G.R. No.

L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as

well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so
much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme
of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on
the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as
a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws
of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it,
as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly
valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484 February 14, 1958

In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen, ADOLFO
CRUZ AZNAR, petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA
CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-appellees.

BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for appellants.

Leopoldo M. abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria Heliuen Christensen Garcia.
Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda Camporedondo.

FELIX, J.:

From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of 1913,Edward E. Christensen,
an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the following year became the
manager of Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada of the same province. At a
certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao,
Cebu, arrived to work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl,Bernarda
Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and Edward E.
Christensen, who was also unmarried staring living together as husband and wife and although
the records failed to establishthe exact date when such relationship commenced, the lower court
found the same to have been continous for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurecd
on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly
born.

G. R. NO. L-11484.

Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of properties his will
naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for probate in court and became the
subject of Special Proceedings No. 622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will
contains, among others, the following provisions:

xxx xxx xxx.

3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
(now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years
ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno descendantsexcept my above

named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx.

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now married
toEduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the factthat she
was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor hasshe been at any time
adopted to me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egipt, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS (P3,600)
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trustfor said Maria Lucy Christensen
with the Davao Branch of the PhilippineNational Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100), Philippine Currency per month until the the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.

8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now residing

inPadada, Davao, Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000), Philippine
Currency.

xxx xxx xxx.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
Lucy CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No.
665 Rodger Young Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
 remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, andwheresover situated; of which I may be possessed at
any death and which mayhave come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime,Provided, honvever, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the
life interest herein given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and
bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the
rest remainder and residue of my property, with the same force and effectas if I had
originally so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and provided, further, that should be
said Maria Lucy ChristensenDaney die without living issue then, and in that event, I give,
devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to
my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124
Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half (1/2) to the children of my
deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CRISTENSEN, . . .

13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City, Philippines,
my executor, and the executor of this, my last will and testament.

. . . (Exh. A).

Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen Christensen Garcia
and Bernarda Camporendondo, the first contending that thewill lacked the formalities required
by law; that granting that he had, thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she
and Lucy Christensen were both children had by the deceased with Bernarda Camporendondo,
yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued at $485,000 while Lucy
would get the rest of the properties;and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified
to be appointed as administrator of the estate because he had an interest adverse to thatof the
estate. It was therefore prayed by his oppositor that the application for probate be denied and the
will disallowed; that the proceeding be declared intestate and that another disinterested person be
appointed as administrator.

Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-halfof the entire estate
in virtue of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having
lived together as husband andwife continuously for a period of over 30 years, the properties
acquired during such cohabitation should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This
opposition was dismissed by the probate court on the ground that shehad no right to intervene in
said proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that might be
affected by the probate of thewill, and likewise, she could not be allowed to establish her title
and co-ownership over the properties therein for such questions must be ventilated in a court of
general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought
by her overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as she did institute Civil
Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G.R. No. L-11483) which we will
consider and discuss hereinafter.
In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the estate after filing
a bond for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administrition
were correspondingly issued to him on May 21, 1953.

The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition. Helen Christensen Garcia
filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of
Edward E. Christensen, alleging that shewas conceived during the time when her mother
Bernarda Camporendondo was living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had
been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her
favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that she and Lucy had
the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda Camporedondo. This motion was
opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before, during
and after the conception and birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known
to be carrying relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the decedent and even
years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship
with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used the surname Christensen illegally and
without permission from the deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and that the
motion of said oppositor be denied.

After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found that oppositor
Maria Helen Cristensen had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will,
for such action must have been brought about by the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's
marriage to a man he did not like. But taking into considerationthat such possession of the status
of a natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of to compel
acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney toacknowledge the
oppositor as a natural child of Edward E. Christensen. Thewill was, however, allowed the letters
testamentary consequently issued toAdolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the
portion of the decision requiring Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of
the testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R.
No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to Us on the ground that the case
involves an estate the value of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.

The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding that the oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child
of the deceased EdwardE. Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney,
recognizeddaughter and instituted heirs of the decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch
natural child.

Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen on July 2,
1934, of the same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was
publicly known to have been living as common-law wife of Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the
facts of the case there can be no question as to Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when
Edward Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such paternity to Helen
and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will
(Exh, A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim that she,
Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditaryshare
corresponding to such descendant. Several witness testified in herfavor, including the mother
Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers andother residents of the community, tending to
prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the latter
to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and
letters were likewise presented to bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by the
deceased and by Lucy herself as a member of the family.

Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate herclaim by introducing
evidence to prove that on or about the period when shewas conceived and born, her mother was
carrying an affair with another man,Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation.
Silva executed an affidavit and even took the witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants
also strived to show that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help extended to
her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the fact that on several occasions, the
deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney,
Exh. 8-Helen).

Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on or about the
period when Helen was born, Bernarda Camporendondo had established residence at her
plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to
manage his merchandising business, he spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy
in the Christensenplantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage fitted himself intothe
picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased weregenerally and publicly
known to be living together as husband and wife. Thismust have been the reason why
Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934 providedfor her maintenance; shouldered the expenses
for her education to the extentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for
girls inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and ineffect gaver
her the attention and care that a father would only do to this offspring. We should take note that
nothing appears on record to show thatChristensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed
Helen's paternity. Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he
andBernarda Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after Helentook sides
with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that decedent's desire that she continue her
studies, Helen ignored the same andgot married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem.
We may state at hisjuncture that while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses
todisprove oppositor'r claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of
the witnesses while testifying and could better gaugetheir credibility and impartiality in the case,
arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen Christensen had established that she had been in
continouspossessions of the status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the
preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to reverse said ruling.The testator' lastacts
cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human
frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an
erring child orone who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In
theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or directacts of the person
against whom such action is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during
his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated occasions
but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that
gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).

The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, an
heir of the decedent, to recognize oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems
improper. The Civil Code for 2 kinds of acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and
compulsory. In the first instance, which may be effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court intervention is
very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial pronouncement is essential,
and while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment onthe right
of the child so recognized is the same, to maintain the view of thelower Court would eliminate
the distinction between voluntary acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if We
consider that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the child and action for
compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the instant case, the
situation would take absurd turn, for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a
natural child of the deceased without a properprovision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil
Code only requires a declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent
who, if living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring as such.Therefore, We hold that in
cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent
court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the
circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a
natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for
such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned
which is her against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect.

G.R. No. L-11483

Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Bernarda
Camporendondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the properties of thedeceased as co-owner
thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased. She alleged as basis for action that she and
the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabitated as husband and wife, continously
and openly for a period for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased
acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry; and that in virtue
of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As the executor refused to account
forand deliver the share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the
court that said executor be ordered to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire
estate of the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that one of them lawfully
belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises. In his answer, the executor denied the avermentsof the complaint, contending that the
decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own
efforts; thatplaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by the late
Edward christensen during his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff and the
deceased was purely clandestinebecause the former habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue,
Davao, from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2
other men; and that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the
Civil Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired.
Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum
ofP70.000.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted theirrespective
memoranda, the lower Court on August 25, 1954, rendered judgmentfinding that the deceased
Edward Christensen and Bernarda Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering from any
impediment to contract marriage, lived together as husband and wife without marital ties
continously for over 30years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by either orboth of them
through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of theCivil Code which said court
considered to have created another mode ofacquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled
to one-half of saidproperties as co-owner thereof in view of her relationship with the
deceasedand ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthis decision,
defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an appealto the Court of Appeals, but as the
property involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us for
consideration.

It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the owner of certain
properties, including shares of stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general
merchandising store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that the deceased and appellee, both
capacitated to enter into the married state, maintained relations as husband and wife,
continuously and publicly for a considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to
be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually
disturb the lower court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not supported by or totally devoid
of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must ofnecessity be modified to
confrom with the evidence if the reviewing tribunalwere to arrive at the proper and just solution
of the controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to consider the
testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother
Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted ways as of
March, 1950, a fact which appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the
circumstances of this caseas found by the trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation
should appear as continuous from the early 20's until March, 1950, the question left for our
determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, byreason of such relationship, may be
considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the deceased during said period and thus
entitledto one-half thereof after the latter's death.

Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind of relationship
brought about by couples living together as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage,
acquiring and bringingproperties unto said union, and probably realizing that while same may
not beacceptable from the moral point of view they are as much entitled to theprotection of the
laws as any other property owners, the lawmakersincorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No.
386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property relations. Said article read as
follows:
 ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules of co-ownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman thus living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties
realized during their cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry, employment or
occupation of both or either of them. And the same thing may be said of whose marriages are by
provision of law declared void ab intio. While it is true that these requisites are fully met and
satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased and herein appellee were
already estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of law governing the cessation of
such informal civil partnership, if ever existed, same may be considered terminated upon their
separation or desistance to continue said relations.The Spanish Civil Code which was then
enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in the instant case failed to
show show thata subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that Republic ActNo.
386 which recognizeed such form of co-ownership went into operation onlyon August 30, 1950,
evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim.

In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the jurisprudence then
obtaining on the matter. As early as 1925, this Court already declared that where a man and a
woman, not suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, live together as husband and
wife, an informal civil partnership exists and made the pronouncement that each of them has an
intereat in the properties acquired during said union and is entitled to participate therein if said
properties were the product oftheir JOINT efforts (Marata vs. Dionio G.R. No. 24449, Dec. 31,
1925). In another case, this Court similarly held that although there is no technical marital
partnership between person living maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is
between them an informalcivil partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest
where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs. FelixVda. de Lesaca, 91
Phil., 135).

Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry
apparently in her desire to tread on the doctrine laiddown in the aforementioned cases, would
lead Us to believe that her help wassolicited or she took a hand in the management of and/or
acquisition of thesame. But such assertion appears incredible if We consider that she
wasobserved by the trial Court as an illiterate woman who cannot even remembersimple things
as the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when shecommenced relationship with the
deceased, not even her approximate age orthat of her children. And considering that aside from
her own declaration, which We find to be highly improbable, there appears no evidence to
proveher alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved
therein, and that in view of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to one-half of such property
to be allowed it must be provedthat the same was acquired through their joint efforts and labor
(Flores vs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have no recoursebut
reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny the claim of BernardaCampredondo. We may
further state that even granting, for the sake ofargument, that this case falls under the provisions
of Article 144 of theCivil Code, same would be applicable only as far as properties acquiredafter
the effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, forsuch law cannot be given
retroactive effect to govern those already possessedbefore August 30, 1950. It may be argued,
however, that being a newly created right, the provisions of Section 144 should be made to
retroact if only toenforce such right. Article 2252 of the same Code is explicit in thisrespect
when it states:

SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which
may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation,
shall have ro retroactive effect.

xxx xxx xxx.

As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirsof the deceased
Edward Christensen would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would
succeed, the answer to such argument wouldbe simply obvious.

With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court erred in admitting the testimony
of appellee Bernarda Camporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of
Edward Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court. We deem it unnecessary to delve on the same because even admitting that the court a
quo committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the outcome of the case in view
of the conclusion We have already arrived at on the main issue.

On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the decision of the lower Court in
case G.R. No. L-11484, with the modification that MariaLucy Christensen Daney need not be
compelled to acknowledge her sister Maria Helen Christensen Garcia as a natural child of her
father Edward E. Christensen, the declaration of the Court in this respect being sufficient to
enable her to all the rights inherent to such status.

The decision appealed from in case G.R. No. L-11483 is hereby reversed and another one
rendered, dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Costs are taxed against appellants in G.R. No. L-11484 and against appellee Bernarda
Camporedondo in G.R. No. L-11483. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor
in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the
law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
—

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of
the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.

F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of

Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but
denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which
was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as

the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering
defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff
the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral
damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees
for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual
and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach
of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity
and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:

ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract
marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought.

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a
minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration
of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause
refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she
may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.

The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be
brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs.
Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such
promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these
articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil
Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is
advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to
betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing
a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter
I, Title III, Book I thereof:

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
 Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the
parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise.

Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is
not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.

Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.

Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.

Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party
even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor
refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.

Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.

Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the
affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for
damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall
be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the
promise of the marriage.

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the
report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:

The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach
of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American
States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344

Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
 New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years
of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry,
the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of
Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-

appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of
her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-
appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from
him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished
as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly
does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
— who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this
instance. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to
get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note
for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the

Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON

APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on
August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to
explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It
added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto
will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's
residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted
from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's
counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated
that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid
defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition
of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action,
his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or
opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani
vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a
mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been
based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-
16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of
court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules
of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained
for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787;
Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing"
an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960),
is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant,
who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next
day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232
of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as
under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to
be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment
is hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to
live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he
prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan

City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez

Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay
the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at
(sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations,
deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive
promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful
promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court
and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for
the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and
brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However,
in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the
morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave
her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and
thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
 Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and
even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in
not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in

toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have
allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-
56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in
the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon,
unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and
(sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
 women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction
or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's

fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the
lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or
proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses
that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in
civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took
the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz
v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must
be respected.
And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is

not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages.
But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or

intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal
acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it
has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
 . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
— who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when
she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there
had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that
such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the
said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient

promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
(43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of

sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
 reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248,
Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,

notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse
of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given
herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.
 But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive
a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury,
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal
law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for
that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless
also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article
1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that
if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee
. . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette
and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her
family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors
a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's
ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was
not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or
less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that
this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay
together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn
duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,

vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if
it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not
prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse
of a person's right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a
court order. Indeed, in the availment of one's rights, one must act with justice, give their due, and
observe honesty and good faith

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21,
1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451, which set aside the
judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier dismissed the
Complaint for damages filed by herein respondents against petitioner. The dispositive portion of
the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is
rendered ordering the defendant-appellee Sergio Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants
bruno and Bernadina Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of [t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty
[t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00)."3

Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution,4 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:

"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig,
Rizal, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six(6)
parcels of land situated in Tanay Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca
Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida. On 12 January 1965,
the Project of Partition submitted was approved and xxx two (2) of the said lots were
adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by
Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formida executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to
them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney's fees. But it was only on
6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties
adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.

"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on 2
July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela
Gutierrez.

"Because his Attorney's fess thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January
1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure in Civil Code4 No. 12726 entitled Sergio
Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of
Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that
the attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the attorney's fees charged
[were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28
September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay
within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the
harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees. Failing in that, the two (2)
lots would be sold at public auction.
 "They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March
1973 the auction sale was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On
2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it
another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder was Amonoy at
P12,137.50.

"Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Code No. 12726 was rendered, the said
decedent's heirs filed on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rixal[,] Civil case
No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment
thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.

"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a
notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April 1986,
the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures
in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.

"On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC
Ivth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306,
was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the plaintiff-appellant
Angela Gutierrez. On a twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay
ng Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as
their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary
restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners'
houses.

"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306
disposing that:

"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated

25 July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orderd, dated 25 April
1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish
the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are hereby ordered
returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third
persons."5

But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents'
house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered
by the lower court.

Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by
respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set
aside the lower court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual
damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.

The Issue

In his Memorandum,7 petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct was correct in deciding that the petition
[was] liable to the respondents for damages."8

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Petitioner's Liability

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights
is a loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no remedy.9 In other
words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable
for damages.

Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of
respondents' house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of
Demolition ordered by the RTC.

We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.

True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the
authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the
Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the
Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June
4, 1986.

Petitioner, howeverm, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he
unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. This is
clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's testimony. The appellate court quoted the following
pertinent portion thereof:10

"Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?

"A. Not all, a certain portion only

 xxx xxx xxx

"Q. Was your house completely demolished?

"A. No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?

"A. Until 1987.

"Q. About what month of 1987?

"A. Middle of the year.

"Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?

A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy."11

The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which allegedly commenced
only on May 30, 1986, was completed the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the
demolitions had already ceased when he received notice of the TRO.

Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outsset, their continuation
after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his
actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his
acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received thae TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he was no
longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.

A commentator on this topic explains:

"The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of
justcie which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another xxx. Over
and above the specific precepts of postive law are the supreme norms of justice xxx; and
he who violates them violates the law. For this reason it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others."12

Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,13 the Court discussed the concept of abuse of
rights as follows:
 "Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties.These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible xxx."

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged
right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of
respondents; house.1âwphi1.nêt

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid
exercise of a right.14 Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned
thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.15

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well
as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more
popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the
evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart
invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the
basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had
their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the
buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner
herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a
loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka
imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus
adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the
traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the
hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming
damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing
the birthday party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no
different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr.
Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those
invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr.
Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not
invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart
was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did
not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as
he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto
who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr.
Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain
Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms.
Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still,
Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak
to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes
was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner
and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito.
Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede
lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her
version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her,
it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he
was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and
was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later
saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited him.40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the
testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the
birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he
was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if
she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action
against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud
voice within hearing distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his
food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary
to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the
damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability
arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or
good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people
to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as
she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in
private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that
the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary
that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such
humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack
of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of
such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes
liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA
603).44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart
the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion
for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in
the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in –

I.

… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING

THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA
"COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILART’S INVITATION"

III.

… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY
BISAYA

IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF
HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD

V.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S

BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes,
a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby
Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions
concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its
latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of
facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions
to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the
other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by
telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other
guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought
Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of
fact.

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the
hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by
the celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many,
being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very
person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his
presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would
naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call
attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the
celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would
certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite
only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests
to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate
affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the
buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose
him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and
discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does
not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It
was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him
out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a
basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any
witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander
Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from
that of its employee.58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is
not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore,
is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also
in the performance of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was
driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before
the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms.
Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old,"
had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates
in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable
and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the
appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without
first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite
Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko
be made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be
established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due
regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or
correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages
should be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of
the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a
Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL
Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the
Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had
income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes
might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its
Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the
facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be
held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being
aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it
rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are
purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid
occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son
of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and
the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as
a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love
with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the
contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which
they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's
parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-
B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said
note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will
have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs
have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which
caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and
sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to
prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial
court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the
defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that
the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their
part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both
of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love
with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme
or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was
allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not
only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors
about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs
with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be
drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr.
and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3,
1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the
factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is
appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later
that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of
his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where
they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973.
On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant
filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing
his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,

defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion,
abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her
evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified,

single and had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4,
Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras
Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to
take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car
driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.
were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with
plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the
Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity
(t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver
while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car travelled
north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San
Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead
threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and
would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened
and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison
Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and
dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength
of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being
a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside
the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against
her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack
because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced
her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after
which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender
her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her
virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came
out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis
of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
 After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once
more to allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and
stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he
intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make
any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the
house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that
same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr.
arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a
Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for
marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and
defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and
lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to
September 29, 1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never

returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her
parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done
against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle,

Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when
plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his
sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but
his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might
have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976).
However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told
him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto
Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and
Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him
to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs.
Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met
defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children
are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor,
she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they
would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado

Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the
 contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that
date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-

appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was
known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made
good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met
plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan
de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's
canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-
appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to
get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel,
where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate
number. Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the
house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with
the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him
to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the
house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and
September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know
about his son's whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in
the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise
denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to
her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado
Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor,
Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and
raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to
pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as
the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado
Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-
appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were
summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-
appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-
appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review,
contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents
for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on
preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence
by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an
agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into
consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to
marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies
of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence
presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate
and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and
calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent
court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once
again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions
of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court
has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid
of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant
case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules
may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing
considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor
of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and
2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on
the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal
of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it
is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.