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their current deployments to the UN

Mission in Mali.

In the face of the PRC’s and Russia’s global assault on international norms, engagement on

shared values is more important than ever before. As I told this Committee last year, education,

training, and security cooperation efforts like the SPP and the Combatant Commanders Exercise

Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program and the Department of State’s International

Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing

(FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of time and money, these programs are

helping us reinforce mutual understanding, shared values and culture, and doctrine. Along with IMET;

our Human Rights Initiative; noncommissioned officer development; and Women, Peace, and Security

programs enhance the professionalism of the region’s militaries and security forces. In particular,

USSOUTHCOM’s decades-long commitment to promoting respect for human rights has become a

cornerstone of our strong partnerships with like-minded militaries. These efforts are among the most

effective ways we can expand competitive space and outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage

our partners to hold the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of peace,

democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information about Beijing’s predatory

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economic practices, the security risks associated with Chinese technology, and activities by Russia, Iran,

and their authoritarian allies that undermine regional sovereignty and security. In addition to expanding

our information sharing efforts throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with

partners in the region to enhance our understanding of the security threats posed by the Venezuelan

crisis, which in turn assists with multinational efforts to plan for longer term recovery and stability once

free and fair democratic elections are held.

We also support the NDS’ focus on developing operational concepts to enhance Joint Force

lethality while building interoperability with allied and partner forces. We leverage our science and

technology portfolio in high-end multinational exercises like UNITAS and PANAMAX, providing

opportunities for the Services to test new warfighting capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment.

Through our Caribbean-focused TRADEWINDS exercise, we are now laying the groundwork for a

combined task force that can counter a range of threats and enable sea control and denial operations.

We conduct cyber training and capacity building with partners like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in an

effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish shared cyber situational awareness in the

region. We continue to work closely with other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure

globally integrated plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and opportunities in this

hemisphere.

Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs. As the NDS recognizes, “non-state actors also

threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities.” TCOs engage in a wide

array of illegal activities that generate approximately two trillion dollars in illicit proceeds annually,

including drug and weapons trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We

see these impacts directly in our homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans since 1999,4 costing

4
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html. From 1999 to 2017, more than 700,000 people have died from a drug overdose.
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our nation billions in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity costs – in addition to the suffering

caused by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption and violence, TCOs also challenge and erode the

governance of partners that we rely on to advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse

decades of successful U.S. policies and security investments.

Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment facilitating opportunities for

malign actors to expand influence, and VEOs leverage to move people and weapons through our

hemisphere. This latter vulnerability is particularly troublesome; there is an interconnected system of

pathways that spans our neighborhood, running through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South,

and Central America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our homeland, and anything can move

on them—for the right price. This ongoing threat was illustrated in 2019 by several successful U.S. law

enforcement operations against human smuggling networks, which continue to enable the movement of

individuals with terrorist links, many of whom attempt to enter the U.S. homeland illegally.

What We’re Doing. We’re strengthening partnerships with countries that contribute military

capabilities to regional security and beyond, with a focus on enabling combined operations and building

interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to the U.S. homeland, reduce the effectiveness of priority

TCOs, and prevent VEOs from leveraging regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.

Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared responsibility, and one in which

they are sacrificing blood and treasure to meet their commitment to halve cocaine production by 2023.

Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to conduct maritime counterdrug operations while

working closely with Panama and Costa Rica to seize drugs headed to the U.S. In 2019, Colombia also

manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of almost 600 police and military killed

or wounded, largely due to IEDs emplaced to protect the coca fields. Inside of Colombia, their security

forces also disrupted and destroyed over 300 cocaine-producing labs, preventing over 400 metric tons of

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cocaine from ever leaving the country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America’s security

challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six Central American countries through the U.S.

Colombia Action Plan program since the program’s inception in FY13. We continue to enable

Colombian operations against priority narco-terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents,

yielding significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.

In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our capacity-building efforts on

improving border security, drug interdiction rates, and institutional effectiveness. Jamaica has now

integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into Joint Interagency Task Force South counterdrug

operations, enhancing our operational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training by

Naval Special Warfare teams, Guatemala’s Fuerzas Especiales Navales (FEN) is now entirely self-

sufficient and responsible for more than 80% of Guatemala’s drug seizures. Like Guatemala, Costa

Rica, Panama and El Salvador are applying U.S.-provided training and equipment to regularly interdict

drug shipments more than 100 miles from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across

America from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are leveraging our

Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian Assistance Program to better address factors driving violence

and migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense

Studies is a force multiplier across the hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the

strategic level and reinforce accountability and transparency in defense institutions.

In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on modest investment. Last year,

the international and interagency “team of teams” at JIATF-South helped keep 280 metric tons of

cocaine off U.S. streets. JIATF-South-led interdictions at sea account for almost four times the

cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that

is 11 times larger than the United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF-South continue to be among

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the best investments in the U.S. government.

In FY20, thanks to congressional support, we are filling detection and monitoring (D&M)

capability gaps through innovative solutions like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). Having

only recently deployed, the MMSV already has supported the disruption of over 3000 kilograms of

cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping a

low profile vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a capacity-building platform in the

Dominican Republic, a key transit point for cocaine trafficking into major U.S. cities like Washington

D.C., Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying commercially-available technology like

unmanned aircraft systems to increase the MMSV’s ability to conduct D&M and provide information to

partner nations who are conducting the interceptions. In addition to the MMSV, we now have one

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the region that will provide needed naval capabilities and

technological advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deployments – these will be game

changers.

On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM, and support the work of our

interagency partners to stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism who are attempting to

exploit the region’s weak border security to move into the U.S. homeland. We deepened counter threat

finance collaboration with the Treasury Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based

member of al-Qa'ida last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging the DOD Rewards

Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for minimal investment; in 2019, we paid $1.2 million

for 72 rewards (information) that led to the neutralization of 97 terrorists, the seizure of 80 weapons

caches, and the destruction of 22 drug labs.

In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago continues to pay dividends for

international efforts targeting extremist networks supporting ISIS and other dangerous groups. Our

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biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and stop known or suspected terrorists last year,

while we deepened collaboration with Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious

activities by supporters of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.

Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) support the global fight

against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the battlefield. As we take proactive steps

to address infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations, the JTF-GTMO team

remains the epitome of professionalism, conducting safe, legal, and humane detention operations that

protect our homeland and U.S. troops serving in harm’s way.

Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our homeland’s defense, we are focused

on building an effective, efficient, and resilient team.

For decades, USSOUTHCOM’s modest budget and small footprint have encouraged us to

embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches. Over the last five years, we absorbed 25% cuts to

our personnel, a 10% reduction to our Exercise program, and a steady decline in available assets and

forces needed to support our mission. We’ve tried to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to

minimize operational impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies, improve

performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.

With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the Department’s current reform efforts.

Our revised campaign plan drove a review of all FY20 operations, activities, and investments. We

eliminated over 200 lower priority events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic partners.

We’ve also revised our joint exercise program to make it more effective and more relevant. In 2019, we

sharpened our emphasis on building readiness of U.S. forces and supporting Joint Force

experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exercises to more directly support the global

competition with the PRC and Russia. Other areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF-

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GTMO manning, contracts, and theater posture.

At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved support to military and civilian

families, and enhanced our training and professional development programs to build a more ready,

results-oriented organization. We continue to work closely with the Department of the Army and local

South Florida community to address housing and high living costs impacting our men and women. At

JTF-GTMO, we undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine long-term

requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. We are also

taking steps to improve quality of life and resiliency of JIATF-South’s headquarters building at Naval

Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in the continental United States, NAS Key West has

significant strategic value in defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I look

forward to working with the Congress on our housing issues in the year ahead to ensure our men and

women get the support they need.

Congressional Support. I’d like to repeat last year’s invitation to members of this Committee to

visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that we value this region and the role our partners play in

keeping our neighborhood safe. Your presence, attention, and engagement, along with that of other key

leaders, matters. I also want to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating

under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel. Confidence in stable, predictable

budgets will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable security partners.

Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our competitive edge: persistent

presence and engagement. We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that have streamlined

security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of choice. Your

continued support to these security cooperation programs and capabilities like IMET and the Perry

Center allow us to build trust and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow

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contributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly, support for analytic initiatives focused

on open source/publicly available information helps mitigate reduced intelligence resources and

provides a steady stream of useful information (especially about malign state actors) that we can share

with partners.

As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the counterdrug mission, we still only

enabled the successful interdiction of about nine percent of known drug movement. That is a small

increase over previous years, but still significantly below where we need to be. We appreciate your

continued support to creative solutions like the MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of

our counterdrug forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter will be critical to

keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the security of the Western Hemisphere. Each additional

force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable ship, embarked helicopter, and law

enforcement detachment) enables the disruption of 35 more metric tons of cocaine.5 Grey hulls, in

particular, still serve as a powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our competitors, and a

reassuring one to our friends. They can also yield multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while

participating in our UNITAS exercise last year, the USS MICHAEL MURPHY supported the

interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine,

simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of intelligence, demonstrating rules-based maritime

behavior, and providing coalition training opportunities for the U.S. Navy.

Conclusion. I’d like to close as I began: with a note of caution, and one of hope.

Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends on the security of our

borders and the stability of our hemisphere – both of which are under assault. Likewise, our ability to

5
USCG National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and/or the Navy’s LITTORAL Combat Ship could fill this requirement, providing us with a
game-changing edge, providing unique capabilities to engage drug traffickers where they are most vulnerable.

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advance diplomatic and economic goals depends on the strength of both our partnerships and our shared

values. We’ve seen what happens when we ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In

the past decade, we’ve seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs, increased presence of malign

actors, and negative trends in democracy.

We’re now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security threats we face now and in

the near future, and the significant opportunities that await only with our initiative and engagement in

the hemisphere. There is no other region we depend upon more for our prosperity and security, and with

which we are more closely tied through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin

America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for our shared values. As I hope

I’ve conveyed, the right, focused attention and modest investments go a long way in this part of the

world, paying significant security dividends to both our global efforts and to our homeland’s defense.

When we don’t engage in our neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our homeland security pays

the price. When we do engage, we reduce threats to the homeland and limit opportunities for

adversaries to operate in close proximity to us. And there is no better return on investment than that.

Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the USSOUTHCOM team and

their families. I look forward to your questions.

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