REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9999 organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary
AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress
Assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act
of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the
dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every individual,
particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel.
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate social services
and improve the quality of life for all.
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure that
every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon
determination it appears that the party cannot afford the services of a counsel, and
that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of
the party.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services
to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include,
among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and
contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices,
bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be
defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and
services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a
certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal
services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and
that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private
counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer
and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or
certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited
association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act
and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court,
shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that
could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten
percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal
profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein
contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid
services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by
the Supreme Court.
Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ,
in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby mandated to
conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures
and guidelines in availing tax deductions and inform the general public that a free
legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being provided by the State.1
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10389
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF
GRANTING THE RELEASE OF AN INDIGENT PERSON IN CUSTODY AS
AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Recognizance Act of 2012″.
Section 2. Statement of Policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to promote
social justice in all phases of national development, including the promotion of
restorative justice as a means to address the problems confronting the criminal
justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged resolution of cases, lack of legal
representation, lack of judges, inability to post bail bond, congestion in jails, and lack
of opportunity to reform and rehabilitate offenders. In consonance with the principle
of presumption of innocence, the 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes and
guarantees the right to bail or to be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. In furtherance of this policy, the right of persons, except those charged with
crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, to be released
on recognizance before conviction by the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of
whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it, upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Recognizance Defined. – Recognizance is a mode of securing the release
of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable
to post bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been
filed shall allow the release of the accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the
custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the
accused resides.
Section 4. Duty of the Courts. – For purposes of stability and uniformity, the courts
shall use their discretion, in determining whether an accused should be deemed an
indigent even if the salary and property requirements are not met. The courts may
also consider the capacity of the accused to support not just himself/herself but also
his/her family or other people who are dependent on him/her for support and
subsistence.
Other relevant factors and conditions demonstrating the financial incapacity of the
accused at the time that he/she is facing charges in court may also be considered by
the courts for the purpose of covering as many individuals belonging to the
marginalized and poor sectors of society.
Section 5. Release on Recognizance as a Matter of Right Guaranteed by the
Constitution. – The release on recognizance of any person in custody or detention for
the commission of an offense is a matter of right when the offense is not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment: Provided, That the accused or
any person on behalf of the accused files the application for such:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a
person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the
principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance, shall be
released on the person’s recognizance.
Section 6. Requirements. – The competent court where a criminal case has been filed
against a person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release of the
detained person on recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all of the
following requirements are complied with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or
incapacity either to post a cash bail or proffer any personal or real property
acceptable as sufficient sureties for a bail bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development
office of the municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the
accused is indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the
accused resides of the application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall
include in its agenda the notice from the court upon receipt and act on the
request for comments or opposition to the application within ten (10) days
from receipt of the notice. The action of the sanggunian shall be in the form
of a resolution, and shall be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the
following conditions:
(1) Any motion for the adoption of a resolution for the purpose of
this Act duly made before the sanggunian shall he considered as an
urgent matter and shall take precedence over any other business
thereof: Provided, That a special session shall be called to consider
such proposed resolution if necessary;
The resolution of the sanggunian shall include in its resolution a
list of recommended organizations from whose members the court
may appoint a custodian.
(2) The presiding officer of the sanggunian shall ensure that its
secretary shall submit any resolution adopted under this Act within
twenty-four (24) hours from its passage to the mayor who shall act
on it within the same period of time from receipt thereof;
(3) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law, fails
to act on the said resolution within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been acted upon
favorably by the mayor;
(4) If the mayor or any person acting as such, pursuant to law,
disapproves the resolution, the resolution shall be returned within
twenty-four (24) hours from disapproval thereof to the sanggunian
presiding officer or secretary who shall be responsible in informing
every member thereof that the sanggunian shall meet in special
session within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the veto for
 the sole purpose of considering to override the veto made by the
mayor.
For the purpose of this Act, the resolution of the sanggunian of the
municipality or city shall be considered final and not subject to the
review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a copy of which shall be
forwarded to the trial court within three (3) days from date of
resolution.
