Russia DA - Michigan7 2019 Starter Pack

RUSSIA DISADVANTAGE
TOP-SHELF
1nc
Russian arms sales are capped now---that limits the capacity for Russian
expansionism
Bershidsky 3-12-2019 – founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the opinion website Slon.ru. (Leonid,
“Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales. Russia is losing market share despite Vladimir Putin's
international military adventures.,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-
loses-market-share)//BB
Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The
U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir
Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has
been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in
eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more
dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and 2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared
97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers
from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the
region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it
doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It was the only one of the world’s top five exporters,
which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter.
SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on
its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry,
said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials
believe sales have
hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent
more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports
were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern
countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52
percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with Saudi Arabia
became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over
partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to
the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade
India dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most
painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the
economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in
Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a
major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s
about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays
into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm
relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are
paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France,
Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security
alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia
notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the
U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners – that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the
U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global
dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its
longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.
The plan leaves a supply vacuum for Russia to exploit --- they’ll use it to advance
geopolitical power
Bodner 17 – analyst @ Defense News (Matthew, “Sales target: Russia sets its sights on the Middle East,” Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/09/sales-target-russia-sets-its-sights-on-the-middle-east/)//BB
The view from Moscow

Russia’s arms sales in the Middle East do not take place in a vacuum. While driven by defense industry interests, they are seen in
Moscow as part of a broader Russian effort to reassert itself as a player of major consequence. Russia’s
expert community likes to talk of an emerging multipolar world order, and Moscow in many ways tries to
act as if that is already the case. But it is difficult to attribute any strategy to its actions. “Russia is not seeking to displace the U.S. in
the Middle East, just cut it down to size,” says Vladimir Frolov, an independent Russian foreign affairs analyst. “ Russia sees weapons
sales as additional leverage and a tool to create dependency on Moscow. Sales to the Gulf, particularly to Saudi, are
seen as a tool for other foreign policy objectives, to facilitate agreements on political issues and create
stakeholders in relations with Russia.” While arms sales are certainly seen by the government as tools in a larger game, the arms
trade in Russia is a little more complicated than that. “To a great extent these deals are often worked out independently,” according to CAST’s
Andrey Frolov. “For example, deliveries to Syria are handled by the Defense Ministry and taken from military stores. The state export agency
Rosoboronexport has nothing to do with this.” This jibes with the sometimes diffused nature of decision-making in Russia. Contrary to common
perception, Putin does not preside over everything that happens. He sets the general tone and path, and hundreds of officials below him try to
interpret and act according to perceived wishes. This makes dealing with Russia difficult, but it also makes formulating and pursuing broad
strategy difficult for the Kremlin. As far as Russia’s competition with the U.S. in the Middle East arms trade goes, the situation was best
described by independent analyst Vladimir Frolov: “Russia’s strategy in weapons sales is to sell everything to everyone
with little geopolitical consideration and zero human rights concern. And Russians will try to seize every
opportunity where the U.S. is seen as an unreliable partner. Egypt and Turkey are just the most recent
examples.”
New arms markets are key to all facets of Russian expansionism
Connolly and Sendstad 17 - *associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. He is also a senior lecturer in
political economy and director of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. He is the
author of numerous articles on the political economy of Russia. **Cecilie Sendstad is the research manager for the Cost Analysis research
programme at the Department of Analysis at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). She has authored numerous published studies
on Russian and Norwegian defence-economic issues, and has also conducted research on defence acquisitions and lifecycle costing for the
Norwegian government (Richard and Cecilie, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms Exports for
Russia,” Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-
sendstad.pdf)//BB
This last potential challenge illustrates that the arms trade is as much driven by developments in the geopolitical marketplace as it is by
commercial concerns. In turn, the multidimensional nature of the arms trade suggests that Russia will make great efforts to ensure
that it remains successful in this industry for decades to come. This is likely to involve a concerted effort to ensure that
sufficient domestic investment in productive capabilities will take place to guarantee that new weapons systems emerge. It is also likely to
involve policymakers attempting to wield arms exports as a component of wider foreign policy. Indeed, it is this
final point that deserves greater attention by researchers in the future. If, as Keith Krause has argued, arms
exports serve as an
important tool wielded by states in pursuit of other foreign policy objectives, then it is plausible that Russia’s
strong position in the global arms market might be expected to boost the country’s position in international
affairs more widely.90 In addition to the economic motives behind arms sales, Krause suggests that arms exports can help states
both in the pursuit of victory in war and in the broader pursuit of power in the international arena.91 Both
motives appear to lie behind Russian arms exports in a number of cases. For Krause, arms exports can help the exporting
country achieve several objectives in the pursuit of the beneficiary country’s victory in war. They include: guaranteeing independence of arms
supply to ensure military security; acting as a quid pro quo for military base/landing rights; assisting friends and allies in
maintaining an effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external threats; substituting for direct military
involvement; and providing testing for new weapons systems. It is not difficult to find at least prima facie evidence for these
motives playing some role in motivating Russian arms exports to Armenia, Syria and Tajikistan. When looking at the role arms exports play in
supporting the exporter’s pursuit of geopolitical power, Krause states that the sale of weaponry can help to: provide access to
and influence over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy objectives; symbolize
commitment to the recipient’s security or stability against internal or external threats; create or maintain a
regional balance of power; create or maintain a regional presence; and provide access to scarce, expensive or
strategic resources. It is likely that at least some of these motives are present in Russia’s sales to countries all over the
world. Moreover, the zeal shown by Russian firms in expanding arms exports to countries beyond their traditional client
base – such as to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Philippines – is surely as much to do with the possibility of weakening ties between
those countries and their traditional allies in the West. It is in this respect that Russia’s future performance
as an arms exporter might have truly strategic significance. If Russia is able to expand its influence
beyond its traditional markets, we should expect to see Russia’s broader political influence in those regions
rise. In this sense, the motives underlying the strenuous Russian efforts to expand arms exports might well go
beyond simple commercial concerns or a desire to place the defence-industrial complex at the centre of efforts to modernize the
Russian economy.
Expanded Russian influence leads to nuclear war and collapses the international
order
Gray 17 – PhD, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the
Centre for Strategic Studies (Colin, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Foreword, in Comparative Strategy, 36.1)//BB, sex edited
Short of war itself, the international political and strategic relations between Russia and the United States
are about as bad as they can be. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the simultaneous conduct of two air independent
campaigns over Syria could evolve all too suddenly into a war triggered by accident or by miscalculation. There
is little, if any, mystery about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations.
Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, Putin is
striving to recover and restore that of which he is able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance.
Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more power and influence. The challenge for the Western
World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail, is to decide where and when this latest episode in
Russian expansionism will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it must and will be halted. It is more likely than not
that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent years has given a credible impression of
opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can. However, there is
ample evidence to support this study’s proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision
of Russia as a recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. Putin’s international political objectives appear largely open today: he will have Russia
take whatever turns out to be available to take, preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the
principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in
general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how
dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman
[person]to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and
power. There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia’s hand, but that he also will
misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current
appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable. Putin’s military
instrument is heavily dependent, indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear
weapons. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single
political or strategic guess in error could well place us, Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all. This
National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin’s elevation of strategic intimidation to
be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and ‘talking the talk’ that goes with such
rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest
priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for
international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves, including virtually every arms control
treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I). The challenge for the United States today
and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and must be done to stop Putin’s campaign in its tracks before it
wreaks lethal damage to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the
world, and particularly in Europe.
UNIQUENESS
U
Russian arms sales and their defense industry are low now
Stratfor 4-29-2019 - American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman,
who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer
(“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-defense-industry-finds-
itself-tailspin)//BB
Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has
been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is
struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its
technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining
precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no
letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline
in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in
general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian
Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the
slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The
downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military —
all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that
Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in
stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems —
such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some
hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but
Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government
budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization
push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt
Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four
years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues
from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and
elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions
have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end
there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further
military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced
severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United
States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018,
their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently
used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to
offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business.
US pressure is whittling away at Russians arms markets now

Khlebnikov 19 - expert on the Middle East at the Russian International Affairs Council (Alexey, “Russia looks to the Middle East to
boost arms exports,” Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports)//BB
Therefore, Russia’s position in the regional and global arms market is getting more complicated and difficult given Moscow’s declining share of
total exports, decreasing imports in Asia and Oceania, and rising competition in the Middle East. In addition, growing U.S. pressure on
Russia via its secondary sanctions puts Moscow in a very challenging situation that will make it harder to
sign big new contracts and increase its arms exports. Despite all of these difficulties Moscow is working
hard to get new deals, both in the Middle East — the world’s fastest-growing and the most attractive arms market — and elsewhere, as
part of a broader effort to maintain its status as a leading arms supplier. However, given the geopolitical
headwinds and intense competition, maintaining that status looks like it will be an increasing challenge in
the years ahead.
Russia’s defense industry is struggling because of low arms sales --- ripples through
supply-chain
Borshchevskaya 17 - Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia's policy toward the Middle East. She is also a
Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University. In addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy. (Anna, “The Tactical Side
of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-
east/)//BB
Ultimately, the
loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense
industry, it also reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases scale-
dependent savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the more Russia
fails to find foreign customers for specific weapon systems, the more it will become burdened with a higher
relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in turn, will further limit Russia's ability to
competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby perpetuating the effect. This is why, for example, India's
withdrawal from the joint development and production of the Su-57 fighter aircraft last year has cast doubt on Russia's ability to sustain the
program in a meaningful way or at an acceptable cost. As a result, Russia has sought — albeit unsuccessfully so far — to export the Su-57 more
widely in an effort to find a partnership that would make the aircraft viable. The Search for Solutions Russia, accordingly, has been
considering other solutions to safeguard its defense sector and improve its overall industrial performance. One possible
remedy centers on what amounts to burden sharing across sectors. In this, the country is looking to harness the defense industry's strengths
for civilian production, similar to the way Western enterprises such as Boeing or Airbus operate. By producing non-military products
for domestic and foreign civilian markets, Russian defense manufacturers could sustain themselves even if their military goods are earning less
revenue. Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced competitiveness. Unfortunately for Russia,
the chances that such a gambit will succeed are low — even for domestic consumption. Although Moscow has
been pushing an import substitution program amid the West's sanctions, Russian firms continue to privilege foreign, instead of domestic,
components. In 2018, 38 percent of Russian industrial enterprises purchased equipment from abroad; two years before, the figure was just 6
percent. Ultimately, if Russian arms producers are failing to find sales for defense customers at home, they're unlikely to find any more of a
domestic civilian market for their wares. As a great power, Russia has lofty ambitions for the modernization of its
military. Budget constraints, more competition from elsewhere and other issues, however, mean many of the army's
most ostentatious projects never make it past the showroom. And moving forward, the Russian defense
industry's plight is unlikely to improve as it faces a vicious circle that is leaving it worse for wear.
U – econ
Russian expansionism is limited now because of insufficient economic resources
Muraviev 18 – Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies, Curtin University (Alexey, “Russia not so much a
(re)rising superpower as a skilled strategic spoiler,” The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/russia-not-so-much-a-re-rising-superpower-
as-a-skilled-strategic-spoiler-90916)//BB
The Russian defence sector plays its traditional role of both earning much-needed cash and furthering
Russia’s geopolitical agenda. In 2017, Russian arms exports were worth US$17 billion, while the total portfolio of foreign orders of
Russian armaments and military equipment is about US$45 billion, effectively retaining the number-two position in global arms sales. Still,
Russia has no means of global economic expansionism. It is desperately seeking new economic
opportunities and partnerships with other countries that do not want all the power focused on the US. This
gives China a strategic lead because of its diversified extensive economic partnerships with the US, Europe and Asia. Yet it would be premature
to crown China as the sole superpower rival to the US. Unlike Russia, China clearly lacks political and diplomatic experience – the ability to play
complex games on a global chessboard. As an incoming superpower with global ambitions but limited experience in great power politics, China
studies carefully the Soviet and Russian experiences and leaves Russia to fight all the major fights at international forums. North Korea and the
South China Sea are among the few exceptions where the Chinese show strategic activism. Apart from its extensive diplomatic experience, China
also needs Russia’s strategic nuclear and conventional military might. Under Putin, the Russian military managed to close
the capability gap with the most advanced Western militaries and transformed itself from a large, under-
equipped and understaffed army into an effective, highly motivated and battle-hardened force. Putin has
given the once-cash-strapped military machine a massive financial boost – and, more importantly, full
political support. Between 2013 and 2017, Russia landed in the world’s top-three nations on defence expenditure, just behind the US and
China. In Europe, Russia has remained the single largest defence spender and buyer of major combat systems. From 2012 until early 2017, the
Russian military received 30,000 new and upgraded armaments and items of heavy military equipment. The Syria campaign and Russia’s ability
to exercise strategic reach has once again made the military factor supported by active diplomacy one of the key determinants of successful
realising its national strategic agenda. In short, Russia is a major global power in outlook and reach, locked in a values-based
confrontation with the West. But it still lacks all elements of a developed superpower.
Russia’s great power ambitions are hindered by limited economic resources
Fortescue 17 - Honorary Associate Professor in Russian Politics at the University of New South Wales and Visiting Fellow at the Centre
for European Studies, Australian National University. His areas of research interest include the contemporary Russian policymaking process,
business–state relations, and Russia’s commercial involvement in the Asia Pacific. He received his PhD in Soviet Politics from the Australian
National University (Stephen, “CAN RUSSIA AFFORD TO BE A GREAT POWER?,” Lowy Institute,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/can-russia-afford-be-great-power)//BB
KEY FINDINGS
Russia wants to behave as a great power, but under its current leadership it is sensitive to its economic capacity to
do so. There are serious restraints, resistant to policy action, that limit its economic capacity. While the West has no
determining influence over the Russian economy, it does have the capacity to raise the economic cost to Russia of
inappropriate great power behaviour, and should do so.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Russia wants to be recognised as a great power, and has sufficient economic power and potential to encourage it to behave
accordingly. However, under its current leadership it recognises that there are economic limits to its
behaviour. There is a consistent commitment to budget discipline and a measured allocation of resources
among key claimants — the social and development sectors, as well as defence and security. That limits the allocation of resources
to power projection, particularly of the hard variety, even if such allocation is at a level high enough to cause considerable
discomfort in the West. The Russian economy is subject to particular pressures: stagnant growth even before the 2014 fall in oil prices, and the
budgetary and investment challenges of lower oil prices and sanctions. The commitment to budget discipline and a measured allocation of
resources has been maintained. However, there has also been a major rhetorical and policy shift towards a more ‘securitised’ economy, including
import substitution-led industry policy. There are major features of the Russian environment which threaten the success of such a policy shift, but
which are highly resistant to policy action. They include much discussed institutional weaknesses, as well as issues of remoteness, climate,
market size, and industrial location that make it difficult for Russian industry to be globally competitive. The West has no determining
influence over the Russian economy. But it is
able to raise the costs of great power behaviour, through reducing
access to investment and technology, and should do so. INTRODUCTION In recent years, Russia has re-entered the
geostrategic calculations of the West in ways reminiscent of the Cold War. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria and
the rhetoric of President Vladimir Putin, among other things, are symptomatic of this renewed assertiveness, but they do not explain it. There is
no question that much of this assertiveness can be attributed to the personality of Putin himself as well as the Russian nationalism that the
president has both fed and fed off. Nevertheless, it does not seem coincidental that Russia reasserted itself during a period of
rapid economic growth in the first 15 years of Putin’s rule. This raises the question of whether Russia can
afford to be the great power it clearly aspires to be. Russia’s desire to be a great power poses a challenge
to Western policymakers. There is, however, a spectrum of ‘greatness’ along which Russia can place
itself. Although Russia will attempt to situate itself as far along the spectrum as it can afford, at present
it is placed quite modestly. Its economic autonomy is tenuous, in terms of policy commitment and reality. Its control
over its claimed sphere of influence is limited, certainly when compared to Soviet and even Tsarist times. And its
activities in the far abroad are limited in scope and nature. Russia’s position along the spectrum of greatness is
predominantly a matter of economic capacity. Its economy is not without heft, ranking No 6 in the world by size (2015 GDP,
purchasing power parity).[1] Given that the prosperity of the population is seen by Russia as part of its great power status, income is as important
as the total size of the economy. However, Russia is still classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country, a category that
contains 56 countries ranging from Albania to Venezuela.[2] As this Analysis will show, Russia’s ability to escape this category is likely to be
limited. A mismatch between expectations and economic capacity presents Western policymakers concerned by recent Russian behaviour with
some interesting policy choices.
U – Recapitalization Incentive Program
The US will expand the Recapitalization Incentive Program, or RIP, now to poach
Russian clients --- eats away at their market share
Weisgerber 5-16-2019 - global business editor for Defense One, where he writes about the intersection of business and national
security. He has been covering defense and national security issues for more than a decade, previously as Pentagon correspondent for Defense
News (Marcus, “US: We’ll Pay Countries to Ditch Russian, Chinese Arms,” Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/05/us-
countries-well-pay-you-ditch-russian-chinese-arms/157084/)//BB
The State Department wants to go global with a program originally aimed at ex-Warsaw Pact members. The
U.S. State Department
wants to expand a little-known effort that offers countries cash to buy American-made weapons if they give
up Russian-made arms. The year-old initiative, called the European Recapitalization Incentive Program, is already helping
six eastern European countries buy new helicopters or armored vehicles. Now, State Department officials
are looking to take the effort global to get allies and partners to abandon not only Russian weapons, but Chinese
ones too. “The goal is to help our partners break away from the Russian supply chain [and] logistics chain that allows
Russian contractors and service personnel and Russian-manufactured spare parts onto either NATO allied bases or partner military bases,” a State
Department official said this week. The effort comes at a time as military officials across the Potomac River at the Pentagon talk
about great power competition between the U.S. and Russia and China. To get the money, countries must get
rid of their Russian weapons, promise not to buy new ones, and commit some of their own funding to
buying American. “It’s meant to incentivize partners and allies to put in their own funds to modernize
their military and divest Russian legacy equipment,” the State Department official said. “The idea being, we can put in some
U.S. grant military assistance. They would then put in some amount of partner military [funding].” The idea is to start the foreign country toward
buying a substantial number of whatever weapons are needed. “We’re going to build at least an initial amount,” the official said. “We’re not just
going to buy them one helicopter or two infantry fighting vehicles.” The American cash flows through a Foreign Military Financing account.
“We’re not using U.S. taxpayer money to completely buy this for a partner,” the official said. “This is going in with our partner together to build
an overarching capability.” The countries already approved for funding have militaries that use Soviet-era helicopters and infantry fighting
vehicles, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance. In some cases, if a country buys parts for these vehicles
and helicopters, they could face U.S. sanctions. Since the program began about a year ago, the State Department has pledged $190 million for six
projects in six countries. The countries are in different stages of buying the new equipment and State Department officials believe it could take a
few years until the partner nations are able to move ahead with the purchases. The countries include: Albania, $30 million for helicopters Bosnia,
$30.6 million for helicopters Croatia, $25 million for infantry fighting vehicles Greece, $25 million for infantry fighting vehicles North
Macedonia, $30 million for infantry fighting vehicles Slovakia, $50 million for helicopters The Macedonian government touted the effort as
“strengthening the capacities” of its army by improving its equipment and bringing it in line with NATO standards. State is looking at a second
round of initiatives with potential for $50 to $100 million for new projects, the official said. Even though the effort is still considered in a pilot or
test phase, the State Department’s fiscal 2020 budget proposal calls for expanding the effort. U.S. officials
are also looking at how to expand the initiative beyond Eastern Europe “to compete against Russia and
China and help our partners get away or stay away from Russian or Chinese equipment.” While State has not yet
identified countries outside of Europe, it’s exploring countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa .
Peeling off even a few clients collapses the Russian defense-industrial-base absent
new markets
Caverley 17 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Jonathan, “Slowing the Proliferation of Major Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market,” Ethics &
International Affairs, 31.4)//BB
Thanks to its large domestic consumption and numerous export deals, the United States is shielded from dependence on and demands by its
clients in ways undreamed of by any other arms exporter. Other weapons-exporting countries rely on relatively fewer
buyers, which means they enjoy less influence over clients, feel more pressure to transfer technology, and engage in more corruption to make
sales. In his definitive book on the global arms trade, Keith Krause lays out the consequence of these forces on “ second-tier producers,”
which “are much more prone to sacrifice or dilute their technological lead in order to maintain their productive base, and are much more
reliant upon export opportunities. They are therefore less likely to demand end-use restrictions, and hence reliance may not translate
into dependence.” Unsurprisingly, the United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. Its two biggest
customers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, account for 13 percent and 9 percent of all U.S. arms deliveries since 2012, respectively.
Another thirteen heterogeneous states account for 3-6 percent each. More surprisingly, Russia, despite being the second largest
global supplier of weapons, sells weapons to a very small group of buyers. For example, 39 percent of its exports go
to India, and 11 percent each go to Vietnam and China. Similarly, China sends 63 percent of its arms exports to only three countries: Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Myanmar. A shift of any one country away from Chinese or Russian imports would be devastating
for its respective industry, leaving buyers largely in the driver’s seat, demanding lower prices, more bribes, and larger technology transfer.
In contrast, European suppliers have a relatively diverse group of client states, if not quite as broad as the United States. That said, nearly half of
recent British exports have gone to Saudi Arabia.
U – brink
The viability of Russian defense exports is on the brink
Denisenetsev 17 – Visiting Fellow @ CSIS (Sergey, “Russia in the Global Arms Market,” CSIS, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170816_Denisentsev_RussiaGlobalArmsMarket_Web.pdf?VHDgCY.h54QWJm1lPCa2w1Lc.BjElJH)//BB
Numerous other factors have contributed to the decline of Russian arms exports: • Growing competition and the
emergence of new arms exporters. Several countries— especially China and South Korea, and to a lesser extent South Africa, Turkey, and
Singapore—have increased their arms exports in recent years, reducing the market share of Russian suppliers. Additionally, the World Trade
Organization has had an indirect impact on the global arms market. WTO rules have limited the ability of national governments to provide direct
stimulus measures to certain industries and exports, but these rules do not apply to the arms market because of national security implications. This
is why many governments use subsidies and encourage "dumping" on the weapons market in order to increase their exports. China also regards
arms supplies as instruments of political influence, so Chinese weapons are frequently offered to African, Asian, and Latin American buyers at
discounted prices as part of a broader Chinese expansion policy. • • Falling oil prices. The price of Brent crude collapsed from $113 per
barrel in the summer of 2014 to $28 in late 2015.45 This has clearly crippled the ability of Russian defense customers such as Algeria,
Azerbaijan, and Iraq to finance their imports. Oil prices have recently recovered to $48—S50 per barrel; however, they are not expected to rise by
much in the near future, thereby putting a cap on procurement programs in petro- states. Also worth mentioning is the crisis of the Bolivarian
project in Venezuela, though this was mostly caused by falling oil prices. The collapse of Libya and the subsequent loss of a $7 billion defense
contract package, of which $2 billion worth of contracts had already been signed.46 The Syrian Civil War. The sanctions on Iran. Western
sanctions on Russia itself. Russian companies that have been targeted by sanctions are finding it more difficult to attract credit financing and
upgrade production facilities. It should be noted, however, that the overall impact of sanctions on Russia's arms export programs is not large.47
Yet another factor undermining Russian arms exports is increased domestic demand for Russian weapons systems. Figure 8 shows Russian arms
exports and domestic defense procurement since 2003. Evidently, orders placed by Russia's own Ministry of Defense (MoD) began to grow
rapidly after the adoption of State Armament Program 2020. As a result of this growth, many suppliers have lost their production
capacity and have had to prioritize domestic contracts over export deliveries. For example, orders placed by the Russian MOD for the S-400
SAM systems will keep their supplier working until at least 2019, 48 thereby severely restricting the supplier's ability to serve export customers
that are unwilling to wait until 2020. Also, for many weapons systems, Russian production capacity has shrunk as a result of the
economic crisis, reforms, and privatizations in the 1990s. In addition to financial constraints, the SAP-2020 program is facing diminished
production capacity and shortages of qualified defense industrial specialists. A combination of all these factors has brought
Russian defense exports to the brink of crisis.
U – AT allies diversifying to Russia now
Sanctions are squeezing Russians arms sales to US allies now
Thompson 18 – Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (Andrea, “The State of Arms Control with
Russia,” Statement for the Record Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lexis)//BB
I would also note that oursanctions policy is an important element in maintaining pressure on Moscow to
abandon its malign activities, and that Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, or
CAATSA, is an important tool in our sanctions toolkit and in our strategic competition with Russia. Arms sales are not only an
important source of revenue for Moscow, but also a means of maintaining or growing its political and
military influence around the world. Ending those sales not only applies pressure to Russia to change its
behavior, but also helps to curb Russia’s access in places where it seeks to maintain or forge such ties. By
mandating sanctions on those who are engaging in significant transactions with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors, CAATSA
provides us with leverage in working with our partners and allied states, so that they reduce their military
ties to Russia, a country that has become an increasingly unreliable and risky security partner. Thus far, we
assess that our global campaign to implement CAATSA has denied Russia’s defense sector several billion dollars in
lost sales as states abandon pending arms deals with Moscow. The Department of State remains committed to the ongoing
full implementation of CAATSA Section 231, including through the imposition of sanctions as appropriate.
U – AT Pakistan
The Russia-Pakistan deal is incomplete --- if it does go through it’s a net loss
because of a loss of Indian sales
Iwanek 5-16-2019 - chair of the Asia Research Centre at the National Defence University at Warsaw and a South Asia expert with the
Poland-Asia Research Centre (Centrum Studiów Polska-Azja, www.polska-azja.pl). From 2014 to 2016 Krzysztof taught Hindi at the Hankuk
University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea. He holds two MA degrees: in History and in South Asian Studies, and a PhD in Cultural
Studies. (Krzysztof, “Russia’s Looming Arms Sale to Pakistan Sets Up a Dangerous Game,” The Diplomat,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-looming-arms-sale-to-pakistan-sets-up-a-dangerous-game/)//BB
On the heels of the recent tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, news broke out that Pakistan is set
to purchase the Pantsir surface-to-air missile system and T-90 tanks from Russia. If true, this deal would be
Russian industry’s biggest ever in its (to-date minuscule) arms trade with Pakistan and would have the potential to shift the
balance of Moscow’s relations with the two South Asian neighbors and rivals. One should be very careful with jumping to conclusions on
such deals, however. First, the media narrative often presents such agreements as if they were destined to
be finalized, ignoring the complex reality of negotiations. In the media, memoranda of understanding may
be confused with final deals, and any stage of talks can be presented as if the ink was already drying
down on the paper. In this case, the Times of Islamabad story actually mentioned that Islamabad “is now planning to send a
delegation to Moscow to finalize the deal” — and an awful lot of deals have died on the way to finalization,
often after years of protracted and delayed negotiations. As for the tanks, the news is that “Pakistan has drawn
up a plan to also procure 360 T-90 tanks” from Russia; there is an even longer and torturous way from
here to getting the tanks rolling on the plains of Punjab or Sindh by Pakistan’s border with India. But there
is a second reason to watch these developments with both an attentive eye and a cool head. Such a
purchase would cause a small political earthquake, and its epicenter would be located in India. By
allowing its companies to sell so much weaponry to Islamabad, Moscow would jeopardize its already decreasing
arms trade with its traditional South Asian client: New Delhi. The Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation, kept a strict policy of not selling weapons to Pakistan,
while remaining India’s close political partner and selling a lot of military hardware to New Delhi. This, however, changed beginning in 2014, when Moscow and Islamabad signed an agreement
to cooperate in the area of defense. The deal paved the way for the first-ever purchase of Russian military equipment by Pakistan: in 2015, the parties agreed that Islamabad would buy Mi-35M
attack helicopters. A lot of eyebrows were raised in New Delhi, and Russia’s clear position on the side of India was not so obvious anymore. The further purchase of Russian Mi-171E helicopters
attracted less attention but possibly had a significance of its own. The aircraft were supposed to be of the civilian variant and destined to be used by the government of the province of
Balochistan, and yet were reportedly used for night vision missions during the anti-terrorist Zarb-e-Azb operation. All of this was sided with a visible rise in a number of bilateral visits (a trend
that actually started in 2012-2013) and a commencement of a series of joint Russia-Pakistan military exercises. And yet so far the numbers are not astonishing. Russia has actually sold four Mi-
I would doubt if
35Ms and a few Mi-171Es to Pakistan. This cooperation is important politically, but constitutes a drop in the roaring rivers of international arms trade.
Moscow could suddenly jump from this level to providing hundreds of tanks to Pakistan without anybody
blinking; every large military deal requires a lot of political backing and maneuvering. The deals do suggest certain policy changes, however, and a growth of multilateral attitudes on all
sides. On one side there are Russians, whose overall export options are in fact very limited (and were further reduced in wake of sanctions that followed Moscow’s brutal interference in Ukraine).
Military technology is actually one of the very few areas where Russia has much to export on offer, and the countries of the Middle East and Asia remain primary buyers. On the other side there
is Islamabad, for which a limited number of choices on the international scene is a permanent situation. Pakistan’s love-hate relationship with United States, in which both countries seem to be
more forced than willing to cooperate, got even more cold and complicated ever since Osama bin Laden was found to be living in Abbottabad. This and a host of other factors led to a gradual
decrease of U.S. financial aid to Pakistan ever since. For Islamabad, in view of its increasingly troubled relations with Washington and its already-visible overdependence on Beijing, it would be
natural to at attempt at least some, however limited, cooperation with Russia. Some have already speculated that South Asia is heading into a global alliance swap: India would become the
United States’ primary partner (including in military affairs), while Pakistan would side with Russia. But let’s face it: the selling of a handful of helicopters amounts neither to Russia’s scoring a
meaningful victory in its attempts to prop up exports nor to Pakistan’s changing its main global partner. The real center of gravity in Moscow-Islamabad relations lies in New Delhi. It is the
growing cooperation between India and the United States in the area of defense, I believe, that prompted the Russians to init iate this kind of cooperation with Pakistan. The signing of a few major
Indo-American agreements of cooperation in defense (such as LEMOA) and a few big-tickets purchases of American hardware by India (such as the Apache and Chinook helicopters) caused
anxiety and anger in Russia. This was coupled with a decrease in Moscow’s military exports to India and, with it, Russian companies losing some of the key bids to American, French, and Israeli
competition (Rosoboronexport’s Komardin was heard fuming about this). It is in these circumstances, I think, that Russia decided to start cooperating with Pakistan in security-related issues. And
India is simply a bigger market than Pakistan. It does not make sense for Russia
yet one additional obvious observation is that
to swap this market for Pakistan; the trick would be then in either having both markets open to oneself or retaining a considerable chunk of the Indian market. New
Delhi lately often chose more advanced military technology when it could, and hence Russian products are less in demand there than they used to be. Yet, many have competitive prices and some
are technologically still very attractive, not only for poorer states. The Indo-Russian arms trade still has a lot of potential, and the recent deals and negotiations between Moscow and New Delhi
attest to this (the recent agreement to sell the S-400 system to India is the best, if special, example of this).
U – AT China
Russian sales to China will decline now
Reaves 18 – MA in Security Studies (Andrew, “RUSSIAN ARMS SALES IN THE AGE OF PUTIN: FOR POLITICS OR PROFIT?,”
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Archives,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/59571/18Jun_Reaves_Andrew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//BB
From a distance, Putin’s recent large contracts of Russia’s most modern platforms would appear to
indicate a positive outlook on future Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation. However, as Sukhankin
surmises: Selling [arms] to China might provide the struggling Russian economy with a much-needed injection of funds and the Kremlin with
illusory hopes for political support from Beijing. But the excited rhetoric regarding these arms sales obscures important
negative trends that Moscow has been ignoring.252 Specifically, China’s ongoing development of its MIC,
rising Chinese arms exports, Russian arms sales to Beijing’s geopolitical competitors, and underlying
Sino-Russian strategic contradictions contribute to the continued reduction of Moscow’s arms sales to
Beijing. Due to the increased capabilities of the Chinese MIC, Beijing no longer entertains Russian offers to import older systems, but instead
demands the most modern platforms.253 While Russia can still count on Beijing’s needs for niche technologies like aircraft engines and
advanced air defense platforms, Beijing’s wish list of Russian equipment is rapidly dwindling. As Figure 6 displays,
China’s imports of Russian equipment have changed from a wide variety of military equipment to—with the exception of transport helicopters—
mostly subsystems needed to outfit domestically-produced equipment. Such changes have also decreased Russia’s share of Chinese imports and,
reciprocally, China’s percentage of Russian exports, as Figures 7 and 8 depict. Ultimately, as Matthew Bodner states, “ Russia has a very
limited catalogue of military hardware that it can sell to Beijing at this point...Russia has already sold
most everything else.”254 Thus, without continued Russian modernization of its defense industry and development of newer and more
technologically advanced weapons systems, Russian arms sales to Beijing will continue to decrease. Unsurprisingly, one of
China’s objectives in developing it owns defense industry has remained reducing its dependence on other states, like Russia.258 With that
decrease of dependence on Russian equipment, the potential for Moscow to leverage arms sales for political or economic benefits also declines.
Such a future outlook, especially in a period of economic sanctions and continued negative relations with the West, is troubling for Moscow.
China’s defense industry has also demonstrated its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Unlike Russia’s MIC, which requires massive, top-
down oversight to ensure its survival, the Chinese MIC has continually dealt with changing circumstances and government requirements with
bottom-up solutions.259 Recently, the CCP has created multiple new initiatives to boost innovation and emerging technology development
through “marketizing” several defense industries.260 Such flexibility in the Chinese arms industry bodes well for its
future success and its greater independence from Russian arms.
U – AT India
Russian sales to India will decline now
India’s ongoing attempts to create a domestic MIC also foreshadow a future decrease in Russian arms
sales to India. New Delhi’s first inclinations for self-sufficiency occurred during the 1990s as Russia slowly retreated from its international
commitments to deal with internal economic issues. The aforementioned technical issues with Russian arms imports and slow
response times in procuring repair parts further motivated New Delhi’s attempts at MIC self-sufficiency.
Reporting by the Jamestown Foundation in 1997 stated that “Indian officials have reportedly indicated their unease over
possible delays in Russia’s export of parts for its military hardware [and] suggested that, for this reason,
India is pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in arms production that will be based in part on acquiring licenses to produce
Russian weaponry at home.”479 India was true to its word. Beginning in the late 1990s, larger Russian sales of aircraft
and tanks all included a portion of the transferred equipment marked for domestic assembly under
licensed production agreements.
India won’t buy from Russia in the future
While India’s domestic production capabilities might take a long time to build platforms that can compete with Russian equipment,
external competition immediately threatens Russia’s domination of India’s arms import market. As Stephen Blank
summarizes, “The trend that Russia now faces—of ever greater competition from other producers—will not be reversed...India will
continue to diversify its defense imports.”489 Unlike in China, where Beijing is constructing a highly capable domestic MIC that
challenges Russia’s market share, Western countries—such as the United States, France, and Israel—are the Russian’s main competitors for
Indian contracts. Multiple factors paint a pessimistic picture of Russia’s ability to maintain its dominant claim
of the India arms market. As mentioned previously, India has had a choice between vendors since the
cancellation of arms embargos following its 1998 nuclear tests.490 Russia’s ongoing technical problems with several of
its imported platforms—namely MBTs, aircraft, submarines, and the Admiral Gorshkov—foment New Delhi’s discontent.491 Russia also lacks a
competitive advantage over the more inventive and financially stable Western countries. With Russia’s economy declining and innovative
capacity waning, Western countries provide India a better source of potential technology transfers and defensive production indigenization, all of
which are key factors for India’s long-term strategic MIC goals.492 Current Western sanctions only further impair Russia’s MIC and ability to
produce technologically advanced equipment.493 As such, the Indians certain have several motivations to look elsewhere for arms vendors.
Geopolitical factors also stimulate India’s desire to diversify its arms sales. While Russia’s desire for suzerainty might shade its view of India and
consider it a de facto tributary state, India does not reciprocate such a perspective. Neither does New Delhi feel that its relationship with Moscow
is mutually exclusive. As Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes said in 2002 during a visit by General Michael Myers, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “We are working together [with both], and I don’t think there is any conflict of interest between our relations with the
United States and our relations with Russia.”494 Furthermore, as Indian worry rises with China’s continual economic growth and military
expenditure increases, New Delhi will ultimately trust Washington more to balance China, not Russia, who depends on Beijing
to join in its crusade against American hegemony. For India, the United States and its various allies certainly appear as
more preferred partners.
LINK
L – generic fill-in
The plan triggers both a supply and demand response:
--- ____ turns to Russia to compensate for the plan’s cut-off of supply
east/)//BB
Russia’s arms—generally speaking—are well made, sometimes on par with the U.S., and well suited for the
region’s needs. These platforms and armaments are also more affordable than Western weaponry. The U.S. simply will
not sell weapons to certain countries, which, therefore, turn to Moscow. Politically, Russian arms come with
few strings attached and thus are a great choice when a country wants to diversify away from the West, or at least signal such an intent.
Moscow has made inroads with traditional clients such as Iran, Syria and Egypt, but also diversified toward countries closer to the West, such as
the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Turkey. Russia’s overall influence in the region is growing in the context of Western retreat. The Russian
defense sector has problems, but also demonstrated improvements, learning and flexibility. Undoubtedly,
Russia’s arms sales to the MENA region will continue to present a challenge for American interests in this region in the
coming years.
---AND, Russia exploits the arms vacuum

Russia,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)
Fourth, Russia is likely to continue to be seen as a reliable source of weapons for countries that do not enjoy
warm relations with the US. This means that a wider range of countries are potential markets for Russian exporters, in contrast with the
situation facing some of their Western competitors. Russian armaments producers have the opportunity to exploit the tensions
that exist between the US and countries such as Iran, China or Syria, and also those that may emerge in countries that
traditionally source their weapons from the US, such as Turkey, Egypt or the Philippines.
It’s empirically true --- Egypt proves fill-in
The effect of U.S. market power is not absolute and is likely only to delay the spread of weapons. As
the Egyptian case
demonstrates, when the United States restricts weapons to punish what it considers bad behavior, other
countries can fill the gap. The recent removal of many technologies from the United States Munitions
List—a roster of products subject to controls under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976—was driven in part by the American
arms industry convincing the government that it is losing competitive advantage abroad. Consequently, many
weapons transfers may no longer be subject to rigorous human rights vetting and end-use monitoring by the State Department. Eroding
American market dominance of higher-end weapons makes it less likely that the United States will
continue to exercise its traditional policy of “unilateral restraint” in their sale.
***that card references the ‘Egyptian case’ ---- that was an example of Russian fill-
in
TOI 13 (Times of Israel, “Egypt ‘looking to Russia’ for arms after US aid freeze,” Lexis)//BB
Egypt is looking to Russia to supply it with arms now that the US has frozen much of its military aid to
the Egyptians, Israeli television reported Friday night. The “historic achievement,” under which the US brought Egypt into its orbit in the
years since the 1979 Camp David Israel-Egypt peace treaty, is about to “go down the drain,” the Channel 2 report said. It referred to comments
earlier this week by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, who said ties between Cairo and Washington were in
“turmoil” and told CNN that Egypt would have to “find other sources” to meet its national security needs .
By “other sources,” said the TV report, Fahmy was referring to Russia, with whom Egypt was now looking to
conclude a major arms deal. This would represent a major change of orientation for Egypt, since its entire army had been built on US
equipment for the past three decades. The news came four days after reports that Israel had argued “directly and bluntly” with the Obama
administration against US aid cuts to Egypt, telling Washington it was making “a strategic error” in reducing financial
assistance to Cairo in the wake of the military’s ouster of president Mohammed Morsi.
Russia will pounce on US arms cuts wherever possible
Freilich 18 –Senior Fellow, International Security Program @ Harvard (Chuck, “How Russia Is Taking Over the Middle East, One
Country at a Time,” Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russia-taking-over-middle-east-one-country-time)//BB
President Putin's
fundamental strategic objective is to restore Russian global leadership, or to put it
somewhat less delicately, to stick it to the United States wherever possible. His primary problem is that
Russia does not have that much to offer today, it cannot compete with the United States and Western
countries on an economic level, or alternatively on a diplomatic one, and all it does have to offer is weapons,
nuclear technology, and energy.
Russia will exploit the arms gap left by the US

Russia,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)//BB
Even in those Asian countries that do not account for a large share of Russian exports, such as Myanmar, Turkmenistan and Mongolia, Russia
is often the primary or a prominent source of arms supplies. In recent years, it has
attempted to enter markets traditionally
dominated by other powers. For example, efforts to increase sales to Pakistan, traditionally supplied by China and the US, are
beginning to bear fruit.30 Indonesia has tended to purchase weaponry from European countries, but Russia has also made inroads into that market
and accounted for over 20 per cent of Indonesian arms imports in 2000–16. Indonesia is now being targeted by Russia as a potential purchaser of
Su-35 aircraft and Varshavyanka-class submarines.31 Russia is also targeting countries that have traditionally sourced
armaments from the US. Recently, it has shown a willingness to exploit the deterioration in relations between
the US and the Philippines to carve out sales opportunities there.32
This is consistent with Russia’s foreign policy objectives

Stronski and Sokolsky 17 – *senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, where his research focuses on the relationship
between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus., **nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia
Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. (Paul and Richard, “The Return of Global Russia: An
Analytical Framework,” Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-
75003)//BB
Though its
foreign actions are often opportunistic, Russia increasingly aims to create a multipolar world in
which it plays a more prominent role. Moscow’s national security establishment broadly supports this international outreach, which
will likely remain an enduring feature of Russian foreign policy. Washington and its allies must carefully judge Russian actions case by case and
respond in concert when possible. THE KREMLIN’S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA Moscow has relied on relatively
inexpensive diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to wield influence and expand its
global footprint. The Kremlin has capitalized on Western missteps and growing anti-establishment sentiments in
Europe and North America. Russia will likely continue trying to fill global power vacuums resulting from U.S.
President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Formulating an effective
response to Russia’s global activism will be challenging. To do so, U.S. policymakers should consider four broad points: Ask the first-order
question. How do Russia’s actions affect U.S. interests and foreign policy goals? In some areas, Russian activities have damaged U.S. interests,
but elsewhere their impact has been symbolic rather than substantive. Russian activity should not be conflated with Russian success. Weigh costs
and benefits. Russia’s approach has had mixed results. Its investments in the Middle East have paid off handsomely. But in Europe, Russian
actions have mobilized Western governments to counter them. Notably, Moscow has fewer resources than the West, serious domestic problems,
and no real allies. Avoid overreacting. Not every instance of Russian activism threatens the U.S.-led international order or U.S. security. At a
minimum, Washington and its allies should expose Moscow’s tactics. More robust responses are justified when important U.S. and allied
interests are threatened—and when Washington has realistic, sustainable means to thwart Moscow’s ambitions without exacerbating the situation.
Leverage partnerships and eschew a one-size-fits-all approach. There is no cookie-cutter solution for countering Russian adventurism.
Washington need not bear this burden alone; it should develop tailored strategies with other actors to deter, contain, and, if necessary, roll back
Russian influence operations. INTRODUCTION For much of the post–Cold War era, the United States and Europe paid little attention to
Russia’s efforts to expand its political, economic, and military influence abroad. The West saw these efforts as relics of the Cold War, primarily
confined to Russia’s immediate neighborhood but largely absent or at least ineffective elsewhere. The effects of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Russia’s internal challenges, and Moscow’s stated desire for integration with the West sharply constrained the Kremlin’s interest and
capacity to project its influence on a global scale and diminished the West’s interest in Russian foreign policy and its global activities. However,
since Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency in 2012 after a four-year stint as prime minister, Russia has engaged in a broad,
sophisticated, well-resourced, and—to many observers—surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. To advance its diverse
objectives, Moscow has relied on a wide array of diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to influence political
systems, public attitudes, and elite decisionmakers in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These objectives include, first
and foremost, undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order and the cohesion of the West; enhancing Putin’s domestic legitimacy by
demonstrating Russia’s status as a global superpower; promoting specific Russian commercial, military, and energy interests; and tweaking the
United States’ nose in areas of traditional U.S. influence. Russia has engaged in a broad, sophisticated, well-resourced, and—to many
observers—surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. The Kremlin launched this campaign in response to the 2012 mass protests
in Moscow, apparently convinced that Western democracy promotion initiatives had instigated these demonstrations to destabilize Russia itself
and promote regime change.1 In 2014, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of its undeclared war in Ukraine, this
counteroffensive intensified and took on new qualities. Whereas previously the bulk of Russian efforts had focused on defending Moscow’s
claimed “sphere of privileged interests” around its periphery, the new campaign has sought to damage the international image of Western
democracy, exacerbate the internal tensions within Western political and security institutions, and expand Russia’s global reach at the expense of
Washington and its allies by playing on Western missteps in different parts of the world. For the first time since the breakup of the
Soviet Union, the United States is facing a Russia that is not, in former president Barack Obama’s memorable phrase, a mere
“regional power,” but rather one that is actively trying to project its influence and establish a presence well beyond
its periphery.2 Despite Moscow’s shift in strategy, the United States and its European partners are increasingly focused on their own
domestic challenges and regional crises in Asia and the Middle East. Russia is keen to exploit increased opportunities in the
resulting vacuum, using both hard and soft power, to expand its influence and presence and to take advantage of
Donald Trump’s presidency, marked by his embrace of an “America First” foreign policy and:3 a retreat from long-established U.S.
leadership in upholding the rules-based international order Washington helped create after World War II; an abandonment of democracy
promotion and rule of law as elements of U.S. foreign policy; a return to isolationism and a rejection of nation-building efforts to redirect U.S.
resources needed at home; a dismissal of multilateral cooperation and a devaluation of long-standing U.S. alliances; the worst domestic political
crisis in the United States in many decades; and, most importantly, a refusal to acknowledge the challenge posed by Russian adventurism.
Finding examples of Russian global activism is easy. Assessing its motivations, consequences, and effectiveness is not.
Specifically, it can be hard to tell whether a given Russian behavior is meant to actively undermine the liberal political and economic order that
has flourished under U.S. leadership or whether it is designed primarily to shore up Putin’s domestic standing and to create timely economic
opportunities for domestic Russian constituencies that support his regime. Likewise, framing a coherent and effective U.S. response to Russia’s
increased global activism will be challenging. The risk of doing too much or too little is real, and getting the answer right entails asking a series
of challenging questions. Is Moscow’s behavior largely symbolic or does it threaten the interests of the United States or its closest allies? What is
the cost to U.S. interests of Russia’s efforts to gain geopolitical and economic toeholds beyond its immediate neighborhood? When should
Russian actions trigger a strong U.S. response? Which Russian activities may risk overreach and pushback? What are the best ways to measure
the impact—both in Russia and the West—of Moscow’s recent global activism? Finding examples of Russian global activism is easy. Assessing
its motivations, consequences, and effectiveness is not. Identifying the key drivers of Russia’s global activism and providing an overview of
Moscow’s many efforts to expand its global influence is a useful and important way to begin formulating appropriate and effective responses to
these behaviors. In some areas, Russian activities have damaged Western interests, but in others their impact has proven to be more symbolic than
substantive. Not every far-flung Russian initiative should be viewed as part of a global zero-sum competition between the United States and
Russia, and the costs to Russia of some of these efforts could exceed the benefits Moscow hopes to gain. Policymakers should seek to assess the
interests that a given Russian behavior is seeking to advance, which policy tools Moscow is employing, which U.S. interests are being
undermined, and which U.S. policy tools would constitute the most effective response. THE WEST AND THE REST Russia’s global activism
can be divided into four geographic regions. While there may be some uncertainty about the drivers at play in each of these regions, there is little
uncertainty about the considerable momentum behind these efforts. In general, Moscow’s ordering of priorities aligns closely with the proximity
of the region to Russia, as well as with Russian threat perceptions. First are Moscow’s efforts to retain its influence or counter Western influence
in the states of the former Soviet Union. In its immediate periphery, Moscow aims to firm up its hold on its neighbors to prevent additional
countries from aligning too closely with the West, and to preserve a buffer zone of pro-Russian or, at least, neutral states around it. In countries
that have already turned away from Russia—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—Moscow seeks to undermine their political transitions, court their
publics, and prevent their true integration with Western political, economic, or security structures. Moscow also is keen to shore up its influence
in Central Asia, a region increasingly dominated economically by China. The second category consists of Moscow’s efforts to undermine the
Western and transatlantic institutions it considers its principal adversaries—the United States, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Moscow has attempted to exploit their internal divisions and challenges as well as the uncertainty about
Washington’s commitment to its allies and partners since President Donald Trump’s embrace of the “America First” agenda. Moscow’s anti-
Western actions are motivated by a widely held view in the Russian security establishment that the administrations of former presidents Barack
Obama and George W. Bush actively sought to weaken Russia domestically, undermine its influence internationally, increase its isolation, and
carry out regime change around Russia’s periphery and even in the country itself. Russian leaders apparently have decided to do to the West what
they believe the West has done to them. Third, Russia is engaging in a campaign to gain or regain influence in other places where the Soviet
Union once held sway. In the Balkans, for example, Russia plays the nationalist and Christian Orthodox cards to complicate Western efforts to
integrate these countries into European structures. In the Middle East, Russia seeks to protect its longstanding equities in Syria and to convey its
purported great power status to domestic and international audiences, as well as its capacity to act beyond its immediate neighborhood and gain a
foothold in what is seen as a traditionally U.S. sphere of influence. The final category consists of Russian efforts to gain influence in parts of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Some of these efforts involve forming coalitions of rising powers willing to challenge the Western-dominated
tries to cultivate authoritarian leaders and take advantage of frictions between
international system; elsewhere, Moscow
the United States and some of its traditional allies or partners. In Latin America, in particular, Moscow hopes to embarrass
Washington and show that it too can make a foray into its main global adversary’s backyard.
L – HR conditions
The plan causes client states to diversify supply through Russia --- the link alone
takes out the case ---the US will try, but fail, to regain market dominance after
Russia fill the vacuum
Rounds 19 – Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in International Relations (Ray, “THE CASE AGAINST ARMS EMBARGOS,
EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA,” War on The Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-
arabia/)//BB
One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great again is international arms sales. The
United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains a distant 23
percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top 100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen
estimated at between 16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest client — Saudi Arabia
— have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More generally, several authors have penned articles in
these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by
economic motivations and more by concern about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully
disagree with all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase, an outright embargo, like
Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016 Turkish Patriot missile request, using the withholding of arms
sales as a blunt force instrument of coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often
backfires. Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to
client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state
into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing
instead of shifting course. Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about demands for direct offsets mistake what is
known as “design technology transfer” for the much more difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for
now it is worth noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation of an independent defense
industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with
the appropriate end-user controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing
financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it comes to preserving complex production lines for
future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but
simply because it is unlikely to work. Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining
communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of
coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the
arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed
similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally
coercive tools is rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful
when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, punishments in the
form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior. Consider
Indonesia and Egypt. In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase nearly 50 Russian MiG-29M/M2s and more than two-dozen
French Rafales. This represented a shocking turn of events after more than three decades of purchasing only American-made fighter jets. It was
also driven largely by the U.S. embargo put in place in 2013, after the Egyptian army’s removal of then-President Mohamed
Morsi, who had won the presidency in a 2012 election. The embargo caused significant tension between the two states driven by “an Egyptian
sense that they were at a point of mortal peril” while the United States was moralizing about democratic reforms. Remarkably, the United
States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies, no official U.S. “democracy
certification”, and Egyptian military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The U.S. arms embargo as a tool of coercive change was an abject
failure. A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the
United States with no history of Russian imports, Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to
purchase Russian Su-27/30s. While Indonesia was always far more politically neutral than Egypt, this remarkable turnaround in arms
sourcing diversification appears to be the result of a U.S. arms embargo implemented in 1999 in response to Indonesia’s apparent human rights
violations carrying out heavy-handed military actions in East Timor. Furious at U.S. meddling in something the government considered a
domestic issue, Indonesia looked instead to Russia with the specific intent to “overcome the effects of [U.S.] arms sales restrictions.” In other
words, Indonesia looked to diversify, not capitulate. Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United
States lifted the embargo in 2005. Perhaps most remarkably, even after the United States agreed to give Indonesia 24 F-16s in 2012, the
archipelago state still agreed to purchase 11 Russian Su-35s. The U.S. attempt at coercion not only failed but continues to perpetuate negative
strategic effects today. Who’s Afraid of Technology Transfer? Another argument for a more restrictive arms export policy concerns direct
industrial offsets (those economic agreements in which a supplier invests in the industry of a client state directly related to the arms being
transferred) and technology transfer. However, these tools should not be feared. Technology transfer is unlikely to breed meaningful competition
for the United States where it matters most, in the medium- to high-end markets, and instead gives the United States a source of political
influence. The problem in many analyses is confusion over the type of technology transfer. There are three ideal-typical categories of transfer:
material transfer, such as simple diffusion of weapons and machines; design transfer, like blueprints and schematics; and capacity transfer, which
involves basic scientific knowledge and expertise within the industrial base. Most technology transfers ultimately fall into the first two categories,
despite what a client state might hope for. Consider the 2003 Polish decision to purchase F-16s from Lockheed Martin with direct offsets valued
at more than $6 billion. This represented 170 percent of the program value and the then-largest in commercial history. Despite this massive
investment, Poland does not design and produce their own fighter jets today, but rather subsections of American-designed systems under license.
In fact, direct offsets provided inroads for U.S. industry in the Polish defense industry in a manner that strongly incentivizes the Poles to continue
purchasing U.S. aircraft, and indeed Poland appears poised to purchase the F-35 in the near future. Offsets and technology transfer may have
helped revive portions of the Polish defense industry and provided some domestic job creation, but it did not create an independent competitor to
the U.S. defense industry. This is exactly as expected with material and design levels of transfer. While some of the very largest industrial states,
such as India or China, might eventually create a world-leading defense industry, it will remain out of the grasp of most states. Consider China,
an unquestionable economic powerhouse of recent decades. Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer,
blatant reverse engineering attempts, and hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for
help with the most advanced weaponry such as fighter jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radars, and jet engines. If China, the
second largest economy in the world struggles so mightily, what threat do smaller, less capable states pose? Capacity transfer, the acquisition of
basic scientific knowledge and expertise crafted over decades, cannot simply be uploaded, emailed to another state, or hacked. Rather, it takes
decades of intentional and costly investment. For high-end weaponry, where research and development costs remain a prohibitive barrier to entry,
the United States and a handful of other advanced economies are likely to remain in the driver’s seat; even with generous technology transfer
agreements. Finally, consider some of the negative second- and third-order effects that excessive restriction caused in
American unwillingness to commit to selling the U.S.-made Patriot missile system and its underlying technology
to Turkey. This was recently posited as a U.S. export restriction success. However, this restraint looks less successful each passing day. Even
with significant design transfer, it is unlikely Turkey could obtain the requisite capacity transfer to be self-sufficient in surface-to-air and anti-
missile defense systems anytime soon. Conversely, by using U.S. technology, the United States could have legally restricted Turkey’s future
export of it. More importantly, Turkey has since agreed to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile
system, a blow to U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey. The S-400 purchase will put advanced Russian technology and military advisors
inside a NATO ally and tier-two F-35 industrial partner that is a sole-source supplier on several F-35 components. As the Air Force Secretary said
last year about Turkey’s S-400 agreement, “Sometimes it’s the United States that’s part of the problem.” Even worse, the United
States has since approved the sale of the Patriot to Turkey, with the acting U.S. Defense Secretary recently commenting,
“we need Turkey to buy the Patriot.” Was holding back on some surface-to-air missile technology worth the strategic cost? It appears unlikely.
The US will currently limit Russian influence with an unrestricted arms sales policy
---the plan disrupts that strategy and cedes diplomatic turf to Russia
Economist 18 (The global arms trade is booming. Buyers are spoiled for choice. Increased competition
between suppliers means buyers have the upper hand., https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/the-global-arms-
trade-is-booming-buyers-are-spoiled-for-choice)//BB
ONLY a few months ago, Canadians were earnestly debating whether or not the country’s Liberal
administration was right to go ahead with executing a $12bn contract to deliver armoured vehicles to
Saudi Arabia. The government said it would, but acknowledged its critics’ concerns by agreeing to adopt a version of an international treaty
that limits arms sales to rogues (see article). However, things took a different turn. It was the Saudis who plunged the deal into
uncertainty. After Canada’s foreign minister urged the release of some political prisoners on Twitter, the Saudi government declared that all
new business with Canada was suspended. This left Canadians unsure if the kingdom still wants the arms deal. And if the Saudis do walk away,
plenty of other countries will be happy to supply armoured cars. “They could get their combat vehicles from Turkey, South Korea or Brazil,” says
Pieter Wezeman, a researcher at SIPRI, a Stockholm-based think-tank. In the United States, meanwhile, Congress has been pressing
the administration to implement the letter of a law that would force countries to make a hard, instant
choice between buying American or Russian weapons. But the Pentagon is hinting that America’s huge
diplomatic power does not quite stretch that far. Defence officials argue it would be better to accept that some countries will go on
buying Russian weapons for a while, in the hope they will gradually kick the habit. Both these developments reflect the volatile (and
from a Western viewpoint, barely controllable) state of the global arms market. Total demand is growing, the
number of sellers is rising and the Western countries that have dominated the business are less confident of
shaping the playing field. Above all, buyers are becoming more insistent on their right to shop around. For the
likes of India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, “this is a buyer’s market,” says Lucie Béraud-Sudreau of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think-tank. Speak softly and sell a big stick The numbers show that the global
commerce in conventional weapons is still dominated by the United States. But America feels strangely
nervous about maintaining that role, and this year it has adopted a more aggressive sales posture. Under a
policy proclaimed in April and mapped out in more detail last month, American diplomats have been told to promote weapons sales more
actively and speed up procedures for approving them. At first sight, American apprehensions seem puzzling. There are
several ways to measure the arms market, but America comes out on top of all of them. SIPRI has studied the volume of cross-border weapon
transfers over the five years to December and compared them with the previous five years (see chart). The size of the world market rose by 10%
between the two periods. In the more recent one, America’s slice of this expanding pie was 34%, up from 30% in the previous five years.
America and its five nearest rivals (in descending order Russia, France, Germany, China and Britain), account for nearly 80% of total transfers.
Britain, meanwhile, claims that last year it jumped to third place among global arms exporters, as measured by the value of their sales. According
to the Defence and Security Organisation, a government body, America bagged 53% of the global business, its “highest-ever market share”. This
left 16% for Russia and 12% for Britain, double the share taken by France. In part, the jumpiness in Washington, DC, stems
from the entry to the market of new competitors, especially China. In part it reflects new products and technologies where
America will struggle to keep its lead. Both these challenges were highlighted by the appearance at last year’s Paris Air Show of a Chinese
military drone that looked very like the American unmanned aircraft that have been used for assassinations, for example in Pakistan. Hitherto,
America has been willing to share these powerful drones only with close European allies. A new policy will broaden the range of customers and
thus lessen the risk that China will dominate a market that could soon be worth $50bn a year. China has long been better known as a buyer of
arms, mainly from Russia, than as a seller. A big share of its arms deliveries have gone to close allies such as Pakistan. But it has enormously
increased its capacity to make and sell its own weapons, including ships and submarines. Meanwhile, American arms-export policy
has been a delicate balance between, on the one hand, seizing economic and geopolitical opportunity and, on the
other, being careful not to share technologies which could destabilise war zones or be used against the United States. But such caution
can be counter-productive. At a panel discussion in Washington this month, a defence-industry advocate lamented that, because of
America’s technology-transfer curbs, France had won from it a contract to sell airborne radar to India. “I like the French, but I like American
industry even more,” he grumbled. In another Franco-American contest over technology, France is finding it hard to sell more Rafale combat
aircraft to its prize arms customer, Egypt, because the accompanying Scalp cruise missile incorporates American know-how, the transfer of which
to third parties is barred. France has promised to develop its own technology, but Egypt may not have the patience to wait. Egypt’s government
has also been a keen purchaser of Russian equipment, including aircraft and attack helicopters. For defence-equipment manufacturers such as
Britain and France, export sales matter ever more as a way to maintain their own industries. Britain’s edge in military aviation may depend on its
sales to Saudi Arabia. And the Royal Navy’s ambitious building programme got a boost when Australia said it would buy British for a new range
of frigates. France wants to develop a new air-to-air missile, but only, as Florence Parly, the defence minister, put it, if it can get foreign
customers. Such desperation adds to the frenzy of market competition. So does the utter indifference Russia
and China display towards their customers’ human-rights policies. So too does the growth in the number of countries that
have graduated from being mainly buyers of weapons and knowhow to sellers—Turkey, the Emirates and South Korea, for example. Japan,
which boasts a huge defence industry, is entirely new to the market. It plunged in when the government lifted restrictions on arms exports in
2014. It competes, albeit from a fairly weak position, with China for Asia-Pacific customers. As for Russia, SIPRI calculates that its share of
the global market has slipped (to about 22% in 2013-17). But it offers
a blend of tried-and-tested hardware and, to a few
customers, superb know-how, especially in air defence. That creates a dilemma for America, which hopes soon
to sell weapons worth $6bn to India, but is dismayed by that country’s determination to acquire S-400 air-defence systems from Russia: missiles
that could ward off potential threats from China or Pakistan. Other countries intent on continuing to buy Russian include Indonesia and Vietnam.
Jim Mattis, America’s defence secretary, has implored Congress not to be too harsh with Russia’s customers, so long as they pledge gradually to
reduce their reliance. In a letter leaked in July to Breaking Defense, a specialist news service, he told a congressman: “We are faced with a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to decrease Russia’s dominance in key regions.” But that could only
happen if America were free to sell its own weapons. For customers, that means that for the foreseeable future they can
keep both American and Russian weapons in their arsenals.
Allowing arms sales to human rights violators allows the U.S. to compete with
Russia
Stohl, 17 --- M.A. in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and managing at the Stimson Center
and directs the Center’s Conventional Defense Program (2/6/17, Rachel, “Trump’s Opportunity to Support Transparency, Accountability on the
Conventional Arms Trade,” https://www.stimson.org/content/trump-opportunity-support-transparency-accountability-conventional-arms-trade,
accessed on 6/8/19, JMP)
Based on Trump’s past statements, including support for known dictators and human rights abusers such as
Russia’s Vladmir Putin and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, as well as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s testimony during his confirmation
hearing, human rights violations are unlikely to be major criteria in determining arms sales
authorizations. Allowing weapons to flow unimpeded to human rights abusers opens the door for U.S.
arms sales to human rights abusing governments in the Middle East, Latin America and Asia, and allows
the United States to compete with Russia and Iran for arms sales to the world’s worst dictators. The Trump
administration will have to decide if that is the legacy it wants to leave at the end of its term.
L – Saudi
The plan causes Saudi to seek arms from Russia --- completely obviates any benefit
of the plan
arabia/)//BB
One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great again is international arms sales. The
United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales (second place Russia remains a distant 23
percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top 100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen
estimated at between 16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest client — Saudi Arabia
— have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More generally, several authors have penned articles in
these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by
economic motivations and more by concern about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully
disagree with all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase, an outright embargo, like
Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016 Turkish Patriot missile request, using the withholding of arms
sales as a blunt force instrument of coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often
backfires.
Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client
states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into
changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing
instead of shifting course. Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about demands for direct offsets mistake what is
known as “design technology transfer” for the much more difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for
now it is worth noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation of an independent defense
industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with
the appropriate end-user controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing
financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it comes to preserving complex production lines for
future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but
simply because it is unlikely to work.
Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms
Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary
states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior
U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year
during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous
research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts
using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi
Arabia. Instead, punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change
behavior.
Consider Indonesia and Egypt. In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase nearly 50 Russian MiG-29M/M2s and more than
two-dozen French Rafales. This represented a shocking turn of events after more than three decades of purchasing only American-made fighter
jets. It was also driven largely by the U.S. embargo put in place in 2013, after the Egyptian army’s removal of then-President
Mohamed Morsi, who had won the presidency in a 2012 election. The embargo caused significant tension between the two states driven by “an
Egyptian sense that they were at a point of mortal peril” while the United States was moralizing about democratic reforms. Remarkably, the
United States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies, no official U.S.
“democracy certification”, and Egyptian military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The U.S. arms embargo as a tool of coercive change
was an abject failure.
A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the United
States with no history of Russian imports, Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to purchase
Russian Su-27/30s. While Indonesia was always far more politically neutral than Egypt, this remarkable turnaround in arms sourcing
diversification appears to be the result of a U.S. arms embargo implemented in 1999 in response to Indonesia’s apparent human rights violations
carrying out heavy-handed military actions in East Timor. Furious at U.S. meddling in something the government considered a domestic issue,
Indonesia looked instead to Russia with the specific intent to “overcome the effects of [U.S.] arms sales restrictions.” In other words, Indonesia
looked to diversify, not capitulate. Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United States lifted
the embargo in 2005. Perhaps most remarkably, even after the United States agreed to give Indonesia 24 F-16s in 2012, the archipelago state
still agreed to purchase 11 Russian Su-35s. The U.S. attempt at coercion not only failed but continues to perpetuate negative strategic effects
today.
Who’s Afraid of Technology Transfer?
Another argument for a more restrictive arms export policy concerns direct industrial offsets (those economic agreements in which a supplier
invests in the industry of a client state directly related to the arms being transferred) and technology transfer. However, these tools should not be
feared. Technology transfer is unlikely to breed meaningful competition for the United States where it matters most, in the medium- to high-end
markets, and instead gives the United States a source of political influence. The problem in many analyses is confusion over the type of
technology transfer. There are three ideal-typical categories of transfer: material transfer, such as simple diffusion of weapons and machines;
design transfer, like blueprints and schematics; and capacity transfer, which involves basic scientific knowledge and expertise within the
industrial base. Most technology transfers ultimately fall into the first two categories, despite what a client state might hope for. Consider the
2003 Polish decision to purchase F-16s from Lockheed Martin with direct offsets valued at more than $6 billion. This represented 170 percent of
the program value and the then-largest in commercial history. Despite this massive investment, Poland does not design and produce their own
fighter jets today, but rather subsections of American-designed systems under license. In fact, direct offsets provided inroads for U.S. industry in
the Polish defense industry in a manner that strongly incentivizes the Poles to continue purchasing U.S. aircraft, and indeed Poland appears
poised to purchase the F-35 in the near future. Offsets and technology transfer may have helped revive portions of the Polish defense industry and
provided some domestic job creation, but it did not create an independent competitor to the U.S. defense industry. This is exactly as expected
with material and design levels of transfer. While some of the very largest industrial states, such as India or China, might eventually create a
world-leading defense industry, it will remain out of the grasp of most states. Consider China, an unquestionable economic powerhouse of recent
decades. Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer, blatant reverse engineering attempts, and
hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for help with the most advanced weaponry such as
fighter jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radars, and jet engines. If China, the second largest economy in the world struggles so mightily,
what threat do smaller, less capable states pose? Capacity transfer, the acquisition of basic scientific knowledge and expertise crafted over
decades, cannot simply be uploaded, emailed to another state, or hacked. Rather, it takes decades of intentional and costly investment. For high-
end weaponry, where research and development costs remain a prohibitive barrier to entry, the United States and a handful of other advanced
economies are likely to remain in the driver’s seat; even with generous technology transfer agreements. Finally, consider some of the negative
second- and third-order effects
that excessive restriction caused in American unwillingness to commit to selling
the U.S.-made Patriot missile system and its underlying technology to Turkey. This was recently posited as a U.S. export
restriction success. However, this restraint looks less successful each passing day. Even with significant design transfer, it is unlikely Turkey
could obtain the requisite capacity transfer to be self-sufficient in surface-to-air and anti-missile defense systems anytime soon. Conversely, by
using U.S. technology, the United States could have legally restricted Turkey’s future export of it. More importantly, Turkey has since
agreed to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile system, a blow to U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey. The
S-400 purchase will put advanced Russian technology and military advisors inside a NATO ally and tier-two F-35 industrial partner that is a sole-
source supplier on several F-35 components. As the Air Force Secretary said last year about Turkey’s S-400 agreement, “Sometimes it’s the
United States that’s part of the problem.” Even worse, the United States has since approved the sale of the Patriot to
Turkey, with the acting U.S. Defense Secretary recently commenting, “we need Turkey to buy the Patriot.” Was holding back on some
surface-to-air missile technology worth the strategic cost? It appears unlikely.
Sometimes It’s Not Dollars, But Sense
As others have pointed out, the United States can afford to “make economic […] sacrifices” in order to privilege politico-security benefits in arms
export decisions. As one author recently explained in War on the Rocks: The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling
weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation [and] … technology diffusion, (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while
retaining its commanding market position. This is undoubtedly true. However, on rare occasions economics do matter. Specifically, maintaining
strategic flexibility by keeping a production line open which would otherwise shutter might sometimes need to be prioritized. Consider the two
recent examples of the F-22 and F-15. In December 2011, the final F-22 fighter jet rolled off the assembly line, 554 short of the original program
requirement. At the same time, close U.S. allies such as Japan and Australia made inquiries about purchasing further increments of the fifth-
generation fighter, which would have kept production going for at least several more years. The United States rejected the inquiries, shuttering
the production line instead. A 2011 RAND Corporation study estimates the cost of restarting production and fabricating 75 additional F-22s to be
$17 billion — nearly $227 million per jet. Despite this cost and because of an evolving international security environment, the US Congress
inserted language into the 2017 defense budget directing the U.S. Air Force to conduct a “production restart assessment,” though the likelihood of
a production restart remains infinitesimally small. Fortunately, the outcome is different for the F-15. In 2013, Qatar made a request for the
purchase of 70 F-15QAs, worth $4 billion. At the time, without another export order the 40-year old F-15 production line was slated to close by
2019, eliminating any future purchases. After delaying approval for nearly three years, the U.S. administration finally approved the deal in late
2016, guaranteeing F-15 production into the mid-2020s. Unlike the F-22, the United States maintains strategic flexibility in F-15 (and F-18 and F-
16) production, largely because of exports. This appears to be an especially prescient decision, as the FY2020 U.S. Air Force budget proposal
requests money to purchase at least eight (and up to 100) F-15EX air superiority platforms; a platform one industry reporter highlighted “is only
possible because other countries have spent roughly $5B over the last couple of decades to continuously evolve the F-15 into what it is today […]
basically, the [Air Force] is getting [these upgrades] for free.”
What About Saudi Arabia?
In sum, more restrictive arms sales, delivery suspensions, or outright embargos are unlikely to succeed in policy coercion. While arms
transfers provide an avenue of influence, embargos often lead to diversification, not desired policy
changes. Additionally, fears of technology transfer and direct offsets creating a competitor out of every client are generally unfounded in the
high-end market in which the United States generally deals. Finally, while the large domestic market provides the United States the luxury of
sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter, particularly when it comes to saving a production line for
future flexibility. These conclusions should therefore inform U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia. The intent here is not to
argue the moral or ethical responsibility of U.S. leaders in responding to Saudi Arabia’s execution of journalists or tactics in the war in Yemen. It
is natural to see the horror wrought in Yemen and want to take any actions necessary to stop it. However, I ultimately argue against a Saudi
embargo. This is not because, as the president has argued, it might cost a few billion dollars and some hundreds of defense industry jobs. As
others have pointed out, the economic impact of Saudi arms purchases on the U.S. defense industry is relatively small. Rather, embargoing
Saudi Arabia is unlikely to fundamentally alter Saudi policies, but likely to further damage U.S. ties with
Riyadh. In the near-term, Saudi Arabia can substitute other weapons, such as the Eurofighter and Tornado, and “dumb bombs”
instead of U.S.-built “smart weapons.” The Saudis can also rely more heavily on their Emirati and Egyptian partners using non-
U.S. produced arms. In the medium to long term, such an embargo is likely to push the Kingdom to greater arms
diversification. If history is any guide, the United States will eventually lift any potential arms embargo
with little change in Saudi behavior, but only after having provided an opportunity for adversary states
such as Russia and China to gain a strategic foothold in Riyadh. Some might counter that it would be
extremely difficult and costly, in both time and money, for the Saudis to significantly diversify their arms
acquisitions away from the United States. This is absolutely the case. However, costly does not mean
impossible. Less wealthy states have already done it. Egypt is one example above; but others such as
Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have significantly
diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to Saudi Arabia, and
few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to believe that the
Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a U.S. embargo. Thus,
while a U.S. embargo might be morally compelling and emotionally satisfying, it is unlikely to create
meaningful change for those most at risk or be strategically beneficial to the United States. In the absence of a
compelling, evidence-based case that an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia might produce desired changes in behavior, policymakers should look
elsewhere for solutions to their Saudi problems.
Russia fills in to sell Saudi Arabia significant armaments
Chollet and Goldberg 18 – * executive vice president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of
the United States, ** Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (Derek and
Ilan, “The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-
given-a-choice-stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-consequences-mbs-khashoggi/)//BB
Whatever the reason, the green-light policy has proved to be a failure. The United States has not ended up with a close partner in the Middle East
but with a rogue ally drawing America into unnecessary quagmires and hurting its interests. The question is what to do about it.
It might feel good for the United States to turn its back on the Saudis, but that won’t enhance U.S.
interests or save lives. The United States has leverage it must use, but that has to be carefully estimated.
A divorce will not cause the Saudis to walk away from the war in Yemen or make up with the Qataris. If
anything, the end result will be the Saudis will be less restrained, because they will no longer feel the
need to acquiesce to U.S. requests. They will certainly feel the loss of sophisticated American weaponry,
but the Russians will step in and supply them with less accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in
Yemen (for evidence of that, consider Syria). The United States will no longer be complicit in problematic Saudi
behavior, but that behavior won’t stop.
L – Middle East
Russia fills in --- uses the plan to sustain their foreign policy ambitions
---empirics + their weapons are good enough
east/)//BB
Nonetheless, there is no denying that Putin is making great strides overall in the MENA region since May 2000,
and more recently in the defense sector as part of Russia’s tactic to use weapons sales to garner closer
relations with Arab states at the expense of the U.S. and Europe. Moscow’s military reform efforts since 2008 have clearly
paid off, and arms sales have been an effective tactical tool in Moscow’s foreign policy arsenal . In dollar terms at least,
Russian arms sales to the Middle East continue to increase every year. In addition, the advantages Russian arms offer to this region continue to
outweigh the disadvantages, both practically and politically. Russia’s overall economic trajectory is on a slow and long-
term path of deterioration, but still nowhere near a collapse. As a July 2016 NATO Defense College report points out, the West
should not confuse Russia’s weakness with fragility.[lxxviii] Even if Moscow boasts more than it achieves in reality, the
Kremlin has been playing a diminishing hand very well. While most U.S. defense experts believe Russia will be unable
to produce much next-generation weaponry, Moscow is making significant strides with its existing
technology. Russian arms are sufficient for most of Moscow’s clients—particularly those who cannot afford top-of-the-
line American technology. In the context of U.S. retreat from the region, Moscow has stepped into a vacuum where
the Kremlin’s efforts generate a multiplier effect of real power. As long as U.S. leadership is absent from
the region, Russia’s arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa will remain a serious problem for
American interests.
Russia will seize US weakness in the Middle East --- they’ll fill the arms sales
vacuum
Overall, Putin’s current policy in the Middle East is succeeding. While some scholars brand him a mere tactician and not a strategist, he
is actually both.657 Not only has he seized initiative in the Middle East, but he also has
a clear end state in mind—a polycentric
world where Russia has renewed geopolitical strength to balance the United States. Furthermore, many of
Russia’s tactical victories in improving relations with Middle Eastern countries have come at the expense of Western
influence, specifically America’s. While some of these victories, like the Western embargo of Egypt, were
not part of a master plan on Putin’s part, his actions display a deft “opportunistic” touch.658 It was Putin who
flew into Syria in December 2017, declaring “Mission Accomplished” in regard to the war versus the Islamic State.659 As Matthew Spence, the
former Deputy Secretary of Defense for Middle Eastern Policy remarked, “power abhors a vacuum.”660 Putin fully understands the
logic behind Spence’s statement. He observed the Obama Administration beating a slow retreat from playing the region’s
“policeman.”661 He then saw the Trump Administration’s recent rash of incoherent policy, such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital,
effectively destroying America’s ability to mediate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.662 As such, he has been able to exploit the void
of American leadership and insert Russia back into a position of influence in order to, as Vladimir Frolov states, “cut the [the United
States] down to size.”663 Putin will continue to capitalize on Western weaknesses during his ongoing campaign to foster
a polycentric world and restore Russia’s reputation to that of a great power. Given the local demand that
exists in the region, arms sales will remain one of Putin’s key tools to sustain and increase Russian influence
in the Middle East. As mentioned earlier, the long-term success of Putin’s plan will require additional
diplomatic maneuvering, but his current efforts are laying the foundation for positive future outcomes.
Russian influence in the Middle East is tenuous --- future arms sales are key
Salacanin 17 – freelance journalist who has written extensively on Middle Eastern affairs, trade and political relations, Syria and Yemen,
terrorism and defence. (Stasa, “Weapons sales: The key to Russia's Middle East agenda,”
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/3/13/weapons-sales-the-key-to-russias-middle-east-agenda)//BB
After almost two decades of relative political obscurity, Russia is back, and has once more set
its sights on a global role beyond
the classic trade of goods and services with geopolitcally strategic economies. Then again, non-economic elements
are almost always present when it comes to such a specific commodity as weaponry. Opinion on this greatly vary. Subscribers of new cold war
rhetoric see Russia as a great threat trying to dismantle the international security order established by the United States. We often heard such
remarks from Hillary Clinton and her followers, as well as think-tanks and the media friendly to her. "I think Russia's objectives are to
stymie and to confront and to undermine American power whenever and wherever they can," Clinton told
the Brookings Institution in September 2015. But how far Russia's resurgence in the Middle East will ultimately go
remains to be seen. In any case, Russia's arms sales will play an important role in the country's
geopolitical plans.
L – Africa
Russian influence in Africa is low now --- but increased arms sales expands it
Ramani 18 – doctoral candidate in international relations at St. Antony’s College at Oxford. He is also a contributor to The Washington
Post, The Diplomat and the National Interest (Samuel, “As the U.S. Disengages, Russia Ramps Up Aid and Arms Sales to Sub-Saharan Africa,”
World Politics Review, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/24457/as-the-u-s-disengages-russia-ramps-up-aid-and-arms-sales-to-sub-
saharan-africa)//BB
Beyond mining and other resources, Russia is still eyeing energy sectors in sub-Saharan Africa, as it promotes nuclear
power as a driver of economic development. Its most prominent move came in 2014, with a landmark but controversial $76 billion deal for
Russian energy giant Rosatom to build two nuclear power plants in South Africa, which has the continent’s only nuclear power station. Then-
President Jacob Zuma personally championed the deal, bypassing South Africa’s parliament. When the deal collapsed in 2017 after a South
African court ruled it unlawful, Russia was forced to look elsewhere in Africa for nuclear energy clients. That search has achieved some notable
success. Last October, Rosatom signed a $20 billion deal to construct two nuclear power plants in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. Russia is
now set to play a leading role in eliminating Nigeria’s chronic electricity shortages, winning it praise. The Nigeria deal also encouraged Lavrov to
negotiate with Angola on the construction of nuclear power plants, and to forge a nuclear technology-sharing agreement with Namibia, the
world’s fourth largest producer of uranium. The growing appeal of Russian weaponry has pushed several African
leaders to ask Moscow for help in carrying out counterterrorism operations. When it comes to security, Russia has
focused chiefly on expanding its array of existing arms contracts and positioning itself as a useful counterterrorism partner. Russia has
emphasized its willingness to sell arms to governments without discrimination on ideological or human
rights grounds, portraying itself as a reliable arms vendor to authoritarian African leaders. Many of those leaders
see proof of Russia’s commitment to noninterference in Moscow’s strident defense of former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe against
potential U.N. sanctions in 2008, along with Russian arms sales to Sudan after its president, Omar al-Bashir, was indicted by the International
Criminal Court in 2009. This hands-off policy has helped Russia expand beyond its traditional Soviet-era coterie
in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2010, Russia has supplied Uganda with 74 percent of its conventional weaponry, signed a $1 billion defense
cooperation agreement with Angola, and agreed to a major military-technical cooperation pact with Nigeria. These deals are likely to continue to
expand in the years to come, as Russia’s effective use of air power during its military intervention in Syria and successful marketing of its S-400
missile defense system—which it recently sold to Turkey, a NATO member—increase its influence over international arms markets. The growing
appeal of Russian weaponry to several African countries has also pushed their leaders to solicit Moscow for help in carrying out counterterrorism
operations. Russia has been especially interested in assisting Nigeria combat the extremist group Boko Haram, while outlining a strategy to
deepen its overall cooperation with Abuja. Even though the Nigerian military continues to work closely with the United States against Boko
Haram, Russia’s offers have been received positively in Nigeria. Nigerian Defense Minister Mansur Dan Ali pointed to Russia’s potential role as
a counterterrorism partner during his meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoygu, last summer in Moscow. Dan Ali even cited
Moscow’s record against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria—where Russia rarely distinguished between “terrorists” and opposition
forces—as a model for West Africa to follow. As senior officials in other African countries, like Chad and Somalia, echo the Nigerian defense
minister’s praise for Russia, Moscow could gain a more prominent role in providing logistical assistance to
governments across the continent facing their own domestic insurgencies. It isn’t surprising that, during his Africa
trip, Lavrov capitalized on Russia’s growing reputation by offering military assistance to Mozambique, which has experienced a wave of attacks
by Islamist groups in the gas-rich northern part of the country. Even though Russia’s influence in sub-Saharan Africa still
pales in comparison to China’s—and, for that matter, the United States’—Moscow has paid more attention to the
region in recent years, for its own economic interests and great power aspirations, and to satisfy African countries’ desire for
sophisticated weaponry. As Russia continues to expand its network of partnerships and support counterterrorism
initiatives across the continent, its rising influence in sub-Saharan Africa could take a U.S. administration that has
shown little interest in Africa by surprise.
African arms sales are key to Russian hegemony --- natural resources and basing
rights
sendstad.pdf)//BB
While Russian arms are competitive across sub-Saharan Africa, most of the region’s countries are comparatively poor. Defence spending in
absolute terms is therefore too modest for Africa to become a destination of real commercial significance. This will not change unless economic
growth accelerates at a sustained rate across the region. Nevertheless, Russian exporters appear keen to strengthen their
position, with officials from Rosoboroneksport describing Africa as a ‘growth market’.70 Russian
suppliers appear to be prepared to tailor their approach to the African market by focusing on the provision
of either older equipment or of service and repair facilities.71 Regardless of whether the region grows in commercial
importance, Russia’s importance as a supplier of armaments there means that it could exploit any political
capital that might be gained from this position by seeking to acquire basing rights for its armed forces, or by
supporting its energy and mining firms in gaining rights to exploit African natural resources.72 However,
Russia is not the only country to be making such efforts on the continent. It faces stiff competition from China, which has been a growing source
of arms and has provided increasing support to African countries in the development of their natural resources.
L – Latin America
Putin will use US restrictions in Latin America to expand their sphere of influence
Stronski and Sokolsky 17 – *senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, where his research focuses on the relationship
between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus., **nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia
Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. (Paul and Richard, “The Return of Global Russia: An
Analytical Framework,” Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-
75003)//BB
Though its
foreign actions are often opportunistic, Russia increasingly aims to create a multipolar world in
which it plays a more prominent role. Moscow’s national security establishment broadly supports this international outreach, which
will likely remain an enduring feature of Russian foreign policy. Washington and its allies must carefully judge Russian actions case by case and
respond in concert when possible. THE KREMLIN’S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA Moscow has relied on relatively
inexpensive diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to wield influence and expand its
global footprint. The Kremlin has capitalized on Western missteps and growing anti-establishment sentiments in
Europe and North America. Russia will likely continue trying to fill global power vacuums resulting from U.S.
President Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY Formulating an effective
response to Russia’s global activism will be challenging. To do so, U.S. policymakers should consider four broad points: Ask the first-order
question. How do Russia’s actions affect U.S. interests and foreign policy goals? In some areas, Russian activities have damaged U.S. interests,
but elsewhere their impact has been symbolic rather than substantive. Russian activity should not be conflated with Russian success. Weigh costs
and benefits. Russia’s approach has had mixed results. Its investments in the Middle East have paid off handsomely. But in Europe, Russian
actions have mobilized Western governments to counter them. Notably, Moscow has fewer resources than the West, serious domestic problems,
and no real allies. Avoid overreacting. Not every instance of Russian activism threatens the U.S.-led international order or U.S. security. At a
minimum, Washington and its allies should expose Moscow’s tactics. More robust responses are justified when important U.S. and allied
interests are threatened—and when Washington has realistic, sustainable means to thwart Moscow’s ambitions without exacerbating the situation.
Leverage partnerships and eschew a one-size-fits-all approach. There is no cookie-cutter solution for countering Russian adventurism.
Washington need not bear this burden alone; it should develop tailored strategies with other actors to deter, contain, and, if necessary, roll back
Russian influence operations. INTRODUCTION For much of the post–Cold War era, the United States and Europe paid little attention to
Russia’s efforts to expand its political, economic, and military influence abroad. The West saw these efforts as relics of the Cold War, primarily
confined to Russia’s immediate neighborhood but largely absent or at least ineffective elsewhere. The effects of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Russia’s internal challenges, and Moscow’s stated desire for integration with the West sharply constrained the Kremlin’s interest and
capacity to project its influence on a global scale and diminished the West’s interest in Russian foreign policy and its global activities. However,
since Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency in 2012 after a four-year stint as prime minister, Russia has engaged in a broad,
sophisticated, well-resourced, and—to many observers—surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. To advance its diverse
objectives, Moscow has relied on a wide array of diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to influence political
systems, public attitudes, and elite decisionmakers in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These objectives include, first
and foremost, undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order and the cohesion of the West; enhancing Putin’s domestic legitimacy by
demonstrating Russia’s status as a global superpower; promoting specific Russian commercial, military, and energy interests; and tweaking the
United States’ nose in areas of traditional U.S. influence. Russia has engaged in a broad, sophisticated, well-resourced, and—to many
observers—surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. The Kremlin launched this campaign in response to the 2012 mass protests
in Moscow, apparently convinced that Western democracy promotion initiatives had instigated these demonstrations to destabilize Russia itself
and promote regime change.1 In 2014, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of its undeclared war in Ukraine, this
counteroffensive intensified and took on new qualities. Whereas previously the bulk of Russian efforts had focused on defending Moscow’s
claimed “sphere of privileged interests” around its periphery, the new campaign has sought to damage the international image of Western
democracy, exacerbate the internal tensions within Western political and security institutions, and expand Russia’s global reach at the expense of
Washington and its allies by playing on Western missteps in different parts of the world. For the first time since the breakup of the
Soviet Union, the United States is facing a Russia that is not, in former president Barack Obama’s memorable phrase, a mere
“regional power,” but rather one that is actively trying to project its influence and establish a presence well beyond
its periphery.2 Despite Moscow’s shift in strategy, the United States and its European partners are increasingly focused on their own
domestic challenges and regional crises in Asia and the Middle East. Russia is keen to exploit increased opportunities in the
resulting vacuum, using both hard and soft power, to expand its influence and presence and to take advantage of Donald
Trump’s presidency, marked by his embrace of an “America First” foreign policy and:3 a retreat from long-established U.S. leadership
in upholding the rules-based international order Washington helped create after World War II; an abandonment of democracy promotion and rule
of law as elements of U.S. foreign policy; a return to isolationism and a rejection of nation-building efforts to redirect U.S. resources needed at
home; a dismissal of multilateral cooperation and a devaluation of long-standing U.S. alliances; the worst domestic political crisis in the United
States in many decades; and, most importantly, a refusal to acknowledge the challenge posed by Russian adventurism. Finding examples of
Russian global activism is easy. Assessing its motivations, consequences, and effectiveness is not. Specifically, it can be hard to tell whether a
given Russian behavior is meant to actively undermine the liberal political and economic order that has flourished under U.S. leadership or
whether it is designed primarily to shore up Putin’s domestic standing and to create timely economic opportunities for domestic Russian
constituencies that support his regime. Likewise, framing a coherent and effective U.S. response to Russia’s increased global activism will be
challenging. The risk of doing too much or too little is real, and getting the answer right entails asking a series of challenging questions. Is
Moscow’s behavior largely symbolic or does it threaten the interests of the United States or its closest allies? What is the cost to U.S. interests of
Russia’s efforts to gain geopolitical and economic toeholds beyond its immediate neighborhood? When should Russian actions trigger a strong
U.S. response? Which Russian activities may risk overreach and pushback? What are the best ways to measure the impact—both in Russia and
the West—of Moscow’s recent global activism? Finding examples of Russian global activism is easy. Assessing its motivations, consequences,
and effectiveness is not. Identifying the key drivers of Russia’s global activism and providing an overview of Moscow’s many efforts to expand
its global influence is a useful and important way to begin formulating appropriate and effective responses to these behaviors. In some areas,
Russian activities have damaged Western interests, but in others their impact has proven to be more symbolic than substantive. Not every far-
flung Russian initiative should be viewed as part of a global zero-sum competition between the United States and Russia, and the costs to Russia
of some of these efforts could exceed the benefits Moscow hopes to gain. Policymakers should seek to assess the interests that a given Russian
behavior is seeking to advance, which policy tools Moscow is employing, which U.S. interests are being undermined, and which U.S. policy tools
would constitute the most effective response. THE WEST AND THE REST Russia’s global activism can be divided into four geographic regions.
While there may be some uncertainty about the drivers at play in each of these regions, there is little uncertainty about the considerable
momentum behind these efforts. In general, Moscow’s ordering of priorities aligns closely with the proximity of the region to Russia, as well as
with Russian threat perceptions. First are Moscow’s efforts to retain its influence or counter Western influence in the states of the former Soviet
Union. In its immediate periphery, Moscow aims to firm up its hold on its neighbors to prevent additional countries from aligning too closely
with the West, and to preserve a buffer zone of pro-Russian or, at least, neutral states around it. In countries that have already turned away from
Russia—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—Moscow seeks to undermine their political transitions, court their publics, and prevent their true
integration with Western political, economic, or security structures. Moscow also is keen to shore up its influence in Central Asia, a region
increasingly dominated economically by China. The second category consists of Moscow’s efforts to undermine the Western and transatlantic
institutions it considers its principal adversaries—the United States, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Moscow has attempted to exploit their internal divisions and challenges as well as the uncertainty about Washington’s commitment to
its allies and partners since President Donald Trump’s embrace of the “America First” agenda. Moscow’s anti-Western actions are motivated by a
widely held view in the Russian security establishment that the administrations of former presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush actively
sought to weaken Russia domestically, undermine its influence internationally, increase its isolation, and carry out regime change around
Russia’s periphery and even in the country itself. Russian leaders apparently have decided to do to the West what they believe the West has done
to them. Third, Russia is engaging in a campaign to gain or regain influence in other places where the Soviet Union once held sway. In the
Balkans, for example, Russia plays the nationalist and Christian Orthodox cards to complicate Western efforts to integrate these countries into
European structures. In the Middle East, Russia seeks to protect its longstanding equities in Syria and to convey its purported great power status
to domestic and international audiences, as well as its capacity to act beyond its immediate neighborhood and gain a foothold in what is seen as a
traditionally U.S. sphere of influence. The final category consists of Russian efforts to gain influence in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Some of these efforts involve forming coalitions of rising powers willing to challenge the Western-dominated international system; elsewhere,
Moscow tries to cultivate authoritarian leaders and take advantage of frictions between the United States and some of
its traditional allies or partners. In Latin America, in particular, Moscow hopes to embarrass Washington
and show that it too can make a foray into its main global adversary’s backyard.
Russia pounces on US weakness in Latin America
Tidd 17 – Admiral, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (Kurt, BEFORE THE 115TH CONGRESS SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 6 APRIL 2017, Lexis)//BB
Mr. Chairman, I’ll speak plainly: if we care about what’s going on in the South China Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, it’s worth
keeping an eye on Chinese, Russian, and Iranian activity in this part of the world, too. For Russia, China, and Iran, Latin America is
not an afterthought. These global actors view the Latin American economic, political, and security arena as an opportunity to achieve their
respective long-term objectives and advance interests that may be incompatible with ours and those of our partners. Their vision for an
alternative international order poses a challenge to every nation that values non-aggression, rule of law,
and respect for human rights—the very same principles that underlie the Inter-American system of peace and cooperation. Some of
what they’re doing—while not a direct military threat—does warrant examination. Even seemingly benign activities can be used to build malign
influence. Now the region’s number two trading partner, China has courted Latin America through economic diplomacy, importing more and
more raw materials, offering loans, and pledging billions in investments in infrastructure development. It sees its own development as contingent
on the development of other countries, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean.2 Beijing cooperates with Latin America on space,
potential nuclear power projects, and telecommunications networks, which could pose security concerns to the United States. China’s military
soft power lies in its ability to engage through offers of all-expenses-paid training, nostrings-attached defense sales and financing to regional
militaries, and donations of equipment and humanitarian aid. China prioritizes engagement with regional organizations like the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) that exclude the United States, and seeks to leverage regional relationships to reshape
international economic and financial institutions to its advantage.3 As part of the Kremlin’s aim to regain its status as a
global power and prove its prowess to domestic audiences, Russia uses soft power tools in an attempt to challenge
U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere and displace traditional U.S. goodwill initiatives. Examples include
the construction of an international police training facility in Nicaragua that will be used to provide regional counternarcotics training and the
funding of a vaccine production plant that will supposedly make drugs accessible and affordable throughout Central America. Additionally,
Russia seeks to discredit the United States through state-owned media like RT-Español and SputnikMundo, which spread misinformation to
create doubts and distrust about U.S. intentions and policy towards the region and other parts of the world. The Russians are also engaging in
some disquieting behavior, such as providing
battle tanks to Nicaragua, which impacts regional stability and could
cause its neighbors to divert vital resources (needed to fight threat networks and address developmental
challenges) to maintain parity. As a continuing state sponsor of terrorism, Iranian involvement in the Western Hemisphere is always a
matter of concern. With the easing of economic sanctions, Iran may be seeking to rebuild its relationships in the region. Tehran uses cooperative
technological, economic, and diplomatic interests as the centerpiece of its regional diplomacy. Although on the surface it portrays its actions as
innocuous, Iran could exploit its cultural centers to build networks, which could be leveraged to extend its influence and advance its interests.
Broadly speaking, some of this outreach is concerning, especially to those of us who care about advancing human rights and promoting regional
peace and stability. Keep in mind there’s no Chinese, Russian, or Iranian equivalent of a Leahy Law, no comparable conditions on security
assistance, no independent domestic media that carefully scrutinizes their activities. Their arms sales aren’t tied to international protocols or
human rights vetting. Their loans don’t come with requirements to follow strict environmental or anti-corruption standards, or even clear terms
and conditions for repayment. Their unscrupulous business practices and disregard for rule of law facilitates corruption, reduces trust in
governments, and poses challenges to the norms and values that have brought prosperity and security for millions of people across our
hemisphere. It’s also worth noting that in recent years these actors have capitalized on the perception that the U.S. is disengaging from the
region. Our partners plainly see that we are conducting fewer engagements; holding smaller and less frequent exercises; and that we have smaller
U.S. military presence in regional embassies and fewer forces and platforms than ever before. When budget constraints limit our ability to engage
with our regional partners, it sends a message that others can, and do, exploit. And while we should work harder to understand the true intentions
of these actors, whatever they intend, in most cases our best response is to strengthen our own security relationships, rather than focus on
“countering” or “competing” with the likes of China or Russia. At times—when it supports our interests and those of our partners—we should
follow avenues for cooperation. At others, we might find we need to work with our partners to address negative influence or destabilizing actions.
At all times, we should focus on being the best possible partner to the region. So it’s on us to demonstrate our
commitment by being an equal and principled partner; it’s on us to earn, and keep, the region’s trust. It’s on us, because we lose relationships not
as a result of any Chinese or Russian actions; we lose them, in large part, by not demonstrating the depth of our commitment to the region. Our
leadership is weakened not because China or Russia offer compelling alternatives, but because it’s not always clear to our network of allies and
partners what’s important to us. American (and Inter-American) principles are undermined not because they no
longer matter, but because we and our partners don’t do everything we can to protect and promote them. Mr.
Chairman, it comes down to this: we have a choice. Success or failure in this region depends on us, what we stand for, and what
we do, much more than it depends on anyone else.
The link is consistent with Russia’s foreign policy strategy
Farah and Babineau 19 – *visiting Senior Fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies at National Defense University and is
President of IBI Consultants. A former Research Coordinator at IBI Consultants, ** Ph.D candidate at the University of Virginia (Doug and
Kathryn, “Extra-regional Actors in Latin America: The United States is not the Only Game in Town,” PRISM, 8.1)//BB
Russian President Vladimir Putin

has made no effort to hide his desire to reestablish his country as a viable
power player and competitor to U.S. influence in the region. Viewed through the lens of the Gerasimov Doctrine, this
engagement is both rational from the Russian perspective and dangerous to the United States. So far, Russia
has primarily focused its outreach efforts on allies in the Bolivarian Alliance, led by Venezuela and including Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, El
Salvador, and Suriname, all of whom share a strong anti-U.S. ideology with each possessing deeply criminalized governments.1 Often operating
as a sort of “parasite state,” the public outreach of the Putin regime in Latin America is designed to maximize impact at low cost. To date, this
approach consists largely of weapons sales and donations, high level state-to-state visits, military and police training in
areas of U.S. specialization such as counternarcotics, and financial assistance in avoiding the U.S.-based banking system. Within international
forums, Russia has used its seat on the UN Security Council to protect Venezuela and Nicaragua from international sanctions, and has
aggressively moved to open up financial operations—including banks and a crypto currency—to help its allies blunt the impact of U.S. and EU
sanctions. The Russian presence, increasingly accompanied by Russian organized crime groups operating under the protection of the
Russian state, is viewed by most U.S. stakeholders as presenting the biggest strategic challenge of the three
countries discussed.
L – Arms Transfer Treaty
Russia won’t sign on, but will fill-in supply vacuums
Sorensen 15 – Juris Doctor, December 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Provo, UT (Joshua, “UNITED NATIONS ARMS TRADE
TREATY: RUSSIA'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABSTENTION AND THE TREATY'S EFFECTIVENESS IN APPLICATION, 11 BYU Int'l L.
& Mgmt. Rev. 237, Lexis)//BB
The ATT has been described as "the most important [treaty] in the history of the United Nations in the field of conventional arms
control standards." 8 But is the ATT really the solution? UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon opened the 2012 General
Assembly stating, "[t]he arms trade fuels ill-regulated and civil conflicts, destabilizes regions and expands the
capabilities of terrorists and criminal networks. We do not have a multilateral treaty on global trade in conventional arms. It's a shame." 9 The
ATT was designed to "prevent and eradicate" this problem; 10 but, will it meet this goal? Whenever States with
principled positions attempt to reach an agreement, some question arises as to the viability of such an agreement. 11 Not every UN Member State
12 has faith in the ATT's ability [*239] to effectively address the problem. Russia, one of the world's largest dealers in arms, 13
believes the ATT is no more than a superficial Band-Aid on a deep wound. 14 And if Russia does not get on board
with the ATT, then how effective can it really be? Russia's justifications for abstention from signing on to the ATT
have some merit, as the ATT does not address arms transfers to private parties. However, Russia's justifications are also
likely, in part, a ploy to allow Russia to transfer arms to States that might otherwise be prohibited
under the ATT. A nation balancing conflicting interests can be tricky; such is the situation with Russia,
therefore justifying its abstention from the ATT is complex.
Russia will remain outside the treaty system --- ensures fill-in
First, many States, including Russia, either rejected the ATT or abstained from joining it. 133 Additionally, the majority of the States
who are signatories to the ATT have not yet ratified it and may avoid ratifying the treaty altogether. 134 Just as various countries thought it
unwise to join the treaty when the largest producer and seller of weapons was rejecting the treaty, 135 it may be unwise to think the
treaty will be effective when the second largest producer and seller is not party to the treaty. The more
countries that do not feel compelled to abide by the ATT--either because they are not party to the treaty or because they do
not feel obligated--will equate to more arms transfers occurring outside the confines of the ATT . Nic Marsh of the
Peace Research Institute Oslo 136 stated, "Having the abstentions from two major arms exporters lessens the moral weight of the treaty . . . . By
abstaining they have left their options open." 137
Russian alone undercuts ATT solvency
Additionally, the ATT will not be as effective as it could be. Without Russia joining the treaty, the ATT loses some of its
potential effectiveness. Russia is one of the largest suppliers of arms in the world, meaning that Russia
alone could supply arms to many of the States that the ATT is intended to prevent from getting arms.
Additionally, other States, including China, have followed suit and avoided becoming party to the ATT. With so many key exporting and
importing States abstaining or objecting, the ATT will not be able to regulate much of the world where the need
for such regulation exists. Further, as long as the ATT does not regulate transfers to non-state actors, much of the problem the treaty was
intended to address will be left unaffected by the ATT. Lastly, even the Member States who are party to the ATT will
likely subordinate the ATT's goals to their own State's interests.
L - AT ‘arms control’ link turn
Russia will not agree to arms control
Gressel 18 – PhD in Strategic Studies, Senior Policy Fellow on the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign
Relations (ECFR). Before joining the ECFR he worked as a desk officer for international security policy and strategy in the Bureau for Security
Policy in the Austrian Ministry of Defence (MoD) from 2006 to 2014 and as a research fellow of the Commissioner for Strategic Studies in the
Austrian MoD from 2003 to 2006. (Gustav, “Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations,
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/under_the_gun_rearmament_for_arms_control_in_europe)//BB
The decrepitude of arms control treaties in Europe is becoming increasingly apparent at the same time as
Russia continues to act as a revisionist power. Russia’s unpredictability and lack of transparency is part of
its competitive advantage. It will therefore not give this up by returning to arms-control agreements of
the late cold war or negotiating new ones. Arms control is an integrated part of Russia’s military strategy:
to advance its own military position while weakening that of its enemies. As a result, it is open to arms-control
agreements that would entrench its military superiority in eastern Europe and prevent the technological gap between Russia and the West from
growing. This logic creates an opportunity for the West. If Europe engages in rearmament, enhances its militaries’ combat-readiness and capacity
to quickly conduct large-scale, sustainable deployments to eastern Europe, it will deprive Russia of its relative military superiority. Moscow will
then be willing to talk on arms control. Europeans still need to agree a common approach on what they want to achieve vis-à-vis Russia, however.
Otherwise, they will be divided and public support for rearmament will falter.
Arms control fails with Russia --- even if they sign on, they won’t enforce anything
that limits expansionism
Payne and Foster 17 – *Keith, PhD in IR @ USC, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo State, **John, PhD, Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (“Russian strategy
Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 36.1)//BB
Russian arms control behavior, including the desire to limit U.S. military capabilities through legally
binding agreements while violating those agreements when convenient, is an element of Russia’s overall
strategy for accomplishing Moscow’s expansionist goals outlined in Chapter One. Russia sees arms control,
including noncompliance with its treaty obligations, as a tool to be employed as necessary to obtain
military advantage, convey strength, compel respect as a superpower, deter Western challenges, enhance
its freedom of action and leverage over others, and bolster the regime’s respect and domestic legitimacy
by demonstrating toughness and a willingness to confront the West. Moscow views arms control not as a
cooperative activity to create a more benign world. It is another arena in which to reinforce President Putin’s statement that, “It’s best not
to mess with us.”1 Too often there is a tendency in the West to dismiss individual Russian arms control
violations as mere “technical” violations that are not “militarily significant.” This approach ignores the
broader role that arms control and a policy of arms control noncompliance play in helping Russia to
achieve its strategic objectives and the military capabilities possible as a result of noncompliance.
Soviet/Russian arms control violations generally are not accidents, one-time incidents, misunderstandings
or legitimate disputes concerning the technical meaning of treaty obligations. More often, they are directly
related to Russian military objectives, which in turn are related to achieving foreign policy goals such as:
1) recovering Russia’s great power status through enhanced nuclear capability; 2) extending its sphere of influence
over (i.e., dominating) former Soviet space by enhancing Russia’s political and military power in Europe;
3) constraining U.S. military capabilities; and, 4) undermining NATO’s will and capability to resist. If an
arms control commitment—either legal or political—comes to interfere with an important Russian objective, it is
simply ignored. Significantly, Russia has violated arms control agreements even when it was clear the
violations would be detected.
Russia uses arms control to expand military power at the expense of the US
Russian arms control violations are a normal and now predictable part of Russian practice. This arms
control behavior is not ad hoc, accidental, or exist in a vacuum. It is linked to Russian military doctrine and
force posture goals, which in turn are linked to Russian foreign policy goals. Russian noncompliance is
directed, at least in part, toward achieving military advantages that could help to intimidate NATO states in
peacetime and potentially defeat them in wartime. Specifically, the capabilities acquired by Russia as part of its
noncompliance activities help facilitate and enable multiple goals, including: 1) recovering Russia’s great power status
(enabled by the fear of its nuclear capabilities); 2) extending Moscow’s sphere of influence and domination over former
satellite states (resulting from the enhancement of Russia’s military power); 3) constraining U.S. military capabilities
(exacerbated by creating monopolies in areas where arms control has reduced or eliminated Western deterrent capabilities); and 4)
constraining NATO’s will and ability to counter or defend against Russian expansion by the threat of nuclear escalation. Apparent
covert Russian nuclear testing is a prime example of this. Russian nuclear weapons are a key element of Moscow’s defense
policy and are seen as the basis of Russia’s great power status. Russian nuclear doctrine holds that controlled and discriminate first use of nuclear
weapons will “de-escalate” a conventional war. Covert Russian nuclear testing may help Russia realize such nuclear capabilities. Also largely
overlooked in today’s debate is the significance of Russian noncompliance with chemical and biological weapons treaties. Critically, Russian
noncompliance may have given Moscow a monopoly on biological and chemical weapons in Europe that it could use or threaten to use in the
event of a major war. Noncompliance with arms control agreements is certainly not the sole reason for the
quantitative and qualitative growth of Soviet/Russian strategic forces. It has, however, contributed
substantially to that growth. The military and political significance of Russian arms control violations has
largely been ignored in the West. The military advantages are quite considerable, especially when viewed in the context of
continuing reductions in Western nuclear and military capabilities. Moscow’s extensive treaty violations may increase both
the prospect of conflict and its consequences. Further, its violations have provided Russia with key military capabilities that are
highly relevant to the current European security crisis, particularly in Russian eyes. “Global norms” against nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons use may not impact Russian behavior in crises or conflict any more than “global norms” against violating treaty obligations or invading
other countries and annexing their territory have prevented Russia from doing so. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan rightly stated: “Simply
collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are
kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war.”107
L - AT ‘aff is small’
Each new market creates economies of scale that lowers prices and improves quality
Technology (Jonathan, “AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME,” War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/)//BB
A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is trying to take its place.
Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded military modernization plans
(not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s interests to choke off as large a percentage of
the Russian export market as possible in favor of the products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American
influence and curbing proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean submarines than
Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually, raising the price of the
products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from anywhere else.
L - AT China fills in
Doesn’t take out the link, because both can fill in --- supply diversification creates
appeals to multiple sellers.
Russia is more likely to fill in --- they out-compete China in other competitive
markets now
Clifford 15 – undergraduate @ Brown citing Roger Cliff, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council specializing in Asian security (Edward,
“An Export to Arms: Is China’s weapons trade as menacing as it seems?,” Brown Political Review,
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/11/export-to-arm-is-chinas-weapons-trade-as-menacing-as-it-seems/)//BB
Furthermore, if
weapons sales are the next great game, then China is barely on the scoreboard. Alarmists
should recognize that despite China’s 143 percent increase in weapons sales over the last five years, it still
only represents 5 percent of the global arms market. Russia, the world’s second-largest producer, has a 27 percent global
market share while US exports make up 31 percent. In fact, from an economic and geopolitical perspective, Chinese weapons sales are competing
far more directly with Russian than American transfers. Both Russia and China tend to sell weapons known for their reliability, simplicity, and
cost-effectiveness — putting them in competition for trade with poorer countries. On the other hand, Cliff points out that American foreign
policy has effectively “locked up” many major weapons markets, including South Korea, Israel, and Japan. As a
result, Russia and China are left to compete for market space — and by extension, influence — among the nonaligned
countries of the developing world. Even there, China is struggling to corner the market. According to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, China is currently the dominant arms dealer in just three African countries: South Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. While
weapons sales are hardly the defining factor in the relationship between two countries, it is clear that even in South Sudan, where China enjoys an
unusually monopolistic relationship in weapons sales, Beijing’s ability to influence decision-making is limited. In a rare divergence from an
espoused policy of noninterference in Africa, China committed 800 soldiers to South Sudan as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. Wang Yi,
China’s foreign minister, said that the commitment of troops was “the responsibility and duty of a responsible power and not because of China’s
own interests.” However, a report by the research group Small Arms Survey revealed that China was also backing a 700-strong militia in the
Unity State — South Sudan’s oil-producing region — in order to safeguard an oil field. For Beijing, an end to the war would be a win twice over,
proving to the world that China is capable of being a geopolitical leader while restoring a semblance of normality conducive to trade. But despite
repeated attempts at intervention and mediation, China has struggled to bring its influence to bear in conclusively ending the civil war. Though
China is still, in many ways, taking its first steps as a world power, its struggling aspirations for responsible
stewardship in Africa are proof that economic ties are not the sole pillar of diplomacy. The wariness of nations in
China’s own backyard is testament to this. On account of its vacillations between indifference and belligerence, China’s foreign policy has failed
to foster trust with its neighbors. It is unclear to what extent China has attempted to use weapons sales to cultivate relationships with neighboring
states, but its perceived aggressions in the South China Sea have certainly had a far more negative impact on regional relations than “friendship
prices” on pistols are capable of making up for. Asian nations don’t turn to China — the regional power and a country that they
should have every economic incentive to cooperate with — as their sole provider of weapons. While many of the less wealthy Asia-
Pacific nations buy with a relative lack of distinction between the United States, China, and Russia, the region’s wealthier countries — and major
players in the South China Sea dispute — import their weapons primarily from the United States. And unlike nations that share borders with the
United States and Russia, no Chinese neighbor, with the exception of Myanmar, buys weapons in any significant quantity
from Beijing.
China needs Russia to manufacture advanced weapons --- still triggers the link
arabia/)//BB
While some of the very largest industrial states, such as India or China, might eventually create a world-leading defense industry, it will remain
out of the grasp of most states. Consider China, an unquestionable economic powerhouse of recent decades.
Despite decades of arms purchases, technology transfer, blatant reverse engineering attempts, and
hundreds of billions of dollars, China still turns to Russia for help with the most advanced weaponry
such as fighter jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, radars, and jet engines. If China, the second largest
economy in the world struggles so mightily, what threat do smaller, less capable states pose? Capacity transfer, the acquisition of basic
scientific knowledge and expertise crafted over decades, cannot simply be uploaded, emailed to another state, or hacked. Rather, it takes decades
of intentional and costly investment. For high-end weaponry, where research and development costs remain a prohibitive barrier to entry, the
United States and a handful of other advanced economies are likely to remain in the driver’s seat; even with generous technology transfer
agreements.
The PLA will block the sale of advanced weapons
Clifford 15 – undergraduate @ Brown citing Roger Cliff, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council specializing in Asian security (Edward,
“An Export to Arms: Is China’s weapons trade as menacing as it seems?,” Brown Political Review,
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/11/export-to-arm-is-chinas-weapons-trade-as-menacing-as-it-seems/)//BB
So far, it would seem that the influx of Chinese weapons has had relatively little effect on the global balance of
power. Even among African nations where China is the sole supplier, Cliff points out that “these countries don’t have a lot of cash, so you’re
looking at a small number of weapons.” But wars of the 21st Century are rarely fought with the parity of the 20th. As Chinese weapons and
weapon systems — notably their guided missile technology — advance, the impact of China’s dealings with more volatile governments may start
to have a larger effect, particularly in domestic clashes, which have comprised 90 percent of the world’s conflicts in the last 25 years. While this
trend may be a relative, if cynical, plus for geopolitical stability, China’s apolitical sale of weapons will continue to fuel conflicts of the most
appalling nature. However, Cliff warns that it is “too early to tell” what the effect of China’s narrowing the
technological gap will have on the global distribution of weapon technology, since the People’s
Liberation Army continues to block the sale of the most advanced weapons outside of China.
Even if China captures some of the new markets, Russia definitely out-competes
with states that oppose China
McCormick 18 (Andrew, “Subs, ships and aftersales service: how Russia’s military is making Moscow a player in the Asia-Pacific,”
South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2162919/subs-ships-and-aftersales-service-how-russias-military-
making)//BB
After all, Moscow isn’t only reaching out to Beijing. Across the Asia-Pacific, Russian military engagement is on the rise, from
revived defence ties with Vietnam to arms sales as far afield as Fiji. At the same time, Russia is bolstering its own forces in its eastern
bases. Watch: Russia shows off naval power in military parade This flurry of activity has prompted speculation of a resurgent and reassertive
Russia in the Asia-Pacific. But defence specialists say the Kremlin has little interest in upending the region’s security status quo. SUBSCRIBE
TO US CHINA TRADE WAR Get updates direct to your inbox your email SUBMIT By registering for these newsletters you agree to our T&C
and Privacy Policy [Russia is] actively seeking new allies and reanimating ties … And, so far, they have been making
significant achievements Alexey Muraviev, an expert in Russian military affairs at Curtin University As Russia finds itself increasingly isolated
from the West – and as regional competition between China and the United States has sent many Asian-Pacific
countries looking for new strategic partners – Moscow is instead using its military to tap a wealth of
diplomatic and economic opportunities in the region. In the near term, this means winning new markets for
Russian military exports, strategic access to new port facilities and airfields and preferential treatment for Russian companies in other
sectors. In the long term, observers say, these efforts might also help propel Russia’s ambitions to become a leading
global power. “The Russians were trying to present themselves militarily in the region not just as a force that engages in traditional
deterrence of the US and its allies but as a promoter of Russian capabilities,” Alexey Muraviev, an expert in Russian military affairs at Curtin
University in Western Australia, said. “They are actively seeking new allies and reanimating ties with old clients. And, so far, they have been
making significant achievements.” LOOKING EAST Countries around the world routinely employ militaries to advance policy goals in other
areas. But Moscow’s defence diplomacy push in the Asia-Pacific was noteworthy because it contrasted with the low-profile approach it took to
the region in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Muraviev said. Vostok 2018 war games: China’s chance to learn Russia’s
military lessons from Syria Just 6 million of Russia’s 144 million people live in the country’s far east, and in the past Moscow’s interests in the
Asia-Pacific took a back seat to those in Europe and the Middle East. However, as markets in Asia boomed and economies in the West stagnated,
Russia became determined to emerge as a player in the East as well. Russia retains a marked edge with its military, which is the second strongest
and most technologically advanced globally. Photo: EPA Russia retains a marked edge with its military, which is the second strongest and most
technologically advanced globally. Photo: EPA Share: A diplomatic pivot began in earnest in 2012 – and hastened when Russia’s military actions
in Crimea and Syria prompted a flood of sanctions from the West. Yet, without the economic dynamism of China or the US, analysts say Russia’s
toolset for projecting and accumulating influence abroad is limited. Even in the energy sector, resource-rich Russia has not kept pace in the Asia-
Pacific with exports from China, the US and other regional energy producers. A strong military is necessary for an independent foreign policy
Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the National Research University in Moscow Russia retains a marked edge with its military,
however, which
is the second strongest and most technologically advanced globally, behind only the US. In its
Eastern Military District alone, Russia
boasts a diverse arsenal of hi-tech land, air and maritime assets, including
long-range bombers, top-of-the-line fighter jets and some of the quietest nuclear submarines in the world.
Much of this firepower is directed as a strategic deterrent towards the US and its allies. Barring the outbreak of major hostilities in the East,
though, Russia’s military assets also serve to boost Russia’s credibility as a regional power, according to Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the
National Research University in Moscow. “A strong military is necessary for an independent foreign policy,” Kashin said. “And an independent
foreign policy is associated with significant economic and political benefits.” Chinese military set for capability boost with delivery of Russian
Su-35 fighter jets In both economic and political terms, Russia would struggle to compete outright with China and the US. In turn, Moscow had
taken a pragmatic approach to maximise its opportunities, said Natasha Kuhrt, a war studies professor at King’s College London. Whereas Russia
often played a zero-sum game in other regions such as Europe, it broadly avoided talk of alliances in the East, Kuhrt said. Instead, Russia has
presented itself as an alternative to countries not keen to line up behind Beijing or Washington. A THIRD WAY
The pitch has certainly worked for the Philippines, especially as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pursues his own independent
foreign policy agenda, according to Fe Apon, a Russia specialist at the Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies in Manila.
“Duterte really wants to develop relations with non-traditional partners for immediate, tangible benefits,” Apon said. “Russia is a natural choice
in the military area.” The growing ties between Moscow and Manila were evident in August, when the Philippine Defence Minister Delfin
Lorenzana announced plans for one of his country’s warships to visit the city of Vladivostok, home to the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet. The port
call was billed as friendly reciprocation for recent Russian port calls in Manila, but it will also mark a historic first for a navy that traditionally
operates closer to home. Philippine Navy band members welcome the Russian Navy vessel Admiral Tributs to a port in Manila last year. Photo:
Reuters Philippine Navy band members welcome the Russian Navy vessel Admiral Tributs to a port in Manila last year. Photo: Reuters Share:
Last month also brought reports that Russia might sell the Philippines two Kilo-class submarines, diesel-powered mainstays of numerous world
navies that Russia has exported since 1985. The subs would be the Philippines’ first, but the bigger news was the seller – the island nation has
traditionally looked to the United States, or American allies in Europe and East Asia, to buy new vessels. Russia is willing to provide brand new
equipment customised to the specific needs of the Philippines, at favourable financial terms, with reasonable delivery times, full aftersales
service... Philippine ambassador to Russia Carlos Sorreta Apon said it seemed clear that Russia was willing to supply better military hardware
than the US, even after six decades of close partnership between Washington and Manila. She said a Facebook post last month by the Philippine
ambassador to Russia, Carlos Sorreta, summed up her government’s views. “Russia is willing to provide brand new equipment
customised to the specific needs of the Philippines, at favourable financial terms, with reasonable delivery times, full aftersales service,
necessary training and without political conditionalities or limitations,” Sorreta said in the post. While the US often imposes policy
expectations on would-be partners or clients – such as a government’s attitude to human rights – Russia has few preconditions about other
countries’ domestic affairs. This was a key selling point for Indonesia, according to Evan Laksmana, a senior researcher at the
Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Indonesia is a former client state of the Soviet Union, and Laksmana said the
country’s legacy familiarity with Russian equipment contributed to Russia’s desirability as a partner. Moscow also offers flexible financial terms
on sales, including “soft loans” that carry below-market interest rates. US military chiefs reach out to Asian allies as great power game heats up
with China and Russia Indonesia has placed orders for Russian Su-35 fighter jets, while Moscow has leveraged its ties with the country to send
clear signals to its adversaries of its expanding reach and influence. TESTING THE WATER In December, Indonesian officials welcomed two
Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers upon landing at an airfield on a small Indonesian island north of Papua New Guinea. The bombers then
launched a long-range air patrol from the airfield, Russia’s first from Indonesian soil. Similar patrols from Russia’s domestic bases elicit routine
protests from the US and Japan – and in this case, military bases in northern Australia were put on alert – but Russia’s muscle-flexing has ruffled
few feathers in the region at large. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (centre) reviews Russian sailors in Manila early last year. Russian
military engagement is on the rise across the Asia-Pacific. Photo: AFP Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (centre) reviews Russian sailors in
Manila early last year. Russian military engagement is on the rise across the Asia-Pacific. Photo: AFP Share: Muraviev said that here Russia
benefited significantly from its limited activity in the Asia-Pacific in recent decades. Where Russian military actions elsewhere might be seen as
bullish, here they seldom raised caution. “Russia find themselves in a really comfy spot, where they are able to deter and
signal to the US and its allies, while also promoting themselves as an alternative source of power to the US and
China,” he said.
INTERNAL
IL – new markets k2 heg
New arms markets are key to Russian expansionism
Millero 17 – MBA and Master’s of Strategic Intelligence, Colonel USAF (Raymond, “ROOTS RUNNING DEEP ARMS SALES AND
RUSSIA’S EXCURSION INTO SYRIA,” https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038117.pdf)//BB
Largely as an inheritance from its Soviet past, Russia has little to export other than arms and raw materials, because it can
no longer afford to transfer arms freely as did the Soviet Union for many years. Arms sales are now driven by profits more than purely
ideological interests. At the same time, Russia’s desire to court favor among anti-Western states is a major factor in
its foreign arms sales policy. Even though economic necessity is the fundamental driver behind Russia’s promotion of arms sales, it is not
at the expense of foreign policy interests. As long as the political price is not prohibitive, Russia will pursue lucrative arms sales, even at the cost
of incurring the displeasure of the West. As ideological considerations have yielded to economic interests in arms sales, Russia still
continues to mix foreign policy with arms sale contracts. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the oil and gas industry
replaced the military industry in importance to the state, however, arms sales still provide important revenue for the state and
are considered a valuable instrument in conducting foreign policy. From the initiatives set forth by Putin,
the arms export industry reemerged as one of the primary tools to advance Russia’s national security
interests. In 2012, Putin himself stated, “We see active military technical cooperation (military exports) as an effective instrument for
advancing our national interests, both political and economic. Growing demand for the goods our defense industry and related sectors produce
brings more money into our state budget and creates new jobs.”25 This statement indicates Putin’s desire to not only improve the
defense industry and domestic economy, but to advance
Russia’s political interests through its state arms export
program. Hence, Putin’s military export strategy is inextricably linked to Russia’s overall national security
objectives to support its image as a great power, maintain an independent 10 foreign policy free from
Western influence, and expand its own influence and political ties with countries disgruntled or at odds
with the West.26 Putin understands the importance of the defense industry and arms trade in reestablishing
Russia as a world power. A strong defense industry and prolific export industry not only represents an image of
military power, but also helps in balancing Western power by securing defense and security agreements and
economically by obtaining resource extraction rights. In order for Russia to maintain and expand its
influence, the defense industry must continue to thrive, especially with the relative decline in oil and gas prices. Hence, the
survival of Russia’s defense industry is increasingly dependent on export sales to emerging and stagnant markets,
with countries looking for alternatives to Western manufacturers. In order to gain access and political influence into
new markets, Russia has resorted to using economic agreements, barter deals, debt forgiveness, and offset contracts to promote arms sales around
the world.27 With these practices, Russia has increased its ability to influence and promote Russian interests.
Arms exports key to Russian heg
sendstad.pdf)//BB
Defence-industrial production is one of only a few technology-intensive economic sectors in which Russia can be considered a world
leader. President Vladimir Putin has affirmed the potential of defence-industrial activity to ‘serve as fuel to feed the engines of
modernization in [Russia’s] economy’.2 However, there has not always been sufficient domestic demand to keep
these engines running. In the 1990s, when defence procurement was drastically reduced, arms exports kept many enterprises
afloat.3 Even today, after five years of rapid growth in Russian defence spending, export markets remain
important to Russian firms. These markets are not only a source of current income, but also a potential
source of future sales to compensate for the anticipated decline in domestic demand over the next few
years.4 The defence industry is also socially important, as it accounts for a significant share of employment in Russia. With around 2.5 million
workers, it is responsible for over 3 per cent of total employment, and around one-third of employment in manufacturing, with defence-industrial
research and development (R&D) and production occupying a dominant place in many cities and regions.5 Arms exports perform
political functions. First, they help support defence-industrial production in areas where domestic demand
may be insufficient to maintain production lines. This helps preserve a wider spectrum of production
capabilities than might otherwise be possible, as was the case during the 1990s. Exports can also be profitable for producers
because government spending may contribute towards development costs. Second, armaments exports can serve as a useful
instrument of foreign policy. By supporting the formation of linkages with politically aligned states, the Soviet Union used arms sales
to expand its spheres of influence and create a more favourable political and strategic situation.6 For the Soviet Union, ‘[p]olitical goals were the
exports today help Russia achieve a wide
dominant factor when the decision to export conventional arms was taken’.7 Arms
range of national security objectives, including supporting its image as a global power, maintaining an
independent foreign policy, expanding its influence in the regions to which it is able to export arms, and
initiating and strengthening defence relations.8
Expanded arms sales are vital to future Russian expansionism
Millero 17 – MBA and Master’s of Strategic Intelligence, Colonel USAF (Raymond, “ROOTS RUNNING DEEP ARMS SALES AND
RUSSIA’S EXCURSION INTO SYRIA,” https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038117.pdf)//BB
Abstract
Reminiscent of the Soviet era, military
arms exports have once again become a major instrument for projecting
Russian power and influence, and are integral in bolstering a fragile economy and offsetting the damages caused by
Western sanctions. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian War on behalf of Bashar Al-Assad indicates a growing primacy of Putin’s
willingness to take calculated risks within the Russian sphere of influence and to use military exports as a political tool to achieve national
security interests. In Syria, Russia utilized its military exports to enhance its image as a world power, maintain access, and counter Western
influence in the Middle East. In addition to sending advanced weaponry to Syria, Russia showcased its military hardware against Western made
weapons, sending a clear signal of Russian reliability and sophistication to nations wanting to upgrade, purchase or diversify their military
inventory. The state owned and controlled Russian defense industry remains a fundamental instrument of
national power and supports the achievement of Putin’s national security goals. Military sales represents
an important aspect to understanding the potential for future Russian adventurism. Hence, future Russian military expansion in
what it considers its sphere of influence, with Putin’s goal to reemerge as a great power, can be anticipated through looking at
Russia’s defense export sales. The inextricable link between foreign military sales and the achievement of
Russia’s national security interests is an important aspect in avoiding the next strategic surprise .
Thesis
This paper argues that Russia
has returned to a pseudo-Soviet style practice of utilizing arms sales as a political
instrument to further its national security objectives. Moreover, this paper argues part of Russia’s decision to commit forces
into Syria was to showcase their military hardware to the world, thereby renewing interest in purchasing arms. This, in turn, provided Russia
is an inextricable link
additional opportunities to expand their influence and counter the West. Finally, this paper argues there
between foreign military sales and the potential for future Russian adventurism. Understanding this link is an
important aspect to avoid strategic surprise the next time Russia commits military forces in its self-
proclaimed sphere of influence.
The US must play the spoiler
Gurak 18 – senior fellow at the Potomac Foundation and was deputy director general of Ukraine’s state-owned arms manufacturer
Ukroboronprom 2014–18. (Denys, “How to Push Back Against Russia? Ukraine's Defense Industry Could Help.,” National interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-push-back-against-russia-ukraines-defense-industry-could-help-32242)//BB
The global balance of power is in transition. A global order that was established after World War II and
the collapse of Soviet Union is now evolving and often dysfunctional. We are witnessing the expansion of
a multipolar world, and the risk of conflict is intensifying due to an increase in the number of influential players
around the world. Ukraine is at the epicenter of these changes and the interests of many of the world’s major powers. It is the key to
balancing Russia’s global ambitions. Since its military aggression in Ukraine in 2014, and even earlier, starting with its war with Georgia, Russia
has continuously tried to destabilize and diminish the global-security system. This was done with only one aim: for Russia to reassert itself under
a new post–Soviet sphere of influence with new borders, both physical and psychological. President Vladimir Putin made this clear in 2007
during his speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he complained that “the United States has overstepped its national borders, and in
every area.” Of the tools Russia uses to gain geopolitical influence, the most crucial is the “diffusion of tactics.” These tactics involve various
methods of influence, ranging from military conflicts to the manipulation of national political and economic systems through disinformation and
proxies, as well as cyber warfare. Faced with such threats, Western political and security systems are vulnerable. Democracy requires public trust
and a bureaucratic consensus to survive. Putin knows this, which is why he has sought to undermine these pillars of democratic stability.
Similarly, the United States and its allies should respond to the Kremlin’s challenges by attacking Russia where it is most vulnerable: its exports
of fossil fuels and exports of weapons. In the oil and gas sector, the West has been assertive in countering Russian aggression by sanctioning
Russia’s energy industry and exporting shale oil and gas from the United States. But in the defense industry and defense trade, on the other hand,
there has not been the same level of action by the West. This is where Ukraine has a critical role to play. There are just a few countries in the
world that have full cycles of defense production. Only the United States, France, Russia, China, and Ukraine cover virtually all technological
capabilities in the defense space. Russia’s
arms trade poses threats to global security. The Kremlin uses defense
technical cooperation as a means to achieve its geopolitical goals. Moscow pursued this policy during the
Cold War by dividing the world into sectors of strategic influence. Back then, the United States was the
counterweight to this destructive Soviet strategy, and it must once again assume this role.
IL – cash key
New defense resources fund Russian conflict --- disrupts world order
Fortescue 17 - Honorary Associate Professor in Russian Politics at the University of New South Wales and Visiting Fellow at the Centre
for European Studies, Australian National University. His areas of research interest include the contemporary Russian policymaking process,
business–state relations, and Russia’s commercial involvement in the Asia Pacific. He received his PhD in Soviet Politics from the Australian
National University (Stephen, “CAN RUSSIA AFFORD TO BE A GREAT POWER?,” Lowy Institute,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/can-russia-afford-be-great-power)//BB
This is not to suggest that Russia should be written off or ignored. The economy is resilient, as it has demonstrated in weathering two recent
crises. It is also of
a size and with a resource endowment such as to encourage it to conceive of itself as a
great power. In trying to turn conception into reality it can be aggressive and disruptive of the established
world order. That produces two challenges for the West. The first is to arrive at a realistic understanding of what it can do, either in the
direction of providing the assistance that would allow the Russian economy to do better, or — more topically at the moment — in the direction of
restricting economic performance and thereby Russia’s capacity to meet its great power ambitions. In either
direction the West’s capacity is limited. The West cannot turn Russia into a balanced and booming economy; nor can it undermine the economy
and through it Russia’s political leadership to the point of irrelevance and collapse. But even limited capacity is important. The
West might not be able to transform the Russian economy, but within limits it can play a role in
determining where Russia is on the great power spectrum. That leads to the second challenge: what should the West do?
That depends on whether one believes Russian movement along the great power spectrum to be a good or a bad thing. If the West feels
that Russia’s current place on the spectrum is cause for disquiet and any further movement along it undesirable, the
capacity to increase the cost to Russia exists and should be used.
Low sales are forcing Russia to cut their defense budget
Harshaw 17 – writes editorials on national security, education and food for Bloomberg View. He was an editor with the op-ed page of
the New York Times and the paper’s letters editor (Tobin, “Vladimir Putin’s arms bazaar is in a serious sales slump,” Live Mint,
https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Ed2ke07FPIkeJ7ICEgVIkM/Vladimir-Putins-arms-bazaar-is-in-a-serious-sales-slump.html)//BB
Russian President Vladimir Putin is mighty proud of his military’s performance in Syria. And, as I have written, it’s
become a central part of a sales pitch: “You can’t miss this opportunity to strengthen our position in the
global arms market," he told a meeting of Russian defence companies this week. He added that there was unprecedented desire for buying
Russian munitions “thanks to the effective use of our weapons in real combat conditions including in anti-terrorist operations in Syria." But
while Putin talks a proud game, it’s hard not hear a tinge of desperation here. That’s because, after years
of phenomenal growth, the exports of Russian-made arms have stagnated. And it couldn’t have come at a
worse time, with oil prices devastating the economy in the midst of a massive military buildup
dependent in large part on those foreign sales. Arms exports are a tricky thing to measure. According to one of the leading
experts on the subject, Sergey Denisentsev, after nearly tripling global sales from 2005 to 2013, Russia has seen them drop or hold steady each
year since. At a recent forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Denisentsev gave some reasons for the
Kremlin’s struggles. At the top of the list are changes in military procurement in China and India, which traditionally counted for about half of
Russia’s exports. But there was a downside to those sales: the Chinese in particular are masters at appropriating the expertise of others, and have
now adapted Russian technology to domestically built planes and ships. “In some ways the student has already surpassed the teacher," said
Denisentsev. India, the world’s top buyer, is also building more of its own equipment. Its first aircraft carrier, the Vikramaditya, was built in the
1980s by the Soviet Union and purchased in 2004 off the Russian junk heap. But its second, the Vikrant, is the first in a planned class of carriers
to be built domestically. A deal between the countries to jointly build a fifth-generation fighter jet have been delayed for seven years over Indian
unhappiness with various Russian proposals. Meanwhile, the country increasingly finds itself in the US orbit, and this month reached a deal for
$2 billion in various arms with Israel. Vietnam, another major market, has been opened to US competition since last year, when President Barack
Obama lifted the ban on sales there. Meanwhile, low oil prices have hurt Russia indirectly as well as directly. Its big customers like Algeria and
Nigeria have signed contracts for a handful of planes, but are hardly on a spending spree because their own oil revenue has dried up. Azerbaijan,
a top customer, cut arms imports by 36%. Iran, even freed of many Western sanctions after an international deal for nuclear monitoring, has a
shambles of an economy. And Syria, of course, has turned from a customer to a charity case—or at best, a proving ground. The state-controlled
Russian press claims there is interest in fighter sales from several South American countries, but there’s no proof this is anything more than
propaganda. Spending in that region has fallen to its lowest level since 2007. It’s hard to believe Venezuela, where citizens go months without
basics such as milk and eggs, is about to splurge on a bunch of $37 million Su-30 fighters. A final problem, as pointed out by Marcus Weisgerber
at Defense One, is that Russia is struggling to churn out desirable products in an age of high-tech weaponry. Traditionally,
Moscow has left the top end of the market to the US and other Western producers, while focusing on what Denisentsev called
“cheap and deadly" weapons within the price range of buyers in the developing world. But as former clients like China and India get wealthier,
Russia is being forced to go upscale. And in developing next-generation jets and missile-defense systems, Moscow is losing its
competitive advantage. Given American companies’ superior reputations and track records, it makes less
and less sense for aspiring powers to buy Russian. The real-world effect is clear: After a decade-long
military expansion intended to solidify its rank as a global superpower, Russia is slashing its defense
budget by as much as 25% this year. (Other estimates put the figure below 10%, but either way, it is a sea change.) Putin has
reason to crow about his military’s performance so far in Syria, but it’s not going to do much for his
bottom line.
IL – AT aggression inevitable
Future adventurism is uncertain --- it’s constrained by limited economic capability
Silwinski 15 – MA in IR @ UGA (Michael, “Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policy,” Law Street,
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/world/russias-aggressive-foreign-policy/)//BB
Many Russians also believe the entire uprising in Ukraine is the result of Western actions. A common argument is that Russia has actually
intervened to protect Russian speakers the same as many western countries do for other minority groups. However, the opinions of everyday
Russians are heavily influenced by the Russian media, which is indiscriminately run by the state and thus broadcasts the state’s message.
Russia’s next course of action remains up in the air. Economically it would seem obvious that Russia has
to stop being so aggressive and work toward appeasing its Western creditors and consumers. Economic
sanctions placed on Russia following its actions in Ukraine are beginning to be felt. The main effects of the sanctions have been in
denying Russia credit and access to markets. Nonetheless, as yet another breached ceasefire implies, Russia doesn’t seem content to return
Eastern Ukraine–and certainly not Crimea–back to the original status quo. Other Foreign Policy Concerns for Russia Along with sanctions, an
even greater problem for Russia suggests it should curtail its recent aggressive maneuvering–falling oil
prices. At the beginning of the year, the price of oil dropped below $50 a barrel. This is devastating to a Russian economy that is dependent on
oil as its main export. From an economic standpoint this has been disastrous to the ruble, which has dropped by 17.5 percent compared to the
dollar in just the first two weeks of 2015. The economy in general is hurting, as well, as it’s projected to retract by three to five percent this year.
What this means for people on the street is also troubling. Lower crude prices mean higher prices for other goods, in particular food stuffs. All
of these economic woes have negatively impacted another grand Putin endeavor, the Eurasian Union. As
the name implies, it is an economic union made up of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan that is supposed to rival the EU.
However, with falling prices in Russia and declining currencies at home, all of the members are already discovering the side effects of allying
with a troubled Russia. The member countries are also wary of sovereignty violations by Russia as well, similar to the ones that have already
occurred in Georgia, Crimea, and now Eastern Ukraine. It seems unlikely that Russia will stop pursuing such an aggressive approach, however.
As a de facto dictator, it is crucial for Putin that he keeps his people happy enough so that they will not revolt. In this regard Putin seems to have
been very successful. In December 2014 he was elected Russia’s Man of the Year for the fifteenth time in a row. Putin’s popularity level in fact
has hovered at around 70 percent his entire time in office, spiking even higher during the invasion of Georgia and following the annexation of
Crimea. It actually seems to Putin’s benefit to maintain his strong appearance in the face of alleged western aggression. While people in the West
may question the authenticity of these ratings, any western politician would love to have the same kind of popularity. Putin has also increased
spending on the military. Even with the economy in crisis, military spending actually increased for this year rising to $50 billion. The effect of
this spending has been evident in increased navy patrols, air maneuvers, improved equipment and greater activity. It also included the purchase of
dozens of new state-of-the-art nuclear weapons to replace obsolete models from the Cold War. So, Russia’s policies are working, at least in part.
While they have proven very costly to the average Russian and the economy overall, it has not dissuaded Putin from his desire to restore Russian
prestige. Frankly it should not be surprising either, with his high approval ratings and the West’s resistance to anything more than soft power
tactics. The
real question going forward is how much further Russia will go down this path. Will it stop
with Eastern Ukraine or go further and risk overstretching? At some point the West will likely draw a line in the sand and if Russia
crosses it, what will be next for Russia and the international community it refuses to abide by?
IMPACTS
! – turns case – new sales
The internal link alone turns the case --- US will sell new arms in response to
Russian fill-in
And the entry of desperate second-tier suppliers shapes U.S. behavior in turn. The presence of alternate
sources, also known as the “gray threat,” has an effect even on the United States, as shown by the recent U.S.
decision to resume military aid and most sales to Egypt. Thailand presents a similar example. The United
States, the Thai military’s traditional supplier, largely ceased both arms sales and military assistance after that
country’s 2014 coup. Thailand accordingly procured weapons from relatively new suppliers, such as China, Russia, and Ukraine,
and has strengthened ties with suppliers from Israel, Sweden, and other countries in Europe. The United States is now resuming
much of its sales to that country.
! – turns case – corruption
Non-US sales fuel global corruption
Technology (Jonathan, “AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME,” War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/)//BB
The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit
conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and
maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting
states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased
sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to
exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals. Lower Levels of Corruption Lead to More Capability America’s ability to
walk away from any given arms deal helps reduce several bad behaviors endemic to the global arms trade. Three-quarters of all international
arms transfers go to countries that, according to Transparency International, score a “D” or worse in terms of anti-corruption measures in their
defense sectors. Almost two-thirds of American exports go to such countries, but compare this to the other leading arms dealers. France is 76
percent and the United Kingdom is 85 percent. Russia and China do not export to any clients graded above a “D.” An identical story emerges
when we look at exports to human rights abusers. The U.S. military-industrial complex may appear to be a collection of
rent-seeking, war-profiteering, influence-peddling, threat-inflating sociopaths until you look at nearly
every other country’s version. The United States sells most of its weapons through its Foreign Military
Sales program, which essentially adds foreign orders onto preexisting ones for U.S. forces. Foreign Military Sales plays an
unheralded role in global anticorruption efforts, since clients pay the same price as the U.S. military,
and most of the contracting is handled by the Department of Defense. Because the combined domestic and international
orders tend to be large, economies of scale also drive down the cost for foreign clients, which makes for an
attractive value proposition, even with many American strings attached. By contrast, when dealing with
less stringent regulations in other countries, buyers are likely to encounter corruption — side payments to
“agents” and bribes to officials — which ensures the purchasing state is not getting the best value for its money. This in turn
undermines a fundamental goal of U.S. arms transfers: enabling partners to provide their own security and
to potentially fight effectively alongside U.S. forces. Loosening American regulations to increase arms sales may not only
increase corruption levels, but also reduce the value of the product bought by U.S. allies and partners, making their militaries less capable.
! – turns case – HR
Non-US sales lead to human rights violations
Kaidanow 18 – MA in Political Science @ Columbia, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Tina, “U.S.
Arms Transfer Policy,” Department of State, https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2018/285045.htm)//BB
The State Department, through my bureau, has played a central role in the development of the CAT
policy and its implementation plan, because arms transfers are and must be tools of our overall foreign policy
objectives. Through the responsible oversight of arms transfers, we are supporting existing allies and partners or
establishing and expanding new security partnerships that we hope will last for generations. The complexities of our
operating environment are manifest. The issues we tackle every day in State are at the confluence of policy, regulatory, economic, and
congressional imperatives. As we endeavor to faithfully implement the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, we are anchoring our arms transfers
in our larger foreign policy framework and simultaneously protecting the security and integrity of our technological advantage and our defense
industrial base. In terms of that larger policy framework, let me speak for a moment about two important global issues we
take into account on every arms sale: human rights, and proliferation. In terms of human rights, the CAT policy
requires that every sale be assessed for the risk it may contribute to a gross violation of human rights. This
reflects an immutable American value, so let me repeat myself: we will not provide arms where we believe
they will be used to conduct a gross violation of human rights. For sure, there can be complexities in any sale: for
instance, not all of our partners are as discriminating as we ourselves are when it comes to the conduct of their military operations. For that
reason, the new CAT policy requires us to work proactively with partners to reduce civilian casualties in
their military operations. We also regularly use sales as an opportunity to engage with partners to address
the human rights conduct of their military. These are often imperfect situations, but we always work to reduce the
chance of the misuse of U.S. arms; the same simply cannot be said for most other suppliers of military
equipment.
! – turns case – secondary sales
Russia fill-in leads to secondary sales
east/)//BB
Why Choose a Russian Weapon?

When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The U.S. will
not sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally
speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the U.S. in
terms of quality and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-
aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons-learned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike
fighter can likely currently beat an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is
developing the next generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses
are on par with those of the U.S. in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them
even longer. [xiv] In addition, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes
less time to deliver after a contract is signed. Moscow is weak when it comes to follow-up support of sales, and Russian
weaponry is not always as technically advanced as America’s, but
it is good enough for the needs of many markets, and is
often far better than what the purchasing countries can build themselves. Russian weaponry is also a good choice for
states on a budget. Moscow advertises this fact. For example, in early October 2015, days after Russia’s Syria intervention, Moscow fired 26
cruise missiles from primarily small corvettes in the Caspian Sea to hit targets in Syria.[xv] Moscow made a public display of the event, not only
to demonstrate Russia’s own might but also to show other countries they need not purchase a large expensive warship to achieve strong naval
capabilities, and that Moscow would be happy to help them achieve this goal. Another practical consideration is that many local military
personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the
situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?”[xvi] For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt’s anti-
Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack
helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space,
but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper
than an F-22[xvii] (which the U.S. is currently not even exporting). Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes
with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from Washington. Moscow, unlike the U.S., does not
prohibit secondary arms sales. This means, for example, that when the U.S. sells weapons to Egypt, the
weapon must stay in Egypt.[xviii] But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily resell to
someone else for profit may be a preferable option.
Doesn’t link to the US --- new CAT policy solves
Kaidanow 18 – MA in Political Science @ Columbia, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Tina, “U.S.
Arms Transfer Policy,” Department of State, https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2018/285045.htm)//BB
The State Department, through my bureau, has played a central role in the development of the CAT
policy and its implementation plan, because arms transfers are and must be tools of our overall foreign policy
objectives. Through the responsible oversight of arms transfers, we are supporting existing allies and partners or
establishing and expanding new security partnerships that we hope will last for generations. The complexities of our
operating environment are manifest. The issues we tackle every day in State are at the confluence of policy, regulatory, economic, and
congressional imperatives. As we endeavor to faithfully implement the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, we are anchoring our arms transfers
in our larger foreign policy framework and simultaneously protecting the security and integrity of our technological advantage and our defense
industrial base. In terms of that larger policy framework, let me speak for a moment about two important global issues we
take into account on every arms sale: human rights, and proliferation. In terms of human rights, the CAT policy requires that
every sale be assessed for the risk it may contribute to a gross violation of human rights. This reflects an immutable American value, so let me
repeat myself: we will not provide arms where we believe they will be used to conduct a gross violation of human rights. For sure, there can be
complexities in any sale: for instance, not all of our partners are as discriminating as we ourselves are when it comes to the conduct of their
military operations. For that reason, the new CAT policy requires us to work proactively with partners to reduce civilian casualties in their
military operations. We also regularly use sales as an opportunity to engage with partners to address the human rights conduct of their military.
These are often imperfect situations, but we always work to reduce the chance of the misuse of U.S. arms; the same simply cannot be said for
most other suppliers of military equipment. In terms of proliferation, we also work to strike a balance between providing
our partners with the capabilities they need to defend themselves and ensure regional stability while
limiting the proliferation of new military technologies and creating regional imbalances that can lead to
an arms race. In doing so, we work within the context of the multilateral regimes to which the U.S. is a party.
That does not mean that some of these regimes do not need updating: for instance, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to
prevent the proliferation of missiles, never took into account the role that unmanned aerial systems now play in both the military and commercial
realms. In reviewing each sale on a case-by-case basis, we must ensure that we are not accelerating the spread
of advanced weaponry and creating opportunities for our competitors – economic and strategic – to expand the
space for their own defense trade, to our ultimate military and economic detriment.
The US prevents secondary sales
Caverley 12 - assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, and Ethan B. Kapstein, a non-resident senior fellow at
the Center for a New American Security who teaches at the University of Texas at Austin and is a visiting professor at Georgetown University.
(Ethan, “Arms Sales and American Interests,” CNAS, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/arms-sales-and-american-interests)//BB
American strategy in the arms trade consists of selling a few high-technology and ultra-expensive weapon
systems to clients that can pay for them, like the oil producing states. That strategy may maximize the short-run interests of the
industry and the U.S. armed services, but is it consistent with America’s long-run interests? Unlike many sectors, the arms trade has both an
economic and security function to fill. From an economic standpoint, foreign weapon sales not only keep workers employed at home, but by
extending production lines, can lower unit costs for the platforms the U.S. armed forces require. From an American security
perspective, arms sales are a vital tool of influence, since countries that acquire weapons from
Washington are less likely to use them in a way that would jeopardize future access to American defense
technology. By monopolizing arms sales, the U.S. can also limit the number of advanced weapons on the
world market.
! – nuc winter
Only U.S.-Russian war causes extinction
Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future
of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-
23.pdf
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-
out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is
likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be
much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the
atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear
winter.
According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of
around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of
Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from
other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and
Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each,
although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100
nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this
estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this
does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there
is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work,
including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.
It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century,
and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is
between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of
human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between
these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.
! – revisionism / war
Russia will pursue revisionist expansionism as long as it has the economic capacity
to do so --- leads to war
Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 36.1)
Russia’s domestic political system under Putin is oriented to expansionist policies and is predicated on
recasting Russia as a de facto empire. The inherent revisionism of Russian policy and its fundamental
anti-liberalism makes anti-Americanism the default option of Russian policy. Cooperation, where possible is tactical
and instrumental, not a result of a strategic rapprochement. This applies to arms control accords where Moscow feels free to break inconvenient
agreements. Russia’s overall security policies begin with the presupposition of conflict with most of its
interlocutors and thus entails a consistent bias toward the militarization of its domestic and foreign
policies. Domestic dissent is equated to treason by fifth columnists linked to external enemies and virtually all elements of domestic policy are
viewed through this prism.71 Given these continuing and strongly rooted factors, Russia’s conventional and
nuclear buildup will continue as long as Russia can afford it and Putin retains power, even if he must ratchet back the level
or scope of this buildup as a result of economic pressures. The dangerous threat environment for the West described above will
not change unless there are dramatic changes in Russia’s expansionist goals and Russia’s willingness to use any and all forms of
pressure to advance them, i.e., Russia’s grand strategy. Absent such a change in Russia’s strategic goals, U.S. and NATO conciliatory
The
behavior/actions are likely to present an image of disunity and indecision, and thereby potentially provoke further Russian belligerence.
usual Western hope that arms control will address threats and relieve it of the need to respond more
forcefully appears particularly fanciful now. Putin is little interested in new arms control and is manifestly
willing to violate existing agreements. As will be discussed in Chapters Two and Five, Russia has systematically violated the
Helsinki Final Act, all the treaties with Ukraine and other CIS governments on the inviolability of borders, and the 1994 Budapest Accord with
Washington, London and Kiev on Ukraine’s denuclearization; it also has broken the INF treaty, the CFE treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe)
and its political promises in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Unfortunately, abundant evidence points to the continuing
mobilization of Russia for a long-term state of siege with the West, if not actual war, as Moscow continues to
insist that it is secure only if all its interlocutors are not. A mobilization policy initiated by 2009 has greatly accelerated since 2013. If Russia
cannot escape from the Putin regime’s anti-Western hostility and insistence upon hegemony, the ensuing state of siege will be a
source of crises and conflict for years. Perhaps most dangerous is the fact that Putin is not a magician who
can control the nationalism and militarism he has inflamed. As the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin
Dempsey said in July 2014, “If I have a fear about this it’s that Putin may actually light a fire that he loses control of.”72
Indeed, crises and conflict are the logical consequences of Putin’s expansionist grand strategy.
Russian expansionism leads to nuclear use

Russian nuclear and conventional force programs and Russia grand strategy Russia clearly attributes political and military value to its
nuclear arsenal, and the threat of limited nuclear first use more specifically, as a means to support its efforts to reassert its dominance over
the post-Soviet space. Moscow’s strategy is intended to intimidate neighbors and deter outside interference in Russian activities through the threat
of nuclear first use. Russia’s apparently low nuclear threshold raises the stakes in any conflict, and compels adversaries to
confront the possibility that should they become involved, so too would Russian nuclear weapons. This has been prominently displayed
throughout hostilities in Ukraine, as Russian nuclear exercises, official statements, and bomber patrols are intended to intimidate Western states.
First and foremost, Russia’s strategy couples multidimensional operations with overt nuclear threats for the purpose of precluding retaliation by
the aggrieved party and/or its allies—thus giving Russia a free hand to pursue its expansionist goals. Moscow seeks this seemingly ultimate trump
card within its “near abroad.” This use of nuclear weapons is not a replay of Cold War notions of mutual nuclear deterrence. It is a strategy of
nuclear coercion to support expansionist goals. As noted in Chapter Three, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe General Sir Adrian
Bradshaw, concluded in this regard that Russia’s “threat of escalation might be used to prevent reestablishment of territorial integrity.”125
Acclaimed Russian analyst Pavel Felgenhauer agreed, suggesting Moscow is becoming comfortable with using the threat of
nuclear war to “scare the West into concessions.”126 This continued approach could lead to an “emboldened Russia brandishing
nuclear weapons each time it wants something.”127 Despite describing its policy as purely defensive, it is clear that Russia considers nuclear
coercion as a great power instrument to be leveraged during periods of hostilities to protect a potential fait accompli. If, as seems to be the case,
Moscow views this as a viable strategy, Russia may continue to act more aggressively toward post-Soviet states, potentially including the eastern
portion of NATO, backed up by nuclear threats. At the very least, if the Kremlin feels threatened, it will display its nuclear sabre to escalate the
conflict to a nuclear level others would simply be unwilling to match. During a meeting at the Valdai Club in October 2014, Putin himself gave a
history lesson on the power of nuclear intimidation, stating: True, the Soviet Union was referred to as “the Upper Volta with missiles.” Maybe so,
and there were loads of missiles. Besides, we had such brilliant politicians like Nikita Khrushchev, who hammered the desk with his shoe at the
UN. And the whole world, primarily the United States, and NATO thought: this Nikita is best left alone, he might just go and fire a missile, they
have lots of them, we should better show some respect for them.128 The danger in this Russian view is obvious: nuclear
brinksmanship could trigger a chain of events that leads to a nuclear confrontation or conflict.129 Should a
confident and “bold” Putin severely miscalculate a NATO response, he could believe nuclear escalation of a
conflict to be a viable option. In addition, if a conflict erupts, Russia’s flexible and discriminate nuclear systems may afford Moscow
the ability to frustrate NATO war-planning. By employing specific, specialized systems against high-value target sets, such as aircraft carriers,
critical command and control nodes, and long-range air bases, Russia could effectively carry out an offset strategy using both non-nuclear and
nuclear means to negate NATO’s conventional superiority by destroying the alliance’s most prized assets. This could cause enormous losses for
NATO military personal and infrastructure, and constrain NATO’s ability to conduct offensive operations to dislodge an occupying Russian
force. As is intended, Moscow’s threat to use nuclear weapons could result in coercive pressure to prevent certain conventional NATO actions
during the course of a conflict as well—essentially a form of intra-war nuclear coercion.130 This could consist of nuclear threats to prevent
NATO from targeting supply hubs, air bases, or sophisticated air and missile defenses located just inside Russia’s borders, which could be critical
targets during an operation to remove Russian forces. By threatening nuclear escalation, Moscow could force NATO to choose between limiting
its response or nuclear war. Thus, NATO must prepare for not just a miscalculated Russian nuclear strike, but a calculated one as well. Finally,
should deterrence fail and a crisis escalate, Russian leaders could believe that limited nuclear use would localize and terminate a conflict on
advantageous terms, as is suggested by its nuclear escalation strategy. Moscow appears to believe that it can control escalation by restraining the
types of nuclear weapons used, their targets, and under what circumstances each weapon is used, while threatening the possibility of further
nuclear escalation, up to global nuclear war. Essentially, by credibly threatening to break the long revered nuclear taboo, Russia appears to
anticipate being able to coerce NATO into submission or acquiescence to Russian domination of the post-Soviet space. In short, Russian nuclear
strategy envisions the threat of and possible employment of nuclear weapons to achieve military and political objectives. As Sergei Ivanov once
told the state Duma, “As regard to use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression, of course [we will use them in this case]. What else were they
built for?131 The Times of London reported in April 2015 that retired Russian generals, who had been briefed by Ivanov and approved by Putin,
met with a group of retired U.S. generals and warned that if NATO builds up its forces in the Baltics, Russia would respond by increasing its
“nuclear posture” and that, “Russia will use its nuclear weapons against NATO.”132 However, the core of Russia’s nuclear strategy does not
appear to anticipate a general nuclear war with NATO. The Kremlin appears to believe that NATO’s greatest strength is also its most exploitable
weakness: dependence on unanimity among its 28 members.133 Following the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s teaching on the value of
disrupting an enemy’s alliances, Russian limited nuclear use threats appear intended to divide NATO by threatening greater destruction and loss
should the bloc fail to yield during a conflict. The Russian leadership appears to assume that French, British, American, and German leaders will
be divided in their willingness to risk nuclear retaliation over distant regions such as Warsaw, Narva, or Daugavpils. As U.S. Amb. Robert Joseph
has noted, “Russia’s doctrine assumes an asymmetry of interests and a lack of willingness on the part of the enemy to risk nuclear war (emphasis
added).”134 A fundamental component of Russia’s nuclear strategy is to challenge NATO’s resolve. Indeed, the Russian leadership has
seemingly come to see limited nuclear threats as a viable policy option specifically fashioned to challenge NATO, based on the presumption that
most NATO members ultimately will be unwilling to defend their Eastern-most allies in the face of Russian nuclear escalation threats.135
Conclusion The Russian leadership undoubtedly views nuclear weapons as an essential coercive instrument to accomplish both political and
military objectives related to securing Moscow’s goals. By developing a spectrum of nuclear threats and capabilities, and a strategy to employ
nuclear weapons, Russia clearly backstops its expansionist campaigns. Whether it be covering hybrid operations, intimidating European states, or
potentially employing nuclear strikes to defeat a conventionally superior adversary, nuclear weapons and the threat of their use
are likely to remain, if not grow, in importance for Russia. In short, Russia’s nuclear strategy is in line with the Putin regime’s
worldview and grand strategy discussed in Chapter One, the goal of which is to establish a new Eurasian security order based on Russian
hegemony at the expense of NATO, and more importantly, the United States. More disturbingly, the Kremlin appears to believe that
actual nuclear employment is a realistic option in support of expansion. Should Putin determine a major
confrontation probable, he could conclude that launching a limited nuclear strike would be an
advantageous option. Given Putin’s apparent propensity for risk-taking and his absolute desire to reestablish
a greater Russia, he could find himself in a situation where he greatly miscalculates either his own forces’ abilities
or NATO’s willingness to capitulate. If Russia’s nuclear exercises are an indication, the threat of Russian nuclear first use is real
in a European contingency that is itself the result of Russian expansionism and aggression.
AT Russia peaceful
Overwhelming evidence proves Russia is expansionist and revisionist --- prefer our
ev --- theirs is benign optimism and ignores a clear historical record
Payne 17 – PhD in IR @ USC, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo State (Keith, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and
conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 36.1)//BB
This monograph, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, is based on readily-available and open sources of information, particularly
including numerous Russian publications. Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded
conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance
appear to be elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda. In this text, we call out and examine the
apparent grand strategy underlying Russian policies, programs and behavior. This examination demonstrates that Russian grand strategy
now includes a deeply-troubling mix of ingredients: increasing hostility toward the West, including
expressed military threats via statements and nuclear exercises directed against the United States and NATO countries; expanding
programs to produce advanced weapons and delivery vehicles, conventional and nuclear; revisions in
military doctrine that place greater emphasis on the employment of nuclear weapons, including first use;
military campaigns against neighboring states; the first annexation of European territory by military force
since World War II; increasing military-oriented incursions in U.S., Canadian, European and Japanese air
space; arms control noncompliance; and increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism. The December
2014 edition of Russia’s military doctrine identified the United States and NATO as the top threat to Russia.1 The President of Estonia, Toomas
Ilves, described the current situation in Europe: “Everything that has happened since 1989 has been predicated on the fundamental assumption
that you don’t change borders by force, and that’s now out the window.”2 Russian hostility and expansionist goals have been
manifest at least since Russia’s 2008 military action against Georgia, which reportedly was backed by an alert of
Russian nuclear forces.3 More recent Russian military actions include the annexation of Crimea, the support of pro-Russian rebels in Eastern
Ukraine with elements of the Russian army, and unprecedented military operations in Syria. These developments have created the
potential for escalating political-military crises in Europe and may be more dangerous than were Soviet Cold War
policies and behavior. In particular, as is explained herein, contemporary Russian nuclear strategy is intended to coerce
the West and enforce Moscow’s expansionist moves with nuclear first-use threats and planning that go
well beyond Soviet Cold War behavior. Until these most recent developments, the West generally has not
considered Russia to be a security threat and there has been very little focus on Russia for two decades. U.S. attention
has been elsewhere and the desire to see Russia as only a past threat has been overwhelming. Presidential
candidate Mitt Romney was roundly ridiculed when he suggested in 2012 that Russia remained a priority security threat to the West, and in the
same year a former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted confidently that the risk of a nuclear confrontation with Russia “belongs
to the past, not the future.”4 And, when Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, the United States was in the process of reducing U.S. military forces in
Europe. Russia continues to receive limited attention. Indeed, many still dismiss the potential for an escalating
crisis with Russia,5 and the systematic, integrated character of pertinent Russian policies remains largely
unrecognized.6 This monograph does not re-create Cold War images of Russia; it seeks instead to identify
and understand emerging realities and the various threads of contemporary Russian policy and behavior in
the unique context of Russian grand strategy. Such a comprehensive understanding of Russian policy and
behavior will be necessary if the West is to formulate an effective counterstrategy and minimize the
potential for crises and conflicts that otherwise appear inevitable. Herein are hundreds of references and statements by senior Russian
officials. Perhaps the most indicative of Russia’s strategic direction is by former Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov, “great powers …do not
dissolve in international unions— they create them around themselves.” It has become increasingly clear that the government of Vladimir Putin
is willing to use naked force and coercion to that end. A reappraisal of Russian grand strategy and its
elements is long overdue following two decades of confident Western belief in benign relations with
Russia, corresponding confident claims about the dwindling value of nuclear deterrence and “hard”
power, and naïve expectations of a perpetual “peace dividend.” This monograph is intended to provide an initial step in
that reappraisal. I would like to express my great appreciation to the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this monograph
possible. I am equally grateful to each of the contributing authors and the Senior Reviewers who have worked diligently to help ensure its
integrity, credibility and veracity, and to Amy Joseph and Matt Costlow at National Institute for their exceptionally professional efforts in support
of this study’s research and publication.
Revisionism is the best explanation for Russian behavior
Michta 18 – PhD, dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies (Andrew, “Time to Push Back Against the Revisionists,” American Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/13/time-to-
push-back-against-the-revisionists/)//BB
China and Russia are pushing a reluctant West to re-examine its most cherished assumptions about the shape of the global order.
Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the parameters of the next round of global state-on-state
security competition are now in full view. Long after history was declared to be at an end and America’s “unipolar moment” was
so lyrically heralded, the world today looks nothing like such post-Cold War projections. The rules-based liberal global order has proved to be a
chimera while the fundamentals of economic power as the foundation of military strength have once again been reaffirmed. Despite decades
spent cajoling people to believe that they owe a higher allegiance to institutions transcending the nation-state, all too many remain stubbornly
unconvinced. This new era of great power competition will likely remain with us for the rest of our lives;
rapid escalation and, ultimately, war are no longer merely a theoretical possibility. This is not to say that the
changes wrought during the preceding decades were all for naught. Although the core principles of great power competition are as true today as
they have always been, over the past three post-Cold War decades the distribution of power has shifted significantly across the globe, and in some
regions quite dramatically. The world has become more complex both in terms of technology and social cleavages, but also more rudimentary:
For America and the West more broadly, questions of national power, national sovereignty, and ultimately national survival are now more urgent
than they have been since 1945.For America and the West more broadly, questions of national power, national sovereignty, and ultimately
national survival are now more urgent than they have been since 1945. The lesson here is not that timing is everything, but rather that strategic
vision—along with the capacity to expect the unexpected—is what matters most when nations approach systemic
inflection points such as those we are at today. The United States and Europe come to this current round of great power
competition burdened by several serious handicaps. The confrontation between the United States and its competitors China and
Russia is increasingly global, posing a dilemma akin to that of a two-front war. Even if one does not fall prey to the exaggerations of
China’s wealth and technological progress commonly afflicting accounts of that country’s rise, it is nevertheless clear that the United States
needs to move beyond the “status quo power” handicap—namely, the reluctance to take risks by pushing back against revisionist
states, and the attendant desire to seek accommodation. For almost half a century, analysts have labored under the delusion
that China can be brought into the liberal international system through economic development, in the process morphing into an approximation of
a Western democracy. The belief that economic access will somehow “domesticate” the Chinese communist regime has always been lacking in
empirical foundation. Indeed, the examples invoked by many in political science, such as the political evolution of South Korea and Taiwan, have
been misapplied; in both cases the strategic imperative of remaining close to the United States shaped their domestic politics. The fundamental
change in our view of China as a power hostile to the United States, intent on replacing America in the international order, should be the
underlying assumption of any debate about U.S. global strategy going forward. This means that in the near term we must make every effort to
“onshore” the critical elements of our supply chain that we have so ill-advisedly farmed out to Asia. We need to recall the Cold War lesson that
technological superiority rests not only in design but, more importantly, in processes, alloys, composites, and so on—namely, in our
technological culture writ large. During the Cold War the Soviets could steal Western designs for weapons systems, but they had to rely on their
own technological culture to produce their versions. In contrast, we have transferred the crown jewels of American technological know-how to
China, the devastating consequences of which become clear when we compare the parameters of our systems with theirs, and measure the shift in
the balance of power. “If you are in a hole, stop digging,” goes the old American adage. This applies in spades to our decades-long trade policy,
which has allowed China to enter the WTO, to claim “developing country” status, and to continue to extort American corporations for their most
treasured economic secrets in exchange for market access. Enough already. Putin’s Russia presents a different challenge to U.S. global
supremacy. Russia is a revisionist power intent on creating a sphere of privileged interest along its
periphery, including in Europe, but it lacks the resources to mount a frontal challenge to the United States.
However, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his thorough understanding of full-spectrum
statecraft, including the application of military force to achieve clearly defined political objectives. Putin’s ability to selectively
invest his country’s limited resources, whether in new military hardware or in campaigns such as in Syria
and Ukraine, has yielded outsized results. The key to Russia’s successful challenge to the rules-based order in Europe has been
Putin’s ability to anticipate the deeply ingrained risk aversion of key powers in Europe. Hence, despite having kicked over the table on which the
leading states in the European Union sought to set the future of the European order, Putin still continues to dangle before them visions of a “grand
deal” that would address Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.” His gamble in Ukraine, meanwhile, has polarized the European Union, and
especially has widened the rift over differing threat perceptions between countries like Germany and France, on the one hand, and the former
Soviet satellites and the Scandinavians on the northeastern flank on the other. The growing discord within the European Union and NATO has
yielded a debate over what, during the Cold War, would have been considered a mortal threat to the unity of the West, as seen in today’s rather
loose talk about the need for European “strategic autonomy”—as though some of NATO’s most vital European allies were now tracking toward
an emancipatory policy that could ultimately leave the United States outside. In short, the challenge to the United States posed by
Russia, notwithstanding the country’s relatively weak economic position when compared to China’s, is much more intricate
and insidious, for it threatens to undermine and dismantle the foundations of the Transatlantic security
system. The United States is at an inflection point, one in which our choices going forward will have a
transformative impact on our security and that of our allies. This is a “late 1940s moment”—one that requires a massive
adjustment in how we view and interact with other key players in the international system and what priorities we set going forward. Today
Washington appears to have finally awakened to the reality that long-cherished assumptions about what the world would look like after the Cold
War were fundamentally flawed. It is almost uncanny that this most profound redefinition of U.S. foreign and security policy has been produced
during the Donald J. Trump presidency—at a time when American politics have become polarized to a point few thought possible only a decade
ago. And yet, through its National Security Strategy and its National Defense Strategy, the Trump Administration has produced arguably the first
coherent articulation since the fall of the Berlin Wall of the world as it is rather than as we wish it to be, free of pious shibboleths and expressing
a determination to redress past mistakes. What needs to happen now is the translation of these key strategic documents into guidance
that will shape the restoration of our military capabilities and those of our allies. This is our “late 1940s moment,” a latter-
day version of the reorientation that yielded our present defense infrastructure and ultimately led to the creation of NATO. The West needs to pull
together yet again. The clock is ticking.
Even if they aren’t revisionist, that’s only because of a lack of economic resources ---
plan changes that calculus
Arshakuni 18 – MA Candidate @ Davis Center (Nini, “Perspectives | Russia's Approach to the Global Order: Revisionist or Not?,”
https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-russias-approach-to-the-global-order-revisionist-or-not)//BB
Yet Russia does not and cannot steer global rules because it does not have the economic resources. “It is
important to go beyond a simple and misleading dichotomy between dominant and emerging or between revisionist
and status-quo powers because Russia fits none of these categories. We need to think about Russia as a
restoring or recovering power,” he said. Discussions of the global liberal order often fail to acknowledge that the Soviet Union also
contributed to the establishment of that order after World War II, he pointed out. The USSR helped found the United Nations and led in the
creation of other institutions and norms (today’s non-proliferation regime and international pacts on human rights, for example) fundamental to
the current international order. Russian official discourse still emphasizes the importance of international institutions. The central role for the UN
and international law has been acknowledged in every Foreign Policy Concept adopted in Russia since 2000. To explain Russia’s adherence to
existing international institutions such as the UN, Istomin claimed that with the rise of new powers – such as China, India, and even the EU,
which have their own agendas regarding the shape of international institutions – Russia has less ability to affect international
norms, especially when compared to the position the USSR enjoyed in a bipolar world. The United States, of course, faces a similar challenge
because it also must consider the interests of rising powers. Thus, new institutions will be less reflective of Russian and American interests –
giving the once-dominate superpowers a reason to cooperate. Istomin conceded that the existing discourse on Russia as a
revisionist power is not completely out of touch with reality. “There are institutions in the international system which
Russia does not feel comfortable with,” he said, citing NATO as an example. Now that Russia has recovered from the crises of
the 1990s, it has pushed back against those institutions in which Russia’s voice was not heard. Another reason Russia tries to
shape new rules and institutions in the international system is strategic. “Russia understands that the rising powers will
continue to rise, and it thus tries to accommodate the interests of other rising powers in order to secure a
better bargaining position until they get stronger,” Istomin said. The BRICS – a forum of countries with very diverse agendas –
exemplify Moscow’s accommodation. “Russia embraced the idea proposed by the rising powers about the reform of international financial
institutions despite it not being Russia’s priority.”
AT Russia peaceful – response to US
Russian motives are independent of US aggression
Kirchick 18 – fellow @ Brookings, author of The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age @ Yale Press
(James, “The Roots of Russian Aggression,” https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/06/11/russian-aggression-ukraine-not-america-
fault/)//BB
Don’t blame the West

The Cold War didn’t “end” — it was won.
— George H. W. Bush, 1992
As U.S.–Russian relations reach a post–Cold War low, a growing number of observers have concluded that Western behavior, not Russian
belligerence, ultimately lies at fault. According to this analysis, the United States and its European allies “humiliated” Russia by enlarging
NATO, undertaking military action in the Balkans, extending trade and other forms of soft power to the former Eastern Bloc, and generally not
affording Moscow the respect it supposedly deserved as a great (albeit territorially smaller and militarily weaker than it once was) power. “The
West will find it easier to coexist with this tormented, intransigent, melancholy and oil-rich neighbor when Russia feels comfortable with itself,
not when its nose is rubbed in its long history of failure,” the British military historian Max Hastings wrote in 2008 after Russia invaded Georgia.
Two years later, well into Barack Obama’s “reset” aimed at repairing relations with Moscow, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack
Matlock blamed American hubris for the rise in tensions. “The collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a military victory, which led to a spirit of
triumphalism and a feeling of omnipotence as the ‘sole superpower,’” he said. Repeating the word “triumphalist,” which has become ubiquitous
in these types of appraisals, Matlock complained that “a lot of this triumphalist mythology has come from the neocons whose ideas were rejected
by Reagan, who in the end was more interested in negotiating.” So stubbornly is this historical narrative of Western arrogance and Russian
innocence asserted that it has become impervious to all manner of Russian mischief, no matter how morally egregious or physically destructive.
In 2014, after Russian president Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimean peninsula in the first armed seizure of territory on the European continent
since World War II, former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev denounced NATO “triumphalism” as the culprit, though the military alliance had
expressly chosen not to offer Ukraine a pathway to membership at its 2008 Bucharest summit. So, too, last year did Odd Arne Westad, a Harvard
professor and the author of a mammoth new history of the Cold War, accuse America of “post–Cold War triumphalism” that “promoted a
prosperity agenda of market values on a global scale.” He lamented that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was not welcomed
into the Western fold. Instead, “ideas and assumptions that had built up over generations persisted, despite the disappearance of the Soviet
threat.” According to these critics of Western “triumphalism,” Washington and its allies repeatedly neglected to take post-Soviet Russia’s
legitimate security concerns into account, thereby making the present impasse all but inevitable. “After the end of the Cold War, the Euro-
Atlantic countries failed to create a regional security system that would include Russia,” Dmitri Trenin wrote in February. Trenin, a former Soviet
army colonel who now works at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is essentially arguing that NATO, originally established to
resist Moscow, ought to have extended membership to it. The most recent and prominent airing of this view appeared in mid May in the pages of
The New York Times Magazine, where Russian-American author Keith Gessen profiled two camps of Washington “Russia hands.” On one side,
he wrote, are the hawkish “internationalists” who impudently act as if the West prevailed in some long twilight struggle against Soviet
Communism. On the other are sober “realists” who “believe that the intransigent and unchanging one in the relationship is the United States —
that the country has never gotten past the idea that it ‘won’ the Cold War and therefore needs to spread, at all costs, the American way of life.”
These critics of Western “triumphalism” are right that the root of our current problems with Russia can be traced back to the 1990s. But they have
drawn the wrong lessons from that crucial period. No proper understanding of contemporary U.S.–Russian relations
can escape the fact that the West won — and the Soviet Union lost — the Cold War. By “win,” one does not mean
only that the free world achieved its geopolitical objectives, liberating Eastern Europe and orchestrating the downfall of a superpower rival. For
the Cold War was more than a mere struggle over territory and global influence. It was also a moral struggle between two fundamentally different
systems. And it wasn’t just liberal-democratic market capitalism that prevailed over totalitarian command-economy socialism. What also won
was a version of state sovereignty whereby small nations have as much right to determine their destiny as large ones do, free from external
domination. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, there triumphed a particular vision of ordering not just a society but the world. Long before the
collapse of their empire, Soviet leaders endorsed this conception of state sovereignty by signing the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which committed
signatories to respect one another’s “sovereign equality,” the “inviolability of frontiers,” the “territorial integrity of states,” “non-intervention in
internal affairs,” and the “peaceful settlement of disputes.” Collectively, these resolutions constituted the act’s “first basket” of agreements. The
second basket incorporated trade and scientific cooperation, while the third committed states to uphold human rights, freedom of emigration, and
freedom of the press. At the time, the Soviets were eager for such an agreement because it essentially legitimized their post-war domination of
Central and Eastern Europe, where they had installed Communist puppet regimes (which, along with the United States and its Western allies,
were also party to the Helsinki accords). While the Eastern Bloc governments had no intention of actually upholding the act’s “third basket,” their
formal recognition of it came back to haunt them in the form of dissidents who cited these written commitments in making their case for great
political freedom. So, too, were the Soviets and their allies taken by surprise when national independence movements referenced the act’s
sovereignty provisions to expose the fundamental illegitimacy of the Warsaw Pact, all along a façade for Russian colonialism. That the Soviets
(and, later, Russians) never intended to take the human-rights and sovereignty provisions of the Final Act seriously is a repudiation not of the
Final Act itself but of the leaders who disingenuously signed it. Soviet leaders again endorsed the principle of national sovereignty when, in 1989,
they supplanted the Brezhnev Doctrine, which permitted Warsaw Pact countries to intervene militarily against “forces hostile to socialism” in
other member nations, with the “Sinatra Doctrine,” whereby Eastern Bloc states could do it their way. Though it was not Gorbachev’s intention,
this momentous decision ultimately led to the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. The first post–Cold War conflict to erupt between Russia
and the West was in the Balkans, where the United States and its allies intervened militarily to avert ethnic cleansing carried out by Moscow’s
traditional ally, the Serbs. Confronting internal economic and political instability, and prosecuting a scorched-earth war in Chechnya, Russia was
in no position to challenge NATO in the former Yugoslavia. This inability to contest Western intervention in what Moscow considered its
imperial backyard bred feelings of resentment among a rising generation of Russian nationalists, who would later choose to fixate on the Western
military alliance as the greatest threat to Russian security. The subject of NATO’s post–Cold War enlargement, and more specifically the false
claim that Western leaders promised their Soviet counterparts that NATO would refrain from
incorporating new members, has won credibility of late. Particularly after the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s
Western sycophants, seeking to justify Putin’s aggression, trotted out the claim that NATO’s “encircling”
of Russia had somehow forced Putin into invading his neighbors. It is remarkable how pervasive this
narrative has become. Touring the United States over the past year to promote my book about Europe, I have never addressed an
audience in which someone did not mention, if not endorse, this argument. Assertions of Western “triumphalism” with regard to NATO
enlargement gained strength in December when an outfit called the National Security Archive at George Washington University selectively
published a series of recently declassified U.S.-government documents purporting to show, once and for all, that Western leaders had indeed
offered their Soviet interlocutors a “cascade of assurances” that NATO would not expand. Despite its official-sounding name, the National
Security Archive is a left-wing organization committed to exposing the Cold War sins, real or alleged, of America through the highly selective
publishing of tendentiously presented documents, and nothing in the latest dump tells us anything new. As is already known, James Baker, then
the secretary of state, promised Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward.” The archive attempts to embellish this statement
by releasing some extraneous once-classified documents. But Baker made that pledge solely in the context of East Germany, a country that, like
the Soviet Union, would soon cease to exist. At the time, it was inconceivable that places such as Poland or Czechoslovakia (another state not
long for this world), never mind the soon-to-be independent Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, might one day join NATO.
Russia and its Western apologists can offer no evidence of a promise not to enlarge NATO, because such a promise was never made. Gorbachev
should have the final word on this matter: “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years,” he
said in October 2014. “I say this with full responsibility. Not a single Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact
ceased to exist in 1991.” Only years later would the prospect of former Warsaw Pact states’ joining NATO become a subject of more than
academic discussion, when the alliance offered membership to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In 1997, all three joined. But
relitigating what assurances the West did or did not make to the collapsing Soviet Union about NATO’s future status is a distraction from the
more fundamental question: What right does Russia have to decide whether its former satrapies can join a defensive military alliance of their own
free will? In the words of the former State Department official Kirk Bennet, “NATO enlargement was driven by demand, not supply.” The newly
independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe all desperately wanted to join NATO, and given their histories with Russia, it’s not hard to
understand why. The practice of invading European neighbors because they stray from the true socialist path — employed by the Russians in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968, respectively — is a model of interstate behavior that was supposed to have been forever
discredited with the collapse of the Soviet Union. (As events in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine six years later demonstrate, however, it has
unfortunately been revived.) The principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity initially laid out in the Helsinki Final Act were later
enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, agreed to by the Soviet Union and, following its dissolution, its legal successor state,
the Russian Federation. In 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum with Ukraine, Great Britain, and the United States, which saw Kiev
surrender its ample nuclear-weapons stockpile to Moscow in exchange for guarantees of its territorial integrity. As with practically every
understanding it signed in the post–Cold War period, Russia later violated this pledge. Throughout the 1990s and well into the reign of Vladimir
Putin, the United States and its allies went out of their way to draw Russia closer and assuage any fears its government might have had, genuine
or contrived, that the Western alliance harbored aggressive designs. In 1997, the NATO–Russia Founding Act was signed to guide relations
between the West and Russia; among other provisions, the accord limits the number of troops each side may permanently station in Central and
Eastern Europe. Five years later, the NATO–Russia Council was established to serve as a forum for “consultation, consensus-building,
cooperation, joint decision and joint action, in which the individual NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners on a wide spectrum
of security issues of common interest.” During the early years of the war in Afghanistan, Russia and NATO collaborated constructively, with the
former permitting the latter use of its airspace and territory to transfer supplies to the theater. As late as 2010, the problem that Russia’s then-
ambassador to NATO had with the military alliance was not that it was too belligerent but that it emanated a “mood of capitulation” with respect
to Afghanistan. Further signs of Western cooperation included granting Russia a place at the table of the G-7 (which thereby became the G-8,
until Moscow’s annexation of Crimea led to the suspension of its membership) and admission into the World Trade Organization. What
provoked the deterioration in relations between Russia and the West, then, was neither NATO
enlargement, nor American foreign policy, nor anything else that the West did, but Russian revanchism
and revisionism. In 2007, Putin delivered an anti-American tirade at the Munich Security Conference, shocking
attendees. Shortly thereafter, Russia launched a cyberattack on tiny Estonia, and the following year it
invaded Georgia. The French writer Michel Gurfunkiel identifies Putin’s four major strategic goals as reuniting “all the Russian-speaking
peoples under a single nation-state,” reestablishing Russia as “the first among equals” in the “Eurasian community,” weakening Europe and the
transatlantic alliance, and restoring Russia as a global power. All of these objectives are in direct conflict with the understandings achieved by
Western victory in the Cold War and agreed to by Putin’s predecessors in the Kremlin, foremost among them that the consensual model of
interstate relations had replaced the coercive methods of the past. Putin’s rhetorical embrace of “Eurasianism,” an ideology
with fascistic and mystical undertones, and his establishment of the “Eurasian Union” as a direct
competitor to the European Union, signaled the decisive shift away from cooperation with the West to a
strategy of weakening it from within. Unlike post-war Germany, which made full amends for its past
militarism and atrocities and committed itself to multilateralism and nonviolent approaches to resolving
international conflict, Russia never went through a process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or “coming to terms with
the past.” Perhaps this was an unavoidable consequence of the Cold War’s peaceful end — the Soviet Union, unlike the Third Reich, was not
subjected to a traumatic military defeat and occupation by its adversaries. But the consequences of Russia’s not engaging in the
sort of critical appraisal of its own history so admirably pursued by post-Holocaust Germany are visible
all around us in the modern-day cult of Josef Stalin, the veil of silence surrounding Communist-era crimes, and the popular support among
the Russian people for Putin’s military adventures abroad. Following the advice of the “realists” Gessen so admires and allowing Moscow a veto
over the foreign-policy orientation of former subjects would have indulged Russia’s notion that it is still an empire and invited more aggression.
By this light, NATO’s denial of Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia indicates how the West failed to reap the benefits of winning
the Cold War. Chief among these benefits ought to have been the welcome rise of sovereign countries’ Western aspirations. Instead, the West
preferred to assuage Russian inferiority complexes and hurt feelings. Deprived of the argument that it was nonexistent NATO expansion to
Ukraine that “provoked” Russia to invade it, some realists cite the EU’s 2013 offer of a trade-and-aid package to Kiev as having justified the
aggression. What this excuse neglects to acknowledge is Putin’s 2004 statement “If Ukraine wants to join the EU and is welcome there, we can
only welcome that.” Ten years later, he waged war against the country for trying to do precisely what he had encouraged. 2 Our present-day
problems with Russia stem from two utterly different, and fundamentally irreconcilable, understandings
of what the end of the Cold War meant. It wasn’t just a side that lost but a whole understanding of how the world should work.
From the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand to the Sudeten crisis to the division of Germany, most of the 20th century’s major conflicts
erupted over border disputes in Central and Eastern Europe. Vladimir Putin’s refusal to acknowledge that small countries have the same rights as
larger ones has pitted a rules-abiding West against a rules-flouting Russia. Faced with neighbors wishing to break free of their post-imperial yoke,
Russians have not paused to consider that maybe it’s their behavior, past and present, that has led the former “captive nations” to be wary of
Moscow’s designs. Rather, Russians have internalized, in the words of former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine
Steven Pifer, the attitude that “nobody likes us, what’s wrong with everybody?” For Western
policymakers to endorse such myopia is like giving car keys to a drunk. As Russian troops marched into Crimea under
the same pretext as German forces did into the Sudetenland — claiming to “protect” the rights and lives of allegedly threatened ethnic comrades
— German chancellor Angela Merkel was said to have remarked that Putin lives in “another world.” He does. It’s a dangerous
world where might makes right, one that successive generations of Western statesmen, along with courageous Poles, Czechs,
Romanians, and countless others, fought to overcome. The post–Cold War “ideas and assumptions” of America and its allies
were not “triumphalist” diktats meant to humiliate or “encircle” Russia by “rubbing its nose” in defeat, but fundamental
principles of sovereignty and national self-determination established to avert war on a continent repeatedly plagued by it. Far from being
too “triumphalist” in its dealings with Russia, if anything, the West was not triumphalist enough.
AT no war
Once a minor conflict starts, it escalates --- neither side has de-escalation measures
in place, and both leaders are conflict-prone
Wood 17 - senior military correspondent for The Huffington Post. His second book, What Have We Done: the Moral Injury of Our Longest
Wars, based on his Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, was published by Little, Brown in November 2016.
(David, “THIS IS HOW THE NEXT WORLD WAR STARTS,” https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/trump-russia-putin-military-
crisis/)//BB
Putin’s favored tactic, intelligence officials say, is known as “escalation dominance.” The idea is to push the other side until
you win, a senior officer based in Europe explained—to “escalate to the point where the adversary stops, won’t go farther. It’s
a very destabilizing strategy.” Stavridis cast it in the terms of an old Russian proverb: “Probe with a bayonet; when you hit steel
withdraw, when you hit mush, proceed.” Right now, he added, “the Russians keep pushing out and hitting mush.” This mindset is basically the
opposite of how both American and Soviet leaders approached each other during the Cold War, even during periods of exceptional stress such as
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Having endured the devastation of World War II, they understood the horror that lurked on the far side of a crisis.
“When things started to get too close, they would back off,” said Miller, the retired Pentagon official. The term of art for this constant
recalibration of risk is “crisis management”—the “most demanding form of diplomacy,” writes Sir Lawrence Freedman, an emeritus professor of
war studies at King’s College London. Leaders had to make delicate judgments about when to push their opponent and when to create face-
saving off-ramps. Perhaps most critically, they had to possess the confidence to de-escalate when necessary. Skilled crisis management,
Freedman writes, requires “an ability to match deeds with words, to convey threats without appearing reckless, and to offer concessions without
appearing soft, often while under intense media scrutiny and facing severe time pressures.” A recent textbook example came in January 2016,
when Iran seized those 10 U.S. Navy sailors, claiming that they had been spying in Iranian waters in the eastern Persian Gulf. President Barack
Obama’s secretary of state, John Kerry, immediately opened communications with his counterpart in Tehran, using channels established for
negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. By the next morning, the sailors had been released. The U.S. acknowledged the sailors had strayed into
Iranian waters but did not apologize, asserting that the transgression had been an innocent error. Iran, meanwhile, acknowledged that the sailors
had not been spying. (The peaceful resolution was not applauded by Breitbart News, headed at the time by Stephen Bannon, who is now Trump’s
chief White House strategist. Obama, a Breitbart writer sneered, has been “castrated on the world stage by Iran.”) Neither Putin nor
Trump, it’s safe to say, are crisis managers by nature. Both are notoriously thin-skinned, operate on
instinct, and have a tendency to shun expert advice. (These days, Putin is said to surround himself not with
seasoned diplomats but cronies from his old spy days.) Both are unafraid of brazenly lying, fueling an
atmosphere of extreme distrust on both sides. Stavridis, who has studied both Putin and Trump and who met
with Trump in December, concluded that the two leaders “are not risk-averse. They are risk-affectionate.” Aron, the
Russia expert, said, “I think there is a much more cavalier attitude by Putin toward war in general and the threat of
nuclear weapons. He continued, “He is not a madman, but he is much more inclined to use the threat of nuclear
weapons in conventional [military] and political confrontation with the West.” Perhaps the most significant difference
between the two is that Putin is far more calculating than Trump. In direct negotiations, he is said to rely on videotaped analysis of the facial
expressions of foreign leaders that signal when the person is bluffing, confused or lying. At times, Trump has been surprisingly
quick to lash out at a perceived slight from Putin, although these moments have been overshadowed by his effusive praise for
the Russian leader. On December 22, Putin promised to strengthen Russia’s strategic nuclear forces in his traditional year-end speech to his
officer corps. Hours later, Trump vowed, via Twitter, to “greatly strengthen and expand” the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. On Morning Joe the
following day, host Mika Brzezinski said that Trump had told her on a phone call, “Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass
and outlast them all.” And in late March, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was becoming increasingly frustrated with Russia, throwing
up his hands in exasperation when informed that Russia may have violated an arms treaty. Some in national security circles see Trump’s
impulsiveness as a cause for concern but not for panic. “He can always overreact,” said Anthony Cordesman, senior strategic analyst at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and a veteran of many national security posts throughout the U.S. government. “[But] there
are
a lot of people [around the president] to prevent an overreaction with serious consequences.” Let’s say that Trump acted
upon his impulse to tell a fighter pilot to shoot a jet that barrel-rolled an American plane. Such a response would still have to be carried out by the
Pentagon, Cordesman said—a process with lots of room for senior officers to say, “Look, boss, this is a great idea but can we talk about the
repercussions?” And yet that
process is no longer as robust as it once was. Many senior policymaking
positions at the Pentagon and State Department remain unfilled. A small cabal in the White House, including Bannon,
Jared Kushner and a few others, has asserted a role in foreign policy decisions outside the normal NSC process. It’s not yet clear how much
influence is wielded by Trump’s widely respected national security adviser, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster. When lines of authority
and influence are so murky, it increases the risk that a minor incident could boil up into an unintended
clash, said retired Marine Corps General John Allen, who has served in senior military and diplomatic posts. To complicate matters
further, the relentless pace of information in the social media age has destroyed the one precious factor
that helped former leaders safely navigate perilous situations: time. It’s hard to believe now, but during the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, for instance, President Kennedy and his advisers deliberated for a full 10 weeks before announcing a naval quarantine of the island.
In 1969, a U.S. spy plane was shot down by North Korean jets over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 Americans on board. It took 26 hours for the
Pentagon and State Department to recommend courses of action to President Richard Nixon, according to a declassified secret assessment.
(Nixon eventually decided not to respond.) Today, thanks to real-time video and data streaming, the men in the Kremlin and White House can
know—or think they know—as much as the guy in the cockpit of a plane or on the bridge of a warship. The president no longer needs to rely on
reports from military leaders that have been filtered through their expertise and deeper knowledge of the situation on the ground. Instead, he can
watch a crisis unfold on a screen and react in real time. Once news of an incident hits the internet, the pressure to
respond becomes even harder to withstand. “The ability to recover from early missteps is greatly reduced,”
Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has written. “The speed of war has changed, and
the nature of these changes makes the global security environment even more unpredictable, dangerous,
and unforgiving.” And so in the end, no matter how cool and unflappable the instincts of military men and
women like Kevin Webster, what will smother the inevitable spark is steady, thoughtful leadership from within
the White House and the Kremlin. A recognition that first reports may be wrong; a willingness to absorb
new and perhaps unwelcome information; a thick skin to ward off insults and accusations; an acknowledgment
of the limited value of threats and bluffs; and a willingness to recognize the core interests of the other side and a
willingness to accept a face-saving solution. These qualities are not notably on display in either capital .
No checks on conflict escalation, and Trump is prone to overreact

Wood 17 - senior military correspondent for The Huffington Post. His second book, What Have We Done: the Moral Injury of Our Longest
Wars, based on his Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, was published by Little, Brown in November 2016.
(David, “THIS IS HOW THE NEXT WORLD WAR STARTS,” https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/trump-russia-putin-military-
crisis/)//BB
With these issues in mind, I traveled to Germany this winter to talk with U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters, who commands American and
NATO air operations. We sat in his headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, a gleaming, modern complex where officers in the uniforms of various
NATO nations bustle efficiently through polished corridors. “The degree of hair-triggeredness is a concern,” said Wolters, a
former fighter pilot who encountered Soviet bloc pilots during the Cold War. “The possibility of an intercept gone wrong,” he added, is “on my
mind 24/7/365.” Admiral James G. Stavridis, the commander of NATO from 2009 to 2013 and now Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts
University, is more blunt. The potential for miscalculation “is probably higher than at any other point since the end
of the Cold War,” he told me. “We are now at maximum danger.” This may sound counter-intuitive, given
President Donald Trump’s extravagant professions of admiration for Putin. But the strong consensus inside the U.S.
military establishment is that the pattern of Russian provocation will continue—and not just because the various investigations
into the Trump campaign’s links with Russia make détente politically unlikely. Antagonizing the West is central to one of
Putin’s most cherished ambitions: undermining NATO. By constantly pushing the limits with risky intercepts and other tactics, Putin
forces NATO to make difficult choices about when and how to respond that can sow dissension among its members. In addition, a certain
belligerence towards the U.S. is practically a political necessity for Putin. The Russian leader owes his popularity to “the tiger of patriotic
mobilization,” said Leon Aron, the director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Given the country’s diminished status in the
world and its stalled economy, he added, militarized fervor for the motherland “is the only thing going for his regime.” Meanwhile,[2] 2.
According to an analysis by the U.S. Army War College, “the top leadership is moving the country onto a war footing” in
response to what it sees as “an arc of crisis around Russia and a period of great turbulence in international affairs.” since the departure of Trump’s
first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, his foreign policy team is now dominated by officials who advocate a hard line on Russia.[3] 3.
These include ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, national security adviser H.R. McMaster, and senior National Security Council
Russia adviser Fiona Hill. Secretary of Defense James Mattis predicted at his confirmation hearing that “there are an increasing number of areas
where we are going to have to confront Russia.” For all these reasons, Philip Breedlove, who retired last summer after three
years as supreme allied commander of NATO, isn’t optimistic that Russia will back off anytime soon. “We’re in
a bad place and it’s getting worse rather than better,” he told me. “The probability of coming up against that unintended but
strategic mess-up is, I think, rising rather than becoming less likely.” When Breedlove’s successor, General Curtis
Scaparrotti, took command in May 2016, he grimly warned a gathering of diplomats and officers of a “resurgent Russia” and cautioned that
NATO must be ready “to fight tonight if deterrence fails.” All of this is happening at a time when most of the old Cold
War safeguards for resolving tensions with Russia—treaties, gentlemen’s understandings, unofficial back
channels—have fallen away. When a Russian jet barrel-rolls a U.S. aircraft, a senior U.S. official hops in a car and is driven to the
white marble monolith on Wisconsin Avenue that houses the Russian embassy. There, he sits down with Sergey Kislyak, the ambassador who has
recently attained minor fame for his surreptitious meetings with various Trump associates. A typical conversation, the U.S. official told me, goes
something like this: “I say, ‘Look here, Sergey, we had this incident on April 11, this is getting out of hand, this is dangerous.’” Kislyak, the
official said, benignly denies that any misbehavior has occurred. (When I made my own trip to the embassy late last year, a senior official assured
me with a polite smile that Russian pilots do nothing dangerous—and certainly not barrel-rolls.) Among the many senior officers I
spoke to in Washington and Europe who are worried about Russia, there was one more factor fueling their
anxiety: their new commander-in-chief, and how he might react in a crisis. After a Russian fighter barrel-
rolled an RC-135 over the Baltic Sea last April, Trump fumed that the Obama administration had only
lodged a diplomatic protest. He considered this to be a weak response. “It just shows how low we’ve gone, where they
can toy with us like that,” he complained on a radio talk show. “It shows a lack of respect.” If
he were president, Trump went on,
he would do things differently. “You wanna at least make a phone call or two,” he conceded. “[But] at a certain point, when that
sucker comes by you, you gotta shoot. You gotta shoot. I mean, you gotta shoot.”
AT war stays conventional
Russia will over-rely on nuclear threats in response to conventional crises --- risks
nuclear war
The year 2014 was a major turning point in post-Cold War history when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and engaged in an expanded war in
Eastern Ukraine with the objective of extending Russian control and possibly creating a land bridge to Crimea. As noted previously, President
Toomas Ilves of Estonia has pointed out, “Everything that has happened since 1989 has been predicated on the fundamental assumption that you
don’t change borders by force, and that’s now out the window.”62 It was also a turning point in the Russian use of nuclear threats. In 2014 and
2015, Russia injected nuclear weapons into the Ukraine crisis, threatening a nuclear response in the event of a NATO counter attack. As Deputy
Secretary of Defense Work has observed, “ …senior Russian officials continue to make irresponsible statements regarding Russia’s nuclear
forces, and we assess that they are doing it to intimidate our allies and us.”63 In his August 2014 Yalta speech on Ukraine, Putin referenced
Russia’s large and growing nuclear capabilities, and warned that NATO should not “mess” with Russia.64 In September 2014, then-Ukrainian
Defense Minister Colonel General Valeriy Heletey said that Russia threatened on several occasions across unofficial channels to use tactical
nuclear weapons against Ukraine.65 In a March 2015 “documentary” marking the one year anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea,
Putin said he was willing to put Russian nuclear forces on alert during the invasion.66 As Colonel (ret.) Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the
Center for Social and Political Research wrote, “Putin is saying that under certain conditions, Russia will be ready to use nuclear weapons to
defend Crimea.”67 Putin reportedly has made nuclear threats through unofficial channels over Crimea and the Baltic
republics. According to the London Times, Russian generals present at a meeting in Germany who said they were speaking for the Russian
government indicated that “any military move by the West on Crimea would trigger a Russian response, possibly involving nuclear force. ‘The
United States should also understand it would also be at risk,”’ the generals reportedly said, and the paper noted that “President Putin is using the
threat of a nuclear showdown over the Baltic states to force NATO to back away from Russia’s border.”68 The fundamental difference
in these statements and past Russian nuclear threats is that Russia is now talking about the first use of
nuclear weapons in support of Russian aggression and expansion, not only in response to an attack on Russia.
This is an important shift. As Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy NATO military commander, has noted, Eastern
European NATO states face the risk of a Russian conventional attack backed by the threat of nuclear “escalation” which would be used to prevent
“reestablishment of territorial integrity.”69 Such overt manifestations of hostility support the foreign policy goals of
restoring Russia’s position as a military force to be reckoned with, expanding Russian dominance in Europe, and creating opportunities
for dissension within the NATO alliance. Nuclear bomber patrols In 2007, Putin announced the start of bomber “patrols,” stating, “Combat alert
has begun today. Twenty strategic missile carriers are taking part in it. The planes that have scrambled will be in the air for 20 hours with
refueling and in interaction with the Navy.”70 These patrols continue to this day and Russian nuclearcapable bombers are deliberately being
flown into the air defense identification zones of the U.S., Canada, NATO Europe, and Japan. The intent of these flights is clearly to
intimidate.71 In July 2015, Sputnik News, a Russian state-run news agency, stated the Tu-95 heavy bomber “is capable of striking the United
States with nuclear bombs,” and the purpose of the flights was to “survey the skies around Russian borders reminding everyone that Russia is a
power to be reckoned with.”72 In May 2015, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg declared, “Russia has also significantly increased the scale,
number and range of provocative flights by nuclear-capable bombers across much of the globe. From Japan to Gibraltar. From Crete to
California. And from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.”73 He revealed that NATO had to intercept Russian military aircraft 400 times in 2014,
twice the number that took place in 2013.74 Sweden has reported “‘unprecedented’ Cold War-era levels of activity by Russian military bombers
and fighter aircraft over the Baltic Sea area.”75 UK Defense Minister Michael Fallon said Russia was playing a “provocative and dangerous”
game that could result in the destruction of an airliner over the UK.76 Russia has even said it will send nuclear-capable bombers to patrol the
Gulf of Mexico.77 These flights have become a serious threat to air navigation safety because the aircraft reportedly fly without notification or
transponders functioning.78 In April 2015, there was a particularly serious bomber incident. The UK press reported that two Russian Tu-95
bombers flying over the English Channel were carrying at least one “nuclear warheadcarrying missile, designed to seek and destroy a Vanguard
[strategic ballistic missile] submarine.”79 The UK protested this flight, reportedly over the threat it posed to air navigation.80 On July 4, 2015,
two Russian Tu-95 bombers reportedly flew within 40 miles of the U.S. and taunted the U.S. pilots saying, “Good morning American pilots, we
are here to greet you on your Fourth of July Independence Day.”81 Since 2013, there has been a significant increase in threatening flights by
nuclear-capable bombers against Japan, including a reported over-flight of a Japanese island.82 In 2015, Reuters reported that the Japanese Air
Force announced that “Russian bombers and patrol planes often enter Japan’s air space close to Japan’s northern Hokkaido island and close to
four smaller islands which are claimed both by Japan and Russia,” and that Japanese fighter scrambles against Russia and Chinese aircraft had
returned to peak Cold War levels.83 These flights are indicative of an increasingly hostile and provocative posture toward both the West and
Japan, intended to strengthen Russia’s political and military standing in support of Moscow’s national objectives. Russian nuclear exercises
While Russian nuclear exercises are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, their increasing frequency and
aggressiveness is a reflection of growing hostility toward the West. They also demonstrate Russian views
concerning the linkage of nuclear weapons to Russia’s expansionism and war planning. Russian exercises, which
mainly focus on fighting the U.S., NATO and Japan, appear to emphasize nuclear warfighting, starting with Russian first use of a small number
of nuclear weapons and escalating to general nuclear war.84 The Russians routinely stage major strategic nuclear exercises and theater war
exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons.85 In addition to the normal training role these exercises serve, they likely are intended to
influence the actions of NATO states through the intimidating effect they create. The unusual high-profile publicity given to nuclear exercises in
Russia appears designed to reinforce this effort at intimidation. According to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, “Russia’s recent use of
nuclear rhetoric, exercises and operations are deeply troubling.”86 Moreover, he noted that Russia has avoided reporting on these exercises as
required by the Vienna Document, agreed to by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and intended to enable confidence-
building measures that reduce the risk of hazardous incidents that can lead to inadvertent conflict. 87 In the same year that the draft Russian
nuclear doctrine was made public, Russia conducted the Zapad [West]-1999 theater war exercise, in which then-Russian Defense Minister
Marshal Igor Sergeyev said Russia simulated the first use of nuclear weapons: “Our Army was forced to launch nuclear strikes first which
enabled it to achieve a breakthrough in the theater situation.”88 Alexander Golts wrote that “the enemy looked just exactly like NATO did in
Yugoslavia.”89 Russian press accounts stated that Russia responded with limited nuclear strikes using cruise missiles launched from Tu-95 and
Tu-160 bombers “against countries from whose territories the offensive was launched.”90 The use of strategic bombers with nuclear cruise
missiles was repeated in later Zapad exercises.91 In 2009, the London Daily Telegraph reported, “The [Russian] armed forces are said to have
carried out ‘war games’ in which nuclear missiles were fired and troops practiced an amphibious landing on the country’s [Poland’s] coast.”92 In
this case, the weapon reportedly used was a tactical nuclear weapon.93 A senior NATO official told Reuters that Russia’s Zapad exercise in 2013
was “supposed to be a counter-terrorism exercise but it involved the (simulated) use of nuclear weapons.”94 The Russians have also reportedly
simulated first use of nuclear weapons in the Vostok [East] exercises and in exercises conducted in the Indian Ocean.95 Russian strategic nuclear
exercises have become larger and, since 2012, have been presided over personally by President Putin. In 2013, while Putin hosted a meeting of
the G-20 Presidents and Prime Ministers at St. Petersburg, Russia announced it was conducting a large ICBM force exercise–the timing of which
was hardly coincidental.96 The simulated first use of nuclear weapons is consistent with Russian concepts of conflict “deescalation,” which was
part of the theoretical basis of Putin’s nuclear first-use doctrine.97 Writing in May 1999, Major-General V.I. Levshin, Colonel A.V. Nedelin, and
Colonel M. Ye Sergeyev described the concept of “de-escalation of military operations” as follows: “Fulfilling the de-escalation concept is
understood to mean actually using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the
enemy ….It seems to us that the cessation of military operations will be the most acceptable thing for the enemy in this case.”98 The 2014–2015
European security crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine has resulted in a dramatic increase in both nuclear and conventional
Russian military exercises. Russian exercises and what Russia calls “snap drills” reportedly will reach astounding levels in 2015 (an
announcement of 4,000 planned in 2015, including 120 involving the ICBM force).99 The senior U.S. Army general in Europe, Lt. General Ben
Hodges, says Russia has demonstrated the capability to deploy 30,000 troops and 1,000 tanks “really fast.”100 Early in the Ukraine crisis, in
March 2014, the Russian Strategic Missile Troops conducted a nuclear exercise which reportedly involved a “massive” nuclear strike.101 In May
2014, Russia announced a very large strategic nuclear exercise involving live launches of tactical and strategic nuclear missiles and missile and
bomber defense interceptors. Russia again said the exercise—in which a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Presidents
participated—ended in a “massive” nuclear strike.102 In February 2015, Russia conducted what was characterized as the largest ICBM exercise
ever,103 involving 30 ICBM regiments operating in six regions of Russia.104 In March 2015, Russia conducted “snap drills” involving strategic
nuclear missile submarines, strategic bombers, and the forward deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. Noted Russian
journalist, Pavel Felgenhauer, wrote that the exercise was intended to send “a clear message: Moscow is not ready to stand down and is
threatening the use of force, including nuclear weapons.”105 Russia’s theater exercises with simulated nuclear weapons use have also threatened
Japan. The Russian Vostok [East]-2010 exercise reportedly simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons and, in part, was fought in the Kuril
Islands claimed by Japan.106 Despite Japan’s protest, the Vostok-2014 exercise, also reportedly involved fighting in the Kuril Islands and was a
nuclear exercise.107 Russia did not even try to hide the fact that the exercise was directed against the U.S. and Japan.108 Russian sources called
it the largest exercise in Russian history.109 These types of exercises go beyond simple defensive military training. The extent of the simulated
use of nuclear weapons is unprecedented and the geographical reach of these exercises is clearly designed to send a strong message to the West
and Japan. Forward deployment of nuclear-capable systems Russian officials have frequently made threats to forward deploy nuclear-capable
Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad (a Russian enclave on the border with Poland). For example, President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to do so the
day after Barack Obama was elected U.S. President.110 Russia appears to believe that the forward deployment of nuclear systems makes the
threat more credible and, thus, enhances Russian political and military leverage with the states that are threatened. The likely goal is to convince
these states that defending themselves against a Russia willing to employ nuclear weapons to attain its foreign policy objectives is a losing
proposition and that accommodation with Russia is the better part of valor. In fact, Russia reportedly already has deployed nuclear-capable
delivery vehicles to Crimea, including Backfire bombers and Iskander missiles.111 Russia’s most modern nuclear-capable fighter bomber, the
Su-34, also appears to have been deployed near Crimea.112 And, it is possible that Russian nuclear weapons have also already been deployed
there—the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security Council has stated that Russia is in the process of doing so.113 Earlier this year, Russia’s
nuclear weapons handling organization, the 12th Main Directorate of the General Staff, announced that Russia is deploying a nuclear weapons
handling unit to Crimea.114 Additionally, according to Russian press accounts, Russia is deploying advanced nuclear-armed equipment to
Kamchatka, the area of the Russian mainland nearest Japan, including the new Borei class nuclear ballistic missile submarine and the S-400
advanced air defense weapon.115 The Russian military buildup The growing militarization of Russia is a manifestation of its growing hostility
toward the West. Russian expatriate Alexei Bayer notes that Russia today is “bursting with negative energy, hatred of the outside world and
enthusiasm for confrontation.”116 Confrontation requires military capability, and Moscow is channeling a significant amount of resources and
energy toward investing in and building up this capability, with military expenditures now reported to be nine percent of Russian GNP.117
According to former Duma member, Vladimir Ryzhkov, the Russian media “promotes the idea that Russia exists in a hostile environment, that it
is locked in a confrontation with the United States and the West—because of which the country must remain on the constant war footing of a
‘besieged fortress,’ arm itself against foreign aggressors and crack down on domestic enemies ranging from the intelligentsia to ordinary
discontents.”118 Russian modernization and expansion of its conventional and nuclear capabilities (described in Chapter Four) enhance Russia’s
ability to implement its provocative threats, particularly in light of the defense spending reductions that have been underway in the United States
and virtually every NATO state.119 This situation is more ominous in light of the asymmetry in approaches to nuclear weapons and the West’s
lack of emphasis on nuclear deterrence. In 2005, then-Chief of the Russian General Staff General Baluyevski stated, “at present and in the
foreseeable future the threat to Russia’s security from abroad is fairly small,” and hence, he added, Russia would not “increase the number of our
deployed missiles and the weapons they carry” because “this would have taken us nowhere …”120 That policy was reversed by 2011. Russia is
now expanding its strategic nuclear forces both quantitatively and qualitatively.121 This force buildup appears intended to support Russian
expansionism via nuclear coercion, not the West’s Cold War concept of stable mutual deterrence.122 Arms control policies, which are discussed
in Chapter Five, have contributed to the feasibility and the intimidation potential of the Russian nuclear buildup. The New START Treaty has
made it economically possible for the Russians to match and then exceed U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities in numeric terms. As former Vice
Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Aleksei Arbatov has observed, “It is essentially a treaty on limiting the American strategic forces
….If we want our strategic nuclear forces—as the basis of the country’s defense capability and of its status in the world—to have equality with
the United States and if parity is important to us, then the new START Treaty makes it much easier for us to maintain it.”123 As is detailed in
Chapter Five, Russia has used arms control and arms control noncompliance to help obtain nuclear capabilities that underpin Russian coercive
nuclear threats. As the U.S National Intelligence Council observed in a December 2012 report, not only is Russia expanding and modernizing its
strategic and tactical nuclear forces, but Russia is “pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its
security strategy,” while the U.S. is going in the opposite direction.124 Among these concepts reportedly are precision low-yield nuclear weapons
and special low collateral damage weapons.125 These are the types of weapons that Russia reportedly will have a monopoly, or near-monopoly
on, and which are well suited to Russia’s strategy of nuclear intimidation.126 A now-declassified CIA report in 2000 links Russian nuclear
doctrine to its new nuclear weapons: “Moscow’s military doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons has been evolving and probably has served as
the justification for the development of very low-yield, high-precision nuclear weapons.”127 It also noted that the potential use of subkiloton
nuclear weapons by Russia “could include artillery, air-toair missiles, ABM weapons, satellite weapons, or multiple rocket launchers against
tanks or massed troops.”128 In 1998, Russian journalists Vladimir Kucherenko and Aleksey Podymov reported the Russian Atomic Energy
Ministry was working to “create highly accurate ‘clean’ third-generation nuclear weapons …which can be very compact by containing the
equivalent of several dozen or hundreds of metric tons of TNT.”129 There are now reports by well-known Russian journalists concerning
Russian deployment of such weapons on its new strategic nuclear missiles.130 In April 2009, Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev, Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff, stated, “There is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful nuclear warheads ….We can install low-yield
warheads on existing cruise missiles.”131 And in 2014, Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu said, “Given the role and
significance of long-range precision weapons in strategic deterrence, the number of precision-weapon delivery vehicles is expected to increase
fourfold before 2021.”132 These weapons appear to buttress Russian nuclear threats, including nuclear first-use threats, and Russian
efforts to coerce its neighbors into accepting a renewed Russian-dominated sphere of influence.133 Russia appears to believe it can exploit the
West’s fear of war, particularly nuclear war, to force Eastern Europeans to accept Russian dominance and “Russification”134—with Western
Europe’s coerced acceptance. Correspondingly, the abrogation of arms control agreements and the development and deployment of new weapons,
both nuclear and conventional, appear intended to intimidate.135 Russia, for example, has recently given considerable publicity to the claimed
capabilities of its new Armata tank and new infantry combat vehicles which were recently shown in the Moscow Victory Day parade.136 Large
displays of modern Russian military equipment are made in the annual Victory Day military parades, 137 and there is constant reporting in the
Russian state-run media on new and supposedly unmatched Russian weapons capabilities, including a new long-range, underwater drone weapon
armed with a largeyield nuclear warhead.138 The July 2015 Russian disclosure that “more than eighty warships and support vessels of various
classes” were on duty at sea is another example of this type of signaling.139 Conclusion Moscow’s confrontational approach
toward the West, including Japan, is a manifestation of Russia’s overall grand strategy as outlined in Chapter One and
its expressed threat perceptions. The aim of this policy is to recover the great power status of the Soviet Union by
creating a Russian sphere of domination over former Soviet territory. Mounting Russian hostility toward the West is
reflected in increasing Russian suppression of democracy, the Russian nuclear and conventional military buildup, its constant military threats, its
nuclear threats and exercises, its military aggression in Ukraine, and its intensifying pressure on smaller states and neutrals. Russia seeks to
exploit the Western fear of war, particularly nuclear war, by a variety of nuclear threats, doctrinal statements about the first use of nuclear
weapons, predictions of war, including nuclear war, well-publicized military exercises involving first use of nuclear weapons against the United
States and its allies, threatened and actual forward deployment of nuclear systems, threats to deploy new types of super weapons, threats to
abrogate arms control agreements, and actual Russian violations of existing agreements. The upgrading of Russian military power and the
advertisement of its capabilities by publicity, military exercises, provocative aircraft flights, and military threats are a key part of this strategy. In
light of current Russian economic and conventional military weakness, nuclear weapons and nuclear
threats play a central role in this Russian strategy of intimidation. The potential for miscalculation, crises,
and conflict are fully apparent in this combination of Russian goals and strategies.
Russia will first-use nuclear weapons
For example, the many official Russian statements claiming Russia’s right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea
reflects efforts to intimidate the West from acting against Moscow and to convey Moscow’s determination to retain Crimea, and thus to deter any
action against its overall policies in Ukraine. Russian nuclear weapons and multiplying nuclear threats—including long-range bomber patrols
against the United States and Europe—aim to deter any Western action against Russia, and to intimidate the West into accepting Russian
conquests as irrevocable faits accompli. This political use of nuclear weapons is not confined to the present crisis.
Similar moves reportedly occurred during the 2008 Georgian war,49 affirming Moscow’s belief that if it lacked nuclear weapons, the West might
intervene against Russian aggression in the CIS. Russia sees its nuclear arsenal, in part, as the instrument that can prevent
robust Western responses to its aggression and occupation of neighboring territories. This is a new and
fundamentally coercive role for Russian nuclear weapons and does not reflect Western mutual nuclear deterrence notions of the Cold War.
Russian statements about nuclear weapons have moved beyond the clear desire to deter and intimidate the
West to include potential operational employment. As the British analyst Roger McDermott has written, The Russian
military understanding of these weapons and reliance on them in certain scenarios suggests that they play
a significant role in security thinking, which has grown and may continue to grow until Russia can successfully redress
its conventional weaknesses. This is borne out in official statements, as well as in the role assigned to them in operational-strategic exercises ….
It is therefore important to understand that Russia regards these weapons differently than the West: for
Moscow they do not simply have political value, they play a role in military planning that compensates
for conventional weakness, and in certain scenarios are considered to be operational systems.50 Thus,
Russian nuclear weapons, whether they be strategic or tactical nuclear weapons could, in severe circumstances, be used in
combat operations. The apparent Russian willingness to employ nuclear weapons likely contributes to their coercive effect.
AT ‘risky business’
This article assumes [with little evidence] that there is no Russian national security
threat, and admits that their calculation would be different if the threat was proven
Thrall 18 – Trevor, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” CATO, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full
In sum, the strategic value of arms sales for the United States is very low given today’s security
environment. Different circumstances would produce a different analysis . Although today
there is little reason for the United States to worry about the Russian threat to Europe, during the Cold War foreign
policy experts agreed that preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the European continent was critical to American security. As a result, the
United States sensibly provided NATO allies with advanced weapons. This strategy greatly enhanced the fighting capability of NATO, thereby
bolstering deterrence and ensuring European security.
Today, happily, the United States faces no such threats. For this reason, the argument in favor of arms sales cannot rest on
national security grounds but must rest instead on “national interest” grounds, that is, on the benefits gained from helping other nations improve
their own security, and from maintaining conditions generally believed to be in the national interest, such as regional stability or the prevention of
war. This is already a much weaker position than the conventional wisdom acknowledges. Even worse for such sales’ advocates, however, is the
fact that arms sales are notoriously uncertain tools for achieving those objectives.
But there is… [cards!]

AT IMPACT TURNS
AT Russian collapse
Putin is resilient
Miller 12-29-2016 – PhD, associate director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University and the author of “The
Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.” (Chris, “Why Putin’s Economy Survives,” Wall
Street Journal, Factiva)//BB
In the late 1980s, as the Soviet economy began to freeze up, Vladimir Putin was a KGB agent in Dresden,
East Germany. Mr. Putin suffered firsthand from the Soviet empire’s demise and vowed never to let such
a catastrophe happen again. The primary lesson he drew was simple: avoid large deficits and high
inflation. Since taking power in 1999, Mr. Putin has studiously implemented a conservative
macroeconomic policy. This has let him weather crises that many observers expected would bring down
his regime. In mid-2014, oil prices began to collapse, and the West slammed financial sanctions on Russia
for its invasion of Ukraine. But Mr. Putin is still standing. Where the Soviets suffered from an exploding budget deficit, financed by
money creation, today’s Russia has pushed through an aggressive austerity program, slashing spending on
social programs and pensions to balance the budget. The Bank of Russia has hiked interest rates to double-digit levels, driving
inflation down to 6%, a respectable figure for an emerging market. The Kremlin’s budget deficit will be a bit more than 3% of GDP this year,
even though oil—which previously provided half of government revenues—is now selling for half its price two years ago. And Russia’s
government debt remains less than 20% of GDP, according to Russian government statistics. America’s
public debt, by contrast, is more than 75% of GDP, according to the Federal Reserve. This conservative fiscal
posture helps explain why, unlike the U.S.S.R., Mr. Putin’s Russia has proven so unexpectedly resilient.
Despite Western financial sanctions, large Russian firms continue to attract the foreign-currency funding
that they need. Despite the commodity crash, Russian oil production is at a post-Soviet high. Russia’s
economy is returning to growth even as Russia’s military wages war in Ukraine and Syria. The Kremlin
has mustered the resources that it needs to deploy power at home and abroad, even amid conditions
similar to those that bankrupted the Soviets. ‘Putin has expropriated his rivals, tolerated epic corruption and sent investors
fleeing.’ Russia’s economic accomplishments shouldn’t be overstated, of course. Mr. Putin has expropriated his rivals, tolerated
epic corruption and sent investors fleeing. The Russian state plays a far larger role in the economy today than it did when Mr.
Putin took power—not to provide useful services such as health or education but to monopolize oil production and fund his patronage networks.
on the economic issues crucial to
Russian wages grew rapidly in the 2000s, but growth has since slowed—and even reversed. Yet
the survival of Mr. Putin’s regime, the record is far better. Macroeconomic stability has underwritten a
decade and a half of relative prosperity. The coming anniversary of the Soviet collapse won’t be widely marked in Moscow. The
demise of the U.S.S.R. is a period most Russians would prefer to forget—and a catastrophe that Mr. Putin
is determined not to repeat.
BUT if he does collapse, that solves European wars
Kirchick 17 – fellow @ Brookings, author of The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age @ Yale Press
(James, “Russia’s plot against the West,” https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-plot-against-the-west-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-europe/)//BB
The annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine is a warning shot across the bow of the West, a message,
written in blood, that the old ways of doing business are over. Less implausible is Russia’s ability to alter the political trajectory of Western
politics in a way that suits its geopolitical aims. Last year in the Netherlands, a motley collection of Russian expatriates, far-right nationalists and
left-wingers banded together to defeat a referendum on an EU trade agreement with Ukraine. Though the Dutch intelligence agency could find no
hard evidence of direct Russian government support to the opposition side, it did conclude that the Netherlands is a target in Moscow’s “global
campaign to influence policy and perceptions on Russia,” and that the Kremlin has mobilized a “network of contacts built up over the years.”
Speaking of Russia’s suspected involvement in this week’s parliamentary election, a Dutch foreign policy analyst told the New York Times that,
“A little effort goes a long way” and could “destroy the European Union from inside.” While waging a nonviolent war against the West from
within, Russia is rapidly building up its military capacities and engaging in kinetic action along Europe’s. Over the course of Putin’s 17-year
reign, Russian defense spending has increased 20-fold. Arms procurement grew by 60 percent in 2015 alone. Kremlin rhetoric over the
past several years has also shifted in a disturbingly confrontational direction. Putin’s recent justification for
the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—stating, alongside a
stunned Merkel, that the infamous agreement which divided up Eastern Europe between the two totalitarian powers “ensur[ed] the security of the
USSR”—epitomizes the moral failure of Russian elites to come to terms with the Soviet past . Other Russian
officials, meanwhile, engage in shockingly loose talk about using nuclear weapons and Russian military exercises frequently end with simulated
nuclear strikes on NATO capitals. The West has neither acknowledged the threat from Russia nor adequately prepared to defend itself against
potential aggression. Only four European members of NATO commit the recommended 2 percent of their GDP to defense; so poorly equipped is
the Bundeswehr that its soldiers infamously had to use broomstick handles instead of guns during a training exercise. This is why Russia’s
war in Ukraine is about far more than Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine is a warning shot
across the bow of the West, a message, written in blood, that the old ways of doing business are over. “Protecting” ethnic Russians
was never the issue for Putin; Russian intervention was about exerting a veto over Ukraine’s Western path. Moscow’s highly sophisticated
execution of hybrid war, a forecast of conflict to come, belies the haughty complacency of people like Obama and his hapless secretary of state,
John Kerry, who scoffed that Russia is trapped in “the 19th century.” On the contrary, it is the allegedly backwards Russians who have adapted
their war-fighting capabilities to the future, and the supposedly advanced Westerners who have been caught in their dust. To quote Lenin again,
what is to be done? To avert catastrophe, it is imperative that the United States pivot back to Europe . As a
collective political entity, Europe is America’s most important ally, with whom we share values and interests. Abandoning Europe at this time
would create a political and security vacuum on the Continent, one that would inevitably be filled by Russia. In response to Brexit, the U.S.
election and the rise of populists across Europe, many in the West are beginning to question the assumptions upon which the postwar liberal
world order stands. While introspection is necessary, we do not need to rethink first principles. Protectionism remains wrong, both morally and
economically. NATO remains the bedrock of our security, no matter how many times certain individuals call it “obsolete.” The postwar
international system has benefited America enormously; it’s not a rip-off. Lavrov’s call for a “post-Western world order” is not new; Russian
leaders have frequently floated proposals aimed at diluting the Western-led international system by incorporating a non-democratic Russia into its
structures. The West wants peace and Russia wants victory. These desires are incompatible. Increasingly, these calls for reassessing the liberal
world order are finding an audience on this side of the ocean, where voices posit that it has outlived its usefulness. In a combination of
astonishing historical illiteracy and sinister prophecy, the president’s senior counselor says he wants to make the world “as exciting as the 1930s”
and that “strong nationalist movements in countries make strong neighbors.” Meanwhile, a leading figure in what passes for the pro-Trump
intellectual movement, who now serves as a high-ranking national security official in the administration, asks of NATO, “What is the alliance for
once its original purpose has evaporated?” The original purpose of NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans
down.” With exception of that last part about Germany, whose neighbors want it to play a more assertive role in continental defense and security,
the founding rationale for the Atlantic Alliance endures. The fundamentals remain; the arrangements we have are working. They need
strengthening, not a redesign. The West wants peace and Russia wants victory. These desires are incompatible .
Those who cherish liberal democracy and wish to see it endure must accept the fact that a Russian regime is once against trying to debilitate and
subvert the free world. While Russia today may not be as conventionally strong an adversary as it was during the Cold War, the threat it poses is
more diffuse. Russia is as much an enemy today as it was a generation ago, and we need to adopt a more hardheaded, adversarial footing and
mentality to defeat it. In a globalized world where the cancerous influences of Russian money and disinformation can more easily corrupt us than
when an Iron Curtain divided Europe, and where the ideological terrain is more confusing than the Cold War’s rigid bipolarity, containing Russia
presents different challenges than it did a generation ago, not the least of which is maintaining Western unity against a more ambiguous adversary
skilled at fighting asymmetrically. Never during the Cold War, for instance, was there such a traumatic break within the Western political alliance
as Britain’s departure from the European Union—nor, for that matter, did an overtly pro-Russian leader ever capture the presidency of the United
States. If the Putin regime cannot live alongside a democratic West, a democratic West cannot live with the Putin regime. A
genuinely democratic Russia would feel no threat from Europe, and thus lack the impulse to debase and
disrupt it. To be sure, the illiberal movements currently roiling the EU would exist regardless of Russia; anyone remotely familiar with the
Continent’s bloody history knows that Europeans don’t require outside instigation to fall for the siren songs of chauvinism, populism and other
illiberal forces. But only absent the revisionist and belligerent regime in Moscow is a Europe whole, free and
at peace possible.
AFFIRMATIVE
NU – arms sales
Russian arms sales are increasing now
Savitsky 11-12-2018 – military analyst based in St Petersburg, Russia. (Arkady, “US Pressure Fails to Affect Russia’s Growing Arms
Exports,” Strategic Culture Foundation, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/11/12/us-pressure-fails-to-affect-russia-growing-arms-
exports/)//BB
On November 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign
States. He noted that “Our capabilities in the military technical sphere must be used to modernize and upgrade all our industries, to support our
science and to create a powerful technological potential for the country’s dynamic development.” The president called for “renewed efforts, not
only, in preserving, but also, in strengthening Russia’s leading position on the global arms market, primarily in the high-tech sector, amid tough
competition.” The US efforts to press other countries into suspending military cooperation with Russia are
inefficient. The number of customers, especially in the Middle East and Africa, is growing. The demand
for Russia’s military production is especially high in the Asia-Pacific Region, accounting for almost 70% of all arms sales,
including India (35%), China (12%) and Vietnam (10%).Today, Russia’s overall military exports are equal to around $15
billion, with the global order book of $55 billion. According to Alexander Mikheev, the head of Rosoboronexport, the sole state
intermediary agency for Russia's defense exports / imports, Russia has already exported arms to over 40 countries, signing
1,100 contracts worth about $19 billion in 2018 – a 25% increase compared to the last year. The president’s
speech coincided with the opening ceremony of Airshow China 2018 (Nov. 6-11), one of the five largest aerospace exhibitions in the world,
Russian manufacturers scored a big success. 14 defense producers displayed over 200 units of hardware. China has defied US threats
to go through with the large deal to buy S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 multifunctional fighters (ten
jets already delivered). The joint programs, such as the development of a heavy AHL helicopter and a long-range powerful aircraft, are in force.
The order book of China’s imports exceeds $7 billion, growing from 5% to 14-15%. The two nations are involved in a joint project to produce
diesel-electric submarines Amur-1650 (export version of Lada Project 677). This is a $2 billion deal. China confirmed the plan to
purchase six Mi-171A2Y “Ansat” helicopters, which will make a 5,000 km long demonstration tour across Southeast Asia, including stops at
Hanoi (Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand) and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia). VKO concern "Almaz-Antey" used the Airshow
China 2018 event to introduce the Viking – the export version of the Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile system. Viking boasts the range of 65 km. 36
targets can be tracked and engaged simultaneously. It has the capability of striking tactical ballistic and cruise missiles as well as sea and ground
targets. The Radioelectronic Technologies Company (KRET) presented over 40 exhibits, including the multipurpose airborne multipurpose radar
with AFAR "Beetle-AME" designed to detect and track aerial, surface and ground targets at the same time. The Russian-Chinese long-overhaul
CR929 jet attracted public attention at the air show. Its basic version will carry 280 passengers over a distance of 12,000 km. India has also
defied the US pressure and will start receiving receive S-400s in the fall of 2020. The $5 billion deal was
signed in October during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi. Russia and Vietnam have signed a $4.5
billion package of deals, including the $1 billion purchase of a batch of Russian Su-30 MK2 fighters and a $2 billion agreement on the sale of six
Russian diesel-electric Project 636.1 Varshavyanka (Kilo) submarines. A Mi-35M attack helicopters deal with to Bangladesh is expected to be
inked soon. In February, Russia signed a $ 1.14 deal with Indonesia to supply 11 Su-35 4++ generation fighters. 2018 is rich in international
defense shows. As of November 12, Russia has taken part in about 20 international exhibitions and forums, such as the Eurasian Air Show in
Turkey’s Antalya, International Far Eastern Maritime Show in Vladivostok and ADAS-2018 defense exhibition in the Philippines (for the first
time). It intends to attend some more large ones till the end of the year. Russia has also taken part in the Indo Defense 2018 show (Nov.7-10) to
display over 200 systems and equipment units. There were two weapons presented for the first time ever in Jakarta: the 122 mm projectile for
Tornado-G MLRS and 140 mm projectile for ship-based Ogon flame throwing launcher. There will be the IDEAS-2018 exhibition in Pakistan in
late November, EDEX-2018 will be held in Egypt in mid-December, and Chile will host the EXPONAVAL – 2018 naval exhibition in early
December. Russia will take an active part in all of them though its presence at Le Bourget Paris air show in June was very limited and it decided
to take no part in Farnborough – 2018 air show in July. Moscow prefers the shows where it has more potential customers. This year, some new
systems were offered to potential buyers, such the Viking and Tor-E2 anti-aircraft missile systems, Sprut-SDM1 light floating tank, Karakut and
Sarsar vessels, Il-78MK-90A aerial tanker and Il-76MD-90A (E) military cargo aircraft. The Sprut-SDM1 light tank is a special case. The
airborne light amphibious tank with firepower of MBT has no rivals in the world. The US-imposed sanctions have failed to
reduce the demand for Russian weapons. China, India as well as many other countries refuse to bow. New
ways to pay for the deals without dollars are sought. For instance, India will pay for S-400s in Russian rubles. The talks to get around dollars are
underway with China. Some deals may be temporarily postponed, some talks frozen, but all in all, the US policy of using sanctions
to reduce Russia arms exports and thus weaken the competitor has failed. The most important agreements,
including the S400 deal with Turkey, a NATO country, have not been affected. This agreement will also skirt dollar
payments. The Russian arms sales are on the rise.
NU – arms sales – Pakistan
Russia recently sealed a new 9 billion dollar deal with Pakistan
Shabbir 4-19-2019 – Ambreen, “Pakistan to Make a Major Multi-Billion Dollar Arms Deal With Russia: Report,”
https://propakistani.pk/2019/04/19/pakistan-to-make-a-major-multi-billion-dollar-arms-deal-with-russia-report/
For years, China has remained the major arms supplier to Pakistan, especially after the latter decided to reduce its
reliance on the US. The ties between the two countries have closely revolved around the defense purchases. It implies that the South Asian
superpower has somewhat monopoly over Pakistan’s defense market where the competition is quite low. In a bid to turnaround the
situation, Russia is looking forward to making inroads into Pakistan’s arms market. According to a Russian news
agency, Pakistan has shown interest in purchasing Russian military hardware. The deal is expected to
amount $9 billion under which Islamabad would purchase heavy and medium fighter jets, medium and
short-range air defense systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and warships. Prospects of Pak-Russia Arms Deal The
agency has cited Konstantin Makienko, the deputy director of the Moscow-based defense think tank
Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Makeinko revealed that two types of Russian military
hardware can make Pakistan’s shopping list, i.e., the new Russian fighter jet MiG-35 and the heavy transport helicopter Mi-26T2.
NU – arms sales – Middle East
Specifically --- they are expanding in the Middle East
Khlebnikov 19 - expert on the Middle East at the Russian International Affairs Council (Alexey, “Russia looks to the Middle East to
boost arms exports,” Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-east-boost-arms-exports)
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) recently published annual report, Russia’s share of
global arms exports shrank by around one-fifth over the last decade, falling from 27 percent to 21 percent, while the
U.S. share increased from 30 percent to 36 percent, widening the gap between the two major arms exporters. As Russia looks to reverse
this decline, it is focusing on the Middle East, the world’s second-largest and fastest-growing arms
market, as a way to boost its exports. While it is early days, the effort seems to be paying off so far. According to
Russian media reports, Russia and Egypt recently signed a new arms deal worth at least $2 billion. This deal,
which involves the purchase of over 20 4++ generation Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets (Flanker-E), makes Egypt a major importer of
Russian arms and comes on top of previous deals between the two countries for tens of MiG-29 jets, Ka-52K helicopters, and coastal
defense units. In addition to the deal with Egypt, Russia is also moving ahead with the sale of the S-400 anti-
aircraft system to Turkey in yet another confirmation of Moscow’s growing focus on the Middle East.
NU – military spending
Military spending is already high --- anything contrary is fudged numbers
Baev 5-6-2019 – PhD, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute (Pavel, “Is Russia Really Cutting Its Military
Spending?,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16.65)//BB
Military force remains a predominant instrument of choice for Russian policymakers; yet, state
expenditures on the Armed Forces continue to decline. This paradoxical situation was recently highlighted by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) latest global military balance assessment, which the Russian media
eagerly picked up (Kommersant, April 29). SIPRI methodology is long-established and respected by experts. And yet, its latest
assessment demoting Russia to sixth position in the world behind France looks not only counterintuitive but, in fact, plain wrong. Of
course, to some degree, the impression that Russia must still be spending a fortune on its military is partly shaped by the assertive political
rhetoric coming out of Moscow, which is amplified by official propaganda and reinforced by exuberant public demonstrations—like the military
parade scheduled to roll over Red Square, on Victory Day, celebrated in Russia every May 9 (Krasnaya Zvezda, April 29). Nevertheless,
significant material evidence exists to raise doubts about the government’s declared 3.5 percent reduction
in military spending in 2018. To its credit, SIPRI does not take the official data uncritically, but even the best research efforts can only go
so far in correcting the deliberate distortions produced by Russia’s main statistical agency, Rosstat (Kommersant, April 6). Every year,
more and more parameters of the defense budget have become secret and denied even to the State Duma
(lower chamber of parliament), in violation of basic legislation (Vedomosti, October 17, 2018). It is also clear that a direct conversion of
expenditures from rubles to US dollars using the current exchange rate produces serious errors because the pricing mechanism in
the
Russian defense-industrial complex is obscure: the Armed Forces obtain new weapons for a price
substantially different from what foreign customers pay (RBC, April 29). In macro-economic estimates, the indicator of
“purchasing power parity” is increasingly used for international comparisons; and a rough (because of secrecy) application of this method to
defense expenditures approximately triples Russia’s stated military budget (Defense News, May 3). President Vladimir Putin excels at praising
Russia’s military might and boasting about new technologically advanced weapon systems, such as the nuclear-propelled underwater vehicle
Poseidon (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, April 26). He used the occasion of launching the nuclear submarine Belgorod (in construction since
1992), which is supposed to carry Poseidons onboard, to concurrently supervise the laying of keels of four other combat ships (Moskovsky
Komsomolets, April 23). This ceremony could not quite camouflage the deep problems in Russian shipbuilding, however, which struggles with
fulfilling orders for the new Yasen-class nuclear submarines as well as with repairs of Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, and
other Soviet-era cruisers (see EDM, April 25). The Russian navy received little attention in the 2027 State Armament Program, which was
approved with delays only in early 2018 because the government insisted on cuts bitterly contested by various lobbies (Nezavisimoe Voennoe
Obozrenie, April 12, 2019). Putin often claims that Russia will not repeat the Soviet blunder of channeling too
many resources toward military needs and will pursue the arms race on the cheap (Forbes.ru, April 29). The
economy is, indeed, stuck in a protracted recession; and discontent caused by the sustained decline in incomes and increase to the retirement age
is deepening (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 25). Growing public demand for social benefits thus raises the political need
for the authorities to hide the real costs of Russia’s militarization.
No L – China fills in
China, not Russia, fills in --- they’ll sell high quality products to states facing
western restrictions --- AND, their products are cheaper
Halder 2-25-2019 (Ben, “CHINA, THE NEXT BIG SUPPLIER OF HIGH-TECH ARMS TO EMERGING NATIONS,” Ozy,
https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/china-the-next-big-supplier-of-high-tech-arms-to-emerging-nations/92647)//BB
China is emerging as a fast-growing supplier of affordable, high-tech weapons systems to countries

facing sanctions or restrictions from the West. Models donning metallic outfits and ill-fitting red baseball
caps posed at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, in
November 2018. But the star attractions were the newest arsenal of Chinese weapons systems on display: from mine-clearing robots and high-
speed unmanned helicopters to stealth drones and radar protection technology for tanks. In all, deals worth $21 billion were struck. And the
show was just one sign of China’s growing clout in a field traditionally dominated by the West, Russia
and Israel: high-tech military equipment. China’s rapid expansion over the past two decades into Africa, Latin America and
across Asia has relied on its growing economic resources and has taken the form of heavy investments, funding and infrastructure projects. Its
military exports were largely bare-bones equipment. Now, the world’s second-largest economy is fast positioning itself as
an attractive supplier of relatively affordable high-tech military hardware to an increasing number of emerging
economies facing sanctions or restrictions from the West. The country’s arms sales to Africa grew by 55
percent between 2012 and 2017 compared to the previous five-year period, totaling $273 million in 2017. Of those sales, 42 percent of
exports landed in North Africa — a region long plagued by U.S. and European arms embargoes and a more general
reluctance from these suppliers to do business. Today, 80 percent of trainer jets across Africa are the Chinese-made K-8 planes, and with
advancements in China’s aviation industry, particularly the development of an indigenous jet engine, Chinese aircraft are becoming more
attractive to African customers. China is now marketing its indigenous, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to potential buyers in Egypt and
Nigeria. Closer to home, China in March 2018 announced a deal to sell Pakistan a large-scale optical tracking system used to accelerate the
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads. It was the first example of China exporting sensitive
technology. Pakistan is facing restrictions from the U.S. on weapons sales because of differences on terrorism and Afghanistan. State-owned
China South Industries Group is aggressively pitching its mine-clearing laser gun to international customers such as Myanmar, which already
relies on China for 68 percent of its weapons because of E.U. and U.S. sanctions. And Venezuela, which imports 23 percent of its weapons from
China, showed off a cache of new Chinese-built military vehicles at a parade in July 2018. China is also pitching a new generation of laser
weapons to Venezuela. These include the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp.’s LW-30 laser defense system and China Shipbuilding
Industry Corp.’s vehicle-mounted laser weapon, both launched at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2018. “The one advantage that African
countries, and for that matter any other country that considers China as an acceptable arms supplier, will have is that the number of suppliers of
more advanced equipment is increasing, which improves the bargaining position,” says Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms
Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme. Some of China’s earliest successes in selling high-tech military equipment came earlier this
decade, in the Middle East, with drones. The U.S. has strict rules on who it can sell UAVs to, and several Middle Eastern nations have had
requests to America turned down. So, “China stepped in and offered its alternatives,” says Wezeman. Since 2014, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan and
Iraq have all bought military drones from China. These UAVs have been deployed in wars against ISIS and in Yemen. But the country’s
willingness to sell weapons systems to virtually anyone gives China a distinct edge in carving out a niche
for itself in the global arms market, and its ability to deliver high-tech machines at cheaper rates than
competitors also attracts potential buyers. China’s most advanced UAV, the CH-5 Rainbow, costs half as much as the $16.9
million U.S.-made Reaper. China’s base model can be acquired for just $1 million. Four of China’s Type 054A frigates were recently ordered by
Pakistan at a unit cost of $250 million, compared to a price tag of $466 million for the similarly sized French-built La Fayette model. Speaking to
the Global Times newspaper, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpieces, Beijing-based military analyst Wei Dongxu claimed in
November that the country’s new HD-1 supersonic missile, known as an aircraft carrier killer, would hit the market at a significantly lower price
than existing products. This includes undercutting the $2.75 million BrahMos missile, developed by Russia and India.
China will out-compete peers like Russia --- has advanced weaponry and is no
longer reliant on ex-Soviet weaponry
Ron Matthews Xiaojuan Ping 17 – *Chair of Defence Economics at the Centre for Defence Management and Leadership, Cranfield
University and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, **researcher at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (Why
the World Should Fear China's Military (Exports), National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-world-should-fear-chinas-
military-exports-22494)//BB
While it may not yet be the dominant player, China’s arms export strategy has proved effective in taking market
share from competitor nations.
Is China’s arms export strategy really a success story? The first question is to establish whether there has been dramatic growth in China’s arms
exports, emulating the success of its broader commercial exports. While the picture is not equivocal, there are signs that something is indeed
happening. Chinese arms sales are growing. Across 2012–16, they accounted for 6.2 per cent of the global arms trade, up by an
impressive 74 per cent compared to 2007–11. In fact, over 2012–16, China’s arms exports raced ahead of those from Germany, France and the
United Kingdom, making China the world’s third biggest arms exporter. This is not a short-term aberration, but a long-term
trend. Between 2000 and 2015, Chinese arms exports expanded by a factor of 6.5. In 2016, China shipped US$2.1 billion in arms, marginally
behind France’s US$2.2 billion, but well ahead of the United Kingdom’s US$1.4 billion. While China’s 2016 market share is well below that of
the United States at 33 per cent, the gap is gradually closing with Russia (23 per cent), and has disappeared altogether with France (6 per cent),
Germany (5.6 per cent) and the United Kingdom (4.6 per cent). China’s arms exports have been criticised for lacking
global appeal since 72 per cent of all exports in the last five years went to just three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Yet,
this criticism is unfair. Such dependence on a few core customers affects both mature and ‘new entrant’
arms exporters alike. Russia was the world’s second biggest arms exporter across 2012–16 but relied on just four countries — India,
Vietnam, China and Algeria — for 70 per cent of those sales. Likewise, 71 per cent of UK arms exports go to India, the United States and Saudi
Arabia (which alone accounted for half of all UK sales across 2010–15). Detractors argue that China’s weapons are only
attractive to poorer nations because its older weapons are cheaper. While there is some truth in this
argument, it needs qualification. China has been successful in diversifying its customer base and now
exports arms to 55 countries worldwide, covering Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Many of China’s clients are
indeed developing countries. For example, two-thirds of the countries situated in the world’s poorest continent, Africa, procure weapon systems
are changing. Chinese arms are no longer relics from a
from China, and much of it is basic military equipment. But times
bygone Soviet era. The PLA has been replacing old Soviet platforms with improved ‘indigenous’ models
and is now exporting modernised platforms, including Type-99 MBTs, J-10 fighters and Yuan-class submarines to Thailand,
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan. China has also adapted, innovated and engaged in systems integration in a
determined bid to move up the technology ladder, developing, for instance, credible and competitive unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and anti-ship cruise missiles. Raised technological sophistication combined with relatively low procurement cost has led to increasingly
cost-effective arms exports. Their attractiveness to more discerning buyers has been translated into a sales portfolio in which 25 per cent of
China’s customers are now positioned in the upper middle/higher income country categories, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. Is there something different, something special, that distinguishes China’s arms export
strategy from its Western counterparts? The answer is a resounding yes. First and foremost, Western strategists should not be under any
illusion that export revenue is the primary goal. Rather, Beijing’s end-game is longer-term geo-political and strategic
influence. The search for regional and global influence is the critical aim of Chinese economic diplomacy. It reflects a more narrowly focused
aspect of Beijing’s soft power framework, embracing foreign aid, foreign direct investment, overseas educational programs and, importantly,
arms sales. China’s arms export model operates according to a carefully-crafted strategy based on three principles: promoting the legitimate self-
defence capability of the recipient country; strengthening the peace, security and stability of that country and region; and non-interference in its
internal affairs. Beijing’s long-standing approach of linking non-interference to arms sales rests on the view that a customer’s political, military
and human rights record lies outside the contractual arrangements. The ‘no questions asked’ policy attracts the opprobrium
of Western states, but there is no disputing its effectiveness in selling guns and securing influence. The
policy particularly appeals to second- and third-tier military states suffering excessive dependence on US or
Russian weaponry. Chinese arms offer poorer states the opportunity to diversify arms sources, regain a degree
of sovereignty over military capability and reduce strategic vulnerability to arms embargoes. The Chinese arms export model has several other
significant features. From a Chinese strategic perspective, it leverages strong client-state relationships and in the process bolsters Beijing’s
influence, particularly among neighbouring states. It is no accident that China’s arms sales to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar
indirectly act to contain the potential threat of Asia’s other mega-power, India. Chinese arms are also competitively packaged. Pricing is low
compared to Western models. Chinese drones, for example, reportedly cost 10–20 per cent of the near-equivalent US version. Finally, China is
amenable to technology transfer through defence offset, supporting client states to indigenise maintenance, repair and overhaul activities and even
produce components. While it may not yet be the dominant player, China’s arms export strategy has proved effective in
taking market share from competitor nations. China has also begun to encroach into higher income
markets, especially where technological sophistication is not required. There is a long-term strategy at work here, driven by
diplomatic and geostrategic objectives, not commercial gain.
No IL – arms not key to expansionism
Arms sales not key to Russian expansionism
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/59571/18Jun_Reaves_Andrew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//BB, ability edited
It is unlikely that Russian arms sales will disappear in the near future, but their strategic pull is weakening.
Influence and leverage, as arms export analyst Andrew Pierre notes, are indeed transitory phenomena.687 While Putin has
successfully integrated arms sales into his strategy of fostering polycentrism, challenging American hegemony, and reestablishing Russia’s
presence globally, his strategic end state of returning Russia to its former world power status lacks international attractiveness. Furthermore, his
focus on short-term political gains in lieu of a more farsighted plan to achieve his strategic end state has
handicapped [limited] his use of arms exports.688 In fact, arms sales have merely supported multiple pragmatic
relationships, not an anti-Western coalition, as states seek to maximize their benefits at the expense of Russia. As Lo observes,
Putin’s policy “is frequently held hostage to short-term political and economic expediency...and the over-personalization of decision-
making.”689 Thus, while Russia’s recent dispersal of arms might strengthen the ability of other states to either reduce the power of the
mean that Russia’s overall strength and influence rise reciprocally. For as
West or promote regional balancing, it does not
long as Putin’s strategy remains myopic as he seeks partners in a quixotic quest to renew Russia’s
grandeur and global influence, states will continue to gain reverse leverage on Russia. Recently imprisoned anti-
Putin activist Aleksey Navalny phrased it best in his ominous foreshowing of Putin’s future: This regime is doomed, I’ve said it and I will repeat
it, but of course, I will not mention specific dates: in the eleventh year I said that they had a year and a half left, and I will not say anything more.
Doom is obvious, because [Putin’s regime] is [a] feudal power, in the post-industrial world unthinkable [sic]; because it prevents us from
developing, inventing, building, growing, teaching and healing.690 While Navalny’s words might err on the dramatic, there is truth within them.
Although Putin might still view arms sales as an important item inside his political toolbox, military exports are
quickly becoming a dull and impractical instrument unable to yield the outcomes that Putin desires
regardless of the previous benefits they once provided.
! d – no threat
Russia is not a revisionist threat --- their impact is wildly exaggerated
Götz and Merlen 19 – *Ph.D. in Political Science from Aarhus University, Post-doc @ Johns Hopkins, **PhD Candidate in IR @ Kent in
UK (Elias and Camille, “Russia and the question of world order,” European Politics and Society, 20.2)//BB
are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it
To begin with, there
adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining
its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In
so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are
subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see
Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has
experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This
happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful
reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian
identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international
order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016). Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour
should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military
activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is
doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and
principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to
constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…)
has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by
Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist
Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the
norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to
describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to
be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of
these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda. Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in
line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For
one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As
Carpenter (2017, January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept
as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq
and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration? For another, interference in the
domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian
does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling
in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016). It is therefore unlikely that a more
democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns
over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar
worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics.
Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair
to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings.
Russia’s actions are defensive

Morris 17 – writer, with bylines @ Vox, Medium, Jacobin and Counter Punch (Brett, “3 Reasons It’s Time to Chill About Russia,”
Medium, https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/three-reasons-its-time-to-chill-about-russia-717e62b0ab1e)//BB
After Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election, one of the few potentially good outcomes was better relations with Russia. Relations had been
souring for years, especially after Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014. Hysteria about Russia and its president, Vladimir
Putin, became absurd: A writer for Forbes asked if Putin was “another Adolf Hitler,” and Republicans in Congress introduced a Russian
Aggression Prevention Act. Now, however, it is mostly Democrats leading the anti-Russian charge, with potentially devastating consequences.
Putin is no doubt an authoritarian leader, and Russia has numerous human rights problems, but increasing the animosity between the world’s two
leading nuclear powers is stupid. But Democrats are eager to paint Trump as a Russian puppet in an attempt to undermine his legitimacy as
president and obfuscate the real reasons they lost the 2016 election. (Namely, they knowingly nominated a candidate disliked by a majority of the
population and actively worked to undermine her primary opponent, who would have been more likely to win a general election against Trump.
In addition, during the Obama years, the Democratic Party lost control of both houses of Congress, the majority of state legislatures, and the
majority of governorships. Clearly, the Democratic Party’s problems cannot be traced back to Trump and Russia alone.) With Russia’s alleged
interference in the 2016 election, relations between the United States and Russia are now at their worst since the end of the Cold War. For his
part, Trump may favor closer relations with Russia because of some vague admiration for Putin’s authoritarianism, or maybe business dealings —
no one really knows for sure. (No one really knows what’s going on inside Trump’s mind.) Whatever his reasons, better relations with
Russia would be a good thing for the world. Much of the political and foreign policy establishment want
to undermine that goal, and a lot of the hysteria about Russia takes the country and its motives out of
context. Russian foreign policy is in significant ways a reaction to U.S. foreign policy. And whatever Moscow’s
crimes and contributions to global instability, they don’t compare to Washington’s. It’s time to chill about Russia. Here are three
reasons why.
1. Russia Is a Relatively Weak World Power
At $69 billion, Russia’s military expenditures are the third largest in the world. That’s a lot. But it’s a fraction of what the
United States spends ($611 billion) and trails behind China ($215 billion). And that’s after years of Putin expanding
Russia’s military. In addition, any kind of military confrontation between the United States and Russia would involve NATO, whose
members spend a combined total of $918 billion. Members of the European Union spend a combined total of about $238 billion, as well.
Russian military spending is expected to fall substantially in 2017, to about $49 billion. (Earlier this year, President Trump
proposed a $54 billion increase in U.S. military spending. In other words, just the increase Trump wants in U.S. military spending would be more
than the entire Russian military budget.) Russia’s economy is weak. Its GDP is worth $1.3 trillion (equivalent to just 7 percent of the
U.S. GDP of $18.6 trillion), and it’s ranked below geographically much smaller countries like Italy and South Korea. Its economy contracted
sharply after the decline in oil prices, since Russia relies on oil and natural gas for most of its export revenue, and is expected to grow only 1.4
percent this year. Russia is furthermore plagued with the problem of a declining population. In 2016, the number of
deaths exceeded the number of births. At best, Russia can expect to maintain its current population of 146 million by 2050, but that number is
more likely to decline and could decrease to fewer than 100 million. As Russia’s population declines, so too will its role on the world stage.
2. The Russian Hacking Story Has Been Blown Out of Proportion (and Ignores Important Context)
It’s beyond the scope of this article to review all the evidence pertaining to Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 election. Suffice it to say,
Russia likely did interfere in several ways to help Trump get elected, but there is no evidence that the integrity of the actual vote was interfered
with. Like it or not, nearly 63 million U.S. citizens voted for Donald Trump, and he won a majority of electors in the Electoral College, making
him a legitimately elected president. However, the media’s endless barrage of information regarding the Russia story has led many to believe that,
essentially, Vladimir Putin personally installed Trump as president. A YouGov poll taken in May 2017 found that 37 percent of U.S. citizens
believe that it is “definitely” or “probably” true that “Russia tampered with vote tallies in order to get Donald Trump elected President,” including
59 percent of Democrats. Similar to the Iraq WMD story, in which the media irresponsibly parroted whatever U.S. officials were telling them
(leading to a disastrous war), the media is now sensationalizing the Russia story, leading many to believe that Putin is some kind of evil
mastermind intent on destroying the United States. As usual, the context of foreign actors is ignored. Putting aside the truth of however much
Russia “hacked” the election, a key question is almost never asked: Why would Putin want to do this? If Putin favored Trump, it probably has
less to do with what he represented and more to do with what Hillary Clinton represented: a continuation, if not escalation, of hostile policy
toward Russia. The recent history of U.S. and Russian relations is what we should examine if we are to have a more productive policy toward
Russia. Of course, none of this justifies any Russian interference in the election — but if we can at least understand Russia’s motives and the
context for its actions, we can adjust policy accordingly. (It also leaves aside blatant hypocrisy on the part of the United States, which has
routinely interfered in the elections of other countries, including the 1996 Russian election.) As discussed above, Russia is a weak power
compared to the United States. Despite this, the United States has been surrounding Russia with more and
more military might since the end of the Cold War, causing Russia to act in antagonistic ways. A report from
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) explains Russia’s ambitions: Putin has sought to reassert Russia as a great power on the global stage and
to restructure an international order that the Kremlin believes is tilted too heavily in favor of the United States at Russia’s expense. Moscow seeks
to promote a multi-polar world predicated on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs,
the primacy of the United Nations, and a careful balance of power preventing one state or group of states from dominating the international order.
In other words, Russia does not seek to dominate the United States, but merely wants more equality in the
international order. The report goes on to note that Moscow “views the United States and its NATO partners as the principle threat to
Russian security” and “the Kremlin’s continued hold on power.” The DIA report explains that Russia views “the buildup of NATO military
capabilities closer to the Russian border, the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe, and the ongoing U.S. pursuit of strategic
non-nuclear precision weapon systems as a serious threat to Russian security.” Supposedly, NATO was founded as a form of collective defense
with the goal of defending its members from a Soviet attack. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, however, NATO was not disbanded after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Instead, it has expanded and now includes countries on Russia’s border — a development Russia rightfully views as threatening.
(Imagine if the Warsaw Pact still existed and Russia were actively trying to add countries bordering the United States to its membership.)
NATO’s expansion to eastern Europe goes against promises the United States made to Mikhail Gorbachev during negotiations over Germany’s
reunification. In return for the Soviet Union allowing a unified Germany to be part of a western alliance, policymakers in the George H.W. Bush
administration told Gorbachev that NATO would not move “one inch eastward.” The broken promise has caused substantial mistrust and
bitterness on Russia’s part ever since. Russian policies toward its neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia, are in large part based on preventing
NATO’s further expansion. In Ukraine, for example, Russia considers its actions there as defensive. As international
relations specialist Stephen M. Walt explains: The
Ukraine crisis did not begin with a bold Russian move or even a
series of illegitimate Russian demands; it began when the United States and European Union tried to
move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and into the West’s sphere of influence. That objective may be desirable in the
abstract, but Moscow made it abundantly clear it would fight this process tooth and nail. U.S. leaders blithely
ignored these warnings — which clearly stemmed from Russian insecurity rather than territorial greed — and not surprisingly they have
been blindsided by Moscow’s reaction. As Walt notes, the “solution to this crisis is for the United States and its allies to
abandon the dangerous and unnecessary goal of endless NATO expansion and do whatever it takes to convince
Russia that we want Ukraine to be a neutral buffer state in perpetuity.”
Russia is inevitably weak and desperate --- no risk of a real great power challenge
Bechev 2-17-2019 – Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council (Dimitar, “Resurgent Russia: Myth and reality,”
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/resurgent-russia-myth-reality-190217060009723.html)//BB
Make Russia Great Again. That is the mission Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have adopted in
international politics. Following his return to the Kremlin in 2012, he took up a more assertive foreign policy, seeking to secure a seat at the top
table of global diplomacy. The effort has paid off. Thanks to its military intervention in Syria, Russia has graduated from a bystander to a leading
powerbroker in the Middle East. Showing off this newly acquired status, Putin recently hosted the presidents of Turkey and Iran, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and Hassan Rouhani, to coordinate a joint response to US President Donald Trump's decision to pull US troops out of northeast Syria.
The summit marked the two-year anniversary of the so-called Astana Process whose professed goal is to bring the bloodshed in the embattled
Middle Eastern country to an end. Conspicuously enough, the US is not part of the forum. Astana, therefore, might be a harbinger of a new global
order to come: One in which emergent non-Western powers, such as Russia, China, India and others run the show. Over the past few
years, Putin has not shied away from confronting the West. In his early days as leader, he wholeheartedly sided with the US
in the aftermath of 9/11 and even touted the prospect of Russia joining NATO. But by the time he delivered his oft-quoted speech at the Munich
Security Conference in 2007, Putin had become convinced that the US and its allies were seeking to dethrone him by fomenting "colour
revolutions" across the post-Soviet space. The Arab uprisings in 2010-2011 only confirmed his fears and, as a prime minister, he publicly
denounced then-President Dmitry Medvedev's decision not to block a UN Security Council resolution authorising a no-fly zone over Libya,
which precipitated the British and French air raids and the ultimate downfall of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. But the rift with the West
became permanent when Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014. Since then, Putin has defied both the US and its
European allies, who imposed sanctions in response to the annexation as well as to Moscow's invasion of Eastern Ukraine, where fighting
continues until the present day. Perceptions of Russia have shifted as a result. Up until 2014, the US and the EU considered it a
difficult partner but not a full-fledged adversary. Now, the Pentagon's national defence strategy casts Russia as a military threat on a par with
rising China. NATO has deployed troops in Eastern Europe in order to dissuade Moscow from pursuing aggressive action beyond its borders.
There are, moreover, mounting fears that Russia is using a variety of tools, ranging from economic blackmail to cyberattacks and from
disinformation to support for populist right-wing and radical leftist parties to undermine its Western competitors from within. The ongoing
controversy over Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, along with the pro-Kremlin rhetoric of anti-immigration politicians in
Europe such as Hungarian President Viktor Orban and Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, never ceases to generate headlines. The EU has
started talking about "resilience" against external influence campaigns, with its eastern neighbour in mind. But Russia
is not that
powerful after all. Its GDP of $1.57 trillion is barely 8 percent of the US' and comparable to that of a mid-
sized European country like Spain. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which Putin finally managed to create in 2014 after years-
long efforts, is no match for the economic juggernaut that is the EU. Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, inherited from the
once-mighty Soviet Union, is at the same level as the US'. Yet, despite the ambitious military reform over the past decade,
the Russian conventional forces lag far behind the US army's in terms of capability and technological sophistication. At $63bn, Russia's defence
budget is far behind that of the US and China, which stand at $643bn and $168bn respectively. Moscow has become better at fighting limited
wars such as those in Ukraine and Syria but is
not in a position to project military power globally. Despite its relatively close
ties to China and India, Russia
cannot rely on a stable network of alliances similar to the ones the US enjoys in
Europe, East Asia and beyond. In short, the Russian Federation cannot and will not replace the US as the
leading power or hegemon in the Middle East or any other part of the world. Even its dominance in post-Soviet
Eurasia is a tall order. Countries in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are oriented economically and politically towards the
West. In Central Asia, China is becoming increasingly the dominant centre of gravity. In a post-American world, Russia, too, would likely end up
as Beijing's junior partner rather than an equal stakeholder. The essence of Russia's strategy is, to quote the late Russian politician
Yevgeny Primakov, to "play a weak hand well". In some cases, this involves exploiting an opponent's vulnerabilities. Polarised
domestic politics in the West have strengthened Russia's hand. This has allowed Putin to play more effectively a "divide and conquer" game. In
other cases, Russia has benefited from being flexible. In the Middle East, for instance, it has been successfully cooperating with all mutually
antagonistic powers: Iran, Israel, the Gulf, Turkey, the Kurds, etc. Nonetheless, Putin's foreign policy record remains mixed. Sometimes his
gambles pay off, sometimes not. Russia's fighter jets, together with Iran's ground troops, saved the Assad regime in Syria. Crimea, too, was a
coup. It sent the Russian president's popularity ratings at home to 80 percent or more. If Nicolas Maduro survives in Venezuela, that will give
Russia a further international boost. In Europe, oil and gas endow Moscow with geopolitical leverage; Germany, for example, has been going out
of its way to push for the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline, to the dismay of the US. Balkan countries, too, have been eager to host an extension of the
Turk Stream pipeline. But then again, there are limits to Moscow's power. NATO is enlarging, despite pushback
from Russia. This year North Macedonia is set to join the alliance, following in the footsteps of Montenegro. At the same time, Putin is
not making much headway in Ukraine. The conflict in the Donbas has long been in a state of deadlock while Kyiv is not accepting
a Russian proposal for a power-sharing constitution which would effectively give Russia veto power over its foreign policy. Furthermore,
international success has come at a cost. The sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are still there.
Despite - or perhaps because of - Donald Trump's friendly overtures towards the Kremlin, the US Congress has been ramping up
punitive measures against Russia. The Mueller investigation and the alleged collusion between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin
have made a rapprochement even more unlikely. For much of the past decade, this pursuit of greatness abroad was paying off domestically,
giving Putin legitimacy and solidifying his grip on power. That appears to be less and less the case, however. Foreign exploits are no
longer able to boost his rating. Gains in Syria, the Central African Republic or Venezuela are not buying the regime popularity.
Russian society is increasingly focused on immediate challenges at home, like anaemic growth, the
projected rise of the pension age, and debilitating corruption. Trust in institutions is low, with only Putin retaining
popularity as an individual. Social discontent is on the rise and the Western sanctions, in conjunction with volatile oil prices, are
adding to the pain. Certainly, these domestic pressures won't force the Kremlin to undertake a U-turn and sue for peace. But they come
as a healthy reminder that the idea that Russia is a revisionist power capable of upending the world order
and Putin is a leader endowed with superhuman abilities is a far cry from reality.
! d – no US-Russia war
No US-Russia war
Bandow 17 --- JD from Stanford (Doug Bandow, 3-6-2017, "What Russian Threat? Americans Shouldn't Be Running Scared of
Moscow," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-russian-threat-americans-shouldnt-be-running-scared-moscow)
Yet the fear-mongering is nonsense. Russia’s presumed attempt to influence America’s election was more smoke than fire. Moscow is accused of a
private hack which released emails detailing the sleaze afflicting one of the presidential candidates. Although illegal like other cyber-attacks, that’s pretty mild,
especially compared to Washington’s routine interference in other nations’ political affairs, including their elections. Although American officials proclaim their
commitment to democracy, their activities almost always promote parties, leaders, and movements friendly to the U.S. More serious are claims that
Moscow poses a security threat. Military capabilities are more than formal military budgets, but the spending disparity between
the U.S. and Russia is vast: Washington’s outlays are almost ten times as much as Moscow’s. President Donald
Trump just proposed an annual jump in outlays, $54 billion, which is nearly as much as Russia will spend all year. Russia lacks the global reach to
challenge America. As Putin noted in an interview with an Italian journalist: “Publish a world map and mark all the U.S.
military bases on it. You will see the difference between Russia and the U.S.” Moscow also lacks the
economic foundation to match the U.S. According to the I nternational I nstitute for S trategic S tudies, “One effect of
the country’s deteriorating economic situation has been the delay in concluding the next State Armament
Program; originally intended to have been started in 2016, this has now been pushed back to 2018.” Russia possesses the world’s second most
powerful nuclear arsenal, capable of destroying America many times over. But even Moscow’s sharpest critics don’t
believe Vladimir Putin plans to commit suicide. That nuclear threat acts more as Russia’s guarantee against U.S. coercion. Neither side
can allow the stakes of any conflict to race out of control. Beyond inaugurating nuclear Armageddon, how does Moscow threaten
America? An invasion seems unlikely, since the two countries don’t share a land boundary. An attack across the Bering
Strait to retake Alaska is more than a little unlikely. Which means there is no direct threat to the U.S. How about isolating America by controlling sea and air and
interdicting commerce? That’s almost as implausible. The vaunted Red Navy is gone. Moscow deploys one decrepit aircraft carrier, no match for Washington’s
multiple carrier groups. And the U.S. is allied with European nations which also possess capable if smaller fleets. Russia is upgrading its forces, but it lacks the
resources to equal America. Moscow is no more likely to dominate the air above or around the U.S. Russia’s air force is capable and has gained valuable combat
experience over Syria, but remains no match for America’s globe-spanning force. More dangerous may be Russian air defenses, which would ensure that hostile U.S.
air operations were not the cakewalk like in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Nor is there any obvious reason why Moscow would inaugurate war with the U.S.
Russia’s critics notwithstanding, the Cold War is over. There is only one aggressive ideological power, and that is America. Putinism is a simpler, practical
authoritarian nationalism. The concerted campaign by Republican hawks like Lindsey Graham and Democratic partisans of all stripes to turn Moscow into an enemy
is not just counterproductive. It is dangerous. That’s obviously not a congenial home for anyone who believes in America’s classical liberal heritage. The vision of a
limited government dedicated to protecting individual rights has few takers in the Russian Federation. The real problem posed by Vladimir Putin is not that he’s an
unpleasant thug, but that he seems to represent a substantial number—a strong majority if polls are to be believed—of Russians. Still, Moscow’s policy reflects much
more a defensive than aggressive stance. Its role in the world looks a lot like that of pre-1914 imperial Russia. The Putin government wants its interests to be respected
and its borders to be secure. It especially doesn’t like seeing its friends, such as Serbia, dismembered without so much as a nod in Moscow’s direction. Russia also
opposes a potentially hostile alliance pushing ever eastward, absorbing lands such as Ukraine that once were integral to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet
Union. The U.S. (and Moscow’s neighbors) might wish that Russia would accept America’s not always so benevolent hegemony. However, Boris Yeltsen’s rule
proved to be but a brief interregnum until age-old Russian nationalism reasserted itself. That Moscow now stands up for what it considers to be its interests is no cause
for alarm in Washington unless the latter has aggressive designs on Russia itself. The belief that such a nation and people would voluntarily, even enthusiastically,
submit to American “leadership” always was a fantasy. Of course, Moscow’s policies sometimes run contrary to Washington’s desires, but that doesn’t mean Russia
poses a threat. Moscow generally has been helpful in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, all significant concerns of the U.S. Russia has moved closer to China,
despite major differences between the two, but largely in response to Washington’s hostile policies toward both great powers. In this way the Obama administration
inadvertently reversed Richard Nixon’s geopolitical masterstroke of 45 years ago. Washington is similarly displeased with Russia’s intervention in Syria, but
Damascus long has been a Russian ally. America has no monopoly on the “right” to wage war in the Mideast. And the U.S. nevertheless remains the region’s
dominant outside power, allying with Israel and the Gulf States, maintaining multiple bases in multiple countries throughout the region, and fighting endless wars for
years. If there is a “Russian threat” to America it must come in Europe, generously defined to include Georgia and Ukraine. Yet the Cold War truly is over. There
is no Red Army poised to plunge into the Fulda Gap and race to the Atlantic Ocean. The very idea of Russian
domination of Eurasia is fantastic. Europe has recovered economically from World War II and consolidated politically into the European Union. The continent enjoys
about three and a half times Russia’s population and almost 15 times its GDP. Indeed, Germany alone almost has three times Russia’s economic strength. The
Europeans still
economies of the United Kingdom, France, and even Italy are larger than Russia’s economy. Despite their shameless defense lassitude,
collectively spend nearly four times as much as Moscow on the military. The UK alone comes close to
Russia’s levels. For all of the sound and fury at recent NATO meetings, no one seriously contemplates a Russian attack on “Old
Europe,” or even most of “New Europe.” What would Moscow gain by triggering a potential nuclear war while trying to
overrun large populations of non-Russians who would resist Moscow’s rule? Theoretical capability does not equal intent. Last year the faculty of
the Naval War College assessed the Russian “threat.” The NWC subsequently issued a “Sense of the Faculty” report which revealed that a majority
believed “Russia’s fear of potentially ‘hostile’ forces on its doorstep and within its historical sphere of influence” was “the most fundamental cause of the Ukraine
Crisis.” Moreover,
71 percent considered the likelihood of an attack on the Baltics to be low or very low. The latter are
seen as most vulnerable to Russian pressure. Yet Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are irrelevant to America’s security. Washington is treaty-
bound to defend them, an unfortunate result of the foolish go-go years of NATO expansion. However, Russian aggression is very
unlikely .
No US-Russian war or adventurism—diplomacy and mutual interests will stop
escalation—multiple empirics prove
Gowan 16 - associate fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and nonresident fellow at NYU’s Center on International
Cooperation, where he was previously research director
Richard, Diplomacy Still Trumps Confrontation for Russia and the West, 1/4/16, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17575/diplomacy-still-trumps-confrontation-for-russia-and-the-west
But the biggest diplomatic achievement of the past 12 months may have been the simple fact that Russia
and the West avoided a return to a Cold War-style confrontation. Having set a collision course with the
U.S. and Europe over Ukraine in 2014, Moscow repeatedly courted a further deterioration in relations. In
January, it unleashed a brutal offensive by its proxies and covert forces in eastern Ukraine, ripping up previous cease-fire
agreements in the process. In September, it launched its intervention in Syria, whipping up confusion in Western capitals over its
intentions and, if independent reports are right, adopting a cavalier attitude to civilian deaths. Both of these military gambles could
have sparked a hard-line response from Western policymakers. In response to the January offensive in Ukraine, U.S.
officials considered plans to arm Kiev, potentially precipitating a further escalation of the conflict. The Russian air campaign over Syria
inevitably risked an unintentional clash with the parallel U.S.-led coalition bombing the self-declared Islamic State, a danger that proved real
when Turkey shot down a Russian jet over its border in November. Despite
these provocations, the U.S. and its allies have
found ways to de-escalate tensions with Moscow. It even seems possible that the two sides will settle on a
compromise over Syria that diplomats hope could lead to broader rapprochement, although the plunge in relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia may now upset this. Why did Russia’s adventurism not lead to a more serious
confrontation? Three factors have been crucial: European leaders’ caution, the Obama administration’s
fierce focus on the Iran deal, and the threat from the Islamic State and its imitators. The Europeans’ fear
of an uncontrolled escalation over Ukraine proved decisive in the first quarter of the year, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
French President Francois Hollande hastily cobbled together a new cease-fire, the so-called Minsk II accords, to ease the violence in Ukraine.
Washington’s urge to settle the nuclear standoff with Iran shaped diplomatic calculations through the middle of 2015, as Russian officials
made a point of being conspicuously helpful in the final negotiations with Tehran. While Moscow’s Syrian
campaign threatened to torpedo relations in the last months of the year, the November terrorist attacks in Paris transformed
Western leaders’ thinking anew. Their priority is now maintaining stable relations with Russia as a basis
for extending operations in Syria against the Islamic State, while all sides seem willing to accept a slow
freezing of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. As a recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) shows,
Russia and its proxies still partially or wholly ignore many key aspects of the Minsk II bargain. Moscow has, for example, skillfully modulated its
military presence in eastern Ukraine, deploying multiple armored brigades during the worst of the fighting while “switching to a smaller force of
trainers, special forces and logistic personnel during calm phases.” But such cosmetic variations help keep the crisis under
control, and although the U.S. and the European Union maintain sanctions on Moscow, everyone is more
focused on Syria. Critics of Western policy believe that Russia is simply reaping undeserved rewards for its chronic adventurism. As I
noted in February, Merkel and Hollande’s drive for a compromise with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Ukraine “rehabilitated Putin as a
serious interlocutor, a status he seemed close to losing after the breakdown of previous cease-fires.” Similarly, as I argued last month in the
American Interest, the Russian president has been the beneficiary of a “vicious cycle” over Syria: “Russia’s tactics have repeatedly caused the
war to worsen; each time the situation deteriorates, Moscow steps up to suggest that it can ease matters through the U.N., a ruse that President
Putin perfected in 2013 with his offer to defuse the chemical weapons crisis.” Moscow has, in short, learned that it can behave like the proverbial
bull in a china shop so long as it promises to help clean up afterward. Yet it is also possible to claim that the West has succeeded in
neutering Putin, or at least containing him, by drawing him back into complex diplomatic negotiations
each time that he goes on the offensive. Despite its apparent bellicosity, Moscow still seems to crave the
status and security that it garners from diplomatic bargains such as Minsk II and the current U.N.-backed negotiations on a
Syrian cease-fire. It is arguable, too, that Moscow’s overall military strategy would make little sense if it could not
fall back on these mechanisms: Russia lacks the military means to run a full-scale war in Syria indefinitely and
could not sustain complete economic isolation from the West over Ukraine. It suits all parties to stay at the
negotiating table rather than ratchet up tensions further, even if the level of mutual mistrust remains
very high. Some observers believe that European and U.S. diplomats are still too easily beguiled by the idea of “positive conversations” with
Putin, while ignoring his ultimate aims. As ECFR’s Kadri Liik points out, Russia wants to be seen as an “equal,” and that means “having
geopolitical veto rights and uncritical acceptance of the nature and practices of its domestic regime.” Yet, if continued diplomacy delivers a
Syrian cease-fire and, at least, relative calm in eastern Ukraine through 2016, the West’s strategy of tolerating Russian
adventurism within certain limits will ultimately look justifiable. Washington and its allies have already gone some way
to granting Moscow extra leverage in the international system, but will not easily accede to Russia’s ambitions for even greater powers.
Relations will remain profoundly difficult. But if Putin and his Western counterparts can find just enough
common ground to work together more than they fight in 2016, they could still make the world a marginally safer
place.
! d – LIO
International order is resilient, the U.S. isn’t key---it adapts and self-corrects
Deudney and Ikenberry 18 - *Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University **G. John
Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (“Liberal World: The Resilient Order,”
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world)
Decades after they were supposedly banished from the West, the dark forces of world politics—illiberalism,
autocracy, nationalism,
protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism—have reasserted themselves. China and Russia
have dashed all hopes that they would quickly transition to democracy and support the liberal world order. To the
contrary, they have strengthened their authoritarian systems at home and flouted norms abroad. Even more stunning,
with the United Kingdom having voted for Brexit and the United States having elected Donald Trump as president, the leading patrons of the
liberal world order have chosen to undermine their own system. Across the world, a new nationalist mindset has emerged, one
that views international institutions and globalization as threats to national sovereignty and identity rather than
opportunities. The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is too soon to write the obituary of
liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching
framework for global politics. The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity
remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit been hard
times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its
unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization. For the first time in
history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a
order will endure, too. Even though the United States’ relative
smaller scale are now present on a global scale. The
power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. As
long as interdependence—economic, security-related, and environmental—continues to grow, peoples and governments everywhere will be
compelled to work together to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. By necessity, these efforts will build on and strengthen
the institutions of the liberal order. THE LIBERAL VISION Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of
political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a
world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that
history will end with the0 triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal. The recent rise of illiberal forces and
the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable
exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested,
pragmatic accommodation. Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a
strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions
about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic
tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often
human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike
realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities
both for human progress and for disaster. Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based
economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing
human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal
thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of
interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental
problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human
activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new
geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals,
liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for
responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic
engineering. Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a
commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as
the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its
champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and
racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to
reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral
commitment of liberals and their allies. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE In many respects, today’s liberal democratic
malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order’s success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system,
expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political
bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were
distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winner-take-all casino
capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of
immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and
created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of
liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize
them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more
progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize
education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy
is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly
recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial
markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and
social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project,
combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to
arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in
collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic
stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination
agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at
reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging
than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee
that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated
historical experiences. Today’s dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new
and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future.
Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as
they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today’s illiberal populists and authoritarians will
evoke resistance and countermovements. THE RESILIENT ORDER After World War II, liberal democracies joined together
to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to
accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their
activities and expectations to the order’s institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may
be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the
moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today
high expectations they generate, revolutionary
to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism. Growing
interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century,
liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological
advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every
aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at
the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith’s case for free trade, for
example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly
strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal
democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and
at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance
dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only
and guarding against its dangers. This
accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also
require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare,
the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the
international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the
same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus
making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In
the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist. The international order is also likely
to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal
regimes such as China and Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for the liberal
international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not uniquely liberal in
character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states,
whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key participants in these institutions are anything but
liberal or democratic. Consider the Soviet Union’s cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order was
primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even so, the Soviet Union often
worked with the democracies to help build international institutions. Moscow’s committed antiliberal
stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington to create a raft of arms control agreements. Nor did
it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which
succeeded in completely eliminating the disease by 1979. More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to
guard against environmental destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such
autocracies as China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such
as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted
the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not
challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot address on their own. Most
institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only require
that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not challenge the Westphalian
system; they codify it. The UN, for example, enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security
Council, the notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international
cooperation has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things liberal are
in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The persistence of Westphalian institutions
provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and democratic institutions can be erected in
the future. Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The last two and a
half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible competitor. During the
rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to
outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist
competitors created strong incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and
band together. And after World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and international
communism. The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the components of the existing order
that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends up competing with the liberal democracies, they will
again face pressure to champion their values. As during the Cold War, they will have incentives to
undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union,
although a great milestone in the annals of the advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of
solidarity. The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international
order. CORE MELTDOWN In challenging the U.S. commitment to NATO and the trading rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization, Trump has called into question the United States’ traditional role as the leader of the liberal order.
And with the vote to leave the EU, the United Kingdom has launched itself into the uncharted seas of a full withdrawal from Europe’s most
prized postwar institution. In an unprecedented move, the Anglo-American core of the liberal order appears to have fully reversed course. Despite
what the backers of Trump and Brexit promise, actually effecting a real withdrawal from these long-standing commitments will be difficult to
accomplish. That’s because the institutions of the liberal international order, although often treated as ephemeral and fragile, are
actually quite resilient. They did not emerge by accident; they were the product of deeply held interests. Over the
decades, the activities and interests of countless actors—corporations, civic groups, and government bureaucracies—have become intricately
entangled in these institutions. Severing those institutional ties sounds simple, but in practice, it is devilishly complicated. The difficulties have
already become abundantly clear with Brexit. It is not so easy, it turns out, to undo in one fell swoop a set of institutional arrangements that were developed over five decades and that touch on virtually every aspect of British life and government. Divorcing the EU means scrapping
solutions to real problems, problems that haven’t gone away. In Northern Ireland, for example, negotiators in the 1990s found an elegant solution to the long-running conflict there by allowing the region to remain part of the United Kingdom but insisting that there be no border controls
between it and the Republic of Ireland—a bargain that leaving the EU’s single market and customs union would undo. If officials do manage to fully implement Brexit, it seems an inescapable conclusion that the United Kingdom’s economic output and influence in the world will fall.
Likewise, the initial efforts by the Trump administration to unilaterally alter the terms of trade with China and renegotiate NAFTA with Canada and Mexico have revealed how intertwined these countries’ economies are with the U.S. economy. New international linkages of production and
trade have clearly produced losers, but they have also produced many winners who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Farmers and manufacturers, for instance, have reaped massive gains from NAFTA and have lobbied hard for Trump to keep the agreement intact, making it
politically difficult for him to pull off an outright withdrawal. The incentives for Washington to stay in international security institutions are even greater. Abandoning NATO, as candidate Trump suggested the United States should do, would massively disrupt a security order that has
provided seven decades of peace on a historically war-torn continent—and doing so at a time when Russia is resurgent would be all the more dangerous. The interests of the United States are so obviously well served by the existing security order that any American administration would be
compelled to sustain them. Indeed, in lieu of withdrawing from NATO, Trump, as president, has shifted his focus to the time-honored American tradition of trying to get the Europeans to increase their defense spending to bear more of the burden. Similarly, major pieces of the nuclear arms
control architecture from the end of the Cold War are unraveling and expiring. Unless American diplomatic leadership is forthcoming, the world may find itself thrown back into a largely unregulated nuclear arms race. The Trump administration’s initiatives on trade and alliance politics have
generated a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty, but their actual effect is less threatening—more a revisiting of bargains than a pulling down of the order itself. Setting aside Trump’s threats of complete withdrawal and his chaotic and impulsive style, his renegotiations of trade deals and
security alliances can be seen as part an ongoing and necessary, if sometimes ugly, equilibration of the arrangements underlying the institutions of the liberal world order. On the issues that matter most, Trump’s foreign policy, despite its “America first” rhetoric and chaotic implementation,
continues to move along the tracks of the American-built order. Moreover, despite Trump’s relentless demeaning of the international order, he has sometimes acted in ways that fulfill, rather than challenge, the traditional American role in it. His most remarkable use of force so far has been to
bomb Syria for its egregious violations of international norms against the use of chemical weapons on civilians. His policy toward Russia, while convoluted and compromised, has essentially been a continuation of that pursued by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations: sanctioning
Russia for its revisionism in eastern Europe and cyberspace. Perhaps most important, Trump’s focus on China as a great-power rival will compel him or some future administration to refurbish and expand U.S. alliances rather than withdraw from them. On the issues that matter most, Trump’s
foreign policy, despite its “America first” rhetoric and chaotic implementation, continues to move along the tracks of the American-built order. In other areas, of course, Trump really is undermining the liberal order.
But as the United States has stepped back, others have stepped forward to sustain the project. In a speech before the
U.S. Congress in April, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke for many U.S. allies when he called on the international community to “step
up our game and build the twenty-first-century world order, based on the perennial principles we established together after World War II.”
Many allies are already doing just that. Even though Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
trade deal lives on, with the 11 other member states implementing their own version of the pact. Similarly, Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris
agreement has not stopped dozens of other countries from working to implement its ambitious goals. Nor is it preventing many U.S. states, cities,
liberal order may be losing its chief patron, but it rests
companies, and individuals from undertaking their own efforts. The
on much more than leadership from the Oval Office. THE LONG VIEW It is easy to view developments
over the last few years as a rebuke to the theory of liberalism and as a sign of the eclipse of liberal democracies and their
international order. But that would be a mistake. Although the recent challenges should not be underestimated, it is important to
recognize that they are closer to the rule than the exception. Against the baseline of the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War
seemed to signal the permanent triumph of liberal democracy and the “end of history,” the recent setbacks and uncertainties look insurmountable.
In the larger sweep of history, however, Brexit, Trump, and the new nationalism do not seem so
unprecedented or perilous. The liberal democracies have survived and flourished in the face of far
greater challenges—the Great Depression, the Axis powers, and the international communist movement.
There is every reason to believe they can outlive this one.
! t/ - domestic instability
Expanded arms sales are key to Russian economic and political stability
Denisenetsev 17 – Visiting Fellow @ CSIS (Sergey, “Russia in the Global Arms Market,” CSIS, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170816_Denisentsev_RussiaGlobalArmsMarket_Web.pdf?VHDgCY.h54QWJm1lPCa2w1Lc.BjElJH)//BB
Furthermore, arms exports are an important indirect factor contributing to domestic stability. This is because,
according to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, thedefense industry employs more than 1.3 million people. 7
Since exports account for about a third of Russia's defense output (more on that in the "Other factors of stagnation" section), the
livelihood of roughly 400,000 Russian engineers, scientists, and technicians, as well as members of their
families, directly depends on defense exports. As a rule, these people form a conservative and patriotically minded
electorate that is staunchly loyal to the Putin administration. As an election strategy, the Russian president and his United
Russia party indirectly support this electorate through arms export stimulus packages (credit financing, government-issued guarantees, etc.).
Russian arms exports and defense relations with other countries also serve as important propaganda instruments.
Russia's state-owned and pro-government media outlets offer regular and generous coverage of the latest achievements of Russian defense
suppliers in foreign markets. Such achievements include large contracts signed with foreign customers and participation of Russian companies in
international arms expos. The rapid growth of Russian defense exports in the 2000s is highlighted as a major
achievement of the Putin era. 8 The media often emphasize the personal role played in that success story by President Putin himself
and by Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec (the parent company of the Russian arms export intermediary Rosoboronexport), who has been a close
friend of Putin since the latter's days as a Soviet agent in East Germany.9 Until recently, the upbeat picture painted by Russian
propaganda was backed by figures. For example, during the Putin presidency, Russian arms exports skyrocketed by 440 percent,
from $3.4 billion in 1999 (when Vladimir Putin became acting prime minister) to a peak of $15.7 billion in 2013.10 In recent years, however,
that growth has slowed and then stalled completely. The focus of this paper is on the current dynamics of Russian arms exports,
the reasons for their steady growth in the 2000s and early 2010s, their current stagnation, and the outlook for the coming years.
Russia is not a revisionist power --- the only risk of US-Russia war is from collapse
Murphy 16 – graduated from The Citadel with degrees in History and French. He graduated from the US Army’s Advanced Military
Studies program, commanded an infantry company in combat, and served as the special assistant to the Commanding General, US Army Europe.
He is a professional strategist. (Robert, “THE MATRYOSHKA IS EMPTY: WHY RUSSIA DOESN’T REALLY MATTER,” Small Wars
Journal, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-matryoshka-is-empty-why-russia-doesn%E2%80%99t-really-matter)//BB
Russia’s alleged threat to American interests is exaggerated, taken well out of context by those that would
benefit from sustained American defense spending, and only applicable as it relates to NATO’s expansion in the Baltic States.
The only real Russian threat to American interests is if it should collapse. If you could not find Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, the Donets Basin, Transnistria or Crimea on a map until Russia intervened, then you’ve understood the relevance a Russian challenge
represents. Judging by the absence of any meaningful international response to Russia’s incursions, you would also be in good company. The
regions in which Russia chooses to intervene militarily simply do not matter to America, or the world.
This is not because Russia does not have interests in more relevant areas; it is because Russia simply
cannot intervene anywhere else. Russia has no reach. Statistically Russia possesses the strongest military that can influence
Europe, but strength is relative. Russia is strong because Europe is weak. Europe has abused America’s security spending for decades and has
ended up with papier-mâché militaries that require American leadership and supervision to work together. European security cooperation is often
limited to cost sharing measures rather than substantial increases to defense capabilities. Viewed simplistically against such an adversary,
Russia’s relative military advantage is formidable, but reversible should Europe get serious about its own defense. Russia is at a
stalemate against an arguably inferior military in the Ukraine, and is logistically constrained to operations
in the Donets Basin, close to its border and overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Russians. The Donets Basin, and Russia’s other
adventures in the Crimea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have turned those areas into economic disaster zones that consume Russian resources and
provide little in return. This hardly represents the reach or strategic acumen of an American near-peer
competitor. However, in the context of vital interests, our Article V commitments to the Baltic 3 (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania) represent the only existential, albeit highly unlikely, intersection of competing Russian-
American interests. To America’s and Europe’s detriment, the Baltic 3 (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) became full-fledged members of
NATO in 2004. In return for their numerically insignificant contributions, they represent NATO’s most vulnerable, most feasible targets for
Russian military aggression. As recent models demonstrate, the Baltic three would be no match for a concerted
Russian assault. Assuming the model accounted for the mobilization of the tens of thousands of reservists to compliment the combined
30,000 active Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian servicemen and women, predictions are that Russia could conquer the region in the course of a
long weekend. Simulations also rightly highlighted the absence of armored NATO forces to counter Russia’s strength in that area. Further
problems for NATO emerge due to the sophistication of Russian air defense capabilities. Lastly, and most alarmingly, the study reminded
analysts of the post-USSR change in Russian nuclear doctrine, now referred to as ‘de-escalation’, in which tactical nuclear weapons may be used
to respond to a successful NATO ground assault. However, the model assumes a hypothetical environment that places the
possibility of such an event into the realm of the absurd. Russia’s overwhelming domestic social and economic challenges
suggest that Russia is far more likely to collapse than it is to take over three nations with an economic output and
population dwarfed by New Jersey[i]. Furthermore, for all its bluster, the least beneficial circumstance for Russia would
be a war with the world. Western exclusion from the group of eight (now seven), western sanctions and sagging fuel prices have been
sufficiently crippling. Further indicators that Russia is relatively unconcerned by security challenges from the Baltic, is that it has made a clear
prioritization of resources to its southern military district. It is evidently more concerned over jihadist terrorism in the Caucuses and support for
breakaway regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Crimea, than it is in diminishing U.S. influence in the Baltics. Some analysts point to
Russia’s operations in Syria as an example of expanded capabilities. While true, it is still too early to judge how strategically relevant those
capabilities are. Russia’s ability to turn aircraft to execute sorties and launch somewhat precise cruise missile strikes certainly bear watching and
assessing, however, these operations are relatively simple. They exist in a permissive environment absent an anti-aircraft threat, and sidestep the
complexity of combined arms land based maneuver and their corresponding sustainment requirements. Sustaining operations in Syria also
required extraordinary logistical measures, particularly in shipping. Operating airfields as a guest of a host nation is an apples to oranges
comparison to opening a theater and conducting prolonged ground combat in hostile territory. The beneficiaries of an aggressive
American foreign policy towards Russia are manipulating the relevance of the threat it poses. Unsurprisingly,
they consist of our allies and our own parochial strategic thinkers. Europe (Germany in particular) is still smarting from the
departure of almost a quarter million Americans and their families since 1990. Russia’s existence and their inability to address military problems
in their own back yards (think Bosnia, Kosovo and the Ukraine) are unpleasant reminders that eventually they may have to spend some of their
own money on their militaries. Nations like Poland and the Czech Republic bear deep reciprocating, historical scars of occupation, and expended
substantial diplomatic capital to host the American missile defense system that President Obama scrapped. Both would appreciate the domestic
assurance, and of course financial boon, of hosting thousands of well-subsidized Americans and their families. Professional American
Analysts and Strategists include clans of former Euro-warriors for whom Russia will always be the
adversary, and whose hard work helped construct the international coalitions that proved vital to our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This
bloc makes legitimate arguments about the trust building and interoperability that can only forward stationed forces can achieve. This argument
assumes Europe will have the stomach and means to join us in another non-article V adventure like Iraq or Afghanistan. Europe’s armies are
shrinking in both size and capability, as is the political will to support such a campaign. Russia’s military deficiencies are unlikely to improve.
Assuming the improbable conditions under which Russia’s flagging economy and ageing population will support planned military reforms, none
of Russia’s initiatives really change the situation. Rather than address the capability gap between its ground combat units and their sustaining
organizations, Russia chose to prioritize improvements such as ICBM delivery, ballistic missile submarines, and sea-based air defense. In effect,
it has chosen to ignore the problems that limit its strategic reach in favor of systems that would deter American and Chinese challenges and
intimidate European populations. An understanding of Russia’s broad ambitions is not hard to assess. Russia is hardly an inscrutable actor
playing its cards close to the chest. It is a loud and boisterous bully whose activities are largely constrained to its home turf, and whose approach
to its neighbors generates derision and scorn as often as it does awe. As described by Eugene Rumer of the Carnegie Endowment, Russia is a
“security manager in a zone of privileged interest”. Russia still represents a strategic challenge. Through their operations in The Ukraine and
Syria, the Russians will inevitably gain capacity in asymmetric warfare, and air-ground operations. They already possess sophisticated cyber-
warfare capabilities. Conversely, absent a concerted Russian effort to enhance long-range sustainment of ground forces, and a dramatic
improvement in Russia’s population growth and economy, Russia will remain an interesting but marginally relevant challenge to American
interests. Russia has no interest in investing itself in a large war, when proxy wars will do. It can challenge
American interests only at great cost to itself and only under exceptional circumstances. Viewed in context of its
capabilities, constraints and interests, Russia does not constitute a significant enough threat to justify the
reapportionment of America’s increasingly limited military force structure.
---xt: ! T/
Arms sales are key to the Russian economy
sendstad.pdf)//BB
Armaments exports play an important role in the Russian economy. They account for a small but significant
share of total exports, and for a substantial share of manufactured exports. This makes the industry one of the leading sectors
through which Russia is integrated with the global economy. Arms exports continue to play an important role in providing
demand for goods and services produced by the defence-industrial complex in Russia. Exports are not as
important to the defence-industrial complex as they were in the 1990s, but they continue to help keep production lines in service,
and thus help preserve the full spectrum of defence-industrial production capabilities.86 This might
become even more important in the future if, as planned, defence expenditure is further reduced from its
current elevated level.87 If the scheduled reduction in spending is indeed sustained, international arms sales would help
offset reduced domestic demand.
Arms sales free up money for infrastructure and pensions
Seddon 18 – (Max, “US sanctions heap pressure on Russian arms makers,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/65433228-3e66-
11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e)//BB
Any fall in defence sector income is likely to harm Russia’s Rbs1.5tn procurement budget, said Ruslan Pukhov,
director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow think-tank. “It is an economy of scale. If you build
10 S-400s for the Russian army they cost X amount. If you build 20 they cost 20 per cent less. They help
make the state rearmament programme cheaper and free up money for the pensioners and the roads,” Mr
Pukhov said.
AT turns case [US conditions good]
The US doesn’t solve HR or secondary sales --- no enforcement
Hill 17 – writer and researcher based in the Middle East (Evan, “The Dangers of Arming Autocrats,” The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/saudi-arabia-weapons-deal/529689/)//BB
Supporters of these sales argue that while these governments may be ugly, if they don’t buy from us, they
will buy from the Russians or the Chinese (or the French), and selling them our weapons gives us greater say in
how those weapons are used, and greater insight into how their militaries operate. If war breaks out, we’ll be able to work closely with
our clients because they’ll be using our technology. Andrew Exum, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy in the
Obama administration, recently argued in this magazine that progressive politicians should take more credit, not less, for these sales, given the
hundreds of thousands of workers employed in the U.S. defense industry and the “millions of American mouths” fed by their salaries. “This
might be another area in which progressive elites … are simply out of touch with the voters they need to win back control of the Congress and
state assemblies, never mind the presidency,” Exum wrote. But arms sales don’t bring home the jobs that supposedly make these deals worth the
angst. The Costs of War project at Brown University’s Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs has found that “clean energy and
health care spending create 50 percent more jobs than the equivalent amount of spending on the military,” while education spending creates more
than twice as many jobs. Boeing’s deal to sell 30 passenger jets to Iran will reportedly support 18,000 U.S. jobs, the same number Lockheed
Martin touted for the air and missile defense systems, combat ships, and tactical aircraft it may sell to Saudi Arabia. But passenger jets won’t be
bombing civilians in Yemen. Nor were Boeing, Raytheon, or Lockheed Martin even willing to hazard a guess as to the number of jobs Trump’s
Riyadh proposals might actually create, when asked by The Washington Post. In Egypt’s case, the provision of U.S. arms has
also not provided the more cynical benefits put forward by the proponents of such sales. U.S. officials
don’t always know how the Egyptian military uses U.S. weapons in the Sinai. In a leaked video that appeared in April,
Egyptian army and militia forces appeared to have used U.S. Humvees to transport several Sinai men to their summary executions. More
importantly, treating values as negotiable based on whether they are effective is a slippery slope. (The argument against torture as both
reprehensible and ineffective, for instance, raises the question of how we would view torture if it worked.) Weapons sales to abusive governments
tweak our conscience, supporters argue, but they offer benefits. Thou shall not kill, except for votes in swing states. In theory, U.S. law came
down in favor of values more than half a century ago, when Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act in the first year of the Kennedy
administration, banning security assistance to any government that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.” U.S. security assistance, Congress wrote at the time, should be provided in a way that promotes human rights and
avoids identifying the United States with abusive governments. Fifteen years later, the Arms Control Export Act set up elaborate procedures to
regulate U.S. government and commercial arms sales and stated that the purpose of such sales should be limited to essentially three areas:
supporting friendly nations’ internal security, legitimate self-defense, or participation in United Nations-sanctioned actions. The last major piece
of legislation, passed 20 years ago by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, forbids the United
States from training or equipping
any unit of a foreign security force if there is “credible evidence” that the unit
has committed “gross violations of human rights.” But this regime of rights-based restrictions has failed
miserably to prevent U.S. weapons from flowing to abusive governments, especially in the lax environment of the
seemingly never-ending conflict against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and whatever progeny will take their place. Michael Newton, a retired Army
officer and professor at the Vanderbilt University School of Law, recently wrote a persuasive argument for the American Bar Association’s
Center for Human Rights that arms sales to Saudi Arabia, based on that country’s various abuses both domestic and international, violate the
conditions of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Control Export Act. “Saudi Arabia presents an apparent prima facie case for the immediate
cessation of sales under the FAA,” Newton wrote. Even the Leahy Law, which theoretically enables the State Department to ban aid to abusive
units based on even circumstantial evidence of violations, is riddled with holes. A 2016 report on military aid to Egypt by the Government
Accountability Office found
that the State Department was failing to record human-rights abuses committed by
Egyptian security forces in its internal database, did not have the organizational charts necessary to
identify problematic Egyptian units and, predictably, could not track some types of aid, like ammunition,
to their final unit. In practice, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which has lead
responsibility for vetting under the Leahy Law, barely has the manpower to sift through the billions of
dollars of arms purchases supported by U.S. subsidies in the form of foreign military financing, leaving foreign military
sales—the exponentially larger purchases countries make with their own cash—almost unsupervised.

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RUSSIA DISADVANTAGE

The view from Moscow

US pressure is whittling away at Russians arms markets now

---AND, Russia exploits the arms vacuum

Russia will exploit the arms gap left by the US

This is consistent with Russia’s foreign policy objectives

Russian President Vladimir Putin

Why Choose a Russian Weapon?

Russian expansionism leads to nuclear use

Don’t blame the West

No checks on conflict escalation, and Trump is prone to overreact

But there is… [cards!]

China is emerging as a fast-growing supplier of affordable, high-tech weapons systems to countries

Russia’s actions are defensive

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