A.

Definition, Scope and Characteristics

Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was passed as an exercise
of police power. The said law’s main provisions are the following:

1. a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;

2. an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term in case of juridical persons;

3. an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;

4. a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of
the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating
to trade, commerce and industry;

5. a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business;

6. a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and

7. a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, an alien, and in behalf of all other alien residents in the Philippines who areengaged in
retail business, questioned the said law for many reasons:

1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law;

2. the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
 3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;

4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue:

1. Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws?

2. Does the law violate the due process of laws?

Held:

1. No. An alien’s stay is for his personal convenience. He/she, in fact, owes allegiance to his birth
country. An alien lacks sympathy, loyalty, and enthusiasm for Filipino customers and indeed, an
alien’s temporary stay in the Philippines is for him to exploit Filipinos and then go back to his/her
original country. The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which
fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the Republic Act No. 1180. These differences are
certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade.

The Supreme Court finds that it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the law is a valid exercise of police
power since the legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of
Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers.

GENERAL RULE: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for
similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.
2. No. The state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. If the laws passed are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied. Petitioner's main argument that retail is
a common, ordinary occupation, and should not prohibited because we are free men is a wrong
assumption.

The legislature and the Supreme Court had found that the privilege has been so grossly abused by
the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices. The law is reasonable and even
necessary to free the national economy from alien dominance. The legislature has the discretion to
determine the necessity of an enactment.

CONCLUSION QUOTE

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. The
law does not violate the due process of law clause because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any
case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of
the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. The framers of the Constitution could not
have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a
noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the of the
police power.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS:

Petitioner the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. - There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
ISSUE:

WON the imposition of tax is harsh and oppressive, and whether the state has the power to impose
such?

RULING:

Petitioner submits that the 30% tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint
of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because
it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is
one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that
it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which
exercises it.

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by
the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry. It was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

"It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that ‘inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation." Taxation has been made the
implement of the state's police power.

1. Nature, scope and characteristics of Police Power as a fundamental and inherent power of the state.
 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such
as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
 "It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that ‘inequities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation

GASTON V. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK

“The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power of the State.”

Petitioners: sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers, who have come to this Court in their
individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and millers.
Respondents:

Republic Planters Bank- is a commercial banking corporation. Philippine Sugar Commission

(PHILSUCOM, for short)- formerly the government office tasked with the function of regulating
and supervising the sugar industry. Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA)- superseded PhilSuCom
under EO No. 18 (abolished PhilSuCOm but its existence was allowed to continue for 3 more years
to prosecute and defend suits)

Facts:

Petitioners, in their individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and
millers pray for a writ of mandamus to implement and accomplish the privatization of republic
planters bank by the transfer and distribution of the shares of stock in the said bank, now held by
and still carried in the name of the philippine sugar commission, to the sugar producers, planters and
millers, who are the true beneficial owners of the 761,416 common and preferred shares with a total
investment of p290m, with a deduction of p1 per picul from sugar proceeds pursuant to P.D. No.
388, which created the PHILSUCOM arguing that it provided for the collection of a Stabilization
Fund. SEC. 7. Capitalization, Special Fund of the Commission, Development and Stabilization

Fund.— There is hereby established a fund for the commission for the purpose of financing the
growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic
market including the foreign market to be administered in trust by the Commission… Respondents
(PHILSUCOM & SRA) arguments:

1. no trust results from Section 7 of P.D. No. 388;

2. that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds under the Government
Auditing Code;

3. that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be

irregular, if not illegal; and that this suit is barred by laches.

ISSUES:

(1) whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and millers pursuant to

Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public funds;

Held:

Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 does provide that the stabilization fees collected "shall be
administered in trust by the Commission “However, while the element of an intent to create a

trust is present, a resulting trust in favor of the sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be

said to have ensued because the presumptive intention of the parties is not reasonably

ascertainable from the language of the statute itself.

No implied trust in favor of the sugar producers either can be deduced from the imposition of the

levy. It is not clearly shown from the statute itself that the PHILSUCOM imposed on itself the

obligation of holding the stabilization fund for the benefit of the sugar producers. It must be

categorically demonstrated that the very administrative agency which is the source of such

regulation would place a burden on itself.

The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the

State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148).

They constitute sugar liens (Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The tax collected is not in a pure exercise

of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization

of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.

The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State for a special purpose — that off “financing
the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components,

stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market." The fact that the State has

taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even

though they are held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special purpose, the

revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute”
administered in trust” for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or

abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

That is the essence of the trust intended (See 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted
from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23[1]). 2

That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the funds were

channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a

trust fund for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is

but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who are to be benefited

from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. To rule in petitioners' favor would
contravene

the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private

purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized

for the benefit of the entire sugar industry “and all its components, stabilization of the domestic

market including the foreign market” the industry being of vital importance to the country's

economy and to national interest.

Osmena v Orbos, GR no. 99886

Principle: The power of taxation can be used to implement police power.

Law created here are exercised as TAX, but considered as an exercise of police power.

This case answers the first question sa syllabus.

—————————-

FACTS :

President Marcos issued pd 1956 on October 10, 1984. Creating a special account in

the general fund, designated as the OPSF. (oil price stabilisation fund)

The purpose of this law is to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and

imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in

the world market prices of crude oil.

President Cozaon Aquino then amended PD 1956.

She promulgated EO 137 on FEB 27 1987 to expand the grounds for reimbursements to oil

companies.

*in 1991, the OPSF incurred a deficit 12 billion to which the ERB tried to resolve by issuing an

order to increase pump prices of petroleum and such shall have covered the OPSF deficit

within 6 months.

OSMENA then reacted to this, saying that OPSF is a special fund, and not a trust fund.

He avers that, the creation of TRUST fund violates article 6 of the consti, saying that all money

collected on any tax levied for a special purpose should be declared as a special fund. Kay

kanang trust fund, mura raman nag, ang kwarta sa usa ka entity gi gunitan og lain nga party.

And if special fund sya, meaning if ang purpose na human na gani og bayad, kay ang extra ma

transfer na sa Government as general funds, dli kay ibalhin sya for another objective sa

government.

Special funds are collected thru the taxing powers of the state, meaning ang amount kay sa

state jud na siya dapat, and limited sa iyahang special objective.

Nya diba, ang ERB ni issue man og ORDER, ni ana ang petitioner nga ni violate daw na siya sa

delegation of powers kay kinsa mana ang ERB, na wala man na nila ma tarong ang law, kay it

was not able to put the SPECIFIC limit on how much to tax.

ISSUE :

Is the power granted to ERB under PD 1956, taxation or police power?

Ruling :

The OSPF was established to protect local consumers from the adverse consequences that

frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the economy. Remember mga beshie nga, if mo

talk about police power gani ta, ang purpose jud ana is “for the general welfare” and for tax is

maintenance and for the improvement sa country. Here kay merely incidental rajud na ang pag
collect sa tax kay ang purpose jud ani is for regulation man.

“the establishment and maintenance of the OPSF is well within that power and responsibility of

the government to secure the physical and economic survival - and kani sya kay police power

jud ni”.

Meaning ang mga fund nga na collect gamit sa ana nga law, kay police power jud ang gi gamit

and ang OPSF kay special fund. This means that, ang kani nga funds kay subject gihapon na

siya sa CoA.

So overview ani guys kay, ang RULING jud gi grant ra ang pag Nullify sa reimbursement of

financing charges, pero ang uban kay Dismissed na.

Summary : and to answer the question

“to define and identify the nature, scope and characteristics of POLICE power, as fundamental

inherent power of the state.

The nature of police power jud is, so big and siya ang pinaka grabe sa tanan. It regulates

everything, even ang way mo dress, ang way mo sturya, mo move sa public and much more

the goal Is for the GENERAL WELFARE. meaning, bsag ang naa sa case kay ni involve jud siya

og taxation, where gi increase ang value sa petroleum diba? PERO dli mana siya mainly mao

ang target nila, but ni impose ra sila og increase kay para ma protect ang consumers ?

CONSUMERS = mga tao raba na, so meaning ang main goal jud ani nga case is for the general

welfare, but ang IMPOSITION SA TAX, incidental rana. GETS?

Police Power: definition, scope and characteristics

[Summary]

Insofar as definition, scope, and characteristics of Police Power is concerned; like Taxation, the
power of Eminent Domain could also be used by the authorities as an implement TO ATTAIN A

POLICE OBJECTIVE. If such express objective of the law was to promote, say, the farmers’
welfare, regulation still comes clearly under the Police Power of the State. In this case, although it
can be said

that it is the Police Power, it is already recognized as an exercise of the power of Eminent Domain

because there is TAKING [note this element] of property for public use [because in this case, aside

from regulation there already was taking of property]- as such, there should be just compensation.
Because of the existence and necessity of the state to provide just compensation, it becomes Power

of Eminent Domain.

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989

Facts:

Background:

[d gyud ko always magbutang ani pero naa man sad ni sa case and the importance of such historical
background is the POLICE

OBJECTIVE that is to be achieved by the state and ang reason why ni exercise sila og power of
eminent domain para ma attain ang police objective nga within gihapon sa police power of the state.]

As mandated by the clauses of the Philippine Constitution about ensuring the WELL BEING and
the ECONOMIC security of the people, especially the less privileged [1935 Constitution], supported
by the clauses which can also be found in the 1973 Constitution, formulation and implementation of

Agrarian Reform Programs were aimed for the benefit of the tenants farmers. Besides such, the
1987 Constitution adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights,
containing many but sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in
the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. RA 3844 was
enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963, in line with the principles. Almost a decade later PD No. 27
superseded, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along

with the martial law. It was to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution

among tenant- farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. After People
Power, as it energized the thrust for agrarian reform, on July 1987, Pres. Aquino issued
EO 228 declaring full land ownership of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation
of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation. After its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they
are not inconsistent with its provisions. After sa enactment ato nga laws naa na dayon mga petition
sa Supreme Court. Daghan ni sila nga petitions pero gi consolidate kay same og issue.

G.R. No. 79777

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No.
228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. They argued nga nganong ang president man ang
nagbuot sa pag DETERMINE sa JUST COMPENSATION nga ang courts rmn ang naay power
mo determine ana. SINCE ACCORDING TO THEM, SUCH IS AN EXERCISE OF THE
EMINENT DOMAIN POWER. Because they believe that its an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, in considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives
the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. For them pod eminent domain ni so:

They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of
the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section
hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian

Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes
that
may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in
cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC. Manuel Barcelona then filed a motion for intervention
representing coconut and riceland owners [agricultral lands pod ghapon ni sila considered]. Ni argue
dayon si Barcelona nga there is failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence thenecessity for
the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property. G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. Argue gyud sila nga naa gyud na nga
compensation requirement since ma hug man gyud siya nga exercise of eminent domain ra gyud ni
for them. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due
process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article
XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation
for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that: Lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic. G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the
same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed
from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the
landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing
P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. Ni request sila na dapat tagaan og rules
nga implementing kay affected na ilang right sa property nila.

Issue:

Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain and if such is the latter,
then request for Just Compensation and the arguments of petitioners should be given merit

Held:
The cases before us present no complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. That right covers the person's life, his liberty and
his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the
owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Such is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain

Ortigas & Co. sold a parcel of land to Emilia Hermoso on August 25, 1976

The contract of sale provided certain stipulations as to the use of the land. The most relevant

stipulation was that the land only be used for residential purposes

In 1991, the MMDA enacted Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning

Area for the NCR. This ordinance reclassified certain lots as commercials areas, and it also

happened to affect the lot in question

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. V. CA AND MATHAY

G.R. NO. 126102 | DEC. 4, 2000

Facts:

In June 8, 1984, a certain Ismael Mathay leased the said lot from the Hermosos. Their lease

contract did not stipulate the purpose of the lease. He then constructed a single story

commercial building for a car company

Ortigas & Co. filed a complaint against Mathay with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of

preliminary injunction against Mathay. It cited that Mathay failed to show the ordinance had

retroactive effect, so it should therefore be given prospective application

 Mathay then appealed to the CA, which granted his petition and nullified the RTC’s decision

Ortigas & Co. appealed to the SC

PETITITONER

The CA erred in upholding the Ordinance No. 81-01 over the August 25, 1976 contract of sale

A contractual right is not automatically discarded even if it is in conflict with police power

Moreover, the contract does not conflict with the ordinance since the latter does not prohibit

the construction of residential buildings. Hence, the contractual parties can voluntarily agree

to its use as a residential lot

RESPONDENT The RTC had erred in refusing to uphold the said ordinance

Police power is superior to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

ISSUE W/N the CA erred in applying Ordinance No. 81-01 over the stipulations of the August 25,
1976

contract of sale

RULING

No, the CA correctly applied Ordinance No. 81-01 over the August 25, 1976 contract of sale.

As a general rule, laws are construed as having prospective application; therefore any law in

effect at the time of the execution of a contract should be applied unless the said law has
retroactive effect. A later law which impairs a contract cannot be given retroactive effect without

violating the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts.

However, the prohibition on the non-impairment of contracts has certain exceptions. One of these

exceptions is POLICE POWER.

“A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or

transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or

contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those

already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to

the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,

peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in

exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.”

Hence, the stipulations in the August 25, 1976 contract of sale relied on by Ortigas & Co. must

yield to Ordinance No. 81-01. The said ordinance, which classified the lot as a commercial zone,

extinguished by retroactive operation the restrictions on the contract of sale between Ortigas and

Hermoso.

While the legal system upholds the sanctity of contracts between parties, its stipulations cannot

contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Otherwise such

stipulations would be deemed null and void.

OBJECTIVES

1. Police power is one of the three fundamental powers of the State which promotes the welfare
of society by restraining and regulating both the use of liberty and property. It can be given

retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Such a power is

dynamic, not static, and must move with the society it is supposed to regulate.

2. It is exercised by the government and cannot be bargained away through the medium of a

treaty or a contract

PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528.

(Note: Data in the table came from the case itself.)

DOCTRINE WHO EXERCISED POLICE POWER (IN THIS CASE)

PURPOSE IN CASE OF CONFLICT

Police Power President to serve as an instrument of social justice

a law done under a proper exercise of police power prevails over any contract per se

Facts:

Private respondents (Office of the President) were buyers on installment of

subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the

lots in favor of the petitioner Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private

respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses

on the lots in question. The subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the

mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

Private respondents then filed a case. The HLURB Office of Appeals Adjudication and

Legal Affairs (OAALA) ruled that PNB — without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina
Village, Inc. — may collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortization, in

accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with

"Marikina Village. Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the

lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. The private respondents

affirmed the decision by declaring Presidential Decree 957.

Petitioner bank raised the following issue regarding the said PD 957:

1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted

only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18,

1975.

Issue:

1. Did the State, particularly the President, err in declaring PD 957 and applying it to the

issue at hand which took place prior to its enactment?

Held:

1. No. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the

same can be plainly inferred from the intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers

from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the

financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law – as an

instrument of social justice – must favor the weak.

Despite the Impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be

legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a

proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract.

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
FACTS:

On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic
Technology Act of 1992" and Sec 15 of said law states that:

“no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having
obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board”

On September 12, 1995, SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to
comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be
transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available. After
petitioner failed to respond to numerous notifications and her failure to submit her appeal for
rechecking to the PRC of the recent board examination which she took and failed., SLMC issued a
"Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos.On March 2, 1999,
petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.

It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner Santos'
separation from work is her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a
precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from the Board

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certification requirement constitute just cause
for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of tenure and whether the state has
the power to regulate the qualification?

RULING:

Petition is without merit.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may
be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. Practice of medicine has been
closely regulated by the State. The regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.

The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State's inherent
police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The
state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements.

1. Nature, scope and characteristics of Police Power as a fundamental and inherent power of the state.
 Police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in
prescribing the specific requirements.

PRC vs. De Guzman, G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

Constitutional Law: Police Power

“It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or

course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated

pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,

and general welfare of the people.”

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine. They passed the

Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).

Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful

examinees in the medical licensure examination.

Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from

Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-
Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. A

comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board
observed that

strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-
breaking

phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.

For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees leads to the

conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

The Board issued a resolution charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud,

and deceit”; in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the
test

results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s judgment rendered ordering the

respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the physician’s oath and to register

them as physicians without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken

against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with
the

requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals. The appellate court ratiocinated that the

respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure
examination for

physicians in February 1993

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT

OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ENTITLE RESPONDENTS TO A WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Held:

The function of m a n d a m u s is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been
established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy,
and the writ of m a n d a m u s is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a well- defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is a long established rule that a license to practice
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. It is true that this Court has upheld
the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations,
the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he
has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory (*satisfactorily-
defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or
ignorance”), then the privilege will not issue for said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of
right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid
requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of m a n
d a m u s to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, 9 June 2004.

Laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable
exercise of the police power.

DOCTRINE BASIS FOR ISSUANCE OR EXERCISE

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Police Power the need for peace and order in the society security for life and limb

First test:

The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power;
Second test:

The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Facts:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP

stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to reduce the rising crime

incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of

Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).

Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner,

Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the

assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied.

Issue:

1. Whether respondents President Arroyo and PNP Chief Ebdane are authorized to issue

the assailed Guidelines on the banning of firearms on the exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. Assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property-right protected by the

Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of

the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, in

this case, guns, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

Did the guideline meet the requirement of the first test (please refer to the
table to know what test)?

Yes. It is clear from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need

for peace and order in the society. Due to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those

committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community,
President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. The motivating

factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

Did the guideline meet the requirement of the second test (please refer to the

table to know what test)?

Yes. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of

firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence.

However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for

a new PTCFOR. The Supreme Court believes this is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of

firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs. BALITE PORTAL

MINING COOPERATIVE

FACTS:

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal
area, situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Marcoppers acquisition of mining rights
over Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subsequently challenged before this Court in Apex Mining
Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al., however, the Court found that Apex did not comply with
the procedural requisites for acquiring mining rights within forest reservesProduction Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive
Director, docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v. Marcopper Mining
Corporation.

On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133
to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), 8 which in turn applied for an
integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.In due time, the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated
MPSA application of petitioner.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 10 which provided,
among others, that:

The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to,
studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating
agreements…such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said
parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the
nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state
utilization espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted
before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

Meanwhile, on January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases,
setting aside the judgment of the RPA. 12 This MAB decision was then elevated to this Court by way
of a consolidated petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 132475 and 132528.

On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals assailed that the memorandum did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of
the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through
studies. Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are
not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable. Being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the
permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the national interest so
requires. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the memorandum issued by the secretary of DENR divested petitioner’s right to the gold
rush under EP No. 133 and whether the state has police power to do so

RULING

Petition is dismissed. Under no circumstances may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded
as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No.
133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded
when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and
utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or
irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of
the Constitution, 21 since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or
amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. 22cräl

Focused on the Scope of Police Power - it is all encompassing

Like timber permits, MINING EXPLORATION PERMITS, do not vest in the grantee any
permanent or

irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment...

[non-impairment clause: is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted

interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent

laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties.] ...and due process
clauses, since the State, UNDER ITS ALL-ENCOMPASSING POLICE POWER, may

alter, modify or amend the same in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. In this case,
answering the question “WHAT IS POLICE POWER?”. Insofar as definition, SCOPE, and

CHARACTERISTICS of police power are concerned, Supreme Court ruled a privilege granted by
the

State, may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is

necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral

resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Southeast Mindanao Goldmining
Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining, G.R. 135190, April 3, 2002

Facts:

This case involves a rich tract of Mineral Land situated in Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It
is

also known as the “DIWALWAL GOLD RUSH AREA”. It is located at Mt. Diwata in the
municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte. The land has been deeply involved in controversy since
the

mid-80’s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels. From 1985 to 1991,
thousands of people went to Diwalwal because of their claims. Peace and order

went down rapidly as hundreds of people perished in mining accidents. Such accidents may be called

man-made or otherwise brought by unregulated mining activities. The many problems of the gold

rush assumed enormous proportions, such that, finding a “winwin” solution was needed. On March
10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation [Marcopper] was granted Exploration Permit No. 133.
[EP 133] , OVER 4000+ Hectares of land. Such included the HOTLY CONTESTED
DIWALWAL AREA. Marcopper’s mining rights over Diwalwal under EP 133 was challenged in
one SC case but eventually, SC sustained their claim as the other mining corp did not comply with
procedural requisites for

acquiring such within forest reserves. Congress then enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No.
7076 or THE PEOPLE’S SMALL-SCALE

MINING ACT. The law established a People’s small-scale mining program to be implemented by
the

secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board [PMRB] under the
DENR

Secretary’s direct supervision and control. It also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside

small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to

small-scale miners under certain conditions. On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Factoran
issued Department Administrative Order No. 66. It

declared 729 hectares of the Diwalwal Area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The

issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR secretary by Proclamation No. 369.

Then, a petition was filed to cancel EP 133 and the admission of Mineral Production Sharing

Arrangement proposal over Diwalwal was filed before DENR and was called the RED Mines Case..
While the RED Mines case was pending, MARCOPPER ASSIGNED ITS EP NO. 133 to
petitioner
Southeast Minadano Gold Mining Corporation [SEM], which in turn applied for an integrated
MPSA

over the land covered by the permit.

In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office accepted and registered the

integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed. On March
3, 1995, RA 7942, the Philippine Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this statue, the MAC

cases were referred to Regional Panel Arbitrators tasked to resolve disputes involving mining rights.
The RPA took cognizance of the RED Mines case- consolidated with the MAC Cases. On May
1997, petitioner filed a complaint for damages before RTC of Makati against DENR Secretary

and PMRB-Davao. SEM alleged, [petitioner], that the illegal issuance of the OTP’s allowed the

extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEM’s [petitioner] mining

claim. HOWEVER, ON JUNE 24, 1997, THE DENR SECRETARY ISSUED MEMORANDOM
ORDER NO. 97-03

WHICH PROVIDED THAT DENR SHALL STUDY THOROUGHLY AND

EXHAUSTIVELY THE OPTION OF

DIRECT STATE UTILIZATION OF THE MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE DIWALWAL

GOLD-RUSH AREA. Such provides, among others that- the DENR shall study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-
Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility
of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the

appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared
policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall
include provisions for profit-sharing between the

state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as
the payment of royalties to

indigenous cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as
the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the
Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered

to undertake such studies. . . . Thus it was questioned in this case that such issuance of MO 97-03 on
the ground that the "direct

state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133
petitioner submits, said memorandum order dictated the said recourse and, in effect, granted

management or operating agreements as well as provided for profit sharing arrangements to illegal

small-scale miners. According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution of the
Consolidated Mines

cases. The "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in the challenged memorandum is nothing but
a

legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No.
133. Issue:

Whether or not there is derogation OF PETITIONER'S VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE AREA
COVERED BY ITS

EP NO. 133

Held: No.

SC Declared that MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy in
resolving

the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed

thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it

did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to

any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies

to determine its feasibility.

It is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed

in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued

efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting
that

Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether

or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and
unsettled matter. Until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated

Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be
impaired

by the issuance of MO 97-03. Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights

under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its

challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be

amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since

the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters

impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in

the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of

contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, 21 since the State, under its all-encompassing

police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general

welfare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative
which the

State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. The constitution provides
that

Ownership of Mineral Resources. — Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the exploration,
development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The
State may directly undertake

such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors. Thus, the State may pursue
the

constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization
of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
agreements with qualified

entities.

MMDA V Garin
FACTS:

Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924, which created the MMDA, grants it the authority to confiscate, suspend,

or revoke driver’s licenses when enforcing traffic laws and regulations

Atty. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) for illegally parking his vehicle and had

his driver’s license confiscated. He was directed to the MMDA to redeem his license, with the

TVR serving as a temporary license

Garin filed for the return of his license and for preliminary injunction with the RTC. The petition

was granted, citing that the confiscation of a driver’s license without giving the driver an

opportunity to be heard violates due process, and is unconstitutional

MMDA appealed to the SC

PETITITONER

Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 limits the MMDA’s powers to fixing, collecting, and imposing fines and

penalties for traffic violations. While these are legislative and executive powers, the doctrine

of separation of powers does not preclude the mixture of these governmental powers in

administrative agencies

The Metro Manila Council, as the MMDA’s governing board and policy making body, has

formulated the IRR for Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 through the MMDA Memorandum Circular No.

TT-95-001 on April 15, 1995. While the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVR’s, Sec.

5(f) of RA 7924 is self-executory and does not even require an IRR

A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a right but a privilege subject to reasonable

regulation under police power in the interest of public safety and welfare. The revocation or

suspension of this privilege does not disregard due process since the licensee is given the
right to appeal the revocation

RESPONDENT

The MMDA does not have an IRR for Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 since the presented Memorandum

Circular No. TT-95-001 was passed by the Metro Manila Council without quorum

The lack of a valid IRR for Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 violates the due process clause of the

Constitution

The contested section further violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation

of legislative authority

ISSUE W/N the MMDA’s enforcement of Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 in confiscating
driver’s

licenses for traffic violations is unconstitutional

RULING

The SC decision has been rendered moot and academic through the MMDA’s later

implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004. This circular issues a

Metropolitan Traffic Ticket, which will be paid at the bank, in lieu of confiscating licenses.

However, the SC made the following observations to be used for future MMDA programs:

1. Yes, the license to operate a motor vehicle is not a right but a privilege granted by the state,

which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest
of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. The

common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police

power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may

be operated on the state highways.

2. No, RA 7924, when it created the MMDA, does not grant it with police power nor legislative

power. All its functions are administrative in nature. The power delegated to it is that which is

given by the Metro Manila Council, which merely promulgates the administrative rules and

regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. Hence, the confiscation, suspension,

or revocation of driver’s licenses, WITHOUT legislative enactment, will be considered an

unauthorized exercise of police power.

Police power is an inherent attribute of our sovereignty, which the Constitution vests in the

legislature to create laws, statutes, or ordinances, for the good of the people. Hence, it cannot be

exercised by any other group that does not possess legislative power. However, it may be

delegated to the following, but only to the extent conferred by the legislature:

(a) the Legislature (inherent)

(b) President (by delegation)

(c) administrative boards (by delegation)

(d) law-making bodies on all municipal levels, including barangay (by delegation)

(e) Municipal governments / LGU's (conferred by statute – general welfare clause of RA 7160)

3. Yes, Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 grants the MMDA the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and

regulations. Since the legislature validly delegated legislative powers to the MMDA, it is duty-

bound to enforce its traffic laws and regulations (in this case, Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-
001). However, they are limited to enforcing ordinances, not enacting them.

Under statutory construction, in cases of doubt, always resolve in favour of the constitutionality

of a statute.

OBJECTIVES

1. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution

in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable

laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the

Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and

for the subjects of the same.

2. It is exercised by LGUs only when t has been validly delegated by the legislature

3. Police power cannot be exercised by any other group that does not possess legislative

power. However, it may be delegated to the following, but only to the extent conferred by the

legislature:

(a) the Legislature (inherent)

(b) President (by delegation)

(c) administrative boards (by delegation)

(d) law-making bodies on all municipal levels, including barangay (by delegation)

(e) Municipal governments / LGU's (conferred by statute – general welfare clause of RA

7160 or Local Government Code of 1991)

Carlos Super Drug Corporation v DSWD. Gr no 166494

Background of the case:

This case stressed that “when conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property

rights must BOW to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by

due process, must yield to general welfare.

FACTS:

Petition by the drug store corporation for PROHIBITION with PRAYER for Preliminary

Injunction, by assailing the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 9257. The EXPANDED SENIOR

CITIZEN ACT OF 2003.

The respondets are DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ and DILG which are tasked to regulate and

monitor the compliance of drugstores to our laws. also, to promulgate IRR for implementation

of the law, and also revoke licenses incase of violation.

Feb 26, 2004 RA 7432 was signed into law by Gloria. Took effect mar 21, 2004.

The law shall grant senior citizens 20 percent discount to

hotels, lodging, restaurants, recreation centres, purchase of medicine in all establishments for

the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. This also includes, funeral, burial.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to

loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly

compensate the discount.

Thus, this is a violation of the constitutional provision “RIGHT to PROPERTY”.

“A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it

would not meet the definition of just compensation.”

Issue : w/n the expanded senior citizens act is unconsti, that private property shall not be

taken for public use without just compensation, would it violate equal protection clause?