(e) The accused shall be properly documented, through such processes as,
but not limited to, photographic image reproduction of all sides of the face
and fingerprinting: Provided, That the costs involved for the purpose of this
subsection shall be shouldered by the municipality or city that sought the
release of the accused as provided herein, chargeable to the mandatory five
percent (5%) calamity fund in its budget or to any other available fund in its
treasury; and
(f) The court shall notify the public prosecutor of the date of hearing
therefor within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of the application for
release on recognizance in favor of the accused: Provided, That such
hearing shall be held not earlier than twenty-four (24) hours nor later than
forty-eight (48) hours from the receipt of notice by the
prosecutor: Provided, further, That during said hearing, the prosecutor shall
be ready to submit the recommendations regarding the application made
under this Act, wherein no motion for postponement shall be entertained.
Section 7. Disqualifications for Release on Recognizance. – Any of the following
circumstances shall be a valid ground for the court to disqualify an accused from
availing of the benefits provided herein:
(a) The accused bad made untruthful statements in his/her sworn affidavit
prescribed under Section 5(a);
(b) The accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has
committed a crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or
release on recognizance without valid justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation,
parole or under conditional pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts
surrounding his/her case indicate the probability of flight if released on
recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during
the pendency of the case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher
penalty to the new crime he/she is being accused of.1âwphi1
Section 8. Qualifications of the Custodian of the Person Released on
Recognizance. – Except in cases of children in conflict with the law as provided
under Republic Act No. 9344, the custodian of the person released on recognizance
must have the following qualifications:
(a) A person of good repute and probity;
(b) A resident of the barangay where the applicant resides;
(c) Must not be a relative of the applicant within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity; and
(d) Must belong to any of the following sectors and institutions: church,
academe, social welfare, health sector, cause-oriented groups, charitable
organizations or organizations engaged in the rehabilitation of offenders
duly accredited by the local social welfare and development officer.
If no person in the barangay where the applicant resides belongs to any of the sectors
and institutions listed under paragraph (d) above, the custodian of the person released
on recognizance may be from the qualified residents of the city or municipality
where the applicant resides.
Section 9. Duty of the Custodian. – The custodian shall undertake to guarantee the
appearance of the accused whenever required by the court. The custodian shall be
required to execute an undertaking before the court to produce the accused whenever
required. The said undertaking shall be part of the application for recognizance. The
court shall duly notify, within a reasonable period of time, the custodian whenever
the presence of the accussed is required. A penalty of six (6) months to two (2) years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the custodian who failed to deliver or produce
the accused before the court, upon due notice, without justifiable reason.
Section 10. Role of the Probation Officer. – Upon release of the person on
recognizance to the custodian, the court shall issue an order directing the Probation
Office concerned to monitor and evaluate the activities of such person. The
Probation Office concerned shall submit a written report containing its findings and
recommendations on the activities of the person released on recognizance on a
monthly basis to determine whether or not the conditions for his/her release have
been complied with. The prosecution including the private complainant, if any, shall
be given a copy of such report.
Section 11. Arrest of a Person Released on Recognizance. – The court shall order
the arrest of the accused, who shall forthwith be placed under detention, due to any
of the following circumstances:
(a) If it finds meritorious a manifestation made under oath by any person
after a summary healing, giving the accused an opportunity to be heard;
(b) If the accused fails to appear at the trial or whenever required by the
abovementioned court or any other competent court without justification,
despite due notice;
(c) If the accused is the subject of a complaint for the commission of
another offense involving moral turpitude and the public prosecutor or the
mayor in the area where the offense is committed recommends the arrest to
the court; or
(d) If it is shown that the accused committed an act of harassment such as,
but not limited to, stalking, intimidating or otherwise vexing private
complainant, prosecutor or witnesses in the case pending against the
accused: Provided, That upon the issuance by the court of such order, the
accused shall likewise become the proper subject of a citizen’s arrest
pursuant to the Rules of Court.
Section 12. No Release on Recognizance After Final Judgment or Commencement of
Sentence; Exception. – The benefits provided under this Act shall not be allowed in
favor of an accused after the judgment has become final or when the accused has
started serving the sentence: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to an
accused who is entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law if the application for
probation is made before the convict starts serving the sentence imposed, in which
case, the court shall allow the release on recognizance of the convict to the custody
of a qualified member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused
actually resides
avvph
Ledesma V Climanco
Facts:
 Respondent judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allow to
withdraw as counsel de oficio.
 Grounds for refusal: His appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commision on Elections = not in position to devote full time to the defense
of the accused
 Res, The conformity of the defendants was due to "its principal effect
[being] to delay this case.
 Prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de
parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him
in his new position without prejudicing the accused.
 What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to
comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio.
 Petition is clearly without merit
 petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. And discharge his
duties
 plus he was counsel de parte for one of the accused
 Deny his motion and appointed him to be counsel de officio for 2
defendants
 Pet – Urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio and his
reason is on the policy of comelec where it is require full time service and
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioner's withdrawal as counsel
RULING
 No. Membership in the Bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standards. Law is a profession and not a trade or craft.Those
enrolled in its ranks aid the courts in the administration of justice. As such,
an attorney may be called or appointed as counsel de oficio to aid indigents
for the realization of their constitutional right to counsel especially in
criminal cases like this where a person may be convicted not because of his
or her guilt but because he or she lacks competent legal representation.
(People V. Daban)
Assuming Ledesma's good faith, his appointment as an election registrar cannot
be availed of now when granting his withdrawal will result to the delay in the
administration of justice. It is to be noted that the proceedings has been delayed
 at least eight times at the defense's instance, resulting to undue inconvenience to
the parties involved.
What is easily discernible in this case is the petitioner's reluctance to comply
with the responsibilities incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio. Petitioner is
admonished for not being mindful of his obligation where he is expected to
exercise due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation, to the case of his
clients. He must be reminded that a member of the bar is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice and is therefore expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less self-interest
In re: Tagorda
FACTS
 In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. He admits
that during his campaign, he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano which, in translation means that he is a lawyer and a notary public;
and that as a notary public he can do notarial acts such as execution of
deeds of sale, can renew lost documents, and etc.; that as a lawyer, he can
help clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; and that he is
willing to serve the poor. The respondent further admits that he is the author
of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality
advising the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board
member, he can still practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the
same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding
preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to
receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD:
 Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
 The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well- merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct,
the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
 It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit,
except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his
duty to do so.
 Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young
inexperienced lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his
acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of
law for a month.
DECISION : Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the
practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support
his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of
P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in
his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule
2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that
lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation
of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting
of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well
as profited from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law
practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule
2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of
the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and
to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of
the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business
VILLATUYA V. TABALINGOS
FACTS:
 Complainant, Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on
December 06, 2004 against respondent, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos. In a
resolution, the court required the respondent to file a comment, which the
respondent did. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation.In a mandatory conference called for by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of theIBP, complainant and his counsel, and
the respondent appeared and submittedissues for resolution. The
commission ordered the parties to submit their verified position papers.In
the position paper submitted by the complainant on August 1, 2005, he
averred that he was employed by the respondent as financial consultant to
assist the respondent in a number of corporate rehabilitation cases.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would
be entitled to ₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases
they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their
clients. Notwithstanding, 18 Stay Orders that was issued by the courts as a
result of hiswork and the respondent being able to rake in millions from the
cases that they were working on together, the latter did not pay the amount
due to him. He alsoalleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation
of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal
services. On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused
respondent of committing twocounts of bigamy for having married two
other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
 In his defense, respondent denied charges against him and asserted that the
complainant was not an employee of his law firm but rather an employee of
Jesiand Jane Management, Inc., one of the financial consultancy firms.
Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent
in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them
regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by
his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant
had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful
solicitation. To support his contention, respondent attached a Joint Venture
Agreement and anaffidavit executed by the Vice-President for operations of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On the charge of gross immorality,
respondent assailed the Affidavit of a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted
by the affiant himself. Respondent informed the Commission that he filed
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the first two marriage contracts. In
both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were
Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant;
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
RULING: First charge: Dishonesty for non-payments of share in the fees.Supreme
Court affirmed the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, but did not
concur with the rationale behind it. The first charge, if proven to be true is based on
an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the
fees for legal services rende-red with a person not licensed to practice law. In the
case of Tan Tek Beng v. David, Supreme Court held that an agreement between a
lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the
layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for
unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not
been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this
matter.Second charge: Unlawful solicitation of clients. (RULE 2.03)In its Report, the
IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated
the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision
that was breached. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code,
which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.A lawyer is
not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a
manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that canreadily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer;or that can be used as a
cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled
by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.It is clear from the
documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc.,
which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by
respondent as a means toprocure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases.Third charge: Bigamy.The Supreme Court have consistently held
that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in
filing the case. Thus, in Garrido v. Garrido:Laws dealing with double jeopardy or
with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or
in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and
fitness for membership in the Bar.We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason
to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of
the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications
or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered
into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to
vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.What has been clearly
established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first
marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held
thus:[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we
foundguilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character
required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but,
likewise, for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in
his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws
in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor
lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of
justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,
demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.Respondent exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57
His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.58The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP to disbar
respondent and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
Khan v Simbillo
A.C. No.5299
August 19, 2003
TOPIC: Practice of law, concept
FACTS:
 Respondent, Rizalino Simbillo, published advertisements on different news
publications on different dates regarding his services as an “Annulment of
Marriage specialist”
 Petitioner, Ismael Khan, in his capacity as an assistant court administrator and
chief of the public information office filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for improper advertising and solicitations of his legal services, in
violations of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
 Respondent admitted acts imputed to him but argued that his acts for advertising
and solicitation are not prohibited acts. Respondent prays for his acquittal
because of the court’s ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order.
 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigated the acts of the petitioner
and found the respondent guilty of the administrative complaint filed by the
petitioner.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N petitioners published advertisement is a valid act and does not violate the
Rules of Court or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Respondent Simbillo is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year.
1. NO
 Pursuant to Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, the practice
of law is not a business but a profession which duty to public service, not
money, is the prime consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers.
 Elements that distinguish the legal profession from a business
- A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and
in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money
- A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
- A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
- A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.
 In advertising himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist” he
undermines to sanctity of marriage. A lawyer may not properly publish
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal
or society program. A lawyer is not permitted to publish any contents
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.
NOTE!: Save file format should be
 Digests
o Format: [Case # - refer to the digest assignment excel sheet; must
have 0’s up to the hundreds level] [Case title] (Last name of the
one who digested)
 e.g. 016 Cruz v. Mijares (Resurreccion)
o Save the digest file under the “Digests” google drive folder
 Full text
o Format: [Case # - refer to the digest assignment excel sheet; must
have 0’s up to the hundreds level] [Case title]
 e.g. 016 Cruz v. Mijares
o The full text of the case must also be saved under the “Full Text”
google drive folder at the same time or earlier than the Digest
 Written digest format reminders
o Must have a margin on both sides (1 in on the left and 1 in or
smaller on the right)
o May be written in short or long hand
o May be in paragraph or bullet points format
o Do not write back to back
o Use a blotter book for the digest notebook
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN
G. COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL
E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE
A. CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and in his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for Respondents.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to
H. E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel
is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of
another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie.chanrobles law library
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents’ memo). This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here. (See
Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from
practicing law under the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie
which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for the release of
87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty.
Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose
of using the letterhead of another law office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation
that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
“SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979
Facts:
 Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who
died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio
Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away.
 Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual
members of the firm.
Issue: WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name
of the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO
Held: In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the
SC said:
 The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded
 in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which
even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased
partners from their firm name.
 The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An
able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business
corporations:
 A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership
formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something
is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the
same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
 Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
For resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Ma. Elena
Carlos Nebreja (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin Reonal (respondent) for his
failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of marriage in her behalf; for his
misrepresentation on its status; and for his use of a fictitious office address.
On June 26, 2006, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against
respondent. Complainant alleged in her complaint-affidavit and position paper that
sometime in March 2004, she engaged respondent's services to file her petition for
annulment. She paid in cash and in checks,2 the various fees he asked from her on
several occasions which totalled ₱55,000.00.
After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any word from him
with regard to the status of her petition for annulment other than his claim that they
needed to wait for her appointment with the psychologist evaluation.
On April 4, 2005, respondent told complainant that her petition for annulment was
dismissed for lack of evidence. He then again asked for sums of money, on separate
occasions, totalling ₱25,900.00, to pay for the psychological test, the sheriff’s fee,
the re-filing fee, and the publication.
Complainant again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money, failed to receive
any update from respondent. When complainant asked for the schedule of her
psychological test, respondent merely told her that the psychologist was unavailable.
When she tried to ask for the number of her case and to obtain copies of the records,
respondent just told her that the records were kept in a cabinet, the key to which was
in the possession of his law partner who was out of town at that time.
On March 14, 2006, complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her
annulment case file. Respondent, however, merely handed to her photocopies of her
marriage contract and her children’s birth certificates. When she asked for copies of
her case files, he just told her that his law office could not let her use the pleadings of
the case. She then asked for his office address to appeal to his law partners, but
respondent refused to give it.
Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand letter bearing the
address of his claimed law office, "18/f Century Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner
de la Rosa, Makati." When complainant tried to look for the said office, she
discovered that there was no such building. She also found respondent’s calling card
bearing the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon City," which,
complainant found out, was respondent’s residential address.
When complainant tried again to obtain copies of her annulment case from
respondent, he did not give any and told her that her annulment case would just be
re-filed. When she asked him to write a letter to explain to the University of
Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy between the surnames appearing in her
children’s NSO-issued birth certificates and the school records, respondent did not
mention any pending annulment case in the letter, which he filed in complainant’s
behalf. These circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any
petition for annulment at all.
In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been engaged by
complainant to handle her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor. In
particular, respondent averred that complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer
because she was unemployed and could not afford his legal services; that he was the
retained counsel of one Desiree Dee, complainant’s associate, in the prosecution of
labor, civil and criminal cases, but not for her annulment; that in the preparation of
the affidavit for the University of Perpetual Help, he did not mention her intention to
pursue an annulment proceeding against her husband upon her request; and that no
psychological test was conducted because she refused to allocate time to
accommodate the schedule of the clinical psychologist.
There are two principal issues to be resolved in this case. First, whether indeed
respondent failed to file the requisite petition for annulment for complainant and
misrepresented its status; and second, whether or not he used a fictitious office
address.
With regard to the first issue, the CBD found that respondent was liable for
inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for annulment. There was no
dispute that the parties met to discuss about the filing of complainant’s intended
petition for annulment of marriage. They, however, disagreed on the engagement of
his services to file the petition.
On the matter, CBD found as sufficient the documentary evidence of payment
submitted by complainant to prove the engagement of his legal services. During the
clarificatory hearing, complainant answered the questions on the purposes for which
the payments were given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
manner, which demeanor was a badge of credibility.3
The CBD did not give credence to respondent’s denials, which prevailed over the
positive and categorical statement of the complainant. It cited the well-settled rule
that positive statement was stronger and attained greater evidentiary weight than
negative evidence.4 Moreover, he did not submit any evidence to support or
corroborate his denials and allegations or to refute complainant’s evidence. In sum,
his claims were merely supported by his allegations, which, by law, were not
equivalent to proof.5
With regard to the second issue, the CBD found that indeed, respondent used a
fictitious office address to deceive complainant. He did not submit any proof that
such building existed or that he held office at said address. He also did not deny
either the due execution and authenticity of the letter with his printed office address.
