[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E.

TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Petitioners, v. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act
No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of
beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. chanrobles vi rtua l lawli bra ry

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16,
1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio
Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo
appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In
the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What
happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November
21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper
issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what
is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this
portion of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of
the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to
3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division
on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2)
in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only
once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published
version does not contain the sentence" (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will
raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no

need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the
resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee

report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners’ principal argument is that R.A. No.
8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that
these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule
XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference
committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for
its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyo’s question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat
Rep. Albano’s motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano’s motion
and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-
122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without
first ruling on Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a
privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo’s query should have been resolved
upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary
situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking
for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the
House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court’s power under Art.
VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6
which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed
membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,

respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents’ defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They
argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the
House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine.
Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of
its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except
insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents
contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as
well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H.

No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the
judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House
of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that
"On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December
2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-
27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. chanrobles vi rt ual lawli bra ry

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the
principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although
not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision
for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun,
11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal." cralaw virtua1aw lib rary

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of
standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in
the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and
effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred
upon it by the Constitution." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore
entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has
been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with
rules."
cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself
as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its
own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of
a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in
a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as
void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own
rules of procedure." cralaw virtua1 aw lib rary

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an
act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses
have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill,
intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for
non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of
Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the
requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held: chanrob1es vi rtu al 1aw li bra ry

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either
in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules.
The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction
of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from
legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in
a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto;
but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature
had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court’s refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature,
and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414,
50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark.
101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules
of proceedings. He wrote: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance
on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion’s sponsorship in

the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving
abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court
is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII,
§1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function is
merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of
our Art. VIII, §1 power. chanro bles. com : virt ual law li bra ry

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They
claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared
Rep. Albano’s motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time
the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano’s motion
for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the
Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say
that the method used in this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that
in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair
must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand,
as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on
the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The
point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the
ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I
came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes
in.

x x x
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one
that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to
my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on
second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if
anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can
announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In
the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that
is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for
the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem."25 cralaw:red

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last
and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27
and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact
that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a
result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle
the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not
say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment
until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not.
The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted
on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo’s question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But
Rep. Arroyo’s question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of
privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo’s question were so, Rep.
Albano’s motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any
further consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the
bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House acted with grave
abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice
Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by
Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there
was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is
obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep.
Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be
present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e. petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate
in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if
voting had been conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference
committee report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice
Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim
either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that
the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind"
an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate. chanroble s virtual lawlib rary

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts." 39 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt
which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at
any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for
this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the
conference committee: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not
been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations: chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an

enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department
to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching
of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule,
except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new
members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill
rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.,) have
departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have
since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.,) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of
the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by
the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4)
provides:chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus,
in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus:
"They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be
law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting
only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No.
8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

x x x
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to
inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A.
No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body. 49 cdtech

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relationship to parties.

Panganiban, J., took no part; former counsel of a party.

Torres, Jr., J., took no part; on leave during deliberations.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., concurring: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not
backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1
I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today might
be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm
stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar
challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No.
7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a
number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of
which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,
incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I
did not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially
those touching upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be
recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by
the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be
followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have
cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the
precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal
legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority
exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however,
fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I
found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or
misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their application. chanroble svirtual|awli bra ry

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was
very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural
irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been ‘saved’ by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot
continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since
constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes
are over facts — whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are
in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill

introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both
legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by
its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I
was quick to qualify the extent of the Court’s review power in respect of internal
procedures in this wise:jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which
provides that ‘(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.’ We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the
internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution." 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate
Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was
likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however,
disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I

cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in
my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly
violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the
orderly conduct of the House’s business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to
the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which
would otherwise warrant the Court’s intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in
any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act
No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners’ arguments in attacking the validity of the law is
merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from
invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends
constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke
my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards
"substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through
Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza
to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on
the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new wrinkles
in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition
of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890) chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal."
cralaw virtua1aw lib rary

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV,
the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.

Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 In Smith, the meaning of
sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz.: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"x x x

"3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may
move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either
of the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of
the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent to the President
before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a
nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the

Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion
to reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power
Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was
sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate,
however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the President to
return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo warranto
was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the
question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to
their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its
own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.

"x x x

"Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that
adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and
delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to
make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say that another rule
would be better. A rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the
vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover,
should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons,
above stated, against the Senate’s construction seem to us compelling. We are
confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smith’s confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to
perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test
spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel
testified before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.
He denied he was a communist and was charged with perjury in the regular court. He
adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge’s
charge to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that —
"x x x

". . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members
of the said Committee, and that at least that number must have been actually and
physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did
meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during
the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question
was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain
there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee
as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of
that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume
there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the
meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is
presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente,
defined the issue as "what rules the House had established and whether they have been
followed." It held:
jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x

"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course

none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead
Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity
may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the
House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the power
to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was
given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were
satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible
finding that the facts contradicted the assumption. chanroble s lawlib ra ry : rednad

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a

consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the
presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury.
The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and
we agree with the trial court’s charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that there were ‘actually and physically present’ a majority
of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was
a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the
face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum
need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary
to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right.
That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime
charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum
is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . ." The minority
view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v.
United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit.
On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally
denied his request to be heard in executive session. He alleged there was a violation of
Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-
committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national
security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the
Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in
a public hearing." In a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
held:jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x

"Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers
at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee’s
practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of
the Committee’s rules, which must be distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the
witness’ reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to
do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply
because the witness was deceived by the Committee’s appearance of regularity, is not
fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin’s case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous
in obeying its own rules." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the
"political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee
legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit,’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.
For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts." . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign
state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the
eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of Article
VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x

"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national
security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new power to
review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government." . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following
postulates: jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph

"x x x

"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." cralaw virtua1aw l ib rary

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the
Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as
follows:chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

‘x x x

‘. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute political question.’

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the
view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal
deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among the
three great branches of our government — the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission
strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the
security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing ‘No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.’ It
also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar
Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective appointees to the
judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away
from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies in
the judiciary — ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the
Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees
by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to ‘appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.’ And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ‘.
. . designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.’
While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of
the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject
to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise
of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen.
chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

The provision defining judicial power as including the ‘duty of the courts of justice . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government’ constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to
upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .

x x x

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of
former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons
of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled
bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses,
signed by the proper officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a
declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a
bill, thus attested, has received in due form the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling
the legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in
their nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land — are
placed on the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of
the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of
the bill was premised on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is the
exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it
cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same
forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires
the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under
this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule
concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of
the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been
regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a
law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are
allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or
mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill.
The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15
viz.:
chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary

x x x

"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids
difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too
many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. As
explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the
legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty
appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of
the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various
jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the leading
American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the
enrolled bill theory, viz.:
jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"x x x

"Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity
originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not
altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that"
(u)nder the ‘enrolled bill rule’ by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents
and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless
competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn v. Hardee, etc., Et Al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices
and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not
conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains provisions that
have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of
the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade v. Atlantic Lumber Co.,
51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

‘This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they
control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.’

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated
on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, Et. Al. v.
Department of Revenue, Et Al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively
reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line
of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called ‘enrolled bill’
doctrine.

x x x

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the
legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .

x x x

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look
behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if
there are any defects.

x x x

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was
properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to
determine the propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for
adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes
of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience
prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and
anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed
a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records
of the legislature. . . .

x x x

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim.
There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a ‘record’ and,
as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of
the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in every
presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated,
record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities
required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its
critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as
follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2)
Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do not accord
with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping
devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5)
The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide
a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill
doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The
maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by
precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of
such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel’s
Adm’r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941)." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of
the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons ‘for neither justice nor wisdom requires
a court to go from one doubtful rule to another,’ and whether or not the evils of the
principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a
change.’

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon
sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be
discarded, and with it the rule it supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-
keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the
rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters,
duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic
voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the
General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the ‘convenience’ rule is not appropriate in today’s modern and
developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits
may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government
requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our
copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is ‘void.’ The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional
and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228
of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to ‘support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth.’ We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution — by any
person, corporation, state agency or branch or government — are brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes
as the ‘extrinsic evidence.’ . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption
that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional requirements have
not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called
enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption
that an enrolled bill is valid. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in
United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940’s,." . . the tendency seems
to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of
the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked
by any authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the
1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"x x x

"Hence, ‘urea formaldehyde’ is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and
different from ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde,’ as separate articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as ‘urea formaldehyde.’ Petitioner contends, however, that
the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction ‘and’ between the
term ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde,’ and that the members of Congress intended to exempt
‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde’ separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called ‘urea formaldehyde,’ not the latter as a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate
the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central
Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board,
L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill — which
uses the term ‘urea formaldehyde’ instead of ‘urea and formaldehyde’ — conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President (Primicias v. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias v. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree." cdti

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill
doctrine, viz.:
jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

". . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of law-making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done
in Congress. After all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants
thereof . Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The ponencia stressed: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that
in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide.
All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine
when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill
as invalid. We ruled:jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

"x x x

"Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is

conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a
co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification

made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures
of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that"
[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President." In Brown v. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has ‘passed
both houses’ will satisfy the constitutional requirement." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court’s inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case
of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the
pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the
judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising

differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

‘A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a
Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).’chanroble s.com : vi rtual law lib rary

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question
was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the
yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding
on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons, where
we explained the reason thus: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

‘To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are,
as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.’

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its
companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority26 partly relied
on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7716. It held:jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"x x x

"Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a statute had been ‘smuggled’ in the printing of the bill have moved or
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the ‘enrolled bill’ rule is absolute. In fact in one case we
‘went behind’ an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee ‘surreptitiously’ inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
‘enrolled bill’ rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled
bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim
is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time
for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give our
unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this
suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and the
Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States have
broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the
enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we
relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as
a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been
repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on
conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an
enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The
Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full
public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these
policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any
branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its
fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice
based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an
enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of
dispensing justice based on truth.
 III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and
that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave
abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting said
petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that
petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not
concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right
of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on
how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated,
these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-
observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

VITUG, J., concurring: chanrob1 es virt ual 1aw li bra ry

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government,
the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have
been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of
overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been
understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and the
authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no
time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law
to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and
accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new
Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under
mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may
even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is shown to have
attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of

Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny
the instant petition.
chanroble svirtual|awli bra ry

Endnotes:

1. JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21, 1996
session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6. par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.

2. Rule VIII. §35. Voting. — Every member present in the session shall vote on every
question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest
therein.

Rule XVII. §103. Manner of Voting. — The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying
"As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye" and, after the
affirmative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

3. Rule XIX. §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. — The Speaker shall state the
motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before being
debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.

4. Rule XVI. §97. Recognition of Member. — When two or more members rise at the
same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.

5. Rule XX. §121. Definition. — Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties,
conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its
members, collectively or individually.

§122. Precedence. — Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.

Rule XXI. §123. Definition and Precedence. — A privileged motion pertains to a subject
matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others.

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.

Rule XVIII. §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. — When a bill, report or
motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for its
reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn, a question of
privilege, and a point of order.

6. 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

7. Rollo, p. 228.

8. Id., p. 229.

9. Art. VI, §16(3).

10. E. g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862); Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14 (1982);
Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com’n. 675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also
Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

11. 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235
SCRA 630.

12. 144 U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13. 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).

14. 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).

15. 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).

16. 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).

17. 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18. ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-

189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58
(1971).

19. Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission,
in 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).

20. Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).

21. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 701
(1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at
480-481 (emphasis added).

22. 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23. United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v.
Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).

24. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).

25. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).

26. Art. VI, §26(2).

27. Id., §16(4).

28. Id., §27(1).

29. Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30. INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED

AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY
PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).

31. Rule XIX, §13.

32. 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10,

1986).

33. ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34. PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).

35. Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

36. Ibid.

37. Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

38. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

39. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40. Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE §1350
at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus
classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed.
1972).

41. EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf . Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).

42. Philippine Judges Ass’n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido, 27
SCRA 131.

43. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v.
Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL V.
MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).

45. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).

46. The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on
the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any
question, at the request of one-fifth of the members present (Id., §16(4)); (3) the yeas
and nays upon repassing a bill over the President’s veto (Id., §27(1); and (4) the
President’s objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)

47. 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348
(1886).

48. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com’n. 675 F.2d 1282.

ROMERO, J., concurring: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

1. 235 SCRA 630.

2. Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence
to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also
of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was
invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that
certain provisions of a state had been ‘smuggled’ in the printing of the bill have moved
or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the ‘enrolled bill’ rule is absolute. In fact in one case we
‘went behind’ an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee ‘surreptitiously’ inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
‘enrolled bill’ rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

3. Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, ‘parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.’ Our
concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of
laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been
faithfully observed in these cases." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

4. Id., pp. 778-779; Emphasis supplied.

5. Id., p. 780; Emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. 144 US 1 (1891).
2. The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of
House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not voting
would be "counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

3. 286 US 6 (1932).

4. 338 US 89 (1948).

5. 374 US 109 (1963).

6. 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond v. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).

7. 235 SCRA 630.

8. Supra.

9. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

10. Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].

11. Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v.
Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law
rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff’s return. The Sheriff is considered as an officer of
the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as a regal act and no official can dispute
the King’s word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th
ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).

12. Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

13. Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14. See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E. 2d
220 [1957].

15. Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed. 1940)

17. 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

20. 78 Phil. 1 (1947).

21. 7 SCRA 374.

22. 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.

23. 56 SCRA 714.

24. 227 SCRA 703.

25. Supra.

26. Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.

27. See writer’s dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28. Op cit.
29. Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.