Ruling : No. Wala juy, violation, and ni remain nga constitutional ang law. because, this is a
legitimate exercise of police power.

in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result

in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Wala man sad jud nila na prove nga, if ang 20 percent discount na ilahang ma grant sa mga

seniors kay dako jud og maiban sa ilahang income. Ilaha gi assail dri nga, if ever daw mo grant

sila ana, need jud daw og just compensation kay naibanan daw ilahang right to property which

is eminent domain jud unta daw dapat. Pero ang gi sulti sa sc kay No. Because the law is a

legitimate exercise of police power!!

The main objective here is for the general welfare. Mao na wala jud exact definition ang police

power kay para mas dako iyahang scope and para dli siya ma limit easily.

“continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the

command of the State for the promotion of public good.”

Ang ma answer ani nga question guys kay ang una gihapon.

“nature, score and characteristics of police power which is naa rasad sa case ang answer”

“Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general

terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room

for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the

greatest benefits. 22 Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and

the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.”

B. Exercising Power/Authority

Bukdlod ng Magbubukid v E.M. Ramos, Gr no 131481. March 10, 2011

Question : WHO MAY EXERCISE POLICE POWER?

Ang police power daw kay governmental function and inherent na siya sa state pero ma

exercise pud na siya sa municipal corporations pero need og VALID DELEGATION of police

power.

municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as

are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. not only does the State

effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does

also.||| (Buklod Nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R.

Nos. 131481 & 131624, [March 16, 2011], 661 PHIL 34-99)

A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from

the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,

municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of

their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly

granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as

empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the

safety of the people. ||| (Buklod Nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v E. M. Ramos and

Sons, Inc., G.R. Nos. 131481 & 131624, [March 16, 2011], 661 PHIL 34-99)

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto

they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be

necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as

shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,

maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of

the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.|||

(Buklod Nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. Nos.

131481 & 131624, [March 16, 2011], 661 PHIL 34-99)

FACTS:

Parcels of land which do not have supply of water owned by Manila Golf and Country Club was

aquired by EMARSON (em Ramos and sons) to be developed as a residential Area known as

Traveller’s Life Homes.

EMARSON applied for an authority under the RA 2264, or the Local Autonomy Act enacted

Municipal Ordinance 1, the “an Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing

penalties for violation thereof. The municipality of Dasmarinas Cavite approved its application.

The implementation of the subdivision was delayed because the property was mortgaged and

the titles are in possession of the Overseas Bank of Manila, while under liquidation.

MAIN ISSUE :

On June 1988, RA 6657 (comprehensive agrarian reform law or CARL took effect). This made a

new process for land acquisition, distribution and classification.

Aquino planned to convert the tenanted neighbouring property of NDC into an industrial estate

to be managed by MARUBENI corp and NDC. They wanted to provide for the tenant farmers

who want to remain at the NDC property with 3 hectares each.

However, the size of the NDC property was not enough. (for industrial projects and for tenant-

farmers).

The DAR, in order to solve this problem was tasked to acquire additional lands from nearby

areas. The DAR included property of the EMARSON, which drew protest.

EMARSON filed a petition to nullify notices, which was granted by DAR. Observing that the

property covered is under Exemption from CARP.

(that the lands already converted into non agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 shouldnt be

covered by carp.

CA ruled in favor of EMARSON because the subject property was already converted as a

residential area prior to effectivity of CARL.

The petitioners argue that the power to reclassify lands is an inherent power of the

national legislature, which is absent as a specific delegation and shall not be used by the

LGU.

*dri man gud guys kay ang nag himo sa EMARSON as residential area para ma immune

sila sa conversion kay ang LGU nga asa sila nag apply.*

And they said that land reform is also a constitutional mandate which should be given

paramount consideration.

EMERSON ARGUE that:

The subject property is already exempt from CARP, kay na classify naman daw ni iya as

residential area, tungod sa approval sa Ordinance sa LGU.

EMARSON also said that the municipality of Dasmarinas can validly zone and reclassify the

subject property.

Ang meaning sa zoning dinhi kay, pwede siya maka exercise sa police power (ang LGU) and

zoning ang gi buhat para naay ma puy-an ang uban tao and para maka tabang sa general

welfare. Kay para ma safeguard ang mga namuyo na didto sa residential area

Plus ang mga farmer-tenants wala paman pud sila ka establish og rights ato nga properTY.

first, kailangna pa to sila I examine if competent ba sila as a farmer, and sunod kay wala paman

pud na declare nga naa na jud sa ilaha ang property. Meaning if ma himo gani ni og property

under CARP, ma agrabyado ang mga namuyo na didto nga residents.

Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of
eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which

logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific

land uses as present and future projection of needs.||| (Buklod Nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing

Ramos, Inc. v E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. Nos. 131481 & 131624, [March 16, 2011], 661

PHIL 34-99)

ISSUE : w/n the LGU has the power to exercise police power thru valid delegation?

RULING : YES hehehe as mentioned above mao nato sya ako gi una ang ruling guyses para

mas maka sabot mo sa pag basa sa case.

Insofar as Jurisprudence in The Exercising Authority of Police Power is concerned, it provides that

National Legislature has the exercising authority of the Police Power, however, it may delegate this

power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal

corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative

powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Since there has been express

grant of such power from the National Legislature to the City then it can exercise it provided that it

complies with the provision of the law which delegated such.

In this case, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced

to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city

council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction. It

is also for them to determine as to whether or not there is a need to regulate and the factual bases

for such regulation as provided in the delegation made by the legislative branch to the city

[Quezon].
IN THIS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT REITERATED THAT MMDA DOES NOT HAVE
THE PWOER TO

ENACT ORDINANCES, AND DECLARED THAT IT IS LIABLE FOR THE ILLEGAL

DEMOLITION OF THE

PETITIONER’S PROPERTY.

Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City

G.R. 177807, 11 October 2011

Facts:

Early 1950s. Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA, Quezon
City. It has an area of

375 Square Meters. On 27 March 1956, the QC City Council issued Ordinance 2904, entitled “An
Ordinance Requiring The

Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as

Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.”

[arcades -An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the
sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun]

It should be emphasized that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there

was yet YET NO BUILDING CODE passed by NATIONAL LEGISLATURE. Thus, the
regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the DISCRETION OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is
to

be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from

the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the

property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners

relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own
purposes. The ordinance kay na amend kadaghan, at first nag add siyag exemption sa mga properties
nya na

amend napod balik nga mas daghan na og na include sa exemption nya gi gamyan na ang required na

width sa arcades. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.

Sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a 2-storey building being constructed

on his property from the application of Ordinance 2904 that the be exempted from constructing an

arcade on his property. February 2, 1966, the City Council acted favorable on Justice Gancayco’s
request and issued a

resolution which says "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner

shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when

public interest so demands." Fast forward. Pag March 2003, Metropolitan Development Authority,
MMDA, kay nag conduct silag

operation nga iclear ang obstruction sa sidewalk sa EDSA. Ni send sila dayon og notice to demolish

kang Gancayco and ni allege nga “a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of
the

Philippines (Building Code) 9 in relation to Ordinance No. 2904.” Gi tagaan siyag 15 days dayon
para

mo comply kay dapat daw to arcade along EDSA didto dapit. Ni-fail si Justice Gancayco og comply
mao to gi proceed sa MMDA ang pag demolish sa “wing walls” sa

ground floor sa structure. Ang na affected na part kay restaurant. Na sugod na dayon og file ang
petition para istop ang pag demolish sa property; he alleged that the

ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just

compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375

square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in

its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-
San
Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option.
He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages.
Alternately, ingon pod siya na dapat naay payment of just compensation if ever mo declare ang

court nga valid ang ordinance.

Insofar as our topic is concerned, ni allege ang Government sa QC nga exercise raman daw to of

police power, and regulation rmn to sa business zone. Ni allege pod ang MMDA nga ni implement

raman mi og legal easement na gi establish sa Ordinance No. 2904 nya there should be a

presumption of constitutionality man sa ordinance. Sa pag file sa case, na question pod kung naa bay
authority ang MMDA nga mo declare nga ang

kana nga property kay “public nuisance” that impeded that safe passage of pedestrians. Issue:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL

Is the zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings valid exercise of police power?

WHO MAY EXERCISE POLICE POWER?

B. Whether or not the MMDA legally demolished the property of Gancayco. Held:

YES. A. It was held in the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air that the nature of police power EXERCISED
BY LOCAL

GOVERNMENT UNITS:

That it is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be

exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National

Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well

as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the

agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.

It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police

power by virtue of Section 12 (oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City

Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the

Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of

buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and

repairing them. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police

power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. In the case
at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it

issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of

the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient

passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City.
More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of

the city, in a business zone along EDSA. Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, 28 which was
passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No.
2904. Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning
ordinances

require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are

necessary within their respective jurisdictions. To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was
passed, there was no national building code

enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the

city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their

jurisdiction. B. Yes, the demolish was illegal. MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was
lodged in the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH),not in MMDA, considering the law's provision. There is also no
evidence

showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. MMDA's
argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to
the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the

acts of the former. In its Answer, 34 the city government stated that "the demolition was undertaken

by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City." Therefore, the
MMDA

acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice

Gancayco's building.

UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V THE CITY MAYOR OF

PARANAQUE

FACTS:

BF Homes Parañaque is one of the largest subdivisions in the country

The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, which

reclassified certain portions of the subdivision from residential to commercial areas

The United BF Homeowners Assoc. (UBFHAI) filed with the CA a TRO and preliminary

injunction, questioning the constitutionality of the ordinance

The CA dismissed the petition, citing that Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 was a valid exercise

of police power, particularly when judicial notice has been taken that the reclassified portions

have long been commercialized. The ordinance was merely the local government’s response

to such changes

PETITITONER
 The reclassification from residential to commercial amounts to the impairment of contracts

between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Particularly because their

titles note that the property will ONLY be used for residential purposes

RESPONDENT

Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power that can nullify or supersede

contractual obligations entered into by the developer and lot buyers

EL ACTO, as a respondent-intervenor, claims that the many commercial establishments

already in the area will be affected if the ordinance will be declared unconstitutional. UBFHAI

are guilty of estoppel since they themselves endorsed the opening of these establishments

ISSUE W/N Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power

RULING

Yes, Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power.

The reclassification is necessitated by the increasing number of homeowners in the area, which

require the addition of commercial areas to service their needs. Several homeowners have long

since converted their lots into commercial spaces, with many of the establishments having been

endorsed by the UBFHAI. Hence, the reclassification is justified.

Since the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power, its enforcement will not impair the

contract between the developer and the lot buyers. The non-impairment of contracts may be

constitutionally-granted but such a rule is not absolute; it is limited by the valid exercise of police
power of the State, the latter of which is exercised in the interest of public health, safety, morals,

and general welfare.

When the public welfare clashes with the individual right to property, the former should be made

to prevail through the State’s exercise of its police power.

OBJECTIVES

1. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is described to be “the

most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and "in a sense, the greatest and most

powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into

and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a

denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.

2. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined

within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the

legal progress of a democratic way of life

3. Municipal governments may exercise police power, through the power vested in them by the

Local Government Code of 1991

4. –

5. –

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008.

(Note: Data in the table came from the case itself)

DOCTRINE EXERCISING AUTHORITY SCOPE PURPOSE

Police Power City Mayor delegated to local government units to promote the order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the localities within constitutional limits

Facts:

Public respondent Mayor Atienza and The Sangguniang Panglunsod ng Maynila

enacted Ordinance No. 8027 on November 28, 2001. The said ordinance was enacted

pursuant to the police power.

Section 1 and 3 of the said ordinance states:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and

ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of

Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of

[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR

Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the

southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the

northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in

the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of

Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.,

Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from

Industrial II to Commercial I.

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the

operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are

hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of

this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to

commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1

to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of

effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called

"Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. However, the City of Manila and the Department of

Energy reached into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) enabling the oil companies to

continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting

from the joint operations and the scale down program. This MOU was ratified in Resolution

No. 97, which also authorized Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to oil

companies.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil

companies. Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b)
(2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and

order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed

them to stay.

Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU

and the resolution. However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not

inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that

the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way

prevent him from enforcing and implementing it.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the respondent City Mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce

the said ordinance and order the removal of the Pandacan Oil Depot and Terminal?

Held:

Yes. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor,

to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is

Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance

No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.

He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we

stated the reason for this:

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the

ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.

The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction

of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to

question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing

duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared

unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the

lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the

world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the

World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the

residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION, INC

FACTS:

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private
residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs
parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the 2 streets is a
concrete perimeter wall approximately 15 feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects
Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its
eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by
iron gates. Point is, Neptune Street, a private owned property was requested by MMDA to open its
gates for public use.

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it
is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to ensure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that
the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there
is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.

Petitioner informed respondent through a notice

ISSUE:

Has the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) the mandate to open
Neptune street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

DOES IT EVEN HAVE POLICE POWER? (Capslock para intense)(To answer this
question, we must first understand what police power is, who has police power and whether
MMDA is political subdivision, a local government unit, or a legislative body)

RULING:

What is police power?

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
 wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public
safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

Who has the power to exercise police power?

Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.

The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

What is local government unit and what is its functions and limits with regards to police
power?

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law

and has substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state. Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.

Provincial government - sangguniang panlalawigan,

city government - sangguniang panlungsod

municipal government - sangguniang bayan

How did MMDA came to be?

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units;

created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila
Area.The MMC (Metro Manila Council) was the "central government" of Metro
Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services
common to the area. It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were
subject to the MMC's approval.
 In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were
devolved to the MMA. Not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila”

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for
the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was
limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local
boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review of legislation proposed by
the local legislative.

With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration
of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA

Is MMDA a local government unit, a political subdivision?

MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with

legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.

Why is it not a political subdivision?

The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No.
7924, the creation of MMDA failed to do so. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official
elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA

And why is it necessary/relevant to be one?

The MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No.
7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare
of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective
 legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal
and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

What are the functions and limitations of MMDA? Is the exercise of police power included?

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.

Why the emphasis that MMDA is of an administrative character and not a political
subdivision important?

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature

Is the present case analogous to the two Sangalang cases? What is the sangalang case?

In Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the court upheld a zoning ordinance

issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an
exercise of police power. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along
Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments
in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the
full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated
the commercial from the residential section of the villag

Both Ordinances, Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No.
81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, means that Jupiter Street was not for
the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street
was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for
security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the
"deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Demolition of wall was a legitimate exercise of police
 power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning
ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was
warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public
convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion
along the public streets adjacent to the Village.

Is the Sangalang case the same with the present case?

The two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning
ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice sent by
petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA,

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree
(P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater
powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

MMDA V. GARIN

Nachura: “While Sec. 5(f), R.A. 7924, does not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate

and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative enactment,

the same law vests the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and

regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the

legislature or those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated (the City of

Manila, in this case), the MMDA is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound — to

confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of

transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education

programs.”

Facts:

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was

issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for
parking

illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then

MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing

his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary

injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f)

of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their

licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating

the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition

against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and

impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

WON Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development

Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's

licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations is valid.

Held:

I. The MMDA is not vested with Police Power

Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by

any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,

however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the

lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs).Once delegated,

the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national

lawmaking body.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the

passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special

development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide"

basic services

affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA
with its

powers limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,

preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and

administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let

alone legislative power.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is

that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the

implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances

and

regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the
petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses

without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police

power.

II. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and

regulations.|||

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila

Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall
"install

and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds

of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and

confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and

regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 18 and P.D. No. 1605 19 to the contrary

notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws
and

regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of

the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members

of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such

conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those

agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this

case), the petitioner is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound — to confiscate and

suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic

management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement

operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.

Francisco v Fernando GR NO 166501

FACTS

Petitioner francisco, as a member of the IBP and a tax payer, filed this original action for the
issuance of the writs of

prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner prays to enjoin respondent the chairman of MMDA to stop
implementing the wet

flag scheme. Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA's
governing body, the

Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a
summary punishment for

jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment; and (4)

violates "pedestrian rights" as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.||| (Francisco, Jr.
v. Fernando, G.R. No.

166501, [November 16, 2006], 537 PHIL 391-396)

Issue : w/n the we flag scheme is constitutional or not?

Ruling : A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some

actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to

the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. 3 On the other hand, a
party suing as a

taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by

taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute. 4 Petitioner meets

none of the requirements under either category.

Nor is there merit to petitioner's claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement

because of the "transcendental importance" of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the

standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the

petition. 5 Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of
a

constitutional or statutory prohibition. 6 Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or
statutory

violation. DCcIaE

On the Flag Scheme's alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and

municipalities within the MMDA's jurisdiction, 7 except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-

jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such
fact

serves as sufficient basis for respondents' implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to
enforce the

anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency

tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. 8 The
absence of

an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any
proof

that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme

is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not
a
trier of facts. 9 The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the
Flag

Scheme. This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere
surmises

and speculations.

Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition

directly with us. This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo

warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals,

does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. 10
We

relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances. 11 This is not the case here.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

This case answers the question guys, sa exercising authority. D btaw jud ko sure ngano naabot ni
siya kay, iyahang gi

question ang validity man sa law. But feel nako ang question ani is if ang MMDA naa bay power to
implement rules in

order to regulate sa jaywalking.

Ang answer jud ana is yes, because ang Jay walking naa naman na daan, what they did kay ang pag
implement ra man

og unsaon ni siya pag penalize. And plus, dli man sad authority sa mga courts mo test sa factual basis
ani, kundi ang

Congress jud na.

[Principle and summary]

SC Said, in this case that - While concededly, the President has the authority to provide for the
establishment of the Greater

Manila Mass Transport System, in order to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along
major

Metro Manila thoroughfares, EO No. 179 which designates the MMDA as the implementing agency

for the project, is ultra vires [beyond one’s legal power or authority]. Under the provisions of EO
125, as amended, it is the DOTC not the MMDA which is authorized to

establish and implement such a project. The President must exercise the authority THROUGH
THE

INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE DOTC, which BY LAW, is the PRIMARY IMPLEMENTING

AND

ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITIY in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of

transportation. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency, the President overstepped
the

limits of the authority conferred by law.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation

G.R. 170656, 15 August 2007

Facts:

In 1969, it was observed that vehicles have increased in number, the traffic congestion got worse
and

the number of people who use thoroughfares or main roads has multiplied. Such has remained

unchecked and still is a problem to this day. Traffic jams continue to become a problem in Metro

Manila. This caused people’s energy to be drained with their patience daily. [The problem which

needs to be solved for general welfare]

This petition is rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the MMDA to
order the closure of provincial bus terminals along EDSA and major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. Challenged by this petition [mmda is the petitioner] are two orders issued by Judge Pampilo
of RTC

Manila. The first assailed Order declared that EO No. 179 [REFERRED AS EO] is unconstitutional
because it

constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power. The second assailed order is the denial of

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. President Gloria issued EO which provided for the
establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport

System.

It provides among others the intention to decongest traffic situation in Metro Manila and giving

MMDA the task to undertake measure to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the

convenience and efficiency of travel of the commuters in this jurisdiction.

It also provided that MMDA HAS RECOMMENDED A PLAN TO DECONGEST TRAFFIC

BY ELIMINATING

THE BUS TERMINALS NOW LOCATED ALONG MAJOR METRO MANILA

THOROUGHFARES...through

the provision of mass transport terminal facilities.

