SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

A Theological argument for a Simple view of Persons

Joshua R. Farris
University of Brisol

Abstract
Presently, there remains an aversion for substance dualism in both philosophical and theological
literature. However, there has been a renewed interest in substance dualism within philosophical
literature. In the present article, I advance substance dualism as a viable position that
persuasively accounts for the Scriptural and theological data within Christian thought. I make a
specific argument in favor of a metaphysically simple substance. Along the way, I note the
overlap between the philosophical and theological literature and suggest that a simple soul as
substance is a metaphysical presupposition grounding the data.

But that which is intelligible and without dimension is neither contracted nor dispersed,
she said. Contraction and dispersal are proper to bodies. The soul, however, is equally
present according to its own invisible and incorporeal nature at the aggregation of the
elements into the body and at their segregation. (Gregory of Nyssa, On The Soul and
the Resurrection, chapter 2, 47)

Introduction

In the contemporary literature on theological anthropology there is an aversion for both

substance ontology and substance dualism on the grounds that the Christian Scriptures presume a

relational and monistic ontology.1 I seek to respond to this general aversion by offering some

persuasive lines of reasoning that provide the foundations for Scripture and theological

construction. In this way, I show that we have good philosophical reasons for a simple view of

persons (which I suggest is likely a soul) that shape and form both our reading of Scripture and

basic theological development. Assuming we do not have good defeaters for a simple substance

1
Most notable is Joel Green in Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008).

1
view, I argue we have good reasons to affirm it as a theological position within Christian

theology.

I address some of the philosophical evidence corresponding to the Scriptural and

theological desiderata. I do this for two reasons. First, coming from the epistemic standpoint of

phenomenal conservatism, I take it that we have prima facie evidence for human beings being

a particular kind of thing. Second, I take it that a natural reading of Scripture’s teachings on the

self (assuming God has revealed truth that corresponds to naturally revealed truth) will either

yield the same conclusions or be made sense of in light of this foundational material. I work

through the literature on personal identity arguing in favor of a ‘simple‘ view, which probably

entails a soul view (however, one could affirm an absolutely simple material particle). Third, I

work through the theological literature on human persons and argue in favor of a simple

substance view as satisfying the theological data. In this way, relational and functional views,

arguably, presuppose simple substance.2 I suggest that there is a good deal of overlap between the

theological and philosophical literature.

Why Accept Substance Dualism as a Theological Position?

I offer three reasons for accepting substance dualism and specifically the idea that I am a

simple thing. I give a reason from my knowledge by acquaintance and two arguments. The first

argument is from the simplicity of the self; the second is an argument for my being simple and

not identifiable with the material aggregate I call my body.

2
Notice, I am not making an explicit argument for the ‘image’ nor am I specifying its nature.

2
 I suggest that I have a basic and direct experience of myself.3 I am simple and absolute

because I cannot be broken down into parts. I cannot be reduced to my essential constituents or

properties. I am the kind of thing that exists in and through my thinking and the stages of my

bodily existence. I am fully present at each stage of my existence. I know this through

introspection. I know when something is crawling on my arm as I am thinking about myself. I

know that if I were to lose one limb I would still be me. Even if I lose part of my brain it seems

that plausibly, I still exist. If I were to lose my memory of past events this would in no way

nullify my existence. I know that I would still exist because distinct memories are not essential

to my being who I am. I know that I am not as an inference of my thinking, but as a precondition

of my thinking. When I think upon anything, it presupposes a thing thinking. f I am thinking

about eating a burrito or a pizza, then I have knowledge by acquaintance—with myself and my

thinking. According to my phenomenal seemings, I exist at every point through change and there

is a property of self-presentation that bears itself at every moment of my conscious existence.

The point is that I have a kind of existence that is absolute and simple. The nature I have

undergirds thinking and bodily existence. 4

Stewart Goetz and E.J. Lowe have put forth an argument, in keeping with the intuitions

above, in favor of a simple self not dependent on the material body or non-essential properties.

This is an argument from intuition. Goetz has argued elsewhere that one’s consciousness of

3
See Roderick Chisholm, “The Problem of The Criterion,” The Foundations of Knowing (Sussex: Harvester Press,
1982), 61-75. Chisholm develops this notion of ‘seeming’ more fully. Also see Chris Tucker, “Phenomenal
Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology” in Evidence and Religious Belief Ed. By Kelly
James Clark and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford: OUP, 2011), chapter 4.
4
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (Lasalle, IL: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1979), chapter 1. Chisholm offers a very convincing argument in favor of our being directly acquainted
with our self through having an individual proposition that uniquely identifies the person. From this basis we are
able to individuate. I am able to individuate myself and others. What I have done here is asserted that I have direct
acquaintance with my self, which seems to be a natural perception. Furthermore, it seems this is the common sense
view of self.

3
actual states of affairs grounds the intuitive logic of possibility.5 His argument is essentially this:

1) I am essentially a simple entity (having no parts that can be separated. 2) A physical body is

essentially complex, and, thus, has parts able to be separated. 3) The Principle of the

Indiscernibility of Identicals. This principle says that for identity to take place x must have every

property had by y, and the same goes that y must have every property had by y. 4) Therefore, on

the basis of these premises, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body. It is still possible I

am a proper part of my body or depend on some minimal bodily composition or something of the

sort.6 This is possible from this argument, but if there is a distinct kind of thing thinking and

thinking is not material it is more likely I am a non-material thing over and against a proper

physical part of my body.7

A more modest argument, which might be accepted as promising by a wider audience, is

an argument from replacement. To indicate that I am a distinct kind of thing that has a simple

nature not dependent on the material body I refer to the argument called the replacement

argument given by Alvin Plantinga. 8 Plantinga argues along these lines: I am a substance, but if I

am a physical substance I would be a proper part of my physical body, composed of my body or

collocated with my body. I am not my body or a proper physical part of my body. I am not

composed of my body or collocated with my body. Therefore, I must be an immaterial kind of

thing. Plantinga offers some thought experiments to bring out this argument. He begins by asking
5
Stewart Goetz, ‘Modal Dualism: A Critique’, in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2001), 89-104.
6
E.J. Lowe, “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self” in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2001), 139-158. Lowe gives an argument for my being a simple self that leaves open the
possibility that I am minimally dependent on part of my body. The problem with Lowe’s ontology of human persons
is that it leaves no place for Near Death Experiences or the intermediate state wherein the self can exist apart from
the body. This is problematic. I will take this issue up later in the dissertation.
7
Goetz, 102. Goetz in discussing the possible conclusions of the argument mentions this possibility that I could be a
physical proper part. Being aware of one’s simplicity is a strong intuition. It is not my intention to look at all that has
gone into this discussion or the whole of the discussion in this one essay.
8
Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology vol II: Providence,
Scripture, and Resurrection ed. by Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Originally published in
Faith and Philosophy, vol. 23 (2006).

4
the question, if I am a physical thing what kind of physical thing am I? The argument begins with

an intuition conceiving possibility; that I have the property possibly to exist when B (my body)

does not.9 We know from experience that surgeons can replace organs with new organs. We

know from the present state of medicine that this is possible. We know of people who have had

liver, heart, knee, hip, ankle, and lung replacements. What about my brain? Can I exist apart

from my brain? It seems at least conceivable that I am distinct from my brain, and possibly could

exist apart from my brain. 10 It seems possible that I could exist with all my bodily parts

destroyed and I still exist. 11 If this is possible, I cannot be identical with the whole of my body

that I presently have or the composition of my body. Then Plantinga asks the question of

speeding of the process of replacing each part of my body down to the cellular level at a rapid

pace. Would the rate change my being modally distinct from my body and all the body’s parts?

It seems not. If these are possibilities at a much slower pace, why should it matter if the rate is

much faster? Plantinga’s point is that it is likely that we are not identical with our bodies, nor do

parts of bodies compose or collocate with our bodies.12 At the end of the day this seems

plausible. If these arguments work, we have reason to reject various forms of materialism, in

favor of the view that human persons are a soul with a body.13 These arguments listed above give

some grounds for thinking that persons are not material things, identified with a physical part, or

composed of material things, but is a different kind of thing. This kind of thing has different

persistence conditions than do material kinds of things and are distinct from the other. It is

important for my purposes to establish a prima facie case in favor of substance dualism. Any

9
Ibid, 388.
10
Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, chapter 8 and New Appendix C. This is one version of the
argument for substance dualism from modality. It fits very well with the argument from replacement with respect to
conceivability and modality.
11
Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 388-389.
12
Ibid, 390-391.
13
For a useful cataloguing of these arguments and others like these see Moreland in The Recalcitrant Imago
Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009).

5
philosophical or theological anthropology ought to accept the notion that the human substance or

soul as substance is a simple immaterial thing.14 I believe this is not only philosophically true but

also assumed in the Scriptural portrayal of man. Hence, this provides a basis for approaching the

Scriptures. Additionally, if my basic experiences interface with that of the text of Scripture and

accords with the traditional understanding, then we have additional justification for affirming a

theological notion of persons as simple souls.

PHILOSOPHICAL, BIBLICAL, and THEOLOGICAL DESIDERATA

Personal Identity

I begin the approach to theological anthropology by considering some of the

philosophical foundations. It seems to me that a particular conception of personal identity

undergirds and grounds a Scriptural and theological understanding of persons. In the following, I

address the philosophical literature on personal identity and I argue in favor of the simple view.

It is common within the literature to read of four views on personal identity, namely the

body view, brain view, the memory or character view, and the simple view. 15 16 The views other

than the simple view are not sufficient for personal identity, but have their place in both

philosophical and theological developments of persons. Later in the discussion, I suggest that

each view helpfully relates to the simple view in two ways, but that a simple/soul view (as I

14
Again, this is the most common view throughout history and Ecclesiastical history. The notion that the person or
soul is a simple immaterial thing is not foreign to Ecclesiastical history. In fact it is very common among the
Patristics and the Medeivals. For one very thoughtful example see Gregory of Nyssa in Soul and the
Resurrection, trans. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), 40-44.
15
Consider a few resources in the literature on personal identity. John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity
and Immortality. (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company; 1978). James Baillie, Problems in
Personal Identity. (New York, NY: Paragon Publishing; 1993). John Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Los
Angeles, California: University of California Press; 2008). David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics
(Toronto, Ontario: Broadview; 2009).
16
Apart from the simple view the others seem to presuppose a relational ontology, generally speaking.

6
describe it) provides the pre-conditions for theological anthropology. First, each view helps fill

out a more comprehensive picture of persons. Second, each view provides evidential support for

identifying one soul over another soul. I will look at each view in turn and offer reasons why I do

not accept it as sufficient for personal identity.

The first position is known as the ‘body view’, which is often associated with Aristotle.17

The bodily criterion for personal identity is the view that persons are identified with their bodies

or with a bodily constitutional relation. Broadly speaking, the view does not say that I identify

with one aspect of my body or one physical part connected with my body. In fact the ‘I’ is a

linguistic reference for the body or biological organism. Alternatively and related to this, one

could say that the body constitutes and makes me—me.18 Thus, I am my body. This is one

popular view held by philosophical and theological physicalists, respectively.19

A helpful illustration of the intuitive problems found with the body view or some similar

view is seen in the Harry Potter books. In book two, The Chamber of Secrets and book

seven Deathly Hallows J.K. Rowling introduces the reader to the polyjuice potion. This

potion can turn one’s body into the body of another by simply dropping the hair of the organism

into which the person attempts to transform. Added to this, I could conceive of a similar state of

affairs. Lets say my wife of 5 years had massive cosmetic surgery in order to take on the tone of

voice, the face, and the body of Giselle Bundchen. Would this then make my wife Giselle

Bundchen? Not at all. You might press the conceivability of the state of affairs further wherein

scientists could change the DNA of a person - in this case my wife’s DNA. Would she then cease
17
A similar view is called Animalism. See Eric T. Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity without
Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
18
See David Shoemaker’s Personal Identity and Ethics (Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2009), chapter 2.
Also see David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
19
A monist of a sort that is not a materialist could hold this if he held that there is something more fundamental to
matter and non matter. The body might be of this sort of thing. This is beyond what we normally think of as a body,
though. On this kind of view, physical matter would be more than gunk, physical-stuff and chemicals.

7
to be the person I once married? I do not believe so. We know from the intuitive reasons given

above, and the arguments from the previous section, that a person is not strictly identical with her

body, bodily constitution or her own biological organism.

I wish to mention one problem, which is the problem of the persistence of identity. It is

difficult to see how persistence in and through time works on a bodily/bodily constitution view.

The body changes every day and takes on new cells; it seems that it is in fact not the same body

after a phase of time. The idea of personal identity with the body rubs against some basic

intuitions about personal identity. Intuitively, from our basic experience of the self, I am

something distinct from my body in virtue of the persistence conditions of the self. I realize that

materialists affirming something like a body view have responses to this sort of problem, but it

appears that the materialist must trade in what is an obvious given for what is a confused and

complex notion of personhood. Why should one be inclined to reject what is given for what is

confused and complex? There is no pre-philosophical or intuitive reason for doing so even if

materialists can offer a coherent explanation for the above-mentioned intuitions.20

A second common materialist view of personal identity is the view often termed the

‘brain view’. The brain view is similar to the bodily criterion view because persons are identical

to a material object. It seems very natural indeed for proponents of materialism to link the self or

the linguistic ‘I’ with the brain on the basis that the brain is responsible for much of the “goings

on” in the biological organism, e.g. body.21 The ‘brain view’ is the view that the person identifies

with the brain in a holistic sense or identifies with some aspect of the brain, say, the cerebral

cortex, wherein the brain controls the functioning of the rest of the body—call this the ‘control

center’. Here again philosophers seem to assume a linguistic reference ‘I’ as identical with the

20
This is not a sufficient refutation for denouncing these versions of the bodily view, but they are reasons I am
putting forth here. It is not my intention to offer a full-proof case against these positions here.
21
Peter Van Inwagen in Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), chapter 15.

8
brain controlling the body. This, as well, seems to have problems. Let me ask a couple of

questions and explicitly draw out the implicit answers of those questions. Am I a brain? Do

brains think? At first glance these two questions seem very odd. The question “Am I a brain?”

seems to immediately imply a response of “no;” but I do have a brain. The second question

seems very odd as well, “Do brains think?” This is unusual in itself. It seems that a brain does

not seem to think. Usually, when speaking of thinking we refer to a person doing the thinking.

We could say it this way, “I use my brain to think.” This seems much more natural. I can hardly

imagine what it means for a brain to think. It is similar to someone saying, “Hand picks up the

cup.” A hand may pick up a cup, but it is someone’s hand picking up the cup. I use my hand to

pick up the cup. As a result, the brain view will not work as a satisfactory view of personal

identity, either. 22

The memory or character theory of personal identity is a third and prominent view.

Historically, the memory and/or character continuity theory is associated with John Locke.23

Ultimately, I think these two views are one view but could be distinguished one from the other. I

will take each in turn and critique both the memory and character views as one set. Proponents of

this theory might come from the camp of materialism/physicalism or from the position that

persons are immaterial kinds of things. A noticeable difference between this view and the

previous two views is that personal identity, according to the memory-character theory, is not,

and cannot be reducible to some physical thing. This requires a materialism of a non-reductive

sort. The memory or character view of personal identity associates the person with his memories

or character. The idea is that the person cannot be strictly identified with a physical thing or a

22
See John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of a Cartesian Conception of the Mind (New York:
Routledge Publishing, 1991).
23
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by. Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin
Publishers, 1997).

9
physical part, but personhood itself must be more than a physical kind of thing. Personhood must

be something of a non-physical kind, namely, thoughts and memories. Arguably, then, mental

items comprise personhood, and these are continuous with one another. 24

It is not unusual for philosophers to associate the character theory with the memory

theory. Similar to the memory view it states that personal identity is found in the connection

between the mental states/properties that make up the character in question with present mental

states/properties. The similarity is that there is a continuous link of memory states or character

states that comprise the person. On the character continuity theory of personal identity a person

identifies with his or her character states. These are states of being the person has. For example,

Johnny exists as a person with the state of being irresponsible because by not paying his bills

Johnny conditions habits of irresponsibility. Another example, Sammy has the character state of

developing a weak will with respect to alcohol. This is so because Sammy has in times past

given in one too many times to having an excess of drinks.

One can see this in a thought experiment. Consider person A, who lives a long life full with

memories of himself in family, in school, and at work. Person A is fully aware of his past life

and experiences day after day. He believes he exists day after day somehow connected to the

past events that he recalls in his memory. Consider Person B, Person B wakes up one day after

having surgery on his brain. When he awakens he has the exact thoughts and memories of Person

A. This is verifiable because the memories and thoughts of both Persons A and B are identical in

historical recall. Person B has no recollection of having thoughts or memories of a pervious

person or historical accounting of another person he just thinks as if he has been Person A.

Hence a problem with the memory view because we know that Person A is not Person B. The

24
It seems that this almost assumes a kind of event-ontology preceding a substantial ontology, possibly. This view
requires a causal/relational link between memories. It is also, arguable, that this view really is a materialist view of
persons at all. There is no relation made to the body/brain, but to mental items.

10
manner of one’s thinking does not necessitate the reality of the situation. My belief that I have

climbed Mount Everest does not mean that I have done so. My memory is not sufficient for

personhood, although, it might be helpful for evidentiary reasons. Memory plays a large role in

the formation of personhood and as such it offers a great deal of evidential support for the reality

this person is this person and not that other person. 25

The character view does not, at least immediately, run into the same problems as the

memory view. The character view avoids the subjective criterion found in the memory view by

requiring states of affairs to comprise personhood. Character states comprise the person, and

cannot be as easily altered or manipulated as seen with memories.26 Having said this, both seem

to run into the problem of fully satisfying our common-sense ideas and intuitions about human

persons. Intuitively, it is wrong to identify persons as a bundle of memories. Instead when we

think and speak of human persons owning memory and developing character states we speak as

if there is a person or a thing owning the memories and having the character states, thus it

seems that both views are unsatisfying. 27

Although these views are insufficient for personal identity they still have a place in the

discussion on personal identity. For example, the bodily-continuity view might count as

empirical evidence for the reality of the same person/soul. Also theologically, it has a role in

accounting for the resurrected body.

25
Recall the classic example of Thomas Reid’s Whipping Boy. See Thomas Reid’s “Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our
Personal Identity in Personal Identity ed. by John Perry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
2008), chapter 7.
26
Consider Personal Identity ed. by John Perry, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008). Perry,
John. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1978). Baillie, James. Problems in Personal Identity. (New York: Paragon, 1993).
27
Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter 8
and 9. Also, a useful argument is found in Swinburne’s essay entitled “Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory” in
Metaphysics: The Big Questions ed. by Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford, UK:
Blackwell Press, 1998).

11
 Next the memory-character continuity view has a place in theological discussion. Like

bodily-continuity it has a place of supporting the belief in a person as a particular person.28 It also

has a role in the development of souls/persons. The memories we have from our past shape and

form the quality of life we have. Character states have a positive role in human flourishing. If an

individual substance is obeying God he will have a more enjoyable and flourishing life, as

promised in Scripture in contrast to those who continue in patterns of unrighteousness.29

Fourth, the defender of the simple or ‘soul’ view identifies persons with souls.30 The simple

view is distinguishable from various materialist constructions of human persons and the

memory-character view of human persons. On the variation of the simple view I advance for

theological purposes, I take it that persons are identical with a soul or an immaterial mental

thing.31 In this case, I am distinct from my body, my brain, and the memory-character view. In

keeping with the arguments given earlier, I take it that I as a person must exist for mental items

to exist, memories, and states of character. The simple view, I offer, of persons says that persons

are not reducible to a material object and are not a bundle of properties (as on the memory-

character view). Persons are irreducibly simple, as argued above from phenomenology,

introspection (the simple argument) and conceivability and replacement (the replacement

argument).32 Some of the benefits that follow from the simple view include the feature of

28
The Evolution of the Soul, chapter 9. See Swinburne develop a similar argument.
29
Jerry L. Walls, Heaven (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111. Walls makes this argument when
speaking of personal identity in the afterlife within the context of Trinitarian identity and relational ontology.
30
A person may hold to a proper physical part or something of the sort and does not have to hold to the soul view as
synonymous with the simple view. Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter 8 and 9. See also Swinburne, Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory. Also
E.J. Lowe’s essay entitled “Identity, Composition and the Simplicity of the Self” in Soul, Body and Survival
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
31
A materialist could develop a simple view by saying that ‘I’ exist somewhere in my brain as a simple self that is
not divisible. For reasons I have already mentioned I do not accept a materialist view of persons because it requires
rejecting what is most apparent or what is an experiential given.
32
This can be brought out be distinguishing intrinsic properties and relational properties. Intrinsic properties are
those properties that are essential to the substance and are constituents of its essence. Relational properties are non-
essential properties.

12
independence, endurance, and absolute identity. The philosophical benefits overlap with and

parallel what we find in theological literature on persons. To this we turn.33

The distinct features of the simple view of personhood include independence and the

endurance of the substantial soul. The soul is independent with respect to non-dependence for the

soul’s identity on anything else. The soul has a kind of identity not dependent on or reducible to

other properties or substances. The soul precedes its properties in some sense, thus having a kind

of independence from them. Next the soul is an enduring kind of thing. It endures through time.

If the soul were a bundle of properties that fluctuates, then identity would fluctuate, or so it

seems. On a simple view, predicating properties, and identity of the thing is possible. It has a

stable kind of identity that does not fluctuate according to the various sortal-phases it encounters.

Sortal-phases are non-essential properties wherein a substance exists in and through various

moments of existence.34 Theologically this is important in accounting for human persons in

general as well as individual persons in particular. A simple substance exists in and through the

various stages of time as substantially the same thing. On this view the person is still the same

person even when going through various phases of existence. Predicating properties of a person

at two different phases of existence is possible. For example, John may exist with a full head of

hair at one phase, yet persist as the same person while losing his hair. As a metaphysical simple,

John is able to exist at differing phases.

When persons encounter the Scriptures for theological development, the simple view

seems to make sense of one’s reading of Scripture. It is not my brain or even eyes that read the

Scriptures, but it is I that persists absolutely through the stages of my reading various aspects of

33
With the simple view one is able to say that persons can be numerically identical through change, yet can change
qualitatively.
34
I have written a similar section surveying personal identity with some distinctions in application as a part of a
completely different argument in a purely philosophical context elsewhere. See Joshua Farris, “The Soul-Concept:
Meaningfully Embrace or Meaningfully Disregard,” Annales Philosophici 5 (2012), 64-67.

13
Scripture. This, then, is presupposed in our reading of Scripture and provides other theological

benefits. Turning to the feature of independence, we find one theological benefit following the

assumption of a simple view.

The criterion of independence has theological significance. If there is an absolute self that

has independence there is the possibility of predicating properties of the substance/person.

Theologically, one can predicate properties of goodness or badness of the individual substance in

question. When Paul says in Romans 6:17: “But thanks be to God that, though you used to be

slaves to sin, you wholeheartedly obeyed the form of teaching to which you were entrusted.

You have been set free from sin and become slaves to righteousness.”35 Paul in effect is ascribing

two properties to the person. Once the person was a slave to sin, wrongdoing or badness, and

presently the person is a slave to righteousness. One is a property of badness, and the other is a

property of righteousness. Other properties, for instance, having wisdom and the freedom to

actualize one’s latent capacities naturally presuppose the distinction of an independent substance

and its properties. It seems to me that a person is still the same person even if there is some

significant accidental change. On this view the person is substantially the same person, yet

accidentally different.

The criterion of endurance (namely, where an entity persists substantially the same

through change; an entity wholly persists through change) has theological significance, as well. I

will give an example here. Substances, at least on this construal, have the theological advantage

of identifying a substance/person in and through the stages of time. Persons, again, are not

reducible to properties, events, or relations. In fact we can make sense of the reality that persons

in redemptive history exist through sortal-phases.36 This means that in and through the

35
NIV, emphasis mine.
36
Swinburne, Richard. The Christian God. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1995), 13-14.

14
experience of time and change human persons identify with persons at differing stages of time by

enduring. So, Chris is a thief and swindler, but upon hearing the gospel of Jesus Christ through

his friend Jerry comes to know Jesus and is no longer a thief and a swindler. There is a real and

important sense in which this person Chris is the same person, yet there is an important sense in

which Chris is different.37

This is a view commensurate with most forms of substance dualism and the simple/soul

view naturally entails substance dualism. It naturally entails substance dualism because it posits a

simple substantial ‘I’ that has a body. My intent here is to demonstrate the philosophical

truthfulness of the simple soul view as the metaphysical substance accounting for personal

identity. Additionally, the philosophical literature, here, seems to find many parallels with the

theological literature. I believe this view coheres with the nature of the theological literature on

personhood and the imago Dei.

Theological Literature and Dualism

I put forward that a soul as substance that bears the features of being simple, independent,

absolute, and enduring accounts for the theological data. In fact, I suggest that than overlap is

present in both the philosophical literature and theological literature that buttresses one’s prima

facie beliefs about herself being a simple soul as substance.

a. Substantive Views

On substance views of persons and the imago Dei, persons just are substances that bear

properties. In the theological literature on substance, persons are the kinds of entities that persist

across time and undergird changes through the Fall, Redemption, and Glorification. In this way,

37
I do not think the other views of personal identity ground this important distinction allowing for change and
sameness.

15
there is a fact of the matter that is presumed in and through the Scriptural delineation on persons.

Having said this, the best accounting for these changes is not just any substance but a soul as

substance as I argued above. Next, I argue that souls (i.e. simple immaterial substances)

undergird and account for functional and relational views of persons.

b. Functional Views

Functionality has also taken the center stage having a venerable tradition of support in

Ecclesiastical history.38 According to this view, persons and the imago Dei are identical to

functions or pragmatic purposings and doings. The passage often cited in favor of this view is

Genesis 1:28, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it, Rule over the fish

of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.”

Notably, this is known as the Creation Mandate. This is God’s command to man. The argument is

something like the following. In the Genesis narrative immediately after God creates man in the

image and likeness of God, he gave man a special work. Work in the Creation Mandate includes

procreation, subduing, and caring for the earth. Proponents of a functional view argue that

Colossians 1:15-20 support their view. This text has two parallels with the Creation Mandate.

First, it speaks of Christ being in the “image of the invisible God.” Second, immediately

following it describes Christ as being head over all creation having subdued all things—in the

sphere of redemption. Therefore, functionalist proponents argue that Genesis 1:26-28 and

Colossians 1:15-20 teach a functional view of the imago Dei because the image is in man’s

functioning most fully actualized in Christ’s functioning as head over his Church and ruler over

38
J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos
Press, 2005), 25-29. Gerhard von Rad is usually associated with this interpretation. See Gerhard von Rad,
Genesis: A Commentary, rev. ed., trans. John H. Marks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 60 ff.; and
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, s.v.“eikon,” by Gerhard von Rad, et al., ed. Gerhard
Kittel, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 2:381-397.

16
the world.39 The problem for this view is that it merely captures what man was created to do, and

seems to miss what underlies functionality and other aspects of the Scriptural narrative.

Whether or not one assumes that the Scriptures teach a functional view of persons and the

image does not mitigate against the fact that functionality presupposes substantiality. In order to

make sense of human beings as functional entities our phenomenological experience of the self is

such that it is a substance of a particular kind. Philosophically, one must make a distinction

between what a thing is and what a thing does. A metaphysically simple substance accounts for

the person’s capacity to act at differing times and in differing ways.

c. Relational Views

Relational Views of the imago Dei abound these days. The most notable proponent in

history is Karl Barth.40 Trinitarian language normally follows as the chief example of the

relational view. The image of God is a relational reality and presupposes a relational ontology.

On this view, there is a strong connection between the Trinity and man’s relational nature. Some

suggest that the Trinity serves as a foundation for and an analogy for human relations. Thus,

human persons are reflective of the Trinitarian nature by their relations. One specific example

includes relationships one has with a spouse. Human persons exemplify relational oneness and

unity in a spousal relationship. Arguably, humans are a finite representation of the Trinity. Man

and wife are in relationship. They are in a deep and intimate relationship. There is a kind of

diversity and oneness manifest. Additionally, the procreative act of bearing fruit and multiplying

39
There is another function worth noting often seen in connection with Christ’s functional position in the Trinity.
Christ is fulfilling his subordinate role of functioning under the Father in completing this work.
40
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/I translated by G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1936-69),183ff. Also consider Barth’s The Humanity of God. Translated by J.N. Thomas. (Richmond, VA:
John Knox Press, 1960). Also see Shults, F. LeRon. Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the
Philosophical Turn To Relationality. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003), see especially
chapter 6. Also see Robert W. Jenson’s Systematic Theology: The Works of God vol.2 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), ch. 18, “The Image of God”.

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reflects this creative action. It is natural then to see this as a manifest imaging of the Trinitarian

God because both the Trinity and a marital relationship reflect oneness and diversity.

Functional and relational views are similar to the memory-continuity view and bodily

view found in the discussion over personal identity. Both have a place in the discussion but are

insufficient in accounting for personal identity. Functional and relational views are similar in that

they provide evidence for the individual substance as the memory-continuity and bodily view

provide evidence for the simple view of human personhood. The two views offer important data

that fleshes out a fuller and more holist picture of human persons, but in themselves require and

presuppose something substantial that is able to persist through change, namely a metaphysical

simple.41 Relations and functions presuppose relata.42 Relational properties require and depend

on substances and cannot stand on their own.43 Relations are also causally conditional and

depend upon an individual’s entering the real world within a social-communal context of

existing. In this sense, relations are causally necessary for the substance. Thus, relations are

significant in the world and in an overarching theological framework.44 I as an individualized

substance necessarily enter into relationships in virtue of my being a person, but this is not the

same as saying relations are foundational to what and who I am.45 Additionally, functions are

41
In fact, one might argue, this logic is borne out in Genesis 1:27-28 wherein the functions and relations that occur,
whether they be causal necessities or conditional realities, do so as distinct from the created entity that God created.
There is certainly a distinction made in text between “product” or object created and the processes that that object
might be involved in. In this passage there is a clear chiasm common to the Hebrew Canon wherein the image of
God as God created humans is connected to their being responsible for taking dominion over the earth and their
being male and female is connected to being fruitful.
42
A term used in ontology in reference to a thing in relation. The thing in relation that is presupposed as logically
necessary and ontologically prior.
43
See a defense of this in Reinhardt Grossmann. The Existence of the World (London: Routledge, 1992), 51-
57.
44
This is often referred to as a traditional view of general ontology. See R. Harre and E.H. Madden, Causal
Powers (Basil: Blackwell publishing, 1975). Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001). Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2013), chapter 1.
Also see E.J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2008), see especially the introduction and chapter 1.
45
It does not seem to me that this undermines the notion that relations are not important or significant. I am also not
saying that there are not essential and internal relations that are part of the substance in question.

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helpful for filling and fleshing out a theological understanding of man’s purpose, but this is the

subject of another article.46 In the discussion concerning persons and the imago Dei these

views have another place in philosophical and theological development.

In recent philosophical-theological literature Jerry L. Walls has argued for a relational

ontology that seems to fit in line with what I argue here. That is, his view is commensurate with a

substantive view of the imago Dei having both stative and dynamic realities or teleological

properties when discussing personal identity in his recent work Heaven: The Logic of

Eternal Joy. What is difficult in Walls treatment of personal identity in theology is his initial

defense of substance ontology, he later moves to defending a relational ontology. Walls argues

for substance dualism at the beginning of his work.47 Then he argues in favor of a relational

ontology regarding personal identity and the imago Dei in the context of speaking about the

Trinity. Substance ontology focuses on what a thing is internally, while relational ontology puts

emphasis on external and accidental relations. Thus, the two ontological descriptions are distinct.

In the context of further elaborating on personal identity Walls moves to a relational ontology

because of the perceived connection between the imago Dei and the Trinity. Walls explicitly

affirms this saying, “The discussion of this section reveals that our individual identity is finally a

relational matter. Who we are is defined by our relationships with others.”48 After affirming this

Walls later states, “only substances with certain given powers and potentialities can relate to each

other in the ways we have been considering. Thus, the relational account of identity

complements and provides depth and texture to the ontological account of identity I discussed
46
Human beings, in Scripture, have a telos and according to the ontology here I suggest an internal teleology.
47
Walls, Jerry L. Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford University Press; 2002), 92-102. He
draws from Colin Guntin in The One, the Three, and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993). This is common parlance in more dynamic views of God, namely Process Theology and Open Theism. It
seems to be prevalent and growing in evangelical theological circles as well. A recent treatment is found in Kevin
Vanhoozer. Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2010), see especially
chapters 3, 4, and 6.
48
Ibid, 108.

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earlier in this chapter.”49 What is difficult to determine is whether Walls is holding to a

substantive ontology and a substantive view of the imago Dei or a relational ontology and a

relational view of the imago Dei. Either way, there is something insightful about his move. As

I stated above, both functional, and relational views have a place in fleshing out our

understanding of the self. Both views reveal more about the substance/person and his

potentiality, all the while giving ontological priority to the substance. The reality of the matter is

that we can have relationships with God and other human persons in virtue of who we are, and a

metaphysically simple substance seems to make sense of the various relationships we enter into.

A similar view to the Wall’s view is a view developed by Richard Mouw. Richard Mouw

in a recent article has argued for a particular philosophical anthropology in relationship to the

image of God. What is insightful about his article is his emphasis upon the essentials of a

Christian philosophical anthropology and what is needed for the imago Dei or what is required

for our covenant partnership with God (construed as a grid for understanding human

composition). Richard Mouw comments that it is not so much the properties that are identical

with the image of God, but the appropriate properties that actualize the image. He states this: “I

argued earlier that it would not do simply to equate the image with the possession of such things

as a soul or free will or rationality. Instead, we need to ask what properties of that order are

necessary in a human being if that being is to actualize the functional-relational roles and actions

associated with the divine call to engage in covenant parternerships.”50 Mouw does not come

down on a particular view concerning the image for the purpose of his essay is to develop the

relationship between philosophical anthropology and the imago Dei. What he does is lay the

framework for moving in a particular direction that establishes the appropriate conditions for the

49
Ibid, 109.
50
See Richard Mouw, “The Imago Dei and Philosophical Anthropology,” 264. In Christian Scholar’s
Review Spring 2012; XLI:3.

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imago Dei along relational and functional lines whereby the image is a representation tied to

covenant partnership in doing actions we were called to do. I believe this move is significant in

that it recognizes the substantial nature that is necessarily presupposed in relational and

functional views. The view I put forth is able to give a metaphysical accounting of the imago

Dei that is essentialist in nature that is grounded in an immaterial human soul as substance. By

extension, this satisfies the holistic nature of the imago Dei that is portrayed in Scripture

affirming its immutable nature. Again, the significance of the Wall’s and Mouw move is that the

‘image’ has certain metaphysical pre-requisites.51 What is significant about the Wall’s and Mouw

views is that substance is required for making sense of relational and functional views. Here I

have made the argument that a soul as a simple substance underlies the Scriptural teaching on

human beings and the theological data on human persons.

Conclusion

In the present article, I have argued that we have a pre-philosophical conception of the

self that seems to undergird and metaphysically account for both the Scriptural portrayal of

human beings and the theological literature on humans. In this way, I suggest that we come to the

Scriptures with this pre-philosophical intuition and that there is an interface between the direct

knowledge we have of self and Scriptural teaching. I have also argued that the authors of

Scripture assume this about themselves and others resulting in a basic hermeneutical control on

our readings of Scripture.

51
This is not to say that there are not substantive variations awaiting the eschaton, as we see in Eschatological or
Christological views.

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