G.R. No.

L-5728 August 11, 1910 The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that
he, after repeated demands made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to
Smith.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant. The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused
and the Chinaman, testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did
not have an opportunity to talk together before they went to the justice of the peace where the
P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.
preliminary investigation was held.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Jolo, Moro
Province, with having violated the provisions of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as
charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of P250, Philippine
currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the
rate of P2.50 a day, and to pay the costs. He appealed.
Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an
examination of the accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's
house. The doctor testified that the accused was strong, robust man, and a man presenting no
appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court whether or not he could state
positively if the accused had used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that
he did not use any opium on that day."
The court below in its decision said:

The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an employee of the
I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person who
Bureau of Internal Revenue. This witness testified that the first time he ever saw the accused
uses daily a large amount of opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good
was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the month of April, 1909; that at the time, while two or
physical condition, and from a casual examination of his person no one would accuse
three men were sitting together in the said salon, he heard the accused say that he on some
him of being a habitual user of opium.
occasions like to smoke opium; that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the accused if
he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked sometimes; that he knew
then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he then asked the accused what The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium,
opportunities he had for smoking opium, and the accused replied, "good opportunities;" he then neither does it contend that he had in his possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in
said to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium." On the invitation of the accused he looked him up smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the house of
that night and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith,
Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to see him the following night; that he saw him the who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.
following night, and accused again said that he could not find a suitable place; that they made
another agreement to meet and at that time they went together to a certain house in the barrio of
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed
Tulay, where a certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said
the name of Lockwood for the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited
court) had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman P2,
the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself and
and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for the preparation of the pipe which was prepared
the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements
for smoking he took the pipe and the pan containing the opium and went directly to the justice of
so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the
the peace and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.
said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had,
by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium
The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere
under the name of Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that he was possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.
accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the
town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not;
But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these
that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was
things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the
the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until he became
commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same offense
acquainted in town; that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and
and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such
after being there about twenty minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for
conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such
him to have some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply
steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to the
that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and
elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his
that they probably would not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker
debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as
that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he
those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant,
(Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to do so; that by
corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into
agreement and the witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the
insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as
Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that
in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a
he (Smith) then left, without the accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the
crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be
accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to examine him
understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the
about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's house.
incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The
judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986
AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the crime of bribery. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby find the
defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; and there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby impose upon
her the penalty of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-
one (21) days and a fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification from holding office. With costs.
Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in an information which
reads:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then employed as Hearing Officer in the Department
of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a public officer, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for
herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency,
from one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condition and/or consideration
for her to act on the claim for compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs.
Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining to the death of her husband, which claim
was then pending in the office wherein the abovenamed accused was
employed and in which, under the law, she has the official capacity to
intervene.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in its decision
as follows:
Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an
employee of the National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument
man at the Upper Pampanga River Project. Upon the death of her husband
on April 27, 1971, she approached the appellant, a hearing officer of the
Workmen's Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the
procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the
requirements, she prepared the application forms and attachments and filed
them with the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San Fernando, Pampanga.
(pp. 213, TSN, October 3, 1973).
After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to verify the
status of her claim. She was informed that the death certificate of her
husband, their marriage contract and the birth certificates of their children
were needed. She secured these documents and brought them to San
Fernando. She was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to
Cabanatuan City, particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the
requirements. So she went to see the appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October
3, 1973).
When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay
P 100.00 so that her claim would be acted upon. The complainant told the
appellant that she had no money then, but if the appellant would process
her claim she would give her the P100.00 upon its approval. The appellant
was adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's proposal.
According to her, on previous occasions certain claimants made similar
promises but they failed to live up to them. (pp. 18-24, TSN, October
3,1973).
The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief
of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to inform him
of the demand of the appellant. Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two
50-peso bills (Exhibits B and B-1 ) and instructed her to go to Col. David
Laureaga, Provincial Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25, TSN,
October 3, 1973).
After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos
to entrap the appellant. The two 50-peso bills were marked with the
notations 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-
violet powder. With this preparation, Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos and
the complainant proceeded to the office of the appellant. When they arrived
thereat, the appellant was talking with three persons who had a hearing
before her. They allowed the three persons to finish their business with the
appellant. After the group had left, the complainant and CIC Balcos who
pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the appellant. Lt.
Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves outside the room and
observed events through a glass window. Aside from the appellant, the
complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three other persons inside the
office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara and Gregorio
Ocampo. The complainant again requested the appellant to process her
claim. The appellant countered by asking her if she already had the
P100.00. In answer, the complainant brought out the two 50-peso bills from
her bag and handed them to the appellant. As the appellant took hold of the
money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under arrest.
Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered the room and
helped in the arrest of the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973).
The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her hands were
examined with a special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The
examination was witnessed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The
result was positive. (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973).
On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts:
On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P
100.00 by the complainant. She declined the offer and never touched the
 bills when they were laid on her table. If she was found positive for ultra-
violet powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on her hand and
dress. He did it four times once at her office, once at the Milky way
Restaurant and twice at the PC Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals,
Annex "A", p. 5)
When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan
City, she demanded the release of the decision of her case, but appellant
told her that she cannot do so for the reason that she is only a hearing
officer to receive evidence about the claim for compensation due to the
death of her husband, and the real office to decide the case is that
Workmen's Compensation Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, Chief of the Criminal
Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to inform
him of the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave
complainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the complainant,
Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap appellant by the use of
fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the notation 'CC-NE-l' and
'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two fifty-
peso bills. After this preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant
proceeded to the office of the complainant. When they arrived in the place
the complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a hearing before
her. After the appellant finished the hearing the complainant and the CIC
Balgos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the
appellant. Then the complainant again requested the appellant to process
her claim by this time the complainant took the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag
and gave to the appellant but the appellant pushed the money, and CIC
Balgos grabbed her hand and told her appellant was under arrest. The
appellant was brought to the headquarters where her hands were examined
with special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination
was witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan City and
the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13, November 6, 1973)
On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant testified that
he was in the office of the appellant at the time the incident took place and
he saw the amount of P100.00 being offered by the complainant to the
appellant but the latter refused to accept the money. When appellant
refused, CIC Balgos took it, rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and
announced that he was arresting her.
Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to her to
expedite the preparation of the decision of her claim and said complainant
put two fifty peso bills in her table after which she was arrested and
investigated and a complaint was filed against her for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R. Araneta
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and
hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment for ONE (1) YEAR, with
perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay the costs. The
P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso bills which were marked as Exhibits 'B'
and 'B-l' are hereby ordered returned to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco who
owns them.
As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and
convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner now assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED BY
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY IN CABANATUAN
CITY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER
OF BRIBERY WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of
the entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against her.
This argument has no merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the submission of the
Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to
ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of
the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the
crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature
of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve to
commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives
the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
Idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As already
stated, entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation
does.
Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng (56 Phil. 44) where
this Court ruled that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service pretended to agree
to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customs house, in order to assure Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount involved is
the seizure of the said opium and the arrest of its importers is no bar to the prosecution and only P100.00 and that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is recommended that the
conviction of the latter. In that case, this Court quoted with approval 16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. petitioner either be granted executive clemency or be given the privilege of probation if she is
57, which states that: qualified.

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action.
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
SO ORDERED.
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable,
the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present
and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence of the instigation of the detective.
...

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due process of
law because she was not charged with bribery in the information but for a crime falling under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was squarely answered
in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that the fact that the information
in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused
guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United
States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the
lower court, but on appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public
funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.

As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts
proved during the trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the
designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process.

In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:

The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of

credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show
beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as
defined in article 387, in connection with Article 383 of the Penal Code, has
been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint
that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated
by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to
constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid
articles of the Penal Code.

Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs.
 [G.R. No. 892. September 11, 1902. ] persons upon whom devolves the duty of prosecuting the crime.

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. JUAN LUNA, Defendant-Appellant.
Jose M. Rosado, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ABDUCTION; CONDONATION. — The express pardon of a person guilty of
attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter’s parents, is not sufficient to remove
criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
This case was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Luna for
attempted abduction, and was brought before us by an appeal taken by the defendant against
the judgment of the 12th of March last, by which he was condemned to one year eight months
and twenty days of prision correccional, with accessories, and to the payment of costs. While the
appeal was pending in this court the attorney for the appellant, by petition dated the 17th of May
last, presented to the court a public instrument dated the 15th of the same month, by which, with
the consent of the defendant, Tomasa Rivera y Felipe, a widow, who states that she is the
mother of the minor Juana Isidro y Rivera, 12 years of age, the alleged victim of the crime
prosecuted, granted an express pardon of the offense committed, as the representative of her
said daughter, in favor of the defendant, Juan Luna, remitting the penalty to which he may have
become liable, this pardon having been granted generously, without consideration of
recompense and without coercion. The attorney for the defendant moved the court to declare
that the penal action brought by the complaining witness was extinguished, and asked that the
bail bond given by the defendant be cancelled.
Correlative to this precept, the following paragraph establishes the right, conferred by the law
upon the injured party, to grant a pardon. In order that the pardon produce its effects it must be
made by the person injured, or, in case that person be a minor, then the parents or guardian of
such person must take part in the granting thereof. But the granting of pardon by these persons
alone, in the name or on behalf of the minor, is not sufficient, because, as the offense essentially
and directly affects the injured party, she alone is entitled to remit the offense and to authorize
the extinction of the penal action. This pardon can only be presumed in the case of the marriage
of the injured party with the offender, and can not be presumed from any act on the part of her
representatives.
The best confirmatory demonstration of the doctrine that it is absolutely necessary and
indispensable that the pardon be granted by the victim of the attempt herself is a decision of the
supreme court of Spain of the 5th of January, 1898, applying the precept of section 4 of article
448 of the Penal Code, to the effect that a marriage entered into by a girl under age, although
illegal because of lack of consent of the parents, is sufficient to produce the extinction of the
penal action and of the penalty, because, by the celebration of this marriage, the pardon of the
offense is presumed, and the crime is blotted out by the marriage of the injured party to the
offender. Consequently, as it has not been made to appear that the offended party, Juana Isidro,
has expressly pardoned the injury alleged to have been done her by the defendant Juan Luna,
and the pardon of the girl’s mother not being sufficient to authorize the dismissal of the case in
accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code, we are of the opinion that the contention of
the attorney for the defendant can not be sustained, and therefore the motion is overruled, with
the costs, and the prosecution of this case in the second instance will be continued. So ordered.

This case deals with an offense in which the penal action or liability to the penalty fixed for its
punishment may be extinguished by the express or implied pardon of the party offended, in
accordance with the last paragraph of article 448 of the Penal Code.

The motion of the counsel for the defendant is based upon an express pardon, recorded in a
public instrument, by the mother of the injured party, who, being a widow, exercises over the
complaining witness the rights of parental authority. The Solicitor-General opposes this motion
on the ground that the pardon was not granted by the injured party herself, as is expressly
required by the Penal Code.

In view of the clear and precise terms in which paragraph 4 of article 448 is drawn, there can not
be the slightest doubt that the express pardon for the offense must be granted by the injured
party, and in case the injured party should be a minor, or should lack the necessary capacity to
maintain an action, then, in order that the pardon have its effect, it is necessary that this defect
be cured by the completion of this deficient personality.

In the third paragraph of article 448 it is provided that if the injured party, by reason of nonage or
moral condition, should be without capacity to sue, and should be so unprotected as to be
without parents, grandparents, brothers, tutor, or curator, then the fiscal may denounce the
crime. It appears, therefore, that the right to prosecute the crime or to appear in the action is
attributed in the first place to the person aggrieved, and, in the event of such person being
unable to do so by reason of lack of personality, then the law designated in successive order the
G.R. No. 1272 January 11, 1904 justice of the peace in Malabon he heard one Florencia Francisco testify that when his brother,
Felix Punsalan, died he was covered with bruises and was passing blood, and that his body was
buried at a place called Ogong, in the village known as Cay-grande.
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. The defendant Marcelo de Leon, who testified as a witness in the case, stated that Felix
Punsalan and Gregorio Mendoza were kidnapped by Baldomero Navarro and Mariano Jacinto,
one night in November, 1902, and that the witness knew this because he also was on of the men
Felix Ferrer for appellants.
kidnapped by these defendants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

The court below rendered judgment condemning each one of the defendants, Baldomero
MCDONOUGH, J.:
Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life imprisonment and payment of
the costs of prosecution. Against this judgment the defendants appealed.
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are
charged with the crime of illegal detention, committed, according to the information, as follows:
Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another,
or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor.
The said defendants, together with other persons unknown armed with revolvers and daggers,
went one night about the middle of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan,
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to
situated in Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo, Province of Bulacan, and by force and
give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall
violence kidnapped the said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this information, having
be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.
given any information as to his whereabouts or having proven that they set him at liberty.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty
The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one convicted
of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve
In the course of the trial Teodoro Pangan, Gregorio Mendoza, and Flaviano Punsalan testified years and one convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not state his
as witnesses for the prosecution. The witness Pangan said that one night about the middle of whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment
November, 1902, while he was asleep in the house of Felix Punsalan, situated in the barrio of for a term of seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words,
Malinta, in front of Maysilo, he, being at that time a servant of the said Punsalan, was aroused for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of the person
by the barking of the dogs; that his master, Felix Punsalan, arose and opened the window, and, deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased
upon seeing some people there, asked them who they were; they answered him by asking who from imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment.
was with him in the house, to which he replied that his servant was there; they asked him if he
had a gun, and he replied that he had no gun, and they asked him to come down and talk with
This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own
them, and the said Felix Punsalan, having gone down accordingly, did not return, and the
behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if
witness added that he had not seen again since that time. This witness says that he did not see
he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for the very statement
the men who called to his master from below but only heard them.
of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a
confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person.
Gregorio Mendoza, the second witness, testifies that he was taken from his house one night in
the month of November, 1902, by seven men, among who were these defendants; that in
So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would
addition to himself, the same party on that night kidnapped Felix Punsalan and that the latter,
have the effect of convincing him under article 481.
with the witness, were taken by their captors to Pudag-babuy where the defendant Marcelo de
Leon hung them to a tree, demanding of them that they hand over their guns; that on that same
night they set the witness at liberty, but kept Felix Punsalan; that the witness did not see The counsel for the defendants claims that such practice is illegal, since the passage by
Punsalan again since that time, and that before the kidnapping he frequently saw him because Congress of the act of July 1, 1902, relating too the Philippines, section 5 of which provides that
he lived next door. ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Section
57 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that a defendant in a criminal case shall be presumed to
be innocent until the contrary is proved; and section 59 provides that the burden of proof of guilt
Flaviano Punsalan, brother of Felix Punsalan, testified that the latter was kidnapped on the night
shall be upon the prosecution.
of November 17, 1902, and that he had not seen since that time; that subsequently, in January,
1903, on occasion of the witness having been called to the barracks of the Constabulary by the
officers of that corps, he heard a statement made there by the defendant Baldomero Navarro in In fact he contends that as these provisions are in conflict with those of article 483 they have the
the presence of the superintendent of secret information, Captain Crame, Inspector Brown, and effect of repealing that section.
Interpreter Austin, in the course of which statement Baldomero Navarro stated that he was the
leader of the band that kidnapped Felix Punsalan and Gregorio Mendoza, and that his
Under the system of criminal procedure existing here under the Spanish Government it was
companions were Marcelo de Leon, Fidel Feliciano, Remigio Delupio, and one Luis; that the said
doubtless lawfull to require a suspected or accused person to give evidence touching the crime
Felix Punsalan died within a week from the time he was kidnapped, in consequence of the ill
of which he was charged or suspected.
treatment received. The witness testified that Navarro made the statement freely and
spontaneously, without threats or compulsion. The witness also testified that in the court of the
And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of article 483 it is necessary to examine that some one has been taken away from home and has not been heard of again, and the facts point
system of procedure. to the prisoner as the presumptive criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he
does so, and proves that the person detained was liberated by him, or that such person is living
in such and such a place, then the prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a charge
In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, volume 3, page 577, we find the
under the first or following sections of article 481, according to whether the facts elicited by the
following description of the distinctive features of the inquisitorial system of criminal procedure,
preliminary or summary investigation show only a detention in general, or for the specific periods
which constitutes the machinery by which the legislator proposed to enforce the penalty
of time indicated in the latter part of the section. But if the prisoner fails to prove the whereabouts
prescribed in the article under consideration. He say:
of the person whom he is accused of making away with, or that he liberated him, then the
prosecuting attorney has a case falling within the last paragraph of article 483.
A criminal prosecution is divided into two principal parts or sections which are, first,
the summary, and second, the penalty stages. The principal purpose of the summary
It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law that no prosecution under this article
trial is to inquire whether a criminal act has been committed and to determine by
would have ever been possible without a concomitant provision of the procedural law which
whom the act has been committed — that is to say, the object is to get together all the
made it the duty of the accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable
date possible for the purpose of proving that an act falling within the sanction of the
deduction from his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483 was composed of three
penal law has been committed by such and such persons. In the plenary stage the
elements:
purpose is a contradictory discussion of the question of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, and the rendition of a judgment of conviction or acquittal. It may well be
that although it appear in the summary stage of the proceeding that the act has been (a) The illegal detention of a person by the accused.
performed by the accused, still in the plenary stage it may be shown that the act was
not really criminal or that there was a lawful excuse for its commission.
(b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the summary investigation that this person had
recovered his liberty.
The record of the summary proceeding should contain evidence of the commission of
a punishable act, all possible data tending to point out the delinquent, a record of all
(c) A failure on the part of the accused in the course of the summary proceeding to
proceedings connected with his arrest and imprisonment, the answers of the accused
prove that he had liberated the person detained, or to give information at that time of
to the interrogatories put to him as to any other witness to obtain from him a statement
his whereabouts, or a refusal to give any evidence at all which left him in the same
of all he knows concerning the crime and those guilty of it.
position as would an unsuccessful attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and
which were necessary to overcome the prima facie case made out by the proof of the
The record of the proceedings described above was then sent to the prosecuting attorney, or to first two elements.
the private accuser and in view of the facts which appeared from the record the prosecution
made out the formal charge, the facts elicited by the proceeding enabling the prosecuting
Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must exists before an information can be filed
attorney to determine within what article of the Penal Code the criminal act fell. After the filing of
for a prosecution under this article. The real trial was the plenary and was very similar to out
such a charge further proceedings were had in which more evidence might be taken by either
regular trial after arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and inquisitorial methods, was
party and in which the accused had his opportunity to make a defense.
vastly different from our preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken away to question
the accused and compel him to testify, then element (c) above indicated, would have always
The summary proceeding was secret, but the plenary stage was conducted publicly. been lacking. And that right has been taken from the prosecution by both General Orders, No.
58, and by the guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the case the crime defined in
article 483 can not now be committed, because the possibility of adding to the element (a)
Article 544 of the royal decree of May 6, 1880, which provided the procedural law applicable in
arising from the act of the accused the other two elements equally essential to the offense has
criminal cases in the Islands, reads as follows: "The defendant can not decline to answer by
been forever swept away by the extension to these Islands of the constitutional barrier against
questions addressed him by the judge, or by the prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the
an inquisitorial investigation of crime.
judge, or by the private prosecutor, even though he may believe the judge to be without
jurisdiction, in which case he may record a protest against the authority of the court."
Under the present system the information must charge the accused with acts committed by him
prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense against the
The author above cited, Escriche, commenting upon this obligation on the part of the defendant
law. The Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense
to testify, says that in case he stands mute the court can not put him to the torture as formerly,
and trust to his making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of
but can only inform the prisoner that his silence is unfavorable to him, that it is an indication of
prosecuting on the prosecution from beginning to end.
his guilt, that in consequence thereof he will be regarded as guilt for all the purposes of the
summary, and that his silence will be taken into account with all the other evidence against him
when the time comes for the rendition of judgment upon him. In this case the prosecuting attorney charges the accused with kidnapping some person and
with not having given any information of the whereabouts of that person, of having proved that
he — the accused — has set him at liberty. To make out a case the Government must show that
Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to the case in question, supposing that the
the prisoner has been guilty of every act or omission necessary to constitute the crime of which
crime had been committed prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58.
he is charged, and it will not be disputed that the exercise of an absolute right can not form part
The judicial authorities having reason to believe that some one has been illegally detained or
of a crime. In this case the Government has proved that the defendant was guilty of a breach of
kidnapped proceed to make a secret investigation of the case, arrest the suspected culprit, and
his duty to respect the rights of others by showing that he, with others, carried a certain
demand of him that he give any information he may have concerning the act under investigation
individual away from his house against his will, the accused not being vested with authority to
and to state whatever may have been his own participation therein. The evidence shows that
restrain his fellow-citizens of liberty. It is impossible for the Government to prove the other
elements of the crime, because the acts necessary to constitute them must be anterior in point
of time to the trial, and must constitute some breach of duty under an existing law. It has been
demonstrated that the omission which, under the former law constituted the two remaining
elements, is no longer penalized but is nothing more than the exercise of one of the most
essential rights pertaining to an accused person.
The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the
United States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England.
It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party
were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the
crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by
duress.
It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person,
which had long obtained in the continental system. (Jones's Law of Evidence, sec. 887; Black's
Constitutional Law, 575.)
In other words, the very object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such practices
as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial
examinations, and to get testimony regarding the offense with which they were charged.
In Emery's case (107 Mass., 172) it was said that the principle applies equally to any compulsory
disclosure of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry,
or indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involved in an issue between
the parties.
If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of
crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure
would be an accusation against himself.
In the present case, if the defendant, as said before disclosed the whereabouts of the person
taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction
under article 481 of the Penal Code.
The decision of the case of Boyd vs. The United States (116 U. S., 616) is authority for the
contention in the present case. There the question raised was one of a violation of the revenue
laws, it being claimed that false entry of merchandise had been made, the punishment for which
was fixed by law at a fine not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or by imprisonment.
It became important on the part of the prosecution to show the quality of the goods imported.
Section 5 of the Revenue Law, passed in June, 1874, authorized the district attorney to obtain
an order of court requiring the defendants to produce their invoices, books, papers, etc., to be
examined by the district attorney in order to obtain such evidence as he desired. Such an order
was served on the defendant. The invoices were produced under protest, the objection being
that their introduction in evidence could not be compelled and that the statute was
unconstitutional as it compelled the defendant to testify against himself.
The law provided that for a failure or refusal to produce the invoices the allegations stated by the
district attorney as to what he expected to prove by them should be taken as confessed, unless
the failure of refusal of the defendant to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction
of the court.
The court stated that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against himself, or to forfeit his property is unconstitutional.
The law, it is true, only required the defendant to produce the invoices, but it declared that if he
did not do so then the allegations which it is affirmed the district attorney will prove shall be
taken as confessed. "This," said the court, "is tantamount to compelling their production for the
prosecution will always be sure to state the evidence expected to be derived from them as
strongly as the case will admit of."
Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar. If the defendant does not do certain things,
if he does not make certain statements or proofs, he is severely punished.
It may be said that the defendant is only required to speak on one point in the case, that the
prosecution must prove the illegal detention, and that the burden of showing the whereabouts
only is put upon the defendant.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the trial of Aaron Burr, expressed his views on this question as follows:
Many links frequently compose the chain of testimony which is necessary to convict
an individual of a crime. It appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule that not
witness is compelled to furnish any one of them against himself. It is certainly not only
a possible but a probable case that a witness by declaring a single fact may complete
the testimony against himself as entirely as he would by stating every circumstance
which would be required for his conviction. The fact of itself would be unavailing, but
all the other facts without it would be insufficient. While that remains concealed in his
own bosom he is safe, but draw it from thence and he is exposed to a prosecution. 1
If it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to testify, that he remain mute, the answer is
that, the illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution, if he does not make certain
proof, if he remains mute, then not only the presumption but the fact of guilt follows as a
consequence of his silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted under American law.
In the case of the People vs. Courtney (94 N. Y., 490), decided by the court of appeals of the
State of New York, the question to be determined was whether or not a law permitting a person
charged with crime to testify in his own behalf was constitutional or not. The law in question
provided also that his omission or refusal to testify "should create no presumption against him."
Judge Andrews, in rendering the decision of the court, stated: "A law which, while permitting a
person accused of a crime to be a witness in his own behalf, should at the same time authorize
a presumption of guilt from his omission to testify, would be a law adjudging guilt without
evidence, and while it might not be obnoxious to the constitutional provision against compelling a
party in a criminal case to give evidence against himself, would be a law reversing the
presumption of innocence, and would violate the fundamental principles binding alike upon the
legislature and the courts."
It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express
words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as
proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution
proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged.
In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting
the party's oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is contrary to the principles of free government;
it is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It
may suit the purposes to despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom."
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed and the defendants are found guilty of
the crime defined and punished by article 482 of the Penal Code; applying the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity each and every one of them is condemned to eighteen years
of reclusion temporal, with the legal accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs of both
instances.
Arellano, C. J., Cooper and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MAPA, J., with whom concur WILLARD and TORRES, JJ., dissenting:
When a person is illegally detained he may recover his liberty or he may not be seen or heard of
again. In the first case the crime would fall within the provisions of articles 481, 482, and 483,
paragraph 1 of the Penal Code, according to the circumstances of the case. The maximum
penalty which could be imposed upon this hypothesis would be that of reclusion temporal, fixed
by article 482.
If the person detained is not seen or heard again, the crime is unquestionably a more serious
one, and the code, in order to be consistent with the system adopted by it of making the penalty
attached to crimes correspond to the extent and degree of the harm occasioned thereby,
necessarily had to fix a heavier penalty upon the illegal detention of a person followed by his
complete disappearance, than in any of the cases in which the person detained recovers his
liberty. "The disappearance of a person who has been illegally detained by another," says
Groizard, in his Commentaries on the Penal Code, volume 5, page 633, "is certainly sufficient to
cause alarm to society. It constitutes a natural increase of the mediate harm caused by the crime
of illegal detention, and gives rise to a well-founded presumption of an increased extent or
immediate harm."
The greater the harm caused by the crime, the greater and more severe the penalty attached to
it. This is the system invariably followed by our code.
It appearing, then, that the code fixes the penalty of reclusion temporal when the person
detained recovers his liberty if his detention has lasted more than twenty days, or any other of
the aggravating circumstances expressed in article 482 concur, it was logical and unavoidably
necessary, in order not to destroy the unity of the system referred to, that the code should fix a
heavier penalty than reclusion temporal for a case in which the person detained has
disappeared, owing to the greater gravity with which the circumstance invests the crime. This
would be so if only on account of the fact while the illegal detention continues, while the person
detained remains in the power of his captors, he continues to be expressed to the danger of
being a helpless and defenseless victim of violence and ill treatment of every kind, including the
loss of his life. Hence the code has fixed the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree
to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua) when the person detained disappears.
"One who illegally detains another," says paragraph 2 of article 483, "and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he has set him at liberty, shall
be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment (cadena
perpetua)."
The fact that Felix Punsalan was kidnapped by the accused in November, 1901, having been
fully proven, and the fact that he has disappeared and that nothing has been heard of him up to
the present time having been also proven, we think that the case should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of article 483 above transcribed, and that the defendants should
be sentenced to the penalty of life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), taking into consideration the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, inasmuch as they have not given information as to the
whereabouts of Punsalan, and have not proven that they set him at liberty.
In the opinion of the majority of the court this article "has the effect of forcing the defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put
upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or in other words of incriminating
himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant
set him at liberty, amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person."
As a consequence of this interpretation, the majority are of the opinion that this article has been
repealed by section 5 of the Philippine bill, enacted July 1, 1902, which provides that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and by the provisions of
section 57 and 59 of General Orders, No. 58, which provide that the defendant in a criminal case
shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and that the burden of the proof of
guilt shall be upon the prosecution. "It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law,"
say the majority, "that no prosecution under this section would ever have been possible (par. 2,
art. 483) without a concomitant provision of the procedural law, which made it the duty of the
accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable inference from his
refusal to do so." If the right had been taken away to question the accused and compel him to
testify, the majority of the court are of the opinion that one of the essential elements of the crime
defined and punished by article 483 would always have been lacking, and that right they
say has been taken from the prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and the guaranty
embodied in the Philippine bill.
Article 554 of the compilation of rules concerning criminal procedure, approved by the royal
decree of May 6, defendant can not decline to answer the questions addressed him by the judge
or by the prosecuting attorney with the consent of the judge, or by the private prosecutor, even
though he may believe the judge to be without jurisdiction, in which case he may record a
protest against the authority of the court," does in fact appear to support the opinion of the
majority with respect to the obligation which it is assumed rested upon the accused under the old
system of procedure to appear as a witness. This provision of law, however, carefully
considered, lacks a great deal of having the meaning and scope attributed to it in the majority
opinion, for neither the article in question nor any other article in the royal decree cited, or any
other provision of law of which we are aware, provides for any penalty in case the accused
should refuse to testify. Far from it, paragraph 2 of article 545 of the royal decree in question
provides that "in no case shall the defendant be questioned or cross-examined," and article 541
in its last paragraph provides: "Nor shall the defendant be in any way threatened or coerced."
Article 543 provides that a judge who disregards this precept shall be subject to a disciplinary
correction unless the offense is such as to require still heavier punishment.
The use of threats or coercion against the accused being prohibited in absolute and precise
terms, how could it be lawful to threaten him, as Escriche states in his Dictionary of Legislation
and Jurisprudence, cited by the majority in support of their opinion (a work which, by the way,
was written long before the enactment of the procedural law in force in the Philippines at the
time General Orders, No. 58, was published) — how could it be lawful, we say, to coerce the
accused by informing him that "his silence is prejudicial to him, that it is an indication of his guilt,
that he will be thereby considered guilty, and that his refusal to testify will be taken into
consideration, together with all other evidence against him when the time arrives for rendering
judgment?" Would this not be an actual coercion, and a coercion of the worst kind, inasmuch as
it implies a threat, also prohibited by the law, of a certain and sure conviction, for the purpose of
constraining and compelling the accused to testify? Would not the judge making such a threat
become subject to the punishment prescribed by article 543 above cited?
Escriche himself, in his article on criminal procedure in the work above mentioned, in speaking
of the testimony of defendants says that "all coercion is prohibited by law." "This," he adds, "has
done away with all physical or moral compulsion to obtain testimony." And in paragraph 70 of the
same article he also says as follows: "If the defendant remains silent when called upon to plead,
and refuses to answer the charges made against him by the judge, he can not be compelled to
answer . . .; nor does it appear that this can be regarded as a plea of guilt, or that the accused
can be considered as the author of the crime on that account.
Providing for the case of the accused refusing to testify, article 392 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure of 1882 provides that "when the accused refuses to answer or pretends to be insane,
or dumb, the judge shall warn him that notwithstanding his silence the prosecution will continue."
This is the only thing which can be done in such a case — the only thing the law permits — and
anything which may be done beyond that for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear, no matter
how light, upon the accused to constrain him to testify would be unjust and illegal.
If, therefore, the law prescribes no penalty for the refusal of the accused to testify, and if an
accused person who does so refuse can not be compelled to do so in any way, if the only
procedure which the law authorizes, if the only action which the judge can take in that case is to
continue the prosecution notwithstanding this denial, how can it be successfully contended that
the accused was obliged to testify? If the law had assumed to impose upon him such an
obligation it would have prescribed some adequate means of enforcing it, for there can not be an
obligation in the true legal sense of the word without the coexistence of some penalty by which
to enforce its performance.
Thus, for example, the law in imposing upon witnesses the obligation to testify, at the same time
prescribes a penalty for one who refuses to perform this duty. Article 560 of the compilation says
that "all persons residing in Spanish territory, whether natives or foreigners, who are not under
disability, shall be obliged to respond to a judicial citation to testify as to all matters within their
knowledge concerning which they may be questioned." And article 567 providing that "he who,
not being under disability, shall fail to respond to the first judicial citation . . ., or shall refuse to
testify as to the facts concerning which he may be interrogated . . . shall be subject to a fine of
not less than 25 nor more than 250 pesetas; and if he should persist in his resistance he shall in
the first case be taken before the court by the officers of the law and prosecuted for the crime
defined and punished in paragraph 2 of article 383 of the Penal Code (art. 252 of the Code of
these Islands), and in the second case shall also be prosecuted for the crime defined and
punished in article 265 of the same Code." (Art. 368 of the Philippine Code.)
This provision of law certainly constitutes a significant contrast to the absence of any other
similar coercive provision which might produce the effect of compelling accused persons to
testify against their will, and this demonstrates that the law did not propose to impose upon them
such an obligation.
To such a degree has the law carried its respect for the conscience of accused persons and for
their natural desire to refrain from incriminating statements that is absolutely prohibits the
administration of an oath even in cases in which such persons voluntarily offer to testify. (Art.
593 of the Compilation, par. 17 of the royal order (auto acordado) of 1860, and art. 9 of the royal
cedula of 1855), thus leaving them entirely at liberty to testify as they may see fit, whether false
or true, without the fear, which necessarily produces a certain moral pressure, of thereby
incurring the guilt of perjury. On this account, and of the fact of the absolute prohibition of using
any threats or coercion against them, the practical result was that not only might accused
persons testify with impunity as to whatever they might see fit, even if false, when voluntarily
offering themselves as witnesses, but that they could never be compelled against their will to
testify at all. This is equivalent to saying that accused persons were not under any obligation to
testify.
We have stated that the law did not authorize the drawing of any inference as to the guilt of the
accused from his silence, and we insist that such is the case. We believe that no provision of law
can be cited in support of the contrary proposition. To what has been said above upon this point
we may add that among the means of proof of the guilt of the accused expressly mentioned in
article 52 of the provisional law for the application of the Penal Code in the Philippines, the
silence of the accused or his refusal to testify is not included.
In corroboration of the assertions heretofore made we refer to a work published in 1883 by the
editorial staff of the Review of Legislation and Jurisprudence, under the title of "Law of criminal
procedure," in which, in the chapter in which the subject of the testimony of the accused is dealt
with (vol. 1, p. 257), the following statement is made:
Is the accused under any obligation to testify? This is the first doubt which arises in
examining the subject with which this chapter deals. The law does not solve the
question expressly, and consequently we must endeavor to discover whether this
obligation is imposed indirectly. We are of the opinion that it is not, inasmuch as
obligations, and more especially with respect to the penal law, are not to be
presumed. Nor do we attribute the lack of the provision to which we refer to
carelessness or oversight on the part of the legislator, both because it is such a
serious matter and because it is expressly provided that the accused is under no
obligation to testify, and because our former laws and the law of Aragon, before the
laws of other European countries, relieved accused persons from the obligation of
taking an oath in order not to place them in the predicament of either telling a
falsehood and thereby committing perjury, or of declaring themselves to be guilt of a
crime of which they are charged. That is to say, our ancient laws of Aragon and the
other laws of Europe which copied the provisions of the laws of Aragon when
providing that accused persons should not be required to take an oath, or permitted to
do so, were based upon the principle which is at the present time recognized by all
criminologists of Europe, that the accused should not be required under penalty to aid
in the prosecution of the crime of which he is charged. Upon these principles, which at
the present time are beyond question, it can not be inferred that the accused is under
obligation to testify.
For the purpose of supporting this contention we have still many other reasons. Upon
the supposition that the law imposes upon the defendant the obligation to testify what
penalty exists for the failure to perform this obligation? None, absolutely none; so that
assuming the obligation to exist, if the accused should refuse to testify, he might do so
with absolute immunity, for in such case there is no coercion measure which can be
used since the abolition of torture. Consequently if our law had imposed the obligation
of testifying upon accused persons, they would have provided some adequate penalty.
And not only is this conclusion to be reached from an examination of all modern
systems of law, without any exception, but it is based upon the express provisions of
the law we are commenting upon in article 392 and the last paragraph of article 689
[should be 389], which provides that no coercion or threats can be used against the
accused, and to endeavor to compel him to testify would certainly be a coercion. If the
accused refuses to testify, notwithstanding his silence, the prosecution will
continue without any prejudice whatever to the defendant. It is true that article 693
provides that the presiding judge shall demand a categorical answer from the
accused, but in case the accused refuses to give such answer there is no penalty
other than that of article 798, to wit, that the prosecution shall continue, even although
the accused shall refuse to answer the questions addressed to him by the presiding
judge. Consequently this appears to decide the question in favor of our contention. If
 the accused refuses to testify, that is his privilege, but the trial will continue down to
final judgment.
With respect to the legal presumption of the innocence of the accused in the absence of proof to
the contrary, this is not a new principle in the law of criminal procedure of the Philippine, nor was
it introduced here by General Orders, No. 58, as might be inferred from the majority opinion.
Centuries ago the Code of the Partidas, which for a long time constituted an integral part of the
laws of this Archipelago, solemnly recognized this principle by establishing in a number of its
provisions that no person should be considered as guilty of a crime except upon proof of his
guilt, and that proof to such degree as to exclude all doubt, proof "as clear as light." "A criminal
charge," says Law 12, title 14, third partida, "brought against anyone . . . must be proved openly
by witnesses or by writing, or by the confession of the accused, and not upon suspicion alone.
For it is but just that a charge brought against the person of an man, or against his reputation,
should be proved and established by evidence as clear as light, evidence not leaving room for
any doubt. Wherefore the ancient sages held and decided that it was more righteous to acquit a
guilty man, as to whom the judge could not find clear and manifest evidence, than to convict an
innocent man even though suspicion point his way."
Again, the provincial law for the application of the Penal Code which was in force here at the
time of the publication of General Orders, No. 58, also required, in order to authorize the
conviction of the defendant, that his guilt be established by some of the means of proof
enumerated in article 52 of that law. In default of this proof the presumption prevailed that the
accused was innocent and the law required his acquittal.
In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation of Jurisprudence, above cited, in the article on Criminal
Evidence, paragraph 5, the author says: "Until it appears to a certainty that the accused is guilty,
it would be a crime to condemn him to suffer any penalty whatever; because he may be
innocent, and every man has a right to be so considered until the contrary is established by
proof."
It follows then that if the accused could under no circumstance be compelled to testify against
his will under the procedural law prior to General Orders, No. 58, and of that procedure the
principle of the presumption of the innocence of the accused until the contrary is proven formed
part, and that notwithstanding this the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483 existed, it is
logical to conclude, against the opinion of the majority, that in establishing that precept the
legislator in no wise took into consideration the supposed obligation of the accused to testify as
to the charge against him, and did not consider it incompatible with that presumption of
innocence, for then as now the accused was under no obligation to testify, and then as now the
presumption referred to constituted a fundamental right of the accused under the law of
procedure.
Passing from this aspect of the question, we will now consider the provisions of paragraph 2 of
article 483 of the Penal Code in connection with section 5 of the Philippine bill enacted July 1,
1902.
Pacheco, in commenting upon article 413 of the penal code of Spain, which is the equivalent of
article 483 of the Code of the Philippines, in his work entitled "The Penal Code" (fifth edition, vol.
3, p. 258), says that this article is based upon "the hypothesis that the person detained has
completely disappeared." Then the author adds: "The law considers the person guilty of this
detention to be guilt by presumption of killing the person detained, unless he proves that he set
that person at liberty." Such is the essence of the crime punished under the provisions of article
483. It does not consist solely in the detention, but in the detention followed by the
disappearance of the person detained. It is indispensable to prove these two facts, for neither of
them alone are sufficient to authorize the application of the article. But, these facts having been
proven, upon that proof alone, and without the necessity of any further evidence, then as stated
by the author cited, we have the crime punished by the article in question, and as a
consequence a case calling for the application of the penalty prescribed by that article. This
being so, if for the purpose of convicting the accused the prosecution has only to prove the two
facts above mentioned, this is doubtless because these facts and these facts alone are sufficient
to constitute the crime under consideration.
Hence it is not true, as stated in the majority opinion, that one of the constituent and essential
elements of the crime is the fact that the accused has failed to give information as to the
whereabouts of the person detained, or failed to prove that he has set him at liberty. This fact,
that is to say, the fact of having given or failed to give information as to the whereabouts or
liberty of the person detained, is entirely foreign to the essence of the crime. Not only is it not a
necessary element for the existence of the crime, but is, on the contrary, a defense, or, as
Groizard says in his Commentaries to the Penal Code (vol. 5, p. 632), an exception which the
law grants the defendant as a means by which, if he avails himself of it and establishes it by
proof, he may avoid the penalty prescribed in that article. "In order that this exception be
available," says that author, "it must be shown by competent evidence that the act alleged in
defense was actually performed." It is unnecessary to add that a defense available to the
accused is not and can not be an integral element of the crime, its direct and immediate effect
being, as it is, to overcome the criminal action arising from the crime.
It having been demonstrated that the wording of article 483 of the Code, the effect that if the
person guilty of illegal detention "does not give information as to the whereabouts of the person
detained, or proof that he set him at liberty," had for their purpose the establishment of a defense
of which the accused may take the benefit, and that they do not constitute an essential element
of the crime in question, it is not possible in our opinion to interpret these words in the sense of
imposing upon the defendant an obligation of testifying as to those facts — an obligation which
did not exist under the old system of procedures, as we have demonstrated — because the use
of a defense allowed by the law would lose its character as such if its use were obligatory.
But it said that if the accused does not give information of the whereabouts of the person
detained, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, he becomes subject to the penalty of
paragraph 2 of article 483, which is much heavier than that prescribed by articles 481 and 482,
to which he would be subject in the contrary case. True. But what is intended to be inferred from
this? Is it contended that upon this supposition the accused is convicted by reason of the fact
that he does not give information as to the whereabouts of the person detained, or proof that he
set him at liberty? Is it meant that the prosecution has only to prove this fact in order to obtain a
conviction? Is it meant that the law punishes as a crime the silence of the accused, as the
majority opinion would lead us to infer? Far from it. Nothing could be further from the true
meaning of article 483 under consideration. What is therein punished is the disappearance of the
person detained. This it is which constitutes the crime defined in that article, and this it is which
must be proven by the prosecution. If the prosecution does not prove the detention of the
supposed victim, and does not moreover prove his disappearance, no matter how complete the
silence of the accused or how obstinate his refusal to give information as to the whereabouts or
liberty of the person detained, there can be no possibility of his conviction under the article in
question. This conclusively shows that the ground of the conviction would not be the silence of
the accused, but the proof offered by the prosecution upon the two facts above mentioned,
which are, as we have stated, essential elements of the crime we are now considering.
For this reason it was that in the case of the United States vs. Eulogio de Sosa, for illegal
detention, decided February 6, 1903, the court acquitted the defendant, declaring that there was
no ground upon which he could be convicted under the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483,
giving among others the reason that "there was not sufficient evidence that the whereabouts of
Nicasio Rafael are unknown," Rafael being the person detained. Mr. Justice Willard, who wrote
the opinion of the court, in that opinion said: "The mere fact that the accused has not given
information as to the whereabouts of the person sequestered is not sufficient to authorize a
conviction." He also expressly laid down the rule that in order to justify a conviction it is
necessary that it "appear to the satisfaction of the court that the person has disappeared." It is
not necessary to add, for it is self-evident, that this decision implies the proposition that
paragraph 2 of article 483 of the Penal Code has not been repealed by the Philippine bill of July
1, 1902. The sense of the decision is that if the disappearance of Nicasio Rafael had been
proven, it would have been proper to convict the accused in accordance with the provisions of
the article of the code under consideration.
It is clear that the accused can overcome the evidence of the prosecution in whole or in part,
either by proving that he had not committed the alleged detention, in which case his innocence
would be completely established, or else by limiting his proof to showing that it is not true that
the person detained has disappeared, as, for instance, proving the whereabouts of the latter, in
which case the gravity of the crime would naturally be reduced. Whatever the evidence may be,
total or partial, demonstrative of the complete innocence of the accused, or only of a lesser
degree of guilt, the law admits this defense either as a total defense or attenuate the penalty, as
the case may be. In the latter case, which is the one to which article 483 expressly refers, the
accused may prove the whereabouts of the person detained, or show that the placed him at
liberty. And because the law makes provisions for this case, which is certainly favorable to the
accused, who under such a hypothesis would be responsible solely for the fact of the detention
and not for the disappearance of the person detained, because the law expressly grants and
authorizes this exception or defense on behalf of the accused, we do not believe that the law
can be accused of injustice, or that it can not be considered as incompatible in the slightest
degree with section 5 of the Philippine bill cited in the decision.
It would be, on the contrary, highly unreasonable and unjust if such a means of defense were
denied to the accused — if solely upon proof by the prosecution of the disappearance of the
person detained, the accused should be held under all circumstances responsible for this crime,
even though he might show by competent evidence the whereabouts of the person or proof that
he had set him at liberty.
It is said that this exculpatory evidence required by article 483 would be accusatory for the
purpose of article 481, because the mere statement as to the whereabouts of the victim or proof
that the accused had set him at liberty implies the confession that the accused did kidnap that
person.
This argument would be weighty if the introduction of this testimony were not wholly voluntary or
optional on the part of the accused. The law gives him this means of defense. It is for him to
determine whether it is for his benefit to avail himself of it or not. In the course of the trial the
accused has an opportunity to inform himself of the evidence for the prosecution, and in view of
that evidence to adopt such a plan of defense as may best suit him. If the evidence of his guilt is
insufficient, if the prosecution does not prove the detention, and furthermore the disappearance
of the supposed victim, the accused even if guilty, may remain silent, and certainty will do so as
to the whereabouts or liberation of the person detained, and may do so with the complete
assurance that his silence will not in the slightest degree be prejudicial to him, and that he can
not by virtue of that silence be sentenced to any penalty whatever.
If on the contrary he sees that the evidence of the prosecution is conclusive, if he sees that it
clearly establishes his guilt, if he feels that it is absolutely convincing, if in fine he feels that he is
helpless to overcome that evidence completely, would he not instinctively realize, no matter how
obtuse he may be, that inasmuch as it is no longer possible for him to avoid conviction, it would
be better for him to elect to suffer the lesser penalty by giving information as to the whereabouts
of his victim? If he does so he does so freely and for his own convenience, and not because he
is presumed by the law without evidence to be guilty, for it has been demonstrated that then as
now the presumption of the innocence of the accused was a principle deeply rooted in the
former system of procedure. Upon this supposition, even if the accused does by implication
admit the fact of the illegal detention he would be benefited thereby, because he would thus
avoid the heavier penalty imposed for the disappearance of the person detained, and which we
assume has been established by the prosecution by sufficient evidence.
And what, we ask, but this very thing, occurs with respect to the allegation and proof of
mitigating circumstances? A defendant who alleges mitigating circumstances by implication
admits the commission of the crime with which he is charged, and seeks solely by means of that
allegation to obtain a reduction of the penalty. Can it be said on that account that the law which
establishes mitigating circumstances is unconstitutional and unjust? Can it be said with reason
that such a law compels the accused to incriminate himself because it puts before him the
alternative of suffering the entire penalty prescribed for the crime, or alleging some mitigating
circumstance, confessing the commission of the offense in order to obtain a reduction of the
penalty? We can not in truth see any difference whatever between the confession of guilt implied
by allegation of a mitigating circumstance and that involved in the fact of giving information of the
whereabouts of the person detained, in crimes if illegal detention.
Apart from this, it is not true that such a statement always implies the confession of illegal
detention. On the contrary, it would be in many cases a complete denial of it. In the present
case, for example, the accused, without testifying at all, might have proved that Felix Punsalan is
living at such and such a place in the Province of Bulacan, without this statement necessarily
carrying with it the conclusion that they admit even by implication that they had sequestered him,
for they might very well have knowledge of his present whereabouts without having been guilty
of sequestering or detaining him. And if the proof should be sufficient to show that Punsalan was
in that place during all the month of November, 1901, the date on which the crime in question is
alleged to have been committed, and that he remained there, entirely at liberty from that time
down to the present, this fact would show furthermore the falsity if the alleged illegal detention of
that individual.
The natural tendency of an accused person is to evade, if possible, the penalty. If the evidence
for the prosecution is such as to make it impossible to evade the penalty, then his tendency is to
elect to suffer the lightest penalty which the law authorizes. In case of paragraph 2 of article 483
of the Penal Code, the law does not condemn the accused because of his remaining silent
during the trial or because he fails to give information of the whereabouts of the person detained.
If the law convicts him it is upon the supposition that the prosecution has fully established the
fact of the illegal detention and the fact of the disappearance of the person detained. It does not
convict the accused without evidence or by reason of his silence. It convicts him when those two
facts which constitute the crime defined in that article have been proven.
But the law, while demanding that proof from the prosecution, at the same time takes into
consideration that it may be overcome by the accused, if not with respect to the fact of the
detention itself, which may be absolutely proven, at least with respect to the disappearance of
the victim, and therefore the law commands that the accused be heard and that the evidence
which he may offer on the point be considered, when he — admitting his guilt of illegal detention
in view of the evidence for the prosecution — voluntarily determines to give information as to the
whereabouts or liberation of the person detained. The law grants him this exception or defense,
but does not impose it upon him. It constitutes a right but not an obligation. For the reasons
stated we find no incompatibility between the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483 of the
Penal Code and section 5 of the Philippine bill of July 1, 1902. And taking into consideration the
legal doctrine that "posteriores leges ad priores pertinent, nisi contrario sint," we are of the
opinion that it has not repealed by implication — and it certainly has not done so expressly —
the provision in question of the Penal Code.
If this article had so been repealed and its principles could not therefore be applied to these
accused, neither could they be punished, strictly speaking, under article 482 of the code, cited in
the decision of the majority, because that article is based upon the fundamental supposition that
the person detained has recovered his liberty, which is not the fact in the case at bar.

ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article
IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in
an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug,
and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit
received an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to
him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group
of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located
at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer.
SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1
Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of
make-believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro,
SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1
Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at
about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11,
1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived.
Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to
Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that
Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy
the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100
grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of
money bills. Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was
consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and
Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were
recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon
conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior
Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the
specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30,
1996, pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega
Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag
appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of
these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz.
They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board
another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They
drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the
men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance
inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come
up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-
in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarragas
cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga
and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny
Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The
agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col.
Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro
and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as
Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which
prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and
brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and
Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw
the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime
charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender
the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE
PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND,
WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE
CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY
OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY
AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN
THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE
SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was
only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to
allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution
failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE
(1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED
WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as
amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers
that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner
insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under
entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the
Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell
the shabusubject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment;
hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that
the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to
make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very
acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with
judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under
fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such
minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is
the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The
reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of
a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine
the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral
wrong.[9] However, such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally
liable, the prosecution is burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the
minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the
nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his
disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted
with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the
prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny
Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could
afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga
called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft
paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who
handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir. A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.

Q And what happened next? Q And after that, what happened?

A After that I showed my money, Sir. A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]

Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. I
withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us
who asked you that question?
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir. A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the
shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container
was it contained?

Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the
money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and
white soft paper, Sir.[14]
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to
the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the
petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner
knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the
same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote
the testimony of the poseur-buyer:

A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir. ATTY. VERANO:

Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
A I dont know, Sir.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the
A Yes, Sir. boy?

Q Tell us. A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.

A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not
surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by
these police officers? FISCAL:

A Yes, Sir. It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.

Q Please tell us. ATTY. VERANO:

 May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young A From my cousin.
boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
COURT:
A No, Sir.
The witness may answer.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area
WITNESS: of SM Megamall, is that correct?

A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.[15] A Yes, Sir.

Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?
and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of
the public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioners answers thereto: A No, Sir.

FISCAL: Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not
made any call?
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
A No, Sir.
COURT:
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed
Please proceed. that there was already this group which met you?

FISCAL: A Yes, Sir.

Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person
did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon? who arrested you?

WITNESS: A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?

Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left A No, Sir.
Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 oclock?
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q What time did you leave?
FISCAL:
A After lunch, Sir.
No further question, Your Honor.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the
police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to ATTY. VERANO:
be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when
your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that No re-direct, Your Honor.
correct? COURT:
A Yes, Sir. Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an
examination?
anybody since the day that you were arrested?

A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone. WITNESS:

Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that A Yes, Your Honor.
[L]ancer car? Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A No, Sir. A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted COURT:
by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and
when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. The witness is discharged.[16]
At whose waist?
 The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired
with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the
petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement
between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v.
Estepano,[17] we held that:

Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any
way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident
that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he
was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution
failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.[19]

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article
IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in
an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug,
and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit
received an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to
him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group
of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located
at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer.
SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1
Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of
make-believe money bills supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro,
SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1
Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at
about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11,
1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived.
Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to
Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that
Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy
the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100
grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of
money bills. Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was
consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and
Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were
recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon
conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior
Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the
specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30,
1996, pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega
Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag
appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of
these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz.
They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board
another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They
drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the
men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance
inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come
up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-
in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarragas
cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga
and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny
Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The
agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col.
Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro
and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as
Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which
prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and
brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and
Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw
the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime
charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender
the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE
PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND,
WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE
CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY
OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY
AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN
THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE
SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was
only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to
allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution
failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE
(1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED
WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as
amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers
that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner
insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under
entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the
Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell
the shabusubject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment;
hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that
the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to
make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very
acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with
judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under
fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such
minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is
the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The
reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of
a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine
the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral
wrong.[9] However, such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally
liable, the prosecution is burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the
minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the
nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his
disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted
with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the
prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny
Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could
afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga
called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft
paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who
handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir. A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.

Q And what happened next? Q And after that, what happened?

A After that I showed my money, Sir. A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]

Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. I
withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us
who asked you that question?
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir. A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the
shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container
was it contained?

Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the
money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and
white soft paper, Sir.[14]
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to
the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the
petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner
knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the
same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote
the testimony of the poseur-buyer:

A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir. ATTY. VERANO:

Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
A I dont know, Sir.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the
A Yes, Sir. boy?

Q Tell us. A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.

A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not
surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by
these police officers? FISCAL:

A Yes, Sir. It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.

Q Please tell us. ATTY. VERANO:

 May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young A From my cousin.
boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
COURT:
A No, Sir.
The witness may answer.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area
WITNESS: of SM Megamall, is that correct?

A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.[15] A Yes, Sir.

Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?
and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of
the public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioners answers thereto: A No, Sir.

FISCAL: Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not
made any call?
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
A No, Sir.
COURT:
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed
Please proceed. that there was already this group which met you?

FISCAL: A Yes, Sir.

Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person
did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon? who arrested you?

WITNESS: A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?

Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left A No, Sir.
Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 oclock?
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q What time did you leave?
FISCAL:
A After lunch, Sir.
No further question, Your Honor.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the
police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to ATTY. VERANO:
be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when
your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that No re-direct, Your Honor.
correct? COURT:
A Yes, Sir. Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an
examination?
anybody since the day that you were arrested?

A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone. WITNESS:

Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that A Yes, Your Honor.
[L]ancer car? Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A No, Sir. A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted COURT:
by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and
when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. The witness is discharged.[16]
At whose waist?
 The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired
with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the
petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement
between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v.
Estepano,[17] we held that:

Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any
way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident
that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he
was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution
failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.[19]

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939 Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the
crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the
vs.
time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this court
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant. observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee. case.

DIAZ, J.: The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the
appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine
discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First
his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must
Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act
on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time
held that the accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised
to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an
Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
having dismissal the case. discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be
old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
in the appealed order as follows: afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act,
but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein
accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos
chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said
accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which
the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately
to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The
accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who
was taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to
attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of
his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang,
who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give
the accused his knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused,
however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his
cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached Juan
Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the
deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was
bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused,
continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the
ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried.

The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty
to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before
us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183566 execution which [would] have produced the crime of Homicide as a
Plaintiff-Appellee, consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or
Present: causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able
- versus - medical assistance rendered to the said Adrian Quinto which prevented his
CARPIO MORALES,* J., death.
Acting Chairperson,
BONIFACIO BADRIAGO,** TINGA, CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-Appellant. VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*** and Criminal Case No. 4276
BRION, JJ.
That on or about the 13th day of September, 2002, in the Municipality of
Promulgated: Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
May 8, 2009 Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one OLIVER QUINTO with the use
of a long sharp bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for
DECISION the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit:

