India Russia Relations

Evolution of the relationship

1927 – Nehru’s visit to USSR.
1955 – Laid the foundation of Industrialisation in India .
1. Nehru Visited USSR.
2. Khrushchev Visited India .
1962 – Expressed regret .

1965 – Tashkent Agreement did not go well.

1971 – Treaty of Peace, friendship and cooperation . Helped India
to win 1971 war.
1986 – Red Carpet for Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev visited India .

After disintegration of USSR

Boris Yeltsin adopted pro-west policy .

1993 – Treaty of Friendship and cooperation .

2000 – Putin visited India. Strategic Partnership.
2010 – Special and Privileged partnership
2020 – India Russia Annual Summit

Defence Partnership
The Soviet Union was an important supplier
of defence equipment for several decades,
and this role has been inherited by the
Russian federation.

India is the second largest market for the

Russian defence industry. In 2018,
approximately 68% of the Indian Military's
hardware import came from Russia, making
Russia the chief supplier of defence
equipment.
India and Russia have deepened their Make in India defence manufacturing cooperation.

Joint development and production, and joint marketing of armaments and military
technologies.

In October 2018, India inked the historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with Russia to
procure five S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system, the most powerful missile defence
system in the world ignoring America's CAATSA act. The United States threatened India with
sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.

India and Russia have several major joint military programmes

including:
1. BrahMos cruise missile programme
2. Sukhoi Su-30MKI programme (230+ to be built by Hindustan
Aeronautics)
3. S-400 Triumf (purchase pending)
4. Kamov Ka-226 200 to be made in India under the Make in India
initiative.
5. T-90S Bhishma with over 1000 to be built in India
6. Akula-II nuclear submarine (2 to be leased with an option to buy when
the lease expires)
7. INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier programme

The S-400 air defence system Issue

The defence relationship with Russia creates with India-US bilateral ties. USA has imposed
sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) , on
Turkey for procurement of the same system.
Yet New Delhi appears determined to proceed with the $5.2-billion deal, having concluded
that the S-400 was cost-effective and will be efficient
in meeting India’s defence needs as compared to rival
systems. The Indian government has stressed that
negotiations were already underway before CAATSA
came into being in 2017, with the Inter-governmental
Agreement (IGA) for its procurement having been
signed in 2016 during the 17th India-Russia summit in
Goa. The contract for its supply was concluded in 2018,
and in recent years, India and Russia have signed a
number of additional defence deals across domains,
including guided missile frigates, T-90 battle tanks, and lease of a nuclear-powered attack
submarine.
It is apparent that US concerns go beyond just CAATSA and Russian arms sales. The presence
of advanced systems such as the S-400 among US allies will clearly impede certain
technology transfers and joint operations, as
evidenced by the immediate suspension of F-35
deliveries to NATO ally Turkey, even before
sanctions under CAATSA came into force. In the
US-India case, where the countries are not formal
allies, the S-400 will nevertheless place constraints
on some contours of what the US envisions for the
future of the US-India defence relationship.
While CAATSA does provide for waivers, acknowledging that there will be friendly countries
with little choice but to continue dealing with proscribed Russian entities, there is no room
for a “blanket exception” of the sort that might entirely insulate countries like India.
Notwithstanding a few key acquisitions, Russia’s overall share of Indian defence imports
has been steadily declining. At the same time, the India-US defence relationship has steadily
heightened, particularly over the last decade. The same is true of Indian relations with the
West and US-allied nations in general, with a significant uptick in imports from Europe and
Israel in recent years, in addition to greater cooperation at the operational level. India
conducts very few military exercises with Russia in comparison to those with the US, Europe,
Japan, and Australia. Indo-Russian exercises also tend to be far less complex, with less focus
on interoperability.
Energy Cooperation

Russia has agreed to build more than 20 nuclear reactors over the next 20 year. It contains
plans to build over 20 nuclear power units in India, as well as cooperation in building Russia-
designed nuclear power stations in third countries, in the joint extraction of natural uranium,
production of nuclear fuel and waste elimination.
Russia is building the 6,000-MW project at the site in Tamil Nadu, which will have six
VVER-1000 nuclear reactors . Two reactors at Kudankulam are currently operational and
two more are being built.

In 2012 Gazprom Group and India's GAIL agreed to LNG shipments to

India of 2.5 million tons a year for the period of 20 years. Indian oil
companies have invested in the Russia's oil sector a notable example is
ONGC-Videsh which has invested over $8 billion with major stakes in oil
fields such Sakhalin-1.

Current state of India Russia Relations

In recent times , the disagreements between India and

Russia, on geopolitics are growing. In December
2020,Lavrov remarked that “India is being an object of
the Western countries persistent, aggressive and
devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by
promoting Indo-Pacific strategies”.

While India and Russia do have some common interests, Moscow has its own imperatives
that New Delhi should understand. Russian confrontation with the West broadly, and with
the US in particular, forces Moscow to lean more heavily on Beijing. That makes India and
Russia less useful to each other for some time to come.
Russia has been useful to India in some ways, particularly in enhancing Indian military
power. But Moscow’s political compulsion to support China is a warning that New Delhi
should heed. India’s dependence on Moscow for weapons is a vulnerability that the Indian
decision makers need to take more seriously.

India and Russia can think about establishing a “multipolar

global order”, but this is not something that can be conjured
.The world is heading towards a US-China bipolarity. Desire
cannot overcome reality.

The source of divergence between Indian and Russian interests lies in the continuing
problems that Russia faces in its relations with the US.

Former US President Donald Trump may have had a bit of a soft

corner for Putin’s muscular preening, but even his own
administration’s response to Russia was not particularly soft.
President Biden and his administration is likely to be tougher, as seen
during the first conversation between him and Putin. The just-
released Biden ‘interim’ strategic guidance document begins by
pointing at the “growing rivalry with China, Russia and other
authoritarian states”.
Putin has shown little indication that he will soften towards the West either. These are early
days, of course, and things may change – the two countries did agree to extend the New
START nuclear arms treaty just three weeks after Biden took over. But it is difficult to see
much cooperation or even a reduction in tensions between the two sides in the immediate
future.

The consequence of this confrontation is that Moscow has increasingly leaned on China both
for support as well as a way to undermine American power. The military relationship
between the two has become increasingly close: in addition to conventional weapons, Russia
is also helping China set up its missile early warning system, one of the most sensitive bits of
technology for any nuclear power. Particularly striking is what has primarily been an arms
supply relationship has become increasingly broader, at least from Moscow’s perspective.
Putin even said that he would not rule out a military alliance between the two countries, a
remark that Chinese officials did not endorse but did not reject either. Russia has also taken
a harsh and sometimes undiplomatic posture towards the Indo-Pacific, with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov characterising the Quad as an anti-China game that the US is pushing
India towards – much to India’s discomfiture. As the latest Quad summit demonstrates,
despite Moscow’s opposition, India clearly sees the grouping as a necessary response to
China. Moscow’s game may be designed to undermine the US’ role in the region or to ensure
that Washington and China continue to scuffle, for that is what serves Russia best. But it
does not serve India at all because it is China’s potential hegemony over Asia that New Delhi
should fear more, not American power. It is American weakness, either in capability or
willingness, that would hurt India.

The widening gulf between India and Russia does serve China, however, as does the rift
between Moscow and Washington. With an economy about half the size of India’s, Russia is
not much of a competitor to China. But Russia can still be a source
of high-technology weapons for China. China’s broader
technological base surpasses Russia’s but it still has the odd
weakness: it flies a fifth-generation fighter jet but it needs a
Russian engine, a dependance that Beijing is clearly unhappy
with. More importantly, Russia provides useful political support
for Beijing at a time when China has antagonised many other
powers.
Like all international partnerships, including India-Russia relations, the China-Russia
partnership is one of convenience. But the conditions that gave rise to it are unlikely to
change in the near future. Indian policy should acknowledge this and adjust accordingly.

Recent developments in India Russia Relationship

Visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla to Moscow:

The visit aimed at “setting an active and ambitious agenda for
bilateral relations”. Foreign Secretary’s visit was intended to
further deepen our cooperation in all sectors.

Shringla at the Diplomatic Academy also spoke on the India-

Russia cooperation in three strategic geographies – Eurasia,
Indo-Pacific and the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, while
highlighting the need to diversify and expand India-Russia
trade basket. He highlighted the steps taken to enhance trade
with the commencement of negotiations in August 2020 for the India-EAEU Free Trade
Agreement. The priority being attached to the International North-South Corridor was
underlined. He also indicated the need for the operationalisation of a “Green Corridor” and a
Bilateral Investment Protection Arrangement to encourage bilateral trade and investment,
respectively.

He discussed with Lavrov the ways to expand the Vladivostok-Chennai corridor-an

important dimension of the development of Russian Far East. PM Modi had announced a
credit line of 1 bn dollar in 2019. India is looking for investment in new areas such as coal,
timber, LNG, for which there is a huge potential in that region. India is also working on
trilateral India-Japan-Russia Cooperation in the Russian Far East. However, a lot has still to
be done to tap its economic potential by enhancing imports and exports through this route.
Shringla underlining the importance of the Indo-Pacific
region in the current environment stated that India would
like to work closely with Russia under ASEAN and East Asia
Summit, of which both are members. Clarifying the Indian
concept, he added that India perceives it as a free, open,
inclusive region, which embraces all in a common pursuit of
progress and prosperity. For India, the Indo-Pacific region is the vast maritime space
stretching from the western coast of North America to the eastern shores of Africa.

India’s Act Far East Policy

Launched by PM Modi in Vladivostok in 2019, where USD 1 billion Line of Credit was
announced for the development of the region and asserted that India will walk shoulder to
shoulder. Putin had declared the development of far East as national priority.