Case Bov

G.R. No.
147387 December 10, 2003
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS
TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which
provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel
M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a
member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;" 1
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES." 2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate and sixteen (16)
3
members of the House of Representatives, was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
4
House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, signed by its
5
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment
thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his
objection to the proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action. 6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees to 7
the Bicameral Conference Committee. Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep.
8
Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees to the Bicameral Conference
9
Committee. 10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been
recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral
Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other
members were given a copy thereof. 11
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House
approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining
their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a
rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the
constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator
signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure was regular. 12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by
the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill
No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is
thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended
its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of
the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr., that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
13
"Accountability of Public Officers:"

14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering
those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as
ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss
the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the
present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered
harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as
taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners’ allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted
into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it
encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of
candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective
official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No.
9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With
the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to
finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency
or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be
expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of
the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its
title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67,
leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the
appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated
as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due
process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that
the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would
be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the
issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents
merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised
by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the
petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
15
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society," had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v.
17
Secretary of the Department of Energy, this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of
18
standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then
Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos. Similarly, the
19
Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other
petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the
validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
21
Jr., Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, Albano v. Reyes, and Bagatsing v. Committee
22 23 24
on Privatization.
25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the constitutional
26
provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-
vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months
away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The
following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons
of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that
the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our
stand. 27
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
28
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul
30
of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.
31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider 32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All
laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as
well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an
act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not
only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media
time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. 35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation.
To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the
title be a complete index of its content.
36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions
of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this
provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? That’s
all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair election
practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier
seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable with the title
"Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things so that we don’t come back again
until we find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
Yes.
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it over with. To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy
issue. For me, it’s even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the
Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam
just for the title Is that what you’re ...?
It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. I’m happy that there is
already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it
would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions
deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections
through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly

adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is
a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field,
we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is
covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the
House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair
election practices because ...
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is
more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think that’s the theory.
So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special
provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus
Election Code?"
Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.

Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election
practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?

VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
The short title, "This Act ..."
You’re back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." That’s the House version, eh, dahil
pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act." 38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause
with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it
would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court.
Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is
39
not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed
limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in
40
Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case
41
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is
achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were
42
not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution 43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has
44
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. 45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
46
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
47 48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners
insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of
the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the
House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor
without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not
signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it
was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report
was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched
in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the
provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the
members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same § 16 as it now
appears in RA No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for
which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a
detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise

bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment
to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision
states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected official who runs for president and vice-
president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. 50
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent
51
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where
the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
52
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
53
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.’"
The Effectivity Clause

Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall take
effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
54
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended…. 55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
56
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has
57
been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as

unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as
it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one
hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda
and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on
the constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of

Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
–
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes
a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding,
to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of

harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process
is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and
orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it
“shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does
not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act
No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in

constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
G.R. No. 173473 – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus BETH TEMPORADA.
Promulgated: ________________
x------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, J.:
A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. – William
Blackstone1
For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner. – William
Shakespeare2
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is one of the more complicated and confusing
topics in criminal law. It befuddles not a few students of law, legal scholars and members of the
bench and of the bar.3 Fortunately, this case presents a great opportunity for the Court to resolve
with finality a controversial aspect of the application and interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. It is an occasion for the Court to perform its duty to formulate guiding and controlling principles,
precepts, doctrines or rules.4 In the process, the matter can be clarified, the public may be educated
and the Court can exercise its symbolic function of instructing bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by statutory and constitutional guarantees.5
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be
presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.6
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that "a
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments,
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment."7
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."8 Since
the goal of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt
an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused.
It is on the basis of this basic principle of criminal law that I respectfully submit this opinion.
The Bone of Contention
The members of the Court are unanimous that accused-appellant Beth Temporada was correctly
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 and the Court of Appeals. However, opinions differ sharply on the
penalty that should be imposed on accused-appellant for estafa. In particular, there is a debate on
how the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in a case like this where there is an
incremental penalty when the amount embezzled exceeds P22,000 (by at least P10,000).
In this connection, the relevant portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed twenty years. In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor to reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the relevant portion of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the

Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense; x x x
Jurisprudence shows that there are two schools of thought on the incremental penalty in estafa vis-
à-vis the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the first school of thought, the minimum term is fixed
at prision correccional while the maximum term can reach up to reclusion temporal. This is the
general interpretation. It was resorted to in People v. Pabalan,9 People v. Benemerito,10 People v.
Gabres11 and in a string of cases.12
On the other hand, under the second school of thought, the minimum term is one degree away
from the maximum term and therefore varies as the amount of the thing stolen or embezzled
rises or falls. It is the line of jurisprudence that follows People v. De la Cruz.13 Among the cases of
this genre are People v. Romero,14 People v. Dinglasan15 and Salazar v. People.16
The Court is urged in this case to adopt a consistent position by categorically discarding one school
of thought. Hence, our dilemma: which of the two schools of thought should we affirm?
The First School of Thought Is

More Favorable To The Accused
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a sentence, the court must determine two
penalties composed of the "maximum" and "minimum" terms, instead of imposing a single fixed
penalty.17 Hence, the indeterminate sentence is composed of a maximum term taken from the
penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code and a minimum term taken from the penalty next
lower to that fixed in the said Code.
The maximum term corresponds to "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the [Revised Penal] Code." Thus, "attending circumstances"
(such as mitigating, aggravating and other relevant circumstances) that may modify the imposable
penalty applying the rules of the Revised Penal Code is considered in determining the maximum
term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after taking into consideration the effects of
attendant modifying circumstances.
On the other hand, the minimum term "shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense." It is based on the penalty prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense without considering in the meantime the modifying
circumstances.18
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa (except
estafa under Article 315(2)(d))19 is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000. If it
exceeds P22,000, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Moreover, where the amount embezzled is more thanP22,000, an incremental penalty of one year
shall be added for every additional P10,000.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code imposes prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (or a period of four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the
amount of the fraud is more thanP12,000 but not more than P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the
penalty is imposed in its maximum period (or a period of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight
years) with an incremental penalty of one year for each additional P10,000 subject to the limitation
that the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed 20 years.
Strictly speaking, the circumstance that the amount misappropriated by the offender is more
than P22,000 is a qualifying circumstance. In People v. Bayot,20 this Court defined a qualifying
circumstance as a circumstance the effect of which is "not only to give the crime committed its
proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no
other penalty than that especially prescribed for said crime." Applying the definition to estafa where
the amount embezzled is more than P22,000, the amount involved ipso jure places the offender in
such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period plus incremental penalty, if warranted.21 In other words, if the amount involved is more
than P22,000, then the offender shall be sentenced to suffer the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty with an incremental penalty of one year per additional P10,000.
However, People v. Gabres considered the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved as a

generic modifying circumstance which is material only in the determination of the maximum term, not
of the minimum term:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense." The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords
with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charged against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
beprision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. (emphasis supplied)
If the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is considered as a qualifying circumstance,
the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for it will be the maximum period of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. This has a duration of six
years, 8 months and 21 days to eight years. The penalty next lower (which will correspond to the
minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence) is the medium period of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, which has a duration of five years, five
months and 11 days to six years, eight months and 20 days.22
If the circumstance is considered simply as a modifying circumstance (as in Gabres), it will be

disregarded in determining the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. The starting point will
be prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum and the penalty next lower will then
be prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods, which has a duration of six months and
one day to four years and two months.
From the foregoing, it is more favorable to the accused if the circumstance (that more than P22,000
was involved) is to be considered as a modifying circumstance, not as a qualifying circumstance.
Hence, I submit that the Gabresrule is preferable.
On the contrary, the second school of thought is invariably prejudicial to the accused. By fixing the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to one degree away from the maximum term, the
minimum term will always be longer than prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods.
Worse, the circumstance (that more than P22,000 was embezzled) is not a modifying circumstance
but a part of the penalty, if adopted, will mean that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
will never be lower than the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, the penalty next lower to the maximum period of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.
The Second School Of Thought

And Its Shortcomings
The primary defect of the so-called second school of thought is that it contradicts the in dubio pro reo
principle. It also violates the lenity rule. Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation with harsher
effects on the accused. In particular, compared to the first school of thought, it lengthens rather than
shortens the penalty that may be imposed on the accused. Seen in its proper context, the second
school of thought is contrary to the avowed purpose of the law that it purportedly seeks to promote,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The second school of thought limits the concept of "modifying circumstance" to either a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It contends
that the respective enumerations under the said provisions are exclusive and all other circumstances
not included therein were intentionally omitted by the legislature. It further asserts that, even
assuming that the circumstance that more thanP22,000 was embezzled may be deemed as
analogous to aggravating circumstances under Article 14, the said circumstance cannot be
considered as an aggravating circumstance because it is only in mitigating circumstances that
analogous circumstances are allowed and recognized.23 The second school of thought then insists
that, since the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is not among those listed under
Article 14, the said circumstance is not a modifying circumstance for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The second school of thought therefore strictly construes the term "attending circumstances" against
the accused. It refuses to recognize anything that is not expressed, takes the language used in its
exact meaning and admits no equitable consideration.
To the point of being repetitive, however, where the accused is concerned, penal statutes should be
interpreted liberally, not strictly.
The fact that there are two schools of thought on the matter by itself shows that there is uncertainty
as to the concept of "attending" or "modifying" circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio pro reo
principle, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and not against him.
Moreover, laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are
enacted.24 The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose which
induced the legislature to enact the statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give a word or
phrase a restricted or expansive meaning.25 In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt
the interpretation that best serves the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its
object.26 Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, that
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted should be adopted.27 Taken in conjunction with the lenity rule, a
doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of incarceration ought to be given an
interpretation that affords lenient treatment to the accused.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to shorten his term of
imprisonment.28 The reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps "uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness." The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation that
benefits the accused.29 This Court already ruled that "in cases where the application of the law on
indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his
prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied."30In the same vein, if an
interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is unfavorable to the accused and will work to
increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should not be adopted. It is also for this
reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the penalty of lesser crimes carries with it
the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave penalties is not only wrong but also
dangerous.
Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that the minimum term of the penalty be
no farther than one degree away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true that the
minimum term of the penalty in an indeterminate sentence is generally one degree away from the
maximum term, the law does not mandate that its application be rigorously and narrowly limited to
that situation.
The Proper Indeterminate