VELASCO, JR., J.:
On automatic review is the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00129, which found accused-appellant Bonifacio Badriago guilty of Frustrated
Homicide in Criminal Case No. 4255 and Murder in Criminal Case No. 4276.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) under the following
Informations:
Criminal Case No. 4255
That on or about the 13th day of September 2002 in the Municipality of
Carigara, [P]rovince of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hack one ADRIAN QUINTO, with the use of a long sharp bolo
(sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby
inflicting upon the latter the following wounds, to wit:
SURGERY NOTES:
(+) hacked wounds transverse approximately 16 cms.
Linear (L) lumbar area level of L-L5
(+) hacked wound (L) forearm.
ORTHO NOTES:
A) Near amputation M/3rd (L) forearm 2˚ to hack wound.
DIAGNOSIS:
Hack wound 15 cms. oblique level of L2 posterior
lumbar area, transecting underlying muscle.
Fracture both radius and ulna.
OPERATION: September 14, 2002.
Wound Debridement and Repair
ORIF (Pinning)
Which wounds required a period of from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days
to heal and incapacitated said offended party from performing his habitual
work for the same period of time; thus the accused performed all the acts of
1. [Stab] wound 4 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 16 cm. (L) ant. chest at the level of
5th ICS along the (L) ICL;
2. [Stab] wound 6.5 x 3 cm. x 22 cm. (L) ant. chest at the level of 6 th ICS
along (L) anterior AAL;
3. [Stab] wound 3.5 cm. x 1.5 x 2 cm., (L) arm proximal 3rd lateral aspect;
4. Amputating wound (L) 3rd, 4th and 5th finger;
5. [Stab] wound 5 cm. x 3.5 cm. x 6 cm. umbilical area with intestinal and
omental prolapsed;
6. Hacking wound 9 cm. x 2 cm. (L) occipital area with skull fracture;
7. [Stab] wound 3 cm. x 1 cm. x 15 cm. (L) posterior back at the level of
T 12, 3 cm. away from vertebral line;
8. [Stab] wound 2 cm. x 1 cm. x 9 cm. (L) posterior back 8 cm. away from
vertebral line;
9. Hacking wound 11 cm. x 2 cm. x 9 cm. (L) posterior iliac with fracture
of hip bone;
10. [Stab] wound 3 cm. x 2 cm. x 3 cm. (L) buttocks;
11. [Stab] wound 5.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 2.5 cm. lumbar area along the
vertebral line.
which wounds caused the death of said Oliver Quinto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The parties later
agreed to try the case jointly. During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr.
Ma. Bella Profetana, Adrian Quinto, Dr. Frederic Joseph Asanza, and Victoriano Quinto. The
defense witnesses consisted of accused-appellant and Rodolfo Gabon.
The prosecutions presentation of evidence is summarized as follows: Adrian testified
that on the morning of September 13, 2002, he was asked by his mother to bring a letter to one
Berting Bello at Barangay Guindapunan, Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the letter along with
his younger brother, Oliver. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where
their mother was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination, however, they were
approached by accused-appellant at Sitio Mombon in Carigara. Accused-appellant then
suddenly hacked him with a sundang or long bolo on his lumbar area.[2] Accused-appellant
aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow shield himself. His lower left arm suffered
a hack wound as a result. Struck with panic, he jumped off the tricycle but could not run
away. He was able to push Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. He
could no longer testify on what happened thereafter as he lost consciousness and only woke up
while confined at Carigara District Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was also
attacked and did not survive.
Dr. Asanzas testimony showed that Adrian suffered from two wounds that could have
been fatal: the hack wound on the lumbar area and on his left arm. He explained
that Adrian could have died had he not been brought to the hospital. When cross-examined, he
stated that there was a possibility that Adrian could still crawl or walk despite the infliction of the
wound on the lumbar area. He also testified that it was possible that Adrian was first hit on the
forearm as he was facing accused-appellant and that he could have been hit on the lumbar area
while he was running.[3]
Dr. Profetana told the court that her post-mortem examination of Oliver showed that
eight of the 11 wounds inflicted on him were fatal. She identified hypovolemic shock as Olivers
cause of death. Furthermore, she stated that it was impossible for the victim to have survived the
wounds as these severed the blood vessels and caused hemorrhage. [4]
Victoriano, father of the victims, testified that his family incurred PhP 20,000 in
expenses for the stainless bar placed on Adrians injured arm. According to his estimate, they
spent about PhP 50,000 for Adrians two-month hospitalization but they were not able to keep the
receipts. For the death of his other son, Oliver, they spent PhP 9,000 for the coffin and about
PhP 10,000 for the wake. He likewise testified that if his familys losses could be quantified they
would claim the amount of PhP 100,000.[5]
In his defense, accused-appellant stated under oath that on the morning of September
13, 2002, he was on his pedicab looking for passengers. While he was on his way to the bus
terminal in Carigara, Leyte, he was accosted by Adrian and Oliver, who carried stones with
them. Adrian called out to him, Now Boning, let us fight. He tried to speed away but the two
chased him, with Adrian driving his pedicab and Oliver standing on the cargo compartment.
They bumped accused-appellants pedicab, causing him to swerve to the middle of the
road.[6] When accused-appellant looked back, Adrian got out of his pedicab and approached him
with a knife about 10 inches long. Seeing Adrian was about to stab him, he grabbed a bolo from
his pedicabs passenger seat and used it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand. Adrians knife
fell and when he bent to pick it up, accused-appellant again hacked at him with his
bolo. Adrian then managed to run away from accused-appellant and head
towards Barangay Guindapunan. Accused-appellant, meanwhile, ran towards the municipal
building to inform the police that he had injured someone. He denied killing Oliver as while he
was fighting with Adrian he did not even see Oliver.[7]
When cross-examined accused-appellant admitted that he did not suffer any injury
following the confrontation with Adrian. He claimed not to know what happened to Oliver.
The other defense witness, Rodolfo, testified that he knew accused-appellant as a
pedicab driver. On the day of the incident he saw two pedicabs engaged in a chase. He noticed
that accused-appellant was in one pedicab and he was being chased by the pedicab driven
by Adrian. The bumper of accused-appellants pedicab was bumped by Adrians pedicab. From a
distance of about four arms length, he saw the two go down from their respective
pedicabs. Adrian said lets have a fight while drawing a short bolo from his waist. Adrian tried to
stab accused-appellant but was unable to hit him. He then saw accused-appellant draw his
own bolo from his waist and hit the left arm of Adrian. Adrians bolo fell to the ground and when
he was about to pick it up he was again hit by accused-appellant.
On cross-examination, Rodolfo stated that he had not seen if Adrian had a passenger
on board his pedicab, and that the incident occurred along a national road with many houses
and shrubbery.[8]
On July 29, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment. Accused-appellant was found guilty
of the crimes charged. The fallo of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, the Court [finds] accused BONIFACIO
BARDIAGO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER instead of Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case
No. 4255, and [sentences him] to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Mayor as Minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and one (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum, and to pay
Adrian Quinto actual damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos and exemplary damages in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.
Likewise, pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended and further amended by R.A. No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)
the Court found accused BONIFACIO BARDIAGO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER charged under the information in
Criminal Case No. 4276, and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH, and pay the heirs of Oliver Quinto civil indemnity in the amount of
Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos; and [to] pay the
cost.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On September 14, 2004, the records of the case were transferred to this Court on
automatic review as the death penalty was involved. But conformably with People v.
Mateo,[10] the case was transferred to the CA via a Resolution dated February 15, 2005.
Accused-appellant, in his Brief filed before the CA, claimed that the trial court erred in
convicting him of frustrated murder as what was read to him at his arraignment was a charge for
frustrated homicide, and the trial court likewise erred in convicting him of frustrated murder and
murder as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also challenged the conviction
on the ground that the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense,
and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong were not appreciated by the trial court.
The CA sustained accused-appellants first contention. It ruled that his conviction for frustrated
murder was a gross violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the
cause of accusation against him. Accused-appellants other arguments, however, were not given
merit. The CA noted the undisputed fact that it was accused-appellant, claiming self-defense,
who inflicted the wounds sustained by Adrian and Oliver. The circumstantial evidence presented
showed accused-appellants culpability. Moreover, according to the CA, his choice of weapon
and the areas he hacked on the victims bodies revealed a clear intention to kill. The CA said he
was able to injure the brothers with no injury caused to himself.
Lastly, the appellate court rejected the mitigating circumstances proffered by accused-appellant.
It ruled that there was no voluntary surrender as accused-appellant himself testified that he had
merely reported the injury and did not surrender. As to the self-defense theory, the CA stated
that accused-appellant failed to establish the victims unlawful aggression, a requisite in such a
mitigating circumstance.
In view of Republic Act No. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death,[11] the
CA reduced accused-appellants penalty to reclusion perpetua with respect to the murder charge
in Criminal Case No. 4276.
 The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing taken into account, the instant appeal
is partially granted.
Accordingly, in Criminal Cases No. 4255 accused-appellant is found guilty
only of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is hereby penalized to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor as maximum
and to pay Adrian Quinto the sum of twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) by way of temperate damages.
In criminal case no. 4276 accused-appellant is found guilty of MURDER and
is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity; twenty five thousand
pesos (P25,000.00) by way of temperate damages, fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
On September 1, 2008, this Court notified the parties that they may file supplemental briefs if
they so desired. The parties manifested that they were dispensing with such filing. Accused-
appellant, thus, re-pleads his arguments first made before the CA. His appeal being partially
granted, the only remaining issues to be resolved are the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AND
MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, AND LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT
SO GRAVE A WRONG
Our Ruling
We affirm accused-appellants conviction.
Frustrated Homicide
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without
any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
(4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide.[13] Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
without medical intervention or attendance.[14]
On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) The
offender performs all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony
as a consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.[15]
From the evidence presented to the trial court, it is very much clear that accused-
appellant was able to perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Adrians death. His
intention to kill can be presumed from the lethal hacking blows Adrian received. His attack
on Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His claim of self-defense was not given credence by both
the trial and appellate courts. Neither are there any of the qualifying circumstances of murder,
parricide, and infanticide. The circumstances, thus, make out a case for frustrated homicide as
accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill Adrian; Adrian only survived due to
timely medical intervention as testified to by his examining physician.
Murder Qualified by Treachery
It is also argued by the defense that the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Accused-appellant reasons that Adrianwas still able to
put up a defense by parrying the blow made by accused-appellant and was even able to jump off
from the pedicab he was driving. He, thus, maintains that the trial court erroneously
characterized the incident as a sudden attack.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.[16] There is treachery even if the attack is
frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend
themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.[17] The records show
that Adrian was suddenly attacked with a bolo, and the most he could do at that moment was to
shield himself somehow from the blow with his arm. Another blow to Adrians back showed the
vulnerability of his position as he had his back turned to accused-appellant and was not able to
flee from attack. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victims were warned of the
danger to their lives where they were defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction
of the coup de grace.[18]
Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
Accused-appellant speculates that if the incident happened in broad daylight and near
a bus terminal, there should have been independent eyewitnesses identifying accused-appellant
as Olivers killer. Much is made of the fact that not even Adrian was able to identify accused-
appellant as Olivers assailant.
The failure by the prosecution to present the weapon allegedly used in the attack is, in
accused-appellants mind, yet another obstacle to the States obligation to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
We hold that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-
appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be competent to establish guilt as long as it is sufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else, was
responsible for the killing.[19] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as there
is (1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
 We go back to accused-appellants own admission that he indeed injured Adrian,
causing him near-fatal injuries. From this admission the rest of the evidence, albeit
circumstantial, made out a clear case for Olivers murder. First, the victims were together in
Adrians pedicab when the attack took place; second, accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a
bolo; third, Adrians injuries were caused by a bolo; fourth, Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety
before he lost unconsciousness; fifth, Olivers wounds were found to have been caused by a
weapon that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-appellant when he
assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day Adrian sustained stab wounds.
Although there is no direct evidence of Olivers actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence
presented sufficiently established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks
on the brothers.
Accused-appellant, thus, cannot argue that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict
him. Furthermore, we have long ago held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not even
essential for a conviction.[21]
Voluntary Surrender
For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be
spontaneous and in a manner that shows that the accused made an unconditional surrender to
the authorities, either based on recognition of guilt or from the desire to save the authorities from
the trouble and expenses that would be involved in the accuseds search and
capture.[22] Moreover, it is imperative that the accused was not actually arrested, the surrender is
before a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority, and the surrender was
voluntary.[23]
None of these requisites are present in accused-appellants case. In fact, jurisprudence holds
that merely reporting the incident cannot be considered voluntary surrender within contemplation
of the law.[24] By accused-appellants own admission, he only went to the authorities to inform
them that Adrian was injured. What is more, accused-appellant claims he had nothing to do with
the murder of Oliver. Even if we were to consider voluntary surrender as mitigating, this would
only apply to the injury inflicted on Adrian. Accused-appellant denies culpability in Olivers death
and this negates any acknowledgement of guilt.
Incomplete Self-Defense
We likewise find implausible accused-appellants assertion that he employed self-
defense. The records show that the requisites of a successful claim of self-defense were not
met. As found in the Revised Penal Code, these are:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Any one who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
In incomplete self-defense, the indispensable requisite is unlawful aggression.[25] What is missing
is either reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it or lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the persons defending themselves. In the instant case, accused-
appellants self-serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any
injuries from his supposed attacker, Adrian, fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression, the
crucial requisite to his defense. As the appellate court noted, there was no clear, credible, and
convincing evidence that Adrian was the one who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant
was merely fending off an attack. Unlawful aggression by the victim must be clearly shown. [26]
Lack of Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong
Under Article 13(3) of the Code, the circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed mitigates criminal liability. This mitigating circumstance
addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender
executes or commits the criminal act.[27] Looking at the victims wounds, however, we cannot
count the circumstance in accused-appellants favor. Adrian suffered a hacking wound on his left
forearm that caused near amputation, and another one on his lumbar area. These wounds would
have been fatal were it not for timely medical assistance. Oliver, on the other hand, bore the
brunt of the attack with eleven (11) different stab wounds, including one on the skull and on the
chest. The number, location, and nature of these stab wounds belie accused-appellants claim of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against his victim.[28]
Conclusion
We agree with the findings by the trial and appellate courts on the particulars of the
case. Findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive absent
any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case.[29] Since the aforementioned exceptions are not present, accused-
appellants conviction is warranted.
Finally, we affirm the sentence imposed on accused-appellant in both criminal cases.
In accordance with jurisprudence,[30] we, however, additionally award moral damages of PhP
50,000 to Adrian. His physical, psychological, and moral sufferings from the wounds inflicted on
him serve as the basis for the award and this does not require proof or pleading as ground for
this award.[31]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00129 which found accused-appellant guilty of Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case No. 4255
and Murder in Criminal Case No. 4276 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
likewise ordered to pay Adrian the amount of PhP 50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33607 December 14, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MADLANGBAYAN Y BONET, defendant-appellant.
Reynaldo Banta for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo C. Abaya and
Solicitor Salvador C. Jacob for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Madlangbayan y Bonet was accused of the crime of robbery with homicide, committed
according to the information as follows:
That on or about December 27, 1970 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others
whose true names, Identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain, and by means of violence, take away from the pocket of
Enrique Fallarme one black leather wallet containing cash in different
denominations amounting to P300.00 and one Seiko wrist watch valued at
P300.00, or a total value of P600.00, Philippine currency, to the damage
and prejudice of said Enrique Fallarme owner thereof, in the said sum of
P600.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said articles and money the
herein accused, in pursuance with his conspiracy with the other still
unknown, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the said Enrique Fallarme by then
and there stabbing him several times with bladed weapons on different parts
of body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
After trial, he was sentenced thus:
WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of robbery with homicide and there being proved the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength without any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the Court sentences him to
DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P12,000.00 for
the death of the latter, the sum of Pl0,000.00 by way of moral damages, the
sum of P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; to return to the heirs of
the victim the articles and cash taken from the latter or to indemnify them
the sum of P600.00 representing the total value thereof if he fails to do so;
and to pay the costs.
In the afternoon of December 27, 1970, Enrique Fallarme and his son, Elywelyn Fallarme went
to their grocery store at Quiapo Central Market, where Elywelyn took P300.00 in various
denominations and handed the money to his father who placed it in his leather wallet.
Thereafter, Elywelyn brought his father to Canonigo St. in Paco, where a road construction was
being undertaken.
Enrique Fallarme, as a supervising engineer in the City Engineer's Office of Manila, supervised
the road construction. Between 7:00 and 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Enrique Fallarme was
stabbed to death by unknown assailants at the corner of San Gregorio and Canonigo streets.
Abelardo V, Lucero, Medical Examiner of the Manila Police Department, who autopsied the body
of Enrique Fallarme testified that there were five stab wounds on his chest, stomach and at the
back. Death was attributed to shock and hemorrhage due to the multiple stab wounds.
Elywelyn Fallarme, who repaired to the scene, found his father sprawled on the ground, dead.
He discovered that his father's wallet containing the P300.00 as well as his Seiko wrist watch
worth P300.00 were missing.
During the wake at Lourdes Church in La Loma, Quezon City, the following evening, Patrolmen
Rafael Carag and Asterio Santos of the Manila Police Department brought the accused Antonio
Madlangbayan to view the cadaver of Enrique Fallarme. The accused Identified the remains as
the person he had stabbed on December 27, 1970.
It appears that Antonio Madlangbayan was arrested by the police at his house in Kahilom,
Pandacan, by Patrolmen Eduardo Cuevas and Reynaldo Pimentel both of the MPD on
information furnished by a police informer. Upon investigation, he disclosed his participation in
the hold-up stabbing of the deceased, together with a certain "Boy Marino," "Imping" and "Rody."
In answer to a question, he stated that he could recognize and Identify the man they stabbed at
the corner of San Gregorio and Canonigo streets. It was for this reason that the police officers
brought Antonio to view the deceased.
Thereafter, Patrolman Rafael Carag embodied Antonio's statement in writing in the usual
question and answer form, in Tagalog, at the end of which the accused affixed his thumbmark
for he did not know how to read and write. The statement (Exhibit E) was then sworn to before
Manila inquest Fiscal Mariano Chavez on December 29, 1970, at 12:50 in the morning. It stated
in substance that: Late in the afternoon of December 27, 1970, the accused Antonio
Madlangbayan was with a certain "Boy Marino," "Imping" and " Rody. " The four converged near
the Public Highway Barracks near the Manila Railroad Station in Paco, intending to have a
drinking spree. They walked along Canonigo St. towards Manuel Roxas High School. They
stopped at Golden Taxi Restaurant and Antonio Madlangbayan gave "Boy Marino" twenty
centavos to buy "Champion" cigarettes. In front of Manuel Roxas High School, they saw Enrique
Fallarme standing near a pine tree. That was past 7:00 o'clock in the evening. What happened
next is narrated by the accused in Exhibit E as follows:
Nilapitan naming apat at pinaligiran namin. Tinutukan ko ang MAMA ng
kutchiliong stainless na pangkusina, sa kaliwang tagiliran, si BOY MARINO
ay tinutukan ang MAMA ng patalim na double blade sa parteng leeg sa
kanan. Ang si "IMPING" at si "RODY" ay nasa likuran. Ang sabi ng MAMA
ay ganito "ANO ANG KASALANAN KO." Ang sabi ni BOY MARINO ay
ganito "WALA, ITAAS MO ANG KAMAY MO," sabay kapkap sa likurang
bulsa ng MAMA at ang ipinangkapkap ay kaliwa niyang kamay. Nakuha ni
BOY MARINO and perang papel at pitaka. Yong Mama na nakataas ang
kamay ay biglang ibinaba and kanyang mga kamay. Akala ko ay manglaban
kaya ko naman siyang sinaksak at naramdaman ko na tinamaan ko sa
parteng tagiliran niya. Sinundan ko pa siya ng saksak sa likod at inabot ko
kay "IMPING" ang aking kutchilio at kinuha naman niya at tumakbo na ako,
na patungong HIWAY.
On December 31, 1970, the crime was re-enacted by the accused and pictures were taken, On the presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess
namely Exhibits G, G-1 to G-9. The extrajudicial confession served as the principal evidence himself to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience, (U.S. vs. de
linking the accused to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide, for which he was los Santos, 24 Phil. 329), said extrajudicial confession when considered together with evidence
convicted and sentenced as above stated. of the perpetration of the crime, is worthy of belief as proof of commission by the confessant of
the crime to which the confession refers.
The accused who admitted to being a member of the Bahala Na Gang, now maintains that his
extrajudicial confession was coerced from him. He claims that when he refused to affix his Meanwhile, the trial court comitted no error in rejecting the defense that the accused was at the
thumbmark to Exhibit E, he was boxed by Patrolman Cuevas and his companions. But it is to be residence of his uncle Atty. Juan Blancaflor in Kahilom, Pandacan, between 7:00 and 9:00
noted that while Patrolmen Cuevas and Pimentel were the ones who arrested the accused in o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1970, which was the latter's birthday. Considering that
Kahilom Pandacan, at which time the accused gave his name as Rudy only to admit later that he the residence of Atty. Blancaflor was barely 500 to 600 meters away from the scene of the
was Tony because Cuevas noticed a tattoo on his arm reading "Tony," it was Patrolman Carag crime, it was not impossible for the accused to have gone there between the hours mentioned.
who took and witnessed his extrajudicial confession together with Patrolman Asterio Santos. Moreover, as there were some guests at the residence of Atty. Blancaflor, the possibility that he
could not have noted the exact time the accused arrived at his house cannot be discounted.
A confession has a high evidentiary value. For according to the Rules of Court: "The declaration
of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in Hence, our painful task of sustaining the conviction of the accused.
evidence against him." (Sec. 29, Rule 130). And a confession is presumed to be voluntary until
the contrary is shown.
Finally, it is manifest that the accused together with his co-assailants who unfortunately have not
been apprehended, took advantage of their superior strength, when the four of them, two of
The presumption has not been overcome in this case where, except for appellant's testimony whom were armed with bladed weapons surrounded and stabbed the unarmed, helpless and
repudiating his confession, no other evidence was adduced to show that the statements in the unsuspecting victim. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was correctly
confession were obtained through force or intimidation. On the contrary, appellant's claim is appreciated by the trial court.
belied by the abundance of evidence showing that his confession was voluntarily given. First, the
confession is replete with details which the accused alone could have known and which could
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery the
not have been concocted by the police. The movements of the accused prior to the commission
homicide, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed in its entirety.
of the crime which are narrated above are from his confession, Second, Fiscal Mariano Chavez
who administered the oath in the confession of the appellant testified that he first asked him
whether he gave his statement and affixed his thumbmark thereon voluntarily and the appellant SO ORDERED.
answered in the affirmative. Fiscal Chavez further testified that the accused did not complaint to
him of any maltreatment nor was the accused maltreated by the police in his presence. Third,
the accused re-enacted the commission of the crime where he reiterated the statements he had
made in his confession. The re-enactment, according to Patrolman Carag, was voluntary and
this must be so because it was made in a public place thus negating ally suggestion of violence
employed on the accused. And fourth, the accused did not present any medical certificate to
show that he suffered injury at the hands of the police.

The more crucial question is whether the extrajudicial confession is sufficient to sustain the
conviction. The Rules of Court provide that "An extrajudicial confession made by an accused
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."
(sec 3, Rule 133)

Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been
committed.

The evidence of corpus delicti must be independent of the extrajudicial confession. However, it
does not mean that every element of the crime must be made out apart from the confession, but
merely that there should be some evidence apart fromthe confession tending to show that the
crime has been committed. (See People vs. Batangan, 54 Phil. 834)

In this case, from the evidence of the prosecution, apart from the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant, the fact of the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide, is well and
sufficiently established. Said fact, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged has been
proved by the uncontradicted testimonies of Elywelyn Fallarme and the police officers assigned
to this case, as well as by the testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero, the police medical examiner, as
to the death of Enrique Fallarme, together with the documentary evidence of the necropsy report
stating the post- mortem findings, including the cause of death.