A PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF RUGA SETTLEMENT IN NIGERIA

ABSTRACT
This study was carried out on the perception of RUGA settlement in Nigeria.
The continuous desiccation of the Sahara, inter alia, has mounted severe
pressures on herding communities in the Sahel regions of Nigeria, leading to
their downward movements to central and southern Nigeria in search of
pastures for their flocks. This has culminated in terrific violent conflicts to
which the RUGA is one of the intervention policies designed by the Nigerian
government to mitigate. This work attempts a situational analysis of the
RUGA policy to identify the various factors that culminated in its rejection by
stakeholders from central and southern Nigeria. Secondary evidences in the
form of media reports and primary data such as press releases by
stakeholders suggest that the rejection was, among other things, instigated
by the hysteria of a calculated stratagem by the federal government to,
through federal-might, reallocate ancestral lands of central/southern Nigeria
to the demographically pressurised herding groups from the north through
the RUGA settlement. There is, therefore, a need for rigorous consultations
of stakeholders nationwide in drafting and implementing sensitive policies of
national significance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the study
1.2 Statement of the problem
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study
1.4 Research questions
1.5 Significance of the study
1.6 Scope and delimitation of the study
1.7 Definition of terms
1.8 Organization of the study
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Background to the RUGA Policy
2.2 Causes of the Conflict
2.3 Implications of Establishing Ruga Settlements
2.4 Theoretical Framework
CHAPTER THREE: THE RURAL GRAZING AREA (RUGA) POLICY: A
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
3.1 What is RUGA Settlement?
3.2 RUGA Settlement Policy: By Who?
3.3 RUGA Settlement: For Whom?
3.4 RUGA Settlement: Through What Means?
3.5 RUGA Settlement: Against What Threat?
CHAPTER FOUR
FEAR, DIFFIDENCE AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF RUGA
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusion
5.2 Recommendations
REFERENCES
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

In Nigeria the practice of preserving land for exclusive use by livestock

existed prior to colonial times. Allocation of grazing grounds to pastoralists

around towns and villages for use particularly during the cultivation season

were socially sanctioned (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell, 1986). However,

since there was no legal instrument to prevent encroachment by crop

farmers, such reserved areas subsequently disappeared with increasing

population and cropping intensity.

This phenomenon was most visible in the subhumid zone of Nigeria where

pastoralists from the semiarid zone further north traditionally moved to

exploit dry-season pastures. Additionally, improved veterinary services and

tsetse control and eradication campaigns have resulted in an expanding

ruminant livestock population in the subhumid zone itself and in restricting

pastoralists' access to the grazing lands (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell,

1986). Combined with this, the greater preference afforded to local (i.e.

subhumid zone) farmers' livestock both for grazing and water has
contributed to the further reduction of the resources available (Kjenstad,

1988)

The cultivators among whom the pastoralists now live were traditionally

subsistence farmers with extensive swidden (slash and burn) agriculture.

They kept very few livestock, mostly small trypanotolerant breeds of goats

and sheep. Although sleeping-sickness is generally cited as the reason for

the sparse population of the zone, it is now recognized that the high labour

inputs required for cultivation also deterred settlement. Farming systems are

marked by a wide diversity of crops and crop mixtures, often combining

cereals, grain legumes and tubers. Compared with the humid and semiarid

zones, regional marketing and long-distance trade were poorly developed.

An unfortunate consequence of this situation is that all the most fertile

pockets of land in the zone have been occupied. Grazing reserves cannot be

sited in populated regions without dislocation of indigenous populations and

consequent ill-will. Reserves are necessarily situated in places previously

avoided for sound ecological reasons. As an illustration of this, when ILCA

tried to keep cattle permanently on Kachia reserve without supplementation,

almost half the animals suffered severe malnutrition stress because of

insufficient and low quality feed that resulted from the poor nature of the

soils.

Nigeria’s cattle-grazing crisis has become a national security threat, sparking

ethnic tension nationwide. Amnesty International estimates that more than

2,000 deaths in 2018 alone resulted from clashes between herdsmen and

farmers over access to water and pasture and the destruction of land and

property — particularly belonging to farmers in the country’s middle belt

region.

Herdsmen from the Fulani ethnic region in the north have brought their cattle

to other parts of the country to graze for generations. Climate change, rapid

population growth and desertification in the north have made it difficult to

breed cattle.

The brutal violence has been a problem for some years. In 2014 the Global

Terrorism Index judged Fulani militants to be the fourth most deadly terror

group in the world, behind Boko Haram, Isis and the Taliban.

In 2018, Nigeria’s National Economic Council took action. It came to the

conclusion that the development of designated cattle ranches would be the

best solution to the problem. The ministry of agriculture also developed a

National Livestock Transformation Plan to address food security and promote

industrial growth. The NLTP committee, chaired by vice-president Yemi

Osinbajo, also advocated ranching.

Ruga project stemmed from the age-long rivalry with farmers. While herders

are feeling relieved from troubles of farmers, farmers are however feeling

cheated by the program because they own the lands. As expected,

Governors Samuel Ortom of Benue and Arc. Darius Dickson Ishaku of Taraba

state were the first to reject the move for setting up Ruga settlement in their

states. This stemmed from the fact that the indigenes of this states are

predominantly farmers, who could not stand the sight of settler-herders in

their states.

1.2 Statement of the problem

“The current government wishes to dissolve diversity in favour of an ethnic

programme,” said Odia Ofeimun, a poet and polemicist.

The press secretary to the Benue state government, Terver Akase, says open

grazing in the state has been phased out: “Anyone who wants to rear

livestock in Benue has to go through the due process.”

That process entails obtaining a licence from the state ministry of agriculture.

The federal government must also seek the state’s permission for land

allocation, as required by Nigeria’s 1978 Land Use Act, which they did not

do. This undermines the government’s separation of powers and shows

serious disregard for Nigeria’s diversity, of nearly 500 ethnic groups.

Pressure from citizens and stakeholders led the government to suspend the

Ruga project.

This is a problem that policy will not be able to solve without taking into

account the region’s cultural history. Nomadic herdsmen have for thousands

of years taken their cattle along routes to more states with better resources.

The cutting of these cultural ties has made the herdsmen feel victimised.

They see a threat to their means of survival. Meanwhile, farmers feel

overwhelmed by the volume of cattle.

In light of this challenges little or no research has been carried out on the

perception of the people on the ruga settlement program of the federal

Government. So this projects aims to find out the perception of the people

of Benue state on the Ruga settlement.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to examine the public perception of the

Ruga settlement in Nigeria.

With specific objectives as follows;

1. To examine and have an overview of the Rural grazing Area in Nigeria.

2. To determine if Ruga would stop herders and farmers clashes in Benue

State.

3. To determine if there is a misconception of the Ruga programme in

Benue state.

