G.R. No.
L-22595             November 1, 1927  According to the Art 729 of the Civil Code, the
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Facts:
 The partition of the estate left by the deceased
Joseph Brimo
 Juan Miciano filed a scheme of partition
 Andre, opposed it. – such opposition is based on
the fact that partition in question put into effect of
the provision of JB’s will are not in accordance
with the Turkish law
 Which violated Article 10 of the Civil Code – now
Art. 16 par 2 of NCC
 Andre Brimo did not present any evidence they
are presumed to be the same as those in PH
therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition
is not erroneous
 Joseph Brimo also expressly state that he wishes
that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection be made and dispose in
accordance PH laws
 Will is conditional, condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator’s will to
distribute his property
Issue: Whether or not the said will should be in
accordance of the national of the Joseph Brimo or in
accordance with Philippine laws
Ruling:
condition made by Joseph Brimo is contrary ot law
because it expressly ignores the testator’s
national law
 When Art 10 states such national law of the
testator is one to govern his testamentary
disposition
 Such condition the in light of legal provision is
considered unwritten and all of the remaining
clauses of the said will w/ all their disposition and
request are valid and effective if not contrary to
the testator’s national law.
 Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified
and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include
the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees.
In the matter of the Testate Estate of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen, ADOLFO CRUZ
AZNAR, petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO
CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-
appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the
Deceased EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, defendant-
appellant.
Facts:
 In this case, In Edward Christensen will,
executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy
of some money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who, in a decision
rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared as an acknowledged natural
daughter of his.
 Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16
(2) of the civil code, California law should be
applied, the matter is returned back to the
law of domicile, that Philippine law is
ultimately applicable, that the share of
Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children
under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria ,
 Helen Christensen and Bernardo
Camperendondo probate the will of Edward
E. Christensen in which Edward give 3600
pesos out of an estate valued at $485,000
while Lucy her sister would get the rest of
the properties.
 Helen contending that the will lacked the
formalities required by law and the
disposition is illegal because She and Luch
were both children by the deceased yet she
only given 3600
 In as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2)
of the  Mew Civil Code, the national of the
deceased must apply, our courts must apply
internal law of California on the matter.
Under California law, there are no
compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator should dispose any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights
oh his heirs.
Ruling:
 The court in deciding to grant more successional
rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law
which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should apply
to Californians domiciled outside of California. The
California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to
the contrary in the place where personal property
is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its
owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside California,
the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to
be followed.
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
 whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
 There is no single American law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no
other than the private law of the State of
California.
 Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of
California and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The
acknowledged natural child claimed her right to
her legitime pursuant to Philippine law. This was
opposed by the decedent's executor contending
that the will, not mentioning her legitimes, was
valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the
Philippines ruled in favor of the child. The reason:
while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of
the country of nationality of the decedent which
should govern, where the law of the latter refers
back the matter to the forum or domiciliary, there
is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine Court will take
cognizance of the issue and apply the law of the
Philippines. The law of the state of California
provides for the applicBility of the law of the
domicile, by reason of which the Court validly
ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.
 The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby
the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place of the forum
refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in
another, and the latter refers the matter back to
the forum (remission) or to a third state
(transmission). Thus, owing to its french
translation: "to send back" or "to refer back
unopened".
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
 Amos Bellis, citizen of Texas and US . First wife,
Mary Mallen, divorced and had 5 legitimate
children
 Second wife, Violet Kennedy, 3 Illegitimate
children
 Amos Bellis executed a will in the PH, where he
distributed the state sin order and manner where
$ 240,000 – first wife
120,000 – Illegitimate children (40,000)
And all the remainder should go to his seven
children from his first and second wife
 Amos Bellis died in San Antonio, Texas, USA
 People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of
the will enact all the conditions made by testator.
 On Jan. 17, 1964 Maria Christina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the partition
 As they claimed that they were deprived as
legitimes as illegitimate childers therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased
 Court overruled the said opposition and approving
the executor’s final partition and report.
 In pursuant to Art. 16 of CC --- it applied the
national law of the decent which is the TEXAS law
– do no provide for legitimes
Issue: Whether or not the Texas Law or Philippine law
may apply
Ruling:
 Texas law should apply as the decedent is a
national and had been domiciled in Texas
 And even if Texas has conflict rule in situs theory
call ing for the application of the law of the place
where the properties is situated, renvoi would
arise
 But there is no proof that there is conflict law rule
of Texas.
 The appellants’ position never mentioned renvoi
but they mentione the 3rd paragraph of Art 17 in
relation to Art 16 of CC
 They states that Art 17 is an exception to Art 16 –
Court said it is not correct.
 Congress already deleted the phrase
“notwithstanding the provision of this and the
next preceeding article as they incorporated Art
11 of the OLD CC to Art 17 of NCC
 Reproduce the said provision as Art 16, where in
itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession
 Art 1039 added for decrees capacity to succeed is
to be governed by the national law of the decent
 Whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in out System of legitimes, Congress not
intended to extend the same to the succession of
the foreign national
 And even if the testator executed two wills, one in
Texas and other in Philippine that he intendend
PH law to govern his PH estated.
 Still would not alter the law, In Miciano V. Brimo:
where the national law cannot be ignored in
pursuant to the Art 16 of the CC
 Therefore, PH law on legitimes cannot be applied
to testacy of Amos Bellis
 Order of the Probate court – affirmed in toto, cost
against appellants
G.R. No. L-14628             September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents
 Facts:
 Soledad Cagigas, complainant is a teacher
in Provincial HS in Cebu
 Pet, was almost 10 years younger than her
 They used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged although the pet
never made promise of marriage
 1951, Soledad gave up teaching and
became life insurance underwriter in Cebu
 Where intimacy developed between the two
 One evening 1953 after coming from the
movie they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V Escano to which he was
attached as apprentice pilot
 1954, Soledad advised pet that she was in
family way where the pet promise to marry
her
 Soledad begot Chris Hermosisisma in
private clinic on June 17
 Almost a month later, Pet married Romanita
Perez
 On Oct 4 Soledad filed a complaint with said
of her child as natural and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise to marry
 Pet admitted the paternity of the chiled and
expressed willingness to support Chris
Hermosisisma but denied having ever
promised to marry Soledad
ISSUE: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under
our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
Ruling:
 NO
 Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced * * *
upon the faith of such promise".
 Such provisions permitting the recovery of
damages had been eliminated by the Congress
 history of breach of promise suits in the US and in
England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of rights of action in the
so-called Balm suits in many of the American
States.
 Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said
Article 2219, particularly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime
punished as such in Article as such in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which
admittedly does not exist in the present case
because the complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of
their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy."
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
ARTICLE 21
Facts:
 Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer
decided to get married on Sept 4, 1954
 But on the Sept 2, 1954 Wassmer left a not
stating that the have to postpone the
wedding because her mother oppose it and
he was leaving on the Convair that day
lastly he requested Beatriz not to ask to
other people for the reason as it would only
create a scandal
 On the Next day another telegram stating :
Nothing Changed rest assured returning
very soon apologiez mama papa love paking
 Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he
heard from again
 Beatriz sued Velez for damages
 Defendant, stated in his affidavit of merits
that he has good and valid defense to his
failure to marry Beatriz as scheduled having
been due to fortuitous even beyond his
control
 Also states that the judgement is wong as
there is no provision of the Civil Code
Authorizing an action for breach promise to
marry as it reiterated in the case of
Hermosisima Vs. CA and Estopa VS Biansay
 Court states that surely this is not a case
breach of promise to marry as it is not an
actionable wrong
 But the mere fact the couple have already
filed a marriage license
 already spent for invitations,
wedding apparels,
 gives Beatriz reason to demand for payment
of damages in pursuant to the Art. 21 where
it is palpably and unjustifiable contrary.
 Another is Art 2219 where moral damages
are recoverable
 The court affirmed the previous judgment
and ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff moral damages for
the humiliation she suffered; actual
damages for the expenses incurred and
exemplary damages because the defendant
acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff
believe that he will come back and the
wedding will push through.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
Facts:
 Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single
and of good moral character and reputation, duly
respected in her community filed a complaint on
October 27, 1987, against Gashem Shookat
Baksh, an Iranian citizen, and an exchange
student taking up a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.  The
 complaint for damages is due to Baksh’s violation
of their agreement to get married.
 Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted
Marilou and proposed to marry her.  She accepted
his love on the condition that they will get
married.  They agreed to get married at the end of
the semester, which was October of that year. 
They also visited Marilou’s parents in Pangasinan
to secure their approval to the marriage.
 Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner
to live with him in Guilig, Dagupan City. It should
be noted that she was a virgin before she lived
with him and not a woman of loose morals. A few
weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem
started to maltreat her, which result to injuries. A
confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig
ensued and Gashem repudiated their marriage
agreement and said that he is already married to
a girl in Bacolod City.
 On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied
Article 21 of the New Civil Code in its decision
favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem
Baksh to pay PhP 20,000 moral damges, PhP
3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP 2,000.00 for
the litigation expenses.
 Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme
Court seeking for the review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set
aside the said decision which was also affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals
Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a
breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
 The Court held that the breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However,
the Court rules that no foreigner should make a
mockery of our laws. 
 In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not
motivated by good faith and honest motive when
he proposed his love and promised to marry
Marilou Gonzales.  He was merely motivated by
lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women.”
 And the Article 21 legislator made such provision
for adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the status
 The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals pursuant to Aticle
21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the
breach of promise to marry, but due the fraud and
deceit employed by herein petitioner that wilfully
caused injury to the honor and reputation of the
herein private respondent, which committed
contrary to the morals, good customs or public
policy.
  Not in pari delicto – moral seduction from
baksh

G.R. No. 140420      February 15, 2001

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA
FORNIDA, respondents.

Facts: