substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-24022. March 3, 1965.]
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE Y. FELICIANO, ET
AL., Respondents.
Jose C . Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; RICE IMPORTATION; REPUBLIC ACT 2207
AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT RICE IMPORTATION STILL
STANDS. — The provision of Republic Act 2207 on government
importation of rice still stands. Section 2 of said Act, among
other things, provides that there should be an existing or
imminent shortage of the local supply of rice of such gravity as
to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the
National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may
authorize such importation thru any government agency that he
may designate.
2. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; GENERAL REPEALING
CLAUSE; PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEAL. — A
repealing clause in an Act which provides that "all laws or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly" is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act
or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting.
1. RICE IMPORTATION; REPUBLIC ACT 2207 NOT IMPLIEDLY
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 3452. — Republic Act 3452 only
authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a
shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied
repeal does not ensue.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and
General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the
President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of
595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which
the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation
of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution
No. 70, series of 1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to
his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the
cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965,
the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as
the government agency authorized to undertake the importation
pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for
February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act
3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and
that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same,
the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together
with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the
instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y.
Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Manager of
the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid
scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any
other act that may result in the contemplated importation until
further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly
appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General
were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due
course, this Court granted upon petitioners’ filing a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been filed, the writ
was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer, do not dispute the essential
allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which
justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the
validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act
2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners’ contention that the importation in question
being undertaken by the government even if there is a
certification by the National Economic Council that there is a
shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is
prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10,
provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They
claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the
importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties
thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency, but from this it
does not follow that at present there is no law which permits
the government to undertake the importation of rice into the
Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the
provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We
refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it
provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage
in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency, and this is certified by the National
Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may
authorize such importation thru any government agency that he
may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National
Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage
present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national
emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost
no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the
impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason
why the disputed importation should be prevented as
petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been
repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the
divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly,
Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause
which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the
nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act
or Acts that are intended to be repealed [Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals
and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is
intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental
Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151
Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521,
199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law
(Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms
of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective,
refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances.
Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions
as provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the
rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The
philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice
during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will
unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local
price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the
other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice
importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step
adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws
are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods
of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice
importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being
applicable only to the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point
of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws.
Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act
2207 covers three different situations: (1) when the local
produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2)
when the local produce falls short of the supply but the
shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and
(3) when the shortage on the local supply of rice is of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first
two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the
government or by the private sector. However, in the case of
the third situation, the law authorizes importation by the
government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations
1 and 2, but not with 3. Nowhere in said law can we discern
that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply
is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In
short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply
of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have
to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not
inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates
importation during normal times is bolstered by a consideration
of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No.
11511 which was presented in answer to the request of the
Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice
in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views
of Senators Padilla and Almendras: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 there is a
proviso in Sec. 10 thereof ‘that the Rice and Corn
Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited
from importing rice and corn.’
SENATE ALMENDRAS: ‘Provided further’, it says, ‘that the
importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding tax.’ So therefore, the position of
the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is
that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes." (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964)
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act
3452 which gives to the President authority to declare a rice
and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public
interest and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure
and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private
warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to
support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the
part of the government even in case of an emergency. The
contention is predicated on a misinterpretation on the import
and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to
an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of
the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous
dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage
of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really
nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation
creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could
have intended under such a situation to deprive the government
of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation.
Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no
rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of
value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy
cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If
there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses
and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual
emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of
the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and
corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is
the duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would
give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal
by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United
States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re
Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32
Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compaña General de Tabacos v.
Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms
and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a
repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive
repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new
statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The
clearest case possible must first be made before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGranth, 187 F
(2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation
of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four
in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any
nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6
thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other
agency or instrumentality to the Government shall be allowed to
purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere
temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title
reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year
1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the
matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4
thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of
Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said
Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already
been repealed. The provision is merely a safeguard placed
therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may
not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848
because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for
lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule
that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to
the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly
quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during
the discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It
should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede
to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import
in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but
that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and
apparently upheld that such request for authority was not
necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is
probably for this reason that said bill, after having been
approved by the senate, was killed in the conference committee
that consider it. This views, while not binding, are a of
persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the
effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
"SENATOR LIWAG: . . . Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the
Committee that in the case of emergency, in case of an
impending shortage, we can of an impending shortage, we can
import rice under the provisions of R.A. No. 2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor,
in this paragraph (c) Section 2 page 2, that when we say ‘under
the provisions of existing law, we are referring to R.A. No.
2207.
x x x
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2
paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in
cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing laws."
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No.
2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the
proposed bill be substitution recognize the continued existence
of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and
Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor,
why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of the
President to import rice.
x x x SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your
Honor, because of the existing law — that is, Republic Act No.
3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is the reason your
Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to
import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of
that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452
and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any
government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because
in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said, there was no
clear cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied
repeal between those two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman
from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act
No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we
want to make that clear . . .
SENATOR PADILLA: ‘Provided, further,’ it says, That the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes.’ So, therefore, the position
of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is
that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.
cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
x x x
already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been
repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the
theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by
Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned.
The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court
does not state clearly which side prevails. I take the view that
the two laws can be reconciled . . .
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisos together, I
maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that
it is possible for them to stand together except on certain
points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency
certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By
reading the two provisos together I would say yes because
there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No.
3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a
shortage amounting to a national emergency." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when
said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it
carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others,
Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already
said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude
clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic
Act 2207 with regard to future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary
appropriation to finance the importation in question, suffice it to
state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn
Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise and secure the
money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We
refer to Section 3(e) of said Act which empowers said
corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it
has as a guaranty, and Republic Act 3452, which creates the
Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and
powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money
under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power
with which to finance the importation in question.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary
injunction by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against
petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur with
the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel
— and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations
therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm
on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens'
Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days
later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed
by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of
sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of
P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon
the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have
relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on
September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance
of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was
because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983,
some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or
"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981,
pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa
nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to
guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation,
whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez,
June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981,
Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17,
1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria
Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued
on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after
Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a
misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the
explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to
penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of
an obligation," as follows:4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an
administrative agency having interpreting authority may
reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but
that its review interpretation applies only prospectively
(Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476;
20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is
issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued
as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his
conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate
Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new
law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one,
i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed
to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By
Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co
moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court
required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The
latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991,
extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal,
which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To
this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After
deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court
resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal . . .5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has
been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA
682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested
the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in
payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June
30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961,
granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not
be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga
v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of
Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a
person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central,
when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in
the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive
application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants
from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128
SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation"
as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An
v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative
Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo
v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only
prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and
Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA,
Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling
that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which
directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an
employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular
was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607,
611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret
Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People
v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant
be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . .
."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes,
in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled
rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim
obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992,
205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that
the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a
foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the
petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting
section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners
Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by
these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
"judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law
of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed
in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines.
Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial
decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine
advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual
existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact
negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April
24, 1985 — which declared "that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published,shall have no force and
effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court
appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . .
(the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these
presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in
the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US
425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S.
559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects — with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the
effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium
legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then
President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts
and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had
been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be)
in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a
minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit:11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox
view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act
taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents
and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit
of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It
does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must
have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is
so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than
that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has
been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified,
its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
 declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:
'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official
(Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with
approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002
[1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores
(99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the
opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in
Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967,
21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer
v. Military Commission No 34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings
conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had
resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this
Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that
Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final
when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should
be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether
of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer
decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted
person or the State shows that there was serious denial
of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of
the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based
on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since judgment
against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes
before the military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President Marcos
in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative
fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration
in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in
Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from
carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this
Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA
533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of
creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all
the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of
the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the
scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General
invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that
in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is
inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been
violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in
the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the
Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special
law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal
advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present
case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on
the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no
less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice,
whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in
the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority
that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos
vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals,
is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no
administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed
by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the
doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity,
and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed,
negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the
Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal
prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The
appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu
City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue
City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to
Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to
take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the
preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active
staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9,
1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April
5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born
on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter. 13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with
his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to
answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent
tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but
Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give
financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and
would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He
would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his
friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money.
Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his
gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell
their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his
father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for
having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so
that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and
regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin
found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he
inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he
no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his
failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm.
He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and
would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially,
Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as
practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that
he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could
and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-
earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was
he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen
played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to
1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a
psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter
had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South
Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate
concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling
and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner
suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra
evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared
by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South
Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary
to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong
with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with
his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC
gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by
Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive
drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which
character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his
marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA
rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial
court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time
he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth
in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina
decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five
years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with
the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a
Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first
ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and
Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized; and
III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law
and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by
the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate
Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the
historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in
Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English
Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same
points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual
principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or
reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the
framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and
precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."
Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon
a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict
between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme
Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United
States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.
The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the
same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that
high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation,
while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis
— constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional
stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction
is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In
soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question
once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of
stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance
reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial
economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse
to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the
stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked
Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
"separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in
order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of
the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show
that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before
overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the
prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It
established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the
rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts
have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the
old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The
same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained
that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part
of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we
declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court
to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases
of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be
considered as on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te
that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated
distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause
of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor
litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are
not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by
the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then
such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced
by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit
to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the
date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article
36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.62
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were
present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited
that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
"defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the
opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation
of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that
petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in
Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took
into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,
as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s
brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s
findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no
valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he
owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes
the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony,
as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case,
the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari
is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the
December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
1avvphi1.zw+
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met
sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for
Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March
1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still
a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country
on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon
City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where
they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two
months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was
on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year
old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his
marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to
at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her.
At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened
to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were
not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the
conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they
could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner
decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a
chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent
assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children.
She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her
injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight
physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and
stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed
for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As
respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the
reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into
a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on
03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no
evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1âw phi 1.nêt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court,
an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court.
In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner
and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A"
of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent
vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically
incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was
legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his
motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.
The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That
the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so
provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is
grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has
been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent
and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity."1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court
of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the
guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina,3 promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be
applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to
be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner
argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant
only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and
not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in
its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been
shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been
so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been
explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court,
in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form
the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II
for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an
entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively
recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court
has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases
for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and
protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy
marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship,
however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these
cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father
and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR.,
and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts
become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Ligle do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our
way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be
issued restraining the respondents from applying and
enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of
petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution,
hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners
to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to
satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners' favor in violation of substantive
due process guaranteed by the
Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors
an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could
escape civil liability for their wrongful acts
by merely converting their money to a
foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an
authorized bank.
The antecedent facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist,
coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with
him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for
four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once
on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.
On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued
Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal
Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar
Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-
8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.)
Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya
filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal
Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4)
counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there
was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped
from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order.
Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal
cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated
February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave
Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of
P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial
court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of
Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13,
1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked
Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served
on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman
sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment
did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court
order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer
to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation,
in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the
Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of
CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been
repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the
substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced
by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Central Bank responded as follows:
May 26, 1989
Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:
This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989
regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No.
960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not
admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed
nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts
within the country's banking system which would help in
the development of the economy. There is no intention to
render futile the basic rights of a person as was
suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as
some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is,
therefore, enjoined.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director1
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion
for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214
entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons
with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for
three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing
the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on
March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N.
Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of
P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of
them;
 3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00;
and
4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25%
of the total amount of damages herein awarded;
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the
award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as
follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the
municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom
on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of
Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M.
Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136,
where he was charged with four counts of Rape and
Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel,
summons was served upon defendant by publication in
the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as
attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media
Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper.
Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60)
days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in
default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their
evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as
witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father,
Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a
certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following
testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's
Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to
Arellano University for her second year.
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the
Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna
Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in
front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She
was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left,
and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
2 to 5)
The American asked her name and introduced himself as
Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He
said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a
sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has
a daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with
him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, pp. 4-5)
The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject
and she told him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go
with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to
his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her
to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning
right to reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan
Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed
that defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house
but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When
Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house,
defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and
invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked
the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was
not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied
Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen
cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a
packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he
circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed
which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands
spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and
inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain.
She tried to shout but no sound could come out because
there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant
withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more
pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his
sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced
his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While
he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she
perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little,
because she could not see. Karen could not recall how
long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash.
He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her
hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water
while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom
washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more
blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant
changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After
the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep.
She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident
happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of
determining the exact time because defendant removed
her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before
she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock
the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a
breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.
defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For
lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for
the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the
evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had
stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is
why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was
raped again during the night. During those three times
defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she
could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The
defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on
her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear
that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and
doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if
somebody would hear her and would be able to call the
police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the
house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant
did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for
help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three
times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after a
breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in
the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a
window because everything was covered by a carpet,
until defendant opened the window for around fifteen
minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the
window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After
that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he
put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-
15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for
help, although defendant left but kept the door closed.
She went to the bathroom and saw a small window
covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole.
She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through
the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so
akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!"
Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a
neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo".
Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep
and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no
policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and
she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited
for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some
food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she
was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day,
February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The
first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30
— 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After
he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a
short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for
help but he did not understand what she was shouting
about. After she was raped the third time, he left the
house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went
to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for
about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices
were asking for her name and she gave her name as
Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a
woman saying they will just call the police. They were
also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the
bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes
being afraid that should the neighbors call for the police
and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might
kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the
American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p.
16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door.
He asked her if she had asked for help because there
were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told
her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one
she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the
police that she left home and willingly; then he went
downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people
conversing but she could not understand what they were
saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were
conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the
door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a
policeman. The policeman asked her name and the
reason why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in
uniform and the defendant was talking to them.
"Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The
policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p.
20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her
neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a
certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors
whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita.
They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her
father arrived, followed by her mother together with some
of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second
floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by
the investigator. The written statement she gave to the
police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to
the National Bureau of Investigation together with the
investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a
medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was
already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day
when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22)
The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked
as Exhibit B.
She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay
City at the time of the incident but she subsequently
transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University,
situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to
be the subject of conversation in the school. She first
applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano
University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit
Station but she was denied admission after she told the
school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for
their denial was that they might be implicated in the case.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not
play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is
always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded
and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept.
 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p.
11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for
Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she
would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is
not sure if she could ever recover from this experience.
(TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said
notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial
court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar
deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down
to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original
jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court?
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the
grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the
bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy
the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency
depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since
criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary
Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has
exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the
plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the
civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs
substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ
of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to
the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is
beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that
the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not
exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied
verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246.
Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from
attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A.
6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a
law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to
regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a
class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other
order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore
Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions
thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject
section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure;
and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person
and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is
needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the
State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the
society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some
measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing
persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or
burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent
Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that some properties are exempted from
execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as
amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that
foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving
reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that
respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings
experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of
Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of
Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has
undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh
effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to
follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court.
But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated
as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply
with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief.2 However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one
for mandamus.3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are
good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the
Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said
stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American
tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein
for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail
and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more
than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation,
anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue
to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had
wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of
damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law,
therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court
believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic
experience she had undergone which could haunt her
mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could
make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been
actually humiliated once when she was refused admission
at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University,
where she sought to transfer from another school, simply
because the school authorities of the said High School
learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared
that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective
damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner
defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period
of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor
Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so
naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an
American national, could not have such a bestial desire
on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime.
Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident
happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage
that in every forest there is a
snake, . . . .4
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be
difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit
could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages;
in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the
gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere
visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a
time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said
statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the
country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law
still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
It has thus been said that —
But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go hand
in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and
manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep
pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to
wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized
society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
The present petition has far-reaching implications on the
right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed
by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation
promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate
the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More
specifically, the petition raises the question whether the
protection against attachment, garnishment or other court
process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No.
1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit
does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere
transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the
deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the
protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by
foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central
Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the
strength of the following provision of Central Bank
Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. —
Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The
Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take
effect after the publication of such rules
and regulations in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of national circulation for
at least once a week for three consecutive
weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations
decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the
deposit was made shall govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of
Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency
Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized
under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an
absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the
depositor, in no instance shall such
foreign currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or
legislative or any other entity whether
public or private: Provided, however, that
 said foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against
attachment, garnishment and other court process to
foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426,
as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking
institutions and branches of foreign banks
are authorized to accept deposits in
foreign currency;
WHEREAS, under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing
the establishment of an offshore banking
system in the Philippines, offshore
banking units are also authorized to
receive foreign currency deposits in
certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the
development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and the
Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were
provided for under the two Systems such
as confidentiality of deposits subject to
certain exceptions and tax exemptions on
the interest income of depositors who are
nonresidents and are not engaged in trade
or business in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the
protective cloak of confidentiality over
such foreign currency deposits, exempting
such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing
the vested rights of depositors would
better encourage the inflow of foreign
currency deposits into the banking
institutions authorized to accept such
deposits in the Philippines thereby placing
such institutions more in a position to
properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus
directly contributing to the economic
development of the country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection
accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure the
development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the
Philippines" (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No.
1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as
follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the
establishment of an offshore banking
system, such as political stability, a
growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others,
exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of
developing countries to have as wide
access as possible to the sources of
capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system
based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the
country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired
investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in
international finance, and contributing to
the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location,
physical and human resources, and other
 positive factors provide the Philippines
with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system
was created by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an
offshore banking system in the Philippines
has been authorized under a separate
decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial
banks, as depository bank under the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No.
6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in
foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency
loans to resident corporations and firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the
foreign currency lending authority of the
said depository banks under RA 6426 and
apply to their transactions the same taxes
as would be applicable to transaction of
the proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency
Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of
PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these
deposits that are induced by the two laws and given
protection and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged
by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only
for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a
transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China
Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his
temporary stay in the Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus
submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions
that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs.
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar
against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower
court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor?
Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor
against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls
for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have
served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426
are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with
the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion,
et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to
RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty.
Antonio M. Brillantes for plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one
question of law being involved therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization
Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety
Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA
the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until
the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and
plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-
defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for
all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case
defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount
adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such
payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D.
Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the
defendants in said case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing
Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses
in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case
and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants,
for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and
prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition
thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of
jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as
actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by
this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But
as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court
became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly
on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a
year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that
1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case
was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is,
therefore, dismissed as having prescribed. 1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the
Court of Appeals, which, on March 20, 1969t certified the case to this
Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law,
namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment
"must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code,
"commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has
become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the
defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been
taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10)
years from December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee
Tecson maintains otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years ... it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each"
— according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being
leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10)
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December
21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this
view in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year
means a calendar year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by
Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the number
of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap
year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what
year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls
and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory
contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used
in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code
of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that,
when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar"
month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such
provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently
promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant
to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it
shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or
"solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in
which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they
have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13
of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court,
in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of
the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil
month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely
mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the
term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this
legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience
or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld
without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in
judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by
judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby
affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1,
2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782
and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district
officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the
cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects
and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first
quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228
that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable
for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate
income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales
to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent
was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its
claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit
or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund
or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum
has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without
a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have
been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14,
1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset
to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by
the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last
included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to
730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition,
which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return,
was filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed
an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a
particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14,
2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A
statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor
construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this
appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption,
should be strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC
should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds
and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13,
2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final
adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in
the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229
of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing
of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive
period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days.
In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the
number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard
to the number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running
from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the
last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from
December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008;
one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008
until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the
law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the
provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the
previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus,
the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987. 1avv phi1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have
been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is
whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12
calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of
1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
1 month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
 month month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14, 21st calendar December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
month 1998 month
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998 22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month 1998 month

7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998 23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month month
8th calendar November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998 24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month month

9th calendar December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

month We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was
filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999 filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
month period.
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to
month
the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999 hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v.
month Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999 No costs.
2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999 SO ORDERED.
month
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999 vs.
month ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,
month 1999 Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999
month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
month
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
20th calendar November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court,
however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation
in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of
the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to
Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to
the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which
are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he
did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are.
He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity
to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error
of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and,
taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no
evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of
the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the
other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the
Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of
my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this
wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is
that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who
fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law,
for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals
shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the
heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is
null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that
the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the
herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of
said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will
of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency
 per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in
his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward
E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was
alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the
entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile
of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because
the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this
appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But
there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in
the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor
himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born
on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first
arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on
July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines
for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his
own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney"
and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion
is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in
his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile,
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with
two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which
would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand,
not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise
 of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not
safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich,
p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination
of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is
not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors,
thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the
rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should
not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi
would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be
the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those
who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in
the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above,
had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the
courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and
France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this property should be
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court
has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions,
on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again
to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question
may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of
the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result
in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons
for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent
parts of the article are quoted herein below:
 The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of
a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if
he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law —
he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time
of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case
of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property.
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of
intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is
more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164,
pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws
for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled
in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict- WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed,
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the with costs against appellees.
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government,
59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly
apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in
each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case
that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar
to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a

citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..