1.4 Research questions

1. What is the overview of the Rural grazing Area in Nigeria?

2. Will Ruga stop herders and farmers clashes in Benue State.

3. Is there a misconception of the Ruga programme in Benue state.

1.5 Significance of the study

The ability of the state to resolve or regulate the recurring crises and to

create an enabling environment where the people's respect and love for their

nation is enhanced would definitely affect the tempo of the national

integration positively. Ruga project stemmed from the age-long rivalry with

farmers. While herders are feeling relieved from troubles of farmers, farmers

are however feeling cheated by the program because they own the lands.

Clashes between herders and farmers is not a new thing in benue state but

little research is been carried out by scholars on this prominent issue. This

study would be useful to government agencies, private individuals and

researchers on how the people view the Ruga Programme in Nigeria.

1.6 Scope and delimitation of the study

The scope of this study is focused on the publics perception of the Ruga

settlement in Nigeria a case study of the Benue state.

The researcher encountered some constraints, which limited the scope of

the study. These constraints include but are not limited to the following.
a) AVAILABILITY OF RESEARCH MATERIAL: The research material available

to the researcher is insufficient, thereby limiting the study

b) TIME: The time frame allocated to the study does not enhance wider

coverage as the researcher has to combine other academic activities and

examinations with the study.

1.7 Definition of terms

The following terms were used in the course of this study:

RUGA: National integration is the awareness of a common identity amongst

the citizens of a country. It means that though citizens belong to different

castes, religions, regions and speak different languages, they still recognize

themselves as one. This kind of integration is very important in the building

of a strong and prosperous nation. National integration can also be seen as

the process whereby several desperate groups within a given territorial are

united together or cooperate under conditions which do not appear to permit

satisfaction of their system needs in any other way.

Federal character: The Federal character is a principle which seeks to ensure

that appointments into the public service fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic,

religious and geographical diversity of the country.

1.8 Organization of the study

This research work is organized in five chapters, for easy understanding, as

follows Chapter one is concerned with the introduction, which consist of the

(overview, of the study), historical background, statement of problem,

objectives of the study, research hypotheses, significance of the study, scope

and limitation of the study, definition of terms and historical background of

the study. Chapter two highlights the theoretical framework on which the

study is based, thus the review of related literature. Chapter three deals on

the research design and methodology adopted in the study. Chapter four

concentrate on the data collection and analysis and presentation of finding.

Chapter five gives summary, conclusion, and recommendations made of the

study.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Background to the RUGA Policy

There is no gainsaying the fact that the two major primary

stakeholders (herders and farmers) involved in the farmer-herder‟s conflict

play a vital role in the agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy. Data from

Federal Livestock Department reveals that as at 2010, 192,313,325 of

poultry chicken, 16,577,962 cattle, 56,524,075 goats, 35,519,759 sheep and

7,471,730 pigs constituted the livestock population of the country (Okewu

et al., 2019:149). Pastoralists, therefore, have been able to meet the meat

demand in Nigeria without government subsidy for generations with a

current estimated cattle population of about 19 million (Onyeama, Gideon &

Ekwugha, 2018:29). Figures from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

also reveals that, as at the first quarter of 2019, crop production remains the

major driver of the agricultural sector and accounted for 85% of agriculture

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the entire agricultural sector

contributed 21.91% percent of Nigeria‟s 16.42 trillion real GDP during same

period (NBS, 2019).

 Thus, intervention in a conflict involving actors as invaluable as above

would naturally demand a carefully conceived, planned, tested and confident

policy such that none of the parties would feel alienated, antagonised or

deprived by its government. It would also demand that the government be

swift, pragmatic and proactive in halting the escalation of such conflict with

concerted efforts at proposing justifiable, equitable and sustainable solutions

to such problems.

Coincidentally, the herder-farmer‟s conflict escalated tremendously

with the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani, as the head

of Nigeria‟s federal executive in 2015. This situation was further complicated

by the media‟s unprofessional reporting and framing of the conflict in a

sensational manner without "considerations of context, accuracy, and

fairness, balance and completeness, integrity and responsibility" (Ciboh,

2017). All eyes were therefore on the Buhari-led administration to take

drastic and unapologetic decisions that would spite offenders irrespective of

their ethnic affinities. The administration tended to be very slow in defining

the threats and the trajectories of the conflicts; being proactive or modelling

an all-encompassing policy to mitigate the effects of the conflict on parties.

 Albeit discriminate military option1 was used as a response mechanism

to attacks, the federal government kick-started its „mitigation‟ plans by

proposing the establishment of cattle colonies2 where designated land areas

will be exclusive for herding across the country to “militate against future re-

occurrence”, even as the conflict was escalating. Three bills (National

Grazing Reserve [Establishment] Bill, 2015 [HB 448]; National Grazing

Routes and Reserve Commission [Establishment] Bill, 2016 [HB 539]; and

National Grazing Reserves Agency [Est, etc] Bill, 2016) (seeLegist, 2019)

were sponsored and sent to the National Assembly to that effect but all failed

to sail through due to the opprobrium the policy mustered from different

divides of the country as well as its rejection by state governors who are

statutorily the landlords of their domains (Okewu et al., 2019:145). The

Minister of State, Agriculture, Mr. Heineken Lokpobiri had in a public lecture

on May 2016, hinted the governments' desire to explore the ranching option

but this proposal was rejected by the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders

Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), an umbrella body for herders, which

insisted on the earlier proposed cattle colony option (Premium Times,

2016a). Subsequently, the federal government had proposed the importation

of grass from Brazil for herders – a proposal which was supported by the
Chairman, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Senator Abdullahi Adamu on

May 8, 2016 (Opejobi, 2016). As a proactive measure, the governor of

Kaduna State Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, having noticed that most attacks were

perpetrated by Fulani from the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger

Republic, Chad, Mali and Senegal, "trace[d] some of these people…to tell

them that there is a new governor who is like them and has no problem

paying compensations for lives lost" and begging them to put a stop to the

killing.3

Other proposals were also made at educating and maintaining a

coordinated information chain between herders. For instance, on May 2019,

the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) disclosed its issuance of a

broadcasting license (October 8, 2018-October 8, 2019) to the federal

government for Nomadic Radio which aim would be specifically for nomadic

education "for the interest of migrant fishermen, herders, hunters, farmers,

and migrants", as one of the grand strategies at ending farmer-herder's

clashes (Elebeke, 2019). This policy was lauded by MACBAN. It was,

however, rejected by southern stakeholders who faulted it on the hysteria

of fulanisation – a coinage used to express Fulani overlord-ship over the

socio-political terrain of Nigeria. The immediate past Minister of Agriculture,

Chief Audu Ogbeh had, on May 21, 2019, divulged some information,

confirming that the “just 10 days ago, President Muhammadu Buhari

approved a programme called the Ruga settlement…to avert any conflict

between the herders and the farmers (Ameh, 2019). Within the same period,

meetings were arranged between the federal government and MACBAN, with

considerations to resuscitate an earlier plan by the government to, in 2014,

pay the latter a sum of N100 billion for mini-ranching facilities (Aworinde,

2019).

At the Fourth Global Diary Congress Africa in July 2019, the federal

government through the Minister of Agriculture (represented by the Director,

Animal Husbandry Services, Mr. Bright Wategire) also hinted that it has

started “something in animal identification and traceability system…to

reduce cattle rustling…and help us get reliable data of animals that we have

in this country” (Alimi, 2019). It is worthy to note that debates engineered

by the media on palliatives and mitigations plans presented by the

government have portrayed the latter as being pro-Fulani and its policies as

herder-appeasement policies. Questions are asked of justice,

compensations, and mitigation plans for the farmers who are perceived as
victims. This is the political climate that circumvented the implementation of

the RUGA policy.

2.2 Causes of the Conflict

Indisputably, Fulani pastoralists are the major group involved in cattle

rearing business in Nigeria. According to Belo (2013) cited in Ndubuisi (2018)

“they own over 90% of the country’s livestock which accounts for one-third

of agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) in particular and 3.2% of the

country’s GDP in general. But these have been affected by the nihilist

ideologies and frequent attacks on innocent farmers and citizens by the

Fulani herdsmen. The conflict has also affected the huge economic gains the

nomads initially contributed to the nation’s gross national product (GNP) and

affected the day-to-day relationships which exist among the trio of Fulani

herdsmen, sedentary farmers, and other ethnic groups in Nigeria (Ndubuisi,

2018:1; Olayiwola, 2019: 99).

The major factor responsible for this strained relationship between the Fulani

herdsmen and sedentary farmers across the country is climate change. When

there is a change in the weather condition, there is always arid weather,

followed by a prolonged drought and desertification particularly in the

northern part of the country. The effect of this is the immediate migration

to the southern parts of the country where there are sufficient rains during

the wet season in search of green pastures for their cattle. Gleick (2010)

cited in Ndubuisi (2018: 4) while attesting to this, opines that climate change

has been identified as the greatest and single factor that induced migration

and population displacement, evident in the case of Nigeria’s Fulani nomads

who are usually pushed out of their ancestral lands to the southern regions

in search of green lands for their cattle. Apart from climate change there are

other natural and fundamental causes of the conflict between farmers and

Fulani herdsmen. One of such causes is the shrinking of ecological space

occasioned by the blossoming population who, in turn, take up some of the

immediately available lands for crop farming, particularly in the Northern

Nigeria. In other words, green lands that were initially available for cattle

grazing are gradually being converted to farmlands and residential areas

inhibited by the over blown population, leading to ecoscarcity (Okoli &

Atelhe, 2013: 80). In the southern regions, it is purely a case of encroaching

without notice on the people’s farmlands in the name of cattle rustling.

Ndubuisi (2018: 3) identified unauthorized encroachment into farmlands by

cattle rustlers and the damages they cause to crops as one of the major

causes of farmers and Fulani herdsmen conflict. Fallow lands left to replenish

after a long period of use are also damaged by cows. This is also identified

as one of the causes of farmers and Fulani herdsmen conflict. Also identified

is lack of political will by the Government and its agencies to arrest and

punish the Fulani offenders engaged in the killing of farmers and other

members of the host communities across the country. Most provocative is

the unwillingness of the government of President Buhari to arrest and

prosecute even a single Fulani offender since he came to office. This line of

argument reinforces the researchers’ suspicion that there is a foul play or

conspiracy on the part of government. This has resulted into reprisal attacks

for self defense from the feuding parties. In this regard, conflict is not only

a matter of self defense but an egocentric drive on the part of the Fulani

herdsmen since their major source of livelihood is being threatened by

climate and farmers in the country.

According to Global Terrorism Index Report (2018), the Fulani ethnic militia

killed over 1,700 people in the year 2018 alone. This figure was estimated

to have surpassed the number of people killed by the Boko Haram terrorists
in the same year! Countless attacks and killings have further been recorded

in 2019. In 2014, over 1,169 deaths were recorded with majority of those

killed predominantly from among the Christian populations in the North and

generally in the South (Global Terrorism Index Report, 2018). Areas mostly

affected are located in the Middle Belt region, particularly in the states of

Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba, and pushing up north to Kaduna

State, with over 3,641 people killed in the clashes between 2015 and 2018

in those areas. The southern states of Anambra, Delta, Edo, Ebonyi, Enugu,

Ekiti, Ondo, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, and Rivers state have also been affected by

the Fulani herders’ onslaught (Olayiwola, 2019).

2.3 Implications of Establishing Ruga Settlements

There are a lot of controversies surround the suspended Ruga settlements

for Fulani herders across the country. The amazing fact in all of the drama

of the Ruga policy is the insistence of the Buhari administration to forge

ahead to establish Ruga settlements in spite of oppositions from civil society

groups, socio-cultural organizations, state governments of the Middle Belt

and Southern regions of the country and individuals. The Buhari-led federal
government alleged that establishing Ruga will be an alternative means to

improve the nation’s economic drive to create jobs and will give the people

the opportunity to have access to credit facilities. Furthermore, the

government argued that Ruga will create security for pastoral families and

curtail cattle rustling, as well as provide a palliative as an alternative to peace

and security of lives and properties in Nigeria (Mudashir et al., 2019). Besides

the massive loss of lives and properties occasioned by the conflict between

farmers and Fulani herdsmen all over the country, the major reason for

opposition from this group of people in recent times is the re-submission of

the executive bill to the Nigerian NASS, seeking to control all the waterways

and their banks by the Federal Government. In short, this action reinforces

the conspiracy inherent in the Ruga programme.

Indeed, most critics perceived the Ruga plan to be a grand conspiracy,

coming from President Buhari and his allies of the Fulani and Muslim

extractions in the North. The critics saw the ruga conspiracy as a ploy by

government to acquire ancestral lands which belonged to the Middle-Belt

and Southern peoples, to accommodate and settle their age-long roving

Fulani nomads and kinsmen from the West African and Central African

regions of the continent in Nigeria. The overall aim, they argued, is to spread
Islam to the MiddleBelt and Southern regions of Nigeria which are

predominantly Christians; and thereby, colonize the space. This line of

thought was strongly supported by the MiddleBelt Leaders Forum, as well as

a handful civil society groups and state governors of the regions of the

Middle-Belt and the South when they described the intended cattle

settlement as a plot to dethrone ancestral communities for the Fulani tribe.

Virtually all state governors in the South of Nigeria condemned the planned

Ruga programme, including members of the ruling All Progressive Congress

party who were bipartisan on the Ruga issue, and came to the conclusion

that the Federal Government had fallen short of being sincere with the Ruga

settlement programme. And, they vowed not to cede even a portion of their

lands to the Federal Government for the Ruga settlement programme.

Instead, they advised anyone willing to do the business of cattle rearing, to

approach the government of the state concerned, and buy lands to establish

ranches under the prevailing regulations in the state, as affirmed by the

Supreme Court. This is because land in any state is vested in the governor

and not in the Federal Government (see Olusegun, 2019; Makinde &

Okechukwu, 2019).
The Director of the Center for Social Justice, Eze Onyekpere, in an interview

with the Sunday Punch, cited in Makinde and Okechukwu (2019), argued

that it was not quite clear why the Buhari administration was determined to

commit huge resources of the nation’s into developing the private business

of herders living in Nigeria whom he had once categorically declared as

mostly foreigners from neighbouring North African countries and who were

certainly NOT Nigerians! Eze, thus, argued that under the Land Use Act, land

can only be acquired for overriding public interests or purposes. The question

as to what is the public purpose in cattle rearing is yet to be answered by

the Buhari-led Federal Government. It, therefore, means that the Federal

Government, by the Ruga settlement plan, is justifying violence and crimes

such as the Fulani cattle herders in the Nigerian space have been involved.

Therefore, the implication is that when people commit murder, arson and

undue violence, like the Fulani cattle breeders in Nigeria, they should be

compensated with community or state land instead of being subjected to

criminal charges and prosecuted accordingly (See Makinde & Okechukwu,

2019).

By this singular act, Buhari has created the impression that the Federal

Government is only interested in altering the demographics and population

dynamics of states with the influx of individuals of doubtful countries of

origins. There is no doubt President Buhari’s action is intended to undermine

the country’s internal security and rattle its collective unity. Buhari’s refusal

to consult with state governors, civil society groups, socio-cultural

organizations and representatives of nationality groups on this issue, created

a suspicion as to what his intentions really were.

The Middle Belt Forum and Southern Leaders came up with a communiqué

after its meeting reaffirmed its suspicion of a conspiracy by the Buhari

government to colonize the entire nation, under the guise of Ruga

settlement, and thereby set his tribes men over and above every other tribe

in Nigeria so as to be able to execute his well-thought out agenda to Islamize

the country. The forum argued that the insistence of the Federal Government

to establish Ruga settlements around the country, in spite of its total

rejection by the general public, can only come from a government that is

irresponsive, and one that is not interested in the unity of the country, in the

consideration of the menace orchestrated all over the country by Fulani

herdsmen, none of whom the government of the day had deemed it fit to

prosecute nor call to order. It stated also that the Fulani herdsmen in the

last four years of President Buhari’s ascension to power have turned non-
Fulani communities in the country into killing fields with the government

turning a blind eye to all their crimes while using state instruments to defend

themselves from prosecution. Since the government is yet to try and convict

any one of the herdsmen for murder and arson, to establish Ruga

settlements in non-Fulani areas would give the herdsmen more effrontery to

attack and kill the people. The group, therefore, challenged the Federal

Government to tell Nigerians and the world in general, the court of law where

any of the criminal herdsmen have been tried for all the kidnappings, raping,

banditry and the brutal killing of men, women and children, and the willful

destruction of farmlands in and around the country since Buhari came to

power (See Sahara Reporters, New York, 2019). The pertinent question that

needs an urgent answer is, if the herdsmen as wonderers can perpetrate

untold hardship and crimes against host communities what would happen

when the government forces the herdsmen on the communities as land

owners?

The horrifying tales of the gruesome attacks perpetrated by Fulani herdsmen

around the country has answered this pertinent question. Such gruesome

attacks are still very fresh in the minds of Nigerians; particularly on the minds

of those people in the affected communities. Yet, the President Buhari-led

administration did virtually nothing to bring the situation under control.

Instead, the government was bent on forging ahead with its planned

programme of establishing Ruga settlements for Fulani herdsmen in non-

Fulani areas of the country. Okere (2019) argued that the announcement in

the month of May 2019, by the Federal Government of Nigeria, that it had

acquired a government funded Amplitude Modulation (AM) Radio Broadcast

license to educate herdsmen, and to foster peace and harmony between the

group and crop farmers wherever they were in collision, is a confirmation of

an alleged conspiracy. This is so because, in the first instance, the radio

station is purely a Fulani one whereas, the various groups that the Fulani

comes into conflict with are not Fulani! This is besides the hue and cry in the

nation of the alleged advancement to the group of a whopping N100 billion

(about $365 million) by the Buhari government, to establish cattle ranches

all around the country and/or to halt the purported criminality among the

cattle rustlers. Okere, thus, argued that the June 25, 2019 announcement

by the Federal Government reiterating its stand to establish Ruga

settlements for herdsmen in the thirty-six states in the country did also

aggravated the stand of the anti-Ruga groups across Nigeria. Most

provocative and insulting to the sensibilities of Nigerians was the position of

the Federal Government through its Senior Special Assistant on Media and

Publicity, Mr. Garba Shehu, that the Ruga settlement program which is

optional to state governments would find advantage in providing economic

benefits to all Nigerian citizens (Okere, 2019).

The socio-economic and cultural group, Miyetti Allah Kauta Hore, generally

referred to as Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN),

the umbrella body under which the marauding Fulani pastoralists and

herders operate, reaffirmed its unalloyed support for the Ruga settlement

programme, and insisted that government must continue with the project no

matter whose ox was gored. The association’s General Secretary, Baba

Uthman Ngelzarma’s utterances also provoked counter-responses from anti-

Ruga groups all over the country. For instance, the Afenifere, a pan-Yoruba

group alleged that Ruga settlement programme was a deliberate ploy by the

Federal Government to turn such settlements into local government areas

for Fulani ethnic group in the future since the Federal Government was

planning to give local governments autonomy. Ohanaeze Ndigbo, an apex

Igbo socio-cultural organization, also conceived the planned Ruga settlement

as a conspiracy to impose the Fulani ethnic group on the other ethnic

nationalities in Nigeria. Wole Soyinka, the 1996 prize winner of the Nobel
Laureate for literature, while speaking at the inauguration of the United

Nations Solutions 17 SDG programme in Lagos, argued that the planned

Ruga settlement programme would become an explosion in the future if not

carefully handled now by Nigerians. At this critical stage, he argued that the

Federal Government failed to address the fundamental issues affecting the

unity of the country, but instead, provided the cattle herders a sense of

impunity. Reiterating the position of the Nobel Laureate, Idada Ikponmwen,

a retired military General and former Provost Marshal of the Nigerian Army,

argued that the Ruga settlement policy of the Federal Government was a

wrong measure, considering the issue of Fulani herdsmen and their banditry

activities in the Middle-Belt, South-East, SouthSouth, and South-West of

Nigeria, with abundant proofs that they were heavily armed militants

(Olusegun, 2019; Okere, 2019).

