PEOPLE V.

MALNGAN
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO, appellant

DOCTRINE: There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide.

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor.

FACTS:
1. Brgy. Chairman Remigio’s group discovered that a fire gutted the house of Roberto Separa, Sr.
2. Gruta, a tanod, reported that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto
Separa, Sr., coming out of the house of the latter.
3. Mendoza, neighbor of Separa and whose house was also burned, identified accused-appellant EDNA. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, EDNA confessed to Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of
angry residents that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that
she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
4. When Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask EDNA at the
latter’s detention cell how she burned the house, EDNA told her: “Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay”.
5. When interviewed by a reporter of ABS-CBN, EDNA was heard by SPO4 Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even
narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SPO4 Talusan was able to hear the same confession, this time at his home,
while watching the television program “True Crime” hosted by Gus Abelgas.
6. The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Separa and other adjoining houses and the death of Separa, his wife and
their four (4) children.

ISSUES:
1. Did accused commit complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide? NO.
2. Which kind of arson is EDNA guilty of? SIMPLE ARSON.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. Crime is simply arson.
There are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom—Article 320 of RPC, as amended by RA
7659, and Section 5 of PD No. 1613.

Art. 320 with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide that if by
reason of or on the occasion of arson, death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. The crime of
homicide is absorbed. The laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'être is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.

(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed—
homicide/murder and arson.

The instant case falls under (a). From a reading of the body of the Information:

“That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause damage, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA x x x that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire [the victims] sustained burn injuries which were the direct
cause of their death immediately thereafter”

Edna is being charged with the crime of arson. It is clear from her intent was merely to destroy her employer’s house through
the use of fire.

2. SIMPLE ARSON. There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson under Art. 320 and 2) simple
arson, under PD 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the
value of the damage caused.
 Art. 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. On the other hand, PD 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size,
not included in Art. 320 and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings,
farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present.

As stated in the body of the Information, Edna was charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house
of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. As it was proved, at the trial,
she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson.

DISPOSITION: Edna guilty of simple arson.

NOTES:
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements
of the crime.

PEOPLE vs COMADRE
431 SCRA 366
Facts
At around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey
Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Jaime
Agbanlog .Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his
son. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre
and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio
suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of
a nearby school. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robber Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They
were all rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital
for wounds sustained which the grenade explosion inflicted. Robert’s companions sustained shrapnel injuries. The
appellants were arrested the following day but denied any participation in the incident, claimed they were
elsewhere when the incident occurred and that they had no animosity towards the victims whatsoever. After trial,
the court a quo convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder for having
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with
the use of an explosive.
Issue
Whether the use of explosives qualify the crime of murder.
Held
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims were
having a drinking spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and the
tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less
defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part.
Treachery therefore attended the commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the “use of an explosive” as
an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, we should determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this
case. When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a
qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the
principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of
treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
 Case No. 84 | G.R. No. 132568 | February 6, 2002 | Puno, J.
Art. 14 | Aggravating Circumstances

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MATT G. CAMPOMANES and EDWIN D. ROSITA

FACTS:

On December 30, 1994, in the City of Manila the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Loreto Alkonga y Benid by
then and there holding his arms and stabbing his body several times with a fan knife, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Accused pleaded not guilty to the charge during the arraignment. The facts, according to prosecution witness
Renante C. Aureada, are as follows:
On December 30, 1994, at around 10:30 p.m., Aureada, a security guard at the Rizal Park, was guarding the area
around the monument of Dr. Jose Rizal when he saw Matt Campomanes, a park photographer, running after Loreto
Alkonga, also a park photographer. Campomanes caught Alkonga and grabbed the latters collar, causing both of them
to lose their balance and fall on the ground, about three (3) meters away from Aureada. Aureada blew his whistle, but
the two, instead of stopping, began grappling for Alkongas camera and hitting each other using the same. Aureada
then saw Edwin Rosita, another park photographer, arrive. Rosita appeared very angry, and brought out a balisong or
fan knife, pointing the same in the direction of Alkonga. Aureada tried to fire a warning shot but his rifle
misfired. Seeing what Aureada was trying to do, Rosita instead went after the latter who started running
away. Aureada took his mobile radio and called the park security patrol. Then Aureada saw Rosita begin stabbing
Alkonga who was sitting on the ground with his arms raised and held by Capomanes. After Rosita stabbed the victim
several times, he, together with Campomanes, ran towards Manila Hotel. Shortly thereafter, they were apprehended
by the park security patrol.
Meanwhile, Aureada brought Alkonga to the Philippine General Hospital. Alkonga died in the hospital at 2:00
a.m. the following day due to multiple stab wounds.
The two accused were presented as witnesses to proffer their own version of what transpired, and to bolster
their theory of incomplete self-defense.
Matt Campomanes testified that on December 30, 1994, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in front of the Rizal
monument taking pictures of a customer when he heard someone asking for help. He turned around and saw Alkonga
holding a knife and running after Rosita. He tried to pacify the two, placing himself between them, but he was instead
hit on the head with a camera by Alkonga. He felt dizzy and lost consciousness. When he recovered, he was already
being apprehended by the park security guard.
Edwin Rosita testified that at about 10:30 p.m. on December 30, 1994, he was at the Rizal Park talking to four
female customers regarding taking their pictures when Alkonga came and asked that he be introduced to the
women. Rosita complied, but after the introduction, Alkonga insisted that he be the one to take the womens
pictures. Rosita and the women refused. The group then transferred to another spot, but before Rosita could take the
pictures, Alkonga followed and kicked him on the abdomen. Alkonga also hit Rosita on the face using a camera. They
engaged in a fistfight, and suddenly, Alkonga drew a balisong and stabbed Rosita on the left chest and on the
waist. Rosita tried to run away from Alkonga. Just then, Matt Campomanes came and tried to intervene, but Alkonga
hit him on the head. When Alkonga was about to stab Campomanes, Rosita grabbed Alkongas hand and they grappled
for the knife. Rosita was able to take the knife from Alkonga, and because of his confusion, Rosita stabbed Alkonga
several times.

The trial court convicted the two accused of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua.
 On November 11, 1999, this Court received a letter from Edwin Rosita manifesting his intention to withdraw the
appeal of his case.

ISSUES: Whether or not evident premeditation was attendant to qualify the crime

RULING: YES
The accused contends that conspiracy was not satisfactorily established by the prosecution, and that no
competent proof was adduced showing that he wanted to kill Alkonga, and further alleges that he could not have
moved nor stopped it (the stabbing of the victim by accused Rosita) even if he wanted to since the incident happened
in a split seconds (sic) so to speak. Accused-appellant claims he did not have the courage to prevent or stop the armed
attacker Rosita. He now proposes that since there was no concerted action between him and co-accused Rosita, there
should be no finding of conspiracy and each of them should be held liable for his own act.
The contention is devoid of merit. Conspiracy is present where the participants performed specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the crime.
Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime need not be shown. Neither is it necessary that all the participants
deliver the fatal blow, as the act of one is the act of all. The fact that accused-appellant was not the one who stabbed
the victim does not negate his participation in the conspiracy. Eyewitness Aureada saw accused holding the arms of
the victim while the latter was being stabbed by accused Rosita. Such positive act of the accused forms part of the
concerted action to achieve the common intention and design to kill the victim. The act of holding the victim to render
him immobile, or defenseless, thus enabling the other companions to consummate the dastardly act, constitutes an
active participation in a conspiracy.
Anent the second assignment of error, the accused contends that it is plain error on the part of the lower court to
appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation on the basis of the presence of conspiracy.
Evident premeditation may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance after the following requisites are
sufficiently established: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is true that where conspiracy is directly
established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the
crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. However, where no such evidence exists, and
where conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime, as in the case at bar,
the above requisites of evident premeditation need to be established. A careful perusal of the records of this case
shows that evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven, and thus, may not be appreciated.
We agree, however, with the Solicitor General that treachery is present. There are two conditions for the
existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, viz: (1) the employment of the means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the
means of execution.
Eyewitness Aureada testified that when the victim was stabbed by Rosita, said victim was in a sitting position
with arms raised and held by Campomanes.
It is clearly deducible that the victim was killed was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused to
ensure the execution of the act without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. In a
sitting position with arms restrained by one of the accused, the victim becomes a helpless and defenseless object of
the attack. It is immaterial that the victim initially grappled with Campomanes and was even able to hit the latter with
the camera. Crucial is the moment when Rosita came with a bladed weapon, and with the victim in a sitting position
with his arms raised and held by Campomanes, said victim was repeatedly stabbed by Rosita. Such manner of killing
had been declared by this Court in a plethora of cases to be attended by treachery.
The accused offers his theory of incomplete self-defense to at least lower the penalty imposable for the crime. The
presence of the first element, unlawful aggression, is a condition sine qua non to the presence of self-defense, complete
or incomplete. It is incumbent upon the accused to prove unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise, his theory of incomplete self-defense will not hold water.
 The contention of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim-- that the victim kicked Rosita on the right front
hip, hit him on the face, and stabbed him below his (Rositas) left nipple and on the waist --was not sufficiently proven
by the evidence on record. During his testimony, Rosita showed a 1 inch scar below his left nipple and on the
waist, but the medical certificate he presented shows that he sustained mere lacerations on the thumb, abrasions and
contusions. No evidence was adduced to prove when and how the scars were actually sustained. Worthy to note is the
contention of the Solicitor General that assuming there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the same
ceased the moment Campomanes held his arms. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the
one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Lastly, the number of wounds
on the body of the victim negates the claim of self-defense, complete or incomplete. In this case, the victim suffered
quite a large number of stab wounds, and Rosita himself admitted during the cross-examination that he stabbed the
victim about nineteen (19) times.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,

WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRANALVIR, Accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: right to be informed of their offenses, disguise, res gestae, treachery

FACTS:

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead
pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina,
died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and
separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of Sigma
Rho fraternity members.

RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered archived by the
court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the information against
them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
2. Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants
were sufficiently identified.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the information filed against
them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them holds no water. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should
not have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their
masks fell off.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such

It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect,
to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused
to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of
identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they
tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is
the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if
there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution. It was
held that the trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies in their statements were immaterial considering the
swiftness of the incident.

Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed
the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked.
This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had
their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.

When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed
the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become
merely corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident,
therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the
commission of the crime

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be
reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they
could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it
would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the
incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to
defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

Romeo Sison et al, petitioners vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, respondents
GR no. 10820-83 November 16, 1995
Puno, J.

On June 27, 1986, Marcos loyalists scheduled a rally at the Luneta but their application for a permit to hold the
rally was denied. They continued with the demonstration anyway. The police arrived and they could not produce a
permit so they were asked to disperse in 10 minutes but instead of leaving, they became violent (shouting “gulpihin
niyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators”). The police pushed them and used tear gas to disperse them. The group
fled to Maria Orosa street and the situation stabilized

a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. They then saw Annie Ferrer a
starlet and supporter of Marcos. Annie Ferrer learned of their dispersal, she continued jogging while shouting
“Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw” (hindi rhyming). The group
answered “Bugbugin!”. Annie was arrested later, which prompted someone to shout “kailangang gumanti tayo
ngayon!” the group then started attacking persons in yellow. Renato Banculo saw this and removed his yellow
shirt.
Banculo later saw the group pursuing a man in yellow who was later found out to be Stephen Salcedo. The group
caught up with Salcedo and boxed, and kicked and mauled him. He tried to free himself but they kept on hitting
him. Ranulfo Sumilang came to Salcedo's help but the group kept on hitting Salcedo, somebody handed Sumilang
a loyalist tag and he then presented this to the group. The group backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to
get Salcedo away from them. But the accused in this case, namely, Raul Billosos, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan,
Nilo Pacadar, Joselito Tamayo, Romeo Sison continued with the hitting. Sumilang also saw Gerry Neri but did not
see what he did to Salcedo.

Salcedo was able to get away from the group and sat on some cement steps, he tried to flee to Roxas boulevard but
Tan and Pacadar pursued him. Salcedo cried for help but no one answered. The mauling continued at the Rizal
monument until Salcedo eventually collapsed. Sumilang hailed a van and brought Salcedo to the Medical Center
Manila but was refused admission. He was then brought to PGH where he died upon arrival.

The mauling was witnessed by many and the press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page
news the following day. Cory instructed the Western Police district to investigate on it and Brigadier General
Alfredo Lim offered a P10,000 reward for persons who could give information which could help arrest the killers.
Sumilang and Banculo cooperated with the Police and several persons including the accused were investigated.

Informations for murder were filed and these cases were consolidated. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses
including Sumilang and Banculo. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution also presented documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the indicent and various photos.

For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling. Either they were not there (since
they were not in the Photographs) or that they were there and were in the photos because they were just watching
or trying to stop the maulers. Sison however said that he was not there and was in fact waiting for his photos to be
developed ( he was a commercial photographer) and was afflicted with hernia which impaired his mobility.

The RTC found Sison, Pacadar, Tan, de los Santos and Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder
qualified with treachery. Starlet Annie Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. The court acquitted the others.

On appeal, CA acquitted Starlet Annie Ferrer and increased the penalty of the rest of the accused except Tamayo.
The Ca found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength (penalty increased to RP). Hence auto
review before the SC (for those sentenced to RP)

Issue/s:
1. WON the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo. NO
2. WON the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the photographs of the mauling incident. NO

1. the defense was arguing that the 2 only testified because of the reward and that Banculo submitted 3 sworn
statements. They also pointed out that Banculo pointed at the wrong person when asked to identify Rolando
Fernandez. The court disagreed

there is no proof that they only testified because of the reward, since Sumilang went to the police station to issue a
statement just 2 hours after the incident. Banculo on the other hand executed 3 statements to identify more
suspects. This did not make his testimony incredible. Banuclo's mistake in identifying one of the accused does not
make his whole testimony a falsity. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In
the court's discretion the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved with respect to
others

2. aside from the photographs, the appellants also questioned the way the court gave evidentiary weight to the joint
affidavit of 2 patrolmen but the court held that the joint affidavit merely reiterated what the other witnesses
testified to and was a mere surplusage.
As for the photographs, the appellants were questioning such evidence for lack of proper identification by the
person or persons who took the same

the rule is that when Photos are presented in evidence, they must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. Value lies in it being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original. Admissibility determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at
the time of the crime.

The correctness of the photo can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by
other competent witnesses. After which it can be admitted subject to its impeachment as to its accuracy. Therefore
the photographer or another competent witness can testify as to the exactness and accuracy of the photograph.

Initially the defense objected to the admissibility of the photos bu then they used the same photos in proving that
some of the accused could not have participated since they were not in the photos. It was not until the third hearing
where the Atty for the appellants interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.
The SC ruled that the use of the photographs by the atty for the appellants is an admission of the exactness and
accuracy of such. That the photos were faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants de los santos, Pacadar and Tan identified themselves in the pictures and explained their presence in said
pictures.

3 of the accused could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim.
The hernia afflicted Sison appeared only once and he was shown merely running after the victim. Tamayo was not
identified in any of the photos but this does not exculpate him. He was still identified by Sumilang and Banculo

the appellants also questioned that the lower court erred in finding conspiracy among the principals and finding
them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength instead of death in tumultuous affray.
SC disagreed and said Art. 251 of the RPC (Death caused in a tumultuous affray) takes place when a quarrel
between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some are
killed or wounded and the author cannot be ascertained. But in this case, the “quarrel” was between a group and an
individual. The group took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by
salcedo to excape. This qualifies the killing to murder. Also the SC held there was no treachery, though the essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without slightest provocation but in this case, the victim had the
chance to sense the temper of the group and run away from them but he was overtaken by them.

There was however conspiracy, there was a concerted effort to bring down salcedo.

Justin Benedict A. Moreto

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs.ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @
DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015
PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y
Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and
for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the
Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:

Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different
parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.3

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.4

Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos
(P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-
Gapan National Road.5

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no.
WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV
(CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6

When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused
the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the
Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a
bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men
hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla
but lost track of the latter.7

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at
the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died
on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera
(Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the
several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's
shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who
alighted from the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested
and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired
bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.9

Version of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at his house in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop
and left it there.10

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to
repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother.
On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his
mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon).
After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he
went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from
him, which he rented from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the
Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he
was tortured.13

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony.14

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y
Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior
Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7)
Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.

Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground that it was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies
of credible witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the
allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and
P02 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles
and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the
assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount
of ₱222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty
Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred
Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand Pesos
(₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV.15

The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death
of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual
damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia
Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense,
he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi,
as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano
referred to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion;
2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4)
whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the
precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the
shooting incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. According to
the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial
differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince because it was not impossible for Adriano to be
physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in
less than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in
Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.18

Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of
Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the
attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as
generic aggravating circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed
and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—19ambush
exemplifies the nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on
the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself."21

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time of the attack.
Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national
highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes
to die of multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn
to the right and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped, precluding all
possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by
Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death
of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano
so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of
firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He
was at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing victim from repelling
the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular
means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was
killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the
acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed a person other than
their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the
commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of
his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera
citing People v. Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is
intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.26

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that
accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and
seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of
several acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from
a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in
People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified
both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal of the records would
reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death
certificate.31

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and unreliable because
they can easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly prove that he was somewhere else
at the time when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.33 In the
case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to
persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the crime scene,
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene
at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by credible witnesses but by the
accused's relatives and friends. Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's relatives and
1âwphi1

friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar,
as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish with a reasonable
degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable.34Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount
of actual damages as ₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount of award of actual
damages should be ₱232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of
actual damages from ₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to
pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos {₱232,482.00) as actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA
BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta
appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that,
Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as out-
patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing
incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on
February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz.
There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of
the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus
which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made
by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the
stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing – in
short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted nor
frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.

[G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE

and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE
and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE
and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 finding herein appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, respectively for the killing of U.S. Col.
James N. Rowe and for seriously wounding Joaquin Vinuya.
It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with
the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in
connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding
his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in
Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended Informations for
murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused. The amended
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 read:
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843 for Murder:

"That on or about the 21st day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence
upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a U.S. Army Officer, by then and there firing at
him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Col. James N. Rowe in
such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844 for Frustrated Murder:

"That on or about the 21st day of April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then and there firing at him while then on board a
Toyota car, hitting him on the scalp and body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of murder, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes independent of
their own will, that is the timely intervention of medical assistance, to the damage and
prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

Upon being arraigned on August 31, 1989, appellant Donato B. Continente, assisted by his counsel
of choice, pleaded "Not guilty" to each of the amended Informations in both criminal cases. On the
scheduled arraignment of appellant Juanito Itaas on October 31, 1989, appellant Itaas, upon the advice
of his counsel, refused to enter any plea. Hence, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not guilty" be
entered in each of the amended Informations in both criminal cases for the said appellant.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on April 21, 1989 at around 7:00
o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS for brevity),
National Capital District Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil Meneses,
Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and time of the ambush,
Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being driven by Joaquin
Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on
their way to the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an
old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding
his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer
car when it sped away from the site of the ambush. [2] The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered
on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary (PC), North Sector Command, led by
PC/Sgt. Fermin Garma, at No. 4 Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.[3]
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential intelligence
information the involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P.
Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver. Accordingly, on June 16, 1989,
the CIS investigation team proceeded to the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City to conduct a
surveillance on appellant Donato Continente. After accosting appellant Continente inside the said U.P.
campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City for questioning. [4] During the
interrogation which was conducted by CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico in the presence of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente admitted to his participation in the
ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political
Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA.[5] Among the documents confiscated from appellant Continente by
the CIS agents, and for which a receipt dated June 16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo
dela Cruz, was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear
the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political
Assassination Team, Regional Command".[6]
Another confidential intelligence information established the participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in
the said ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who was a
known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City was arrested in Davao City and was
brought to Manila by Capt. Gil Meneses for investigation. [7] CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico investigated
and took down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the investigation that he was an
active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence of
Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was one of
those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue on April 21, 1989.[8] The said appellant identified the Toyota Corolla car that
the assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. Rowe. [9]
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a
certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta reveals that at
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street
on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall
when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw
persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance of more or less one (1) meter at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the
street to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while
continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car. [10] She recognized appellant Juanito
Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person, directly behind the
driver of the maroon car, whose body was half exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use
of along firearm.[11] The shooting incident lasted for about five (5) seconds only after which the maroon
car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a
white Mitsubishi Lancer car.[12]
Prosecution eyewitness Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as
the same person whom she had encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of
April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of Tomas Morato Street which
was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of the car, who
was then reading a newspaper, when the latter remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy.She-boom!" as she was
walking along the street toward the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20, 1989, she saw the same person
inside the white Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked along the side of Tomas Morato Street
while she was again on her way to attend practicum in the JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the
identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who is allegedly a member of the NPA, from the
pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.[13]
Prosecution witness Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she had
encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside the JUSMAG Compound. Her first
encounter with appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April 17, 1989 when
she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia nearby. She mistook the said appellant for a
tricycle driver who was simply walking around the premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same
carinderia again on the following day, April 18, 1989, and she was even teased by her companions that
he was her escort. On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third time inside the
same carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the identity of appellant
Continente when Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for identification. She thought that he
was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the carinderia near the JUSMAG Compound. [14]
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and assigned to Col.
James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG, Quezon City. He drove along EDSA and turned left upon
reaching Timog Avenue in Quezon City. While he was making a right turn at the intersection of Timog
Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed four (4) people on board a red car, two (2) of whom
suddenly opened fire at the car that he was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident
happened very fast and that he had no opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite
the incident, Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound. Upon arrival at the JUSMAG
Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the car, was also hit
during the shooting incident.[15]
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City
for treatment. Subsequently, they were transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga. It was
only then that Vinuya learned of Col. James Rowe's death whose body was already wrapped in a
blanket. Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga for four (4) days for the injuries
he sustained on his head, shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand.Thereafter, he was taken
back to JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate.[16]
Prosecution witnesses Dr. Walter Divers and Dr. Jose Santiago testified on their respective medical
findings[17] on the victims. Dr. Divers confirmed in court the contents of his medical report dated April 21,
1989 which shows that Col. Rowe sustained a gunshot wound on the left side of his head and abrasions
on other parts of his body and that he was pronounced dead upon arrival at the V. Luna Hospital in
Quezon City.[18] On the other hand, Dr. Santiago identified the medical report dated April 25, 1989 that he
prepared relative to the treatment that he administered on Joaquin Vinuya. The report shows that Vinuya
sustained three (3) superficial injuries on the scalp, on the left shoulder, and on the back of the left hand
which could have been caused by bullets that came from a gun; and that the wounds could have caused
the death of Vinuya without the medical treatment that lasted for four (4) days. [19]
For the defense, appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his sworn
statements which are respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989, insofar as the same
establish his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant
Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August 27 and 28, 1989 in Davao City;
that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and that subsequently, he was hit
and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus, causing him to loss consciousness. [20]
Appellant Itaas further testified that he affixed his signatures on his sworn statements dated August
29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the CIS officers and that Atty. Filemon Corpus was not present
during those two occasions. The said appellant admitted having sworn to the truth of the contents of his
said sworn statements before the administering fiscal, but he disclosed that the CIS officers previously
threatened him to admit the contents of the two sworn statements. [21]
Appellant Donato Continente testified that he was working as messenger with the U.P. Collegian, an
official monthly publication of the University of the Philippines. He was walking on his way home inside
the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City from his workplace in Vinzon's Hall in the late afternoon of
June 16, 1989 when four (4) persons blocked his way and simultaneously held his body and covered his
mouth. He asked if they had any warrant of arrest but the persons simply boarded him inside a waiting
car where he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Thereafter, they took his wallet that contained his NBI
clearance, SSS, tax account number (TAN), identification card, two (2) pictures, and a typewritten
certification from "SINAG" where he used to work.[22]
Appellant Continente learned that he was taken to Camp Crame in Quezon City only in the following
morning when his blindfold was removed so that he could give his statement in connection with the
killing of Col. James Rowe before a CIS Investigator whom he later identified during the trial as Virgilio
Pablico. Appellant Continente affirmed the truth of his personal circumstances only which appear on his
sworn statement dated June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of the statements embodied
therein. The said appellant claimed that he initially denied any knowledge in the killing of Col. James
Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he (Continente) knew something about it; that
appellant Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the investigation; that he signed his
sworn statement in the presence of Pablico and swore to the truth thereof before the administering fiscal
for fear that something might happen to him while he was alone; that he signed the last page of his
sworn statement first before signing the waiver of his constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala whose legal services was engaged by the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity
to talk with Atty. Manansala who left after he (Atty. Manansala) signed, merely as witness, the first page
of his sworn statement, which is the waiver of his constitutional rights.[23]
On rebuttal, prosecution witness Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz testified that he prepared and issued the
receipt for the documents which he confiscated from appellant Continente on June 16, 1989; and that it
is the standard operating procedure in the CIS to put a blindfold on an arrested suspected NPA member
in order to withhold from him the view and location of the entrance, the exit and the terrain in the
camp.[24]
The testimony of CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico on rebuttal reveals that during the investigation of
appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas, their respective lawyers namely, Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala and Atty. Filemon Corpuz, were present; that appellants Continente and Itaas conferred with
their lawyers before they gave their statements to the CIS investigator; that the CIS investigator typed
only the statements that the appellants had given him in response to his questions during the
investigation; that both appellants were accompanied by their respective lawyers when they were
brought to the fiscal for inquest; and that said appellants were never tortured nor threatened during the
investigations of these cases.[25]
The trial court rendered its decision[26] in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 to 44 on February 28, 1991
finding both appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder. It ruled, thus:

"In assessing the evidence against co-accused Continente, it is undeniable that the yardstick
of his culpability hangs in the validity of the extra-judicial confession he had executed. A
close scrutiny of the document would reveal that the confession is free from any taint of
illegality and thus serves as a basis for his conviction.

The presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed has not been
satisfactorily controverted by the accused.

Circumstances show that Continente's waiver was done with the assistance of a counsel of
his choice. The records indicate that Atty. Bonifacio Manansala was accused's counsel
during his custodial investigation and his arraignment and that his counsel during the trial
was a relative of the aforementioned lawyer. These factors are undeniable evidence of trust
reposed upon Atty. Bonifacio Manansala by the accused.

Continente also admitted on cross-examination that he had read his statement which
included the PAGPAPATUNAY containing his waiver of constitutional rights (TSN 29 August
1990 p. 29). Accused was raised in Metro Manila and spoke Tagalog, thus would not have
any difficulty in comprehending the questions addressed to him and the information relayed
to him with respect to his rights. The court can not equate that whenever a suspect is taken
into custody and is fearful of his safety, the police authorities had exercised pressure or had
threatened if not subjected them to physical abuse. Moreover, the fact that the accused
admitted that his answers were typed as he spoke them (TSN August 30 1990 p.4) leaves
no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer.

xxx xxx xxx.

The prosecution evidence gathered against accused Itaas cradles on two incriminating
points. The Zulueta testimony and his extra judicial confession working independently, one
without the other, have the force capable of convicting the accused.The interplay of these
two valuable evidence solidifies a ruling of guilt against accused Itaas.

The defense raised by the accused is not sufficient to overrule this Court's determination of
guilt against Itaas.

The testimony of Zulueta has been candid and straightforward, devoid of any material
contradiction. No motive has been imputed to assail the credibility of her testimony. xxx

xxx xxx xxx.

With respect to the extra-judicial confession executed by accused Itaas, the Court finds that
such was made pursuant to the Constitution. Although it may be argued that accused
resides in Davao, the fact that he could understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his
testimony and proven by the proceedings in court where he was answering questions
addressed to him in Tagalog militates against his inability to comprehend his right and its
subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused contests the independence and competence of
Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground that said lawyer was a military lawyer. Although the
military background of Atty. Corpuz is admitted, this does not automatically disqualify him to
act as lawyer for the accused.Proof of the fact that he failed to render his duty to safeguard
the rights of the accused must be shown before this court nullifies the weight of Itaas' extra-
judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly rings hollow. No medical certificate had
been shown by the accused that he had indeed suffered brutal treatment from his jailers
specially since he had alleged to have been treated by a doctor for his injuries."

Thereafter, the trial court meted out the following penalties on the appellants:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DONATO
CONTINENTE y BUENVENIDA and JUANITO ITAAS y TURA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER, and each is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the killing of Col.
James Rowe, to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs; and an imprisonment from Ten (10) Years and
One (1) Day of PRISION MAYOR as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM for the crime committed against
Joaquin Vinuya, and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED."

From the foregoing judgment of the trial court, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas
separately instituted the instant appeal.
 On March 15, 1993, appellant Donato Continente filed his Appellant's Brief [27] while appellant Juanito
Itaas filed his Appellant's Brief [28] on March 5, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee's Brief[29] for the People on October 4, 1993. Appellant Itaas filed a Reply Brief [30] on December
3, 1993.
Appellant Continente raised the following assignments of error by the trial court:
I

THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING PROBATIVE

VALUE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONTINENTE.
II

THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE BY THE
PROSECUTION'S LONE WITNESS.
III

THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

CONTINENTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

On the other hand, appellant Itaas interposed the following assignments of error:
I

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND

APPRECIATING THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF MERIAM ZULUETA.
II

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND

APPRECIATING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ITAAS.
III

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING

TESTIMONIAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT POSING BESIDE THE AMBUSHER'S AND THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED
CARS.
IV

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE

PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
V
 THE EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY BY THE AUTHORITIES DEPICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ITAAS AS "THE ROWE KILLER", A "COMMUNIST" AND A MEMBER OF
THE CPP/NPA/NDF/ABB INFLUENCED MERIAM ZULUETA'S IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The principal issues are:

1. Whether or not the waivers of the constitutional rights during custodial investigation by the appellants
were valid; and
2. Whether or not the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta was credible.
The rights of the accused during custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."

The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was initially
accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel. If the waiver complies with the constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will
be tested for voluntariness,[31] i. e., if it was given freely-without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or
false promises; and credibility,[32] i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
In assailing the validity of their written statements, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas
contend that they were not properly informed of their custodial rights under the constitution as to enable
them to make a valid waiver. The pertinent portion of appellant Donato Continente's written statement
dated June 17, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:

PALIWANAG: G. Donato Continente, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa

pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Army Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG.

Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan
alinsunod sa ating umiiral na Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:

Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay
magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sasabihin mo sa salaysay
mong ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman
dito sa Pilipinas.

Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng abogado ayon sa iyong sariling pili habang ikaw
ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang kakayanang umupa ng abogado, ikaw ay
bibigyan namin ng isang abogado ng gobyerno bilang tumayo na iyong tagapayo at ng
sa gayon ay maprotektahan ang iyong mga karapatan.

Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.

 TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo. Nauunawaan ko po.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang siya mong maging tagapayo?
SAGOT: Wala po pero nakapagdesisyon na po ako na ako ay magbibigay ng salaysay kahit na wala akong
nakaharap na abogado.
TANONG: G. Continente, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan, ayon narin sa batas, ay kinakailangang gawin sa
harap ng isang abogado. Payag ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa harap ng isang abogado ng
gobyerno?
SAGOT: Pumapayag po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong
mga karapatan, at nauunawaan mo ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[33]
On the other hand, the pertinent portion of appellant Itaas' written statement dated August 29, 1989
is quoted, to wit:
01. PALIWANAG: G. Juanito Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkakaambush at pagpatay
kay Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG at pagkasugat ng kanyang driver. Bago kita simulang tanungin ay
nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas. Ito
ay mga sumusunod. Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw
ay magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay
maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikalawa,
karapatan mong magkaroon ng pili at sarili mong abogado habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay
walang pambayad ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan ng gobyerno ng abogado na wala kang aalalahaning
anumang kabayaran. Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang ikaw ay patnubayan?
SAGOT: Wala po pero ako ay nakahandang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap na
abogado.
TANONG: G. Itaas, ayon din sa batas, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan ay kailangan ding pagtibayin sa
harap ng isang abogado, nakahanda ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa harap ng isang
abogado na bigay sa iyo ng gobyerno?
SAGOT: Opo. Nakahanda po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong
mga karapatan at nauunawaan mo naman ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[34]
Also, the pertinent portion of his (Itaas) supplemental written statement dated August 30, 1989 is
quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman pa rin sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay
U.S. Colonel James Rowe. Tulad sa nauna mong pagbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na muli ang
iyong mga karapatang manahimik, magkaroon ng pili at sariling abogado at karapatang
mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito. Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka pa rin bang magbigay ng salaysay at ipapatuloy ang pagbibigay mo ng salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo.
 TANONG: Nakahanda ka bang lumagdang muli ng isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng
iyong mga karapatan at handa ka ring isuko ang mga karapatan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.[35]
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or Paliwanag found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not
meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince a clear
and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights. [36] We emphasized that
when the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his rights to remain silent
and to have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. [37] In other words, the right of a person under
investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right.[38]
In the case of People vs. Jara,[39] we declared that:

"This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators
either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to
sign it or even copy it in their own handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a
right is missing."

It must be noted however, that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an
accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an explanation as to
the nature of the investigation that is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants in the
ambush on April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding
his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that the appellants may choose not to give any
statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the appellants may be
used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they contain an advice that the appellants may
engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the services of a lawyer, they
will be provided with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS
Investigator Virgilio Pablico their intentions to give their statements even in the absence of counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico requested for the legal services of
Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for
appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with
Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half an hour before the investigation started. [40] Nevertheless,
the appellant (Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even in the absence of
counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signed[41] the "Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of
his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the same as counsel of the
appellant.
With respect to appellant Itaas, Atty. Felimon Corpuz testified that his legal services were requested
on two (2) occasions to act as counsel for appellant Itaas after the latter purportedly manifested his
intention to waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the investigation. Atty. Corpuz stated
that he conferred with the appellant before the investigations and explained to him his rights under the
constitution and the consequences of waiving said rights. After the explanation, appellant Itaas decided
to sign the "Pagpapatunay", which are entirely written in Tagalog, a dialect which he understands, in his
written confessions respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989 stating that his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were explained to him; that he fully understood the
same; and that he was willing to give a written confession even without the assistance of counsel. [42]
Appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas likewise impugn their respective written
statements. They allege that the statements appearing therein were supplied by the CIS
investigator. CIS Investigator Pablico however, categorically denied on rebuttal the allegations of the
appellants. Pablico disclosed that during his investigations of the appellants on separate occasions he
simultaneously typewrote his questions to the appellants including their answers thereto which are done
entirely in Tagalog, thus leaving no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer. After the investigation, he
allowed the appellants to read their respective confessions, [43] a fact that was admitted by appellant
Continente.[44] Thereafter, the appellants voluntarily affixed their signatures on every page of their written
confessions.
On July 18, 1989 appellant Continente appeared before City Prosecutor Galicano of Quezon City
and affirmed under oath the truth of his statements by affixing his signature on the left hand portion of
every page of his written confession.[45]Likewise, appellant Itaas, accompanied by Atty. Corpuz, affirmed
under oath the truth of his statements in his written confessions by affixing his signature on every page
thereof before the administering officer.[46]
In a desperate attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of his confessions, appellant Continente
claims that he was under pressure to read entirely his written confession before he affixed his signature
thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of the appellant is belied by his own admission that he was treated
fairly during the investigation, thus:
Court: Proceed.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, since the time you were arrested on June 16, 1989 until this time, you said you were
staying in Camp Crame, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And from the time you were arrested up to this time, you were never harmed by anybody in Camp Crame,
that is also correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: In fact, from the time you were arrested when that blindfold was removed, you were treated fairly, am I
correct?
A: Yes, sir.[47]
There is also no basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that he was tortured into giving a
confession and was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the same before the
administering officer. This Court held that where theappellants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the
oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.[48]
It has been established by the evidence that Atty. Filemon Corpuz was present during both
occasions that appellant Itaas was being investigated by Investigator Virgilio Pablico in Camp Crame
and even accompanied the said appellant before the administering officer. Appellant Itaas did not
present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim despite the fact that a doctor was summoned for
his check up immediately upon his arrival in Manila after he was previously arrested in Davao City. [49] He
did not complain to the administering officer about the threats and torture he allegedly suffered in the
hands of the CIS agents. Neither did he file any criminal nor administrative complaint against said
agents for maltreatment. The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges
against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. [50] To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his
solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever. [51]
The Court also notes that the respective written confessions of appellants are replete with details
which could be supplied only by someone in the know so to speak. [52] They reflect spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have
been applied.[53]
In particular, appellant Juanito Itaas admitted in his written confession [54] dated August 29, 1989 that
he was an active member of the New People's Army (NPA) and performed different functions mainly in
the province of Davao; that he was one of the two other members of the NPA who were sent to Manila
sometime in March 1989; that appellant stayed in Merville, Paranaque before moving to an apartment in
Santolan, Pasig together with certain Vicky and her husband Ronnie, Onie, Bosyo and Bernie; that one
day before the ambush on Col. Rowe he (Itaas) was told by Ronnie to take part in a major operation by
the NPA; that he (Itaas) was not informed by Ronnie about the identity of their supposed target; that on
the following day, Ronnie and the appellant boarded a dark brown Toyota car together with certain
Edgar and James; that he (Itaas) was seated directly behind the driver beside Edgar and James while
Ronnie sat beside the driver; that they were armed with M-16 rifles while Ronnie was armed with an
ultimax; that after several minutes their car reached a junction (circle) and was running alongside a dark
gray car; that he fired automatic shots toward the dark gray car only after his companions started firing
at the said car; and that after the ambush they drove back to their apartment in Santolan, Pasig while
they were being followed by a back up car allegedly being occupied by certain Liway, Fred and
Eddie. Appellant Itaas also identified in his written confession[55] dated August 30, 1989 the gray
Mitsubishi car that they ambushed on April 21, 1989 and the car that they used on the same date of
ambush.
On the other hand, the written statement[56] dated June 17, 1989 of appellant Donato Continente
reveals that he had been a member of several revolutionary groups before becoming a full fledged
member of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the Political Assassination Team (PAT)
headed by a certain Kit; that the objective of their team was primarily to conduct surveillance on
foreigners and diplomats; that he did not know Col. James Rowe prior to the shooting incident on April
21, 1989; that his participation in the ambush was merely for having conducted a surveillance of the
vicinity of the JUSMAG in Tomas Morato Avenue in Quezon City; that he gathered certain data,
specifically: the number of people and volume of vehicles around the area, the measurement of the
streets, as well as the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Avenue; that his
surveillance activity was continued by certain Freddie Abella and Taddy who are also members of the
PAT; and that he came to know the identity of the victim of the ambush on April 21, 1989, through
Freddie Abella who informed him two days after the incident.
Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
assistance during their respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that
both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been
ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really
has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.[57]
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to give their
statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to abide by
the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.[58] Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the
ascertainment of truth.[59] What is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to counsel is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to provide him with the best
defense.[60]
We agree with the trial court's observation that the retention by appellant Continente of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala as his counsel until the early stages of his case in the lower court and his
subsequent decision to engage the legal services of Atty. Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino
Manansala, who represented the said appellant throughout the proceedings in the absence of the former
bespeaks of the trust he had for the said lawyer. On the other hand, while it is admitted that Atty.
Felimon Corpuz served in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and Separation Board of the armed
forces, such fact is not sufficient to adjudge the said lawyer as biased against the appellant (Itaas) in the
absence of any concrete evidence to that effect.The defense also failed to adduce substantial evidence
to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was short of being a vigilant and effective counsel for the said
appellant.
Moreover, the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta confirms to a large extent the
statements made by the appellants in their written confessions. Zulueta positively identified appellant
Juanito Itaas as among the persons on board a car, directly behind the driver, whose body was half
exposed, while firing at the car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City. She also testified that she had seen appellant Donato Continente on at least
three (3) occasions at the carinderia outside the JUSMAG compound. She mistook appellant Continente
for a tricycle driver on April 17, 1989 while the latter was simply walking around the premises. The
second and third encounters with the appellant (Continente) took place on April 18 and 19, 1989 while
the said appellant was standing inside the same carinderia.
The defense assails the propriety of the pre-trial identification by Meriam Zulueta of appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas as pointedly suggestive. However, there is no sufficient evidence
on record to show that the appellants were previously indicated by the CIS investigators to Zulueta that
they were the perpetrators of the crime.[61] Besides, a police line-up is not essential to a proper
identification of the appellants.[62]
The defense for appellant Itaas further argues that the so-called "positive identification" of appellant
Itaas by Meriam Zulueta cannot be considered reliable inasmuch as the same was based on a fleeting
glimpse of a stranger. To support its argument, the defense cited cases[63] where the Court rejected the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses for not being credible, such as: where the identification of a
stranger is based upon a single brief observation made during a startling occurrence; where the
testimony of the witness defies human nature and reason; where there are serious inconsistencies and
glaring omissions in the testimony of the eyewitness; and where the witness only identified the suspect
after he was arrested and the witness was informed by the police that the suspect was one of the killers.
It should be pointed out that the above rulings of the Court are based on the circumstances peculiar
to each of the abovecited cases that do not exactly obtain in the cases at bench. It is accepted legal
precept that persons react differently to a given situation. [64] In the same way, certain witnesses to an
unfolding crime may run or scamper to safety while others would remain transfixed and strive to identify
the perpetrators thereof. As found by the trial court, Zulueta testified in an honest and straightforward
manner that she was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in
Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon
looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at
a gray car. Zulueta returned to the sidewalk to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and
covered her head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray
car. In acting the way she did, Meriam Zulueta was merely reacting naturally to the crime that was
unfolding before her. And while the shooting incident lasted for only about five (5) seconds, that was all
that Zulueta needed under the situation to recognize appellant Itaas whose body was incidentally half
exposed.
The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious and material contradictions that
can detract from her credibility. The trial court accorded full faith and credence to her said
testimony. The defense failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may have
impelled the same witness to falsely testify against the appellants. It is well-settled rule that the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest
respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and
determine if they are telling the truth or not.[65]
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse."
The trial court erroneously found that the appellants allegedly conspired in the commission of the
crimes charged in the instant criminal cases. While it is clear that the appellants did not even know each
other, the lower court opined that the Alex Boncayao Brigade is such a large organization that there is
great likelihood that the participants of the various stages of the crime are unknown to each other. To
justify its position, it cited the ruling in the case of People vs. Geronimo[66], thus:

When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and
the other performing another part as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same
object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal associations, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments, the Court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were
engaged in a conspiracy.

We disagree. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three (3) requisites: (1) that two or more
persons come to an agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3)
that the execution of the felony was decided upon.[67] While conspiracy must be proven just like any
criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt, [68] the same need not be
proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime.[69]
The case against appellant Donato Continente is primarily anchored on the written statement [70] that
he gave during the investigation of these cases. The pertinent portions of his written statements are
quoted hereunder, to wit:
T: Ikaw ba'y naging full fledged member ng Partido?
 S: Nito pong Oktubre 1988.
T: Sino naman ang iyong kinikilalang puno sa inyong Partido?
S: Ganito po iyon. Mayroon kaming sariling grupo na kung tawagin ay PAT. Ang ibig sabihin nito ay
POLITICAL ASSASSINATION TEAM. Ang aming puno ay tinatawag naming PO o Political Officer. Ang
susunod sa kanya ay ang TL o Team Leader; tapos po ay ang Vice Team Leader; at mga miembro na
nagsasagawa ng activities tulad ng gawaing edukasyon, surveillance at intelligence.
xxx
T: Ano ang mga alam mong objectives ng inyong team?
S: , Ang mga objectives po namin ay magsagawa ng surveillance sa mga foreigner o diplomat. Kinukuha
namin ang plate number ng kanilang mga sasakyan, make, model at kulay nito at ito ay aming tinitipon.
xxx
T: Nakikilala mo ba itong si Col. James Rowe ng U.S. Army na nagtrabaho sa JUSMAG?
S: Nakilala ko po lamang siya ng mapabalitang patay siya sa ambush sa may malapit sa JUSMAG noong
buwan ng Abril 1989.
xxx
T: Ano ang iyong naging partisipasyon sa pagkakapatay nitong si Col. Rowe?
S: Surveillance po lamang ang aking naging papel dito.
T: Paano mo naman isinagawa itong pag-surveillance kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Nagpunta po ako sa area ng JUSMAG doon sa Tomas Morato Avenue, Q. C. at nagmanman doon tungkol
sa dami ng tao at sasakyang dumadaan tuwing tanghali. Inalaman ko din ang lawak ng kalsada at layo ng
Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG. Sa report ko ay sinabi ko na mga anim (6) na hakbang ang luwag ng
Tomas Morato Avenue, madalang ang daan ng tao at sasakyan at ang layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng
JUSMAG ay may tatlong poste o apat na poste lamang.
T: Ang pagrereport mo bang ito ay ginawa mo ng verbal lamang?
S: Verbal lamang po.
T: Kanino ka naman nagreport?
S: Kay Ka Freddie Abella po.
xxx
T: Bakit mo natiyak na ang ABB ang nagsagawa ng pag-ambush kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Dalawang (2) araw po matapos ang pag-ambush kay Col. Rowe ay nagkita kaming dalawa ni Freddie sa
aming bahay. Sa pagkikita naming iyon ay ikinuwento niya sa akin ang mga pangyayari. xxx
It should be emphasized that conspirators are the authors of the crime, being the ones who decide
that a crime should be committed. Strictly speaking, a person may not be considered a conspirator by
his mere subsequent assent or cooperation in the commission of a crime absent a clear showing, either
directly or by circumstantial evidence, that he participated in the decision to commit the same; [71] in which
case, his culpability will be judged based on the extent of his participation in the commission of the
crime.
In the case at bench, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal
cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the following requisites must
concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[72]
 The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that appellant
Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his
driver on that fateful morning of April 21, 1989.The evidence adduced disclose that the participation of
appellant Continente was made only after the plan or decision to ambush Col. Rowe was already
a fait accompli. Continente was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound in Tomas
Morato Street, Quezon City, before the shooting incident to gather certain data, specifically the number
of people and volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of the streets, and the distance of the
JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently, Continente reported his findings to
Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken over the activity. Significantly, appellant
Continente was not even present at the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.
The error of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant Continente's participation in the crimes
charged lies in its apparent confusion regarding the distinction between a conspirator and an
accomplice. In view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente, the distinction between the two
concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People vs. de Vera, et al. [73] needs to be reiterated,
thus:

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.

With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court correctly found that the evidence
against him which consist of his written confession and the straightforward and credible testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if taken independently, are sufficient to convict
him. Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in his written confession that he and his companions fired at
the gray Mitsubishi car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in
Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam Zulueta positively identified appellant Itaas as one
of the persons she saw on board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and place where Col.
Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. [74] The evidence clearly shows
that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the
crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their
victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the
car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas
Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired
at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James
Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the
said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand
from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a felony is frustrated when
the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in
his testimony, is not sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that the
wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial wounds. [75] The records
disclose that Joaquin Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG
Compound which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush. [76] It also appears that Vinuya was
treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga after which he
was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. Hence, the crime committed
as against him is only attempted murder.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of murder and
attempted murder for his direct participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe and in the wounding of his
driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua for the murder of Col.
James Rowe and the medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of Joaquin
Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter case, the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, that
is, prision correccional.
On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder, the penalty
to be imposed on appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion
temporal and prision correccional, respectively.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in both cases,
the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Continente as an accomplice to the crime of
murder is the medium period of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor, while the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant as an accomplice to the crime of attempted
murder is the medium period of prision correccional and the minimum shall be arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice,
respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally
the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal and as accomplice,
respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as
maximum. Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.