74. PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO G.R. No. 119220.

September 20, 1996

FACTS:

SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an
investigation regarding reports on the presence of armed men roaming around barangays of Caibiran.

Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the group of Solayao because the
accused-appellant himself is drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more
suspicious is when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the group fled leaving behind Solayao, herein
accused-appellant.

According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong” (49-inch firearm) wrapped in dried
coconut leaves. He thought that it’s only a torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him and that he is
not aware that there’s a concealed weapon inside. He further claimed that this was the third torch
handed to him after the others had been used up.

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of Biliran, with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition defined and penalized under PD No. 1866.

The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the
firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible
accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon
reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano,
Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an
unlawful warrantless search.

HELD:

NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to the Posadas case where
the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a
probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified
himself as a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that
there were armed men roaming around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that
the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when
his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no license to carry
the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant
admitted to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber
would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm.
75. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Vevina Buemio

Rule 130 S27 – Offer of Compromise not admissible

FACTS:

1. Herein accused Buemio was charged with several information on illegal recruitment and estafa.

a.She is charged with illegal recruitment by several people. Her modus is that she would tell the
victims that she can help them place jobs in Japan, earning 10,000 yen per day. She would
collect 60k as placement fee, and when the time comes, they would get a ticket to Korea
instead, Buemio claiming that it’s “easier” to get into Japan if they are in Korea.

b.However, this would turn out to be a hoax as the victims would never go to Japan and would
be forced to use their return tickets. Buemio would also fail to return the money they paid even
though she promised to do so.

2. Hence, her victims filed a complaint with the NBI, who later found probable cause.

3. RTC found her GUILTY. SC AFFIRMED.

4. Based on the facts, some of those complainants were never mentioned in the award of
damages.

5. SC found that the reason why RTC did not mention the other complainants was due to an
affidavit of desistance they filed.

ISSUE: W/N the complainant’s affidavits of desistance would be enough to exonerate the accused of the
crime charged

HELD: NO.

Generally, the court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when it is
executed as an afterthought. Some of the complainants may have had a change of heart as the offense
on their person is concerned, but this will not affect the public prosecution of the offense itself.

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law
belongs to the sovereign power instantly charged by the common will of the members of society to look
after, guard and defend the interest of the community

The cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes
should not be overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State.
84. People vs. Puesca

Facts:

5 people were charged with robbery in band with homicide. Sgt. Baño in an extrajudicial confession
made to him by Puesca admitting his participation in the commission of the offense and mentioned the
names of the other persons involved. The prosecution asked Sgt. Baño to mention the names and the
counsel for Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected on the ground of hearsay.

The judge allowed the witness to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who
had raised the objection.

Issue:

W/N the hearsay rule is applicable in this case.

Ruling:

No. In the case at bar where the purpose of the prosecuting officer is only to establish the fact that the
accused had mentioned to the witness the names of those who conspired with.
89. People vs. Luvendino [GR 69971, 3 July 1992]

Facts:

On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village, Tambak,
Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore
commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic
day, she would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving
home from work

at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children that Rowena was
not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home
carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a street in the village. Panfilo
Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied
with the latter's promise to send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the
Taguig Police Station to report his daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him that a search
party would be mounted presently. Panfilo returned home and, with the help of some neighbors,
launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva
Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from

the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her
knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody
fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where
on arrival she was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple injuries indicated the
victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa showed that the
victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia by manual
strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C.
Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape
with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the accused but only Ernesto Luvendino was
actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It appears that Luvendino re-enacted the
events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene, where pictures were taken by a
photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly
remarked: "Inaamin ko po na kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment,
Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty. Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial.
On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to
death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amountof P50,000.00 for
the damages suffered as a result of her death.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the trial court erred in:

a.Not holding that his demonstration or re-enactment of the crime as well as his subsequent written
admission of guilt as inadmissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel.
b.According credence to the identification and other statements made by the prosecution witness
Bayani Cemitara

c.Allowing Luvendino’s counsel before the trial court to continue as such not withstanding such
counsel’s express mental reservations

Held:

a.The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during
the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re enactment was apparently staged promptly upon
apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision
of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was
investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino.
The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to
the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel
and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these
circumstances, the Court must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-
enactment.

b. Next is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. He claimed that it was extracted because of the
beating of the policemen and that a chain had been wrapped around his neck. The court disbelieved
such claim since he was not examined for his claim of maltreatment, he did not institute any criminal
action against his alleged intimidators, it could not have been missed by his lawyer and his mother. The
court ruled that were the confessant failed to present any evidence of compulsion or duress or violence
on his person for purposes of confession, the extrajudicial confession may be admitted. Also, he
claimed he was not inform of his constitutional rights before extraction was given by him or extracted
from him. First, he was informed by Police Sgt. Galang before he commenced investigation. Second, the
written extrajudicial confession itself stated Ludevino was informed of his constitutional rights and that
he was waiving those rights. Third, he first signed his extrajudicial statement at the police department
and that later, when he was brought to the office of the Provincial Fiscal Mateo, where he subscribed to
or signed once more the same document, this time under oath, in the presence of his mother and Atty.
Eustacio Flores.

The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was
initially a judge-made one and was first announced on April 26, 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and it was
reiterated in People v. Galit. The Morales-Galit doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for
the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not
reach waivers prior to April 26, 1983, the date of promulgation of Morales.
c. Second error was that the trial court had erred in believing the testimony of prosection Cemitara. It is
well-settled rule that the assessments by a trial court of the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses
who testified before it are to be accorded great respect by appellate courts. Appellant presented no
evidence to show any personal grudge on the part of Cemitara against Luvendino, nor any evidence of
any ill motive weighty enough to have moved Cemitara falsely testify for the prosecution.

d. Third principal assignment of error, that he had been deprived of due process because he was
represented or continued to be represented, by a lawyer who had manifested mental reservations.
Atty. Sardillo himself did not insist on withdrawing as defense counsel. If appellant Ludevino in trut had
entertained substantial doubts as to the sincerity or capability or impartiality of his lawyer, he could
have easily terminated the services of that counsel and retained a new one or sought from the trial
court the appointment of counsel de officio. Instead, appellant continued to retain the services of Atty.
Sardillo until the trial court rendered its decision and that Atty. Sardillo continued to represent apThe SC
ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to the Posadas case where the
suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a
probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified
himself as a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that
there were armed men roaming around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that
the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when
his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no license to carry
the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant
admitted to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber
would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm.