Tirazona vs.
Phil Eds Techno Service imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is
GR No. 169712, 20 Jan. 2009
FACTS:
 Tirazona, being the Administrative Manager of Philippine
EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET), was a managerial
employee who held a position of trust and confidence;
 that after PET officers/directors called her attention to her
improper handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file
employee, she claimed that she was denied due process
for which she demanded P2,000,000.00 indemnity from PET
and its officers/directors; that she admitted to reading a
confidential letter addressed to PET officers/directors
containing the legal opinion of the counsel of PET regarding
her case; and that she was validly terminated from her
employment on the ground that she willfully breached the
trust and confidence reposed in her by her employer. In
the end, we concluded that:
 Tirazona, in this case, has given PET more than enough
reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has
shown towards the company and her stubborn,
uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the
company's termination of her employment. Moreover,
Tirazona's reading of what was supposed to be a
confidential letter between the counsel and directors of
the PET, even if it concerns her, only further supports her
employer's view that she cannot be trusted. In fine, the
Court cannot fault the actions of PET in dismissing petitioner.5
 She argued therein that the Court failed to consider the
length of her service (26 years) to PET in affirming her
termination from employment. She prayed that her
dismissal be declared illegal. Alternatively, should the Court
uphold the legality of her dismissal, Tirazona pleaded that she
be awarded separation pay and retirement benefits, out of
humanitarian considerations.
ISSUE: WON Tirazona was validly dismissed? YES
RULING:
GENERAL RULE: an employee who has been dismissed for any of
the just causes enumerated under Article 2821 of the Labor Code is
NOT entitled to separation pay.
In Sy v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, we declared that only
unjustly dismissed employees are entitled to retirement benefits
and other privileges including reinstatement and backwages.
EXCEPTION: the grant of separation pay or some other financial
assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just
causes on the basis of equity
[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. x x x. (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission)
We set the limits for such a grant and gave the following ratio for the
same:
Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted
separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he
will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks
he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of
misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it
will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve
the protection and concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly
will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an
not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot
be permitted to be [a] refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those
who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean
and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen
to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for
the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it,
like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character. (Emphasis ours.)
Contrary to her exaggerated claims, Tirazona was not just
"gracelessly expelled" or "simply terminated" from the company
on 22 April 2002.
She was found to have violated the trust and confidence reposed in her
by her employer when she arrogantly and unreasonably demanded from
PET and its officers/directors the exorbitant amount of P2,000,000.00 in
damages, coupled with a threat of a lawsuit if the same was not promptly
paid within five days. This unwarranted imposition on PET and its
officers/directors was made after the company sent Tirazona a letter,
finding her handling of the situation involving a rank-and-file
employee to be less than ideal, and merely reminding her to be
more circumspect when dealing with the more delicate concerns
of their employees. To aggravate the situation, Tirazona adamantly
and continually refused to cooperate with PET's investigation of
her case and to provide an adequate explanation for her actions.
Verily, the actions of Tirazona reflected an obdurate character that is
arrogant, uncompromising, and hostile. By immediately and
unreasonably adopting an adverse stance against PET, she sought to
impose her will on the company and placed her own interests above
those of her employer. Her motive for her actions was rendered even
more questionable by her exorbitant and arbitrary demand
for P2,000,000.00 payable within five days from demand. Her attitude
towards her employer was clearly inconsistent with her position of
trust and confidence. Her poor character became even more evident
when she read what was supposed to be a confidential letter of the legal
counsel of PET to PET officers/directors expressing his legal opinion on
Tirazona's administrative case. PET was, therefore, fully justified in
terminating Tirazona's employment for loss of trust and
confidence.
Tirazona also failed to persuade us to consider in her favor her
length of service to PET.
In her Reply to the Comment/Opposition to the instant motion filed by
PET, Tirazona retracted the above allegation and stated that the claim
of twenty-six (26) years of employment with PET was an error committed
through inadvertence. She then averred that the length of her
employment with PET should indeed be counted from July 1999, which
up to the present time will result in a period of eight (8) years, more
or less.
We find that the above statement is still inaccurate. As this Court ruled
in our Decision dated 14 March 2008, Tirazona was validly terminated
from her employment on 22 April 2002. Therefore, counting from the
time when Tirazona was employed by PET on 19 July 1999 up to the
time when she was dismissed, she had only rendered a little more
than two (2) years and nine (9) months of service to PET.
 In Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao and Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Lariosa, separation pay was granted to the dismissed
employees, as they were mere rank-and-file employees who
did not have any previous derogatory record with their
companies and in equitable regard for their long years of
service spanning more than ten (10) years.
 In Farrol v. Court of Appeals,20 separation pay was awarded
because the penalty of dismissal was held to be harsh and
disproportionate to the offense committed and the dismissed
employee had been at the service of the company for twenty
four (24) years.
 In Negros Navigation Co. Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,21 separation pay was awarded to the employee
dismissed, as it was the employer itself that prayed for the
award of the same, in lieu of the employee's reinstatement

 Lastly, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Abad,22 separation pay was ordered granted to a dismissed
managerial employee because there was an express finding
that the violation of the bank policies was not perpetrated for
the employee's self-interest, nor did the employee exhibit any
lack of moral depravity. The employee had also been in the
service of the company for twenty-five (25) years.
Obviously, Tirazona's reliance upon the above-cited cases is
misleading, as the circumstances therein are markedly different from
those in the case at bar.
In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or any other kind
of financial assistance to Tirazona, under the guise of
compassionate justice, is not warranted in this case. To hold
otherwise would only cause a disturbance of the sound
jurisprudence on the matter and a perversion of the noble dictates
of social justice.
BEST WEAR GARMENTS VS. DE LEMOS
GR NO. 191281, 5 DEC. 2012
FACTS:
 Petitioner Best Wear Garments is a sole proprietorship
represented by its General Manager Alex Sitosta.
Respondents Cecile M. Ocubillo and Adelaida B. De
Lemos were hired as sewers on piece-rate basis by
petitioners on October 27, 1993 and July 12, 1994,
respectively.
 On May 20, 2004, De Lemos filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for backwages and other accrued
benefits, separation pay, service incentive leave pay and
attorney’s fees. A similar complaint was filed by Ocubillo
on June 10, 2004. Both alleged in their position paper that in
August 2003, Sitosta arbitrarily transferred them to other
areas of operation of petitioner’s garments company,
which they said amounted to constructive dismissal as it
resulted in less earnings for them.
a. De Lemos claimed that after two months in her new
assignment, she was able to adjust but Sitosta again
transferred her to a "different operation where she
could not earn [as] much as before because by-
products require long period of time to finish."
She averred that the reason for her transfer was her
refusal "to render [overtime work] up to 7:00 p.m." Her
request to be returned to her previous assignment was
rejected and she was "constrained not to report for
work as Sitosta had become indifferent to her since
said transfer of operation." She further alleged that
her last salary was withheld by petitioner company.
b. On her part, Ocubillo alleged that her transfer was
precipitated by her having "incurred excessive
absences since 2001." Her absences were due to the
fact that her father became very sick since 2001 until his
untimely demise on November 9, 2003; aside from this,
she herself became very sickly. She claimed that from
September to October 2003, Sitosta assigned her to
different machines "whichever is available" and that
"there were times, she could not earn for a day
because there was no available machine to work
for [sic]." Sitosta also allegedly required her to
render overtime work up to 7:00 p.m. which she
refused "because she was only paid up to 6:25 p.m."
 Petitioners denied having terminated the employment of
respondents who supposedly committed numerous
absences without leave (AWOL). They claimed that
sometime in February 2004, De Lemos informed Sitosta that
due to personal problem, she intends to resign from the
company. She then demanded the payment of separation
pay. In March 2004, Ocubillo likewise intimated her intention
to resign and demanded separation pay. Sitosta explained to
both De Lemos and Ocubillo that the company had no
existing policy on granting separation pay, and hence he
could not act on their request. De Lemos never reported
back to work since March 2004, while Ocubillo failed to
report for work from October 2004 to the present.
 As to the allegation of respondents that the reason for their
transfer was their refusal to render overtime work until 7:00
p.m., petitioners asserted that respondents are piece-rate
workers and hence they are not paid according to the
number of hours worked.
 LA: Constructive dismissal. neither resigned nor abandoned
their jobs, the ambiguities in the circumstances
surrounding their dismissal are resolved in favor of the
workers. It was emphasized that respondents could no longer
be deemed terminated for reason of AWOL because this
prerogative should have been exercised before the dismissals
have been effected. Moreover, it would have been illogical for
respondents to resign and then file a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
 NLRC REVERSED: The NLRC found no basis for the charge
of constructive dismissal, thus: Complainants’ alleged
demotion is vague. They simply allege that by reason of their
transfer in August 2003, they did not earn as much as they
earned in their previous assignments. They failed to state how
much they earned before and after their transfer, if only to
determine whether or not there was indeed a diminution in
their earnings. PIECE RATE RIN SILA.
ISSUE: WON the ees were illegally dismissed. YES
Complainants’ transfer was a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Respondent company points out that it is engaged in the business of
garments manufacturing as a sub-contractor. That, the kind of work it
performs is dependent into with its client which specifies the work
it has to perform. And, that corollary thereto, the work to be
performed by its employees will depend on the work specifications
in the contract. Thus, if complainants have been assigned to different
operations, it was pursuant to the requirements of its contracts. x x x.
In furtherance of their defense that complainants were not dismissed,
either actual or constructive in August 2003, respondents allege that
complainants continued to report for work until February 2004 for
complainant De Lemos and August 2004 for complainant Ocubillo. We
lend credence to this allegation of respondents because it remains
unrebutted by complainants.
Security of Tenure
The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested
rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its
prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. Thus, an
employer may transfer or assign employees from one office or area of
operation to another, provided there is no demotion in rank or
diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and the action
is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected
as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause.
x x x. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be
exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic
elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused
with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used
as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.
In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it
involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of
proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to constructive
dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an
offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise,
constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the
employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment. (Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC)
Respondents were not constructively dismissed.
Being piece-rate workers assigned to individual sewing machines,
respondents’ earnings depended on the quality and quantity of finished
products. That their work output might have been affected by the change
in their specific work assignments does not necessarily imply that any
resulting reduction in pay is tantamount to constructive dismissal.
Workers under piece-rate employment have no fixed salaries and their
compensation is computed on the basis of accomplished tasks.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the transfer was
unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the respondents. Such
deployment of sewers to work on different types of garments as dictated
by present business necessity is within the ambit of management
prerogative which, in the absence of bad faith, ill motive or
discrimination, should not be interfered with by the court (no showing
here)
"the objection to the transfer being grounded on solely upon the
personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the
employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey
an order of transfer."
The award of backwages cannot be sustained. backwages may be
granted only when there is a finding of illegal dismissal.
Indeed, there was no evidence that respondents were dismissed from
employment.
In cases where there is no evidence of dismissal, the remedy is
reinstatement but WITHOUT backwages.
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not
intended to oppress or destroy management.22 While the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights
which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple
fair play.23 Thus, where management prerogative to transfer employees
is validly exercised, as in this case, courts will decline to interfere.
Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal, praying for
reinstatement with backwages and other benefits against
Isetan Department Store.
 Complainant Corazon Jamer was employed on February 10,
1976 as a Cashier at "Joy Mart," a sister company of Isetann.
After two (2) years, she was later on promoted to the position
of counter supervisor.
She was transferred to Isetann, Carriedo Branch, as a money
changer.
In 1982 she was transferred to the Cubao Branch of Isetann,
as a money changer, till her dismissal on August 31, 1990.
 Complainant Cristina Amortizado, on the other hand, was
employed also at "Joy Mart" in May, 1977 as a sales clerk.
In 1980 she was promoted to the position as counter cashier.
Thereafter, she was transferred to "Young Un Department
Store" as an assistant to the money changer.
Later on, or in 1985, she was transferred to Isetann, Cubao
Branch where she worked as a Store Cashier till her
dismissal on August 31, 1990.
 Respondent Isetann Department Store on the other hand, is
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines and is engaged in retail trade and the
department store business. Individual respondent, John Go is
the President/General (Manager) of respondent Department
Store.
 This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants
by the respondents. They were both dismissed on August 31,
1990 on the alleged ground of dishonesty in their work as
Store Cashiers (function: to accumulate, at the end of daily
operations, the cash sales receipts of the selling floor cash
register clerks. At the close of business hours, all the cash
sales of the floor cash register clerks are turned over by them
to the Store Cashiers, complainants herein, together with the
tally sheets prepared by the cash register clerks. Thereafter,
complainants will reconcile the cash sales with the tally
sheets to determine shortages or coverages (sic) and
deposit the same with the bank depositor(sic) of
respondent's company. Thereafter, the recorded
transactions are forwarded to the main branch of respondent's
company at Carriedo for counter-checking.)
 On July 16, 1990, complainants discovered a shortage of
P15,353.78. Corazon Jamer first discovered the shortage. In
fact at first, she thought that it was merely a P1,000.00
shortage but when she reconciled the cash receipts, from the
cash register counters, with the tally sheets and the actual
money on hand, the shortage amounted to P15,353.78. She
informed her co-store cashier, complainant Cristina
Amortizado, about the shortage. Cristina Amortizado also
reconciled and re-counted the sale previous to July 16, 1990
and she also confirmed that there was a discrepancy or a
shortage of P15,353.78. They did not, (sic) immediately
report the shortage to management hoping to find the
cause of the shortage but to no avail they failed to
reconcile the same. Hence, they had no other alternative
but to report the same to the management the next day.
 Respondents placed both complainants and their co-
store cashier Lutgarda Inducta under preventive
suspension for the alleged shortages. Thereafter,
respondents conducted an administrative investigation.
Finding the explanation of the complainants to be
unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the complainants
from the service on August 31, 1990.
 Aggrieved and not satisfied with the decision of management
terminating their services, complainants instituted this
present action on September 26, 1990.
 In justifying complainants' dismissal from their employment,
respondents alleged: shortage of P15,353.78 was discovered.
+ under-deposit of P450.00 of cash receipts for July 14,
1990.Considering that the foregoing deficits were attributable
to herein appellees and to another store cashier, Mrs.
Lutgarda Inducta, who were the ones on duty those days
respondent Isetann's Human Resources Division Manager,
Teresita A. Villanueva, issued individually addressed to herein
appellees and Mrs. Inducta requiring them to submit
written explanations in regard to their above malfeasance
within 48 hours from receipt thereof. Pursuant to said
letters, they were likewise placed under preventive
suspension.
 Thereafter, the Committee on Discipline of appellant Isetann
conducted a series of investigations probing the aforestated
shortages + several other sums which appellees failed to
turnover or account for. Finding: the appellees and Mrs.
Inducta responsible and consequently requiring them to
restitute the same to respondent Isetann. This Decision and
the notices of termination were sent by respondent
Isetann to the appellees, and which the latter admittedly
received.
COMPLAINANTS’ VERSION:
Aside from the foregoing persons, Alex Mejia had and was
allowed by management to have uncontrolled access to
the said room including the vault. Ostensibly, the purpose
 was to assist in the bringing in or taking out of coin bags,
monies, etc.
There were therefore, at a minimum at least six (6)
persons who could have had access to the company
funds. To ascribe liability to the store cashiers alone, in the
absence of a clear proof of any wrongdoing is not only unfair
and discriminatory but is likewise illegal.
Parenthetically, and within the parameters of their assigned
tasks, herein complainants could not be faulted in any way for
the said shortage as there is no showing that the loss occurred
at the time they were in control of the funds concerned.
Complainants do not dispute the fact that there appeared
to be a shortage of P15,373.78 (sic) for the July 15, 1990
(a Sunday) sales and which were tallied and the loss
discovered on the following day, July 16, 1990. They
however vehemently deny any culpability or participation
in any kind, directly or indirectly, in regard to the said loss
or shortage. Given the kind of trust reposed upon them
by respondents for fourteen and thirteen years
respectively they were not about, although they could
have done so before given the negligence and laxity of
management in regard to the control and handling of
funds of the store, to break said trust.
At the time the persons who had access either to the vault the
money and/or the keys aside from herein complainants, were:
1) Lutgarda Inducta, also a store cashier on duty at the time;
2) the SOM Mrs. Samonte, the supervisor in charge; 3) Alex
Mejia, an employee assigned as utility man; and 4) Boy
Cabatuando.
There where(sic) three (3) keys to the money changer's room,
and these keys were assigned and distributed to: a) master
key is or was with the SOM's (Mrs. Samonte) room at the 3rd
floor of the building; b) another key is or was in the possession
of the keeper of the keys, i.e. Boy Cabatuando; and c) the third
and last key is any of the store cashiers depending on who is
on duty at the time.
Likewise, there were four (4) persons who were aware and
knew of the vault combination. These were the three store
cashiers, i.e. herein complainants, Lutgarda Inducta and their
SOM, Mrs. Samonte.
LA: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL Reinstate complainants
NLRC: Reversed
HELD: DISMISSAL WAS VALID.
On the merits, we find and so hold that substantial evidence exists
to warrant the finding that petitioners were validly dismissed for
just cause and after observance of due process.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the
substantive and the procedural.
a. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause
as provided by law (Articles 282, 283 and 284, of the Labor
Code, as amended),
b. but the rudimentary requirements of due process, basic of
which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself,
must be observed before an employee may be dismissed.
Art. 282. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the followings causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, we find no difficulty in agreeing with the findings of
the public respondent that the herein petitioners were guilty of acts of
dishonesty by incurring several occurrences of shortages in the amounts
Gandara vs. NLRC, 300 SCRA 702 (1998)
FACTS :
 Milagros Sy, owner of Gandara Mill Supply, at No. 708
Gandara St., Binondo, Manila, was the respondent in NLRC
Case No. 02-01653-94 instituted by Silvestre
Germano (now the private respondent).
 On February 6-11 1995, Germano without notifying his
employer, Milagros Sy, did not report for work. Like any
expectant father, he chose to be near his wife who was then
about to deliver. The wife gave birth on February 12, 1995.
Upon private respondents request, Milagros Sy extended
some financial assistance to the Germano couple.
 Gandara Mill Supply is a small business enterprise with only
two (2) employees, including Germano, to do manual work.
With inadequate manpower, the absence of just one worker
can spell untold difficulties in its operations. Matters became
even worse when Germano, without informing his employer,
was absent for a long time, so much so that the former
incurred the ire of the latter. Two (2) weeks after, private
respondent returned to duty, and to his surprise, he was
met by his employer to personally tell him that someone
had been hired to take his place. He was advised,
however, that he was to be re-admitted in June 1996.
 Germano filed a case of ID on February 27, 1995.
 To buy peace, Gandara offered P5,000.00 but to no avail. The
offer was flatly rejected by Germano. When conciliation efforts
proved futile.
 Despite receipt of the aforesaid Order, however, Gandara still
failed to file their position paper therewith, prompting the
Labor Arbiter to hand down a decision ordering to pay
separation pay and backwages
 On May 22, 1996, the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal
for failure to post a cash or surety bond.
ISSUES:
FIRST, did the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners appeal and in not giving petitioner a chance to
prove that the private respondent was not illegally dismissed but was
merely suspended for abandoning his job?; and
SECOND, did the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion
in awarding to the private respondent the amount of SIXTY-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE AND
90/00 (P65,685.90), which amount petitioner assails as excessive?
RULING:
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden of proof in whowing
that Germano was not illegally dismissed. Unfortunately, petitioner
failed to discharge its burden of proof.
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that, findings of
fact by quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are conclusive upon the
court in the absence of proof of grave error in the appreciation of facts.
Petitioners bare allegation that it was denied the right to be heard is
negated by the Labor Arbiters extension of much leniency to petitioner
by allowing the latter to submit a position paper on April 28, 1995, then
on May 5, 1995, and finally, seven (7) days from receipt of the Order
dated May 9, 1995. Generally, reglementary periods are strictly
observed to the end that orderly administration of justice be
safeguarded. In the case under consideration, the public respondent
had been quite liberal in observing and enforcing the rules.
Consequently, petitioners protestation of denial of opportunity to be
heard is barren of any factual basis. The principle of laches finds a wide
room for application here.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to raise it.
So also, in the Order, dated May 9, 1995, respondent Commission
declared in clear and unequivocal terms that failure to file a position
paper is deemed a waiver of the right to be heard and that decisions will
be based on the position paper submitted.
By its inaction, petitioner was properly considered to have waived or
forfeited the right to refute private respondents stance. Indeed, petitioner
cannot now be permitted to belatedly complain of a denial of due
process.
That petitioner was not represented by a lawyer in all the aforesaid
proceedings was solely attributable to its own negligence or inattention
to the case. While the court has held that representation by a lawyer is
a fundamental right of litigants, petitioner has nobody to blame but itself
for its failure to secure the services of counsel resulting to the dismissal
of its case. In the case under scrutiny, petitioner was represented by
a non-lawyer, Ramon Flores, who was present from the beginning
of the case but failed to efficiently follow-up the case until the
promulgation of judgment. While the right to due process is available
to all the parties, it does not countenance self-serving excuses devised
to undermine orderly administration of justice.
The doctrine of compassionate justice is applicable
under the premises, private respondent being the
breadwinner of his family. The Social Justice policy
mandates a compassionate attitude toward the working class
in its relation to management. In calling for the protection to
labor, the Constitution does not condone wrongdoing by the
employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions
that may be applied to him in the light of the many
disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an albatross on
his neck.6
Untenable is petitioners contention that the said amount awarded,
representing backwages, separation pay and attorneys fee is
excessive and tantamount to a deprivation of petitioners property
without due process of law.
Once a finding of illegal dismissal is established, an award of separation
pay and backwages is in order and binding upon the court, unless the
contrary is proved. The court shares the Labor Arbiters observation and
ratiocination that the amount of the questioned award is not excessive
in light of prevailing economic conditions.

Germano was illegally dismissed.

While a prolonged absence without leave may constitute as a just cause
of dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due
process.

Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was

not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the
legality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and
therefore illegal.

 On hand that private respondent was really dismissed, there

is no clear indication that the latter was to be reinstated. In
fact, since the inception of the case, what petitioner merely
endeavored was to compromise for a measly sum
of P5,000.00, and no mention of taking respondent back
to his job was ever offered as part of the deal to end the
controversy. What can be surmised from petitioner’s offer
to re-admit the private respondent, was nothing but a
polite gesture couched in words intended to make the
impact of his so-called suspension less severe. Invoking
the plight of a working man, where no work, no pay is the rule
of thumb, the court cannot sanction an over extended
suspension. The Labor Code explicitly provides, that :

 No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty

(30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker
to his former or substantially equivalent position or the
employer may extend the period of suspension provided that
during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other
benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not
be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the
extension if the employer decides after completion of the
hearing to dismiss the worker.

In this case, the supposed suspension was expected to last for

more than the period allowed by law, thus making the suspension
constitutive of an illegal dismissal. Therefore, the Labor Arbiters
contention is upheld by the Court.

 Granting arguendo that private respondents absence

engendered undue difficulty to the smooth operations of
petitioners business, considering the predicament of
respondent Silvestre Germano, his dismissal is
unwarranted. In holding the constitutional mandate of
protection to labor, the rigid rules of procedure may
sometimes be dispensed with to give room for compassion.