Dr. Agharese Osife, an agricultural economist at the Ambrose Alli University,

Ekpoma, Edo State, argued that the Ruga settlement programme was a

deliberate attempt to acquire lands in the 36 states of the federation by the

Federal Government for the Fulani herders and never a part of the National

Livestock Grazing programme found in states like Kaduna, Bauchi, Borno,

Sokoto and Kano (Okere, 2019). According to Garba Shehu, the presidential
spokesperson, in justifying the need for establishing Ruga settlements, he

argued that Ruga settlement is not just a settlement but an organized large

expanse of land that will settle migrant pastoral families, animal farmers and

herders with adequate basic amenities such as schools, hospitals, road

networks, veterinary clinic, markets, and manufacturing entities that will

process and add value to meats and animal products. By this, Garba Shehu

tried to allay the suspicion of Nigerians that the Ruga program is nothing

else but only a means to resolve the farmers and herdsmen conflict and

never to indirectly colonize the country for the Fulani ethnic group (Mudashir

et al., 2019). These researchers, thus, concur with the position of the anti-

Ruga protesters i.e., that the Ruga program was in disguise a conspiracy to

conceal the intentions of the Federal Government to acquire community

lands and colonize Nigeria for the Fulani tribe.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts Chabal’s (2009) twofold conflict theory, on the one hand,

and, on the other hand, the Richard Hofstadter (2008) and Peter Knight’s

(2003) conspiracy theories, to examine the actual causes of the conflict

between Fulani nomads and sedentary farmers. As well, these theories will

help to ascertain the implications of establishing cattle colonies which the

government of the day considered as an alternative to peace and security of

lives and properties throughout the country.

Chabal’s Twofold Theory

This theory is adopted to depict the actual situation of the conflict between

sedentary farmers and Fulani nomads on the one hand, and the role of the

Federal Government to resolve this conflict on the other hand, especially as

it appertains to the Federal Government’s intent in establishing cattle

colonies across the country, seen by critics as a means to undermine the

unity of the country. Chabal’s twofold theory, thus, is a clear manifestation

of the reality of trying to survive while suffering and smiling which is a true

reflection of Bahari’s prejudice over the conflict between crop farmers and

Fulani nomads in the former’s territory. According to Chabal (2009) cited in

Ezemanaka and Ekumaoko (2018), politics of suffering and smiling explain

the legitimacy of a typical African politics that manifests in the Nigeria’s

national politics. It also explain the fact that the ordinary people of Africa are
often engaged in distinct economic activities in order to earn a living and self

esteem or respect such as the nomads and farmers, although most of these

activities conflict with the interests of one another.

Ezemanaka and Ekumaoko (2018:34) argued that Africans like other people

throughout the world move when necessary in search of economic gains.

The reason why Fulani nomads migrate is to gain access to green pasture

for their cattle, a custom that increases their economic activities and gains.

They argued that this activity has become more often than ever because of

the development of pasture lands into permanent habitants and farmlands

for the growing re lands are becoming towns and extension of cities thereby

creating scarcity of lands for pasture. Also of pertinence is climate change

which is also one of the reasons for Fulani herdsmen migration to the

southern region of the country where there is sufficient rain and green

pasture for their cattle (Agbugu & Onuba, 2015; Nte, 2016).

Chabal (2009), thus, argued that understanding happenings in regional or

district politics will require informal political experiences made up of a

number of socio-economic and political facets or elements particularly those

outside the sphere of traditional academic analytical categorizations. Chabal

opines that this will help in understanding formal and informal experiences

which were previously neglected, and the causalities that derive from such

neglect as a result of the irrational behaviours of leaders or parties in conflict.

In other words, Chabal’s proposition explains the role of President Buhari in

the conflict between crop farmers and Fulani herdsmen. In essence, the

politics of surviving, using migration which is occasioned by climate change,

explains the reason why the Fulani nomads migrate to the southern parts of

the country in search of fertile grazing grounds for their cattle and the

desperate search of permanent solution to these problems by the President

of the Federal Republic who is also a Fulani by tribe.

President Buhari’s hesitation to address the issues surrounding this conflict

has been attributed to the fact that he has compassion for his kinsmen who

are struggling to sustain their major means of livelihood in the face of terrible

droughts and reduced pastures occasioned by climate change in their lands.

The consequence of his actions or inactions is likely to undermine the unity

of the country. Whether it is intentional or not, his actions have failed

Nigerians.
Conspiracy Theory

Conspiracy theory, like every other discourse in the social sciences, has

definitional controversies. It will therefore require explicit explanations to

provide a meaning to the concept. Conspiracy theory was said to have

emerged in the wake of unsettling events such as economic shocks, mass

shooting, terrorism, among others (Monica Jimenez, 2019). There are two

schools of thought which harp on why the theory proliferates in our

contemporary age. The first school is sustained by individualistic framework

pioneered by Richard Hofstadter (2008) and his associates. This group

argued that those who conspire to commit crime or commit any other form

of offences have a paranoid personality and they use other persons as

scapegoats. They also possess the “us versus them world view”. Adherents

of this group also argued that conspiratorial thinking is associated with

marginalized and less powerful group of people in the society. The second

school which was championed by Peter Knight (2003) viewed conspiracy

from a cultural sociology perspective, with emphasis on pervasiveness of the

secrecy of the government. This theory raises the awareness about behind

the scene information and the cynicism exhibited towards corporate and

government powers (Korta, 2018: 31).

Conspiracy theorists believe that when an organization acts covertly, it tends

to achieve a malevolent end. Hence, the theory explains the reasons why

some events occur in our societies like the emergence of ethno-nationalism

groups or the new radical Islamic groups, and such events that provoke

conspiracy by some sinister state-sponsored terrorist groups, etc. This

means that every event is traceable to a cause or circumstances (See

Barkun, 2003: 3; Marmura, 2014 cited in Benjamin, 2017). In some

circumstances, conspiracy can lead to conflict, genocide, terrorist attack

and/or a full scale war. The conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen

is perceived as a deliberate conspiracy by Islamic fundamentalists to carry

out Islamic Jihad on non Muslims and moderate Muslim extractions. Weeks

after the Cattle Colony bill debacle in Nigeria, the re-presentation of the self-

same executive bill repackaged as Ruga Settlement bill to the National

Assembly is perceived in some quarters as a deliberate attempt by the Fulani

tribal president and his henchmen to re-colonize Nigeria through the

establishment of the colonies or settlements for cattle across the country.

The opinion is that this is the highest conspiracy in recent time which can be

better imagined than experienced.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RURAL GRAZING AREA (RUGA) POLICY: A SITUATIONAL

ANALYSIS

Nothing generated more controversy in Nigeria between the last week

of May and the first fortnight of June 2019 than the Ruga settlement policy.

Tirades, supports, critics, warnings, and even ultimatums either for sustained

implementation of the policy or its immediate repudiation dominated

discourses on print, electronic and social media. Analysis and public opinion

were guided by fear or positions of influential personalities and

commentators to the detriment of objectivity in what was good of the entire

policy that was painted black.

3.1 What is RUGA Settlement?

But for public opinion‟s association of land grabbing and fulanisation

to the word “Ruga”, its frequency in discussions within the first fortnight of

June, 2019 would have made a curious mind mistake it for the medical

definition which is “an anatomical fold or wrinkle especially of the viscera”

(Merriam Webster Dictionary Online, 2019). Nevertheless, the acronym, as

represented earlier, defines the Rural Grazing Area settlement programme.

It is important to note that there is no official document available to the

public domain that defines the full scope of the RUGA initiative, other than

snippets from the federal government (Toromade, 2019a). According to

Idowu Bankole, the word Ruga is not just an acronym for the Rural Grazing

Area but “a Hausa term that means cow settlement” (Bankole, 2019). The

RUGA settlement, from available details, was designed as a specific land area

carved out for the settlement of herders and their cattle. In RUGA

settlements, herders were suppose to graze within a defined parameter and

maintain some level of seclusion since they were to be provided with

amenities such as pastures, water, health facilities, schools, security, road

networks, veterinarian clinics, markets as well as processing firms that would

make refined products from meat, milk and other cattle byproducts

(Toromade, 2019b). The preliminary project was proposed to cover some

ninety-four locations in Adamawa, Benue, Ebonyi, Edo, Kaduna, Nassarawa,

Oyo, Plateau, Taraba, Ekiti, Niger and Zamfara States (Iyare, 2019).

3.2 RUGA Settlement Policy: By Who?

 This question is pertinent since, by the supreme law of the land, the

federal government of Nigeria controls no land but the federal capital

territory. The Rural Grazing Area settlement scheme was rolled out by the

Buhari-led federal government in May 2019 as one of the policies directed at

putting an end to the farmer-herder crisis. As stated earlier, it was first

announced by the immediate past Minister of Agriculture, Chief Audu Ogbeh

on May 21, 2019. Though the RUGA idea resonates the earlier initiative by

the National Economic Council (NEC) presented under the National Livestock

Transformation Plan (NLTP) (2018-2027) (Iyare, 2019), it was not part of it.

The latter had recommended that “cattle herders are expected to be

registered with cooperatives” who would then rent land from state

governments “and also benefit from ranch resources on several terms

including loans, grants and subsidies” (Toromade, 2019b). The NLTP, asides

being championed by the office of the Vice President, engaged stakeholders

from different parts of the country and was endorsed by state governors in

the NEC. Hence, when, in June 28 2019, the SecretaryGeneral of MACBAN,

Baba Uthman Ngelzarma averred that the Ruga settlement model is a part

of the NLTP "being implemented under the office the Vice-

President"(Akinkuotu, 2019), the office of the vice president issued a

statement, refuting such claim that Ruga and the

NLTP were synonymous or contagious policies (Daka, Falaju & Agbedo,

2019). It appears the RUGA project was conceived by the Ministry of

Agriculture and approved by the President on May 11, 2019, without

attempts at harmonising it with the NLTP which was handled by the office

of the vice president for the NEC. Several state governors from the north-

central and southern Nigeria have, since then, dissociated themselves from

the RUGA project, even before its suspension by the federal government on

July 3, 2019.

3.3 RUGA Settlement: For Whom?

Due to the discrete handling of the RUGA settlement policy document

and the tone which the past Minister of Agriculture, Chief Audu Ogbeh,

announced the policy on 21 May 2019, speculations loitered patterning to

the actual beneficiaries of the programme. The Minister had avouched that

"we [federal government] are going to build settlements where herders will

live, grow their cattle and produce milk". To this end, it was summarised that
the project is exclusively for herders, their cattle and their families. However,

the federal government had, through a Presidential Aide Garba Shehu,

explained on July 28, 2019, that the project is not meant for herders only.

According to Garba:

“Ruga Settlement” that seeks to settle migrant pastoral families

simply means rural settlement in which animal farmers, not just

cattle herders, will be settled in an organised place with provision

of necessary and adequate basic amenities…Beneficiaries will

include all persons in animal husbandry, not only Fulani

herders…The overall benefits to the nation includes a drastic

reduction in conflicts between herders and farmers, a boost in

animal protection complete with a value chain that will increase

the quality and hygiene of livestock in terms of beef and milk

production, increased quality of feeding and access to animal

care and private sector participation in commercial pasture

production by way of investments (Qtd. in Udegbunam, 2019).

 According to the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Agriculture

and Rural Development, Mr. Mohammed Umar, RUGA would attract

investors, eradicate nomadism in ten years, and create employment to the

tune of 2,000 jobs opportunities in each settlement (Iyare, 2019). If

multiplied by the 36 states of the federation, the RUGA had the prospects of

employing about 72,000 Nigerians upon full implementation. It would have

helped in the management of some „un-governing spaces‟ along Nigeria‟s

highways and border communities and by implications, benefited the entire

country. Furthermore, the policy would have curtailed cattle rustling,

kidnapping, crop destruction by cattle, and constant friction and

confrontation between farming settlements and nomadic herders. Succinctly,

the policy was designed for pastoralists, to reduce friction with farmers at

the overall best interest of Nigerians.

3.4 RUGA Settlement: Through What Means?

A policy of national significance such as the RUGA settlement is always

conceived and presented for deliberations at National Executive Council

meetings which has both Ministers and the Governors of the 36 States of
Nigeria in attendance. The RUGA policy, by all indications, did not follow this

medium. This is demonstrated by the fact that the office of the Vice President

had denied having anything to do with the policy in an attempt to exonerate

the Office from the backlash that followed it. The fact that the Vice President

was ignorant of such development demonstrates the skirmishes that

surrounded its formulation and subsequent presidential approval. This is

more so as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recongises the

Vice President as the Chairman of the National Economic Council (NEC)4 with

the responsibility to “advise the President concerning the economic affairs of

the Federation”.5 It is, therefore, an aberration that a policy of this

magnitude circumvented the Vice President's office and still managed to

secure presidential approval. Hence, the RUGA policy is a product of "federal

might" which has been defined as:

the judicious and/or extra-judicial utilization of government

institutions and its agencies by the ruling federal government for

and/or against its friends, opposition-controlled states and

dissident voices before, during and after elections and at clashes

of interests, not just for its immediate party aggrandizement, but

 to prove political points of supremacy, “being in charge”,

intimidation, rascality, power politics and coercive diplomacy. It

is the corruption of and manipulation of federal institutions for

individual and group gratification (Ekpo, Agorye & Tobi,

2019:986).

Though adjudged as benevolent (from the core northern states) and

malevolent (from north-central and southern states of the federation) the

project was a federal government project which according to Presidential

Aide, Garba Shehu, the "government at the centre has gazetted lands in all

states of the federation” but would not push through since the intention of

the programme is not to “force this programme on anyone” (Agbakwuru,

2019). This notwithstanding, the federal government has, on several

occasions adopted the persuasive and “carrot” approach by constantly

pleading with state governors to embrace the project. In fact, the former

aide to the President on National Assembly matter, Senator Ita Enang, had,

in an attempt to woo State governors, disclosed that over N2.258 billion has

been earmarked in the 2019 budget for Ruga for supporting States to benefit

from (Nda-Isaiah, 2019).

 The fact that state governors constituted the most vociferous

impediment to the realisation of the project is obvious. The fact, also, that

the President is not pleased with the disposition of the governors towards

the RUGA project is translucent. Hence, the recent canvassing for the

amendment of the Land Use Act of 1978, which grants ownership of lands

to State governors, by the Senate President, Senator Ahmed Lawan

(seePremium Times, 2019), might not be unconnected to the frustration of

check and balance. Bypassing the various stakeholders in planning and

executing the RUGA policy was not good enough a strategy, to go about a

project of such magnitude in a political climate that was already saturated

with fear and diffidence.

3.5 RUGA Settlement: Against What Threat?

If there is anything that is incontrovertible in present Nigeria, it is the

fact that insecurity has been at its peak since the end of the civil war in 1970.

The author had introduced this work with statistics depicting the trend and

deterioration in the relationship between herders and their host

communities, as they make their southward movements away from the

scourge of the desiccating Sahara. The conflict has, over time, escalated to

the crisis stage, culminating in the government experimenting with different

policies with the grand plan of putting to an end the violence associated with

the crisis or mitigating the effects of already inflicted violence on parties.

The policy, however, was designed to tackle natural and direct violence

against herders and vice versa, by their host communities. Other forms of

violence such as structural (indirect), cultural and time violence (Galtung,

1996:31) were negated by the codifiers of the

Ruga settlement policy. Even so, the project neglected the verbal aspect of

physical violence which was left unchecked during the short implementation

phase of the project. For instance, callous statements6 were made by

MACBAN and some northern groups without concerted attempts by the

government to caution them. This brewed feelings of fear, alleged

complicity, and mutual agenda on the part of the farming communities who

automatically withdrew to the defensive with overblown pressure on their

governors to reject the project. Coupled with this was the insinuation by

retired General T. Y. Danjuma of the complicity of the security apparatuses

in the conflict. Another respected Nigerian and former president, Chief

Olusegun Obasanjo, had in an open letter, accused the Buhari administration

of "treating the issue [crisis] with cuddling gloves instead of hammer" and

also echoed the dominant opinion that the attacks are perceived as "Fulani

menace unleashed by Fulani elite in the different parts of the country for a

number of reasons" (Akinyemi, 2019). The RUGA settlement policy could not

allay this climate of fear, but rather, justified further worries and

hypersensitive climate of structural violence, especially among farming

communities.
CHAPTER FOUR

FEAR, DIFFIDENCE AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF RUGA

From all indications, the hasty formulation and implementation of the

RUGA settlement project made it appear very hazy - a situation that was

further complicated by the dissociation of the office of the Vice President

from the project. The fact that the National Livestock Transformation Plan

(NLTP) (2018-2027) was already conceived by the NEC and implementation

had also commenced raised eyebrows on what necessitated the

“dualisation”, as well as questions on what was added or expunged from the

„duplicated‟ policy.

The climate of fear and diffidence developed and escalated from 2015

following the conspicuous rise in attacks and the succeeding effrontery

nurtured by the herders in their dispositions and comments through

MACBAN, their umbrella body. The trend was further amplified by the fact

that the president, Muhammadu Buhari, is a Fulani. Another coincidence

which raised dust was the fact that most of the heads of the federal security

apparatuses were of the northern Muslim stock7. Even so, the President

barely condemned herders' attacks – a disposition that generated so many

controversies and conspiracy theories that the Minister of Information and

Culture, Mr. Lai Muhammed admitted that the government is working, but

silently, to restore normalcy (Kayode-Adedeji, 2016). It took until April 27,

2016, before the president overtly condemned an attack which occurred at

Ukpabi Nimbo of Enugu State (Premium Times, 2016b).

Nevertheless, the government had, in 2015, proposed a bill for the

implementation of cattle colonies across the federation for herders. This was

bitterly rejected by State governors and gave rise to bills that proscribed

open grazing in states such as Benue etc. Subsequently, there were

eyewitness reports of security agencies aiding attacks or facilitating free

passage of suspected Fulani militias. The government had also jettisoned the

plans of importing grass from Brazil – a proposal that MACBAN had rejected.

Governor El-Rufai had located Fulanis across West Africa and offered

requisite compensation that would discourage subsequent reprisal attacks in

Kaduna. There was a proposal to support MACBAN to the tune of N100 billion

coupled with the hysteria of the Fulani radio. All these policies were berated

by Nigerians from the south and north central who were perplexed at the

level of interest expressed by the federal government towards the private

enterprise of Fulani pastoralist. The fact that the federal government showed
very infinitesimal concern to farming communities destroyed during the crisis

called for further queries. Failure to arrest nor prosecute culprits was another

source of factoid which engineered fear from both sides of the divide.

Thus, when the RUGA settlement policy was announced by the then

Minister of Agriculture, Chief Audu Ogbeh, it landed on the ocean of hysteria

of federal-backed landgrabbing for the explicit aim of Fulani preponderance.

Suspicion was even more embossed when Vanguard News reported on June

30, 2018, that herdsmen have renamed over 54 local Plateau communities

grabbed from indigenes (Nanlong, 2018). Thus, when the RUGA settlement

policy was eventually announced, it received the worst form of opprobrium

from the public. Every reaction was cloaked in fear. This fear was expressed

in the diction and imagery which was contained in the reactions of southern

stakeholders. For instance, the Benue State governor, Samuel Ortom, in a

statement by his Chief Press Secretary, Terver Akase maintained that:

We find the approach of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture not

only as a gross violation of the ranching law but also as an insult

to the sensibilities of the entire Benue State…The Government of

Benue State is willing to support cattle owners to establish

 ranches as stipulated by the law prohibiting open grazing. We,

however, wish to reiterate that Benue State has no land for

grazing reserves, grazing routes, cattle colonies or Ruga

settlement (Ameh et al, 2019).

Similarly, all States in south-east Nigeria rejected the proposal with the

Enugu State governor, Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, stating their position thus "no land

for cattle colony, Ruga settlement, or in whatever nomenclature it is called"

(ibid). While the Taraba State government had declared that “we will not

accept anything other than ranching”, the Ondo State government

maintained that “we don‟t believe in creating anything of such, we already

have our own ranches established, with believe that the cattle there would

be healthier and better” (ibid). The Midwest Movement, comprising of the

government of Delta and Edo States “totally and unequivocally” rejected

“this brazen 21st century colonisation in its entirety” and described it as “a

plot by the federal government to tacitly annex swaths of lands belonging to

various ethnic nationalities in States across Nigeria, in a bid to settle Fulani

herders in colonies to be known as RUGA Settlements” (Iyare, 2019).

Professor Wole Soyinka (a Nobel Laureate) and Oba Adeyeye Ogunwusi (a

first-class monarch) jointly:

call[ed] on Nigerian people to recognize that the internal

colonization project is ever recurrent, that there are backward,

primitive undeveloped minds that have failed, and continued to

fail to overcome delusions in this antiquated believe in sectarian

domination as the key to social existence, a believe that despises

peaceful cohabitation that is based on mutual respect (Nathaniel,

2019).

On its part, the Middle Belt Forum, a sociopolitical group championing

the northcentral interest, through its National Publicity Secretary, Dr. Isuwa

Dogo, observed that the RUGA Settlement was part of a plot to:

import criminal Fulani from within and neighbouring countries to

settle them in our communities in order to change the

demography for political, social and economic advantage in

 pursuit of the much talked about „Fulanisation‟ agenda of the

present administration…the government is on a mission to settle

criminal terrorist herdsmen that are behind the incessant

invasions of our communities and displacing our people from

their ancestral land…(Adetayo et al, 2019).

The Rivers State Government also rejected the RUGA policy and even

admonished its indigenes to “join the State government to protect all arable

lands by reporting any form of encroachment under whatever guise”

(Godwin, 2019). The Rivers State governor, Nyesom Wike in a subsequent

video reiterated that:

…I can‟t participate. I have no land. The little one I have I‟ve

said is for agriculture so if I give it out where is the agriculture

I‟m going to do. But if they say that they want water, then

because we lay pipes from here and take our oil to other

areas…they can also lay pipe in the Bonny ocean and then take

the water so the cows can be drinking…at least we have tried to

 contribute water. But any other thing, I‟m not a party to it

(Youtube Video).8

There was a concomitant rejection of the policy by socio-cultural

groups across the north-central, south-east, south-south and south-west

Nigeria. The RUGA settlement plan eventually incurred condemnations from

different chapters of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), an umbrella

body for Christians in Nigeria.

Though President Buhari had bowed to public pressure and suspended

the RUGA settlement project on July 3, 2019, the political climate was still

tensed and heated. For instance, a group of northern youths under the

umbrella of Coalition of Northern Group had openly called out and castigated

southern stakeholders for rejecting the project and issued an ultimatum to

the federal government that “they must act to halt and completely stop this

raging madness within 30 days beginning from…July 3, 2019” and implement

the already suspended project across the 36 States of the federation (Ugwu,

2019). This had culminated in further fears of a possible reintroduction of

the policy from the backdoor, a concern which was expressed by the former

Minister of Aviation, Dr. Femi Fani-Kayode as well as some chapters of the

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) across southern Nigeria. The fear was

so intense that, even for legitimate acquisitions, all land purchases in

southern Nigeria attracted public scrutiny and suspicion.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

There is barely a state in Nigeria that does not have settlers‟

communities or clusters of settlements for non-aborigines. In fact, it was

given credence by the British colonial policy of Sabon gari (strangers‟

quarters) which ensured that settlers were clustered in a defined space away

from the aborigines (Nnoli, 2007). Thus, having settlers around has never

really come with the hysteria of insecurity and land-grabbing. The leading

author is aware of a community leader in the Ikot Edem Odo community of

Akpabuyo, Cross River State that sold a large plot of land to herdsmen,

months before the RUGA settlement hysteria. In fact, a former Director,

Directorate of Military Intelligence, Col. Kunle Toogun, had noted that some

traditional rulers in the Oke Ogun community of Oyo State were selling lands

and inviting herdsmen to their domains just three months before the security

spats (Makinde & Bosun, 2019).

The trouble, therefore, with the RUGA settlement policy lied in the fear

of the unknown, revolving around conspiracies of "Islamisation, Fulanisation

and federal-backed land-grabbing agenda". Several coincidences, actions,

and inactions of the Buhari-led federal government created a favourable

climate for the aforementioned fears to thrive. The failure, by the federal

government, to carry stakeholders along ensured that very little

endorsement and information was available on the public to provide answers

for inquisitive minds. It was therefore easy for the Vice President and the

state governors to dissociate themselves from what they know nothing

about, and by implication, heightening the fears of a possible federal-back

demagogue.

Also, the growing brazenness and audacity of herders, as well as the

uncouth reactions of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria

(MACBAN) to certain issues, made for assumptions that "Buhari has made

Nigeria headquarters of Fulanis in Africa" (Akinsuyi, 2019). Retrospectively,

the wanton rise in the number of herders' attacks from the inauguration of

the Buhari presidency in 2015 and the sluggish response of the President

had culminated in the hysteria of purported Fulani planet. The seeming

Fulani appeasement policies and failure to punish culprits or security

personnel who mutinied9 created more room for speculations on what,

actually is the government's interest in the private pastoral enterprises of

the Fulanis.

The RUGA settlement policy could have been a good policy but its

antecedents, opacity, and the concomitant fear it generated buried it even

before it kick-started. Situations could have been different had the

government been perceived by the generality of the citizenry to be proactive,

equitable, just and nationalistic. The exclusion of stakeholders and late

consultation of primary stakeholders, especially the governors, after the

announcement of the policy was a miscalculation – aside depicting political

arrogance on the part of the federal government, it bloated the federal

power – a reality which the governors were ready to frustrate.

5.2 Recommendations

The federal government must, therefore, redeem itself and do

everything lawful to convince the citizens that it is neither pro-north or for

Fulani. This is very important in allaying fears and regaining the trust and

confidence of Nigerians. Secondly, the government must be involved in

broad and wide consultations with stakeholders on issues and strategies for
the management and resolution of the herders-farmers‟ crisis. Thirdly, the

federal government must invest in public relations and display conspicuous

and overt commitment to the resettlement and compensation of affected

farmers to demonstrate inclusivity in its problem-solving disposition. Without

these gestures, the fear-driven perceptions which are appearing real will

linger. The public opinion would remain that the government has a sinister

move; is unjust; is pro-herders and is indifferent to the plight of the farmers.

Consequently, every policy would be analysed from the cloud of fears and

accorded apposite conspiracy paradigms.

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