It also provided and specified that such objectives is in accordance with the plan proposed by the

MMDA. MMDA was also designated by such as the IMPLEMENTING AGENCY FOR THE
PROJECT.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking
body

of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 7 expressing full support of the

Project.[Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project]

Recognizing the imperative to integrate[combine] the different transport modes via the

establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Thus, on Feb 24, 2003, Viron
Transport Co. [Viron], a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

public transportation with a provincial bus operation petitioned and alleged that the MMDA was

poised or in control “to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing
all

provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic

regulation. Such, according to Viron would mean that its bus terminals would be closed.

It alleged that MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to

abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property. Viron asked

to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA under RA 7924 which

created it. Mencorp, another bus operator asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and
illegal for

transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over

their respective terminals. Mencorp wanted the plan of the MMDA chairman to close provincial bus

terminals in EDSA to be issued a TRO. Issue:

Whether or not MMDA has authority to direct bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals. Held:

No. It is an exercise of the Police Power of the state.

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of
their

bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or
rentals

of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property

without due process of law. Former Pres. Cory Aquino issued in the exercise of her Legislative
Power EO 125 before to reorganize

the [ministry before]Department of Transportation and Communications. Among others, such EO

125 provided that it shall have the authority to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field
of transportation and communications, establish and administer comprehensive and integrated

programs for transportation and communications. The authority and responsibility is vested in the
Minister [Now Department] of Transportation and

Communications and has the authority to issue orders, rules and regulations. There is grant of
authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer

comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, the
DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other

issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. Since under the
law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for

transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same because such is the president’s

alter ego. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the

President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. Respecting nga ang President
naay authority to order the implementation as discussed above IN THE

EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER of the state, THAT MEANS THAT SUCH
DELEGATION TO THE DOTC

TO ESTABLISH AND ADMINISTER AND ISSUE ORDERS AND RULES AND

REGULATIONS OF THE GOOD

AND WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE IS ALSO AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact

increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the

President and administrative boards...

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority
to

implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by

the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination
of respondents' terminals. This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in
the way of its efforts at solving

the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say

the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court

can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC
—

as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and

administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and

communications — which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like

the Project subject of the case at bar. No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be
then, any plan, strategy or project which

it is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster.

C. LIMITATIONS (TEST FOR VALID EXERCISE)

a. Lawful Subject

TAXICAB OPERATORS VV Board of transporation

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila (TOMMI) seek to declare the nullification of both

Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 the Board of Transportation (BOT) and Memorandum

Circular No. 52 by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)

Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 by the BOT concerns the phasing out and replacement of

old and dilapidated taxis—those over 6 years old. It shall first be implemented within Metro

Manila and will be carried out outside Metro Manila on a date to be determined by the BOT

Pursuant to the BOT circular, the BLT issued the implementing Memorandum Circular No. 52

which instructed all personnel within Metro Manila to implement the same and to schedule

the phasing out of such vehicles

TOMMI filed a petition with the BOT to stop the implementation and sought to have the case
resolved before the phasing out. However, the representatives who personally followed-up

on the status of the case were later told that records of the case could not be located

TOMMI filed a case with the SC

PETITITONER Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 violates the right to equal protection of law
because it is

only being implemented in Metro Manila and directed solely to the taxi industry

RESPONDENT

Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 is initially being implemented in Metro Manila compared to

other cities since it is an area that is subject to heavier traffic

The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers

of old and dilapidated taxis

ISSUE W/N Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 passed the tests for the valid exercise of police
power,

particularly the lawful subject test

RULING

Yes, Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 passed the tests for the valid exercise of police power,
particularly the lawful subject test.

The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,

morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things

hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.

In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare

may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may

plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

The riding public is numerous and comprised of various classes, and the general interest towards

their safety and security when travelling via taxis require the exercise of police power. Since

taxicabs are most prevalent in Metro Manila, with such vehicles making up large portions of the

already heavy traffic, it is therefore an activity that affects the general welfare of the population.

The rights enjoyed by such taxi operators, such as TOMMI, may have to yield to the interests of

the greater number.

The assailed circular therefore does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law

unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and

undeniable.

OBJECTIVES

1. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the

health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit

all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.

2. Police power can be used to regulate modes of transportation

3. –
4. –

5. Police power may regulate the rights enjoined by others in order to ensure the safety and

security of the general public

Velasco v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-24153, 14 February 1983.

DOCTRINE LIMITATION / TEST FOR VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

WHAT IT MEANS

Police Power lawful subject the interests of the public, not mere particular class, require the exercise
of police power

Facts:

Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower court dismissing their suit for a

declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila.

The assailed ordinance states:

"It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct

the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent

room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the

same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator

of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the

same person."

Issue:
1. Whether the said ordinance was unconstitutional and therefore an improper exercise

of police power.

Held:

No. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure.

The objectives behind its enactment are:

(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the

business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by

Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance

regulating the business of barbershops;

(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of

the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare

clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm

made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form

the police power to a municipality”. As above stated, this clause has been given wide

application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of

the case been liberally construed by the courts.

BAUTISTA VS. JUINIO

FACTS:

Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista challenged the validity of an energy
conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869 of 1979 (the government’s response to the
protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974) for being allegedly violative of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It states that the use of private motor vehicles with
H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from "[I2:00] a.m. Saturday morning to
5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday” with
the exemption of (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (c) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e)
TC (Tourist Cars). Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the
penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-
specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction.

Petitioners: while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable--energy conservation, the
provision banning the use of H and EH vehicles is unfair, discriminatory, amounting to an arbitrary
classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause.

: Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use
and enjoy their private property while others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted
freedom."

: the ban imposed, in result and effect is class legislation since the rich have the option to
not use their heavy cars but two small cars which would be counterproductive to the purpose of
energy preservation.

ISSUE:

Is LO1 869 AND MC 39 a violation of due process and equal protection clause or is within the
bounds of police power?

RULING:

SC holds the petition without merit.

On due process

Its Whereas clause is not offensive to the due process despite its police power measure may be of
arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character:[Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply availability
underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability
of the country's economy and sustain its developmental growth. What is undeniable is that the
action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be
the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent.

In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed
governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is
settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As
stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ It
would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.'"

On equal protection clause:

Petitioners argued that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles
classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such
category. But to assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination, that finds no support in reason.

5. To identify, demonstrate and analyze how police power may be validly exercised in light of the limitations attached
to it.

 The action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution
(somehow requisite ang appropriateness of response is ruling within the limitation of police
power)
 "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’” (In case due process and police
power conflicts, rule in favor of police power.)

SANGALANG vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988

“While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it

has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare

of the people.'

Facts:
Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of Jupiter Street, Makati Metro Manila.

Sangalang and the other petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter Street filed a petition to hold
the

vendor, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the

perimeter wall (that served as a boundary between the residential and commercial zones) along
Jupiter

Street that had closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in,
as a

consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very

restrictions it had

authored, pursuant to agreements in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision.

The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions
and

easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. When MDC
sold

the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole stretch of the

commercial

block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street
in

the east, was still undeveloped. Altough it was not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a
fence or

wall on the commercial block along Jupiter.

In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the
zonification of

Makati. Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village (BAVA) was classified as a Residential Zone, with its

boundary extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter
Street

was considered a common boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.
Gates had been installed by BAVA to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads
and

streets of the village. Then, the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed that, in the interest of public

welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the streets in Bel-Air Village should be
opened

for public use. The other streets in Bel-Air Village were voluntarily opened except Jupiter Street. The

Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to open for vehicular
and

pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Finally,
the

municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates

constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences

located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length
of

Jupiter Street to public traffic.

Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala
Corporation

predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict. After trial on the merits, the then

Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and awarded damages. Defendant is further ordered
to

restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west
to

Zodiac Street in the east, at its own expense,

On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed from as not supported by the

facts and the law on the matter, it was set aside and another one entered dismissing the case for lack
of
a cause of action.

Issues:

WON the enactment of the municipal ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, the restrictive easements in
question

are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs,
and

interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power.

Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the
parties," 65 65

but while it is so, it cannot contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy."

Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health,

safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever

necessary.

While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it
has to

be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.'

Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and
"in a sense, the

greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be
judicially

inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners

have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-
impairment" guaranty

of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of

general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to

warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to

have been committed by the Court of Appeals.

Lim v Pacquing Gr no 115044

BACKGROUND (NACHURA) : it was held that PD 771, which expressly revoked all existing

franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including jai alai) issued by

local governments, was a valid exercise of the police power. Gambling is essentially

antagonistic to the objectives of national productivity and self-reliance, it is a vice and a social

ill which the government must minimise or eradicate in pursuit of social and economic

development.

Jhan : This means that, ang particular class kay I distinguish gyud na sya dapat sa general

welfare. Usa ni siya sa requisite sa valid exercise of police power, ang lawful subject.

Meaning : as long as para jud sa general welfare, pwede rajud na ma agrabyado somehow

and ma regulate ang enjoyment sa property sa usa ka particular class. (salus populi est

suprema lex = the welfare of the people is the supreme law).

This case answers the question : to identify, demonstrate and analyze through case laws, how

police power may be validly exercised in light of the limitations attached to it.

———————————————-
FACTS:

March 28 1994, Mayor Lim was ordered to issue a permit or license in favor of ADC

(associated development corporation) to operate JAI ALAI.

April 11 1994, mayor lim was ordered to explain why he didnt comply with such order. Then

again he was ordered on April 20 1994 to issue such license in favor or ADC.

Sept 13 1994, petitioner Guingona issued a directive to the chairman of GAB, Francisco

sumulong to hold the grant of authority, or if ever, already granted, to withdraw such grant to

ADC to operate the jai alai in manila until the legal questions are resolved;

1. IF PD 771 IS Unconsti : this pd revoked all existing jai alai franchisers.

2. Assuming manila has the power to issue jai alai franchise to ADC, whether the franchise

granted is valid, considering that the franchise had no duration, and it appears to be

granted forever.

3. Wether the city of manila had the power to issue a jai alai franchise to adc in view of EO

392 dated jan 1 1951 which transferred from local Govs to the GAB, the power to regulate

jai alai.

————————————-

On sept 15 1994, ADC filed a prohibition mandamus and injunction with damages and prayer

for TRO against Guingona and GAB Sumulong. This seeked to prevent GAB from withdrawing

the provisional authority for them to operate jai alai.

Issue : w/n PD 771 is a valid exercise of Police Power?

Held:

Yes, this is a valid exercise of Police power, kay ang Franchise privilege mana siya nga gi grant
sa Government towards ADC, which is ang pag permit sa ila nga mo operate og jai alai. This

means that, dli na siya right nga ma protect maong ang pag regulate ana kay pwede gihapon

thru police power. So ang pd 771 wala na siya ni violate og any right sa ADC. Valid ang pag

exercise ani sa police power kay first, wala man nila gi single out ang ADC, kay ang 771 gi

revoke man ANG TANAN, so dli jud ni siya violation sa equal protection clause. Plus, wala man

sad gi pasa sa government ang pag grant og franchise sa manila, ilahang gi buhat ani is ang

pag issue raman og order and permit so meaning in order para mahimo og franchise dli jud

dapat na adto ra sila sa City of Manila mo kuha og permit. BUT DLI JUD PWEDE MA

CANCEL ANG FRANCHISE ALL TOGETHER, only ang REGULATION.

Valid ni siya nga pag exercise kay first diba duha man ka test? If ang general public ma benefit

ba? Yes kay ma regulate man ang gambling, and sa second na test, yes kay lawful man ang

means.

Means : naa may substantive due process dri, and ang equal protection clause wa man na

violate kay ang tanan man gambling ang naigo ani, and sunod ang non impairment of property

rights kay yes wala, kay ang franchise privilege mana.

————————-*notes from the case*————— below——————————————

—

The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the

State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is

the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court

through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:

"The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-

protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to

prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried

onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the

onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not

go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not

arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.”

It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which

government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic

development.

"In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may

prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some

forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider

sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,

cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted

its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.

Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting

theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that

questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not

addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and

legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of

government.”

ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD No. 771. Clearly,

however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to

benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under

PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.

(Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There

is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC’s allegation of

improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as

already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed

purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.

On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the

Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but

rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's

power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling

franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FACTORAN

FACTS:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers, in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten
the development of mineral resources

EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for
the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-
production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.

DENR issued Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted
into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.”

And Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and
gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates

Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and
claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE:

WON DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both
contravene or subvert the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211

RULING:

Regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those
granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the
police power of the State over the sanctity of the contract:

"The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of

contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to contracts which respect property, or
some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have
no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State, and involving the public rights and public welfare of the
entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its
police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be
affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to
regulate and control them.”
The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 is geared towards a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth. The exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary
to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Administrative Order No. 57 does not automatically convert mining leases and agreements to
production-sharing agreements. The use of the term "production-sharing agreement" in the same
provision implies negotiation between the Government and the applicants.

In simpler terms, Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 of the DENR Secretary which effectively
converted existing mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements
within one year from effectivity are valid, inasmuch as the subject sought to be governed by the
questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of E.O 279, and that mining leases or
agreements granted by the State are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the State. And because the purpose of upholding public interest is in line
with article 12, exercise of police power must be given due course. (according to nachura and
sa akong nasabtan)

5. To identify, demonstrate and analyze how police power may be validly exercised in light of the limitations attached
to it.

 The State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest, extends to all the vital public
needs.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA

G.R. NO. 93891 | MAR. 11, 1991

Facts:
The Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) issued an ex parte order to Solar Textile Finishing

Corp. (STFC) to immediately cease and desist from using its wastewater pollution source

installations from discharging untreated wastewater directly into the river

Two inspections showed that STFCs wastewater treatment plant was non-operational.

Chemical analysis samples showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what is

permissible under the PD 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations

and the 1982 Effluent Regulations

STFC appealed to PAB, who then issued an order allowing the former to operate temporarily

and for the re-evaluation within one month

Before the month was up, STFC filed a preliminary injunction with the RTC. The RTC

dismissed its petition since PAB’s approval for temporary operation had rendered it moot and

academic

STFC appealed with the CA. The CA reversed the RTC’s dismissal and remanded the case

back for further proceedings. It further held that while the case was moot and academic, the

question of due process must be settled

PETITITONER

Under PD 984, PAB has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations

of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging

wastewater with pollution levels exceeding the maximum imposed standards

RESPONDENT
 PAB’s ex parte order may only be issued if the effluents discharged posed an "immediate

threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In this case, STFC

claims that the inspection reports made no finding that the wastewater discharged posed such

a threat.

ISSUE W/N the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision on the ground that STFC was
denied due

process by PAB thru its issuance of ex parte cease and desist orders

RULING

Yes, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision.

Sec. 7(a) of PD 984 grants PAB the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the

operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is

discharging wastewater with pollution levels exceeding the maximum imposed standards OR

when the waste poses an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal

and plant life."

The reports show that there was prima facie evidence that the effluents emanating from STFC's

plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances, showing

adequate basis to support the ex parte cease and desist order issued by PAB.

The ex parte cease and desist order was issued by the PAB, the very government agency tasked

with determining whether the effluents of an establishment complies with statutory and regulatory

provisions. Such orders are permitted by law to stop the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into Philippine waters since the process of litigation may take years.

The relevant pollution statutes are enacted and promulgated in the exercise of police power to

protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection

of plant and animal life. The exercise of such a power may allow for procedural due process to

be set aside when any action threatens such vital public interests.

STFC may have avoided this by simply absorbing operating their wastewater treatment facility.

Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce costs, increase profits, and

risking public welfare through their disregard of anti-pollution statutes and implementing

regulations.

OBJECTIVES

1. –

2. The exercise of police power may allow for procedural due process to be set aside when any

action threatens such vital public interests.

3. PAB

4. –

5. The relevant pollution statutes are enacted and promulgated in the exercise of police power

to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the

protection of plant and animal life.

b. Lawful Means

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, 20 March 1987.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection.
DOCTRINE

LIMITATION / TEST FOR

VALID EXERCISE OF

POLICE POWER

WHAT IT MEANS

Police Power lawful means

the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals

Facts:

Petitioner, after the six carabaos that he transported from Masbate to Iloilo were

confiscated by the police station commander of Iloilo, challenged the constitutionality of

Executive Order No. 626-A. He had filed a complaint for recovery and was given a supersedeas

bond of P12,000.00. The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the

interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos

not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626

particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators

still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial

movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive

Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of

carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and

provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the

violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,

do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that

henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or

purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to

another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this

Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and

forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions

and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat

Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to

deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry

may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

Notes by: Maria Resper S. Lagas

JD-WT I
Constitutional Law II

EH303

Petitioner claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according

the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due

process.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the said Executive Order No. 626 was a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

No. In light of the test of lawful means, the reasonable connection between the means

employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the Executive Order is missing. The

Supreme Court does not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos

can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with

no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one

province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another

province will make it easier to kill them there.

(In non-legal terms, wala’y direct correlation ang pag preserve sa carabao and ang

pag bawal sa pag transport sa carabao. Ang dili pag transport sa carabao kay dili magpasabot

na dili na kini mapatay in other ways. Wala’y relate daw ang goal ug ang means employed

ana ang SC.)

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station

commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery

and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure

to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The measure did not give the
petitioner a chance to be heard.

The Executive Order is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method

employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law

and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property

confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and

punished.

JMM PROMOTION v CA 120095

*lawful means*

Before we get to the case, remember guys that if the exercise of police power is in question, the one
who assails it has

the burden of proof to prove that such exercise does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or

unreasonably. This means that, laws, in the exercise thereof, has a presumption of validity.

Part of the proper exercise of police power is regulation of a profession, calling and business or
trade.

This is because, as will be stated in the case further, that their conduct affects either the execution of
legitimate

governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public
morals. ||| (JMM

Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, [August 5, 1996], 329
PHIL 87-102)

LAWFUL MEANS: it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define
the mode and manner in

which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.|||
(JMM Promotion and

Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, [August 5, 1996], 329 PHIL 87-102)
Legitimate exercise of police power because To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates the due

process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating
entry to the practice

of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written
and practical exams

before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their
seamanship.

Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors
and other

professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken
continuing education

courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose
an unwarranted

deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other
workers meet reasonable

regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.|||

(JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

120095, [August 5, 1996], 329 PHIL 87-102)

————

The case:

FACTS : The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for
brevity) filed a class suit on

January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures
and requirements for

screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of
the former and other

related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,

1.)violated the constitutional right to travel;

2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and

3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law.

FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and
illegal and in gross

violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary

injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for
brevity) filed a motion for

intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However,
on February 21, 1995,

the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the compliant.

An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a
consequences, ARB

requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the

said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

Issue : w/n said issuance is a valid exercise of police power?

RULING

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by
the Secretary of

Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or

trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state
particularly when

their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation
of the State, the public
health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(use your property in

such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of
legislative action to define

the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to
himself or others. In

any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is

certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process
clause is to ignore the

settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various
trades or profession.

Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are
deemed fit to

practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a
property right under

the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory
standards no

such deprivation exists.

This answers the question : ARE THE MEANS EMPLOYED specifically the issuance of DOLE
order no 3 (more

requirements for artists) issued by the secretary of labor lawful?

Yes, because, the regulation does not deprive them of any right, so long as they follow.

It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under
the due process

clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such
deprivation exists.|||
 (JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, [August 5,
1996], 329 PHIL 87-102)

In this case, the Law means and authority to exercise the Police Power is absent. Sec. 2 of the
COMELEC Resolution 2772, which mandates newspaper of general circulation in every

province or city to provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page as COMELEC SPACE is
invalid

exercise of police power.

In this case, the lawful means and lawful subject requisite, also the authority has not been complied

with. There being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity

for the taking of print space, nor that the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response

to such necessity. Although this was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, because
it was held that

the attempt was for a police objective, this case has been decided in such manner. Philippine Press
Institute v. COMELEC, G.R. 119694, 22 May 1995

Facts:

The Philippine Press Institute or PPI is before the SC assailing the Constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2772 issued by the respondent COMELEC and its Comelec directive dated March 1995. PPI is
a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. March 2, 1995,
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772.

In such implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Maambong sent letters
to

various publishers of newspapers like Business World, Philippine Star and others- all members of
PPI.

In the letter, it provides among others that they “are directed to provide free print space of not less

than one half (1⁄2) page for use as 'Comelec Space or similar to the print support which you have

extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each political

party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known to their
qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.” PPI
now seeks to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 as unconstitutional and void because it

violates prohibition imposed by the Consti against government and any of its agencies in taking of

private property for public use without just compensation. They also contend that the letter
directives

of Comelec requiring them to give free “Comelec Space” and at the the same time process raw data

to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the Bill of

Rights

and is violative of freedom of speech, the press, and expression. The Solicitor General then filed a
comment, ni sulti siya nga wla man silay obligation kay ang nature

ato dili man mo mandate and wala man ni provide of criminal or administrative sanction. Ingon pod

ang Sol Gen nga despite kuno however, if ato to ideclare nga mandatory, it is man a valid exercise of

police power of the state. Solicitor General then argued nga permissible exercise man to of the
power of supervisor or

regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media

enterprises during the election period to safeguard the elections fairness.

Eventually, the case in relation to such letter kay na declare nga moot and academic because it was

construed as manifested by the Sol Gen nga dili siya requiring sa publishers and it also did not
provide

for sanction but mura ra daw og solicitation ang gi buhat and it was not to compel man. Nag-ask

radaw sila if pwede ba nga tagaan sila og free space same sa paghatag sa ila ato sa 1992 Elections. At
this point, pwede na siya tawagon nga moot and academic and idismiss but SC refused because it

wants to put this issue to rest and prevents its coming back, repetition or resurrection. Issue:
Whether or not such is a valid exercise of Police Power. Held: No. A written communication
officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by government
(here a constitutional) agency and signed by member of the Commission

presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so
addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of,
criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such direction, only aggravates the constitutional

difficulties inhering in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the

legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection. To compel them to
donate “COMELEC SPACE” constitutes TAKING of private personal property for

public use or purposes. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use
need to be examined

here: one is the necessity for the taking;another is the legal authority to effect the taking. Wala daw
authority ang comelec mo buhat ana and wala pod nila na prove ang need para sa taking

because wala nila na pakita nga unwilling mo sell print space at normal rates ang PPI. So meaning if
dili sila unwilling mo baligya for normal rates, nganong need man ang taking og

regulation?

That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note

only that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the

respondent Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the identities,
qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for
"dissemination of vital election information". The taking of private property for public use is, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not

without payment of "just compensation". Also, there was no power delegated to the COMELEC to
do so, and, while private property may

indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no

attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the

police power. Without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public
necessity,

indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers

or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or

magazine publishers. [thus no lawful means of exercising such kay wala pa gani silay authority, wala
pagyud nila gi comply
ang requisites and wala nila gi consider ang circumstances]

No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of

print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only

reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not

constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA

G.R. NO. L-34915 | JUN. 24, 1983

FACTS:

Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 allots 6% of the total area of private memorial cemeteries to be

set aside for charity burials of resident paupers of Quezon City for at least five years

The ordinance was enforced seven years after its enactment, with the Quezon City Engineer

notifying Himlayang Pilipino Inc. (HPI) of its enforcement

HPI filed a petition with the CFI to have the ordinance annulled. CFI declared the ordinance

null and void, citing its violation of the Constitution, Quezon City Charter, Local Autonomy

Act, and Revised Administrative Code

When the motion for reconsideration was denied, the City Government filed the petition with

the SC

PETITITONER

Taking HPI’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power, especially since the

land is being taken for public use as a burial ground for paupers

The Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power,

to pass such ordinances that promote public welfare

RESPONDENT

The taking or confiscating property is unconstitutional because the ordinance permanently

restricts the owner of beneficial use of private property

The general welfare clause, under the exercise of police power cannot be used as a source

of power to take the property because the property should be urgently and summarily

destroyed to promote public welfare—in this case, the property is being confiscated for public

use

ISSUE W/N Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of police power, particularly the lawful

means test

RULING

No, Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is not a valid exercise of police power. It failed to pass the

lawful means test.

Under the lawful means test, the means employed by the State should be reasonably necessary

for the accomplishment of the purpose and should not be unduly oppressive on individuals.

Police power refers to 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the

use of liberty and property'. It is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in

the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking

or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order

and promoting general welfare as for instance (i.e. drugs).

In this case, the Charter of Quezon City, is granted, among many other powers, the power to

regulate businesses, trades, and occupations. However, the power to regulate does not include

the power to prohibit nor the power to confiscate. Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is not a

mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property

without due process of law and even does so without just compensation.

There is no reasonable relation between setting aside 6% of the total area of a private cemetery

for pauper’s burials and the promotion general welfare. The ordinance actually takes, without just

compensation, from a private cemetery for the benefit of paupers when such persons are charges

of the municipality—the government is merely passing the burden to private entities.

Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) simply authorizes

the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct

public cemeteries. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.

OBJECTIVES

1. Police power refers to 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and

regulating the use of liberty and property'

2. –

3. Quezon City Council

4. –

5. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a

few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for
the purpose of protecting peace and order and promoting general welfare as for instance

Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. No. 148339, 23 February 2005.

DOCTRINE

LIMITATION / TEST FOR

VALID EXERCISE OF

POLICE POWER

WHAT IT MEANS

Police Power lawful means

the means are reasonably

necessary for the

accomplishment of the

purpose, and not unduly

oppressive upon individuals

Facts:

Respondent, JAC Liner, a common carrier operating buses with routes along Lucena

City, filed a petition for prohibition and injunction against Lucena City Mayor and the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena and challenged the constitutionality of Ordinance No.

1631 and 1778.

City Ordinance No. 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility

in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance No. 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary

terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena

Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected

by the ordinances.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance No. 1631 as a valid

excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void for being

invalid and ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive

and unreasonable exercise of the police power. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s

petition thus, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:

1. Did the City of Lucena properly exercise its police power when it enacted the subject

ordinances?

Held:

No. Petitioner contends that the purpose of the said ordinances is to reduce traffic

congestion however, the means employed to attain such purpose, according to the Supreme

Court, is unnecessary. The grant of exclusive franchise to petitioner does not, in any way,

solve traffic problem. The scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is

so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised

terminal are barred from operating at all.

Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would

subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as

correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly

where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.

The Supreme Court is aware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City

supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from

the private sector, copies of which were submitted to the Supreme Court by petitioner. The

weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual's rights.

AMELIA CABRERA VS. MANUEL LAPID

FACTS:

Amelia M. Cabrera filed a petition to the Office of the Ombudsman against Manuel Lapid,
Fernando Baltazar, Reynaldo F. Cabrera and Superintendent Diony Ventura, respectively, in their
capacities as Governor of Pampanga, Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga and Superintendent of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Region 3, Pampanga.
Petitioner accused respondents the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a
tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. A month after commencing
operations, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond
as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Despite pleas from petitioner,
respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond.

Respondents insisted that the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was erected on the
seashore, at the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. Governor Lapid argued
that DA is the government agency authorized to enter into licensing agreements for fishpond
operations, and the fishpond operation was not covered by a fishpond lease agreement or
application. Governor Lapid also referred to the certification by the Municipal Health Officer of
Sasmuan issued before the actual demolition of the fishpond, describing it as a nuisance per se and
recommending its abatement

Petitioner argued that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the
municipalities.
ISSUES:

WON the demolition in the proper exercise of police power?

RULING:

It was a valid exercise of police power.

Ombudsman ruled that the repealing clause of R.A. No. 7160 expressly repealed only Sec. 2, 6 and
29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704 so that in harmonizing the remaining provisions of P.D.
No. 704 and the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 applicable to the grant of fishery privileges, the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the government agency authorized to grant fishpond
license or permit in areas not identified as municipal waters or not declared as alienable or
disposable by the DENR. Since it appears from DENR records that the subject property has not
been declared disposable or included in areas devoted for fishpond development, the Ombudsman
concluded that the lease agreement entered into by petitioner was void ab initio. In view of the
illegality of the lease agreement, the Ombudsman ruled that its demolition was justified. The
Ombudsman described the demolition as a valid exercise of police power and in accordance with
the provision of Sec. 28 of P.D. No. 704 directing the removal of any fishpen or fishpond that
obstructed the free navigation of a stream or lake. It also upheld the authority of the district health
officer to determine the abatement of a nuisance without need of judicial proceedings.

Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to
the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question
following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman ruled that there was
no violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the words of the Ombudsman, "those
who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve
the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."