Penalties In These Cases
From the above disquisition, I respectfully submit that the prevailing rule, the so-called first school of
thought, be followed. With respect to the indeterminate sentence that may be imposed on the
accused, I agree with the position taken by Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Accordingly, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
(1) in Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21
days of prision mayor as maximum;
(2) in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to
10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid
three estafa cases and
(3) in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21
days of prision mayor as maximum.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Commentaries on the Laws of England 92.
2
King Henry The Fifth, Act 3, Scene 6, Line 11.
3
A survey of criminal law jurisprudence will show that among the portions of the ruling of trial
courts and the appellate court that are most commonly corrected by this Court is the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In fact, even this Court has grappled with the
matter. (See People v. Moises, [160 Phil. 845 (1975)] overruling People v. Colman [103 Phil.
6 (1958)]; People v. Gonzales [73 Phil. 549 (1942)] overturning People v. Co Pao [58 Phil.
545 (1933)] and People v. Gayrama (60 Phil. 796 (1934)] and People v. Mape [77 Phil. 809
(1947)] reversing People v. Haloot [64 Phil. 739 (1937)] which followed the Co Pao ruling.)
4
See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 219 Phil. 402 (1985).
5
Id.
6
See Section 14 (2), Constitution.
7
Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (2004), p. 1359.
8
People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
9
331 Phil. 64 (1996).
10
332 Phil. 710 (1996).
11
335 Phil. 242 (1997).
These cases include People v. Hernando, 375 Phil. 1078 (1999), People v. Menil, 394 Phil.
12
433 (2000),People v. Logan, 414 Phil. 113 (2001), People v. Gallardo, 436 Phil. 698
(2002), Garcia v. People, 457 Phil. 713 (2003) and Vasquez v. People, G.R. No. 159255, 28
January 2008, 542 SCRA 520.
13
383 Phil. 213 (2000).
14
365 Phil. 531 (1999).
15
437 Phil. 621 (2002).
16
439 Phil. 762 (2002).
17
People v. Ducosin, supra.
18
People v. Gonzales, supra note 3.
The penalty for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) is provided under PD 818 (Amending Article
19
315 of the Revised Penal Code by Increasing the Penalties for Estafa Committed by Means
of Bouncing Checks).
20
64 Phil. 269 (1937).
This is similar to the effect of the circumstance that the offender intended to aid the enemy
21
by giving notice or information that is useful to the enemy in the crime of correspondence
with hostile country under Article 120(3) of the Revised Penal Code (which necessitates the
imposition of reclusion perpetua to death) or of the circumstance that the offender be a
public officer or employee in the crime of espionage under Article 117 of the Revised Penal
Code (which requires the imposition of the penalty next higher in degree than that generally
imposed for the crime).
22
See Article 61(5) of the Revised Penal Code. If the penalty is any one of the three periods
of a divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that period next following the
given penalty. Thus, the penalty immediately inferior to prision mayor in its maximum period
is prision mayor in its medium period (People v. Co Pao, supra note 3). If the penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion
temporal in its minimum period (People v. Gayrama, supra note 3). The penalty prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for a felony is a degree. If the penalty prescribed for a felony is
one of the three periods of a divisible penalty, that period becomes a degree, and the period
immediately below is the penalty next lower in degree (Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal
Code, Book Two, Fifteenth Edition [2001], p. 700).
In particular, Article 13(10) expressly provides that "any other circumstances of a similar
23
nature and analogous to those above mentioned" are treated as mitigating. Article 14,
however, does not have a similar provision.
24
Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
25
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
26
Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909).
27
Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 (1909).
28
People v. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
29
Id.
30
Id.
In dubio pro reo

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigationJump to search
The page of the Egidio Bossi's treatise with the words ″in dubio pro reo″ on it.
The principle of in dubio pro reo (Latin for "[when] in doubt, for the accused")[1][2]means that a
defendant may not be convicted by the court when doubts about his or her guilt remain.
The rule of lenity is the doctrine that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the more lenient
punishment.[3]
To resolve all doubts in favor of the accused is in consonance with the principle ofpresumption of
innocence.[3]
Contents
 1Origin
 2National peculiarities
 3See also
 4References
 5External links
Origin[edit]
The main principle in the sentence was part of Aristotle's interpretation of the law and shaped
the Roman law: Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur (Digest of Justinian I, D.50.17.125);
[4]
in English: "The condition of the defendant is to be favored rather than that of the
plaintiff."[5] However, it was not spelled out word for word until the Milanese jurist Egidio Bossi(1487–
1546) related it in his treatises.
National peculiarities[edit]
In German law, the principle is not normalized, but is derived from Article 103(2) GG, Article
6 ECHR, as well as § 261 Code of Criminal Procedure. The principle has constitutional status. The
common use of the phrase in the German legal tradition was documented in 1631 by Friedrich Spee
von Langenfeld.
In Canadian law, the leading case establishing how to decide criminal cases where the guilt of the
accused depends on contradictory witness accounts is R. v. W.(D.) (1991).
G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD GUINTO Y SAN ANDRES, Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Richard Guinto y San Andres (Guinto) from the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated 31 January 2011, affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.2
cralawlawlibrary
The Facts
The prosecution presented a buy-bust case.
As narrated by Police Officer 1 Melvin Jesus S. Mendoza (PO1 Mendoza), the operation was conducted on 20
January 2004 at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning by the members of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force
(AIDSTF), Pasig City Police Station. It was prompted by an information given by a female caller received by
AIDSTF’s Team Supervisor Senior Police Officer 3 Leneal Matias (SPO3 Matias), who in turn, coordinated
with Police Inspector Melbert Esguerra (P/Insp. Esguerra), the head of AIDSTF. According to the female
caller, a certain “Chard” was selling shabu in a place located at 137 MC Guinto, Barangay
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Based on the information, P/Insp. Esguerra instructed the team to verify the call
from their civilian informant residing also in Barangay Pinagbuhatan. Upon positive verification, P/Insp.
Esguerra formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO3 Matias, SPO2 Braulio Basco (SPO2 Basco), PO1
Michael Familara (PO1 Familara), PO1 Alan Mapula, and PO1 Porferio Bansuelo (PO1 Bansuelo) and
designated PO1 Mendoza to act as the poseur-buyer. In turn, SPO3 Matias prepared the pre-operation
report and coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on the buy-bust operation.
PO1 Mendoza, as the poseur-buyer, was given two (2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills as buy-bust money by
P/Insp. Esguerra.3cralawlawlibrary
After the briefing, the team including the informant proceeded to the target area at around eleven o’clock in
the evening of 19 April 2004. Upon arrival, PO1 Mendoza and the informant positioned themselves outside
the house of this certain “Chard” (later identified as the accused Richard S.A. Guinto) and waited for him to
step out. Meanwhile, the rest of the team stood nearby and waited for PO1 Mendoza’s pre-arranged signal
of raising of hand to indicate that the sale transaction was already consummated. After two hours, Guinto
finally went out of the house. The informant approached Chard and introduced PO1 Mendoza as a person in
need of illegal drugs worth P200.00. PO1 Mendoza then gave buy-bust money to Guinto as payment.
Guinto, in turn, drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave them to PO1 Mendoza. Guinto then
put the money on his left pocket. To indicate consummation of illegal sale, PO1 Mendoza made the pre-
arranged signal to the other members of the team and introduced himself to Guinto as a police officer. The
other members of the team responded and arrested Guinto. Immediately, PO1 Mendoza confiscated the
marked money from the left pocket of Guinto and marked the plastic sachet containing shabu with the
markings “RSG/MJM.”4 cralawlawlibrary
Afterwards, the buy-bust team brought Guinto to Pasig City Police Station and turned him over to SPO2
Basco for investigation. PO1 Mendoza turned over the confiscated drugs to SPO2 Basco. Consequently,
SPO2 Basco asked for a laboratory examination request to determine the chemical composition of the
confiscated drugs.5 Thereafter, confiscated drug was brought by PO1 Noble to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.6 cralawlawlibrary
The prosecution also presented PO1 Familara as its second witness to corroborate the statements given by
PO1 Mendoza. However, several inconsistencies were apparent in his testimony.
When asked during his direct examination on who gave the buy-bust money to PO1 Mendoza, PO1 Familara
answered that it was SPO3 Matias.7 Likewise, the pre-arranged signal was differently described as
scratching of the nape instead of raising of hand.8 He also testified that their asset arrived at around one
o’clock in the morning to accompany them to Pinagbuhatan.9 Another inconsistency which surfaced was
when PO1 Familara testified that upon the consummation of illegal sale, he went to the place of the arrest
and saw PO1 Mendoza arresting Guinto. PO1 Mendoza then positively identified Guinto as the one who sold
one (1) plastic sachet of illegal drug instead of two (2) sachets.10 cralawlawlibrary
Finally, the last witness presented by the prosecution was Police Officer 2 Richard Noble (PO2 Noble).11 He
corroborated the statements given by his fellow police officers but again, presented an inconsistency as to
the time of the asset’s arrival compared to the one narrated by PO1 Familara. A conflict came out as to the
time of the team’s arrival to the target area and as to how long they waited for the accused to go out. In
his direct, he testified that the asset arrived at the police station before eleven o’clock in the evening prior to
the buy-bust operation.12 Afterwards, they had a briefing on the operation. He recalled that they waited
for around 15 to 20 minutes before the accused came out13 while PO1 Mendoza testified that they waited for
the accused for two hours. When asked again by the Court on the time of their arrival, he answered that it
was at around one o’clock in the morning.14 cralawlawlibrary
The defense interposed denial.
Guinto narrated that at the time of the arrest at 10:00 o’clock in the evening of 19 January 2004, he was in
their house cooking with his family. Several men suddenly entered the house, grabbed his arm and
searched the premises. When asked why the men entered their home, the men did not give them any
reason. Afterwards, Guinto was brought to the police headquarters and investigated by the police.15 cralawlawlibrary
Jane P. Guinto (Jane), the wife of the accused Guinto, corroborated the statements of her husband. She
recalled that several armed male persons entered their house while she and her family were cooking to
celebrate fiesta the next day. The men were not authorized to search nor arrest the person of his husband
and failed to introduce themselves to them. Thereafter, these male persons frisked her husband,
handcuffed him and brought to the police station. Meanwhile, Jane left her two children under the care of
her aunt to follow her husband. It was there at the station where the police officers tried to extort money
from her in the amount of P50, 000.00.16 cralawlawlibrary
Finally, John Mark P. Guinto (John Mark), one of the two children of Guinto, affirmed the narration of his
parents on material points. He testified that he and his younger brother were watching television at the
time of the illegal arrest of his father. His parents were then cooking when some uniformed police officers
arrested his father and brought him to the police station. However, he testified that he went to their
neighbor’s house and hid there out of fear, contrary to the statement of his mother that she brought them
to her aunt.17cralawlawlibrary
Guinto was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under Section 5 of Article II
of R.A. No. 9165: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On or about January 20, 2004 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO1 Melvin Santos Mendoza, a police poseur buyer, two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
bag each containing two centigrams (0.02 gram) of white crystalline substance, which were found positive
to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.18 chanrobleslaw
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Based on the Pre-Trial Order,19 the prosecution and defense stipulated that Forensic Chemist Annalee R.
Forro (Forro) of the PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination on the samples submitted and they
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 8 October 2008 rendered a Decision20 finding Guinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 for
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with all the accessory penalties under the law. It held that
all the elements to constitute illegal sale was present to convict the accused of the offense. Likewise, it
affirmed the testimonies of the police officers on the conducted buy-bust operation and the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties as against the claim of unsubstantiated denial of Guinto.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drug were proven as testified by the police officers PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara. It found
credible the straightforward and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses on what transpired
during the buy-bust operation.21 Further, it held that the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of
custody of evidence and the regularity of performance of the police officers who conducted the operation.
Finally, it affirmed that the non-compliance of the strict procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 did not invalidate the seizure and custody of the
seized items as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
operatives. 22cralawlawlibrary
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we reverse the finding of the trial courts. We find that the
prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale.
Moreover, the conflicting statements of the policemen on material points tarnished the credibility of the
testimony for the prosecution.
Primarily assailed by the accused are the inconsistent statements of the apprehending police officers with
respect to the circumstances of his illegal arrest and the broken chain of custody which would warrant his
acquittal.
We are convinced.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.23
Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic
substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to first establish beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other arguments.24 cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an illegal sale of
dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation of the testimonies of PO1 Familara
and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number of plastic sachets
bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival at the place of arrest,
PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto. On the other hand,
PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency
is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints the very corpus deliciti of the crime of
illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecution’s evidence places in reasonable doubt the
identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in court.
We likewise see that the conflicting statements of the police officers defeat the presumption of the regularity
of their performance of duties ordinarily accorded by the lower courts.
We find several inconsistencies on points material to the credibility of the buy-bust operation.
Among those are the inconsistencies on the pre-arranged signal, length of time the police officers spent in
waiting for the accused and the exact time of the arrest.
Aside from those alleged by defense, this Court found several more evident inconsistencies, which when put
together, erodes the presumption of regularity of performance of duty.
We discuss.
First, as already pointed out, as to identity of the corpus delicti of the crime.
PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara fatally contradicted each other’s testimony as to the number of sachets
bought from Guinto. In his direct testimony, PO1 Mendoza positively identified that the accused gave two
plastic sachets in exchange of the P200 marked money.25 However, the same identification was refuted
when PO1 Familara testified that PO1 Mendoza informed him that he (Mendoza) successfully bought one
plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto.26 cralawlawlibrary
Second, as to where the marked money was recovered after the buy-bust operation.
According to PO1 Mendoza, he was able to obtain possession of the buy-bust money from the left front
pocket of Guinto as transcribed in his direct testimony dated 19 August 2004. However, in his direct
testimony dated 18 August 2005, Mendoza testified that he was able to recover the buy-bust money from
the right hand of Guinto, as opposed from his previous narration that he recovered the money from Guinto’s
left pocket.27cralawlawlibrary
Third, conflicting circumstances before the arrest.
In his first testimony, PO1 Mendoza recalled that upon their arrival at the target area at around eleven
o’clock in the evening, the team waited for almost two hours for the accused to come out from his house.28
However, PO1 Familara testified that they arrived at the target area at around one o’clock in the morning of
20 January 2004.29 Witness PO1 Noble, on the other hand, recalled that they left for the area at around
eleven in the evening30 and waited for 15 to 20 minutes31 for Guinto to come out but contradicted his former
statement and testified that they arrived at around one o’clock in the morning.32 cralawlawlibrary
Fourth, as to the pre-arranged signal.
PO1 Mendoza testified that the agreed upon signal will be the raising of hand to signify the consummation of
illegal sale.33 Again, it was contradicted by PO1 Familara’s statement that what was agreed upon during the
meeting was the scratching of the nape as the pre-arranged signal of PO1 Mendoza.34 cralawlawlibrary
Finally, the source of the buy-bust money.
During his direct examination, PO1 Mendoza was asked on who gave him the buy-bust money. In his
answer, he identified that it was P/Insp. Esguerra35 as the source. On the contrary, PO1 Familara identified
SPO3 Matias as the one who gave PO1 Mendoza the marked money during their meeting.36 cralawlawlibrary
We find support in several jurisprudential rulings.
In People v. Roble,37 the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and generally not disturbed upon appeal.
However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact of weight or substance. In this present case, the contradictions, numerous and material, warrant the
acquittal of accused-appellant.38cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is
the objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding
the conduct of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture detailing the
buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery
of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the
drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict
scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.39 In
light of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really
transpired on the buy-bust operation.
In People v. Unisa40 this Court held that “in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drug Act, credence is
given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.”
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by this Court as proof that the statements of
the police officers is credible. As maintained by the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in
the absence of any improper motive, presumption of regularity of performance of duty prevails. However, it
must be similarly noted that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of public officers does
not outweigh another recognized presumption - the presumption of innocence of the accused until proven
beyond reasonable doubt.41 cralawlawlibrary
In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of regularity of performance of duties
must be harmonized with the other interest of the State which is the interest of adherence to the
presumption of innocence of the accused.
However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the presumption of
innocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest
degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.42 cralawlawlibrary
In conclusion, this case exemplifies the doctrine that conviction must stand on the strength of the
Prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must
always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this requirement, the Court will not
allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a matter of course.43 cralawlawlibrary
The present case shows that the prosecution fell short in proving with certainty the culpability of the accused
and engendered a doubt on the true circumstances of the buy-bust operation. In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.44
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 31 January 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03844 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 8 October 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 164 of Pasig City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellantRICHARD
GUINTO y SAN ANDRES is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention unless
his continued confinement is warranted for some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED. cralawred
G.R. No. 198314 September 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RICHARD GUINTO Y SAN ANDRES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Richard Guinto y San Andres (Guinto) from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 31 January 2011, affirming the decision of conviction
1
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. 2
The Facts
The prosecution presented a buy-bust case.
As narrated by Police Officer 1 Melvin Jesus S. Mendoza (PO1 Mendoza), the operation was
conducted on 20 January 2004 at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning by the members of Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Task Force (AIDSTF), Pasig City Police Station. It was prompted by an information
given by a female caller received by AIDSTF’s Team Supervisor Senior Police Officer 3 Leneal
Matias (SPO3 Matias), who in turn, coordinated with Police Inspector Melbert Esguerra (P/Insp.
Esguerra), the head of AIDSTF. According to the female caller, a certain "Chard" was selling shabu
in a place located at 137 MC Guinto, Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Based on the information,
P/Insp. Esguerra instructed the team to verify the call from their civilian informant residing also in
Barangay Pinagbuhatan. Upon positive verification, P/Insp. Esguerra formed a buybust team
composed of SPO3 Matias, SPO2 Braulio Basco (SPO2 Basco), PO1 Michael Familara (PO1
Familara), PO1 Alan Mapula, and PO1 Porferio Bansuelo (PO1 Bansuelo) and designated PO1
Mendoza to act as the poseur-buyer. In turn, SPO3 Matias prepared the pre-operation report and
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on the buy-bust operation. PO1
Mendoza, as the poseur-buyer, was given two (2) pieces of marked ₱100.00 bills as buy-bust money
by P/Insp. Esguerra.3
After the briefing, the team including the informant proceeded to the target area at around eleven
o’clock in the evening of 19 April 2004. Upon arrival, PO1 Mendoza and the informant positioned
themselves outside the house of this certain "Chard" (later identified as the accused Richard S.A.
Guinto) and waited for him to step out. Meanwhile, the rest of the team stood nearby and waited for
PO1 Mendoza’s pre-arranged signal of raising of hand to indicate that the sale transaction was
already consummated. After two hours, Guinto finally went out of the house. The informant
approached Chard and introduced PO1 Mendoza as a person in need of illegal drugs worth ₱200.00.
PO1 Mendoza then gave buy-bust money to Guinto as payment. Guinto, in turn, drew two (2) plastic
sachets containing shabu and gave them to PO1 Mendoza. Guinto then put the money on his left
pocket. To indicate consummation of illegal sale, PO1 Mendoza made the prearranged signal to the
other members of the team and introduced himself to Guinto as a police officer. The other members
of the team responded and arrested Guinto. Immediately, PO1 Mendoza confiscated the marked
money from the left pocket of Guinto and marked the plastic sachet containing shabu with the
markings "RSG/MJM." 4
Afterwards, the buy-bust team brought Guinto to Pasig City Police Station and turned him over to
SPO2 Basco for investigation. PO1 Mendoza turned over the confiscated drugs toSPO2 Basco.
Consequently, SPO2 Basco asked for a laboratory examination request to determine the chemical
composition of the confiscated drugs. Thereafter, confiscated drug was brought by PO1 Noble to the
5
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. 6
The prosecution also presented PO1 Familara as its second witness to corroborate the statements
given by PO1 Mendoza. However, several inconsistencies were apparent in his testimony.
When asked during his direct examination on who gave the buy-bust money to PO1 Mendoza, PO1
Familara answered that it was SPO3 Matias. Likewise, the pre-arranged signal was differently
7
described as scratching of the nape instead of raising of hand. He also testified that their asset
8
arrived at around one o’clock in the morning to accompany them to Pinagbuhatan. Another
9
inconsistency which surfaced was when PO1 Familara testified that upon the consummation of
illegal sale, he went to the place of the arrest and saw PO1 Mendoza arresting Guinto. PO1
Mendoza then positively identified Guinto as the one who sold one (1) plastic sachet of illegal drug
instead of two (2) sachets. 10
Finally, the last witness presented by the prosecution was Police Officer 2 Richard Noble (PO2
Noble). He corroborated the statements given by his fellow police officers but again, presented an
11
inconsistency as to the time of the asset’s arrival compared to the one narrated by PO1 Familara. A
conflict came out as to the time of the team’s arrival to the target area and as to how long they
waited for the accused to go out. In his direct, he testified that the asset arrived at the police station
before eleven o’clock in the evening prior to the buy-bust operation. Afterwards, they had a briefing
12
on the operation. He recalled that they waited for around 15 to 20 minutes before the accused came
out while PO1 Mendoza testified that they waited for the accused for two hours. When asked again
13
by the Court on the time of their arrival, he answered that it was at around one o’clock in the
morning. 14
The defense interposed denial.
Guinto narrated that at the time ofthe arrest at 10:00 o’clock in the evening of 19 January 2004, he
was in their house cooking with his family. Several men suddenly entered the house, grabbed his
arm and searched the premises. When asked why the men entered their home, the men did not give
them any reason. Afterwards, Guinto was brought to the police headquarters and investigated by the
police. 15
Jane P. Guinto (Jane), the wife of the accused Guinto, corroborated the statements of her husband.
She recalled that several armed male persons entered their house while she and her family were
cooking to celebrate fiesta the next day. The men were not authorized to search nor arrest the
person of his husband and failed to introduce themselves to them. Thereafter, these male persons
frisked her husband, handcuffed him and brought to the police station. Meanwhile, Jane left her two
children under the care of her aunt to follow her husband. It was there at the station where the police
officers tried to extort money from her in the amount of ₱50,000.00. 16
Finally, John Mark P. Guinto (John Mark), one of the two children of Guinto, affirmed the narration of
his parents on material points. He testified that he and his younger brother were watching television
at the time of the illegal arrest of his father. His parents were then cooking when some uniformed
police officers arrested his father and brought him to the police station. However, he testified that he
went to their neighbor’s house and hid there out of fear, contrary to the statement of his mother that
she brought them to her aunt. 17
Guinto was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under Section 5 of
Article II of R.A. No. 9165:
On or about January 20, 2004 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Melvin Santos Mendoza, a police poseur buyer, two (2) heat-
sealed transparent plastic bag each containing two centigrams (0.02 gram) of white crystalline
substance, which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug, in violation of said law. 18
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Based on the Pre-Trial Order, the prosecution and defense stipulated that Forensic Chemist
19
Annalee R. Forro (Forro) of the PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination on the samples
submitted and they yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as
shabu.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 8 October 2008 rendered a Decision finding Guinto guilty beyond reasonable
20
doubt of the offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with all the accessory penalties
under the law. It held that all the elements to constitute illegal sale was present to convict the
accused of the offense. Likewise, it affirmed the testimonies of the police officers on the conducted
buy-bust operation and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties as against
the claim of unsubstantiated denial of Guinto.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drug wereproven as testified by the police officers PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara. It
found credible the straight forward and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses on what
transpired during the buy-bust operation. Further, it held that the prosecution has proven as
21
unbroken the chain of custody of evidence and the regularity of performance of the police officers
who conducted the operation. Finally, it affirmed that the non-compliance of the strict procedure in
Section 21 (a), ArticleII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 did not invalidate the seizure and custody of the seized items as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the operatives. 22
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we reverse the finding of the trial courts. We find that the
prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale.
Moreover, the conflicting statements of the policemen on material points tarnished the credibility of
the testimony for the prosecution.
Primarily assailed by the accused are the inconsistent statements of the apprehending police officers
with respect to the circumstances of his illegal arrest and the broken chain of custody which would
warrant his acquittal.
We are convinced.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the
23
narcotic substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delictiof the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to
first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other
arguments. 24
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes an illegal
saleof dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon evaluation ofthe testimonies of
PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and
number of plastic sachets bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that
upon arrival at the place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was ableto buy one plastic sachet
of shabu from Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two plastic
sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one that can be brushed aside as
the discrepancy taints the very corpus deliciti of the crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention,
the prosecution’s evidence places in reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that
was presented in court.
We likewise see that the conflicting statements of the police officers defeat the presumption of the
regularity of their performance of duties ordinarily accorded by the lower courts.
We find several inconsistencies on points materialto the credibility of the buy-bust operation. Among
those are the inconsistencies on the pre-arranged signal, length of time the police officers spent in
waiting for the accused and the exact time of the arrest.
Aside from those alleged by defense,this Court found several more evident inconsistencies, which
when put together, erodes the presumption of regularity of performance of duty.
We discuss.
First, as already pointed out, as to identity of the corpus delictiof the crime.
PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara fatally contradicted each other’s testimony as to the number of
sachets bought from Guinto. In his direct testimony, PO1 Mendoza positively identified that the
accused gave two plastic sachets in exchange of the ₱200 marked money. However, the same
25
identification was refuted when PO1 Familara testified that PO1 Mendoza informed him that he
(Mendoza) successfully bought one plastic sachet of shabufrom Guinto. 26
Second, as to where the marked money was recovered after the buybust operation.
According to PO1 Mendoza, he was able to obtain possession of the buy-bust money from the left
front pocket of Guinto as transcribed in his direct testimony dated 19 August 2004. However, in his
direct testimony dated 18 August 2005, Mendoza testified that he was able to recover the buy-bust
money from the right hand of Guinto, as opposed from his previous narration that he recovered the
money from Guinto’s left pocket. 27
Third, conflicting circumstances before the arrest.
In his first testimony, PO1 Mendoza recalled that upon their arrival at the target area at around
eleven o’clock in the evening, the team waited for almost two hours for the accused to come out
from his house. However, PO1 Familara testified that they arrived at the target area at around one
28
o’clock in the morning of 20 January 2004. Witness PO1 Noble, on the other hand, recalled that they
29
left for the area at around eleven in the evening and waited for 15 to 20 minutes for Guinto to come
30 31
out but contradicted his former statement and testified that they arrived at around one o’clock in the
morning. 32
Fourth,as to the pre-arranged signal.
PO1 Mendoza testified that the agreed upon signal will be the raising of hand to signify the
consummation of illegal sale. Again, it was contradicted by PO1 Familara’s statement that what was
33
agreed upon during the meeting was the scratching of the nape as the pre-arranged signal of PO1
Mendoza. 34
Finally,the source of the buy-bust money.
During his direct examination, PO1 Mendoza was asked on who gave him the buy-bust money. In
his answer, he identified that it was P/Insp. Esguerra as the source. On the contrary, PO1 Familara
35
identified SPO3 Matias as the one who gave PO1 Mendoza the marked money during their
meeting. 36
We find support in several jurisprudential rulings.
In People v. Roble, the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of
37
the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and generally not disturbed upon
appeal. However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact of weight or substance. In this present case, the contradictions, numerous and
material, warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant. 38
Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in order to establish the credibility of prosecution
1âwphi1
witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buybust money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. In light of these guiding principles, we rule
39
that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on the buy-bust
operation.
In People v. Unisa this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drug Act,
40
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumedto have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidenceto the contrary suggesting ill-
motive on the part of the police officers."
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by this Court as proof that the
statements of the police officers is credible. As maintained by the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, in the absence of any improper motive, presumption of regularity of performance
of duty prevails. However, it must be similarly noted that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of public officers does not outweigh another recognized presumption - the
presumption of innocence of the accused until proven beyond reasonable doubt. 41
In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of regularity of performance of
duties must be harmonized with the other interest of the State which is the interest of adherence to
the presumption of innocence of the accused.
However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the
presumption ofinnocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the
prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction. 42
In conclusion, this case exemplifies the doctrine that conviction must stand on the strength of the
Prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. Evidence proving the guilt of the
accused must always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls short of this
1âwphi1
requirement, the Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should
come as a matter of course. 43
The present case shows that the prosecution fell short in proving with certainty the culpability ofthe
accused and engendered a doubt on the true circumstances of the buy-bust operation. In dubio pro
reo.When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right. 44
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 31 January 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
inCA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03844 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 8 October 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 164 of Pasig City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant RICHARD GUINTO y SAN ANDRES is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately
released from detention unless his continued confinement is warranted for some other cause or
ground.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree. A doctrine that extends the exclusionary rule to make evidence
inadmissible in court if it was derived from evidence that was illegally obtained. ... or if there is
attenuation between the illegal activity and the discovery of the evidence.
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.
Squarely raised in· this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
1
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on
their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without
the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the
meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop
and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should
be acquitted.
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin
2
Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
3
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. 4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 5
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint
in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger 6
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver 7
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
8
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack 9
while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao 11
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
12
of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
13
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag." "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
14
station." Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" inside the station.
15 16 17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces
18
of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
19
marijuana. 20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI Bayan personally 21
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer Police 22
Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana. The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
23
grams. The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. The marijuana collected from
24 25
Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams. A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and
26
Dayao’s bags. 27
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney
to take him" to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and
28 29
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
30
Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in
31
carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." Cogaed agreed because they were
32
both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
33
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. SPO1 34
Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. Thereafter, 35
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts36
were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
where Cogaed was apprehended. 37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." The bags were also
38
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. The information against them
40
states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four
hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union. Cogaed 42
and Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14
43
years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision dated May 21,
44 45
2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or
that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest." Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also
47
be considered illegal. However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
48
Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1
49
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." 50
Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
51
affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
52
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
his bag." Hence, this appeal was filed.
53
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS. 54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary. 55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause
that can only be determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by
56
the judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage can only
57
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be
searched. 58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules
59
of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This
60
court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured." The61
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (Citations omitted)

62
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
63
and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. 64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation
65
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." This court stated that the
66
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
warrant." 67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all
the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are necessary for law
68
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe —
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented
69
by people abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish
70
eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner." The suspicion increased when the man avoided
71
the police officers. These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
72
drugs. These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
73
investigate." 74
In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also
75 76
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight
77 78
added to the suspicion. After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
79
firearm" in his possession. This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
80 81
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first." This was also a valid search.
82
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing
a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative
of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger
jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor. 83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that
the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor. 84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less
85
than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting
86
the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. (Emphasis supplied)
87
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." 88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
89
cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a "genuine reason" to serve the purposes of the
90 91
"stop and frisk" exception:

92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (Emphasis supplied,
93
footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely
94
on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly

95
innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
96
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
97
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting
the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer. (Emphasis supplied)
99
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
100 101
dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
102
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus 103
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
104
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
105 106
that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.
107 108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no
109
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It 110
was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
111
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

112 113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau
114
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI 115
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a
boat. Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what
116
turnedout to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the searchand seizure was
117
illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.

118 119
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
120
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City." One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
121
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The
122 123 124
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from
125
his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and discovered
126 127
live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’." 129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Both elements were missing
130
when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
131
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection
132
was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive
intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from
the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it
not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, ma’am.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, ma’am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag,
you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it
not?
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. (Emphasis supplied)
133
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge
Florendo’s questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down
1âwphi1
the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also
1âwphi1
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer
must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or
her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of
136
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." It ensures that
137
the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags,
a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However,
we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union
and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he
is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

147387 December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

G.R. No. 152161

CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,

Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006

House and Senate versions of the bill.

The Petitioners’ Case

"Accountability of Public Officers:"

The Respondents’ Arguments

The Court’s Ruling

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider 32

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.

Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.

Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.

The Fair Election.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

O, Fair Election Act.

Fair election practices?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Wala nang practices nga.

Wala nang practices.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

The rest wala nang problema ano?

Wala na iyong practices?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.

O, wala na? We will clean up.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

The short title, "This Act ..."

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):

You’re back to your No. 21 already.

The full title, the same?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006

explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the compromise

The Effectivity Clause

been shown in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in