By failing to controvert the evidence of the other party, the truth of the said evidence
was deemed to be admitted by the litigant.6 Such act, as held by the CBD, was a
violation of respondent’s lawyer’s oath to do no falsehood and which consequently
rendered him administratively liable.
On September 25, 2008, the CBD found respondent guilty of both charges and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law and ordered him to return the
amounts taken from the complainant. The dispositive portion of its report reads:
WHEREFORE, it is therefore respectfully recommended that respondent be: (a)
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year; and (b) ordered to
return to complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of ₱80,900.00 with
12% interest per annum from the date when this recommendation is affirmed by the
Supreme Court until the full amount shall have been returned.
On December 11, 2008, a resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the
IBP, which adopted and approved the recommendation of the CBD. The IBP
Resolution is hereby quoted as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-652
CBD Case No. 06-1767
Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja vs.
Atty. Benjamin Reonal
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his inexcusable negligence
by failure to file the annulment petition and for misrepresentation, Atty. Benjamin
Reonal is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Ordered to return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(₱80,900.00)* to complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12% interest per
annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Complainant and respondent filed their motions for reconsideration on April 25,
2009 and April 27, 2009 respectively, but both were denied in a resolution, dated
January 3, 2013.
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the resolution of the
IBP except with respect to the order to return the amount of ₱80,900.00.
Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted
petition. His conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, 7 amounted to
inexcusable negligence. This was found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed in
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a
lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the
rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a
violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do anything to
protect his client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this
Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case,
among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the appropriate actions in
connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he
received from his client.11
With regard to respondent’s misrepresentation of his office address, the case of Porac
Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 sets an example. In the said case, the Court
imposed a six-month suspension on the lawyer after it was established that the said
lawyer indeed claimed to be a lawyer of Porac Trucking, Inc. when, in truth and in
fact, he was not. Still, in another case,13 the same six (6) month suspension was
inposed on the erring lawyer after it was established that he claimed before the trial
court to be a member of Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in truth, he was not.
In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then
completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform complainant
of the true status of the petition. His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for
legal services in handling the complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render
the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.14
For all of respondent's acts - failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of
marriage in behalf of the complainant, his misrepresentation on its status and his use
of a fictitious office address, he deserves the penalty imposed upon him by the IBP.
The Court, however, deletes the aforementioned order stated in the resolution of the
IBP, to wit, "To return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(₱80,900.00) to complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12% interest per
annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court." The
Court has recently adopted the policy to let the complainant claim and collect the
amount due from the respondent in an independent action, civil or criminal.1âwphi1
Nevertheless, the Court looks with disfavor at the non-payment by a lawyer of his
due obligations.
WHEREFORE, the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP adopting and
approving the September 25, 2008 Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP that Atty. Benjamin Reonal be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year is hereby APPROVED. The order to return the amounts received
from complainant is hereby DELETED. This decision is immediately executory and
is without prejudice to the filing of any civil or criminal action against respondent.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was
conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy
which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present
case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the
memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused
as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio,
Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and
sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said
appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be
reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was
granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of
sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation
of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record.
Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of
Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a
number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to
persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers
of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and
confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of
Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he
should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to
have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for
new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and
confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio
Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of
several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was
deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime,
the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of
the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for
new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation
designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman
and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on
September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal
investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and
Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz
wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation
from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for
postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On
that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the
committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in
view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was
pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation
being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and
confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were
being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator
and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal
case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and
consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent
Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice
and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants
had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority
to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it
was because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the
investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and
rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for
this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to
being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed
him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be
allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that
such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated
in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons
who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that
petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that
investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants
when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either
repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication,
addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September
21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo
Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting
to his being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he
and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal
intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys
had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of
the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court
such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated;
usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor
General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved
in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a
justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal
case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de
Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within
the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had
commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun
to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court,
according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an
early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to
trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action,
whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the
original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits
and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess
and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that
should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of
Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar
Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he
might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against
Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and
as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to
prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to
any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June,
1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify
before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a
right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or
less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants
whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or
was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said
investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than
a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva,
petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said
investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even
strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be
compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the
respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to
acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and
confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then
he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly,
unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the
investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted
to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of
microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were
busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the
encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after
Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am
willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and
the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent
Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask
questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right
and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under
investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand,
unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom
he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently
declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now
before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place
during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals,
narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as
vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed
as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had
already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under
appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the
press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and
good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said
publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal
and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable,
even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called
upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the
others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature
deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be
sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the
preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is
concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said
preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear
and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said
investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner
is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part
and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco
G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and
wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection
with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and,
furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more
severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera,
JJ., concur.
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in
Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores
defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan
(Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of
dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but
also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice
of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to
Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate
investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative
Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report and
recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine
Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as
follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold
Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the
defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his
appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE
compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of
another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores
asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for
failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating
thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated
September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered
a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September
14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth,
justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a
cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1 But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number
which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent
Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the
following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am
hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste
basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for
another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I
feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance
with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that
Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge. 7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit
proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him.
"Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the
judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is
to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to
which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of
the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his
client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common
sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with
the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he
is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of
₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15,
20091 and March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
109265.
The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4
hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George and
Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed
before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for
Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay,
Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property, which has
an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato’s
name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim.
The sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No.
V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed
a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents. 3
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was
granted byRegional Adjudicator Conchita C. Miñas (RA Miñas) in a Decision4 dated
December 2, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession
from her deceased father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain
petitioner in peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject
hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the
subject parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended;
and
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy
Rivera for having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence
beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office.
5
SO ORDERED.
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final. 6
Upon Consolacion’s motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Miñas issued
a writ of execution on January 8, 2008.7
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the
Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing
Spouses Lim to accept the amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender
during the initial hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No.
V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00
on March 3, 2008.9
Consolacion’s petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08,
was given due course by RA Miñas in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully
redeemed;
2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the
redemption price consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping
indicated in Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in
the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in
paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption in
favor of petitioner;
4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of
Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to
execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and
5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of
TCT No. V-73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George
Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of
Redemption.
SO ORDERED.11
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
issued a Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Miñas Decision dated June 2,
2008. Specifically:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;
2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject
landholding;
3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered
in the names of the respondents-appellants;
4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession
of the subject landholding; and
5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Region IV-A to return the Manager’s Check No. 0000004518 issued
by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR
Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to herein
petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.13
On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, 14 which the DARAB
denied in a Resolution15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for
Reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the
order, resolution, or decision of the Board or Adjudicator. Records show that both
the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the Decision dated 18
February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada, the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for
Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was
filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision
has already become final and executory. x x x.16
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court with the CA.17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within
five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and
Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel
failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption
Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion’s
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community tax
certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a
Resolution19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned
Resolution. However, the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said
Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July
1, 2009, despite receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.20
Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a
Resolution21 dated March 11, 2010.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA’s summary dismissal of her
petition on technical grounds is unwarranted.1âwphi1 Consolacion invoked
substantial justice against the CA’s strict application of the rule requiring her counsel
to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule
rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping
defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That
there was merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her
counsel’s MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated and a verification
and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her motion
for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her
petition and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules
or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid
application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error
committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of
petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements
attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity
afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this
took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion’s
petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness.
Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not
explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be
an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting
the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally
construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the
presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed
for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they
deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s intent "to forge a bastion
for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." 22
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the
duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to
seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission
by harking on liberal construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result,
she is bound by such.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
dated October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule
200 SCRA 584 1.03).

Facts:

 This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by

Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc.
(V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for
the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for
registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in
favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision
 Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
suspended the registration of the documents with certain “special
conditions” between them, which was that V&G should provide him with
weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
 Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents.
He himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents
to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in
favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the
Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court
for his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and
its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional