1NC Saudi

Russia fill in

Russian exports dropping now, but market share remains significant

Moscow Times 19, 3-11-2019, "Russia Remains Second-Largest Arms Exporter Despite Sales Drop –
Think Tank," https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/11/russia-remains-second-largest-arms-
exporter-despite-sales-drop-think-tank-a64763

Russia remains the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the United States despite five years of
declining sales abroad, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has said in a new
report that was disputed by Russia’s state-owned arm exporter. Russia’s arms exports dropped 17
percent between 2014 and 2018 when compared to 2009-2013, contributing to a widening gap with U.S.
exports, SIPRI said in the report published Monday. The Swedish think tank said declining arms
purchases by India and Venezuela played a major factor in Russia’s reduced exports. The state-owned
Rostec corporation, which includes the Rosoboronexport arms exporter in its vast portfolio, disputed the
accuracy of SIPRI's calculations, saying that sales have grown throughout the past decade, RIA Novosti
reported Monday. “There are big questions regarding the methodology of the calculations,” Rostec’s
press service said. Last year, Russia surpassed the United Kingdom to become the world’s second-largest
arms producer. According to SIPRI, international arms sales increased by almost 8 percent in the latest
five-year period. The five largest exporters, including France, Germany and China, accounted for three-
quarters of all arms exports in 2014-18, SIPRI said. Rosoboronexport, the sole entity responsible for the
supply and export of Russian arms and military equipment abroad, was established in 2000 by Vladimir
Putin and has since sold over $50 billion worth of arms, Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov has said.

Plan causes Saudi shift to Russian arms – higher costs won’t prevent
Ray Rounds 19, 4-16-2019, (U.S. Air Force F-15E pilot and a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University
in International Relations. He is a U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate and
a former Mirage 2000 exchange pilot with the French Air Force.) "The Case Against Arms Embargos,
Even for Saudi Arabia," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-
embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/

What About Saudi Arabia? In sum, more restrictive arms sales, delivery suspensions, or outright
embargos are unlikely to succeed in policy coercion. While arms transfers provide an avenue of
influence, embargos often lead to diversification, not desired policy changes. Additionally, fears of
technology transfer and direct offsets creating a competitor out of every client are generally unfounded
in the high-end market in which the United States generally deals. Finally, while the large domestic
market provides the United States the luxury of sacrificing financial gains for political influence,
sometimes economics do matter, particularly when it comes to saving a production line for future
flexibility. These conclusions should therefore inform U.S. policy on Saudi Arabia. The intent here is not
to argue the moral or ethical responsibility of U.S. leaders in responding to Saudi Arabia’s execution of
journalists or tactics in the war in Yemen. It is natural to see the horror wrought in Yemen and want to
take any actions necessary to stop it. However, I ultimately argue against a Saudi embargo. This is not
because, as the president has argued, it might cost a few billion dollars and some hundreds of defense
industry jobs. As others have pointed out, the economic impact of Saudi arms purchases on the U.S.
defense industry is relatively small. Rather, embargoing Saudi Arabia is unlikely to fundamentally alter
Saudi policies, but likely to further damage U.S. ties with Riyadh. In the near-term, Saudi Arabia can
substitute other weapons, such as the Eurofighter and Tornado, and “dumb bombs” instead of U.S.-built
“smart weapons.” The Saudis can also rely more heavily on their Emirati and Egyptian partners using
non-U.S. produced arms. In the medium to long term, such an embargo is likely to push the Kingdom to
greater arms diversification. If history is any guide, the United States will eventually lift any potential
arms embargo with little change in Saudi behavior, but only after having provided an opportunity for
adversary states such as Russia and China to gain a strategic foothold in Riyadh. Some might counter
that it would be extremely difficult and costly, in both time and money, for the Saudis to significantly
diversify their arms acquisitions away from the United States. This is absolutely the case. However,
costly does not mean impossible. Less wealthy states have already done it. Egypt is one example above;
but others such as Venezuela and even tiny Kuwait — frustrated at years of U.S. approval delays — have
significantly diversified their arms acquisitions. In other words, with the money and options available to
Saudi Arabia, and few other producers showing a stomach for a full embargo, it is not unreasonable to
believe that the Saudis might significantly diversify their arms acquisitions over time in response to a
U.S. embargo. Thus, while a U.S. embargo might be morally compelling and emotionally satisfying, it is
unlikely to create meaningful change for those most at risk or be strategically beneficial to the United
States. In the absence of a compelling, evidence-based case that an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia
might produce desired changes in behavior, policymakers should look elsewhere for solutions to their
Saudi problems.

New Russian arms sales to the Middle East reinvigorate global security competition
against the West
Paul Stronski & Richard Sokolsky 17, 12-14-2017, "The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical
Framework," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003

In the Middle East and North Africa, there is no doubt that Russia has improved its geopolitical position,
but the sustainability of its approach remains an open question. Moscow has been successful, most
notably, in preventing the collapse of the Assad regime and putting itself (along with Iran) in the driver’s
seat for determining the ultimate outcome of the Syrian civil war. At the same time, however, Russia’s
ability to help stabilize and reconstruct the country is limited, and there is no assurance that large-scale
fighting will not resume in the future. Its prospects to bring an end to the violence and restore stability
and security in Libya or Afghanistan are equally doubtful. In these war-torn countries, Russia’s approach
is neither a factor for stability nor sustainable development. And while Russia may have raised its
diplomatic profile and expanded its arms sales, economic engagement, and energy opportunities in the
Middle East, it is hardly on the cusp of supplanting U.S. dominance in the region. Moscow’s support for
Assad constrains its ability to strengthen relations with the Sunni Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf,
although some Gulf states have come to the realization that the Syrian opposition has been defeated
and now speak of an inclusive peace process.74 Moscow’s desire to protect and advance its important
equities with Iran also will hamper Russian influence in the region, although that did not stop Saudi King
Salman from visiting Russia and allegedly trying to bridge differences over Iran.75 That visit indicates
that the Saudis now recognize they need to deal with Russia on regional issues, even if a Riyadh-Moscow
partnership is unlikely to blossom anytime soon. Meanwhile, Russia’s prospects for expanding its web of
relationships in Southeast Asia remain uncertain at best and seem to depend more on U.S. and Chinese
moves in the region than on its own actions. If Washington continues to disengage, as it has by
abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Moscow may be presented with new opportunities for
engagement, though it will have to compete with a more powerful Beijing in this neighborhood and will
want to constrain its activism to avoid a confrontation with China. It certainly did not go unnoticed that
while Philippine President Duterte responded favorably to Russia’s openings, he also traveled to Beijing
and was rewarded with over $20 billion worth of financing and investment pledges—a feat that Russia
would have a hard time matching.76 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Moscow’s relationships may be
complicated by its embrace of China.77 Several countries in the region, particularly the Philippines and
Vietnam, are wary of China and its posture in the South China Sea, where Russia conducted joint naval
exercises with China in September 2016, shortly after an arbitration court in The Hague ruled in favor of
the Philippines’ claim against China. This sent a signal to the region whose side Moscow was on.78
Putin’s overt support for China’s position also had an anti-U.S. dimension, for it was framed as an
argument that regional neighbors should resolve territorial disputes without involving outside
powers.79 Ironically, this stance could further limit Russia’s reach in Southeast Asia. If the process of
U.S. disengagement from the region continues, Southeast Asia will likely have little choice but to seek
greater accommodation with China, and Russia may be the odd man out. In some instances, Russian
activities have more symbolic than real meaning for its global aspirations, and they can easily be
exploited by governments it is courting to extract diplomatic or economic concessions from Moscow.
For example, the Kremlin’s outreach to the Philippines and Serbia, both of which wish to maintain and
strengthen their ties with the West, could very well end up in that category. Nor is Russia immune from
overreaching or incurring blowback, particularly when it comes to the ways that the United States and
Europe have responded to Russian efforts to divide them. To be sure, Russia has succeeded in trying to
limit Ukraine’s Western integration and domestic reform efforts. It also has exacerbated strains in
transatlantic unity and highlighted the lack of coherence in U.S. and European policies toward Eurasia.
But, at the same time, Russian aggression in Ukraine and threats to other European states have
triggered a real debate in NATO—for the first time in a generation—about the need to muster military
capabilities to defend its eastern flank. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instigation of armed conflict in
eastern Ukraine have even unnerved many of Russia’s closest allies and damaged Russian soft power in
Eurasia. Lastly, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has cemented the latter’s Western orientation and
driven a stake through the heart of Moscow’s dreams of integrating Ukraine into the EEU. Similarly,
Russia’s intervention in the 2016 U.S. presidential election certainly fueled political dysfunction, but it
also backfired by creating a political firestorm that has weakened Trump’s ability to reset relations with
Moscow and strengthened, rather than removed, sanctions against Russia. The Russian-engineered
political debacle in the United States helped firm up European resilience to and awareness of Moscow’s
tactics and growing economic power in several EU or NATO countries. In light of this blowback, it is an
open question whether Moscow will be able to sustain an effective foreign policy with the necessary
material wherewithal and vision to present its leadership as an alternative to the U.S.-led international
order. Previous Russian efforts to show global or regional leadership—through BRICS, the CSTO, and the
EEU—have all floundered. Based on this track record, Russian efforts to push the EEU beyond the
borders of Eurasia—through free trade agreements (FTAs) or discussions about potential membership
bids by Iran, Turkey, and others—appear highly likely to meet the same fate. In fact, the recent
diplomatic spat between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in which Astana closed the border and denied
access to Kazakh markets of some Kyrgyz food products for “phytosanitary reasons,” highlights the EEU’s
dysfunction and poor track record of promoting Eurasian integration.80 Theoretically, Washington’s
backtracking on free trade has given Moscow an opening vis-à-vis traditional U.S. trading partners to
present itself as a champion of free trade principles. Moscow is publicly pushing, for example, FTAs
between the EEU and India, Indonesia, Israel, Mongolia, Singapore, and South Korea.81 However,
without China’s economic heft, Moscow may find that its attempts to position itself as a champion of
free trade border on irrelevance. Such initiatives may stoke unease in Washington or Brussels that
Moscow could be successful in cultivating ties with these countries. But such an outcome appears highly
unlikely given Moscow’s lackluster economic performance and the modest size of its economy. Most of
these countries are far more likely to orient their trade policies toward China or conclude agreements
with each other or other neighbors. All of that said, it would be wrong to conclude that Russia lacks a
strategy or the resolve to expand its global reach. Russia aims to increase its clout, refurbish its image,
and assert itself on key international issues where retreating Western power has created vacuums.
Moscow aspires to challenge the Western political, economic, and security institutions—around which
much of the current international system is based—that it claims pose threats to Russia’s own interests.
The Kremlin is determined to exploit opportune targets, and it has considerable resources that it can
deploy in an agile, decisive manner when opportunities arise. The dire state of Russia’s relations with
the West means that Moscow has less to lose internationally by making bold foreign policy moves; such
actions are popular at home and broadly supported by Russia’s national security establishment.
Moreover, Moscow so far has avoided overextending itself militarily, economically, or politically. It has
cast its diplomatic net far and wide, displaying a clear propensity to take advantage of opportunities left
behind by the West. To many observers, Russia seems almost indiscriminate in its choice of partners.
Perhaps, most importantly, Moscow is animated by an aspiration that has guided it for some two
decades: a multipolar world presided over by a constellation of major powers that includes Russia. This
vision is the exact opposite of the unipolar world that the Kremlin has charged Washington with trying
to build and sustain since the end of the Cold War. Successive Russian governments over the past
quarter century have pursued this vision with considerable skill and determination. There is no
indication that this will change in the foreseeable future.

Unipolarity is sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war
and escalation – power vacuums causes cascade prolif and extinction
Hal Brands 15. On the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University The Elliott
School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28

The fundamental reason is that bothU.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a
robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has
equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies .43 During the Cold War and after,
for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of

nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the
composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions
and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as
U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can
tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have
acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has

occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the
dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and
security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their
militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful
countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and
fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike,
deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States
“effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if

Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability
would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most
powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing
the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The
consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned . As offshore balancers have argued, it
may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with
countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing
the American pacifier
would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled . Long-dormant
security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical
antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the
reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor —think
Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel
empowered to more assertively press their interests . If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions,
Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble .”46 Scanning the
global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise . In Europe, a revisionist Russia is
already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf
and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting
in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat
to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional
status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have
historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely
yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn,
would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a
key region. It is hard to imagine , for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the
robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to
piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have
argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World
War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the
United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating
geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest
risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run , of course, is that a key region might not be able to
maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-
Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing
assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in
fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly , and if Beijing continues to increase military
spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing
Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor . This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of
retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian
neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous
and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea
to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions . Alternatively, and perhaps more
worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent

to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative
weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations
with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly
fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have
great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or
bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein,
retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—
and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China
themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous
environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents
acknowledge.

xNuke war causes extinction.

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security
adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic
Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense
Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General
Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/
NGO13.pdf

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning
cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing
global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could
produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a
'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about
0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that
temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the
growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply . Furthermore, there would be massive
ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that
agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and
by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the
deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as
destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to
depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the
lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for
decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is
arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on
Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The
most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth
Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by
nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human
survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here
and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.
 Reduce- Make Smaller
Reduce means to make smaller in size, amount, or number.
Dictionary.com, 18
(Dictionary.com, “Reduce”, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/reduce, 6/29/18, NS)

Reduce:

verb (used with object), re·duced, re·duc·ing.

to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number, etc.:

to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds.

to lower in degree, intensity, etc.:

to reduce the speed of a car.

to bring down to a lower rank, dignity, etc.:

Oxford Dictionaries 18

01NC
Relations high now- Trump and Netanyahu enjoy politically beneficial friendship
Shesgreen, 04/15/19
(Deirdre Shesgreen, Foreign Affairs Reporter, “Trump-Netanyahu: How two leaders reap political
rewards from their cozy relationship,” USA Today,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/03/25/how-donald-trump-and-benajmin-
netanyahu-israel-benefit-close-relationship/3249644002/)
WASHINGTON – If President Donald Trump has a true political bromance with any foreign leader, it's probably Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. Sure, Trump says he “fell in love” with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, and he’s clearly smitten with Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, the “Trump
of the Tropics.” But the
bond between Trump and Netanyahu goes far beyond political flattery and good
chemistry. It’s also great politics – for both men – as they each face re-election battles . The two leaders met
Monday at the White House, where Trump signed an official proclamation recognizing Israel's sovereignty over
the Golan Heights, a disputed territory the United Nations considers "occupied" by Israel. “Our relationship is powerful,” Trump
declared of U.S.-Israeli ties. “You’ve always been there, including today," Netanyahu responded, "and I thank you.” Monday's frothy exchange
spotlights the mutually beneficial politics of their friendship. " Cut
from the same political cloth, Trump and Netanyahu
have forged a symbiotic alliance," Shalom Lipner, an expert on the Middle East and fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote in a recent
analysis. "Trump’s benevolence toward Israel ... buoys the prime minister’s prospects ," he wrote. "And when
he responds gratefully by heaping praise on Trump, Netanyahu bolsters the president’s standing among
his core Republican and evangelical supporters ."Trump enjoys high approval ratings in Israel, and
Netanyahu has made his close relationship with the American president a centerpiece of his campaign
before Israel's election April 9. Netanyahu even erected giant billboards showing him shaking hands with Trump and declaring "Netanyahu, in a
different league."

US arms sales assure Israel – Israeli military strength reliant on US arms sales- plan
hurts assurances
Cooper 15 – (Helene Cooper. Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent with The New York Times.
She joined the paper in 2004 as assistant editorial page editor, before becoming diplomatic
correspondent in 2006 and White House correspondent in 2009. In 2015, she was part of the team that
won the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting, for her work in Liberia during the Ebola epidemic. She
is also the winner of of the George Polk award for health reporting (2015) and the Overseas Press Club
Award (2015). “Top U.S. Military Official Seeks to Assure Israel on Security”. New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/world/middleeast/general-martin-dempsey-reassures-israel-on-
security.html. DGP)
TEL AVIV — The Obama administration on Tuesday increased its efforts to ease Israel’s opposition to a possible nuclear deal with Iran, as the
top American military leader assured Israeli officials that the United States would further strengthen Israel’s
arsenal of arms, warplanes and cybertechnology.

Israeli military officials pressed Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to expand
the long-term
maintenance of Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional adversaries to include not just better weaponry but also
more weaponry and training for what could be a larger Israeli defense force.

The request reflected increased anxiety

in Israel not only over an international nuclear pact with Iran, but also over increased
American supplies of arms to Arab countries . While these countries mistrust Iran, historically they also have been adversaries
of Israel.

Even before meeting with General Dempsey on Tuesday, Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon of Israel expressed concern that Washington’s efforts
to supply advanced arms to reassure Arab allies worried about Iran could eventually give Israel cause for concern.

“Even if there are not now any hostile designs against us, as we know in the Middle East, intentions are liable to change,” Mr. Yaalon said at a
security conference. “The capability will without a doubt be there, and this must be prepared for.”

For Israel, that preparation is taking the form of asking the Obama administration for more of everything, from arms to training to
cybertechnology.

“Israel wants to make sure that we’re not just helping them on the qualitative side ,” General Dempsey told
reporters traveling with him after his meetings. “It’s the notion that size matters.”

Military officials said that no specific new commitments had been made, but that the Pentagon would continue to work with
Israel to expand its military.
General Dempsey said that Israel did not want just to “overmatch” Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates qualitatively.
“They want to overmatch them in size as well,” he said.

At the moment, assurance of additional military aid is about the only thing that Israel is getting from the
United States. Relations between the two countries have been increasingly tense, as President Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu remain at odds over an Iran nuclear agreement and over what the White House views as Israeli intransigence on the issue
of Palestinian statehood.

Mr. Obama last week reiterated a warning to Israel that Mr. Netanyahu’s election campaigning against a Palestinian state earlier this year may
mean that the United States will agree to resolutions in the United Nations that are anathema to Israel. One likely possibility raised by White
House officials would be a resolution embodying the principles of a two-state solution that would include Israel’s 1967 borders, with mutually
agreed swaps of territory with the future Palestine.

“If, in fact, there’s no prospect of an actual peace process,” Mr. Obama said in an interview with Israel’s Channel 2, “then it becomes more
difficult to argue with those who are concerned about settlement construction, those who are concerned about the current situation. It’s more
difficult for me to say to them, ‘Be patient and wait.’ ”

The president said that nonetheless, his commitment to Israeli security would remain, and General Dempsey’s visit was in many ways meant to
reinforce that.

Israel is already helped by a law enacted by Congress in 2008 requiring that arms salesallow Israel to maintain a “qualitative
military edge” in the region. All sales to the Middle East are evaluated based on how they will affect Israeli military superiority.
But the Obama administration has also viewed improving the militaries of the Gulf Arab states — those that see Iran as a threat in the region —
as critical to Israeli security.

General Dempsey’s trip is the second by a high-ranking American official to reassure Israel in the past
week. Last week, John O. Brennan, the Central Intelligence Agency director, met with Mr. Netanyahu and other officials.
General Dempsey said he had pointed out to Israeli defense officials that Israel was way ahead of the Gulf Arabs in the race to receive the F-35
fighter jet, considered the jewel of America’s future arsenal. The plane, one of the world’s most expensive weapons projects, has not been
marketed to Arab allies of the United States.

“I reminded my counterparts that they are on the path to have the joint strike fighter where others in the region are not,” General Dempsey
said, using another term for the F-35.

U.S. alliance deters Israel first strike on Iran

Chossudovsky, 06/14/19

(Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics and founder of Center for Research on Globalization,
“Pre-emptive Nuclear War: The Role of Israel in Triggering an Attack on Iran,” Global Research,
https://www.globalresearch.ca/pre-emptive-nuclear-war-role-israel-attack-iran/5677025) ZFO

There has been much debate regarding the role of Israel in initiating an attack against Iran.

Israel is part of a military alliance. Tel Aviv is not a prime mover . It does not have a separate and distinct military
agenda.

Israel is integrated into the “war plan for major combat operations” against Iran formulated in 2006 by U.S. Strategic Command
(U.S.STRATCOM). Inthe context of large scale military operations, an uncoordinated unilateral military action
by one coalition partner, namely Israel, is from a military and strategic point almost an impossibility.
Israel is a de facto member of NATO. Any action by Israel would require a “green light” from
Washington.
An attack by Israel could, however, be used as “the trigger mechanism” which would unleash an all-out war against Iran, as well as retaliation
by Iran directed against Israel.

In this regard, there are indications going back to the Bush administration that Washington had indeed contemplated the option of an initial
(U.S. backed) attack by Israel rather than an outright U.S.-led military operation directed against Iran. The Israeli attack –although led in close
liaison with the Pentagon and NATO– would have been presented to public opinion as a unilateral decision by Tel Aviv. It would then have been
used by Washington to justify, in the eyes of World opinion, a military intervention of the U.S. and NATO with a view to “defending Israel”,
rather than attacking Iran. Under existing military cooperation agreements, both the U.S. and NATO would be “obligated” to “defend Israel”
against Iran and Syria.

It is worth noting, in this regard, that at the outset of Bush’s second term, (former) Vice President Dick Cheney had hinted, in no uncertain
terms, that Iran was “right at the top of the list” of the “rogue enemies” of America, and that Israel would, so to speak, “be doing the bombing
for us”, without U.S. military involvement and without us putting pressure on them “to do it”8

According to Cheney:
One of the concerns people have is that Israel might do it without being asked. …Given the fact that Iran
has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act
first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards,9
Commenting the Vice President’s assertion, former National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview on PBS, confirmed with some
apprehension, yes: Cheney wants Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to act on America’s behalf and “do it” for us:

Iran I think is more ambiguous. And there the issue is certainly not tyranny; it’s nuclear weapons. And the vice president today in a kind of a
strange parallel statement to this declaration of freedom hinted that the Israelis may do it and in fact used language which sounds like a
justification or even an encouragement for the Israelis to do it.10

What we are dealing with is a process of joint U.S.-NATO-Israel military planning. An operation to bomb Iran has been in the active planning
stage since 2004. Officials in the Defense Department, under Bush and Obama, have been working assiduously with their Israeli military and
intelligence counterparts, carefully identifying targets inside Iran. In
practical military terms, any action by Israel would
have to be planned and coordinated at the highest levels of the U.S. led coalition .

Iran-Israel War is existential

Trabanco, 01/13/09(José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, Geopolitical Monitor Writer, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can
Explode at Anytime,” Global Research, https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-middle-eastern-powder-keg-can-explode-at-
anytime/11762)

Those Arab governments are afraid of Iran’s using its proxies and allies to fuel unrest and to topple them, thus advancing Teheran’s agenda of becoming a regional leader. If those
governments are overthrown, their hypothetical successors will surely be much less willing to collaborate with the West, which knows that, if such thing ever
happens, the Middle Eastern balance of power would dramatically change, not to mention that the price of

oil would skyrocket.

Israel fears a nuclear Iran would mean the end of the Israeli monopoly over nuclear weapons in the
region. An Iran armed with nuclear weapons (even if it is ruled by hardline Mahmud Ahmadinejad) would not be foolish enough to attack Israel first because Teheran is well aware of
Israel’s menacing stockpile of nuclear weapons.

the Israeli government really is scared of is the possibility that any rival of Israel, covered by a
So what

hypothetical Iranian nuclear umbrella, would feel less intimidated by Israel . Moreover, such scenario could encourage other
Middle Easter States to develop their own nuclear weapons. So far, the Israelis have implemented a policy of dispensing carrots (negotiation proposals) and sticks (air strikes) to Damascus in
an attempt to seduce Syria away from Iran.

On the other hand, the West is not afraid of a nuclear Iran per se. One can infer that from their refusal to do anything meaningful to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by States like
India, Israel or Pakistan. Rather, the Americans and the Europeans cannot accept a ‘Pax Iranica’ in the Middle East because Teheran would, de facto, control a zone which contains the world’s
largest oil reserves, a resource the Western economies have to import because their domestic supplies are not enough to meet their consumption needs.

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad’s government will certainly
respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe
even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like
Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and
their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at
Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would
dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense
financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those
respects.

In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could
rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and dangerously escalate by
engulfing the whole region and perhaps even beyond . There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their
respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any
of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the
stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.
 1NC – DA
US arms sales to Mexico are growing now
Lindsay-Poland 15 (John Lindsay-Poland; Wage Peace Coordinator for AFSC, writer, activist,
researcher and analyst focused on human rights and demilitarization; 3/23/15; “The Mexican Military's
Buying Binge”; https://nacla.org/news/2015/03/23/mexican-military%27s-buying-binge-0; DS) brackets
added for clarity

Mexico has been on a buying spree for U.S. military equipment, especially helicopters and armored vehicles, with
purchases amounting to more than a billion dollars in the last 12 months . U.S. Northern Commmand chief Admiral
William Gortney said the combined deals represent "a 100-fold increase from prior years ." For a military supposedly proud
of its independence from the United States, it is a dependent client.

On Tuesday, March 17, the State Department approved the sale of three Blackhawk helicopters to the Mexican military
for $110 million, to support Mexican troops engaged in counter-drug operations. The deal comes on the heels of a larger agreement last April
for Mexico to buy 18 Blackhawks for $680 million. The helicopters are produced by Sikorsky, based in Connecticut (also supplier to Colombia
and other countries), and General Electric, in Lynn, MA. The deals include training and the construction of a facility. The United States will also
reportedly supply six M134 7.62mm machine guns for the helicopters, which fire up to 6,000 rounds a minute.

Last May, Washingtonapproved a sale of more than 3,000 Humvees for the Mexican military, at a cost of
$556 million, in order to expand "existing army architecture to combat drug trafficking organizations"
and enhance "interoperability between Mexico and the U.S." The Humvees will be built by AM General in Mishawaka,
Indiana. A later report said that in December the Pentagon approved sale of 2,200 of the Humvee vehicles, for just $245 million.

Mexico City police purchased five helicopters from Texas-based Bell last month, for another $26.4 million. The helicopters will be assigned to
the Condores, a group of special police. Two weeks later, the Mexican Air Force sealed a deal for 15 Bell helicopters, valued for at least $37
million, to be based at an airbase in Jalisco state.

In January, the Pentagon said that the Mexican Navy, too, is buying Blackhawks – five of them, for $56 million. Last September, the Navy also
announced the purchase of four King Air 350ER aircraft, to be used for "maritime surveillance of strategic installations, light transport, and
medical evacuation." The aircraft are built by Beechcraft Corporation, a subsidiary of Textron Aviation, which sold another four aircraft to the
Mexican Navy in 2013.

All told, these agreements represent at least $1.15 billion in arms sales to the Mexican military or police in the last year, mostly facilitated by
the Pentagon through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. FMS sales frequently come at a discount, and are not subject to human rights
restrictions, such as the Leahy Law.

These sales do not include guns and ammunition. In 2014, the U.S. legally transferred more than 28,000 firearms to Mexico, most of them
military rifles, at a value of $21.6 million. The year saw the most firearms sales in dollars of the 15 years that the U.S. Census Bureau has kept
data.

Many more weapons crossed the border from the United States illegally. In 2013, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms traced 10,488
firearms recovered at crime scenes in Mexico back to U.S. manufacturers or sales. A University of San Diego study estimated that a quarter of a
million firearms were purchased annually in the United States to be trafficked into Mexico from 2010 to 2012. These numbers dwarf the
disastrous "Fast and Furious" program by which ATF allowed hundreds of weapons purchased in Arizona to cross into Mexico in 2009 and 2010.

Mexico also gets military equipment from the United States through direct commercial sales [DCS], which
are disclosed later. In 2013, the U.S. approved more than a billion dollars in sales of military equipment to
Mexico, most of it for "spacecraft systems and associated equipment." This could include satellites, GPS systems, or ground control stations.
It also approved sales of more than 116 million rounds of ammunition and $187 million in "military electronics."
The plan decks US-Mexico military cooperation – empirics prove
Garza 10 (Rafael H. Garz Jr; B.S., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, MA Thesis on Security
Studies in the Western Hemisphere; March 2010; “THE U.S. AND MEXICO: TRADING PARTNERS,
RELUCTANT MILITARY ALLIES”; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518582.pdf; DS)

2. Interdependence and Security Without Much Military Cooperation Despite

increased levels of economic
interdependence and cooperation, Mexico and the United States resisted calls for closer military
cooperation. In fact, high-level official security consultation improved in the area of public and border security, but
military-to-military cooperation was limited to equipment purchases and military training , especially for anti-
narcotic and anti-insurgency campaigns.75 The United States, with the implementation of Operation Intercept in 1969, coerced Mexico into the
drug war. This operation virtually closed the border for 20 days and caused great economic damages to Mexico, which forced the government
to capitulate to Washington’s pressures. This led to the joint Operation Condor of the 1970s that attempted to eradicate marijuana and poppy
fields. Ultimately, this policy triggered the cartelization of drug trafficking and worsened the bilateral relationship by the mid 1980s.76

It was during this time that Mexico began to accept unprecedented quantities of helicopters, specialized
aircraft, spare parts, pilot training and other forms of technical assistance. I t also sought to formalize the presence
of U.S. law enforcement agents that for decades, with or without notification, had gathered intelligence in Mexico. In 1983, under pressure
from the United States, Mexico increased its military participation in the war against drug trafficking .77 This,
however, does not translate into military-to-military cooperation, but is the result of unilateral action on behalf of U.S. states to tackle what is
essentially a public security challenge, in the form of drug-trafficking. In other words, this is not consistent with the definition of military-to-
military cooperation defined in the introduction, which includes mutual measures, such as service-to-service interaction, professional contact
through military institutions, joint exercises, and regular ministerial meetings, among others.

In 1985, U.S. pressures against Mexico increased because of the Enrique Camarena incident, the D.E.A. agent murdered on Mexican soil while
performing his anti-narcotic duties. Many U.S. officials accused the Mexican government —focus was placed on the police—for being directly
involved in Camarena’s murder. Hence, the U.S. launched Operation Intercept II, which virtually closed down the southern border for eight
days, forcing Mexico to accept unilateral incursions by U.S. security forces. In
1986, the United States increased its
intelligence operations in Mexico and began using more sophisticated military equipment . This led to the
capture of two Mexican citizens accused of complicity in the Camarena affair; but such a move occurred on Mexican soil, without the consent
or authorization of Mexico’s government. Eventually, this unilateral action alarmed and outraged Mexican authorities since U.S. policy
appeared to be “based on the willful disregard of the sovereignty of other states.”78 Alarmed by U.S. unilateral actions, Mexico formulated new
policies designed to counter its two security threats: drug trafficking and American unilateralism. In 1988, President de la Madrid declared drug
trafficking a security threat to national security and staged a permanent campaign against it. Additionally, Mexico proposed a set of new
agreements with the United States to facilitate extradition, such as the 1994 U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty.79

Another issue that increased U.S. concerns about Mexico’s security was the Zapatista insurgent movement in Chiapas in 1994. The Mexican
government launched an offensive against the Zapatista guerrillas who had quickly seized seven towns. The fight ended with a cease-fire
agreement on January 12.80 During this time, the army and police were heavily criticized as they faced allegations of human right abuses during
their operations.81 In response to the Zapatista insurgency, Mexico increased its defense budget significantly; while it developed a closer
security relationship with the United States. Mexico increased its defense procurement, maintenance, operations and construction.82

In 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited Mexico to discuss a wide array of bilateral security issues and to foster cooperation in the war
against drug trafficking. This
was the first time that a U.S. defense secretary officially visited Mexico. 83 Virtually
no operational military-to-military cooperation had existed prior to this visit. These interactions set the
stage for increased U.S. military training of Mexican officials and for the transfer of military equipment
to assist Mexico in the fight against drug trafficking.84 Nevertheless, cooperation was limited to drug trafficking, and, as
John A. Cope argues, a distant, circumscribed and limited military relationship still existed between the armed forces of the United States and
Mexico.85

During the 1990s, Mexico

ordered 263 Belgian and 28 U.S. armored personnel carriers, four UH-60
helicopters, and accepted a donation of 73 UH-1H helicopters . The irony of it all is that in 1998, a year after the
purchases, the Mexican National Defense Ministry grounded the U.S. donated helicopters and returned them to Washington arguing that repair
options were too costly. In fact, the helicopters were over 30-years old.86 Likewise, IMET increased from half-million in 1995 to $9 million in
1998. The number of Mexican officers instructed in U.S. military schools reached an unprecedented total of 757 officers. The same year, the
U.S. government provided about $35 million in military assistance to Mexico. “The U.S. justified this increased budget as part of the
counternarcotics effort; Mexico understood it, of course, as assistance to its national security.”87 Consequently, during this period, military-to-
military cooperation increased, but it was mostly restrained to drug trafficking, with few institutional linkages similar to those developed in the
economic realm, with NAFTA. In fact, the interaction between U.S. and Mexican defense authorities occurred during private meetings and
through informal mechanisms, encompassing exclusively the respective armies’ chiefs and port calls by U.S. Navy ships to Mexican ports.
Institutionalization of military relations remained weak at best, non-existent at worst. In
sum, even as the economies of both
countries increased their interaction and became heavily interdependent, military-to-military
cooperation was limited. Furthermore, relations between the armed forces of the United States and Mexico were distant, even as
both countries faced the growing common threat of organized crime. Hence, liberal and realist accounts fail to
account for the lack of substantial military cooperation in U.S.-Mexico relations.

US-Mexico security cooperation is crucial to counter narcoterrorism

Kilroy 07 (Ph.D., is a nonresident scholar in the Baker Institute Mexico Center, associate professor of
politics at Coastal Carolina University in South Carolina, B.S. in political science from Santa Clara
University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia; September 2007;
“Perimeter Defense and Regional Security Cooperation in North America: United States, Canada, and
Mexico”; https://www.hsaj.org/articles/138; DS)

The DMA process established a biennial mechanism for routine meetings between defense ministers throughout Latin America. It also
fostered discussions on topics ranging from commitments to fight environmental disasters, to fighting
narcoterrorism. While specific agreements and programs were often missing, what was occurring was a cultural shift in many Latin
American military institutions, recognizing that a key democratic principle being invoked by the United States was military subordination to
civilian authority. It was not enough that all nations participating in the DMA had democratically-elected heads of state. The United States was
also promoting the notion that civilian control should go much further and include civilian heads of the Ministries of Defense.15 This idea was
solidified by the formation of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), under the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.
The CHDS actively promoted the process of “civilianizing” Ministries of Defense by offering courses designed to develop Latin American civilian
defense workers by educating them on defense planning, programming, and budgeting issues.16

The DMA process was successful in this regard in “converting” Latin American militaries to the U.S. model with
one civilian minister (or secretary) of defense overseeing the individual armed services. By the time the fourth DMA occurred, all Latin
American countries, except Mexico, had a minister of defense (or equivalent), and all but six were civilian.17 By the time of the fifth DMA,
Mexico continued to be the lone stand-out, maintaining its separate cabinet-level military organizations, with the military officer-run secretary
of defense and secretary of the navy directly falling under the president, rather than a civilian minister of defense. For this reason, Mexico’s
participation in the DMA process has been limited to symbolic gestures or behind-thescene bilateral
discussions, yet no official proclamations of support for broader hemispheric security cooperation
through strictly military organizations. Rather Mexico has chosen to pursue discussions on regional
security cooperation through other established venues, such as the OAS Conference on Hemispheric Security or through its military
advisory component of the Inter-American Defense Board.

The DMA process continues to foster a commitment to the broad goals and objectives of hemispheric security cooperation originally envisioned
by Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1995. However,
it has failed to establish the institutional structures of a
NATO-like security organization with all nations in the region equally committed to the same concepts of “security.” Ironically,
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s opening comments at the fifth DMA in Chile in 2002 came immediately before his departure for Prague and
participation in the NATO summit. Rumsfeld noted similarities between the processes both NATO and the DMA faced: “consolidate the
democratic progress of the region; set military priorities in our democratic societies; identify the new threats of the 21st century; and transform
our capabilities to meet those emerging threats.”18 However, that is where similarities ended. While NATO created a formidable military
alliance, credited with maintaining peace and stability in Europe throughout the Cold War, the DMA has produced no such equivalent security
agreement in the Americas.

For the United States, Mexico, and Canada, security relationships throughout the previous century have
remained primarily bilateral relationships, either between the United States and Mexico , or between the
United States and Canada. NATO further provided a structure whereby the United States and Canada operationalized military doctrine, tactics,
and equipment through a number of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), as well through training and exercises. This relationship, forged in
combat, has grown through further military cooperation in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently in Afghanistan. Canada and Mexico
have only recently come together on the “perimeter” of security discussions, primarily through the formation of the NAFTA in 1994 and their
growing economic interdependence with the United States. It was only through the tragic events of September 11, 2001 that these
three
nations would be transformed by the new security challenges of global terrorism and realize that their
futures – politically, economically, and physically – were indelibly linked by this new reality, since an
attack on the economic infrastructure of the United States would have significant repercussions
throughout the Northern Hemisphere .19

Narcoterrorism causes nuclear conflict

Björnehed 04 (Emma Björnehed; researcher and project coordinator for the project on Terrorism and
Conflict at the Program for Contemporary Silk Road Studies at Uppsala University, Associate Senior
Lecturer; “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror”;
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/drogue-terreur.pdf; DS)
Similarities of Counter-Narcotics and -Terrorism Policy

The traditional separation of narcotics and terrorism counter measures and agencies has gradually faded
since 9/11. The urge for increased cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies is advocated on a
national, regional and international level. This can easily be seen when reviewing the many conferences, meetings and
conventions signed on drug and terrorism associated security issues. Conventions contain clauses on the necessity for
cooperation on combating narcotics and terror in concert , arguing that since both networks are interlinked in practice,
they are inseparable in policy considerations [36]. International and regional institutions advocate that ignoring the link between
narcotics and terrorism will lead to the failure of defeating either criminal entit y. This line of reasoning was
present even before 9/11 as seen in the Tashkent conferences in 1999 and October 2000, where the need to coordinate efforts to fight drugs,
crime and terrorism since they were all interlinked, was pointed out [37]. After 9/11, the importance of policy cooperation was advocated by
the UN in conjunction with the drafting of Resolution 1373 when the Security Council noted that “the close connection
between international terrorism and transnational organised crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering,
illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially
deadly materials, emphasises the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and
international levels to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international
security” [38]. Focusing on the link between narcotics and terrorism the law enforcement efforts and intelligence gathering agencies began
a more developed framework for cooperation and the war on drugs and the war on terror became interlinked .

USFG refers to the 3 branches of government established by the US Constitution.

US Legal.com 2016
https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government
shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The
Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive,
comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes
a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three
branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government
to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved
to the States or to the people.
 1NC A2: Relations Resilient
Changes in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East make now a
unique time for US-Saudi relations
Blanchard 18 [Blanchard, Christopher, specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, 9/21/2018. "Saudi Arabia:
Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service, Accessed: 6/9/2019.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf GMDI

Since 2011, significant shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East have focused international
attention on Saudi domestic policy issues and reinvigorated social and political debates among Saudis (see “Domestic
Issues” below). These regional shifts, coupled with ongoing economic, social, and political changes in the kingdom, may make sensitive

issues such as political reform, unemployment, education, human rights, corruption, religious freedom, and extremism more prominent in U.S.-
Saudi relations than in the past. U.S. policy initiatives have long sought to help Saudi leaders address economic and security challenges in ways
consistent with U.S. interests. Recent joint U.S.-Saudi diplomatic efforts to strengthen economic, educational, and interpersonal ties have

focused on improving opportunities for the kingdom’s young population . Tens of thousands of Saudi students continue to
pursue higher education in the United States, although numbers have declined in response to Saudi government funding changes. Some nongovernment

observers have called for a reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations amid the kingdom’s ongoing military campaign in Yemen. 3
They cite concern about human rights conditions in the kingdom, as well as resurgent questions about the relationship between religious proselytization by some
Saudis and the appeal of violent Islamist extremism. U.S. officials have called publicly for the kingdom to seek a negotiated settlement in Yemen, allow peaceful
expressions of dissent at home, and help fight extremism abroad. Any
more strident official U.S. criticisms of the kingdom’s policies
traditionally remain subjects of private diplomatic engagement rather than official public discussion. Saudi

concerns about U.S. leadership and policies in the Middle East grew during the Administrations of Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, in parallel to U.S. concerns about Saudi priorities and choices. In particular, Saudi leaders at times signaled their
displeasure with U.S. policy approaches to Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Saudi officials also opposed the changes to U.S. sovereign
immunity law that were made by the 114th Congress through the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (S. 2040, P.L. 114-222, aka JASTA) and have sought their
amendment or repeal.4
 2NC A2: Relations Resilient
US-Saudi relations aren’t resilient – yes we’ve weathered past issues but the current
landscape has relations on the brink
Hannah 19 [Hannah, John, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on U.S.
strategy. During the presidency of George W. Bush, he served for eight years on the staff of Vice President Cheney,
including as the vice president's national security advisor, 3/27/2019. "Trump Should Salvage U.S.-Saudi Relations."
Foreign Policy, Accessed: 6/10/2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/27/trump-should-salvage-u-s-saudi-
relations/ GMDI

The relationship has endured oil boycotts, the 9/11 attacks (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi
It’s true that there’s a lot of ruin in U.S.-Saudi ties.

nationals), and more than 70 years of constant clashing of cultures and values . The national interests that have

bound Washington and Riyadh together through the decades, despite their deep differences, remain formidable. But real
changes are now afoot in the underlying dynamics of the relationship. They should at minimum give pause to anyone who blithely
assumes that there’s no amount of public derision that the United States could heap on the kingdom that
might put the broader U.S.-Saudi partnership at risk, and the Trump administration should take notice. One such change is the
rapid rise of Saudi nationalism—especially among the country’s large youth population. As part of his reform agenda for transforming the kingdom, Mohammed bin
Salman has consciously sought to build a new sense of identity among Saudis , grounded in nationalism rather than
Wahhabism, the fundamentalist religious sect that served as an ideological gateway for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While largely a positive development, the

nationalist tide could have a double edge, as I learned on an Atlantic Council trip to Riyadh in February. It was striking how many researchers,
activists, and government officials in Riyadh seem ed defensive, resentful, and even angry when asked about the
United States. “We’re getting sick and tired of having our country reduced to its worst mistakes,” one woman said, referring to the Khashoggi tragedy. Another said, “Thanks to the crown
prince, the lives of millions of women are being positively transformed in ways that our mothers couldn’t even dream of. If the United States can’t appreciate the historical importance of

the
what’s happening here, and chooses to focus only on our faults and trying to change our leadership, then you’re hurting our cause—and I’ll oppose you.” Whether justified or not,

sense of hurt, of being misunderstood and unfairly attacked, even humiliated, appeared genuine. It’s not hard to see how that kind of raw
populist emotion, sufficiently stoked, could result in overreaction, miscalculation, and counterproductive policies. At a minimum, it’s a
new variable in the equation that U.S. policymakers, in both the administration and Congress, should be taking into account as they calculate
how best to pressure the kingdom to change its most problematic behaviors. Perhaps an even more important change, one that amplifies the potential risks of a

possible nationalist backlash, is the emergence of great-power competitors with the U nited States, especially China. It’s still the

case that Saudis overwhelmingly prefer Washington to remain their dominant global partner. If nothing else, they know that if the
worst were to happen, and war with Iran came, neither Russia nor China would lift a finger to save the house of Saud. The U.S. military still would—probably. But that “probably” is itself a

growing problem, one which has been getting worse over the past decade as two successive U.S. presidents of both major parties have

increasingly signaled their determination to do less , not more, in the Middle East to guarantee the security of

partner states. Inevitably, as the perception of U.S. retrenchment deepens, the Saudis are hedging their bets
and developing new geostrategic options. Today, China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner . It’s among the biggest

customers for Saudi oil—while the U.S. shale boom increasingly poses the greatest threat to Riyadh’s
economic prosperity. Thanks in no small part to decades of intellectual-property theft on a world-historical scale, Chinese technology, including military,
intelligence, and cyber systems, as well as critical emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, is increasingly closing the gap with the best U.S.

high-tech offerings. And Beijing, like Moscow, is perfectly prepared to sell its most advanced capabilities to
Riyadh with no strings attached. No complaints about the kingdom’s human rights record. No mentions of Khashoggi. No threats to withdraw support as punishment for the war in
Yemen. As was painfully obvious during Mohammed bin Salman’s recent values-free trip to China in February, in an increasingly ideological age of great-power

competition that pits Western-style liberal democracy against Beijing’s model of authoritarian capitalism , it’s
no secret in which camp the house of Saud feels most at home . The only point being that the decades-old
assumptions that have governed the U.S.-Saudi relationship, while largely still valid, may be on increasingly shaky
ground. Before the Senate passed a resolution earlier this month to end all U.S. support for the Saudi war in Yemen, Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut confidently reassured his
colleagues, “The Saudis won’t go somewhere else.” The suggestion that they might turn to another great power for weapons, he claimed, “is belied by how this alliance has worked for years
and the complication of the Saudis turning around and choosing to go to another partner.” While I’d still bet that Murphy is more right than wrong on this issue, if only due to the immediacy of

Saudi Arabia, U.S. foreign policy, and the global balance of

the Iranian threat for Riyadh, I increasingly lack his sense of certitude.

power are all now in flux in ways that are quite unprecedented.
 1NC A2: Khashoggi
Khashoggi won’t thump arms sales or relations – Trump downplayed the incident
Khatami 18 [Khatami, Elham, deputy editor who works with policy reporters. Previously, she worked as a
grassroots organizer within the Iranian-American community. She also served as research manager, editor, and
reporter during her five-year career at CQ Roll Call, 10/12/2018. "The long history of U.S. arms sales to Saudi
Arabia." Think Progress, Accessed: 6/9/2019. https://thinkprogress.org/the-long-history-of-u-s-arms-sales-to-
saudi-arabia-13aaa614a543/ GMDI

the disappearance of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul last week has prompted numerous
News of

lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to urge the Trump administration to halt U.S.-Saudi arm sales and reevaluate a decades-
long alliance that has enabled the Gulf nation’s bad behavior. President Donald Trump, however, shot down the possibility Thursday, telling
reporters he is unwilling to give up the billions of dollars in funding from the U.S.-Saudi arms deal reached in May 2017. “I don’t like stopping
massive amounts of money that’s being poured into our country,” Trump said. “They are spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs for this country.” While the
$110 billion number Trump touted is “fake news” (last year’s deal likely amounted to $4 billion), the arms agreement is the latest in nearly one century of U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia.
Although U.S.-Saudi relations grew slightly tense toward the end of President Obama’s term, largely due to the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and Saudi’s unwillingness to engage with Iran, Obama’s
administration oversaw the largest U.S.-Saudi arms deals in American history. A 2016 report by the Congressional Research Service found that, from 2008 to 2015, Obama’s sales to Saudi
Arabia amounted to nearly $94 billion. Those sales showed no signs of slowing down in 2015 as Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab countries in a military campaign against the Houthi rebels in

Yemen. The United States has supported Saudi’s efforts with “weapons sales, aerial refueling, intelligence, and targeting support,” BuzzFeed
News reported. U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia have warmed considerably under President Trump, whose family remains especially
close with the Gulf kingdom’s totalitarian prince Mohammed bin Salman. Although Saudi Arabia has not purchased new arms platforms under Trump, according to Lawfare’s Bruce Reidel,

the Trump administration has helped soften Saudi’s image , refusing to hold them accountable for war crimes in Yemen or for human rights
violations within the country, and positioning the Gulf nation as a counter to Iran’s influence in the region. Shortly after Trump visited Saudi Arabia in the spring, the Senate tabled a bipartisan
resolution to stop U.S. military funding that supports Saudi Arabia’s brutal actions in Yemen. As ThinkProgress reporter D. Parvaz wrote at the time, U.S. military officials have aided Saudi
efforts in Yemen “by refueling Saudi coalition bombers, an unauthorized action that can be stopped using the War Powers Resolution. The bill that failed … invoked the resolution and called for
the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the country not fighting al Qaeda.” As of August 2018, strikes by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen have resulted in the deaths of nearly 6,600
civilians, including children, and the wounding of nearly 10,500, with millions more suffering from food and medical shortages as a result of the Saudi assault on the port city of Hodeidah. The
Trump administration has barely made a peep about these actions, instead officially certifying that the Saudi-led coalition is “undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to

Khashoggi’s case is unlikely to put an end to the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia. At the same press
civilians and civilian infrastructure.”

conference on Thursday, Trump downplayed the alleged murder at the hands of a Saudi “assassination squad,” telling reporters, “Again, this took

place in Turkey, and to the best of our knowledge Khashoggi is not a U.S. citizen , is that right? He’s a
permanent resident.”