Republic of the Philippines
Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity
of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought
this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at
8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected
to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.1 Rep. Arroyo
appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to
a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the
order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced
that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end
of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House
of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and
ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up.
I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for
one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr.
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned
until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript
of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators
of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.
of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the
published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions
differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot
be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world
"no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated
three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence
"(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the
quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,
there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that,
in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of
the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that
the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35
and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the
years or nays,but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to
prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2)
in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's
motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97,4 the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5the
Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question
which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued
that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption
of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation
at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the
session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering
the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of
the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In
addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers
and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of
its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such
as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion,
were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under
the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering
the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr.
Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there
was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of
the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite
the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any
rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method
are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to
a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such
authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action
as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon
it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the Supreme Court of
14
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the
Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by
the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it
appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and
final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We
think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective
branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893
Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before
a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that
in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district
court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending
that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may,
then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without
making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is
merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature
in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force
from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative
pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and
consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty
manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be
a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its
own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern
its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In
re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151,
11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of
Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our
government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into
an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art.
VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond against. 22
judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice,
however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way
to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and, therefore, to
would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for
political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the
into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
approval of the original bill the votes of the members byyeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
Art. VIII. §1 power.
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved. that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There
declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the
being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this,
afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the added)
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. its approval except Rep. Lagman.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report
should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own
members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this
making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act
case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact
upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an
was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in
form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically precedence.30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva any further consideration of the question. 31
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that
No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has
committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were
a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
approved.
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino granted to the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a branch of
and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said: the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
the debate, then the voting comes in. effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
xxx xxx xxx
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point of order. interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a presence of a quorum. 34
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in
announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and
this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee
nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep.
on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is
approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral
not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure.
conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañada would have voted in
favor of the conference committee report.37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification
by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice
Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here
or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that
the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill
has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment
to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the
courts." 39 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the
righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill
sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41
decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four
new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.)
Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of
the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is
confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows
that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A.
No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required
by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have
also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this
Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals
as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should
be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote
period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made
in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek
the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the
SO ORDERED.
last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress. Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.
cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill
rule rests on the following considerations:
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed

by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn Separate Opinions
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires
the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to VITUG, J., concurring:
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of
conformity with the Constitution. 45
the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which
massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of that great burden has been imposed, could not have been
evidence. thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term
grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on
jurisdiction.
the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our
 I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of
a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls
and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time,
it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the
fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone
departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term
"judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what
may even be deemed to be political questions provided,
however, that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of
justiciability on purely political issues — is shown to have
attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion
in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R.
No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant
petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant
petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent which I
expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat
bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today
might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and
inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino.
legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural
disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever — not
over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as
eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to
rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined
legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to
substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the
end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching
both legislators and the public unawares and altering
the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum
for the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the
majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick
to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of
internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec.
1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." We are also
guided by the principle that a court may interfere
with the internal procedures of its coordinate
branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle
consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
was applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic
several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee
Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate
Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive
Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee
and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was
but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment
discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in
Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant
view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have
decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most
majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle
especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
which should have justified the Court in questioning the
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on
actuations of the legislative branch.
what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the
Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to
opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentinodissent. At the same
hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would
precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the not hold true in the instant petition.
enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To
me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of
adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly
objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise
conduct of the House's business. They have no direct or
or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or
reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the
misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their
Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise
application.
warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are
not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of
enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is
reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and
factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards.
substance of the law itself. Thus: This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my
previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be
conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is
towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it
whether or not the procedural irregularities that
is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances of instant
attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and
petition.
Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and
printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
impugned, having been "saved" by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition
cogent reason why we cannot continue to place
of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar.
reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to
Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and
perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating
Constitution and the winds of changing time.
more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law
itself . I

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin,1 as a
window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where
the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power
of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that
"each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this
as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion
of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not
vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum
to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this
rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of
his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker
or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation
of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith,
the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate
was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any
Senator voting in the majority may move for a
reconsideration on the same day on which the vote
was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual
executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration
of the time within which a motion to reconsider may
be made, the motion to reconsider shall be
accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to
reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on
the table without prejudice to the nomination, and
shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate
shall not be returned by the Secretary to the
President until the expiration of the time limited for
making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a
motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the
Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the US
Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US
President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The
Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith
and requested the President to return its resolution of
confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo
warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the
question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the
applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the
Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its own rules even
while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate
a construction different from that adopted by the
Senate itself when the present case was under debate
is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power.
The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to
make its own rules; and it is not the function of the
Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule
designed to ensure due deliberation in the
performance of the vital function of advising and
consenting to nominations for public office,
moreover, should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above
stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us
compelling. We are confirmed in the view we have
taken by the fact, since the attempted
reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate
itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as
tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect
the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its
ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United
States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education
and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a
communist and was charged with perjury in the regular court.
He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no
quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless,
he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members
of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that —
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a
quorum of at least thirteen members of the said
Committee, and that "at least that number must have
been actually and physically present . . . If such a
Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did
meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of
the hearing some of them left temporarily or
otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack
of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not
remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this
case, the existence of that Committee as a competent
tribunal provided that before the oath was
administered and before the testimony of the
defendant was given there were present as many as
13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the
afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed
the jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply
because it was present at the start of the meeting of the
Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established
is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is
raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A
majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente,
defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and
whether they have been followed." It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary
legislative business is of course none of our concern,
and by the same token the considerations which may
lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to
treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not
control the issue before us. The question is neither
what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity
may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The
question is rather what rules the House has established
and whether they have been followed. It of course has
the power to define what tribunal is competent to
exact testimony and the conditions that establish its
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by
the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to
assume that the conditions of competency were
satisfied even though the basis in fact was not
established and in face of a possible finding that the
facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute
which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction,
petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term
of from two to six years. An essential part of a
procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a
punishment is that all the elements of the crime
charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
An element of the crime charged in the instant
indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal,
and the trial court properly so instructed the jury.
The House insists that to be such a tribunal a
committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree
with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury
had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
there were "actually and physically present" a
majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is
satisfied by a finding that there was a majority
present two or three hours before the defendant
offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law
that a quorum need not be present when the offense
is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to
the rules and practice of the Congress but denies
petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he
be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements
of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is
not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable
that such a body can be the instrument of criminal
conviction.
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule
and practice that a quorum once established is presumed to
continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this
decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The
minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellinwas indicted
on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to
him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of
contempt of Congress on four counts. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit.
On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the
Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV
which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-
committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House
of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a witness
in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the
Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive
session for the purpose of determining the necessity or
admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a
public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for
judicial review when he discovers at trial that his
rights have been violated. This is especially so when
the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced
reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the
Committee's rules, which must be distributed to
every witness under Rule XVII, the witness'
reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually
does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules.
To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply
because the witness was deceived by the Committee's
appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee
prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's
case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that
the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its
own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the
judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark
case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed
jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the
Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not
be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts
cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by
the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments
of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now
beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the
political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely
eliminated this defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political
question defense in national security cases. To a great degree,
it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the
new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of
the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the
following postulates:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the
sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional
Commission explained the sense and the reach of
judicial power as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of
its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters
constitute political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it
granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty
of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials
done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of
this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the
people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing
new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the
significant changes made in our constitutional
canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered
during martial law. One of the areas radically changed
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three
great branches of our government — the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the
powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the
security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by
providing "No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure
of its Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to
the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary
by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was
tasked with screening the list of prospective
appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a
specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary —
ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy
in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days
from the submission of the list of recommendees by
the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the
lower courts. To further insulate appointments in the
judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court
was given the power to "appoint all officials and
employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the
judiciary from the other branches of government
more watertight, it prohibited members of the
judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency
performing quasi judicial or administrative
functions." While the Constitution strengthened the
sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers
of the two other branches of government, especially
the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President
clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law.
The exercise of this power is now subject to
revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be
reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including
the "duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts
of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of
government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law
which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the
duty to annul acts of government committed with
grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism.
This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional
violations by initially determining what it cannot do;
under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress
— this Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this
solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies
the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true
to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity.
To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial
sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts.
In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power
is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our
own history should provide us the light and not the experience
of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it
relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the
petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally
enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper officers of each
House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the
two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President
that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written
Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the
government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their
nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in
the land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with
the same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot
be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the
bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus
made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms
and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law
that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled
bill unless there affirmatively appears in thejournals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with
one or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other
jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has
been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however,
can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been
violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic
evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of
extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale
of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for the enrolled bill
theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
competent for courts to inquire as to what
prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are
required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme
Court of Florida declared
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as
signed by the legislative offices and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this
presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown
from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative
officers, contains provisions that have not passed both
houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a
part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in
the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628,
text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed

xxx xxx xxx
to the holding that when the
journals speak they control, and
The signing by the Speaker of the House of against such proof the enrolled
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, bill is not conclusive.
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
More enlightening and apropos to the present
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13,
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in
Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et
due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively
government, and that it is delivered to him in
reproduced hereunder.
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, . . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce,
and is deposited in the public archives, its reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress this court which created and nurtured the so-called
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As "enrolled bill" doctrine.
the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
xxx xxx xxx
the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of [1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, certain procedures that the legislature must follow
a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
xxx xxx xxx
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires
the judicial department to act upon the assurance, and . . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in
to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill,
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to
to determine, when the question properly arises, determine if there are any defects.
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop

of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a
rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of
evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too
many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed
by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the
validity of every act published as law is to be tested by
examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two
houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation,
difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation,
and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the
law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on
the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are
conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been
rejected in various jurisdictions in the United States. In his
Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its
companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the
leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the
withering, if not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that
doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not
altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial
inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the "enrolled
bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its
existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated
this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and
approved by the governor. In declining to look behind
the law to determine the propriety of its enactment,
the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the
enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to
scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal
branch of government. Second, reasons of
convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring
the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated
considerable complex litigation if the court ruled
otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor
record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and
expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as
enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the
legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason,
or as a result of judicial whim. There are
four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled
bill was a "record" and, as such, was not subject to
attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one
of the three branches of government, the courts,
being coequal, must indulge in every presumption
that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was
originally formulated, record-keeping of the
legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of
equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill,
be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in
Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states,
however and it has not been without its critics. From
an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not
favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present
case) produces results which do not accord with facts
or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive
to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings.
(4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping
devices now used by legislatures remove one of the
original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards
the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth
and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by
any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has
come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
state agency or branch or government — are brought
to light and corrected. To countenance an artificial
rule of law that silences our voices when confronted
with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to
this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one
which Professor Sutherland describes as the
"extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is
a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is
valid, but such presumption may be overcome by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishing that constitutional requirements have
not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all
other cases following the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a
conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid.
...

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once
the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare
unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals
decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests
that starting in the 1940's,
that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the
points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule
such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or
leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be
logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287
attacked by any authoritative source of information." 19
Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill

The force of the rule depends
doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that
upon the nature of the question
this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the
to be decided and the extent of
rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
the disturbance of rights and
verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this
practices which a change in the
ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
interpretation of the law or the
course of judicial opinions may
create. Cogent considerations xxx xxx xxx
are whether there is clear error
and urgent reasons "for neither
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished
justice nor wisdom requires a
product which is patently distinct and different from
court to go from one doubtful
"urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used
rule to another," and whether
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
or not the evils of the principle
"urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however,
that has been followed will be
that the bill approved in Congress contained the
more injurious than can
copulative conjunction "and" between the term
possibly result from a change.
"urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in
not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished
it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports. product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the
members thereof. But said individual statements do
Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the
not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and
less do they indicate the intent of the House of
technology are the rule in record-keeping by our
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs.
General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric
Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs.
typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000
equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic
[March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games
voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and
and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19,
fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep
1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled
accurate and readily accessible records.
bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — conclusive
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
appropriate in today's modern and developing passed by Congress and approved by the President
judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections,
if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
justice is done. The existence of difficulties and certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
complexities should not deter this pursuit and we the Executive — on which we cannot speculate
reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides. without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
various branches of government requires that we
decree.
shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other
errors of our copartners in government. We simply
do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our
provides that any law contrary to the constitution is fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:
"void." The proper exercise of judicial authority
requires us to recognize any law which is
. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without
what really happened. The respect due to the other
elaborating the point, we believe that under section
branches of the Government demands that we act
228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
to "support . . . the Constitution of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations
respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast
of the constitution — by any person, corporation,
in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth
 trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of law-making, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this
Court to make can be better done in Congress. After
all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative
need for which seems to be suggested by the
petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy
of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but
of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule
of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course
to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there
are certain matters which the Constitution expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the
enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We
ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the
presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the
respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill
to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation for his signature meant that the
bill he had signed had never been approved by the
Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it
invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the
(1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by
the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President." InBrown vs. Morris,
supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that
the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step
is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the
presiding officer, the proof that it has 'passed both
houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
the Senate President, granting it to have been validly
made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute.
Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the
issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the
effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute.
The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not
the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses
of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly
is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified
by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary
rationale in the case of Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent
part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking
privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report. In rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its
jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may
deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise
differences between the two
houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by
rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which
new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference
bill. But occasionally a
conference committee
produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate.
These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies,
Legislative Law and Process: In
a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3,
1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. v. Gimenezlaid down the rule that the enrolled bill
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters
that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas
and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals
are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as
we held in the old (but stills valid) case
of U.S. vs. Pens, where we explained the reason thus:
 To inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into
existence, to invade a demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also under
coordinate and independent
department of the Government,
and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, et al and its companion cases. 25 Involved in the case
was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly
relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to
the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the
requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained
or that certain provisions of a statute had been
"smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government. There is no reason
now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is
absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his
signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional
procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation
that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared,
we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled
bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our
Rules will show that its section on conclusive presumption does
not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill.
But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all
too often results in the suppression of truthcannot be justified
under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution
a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national
policy 29requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat thispolicy
on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these
policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike
down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if
it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its
fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice
is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere
prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of
dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are
justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondents to justify
granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition
merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented
from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not
concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor
does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question
the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House
enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters
of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are
justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondents to justify
granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition
merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented
from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not
concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor
does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question
the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House
enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters
of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here
made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit
that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive
pronouncement that we no longer give our unqualified support
to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for
this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is
appropriate only in England where it originated because in
England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is
supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States
have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking.27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to
the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and
rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of