Tañada v.

 Tuvera
GR No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446)
April 24, 1985
 
 
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
 
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
 
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the following questions:
 
1.   What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2.    Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3.    What is meant by "publication"?
4.    Where is the publication to be made?
5.    When is the publication to be made?
 
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
 
In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This
elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening
events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court.
 
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
 
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
 
 
ISSUES:
1. Whether the government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. 
2. Whether there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not.
3. Whether publication means complete publication.
4. Whether the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
 
 
HELD:
1. No.
 
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
 
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed
out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided.”
 
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think
of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
 
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and
this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
 
 
2. Yes.
 
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. [[1]]
 
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
 
 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
 
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
 
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions  or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
 
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down
by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by
this rule but by the Local Government Code.
 
 
3. Yes.
 
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
 
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. One reserved his vote  and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
should be made. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.
 
 
4. Yes.
 
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
 
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
 
Fuentes v. Roca
GR No. 178902
April 21, 2010
 

FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza sold a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City, on October 11, 1982 she to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six
years later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners the Fuentes spouses. They later signed an agreement to sell dated April 29, 1988 which required Tarciano to secure the
consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca, to the sale within six months. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.  Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months
afterwards.
 
Eight years later in 1997, the respondents, the Rocas filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC
of Zamboanga City claiming that the sale to the spouses was void since Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus
prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
 
 The RTC dismissed the case because the action grounded on forgery or fraud had already prescribed.  Here, the Rocasfiled their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was
issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989. Also, the RTC noted that the law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid.  
 
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code
under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
 
The CA held that the sale was voidable, its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest and the value of their improvements. 
 
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review. 
 
 
ISSUE:

Whether the Family Code applies in the sale of the conjugal property by Tarciano.
 
 
HELD: Yes.
 
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in

1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole

administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 [17] prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without

his wifesconsent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of

the sale.Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code

on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.[18] Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to

vested rights.[19]

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the

real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. 
 
Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation
GR. No. 179579
February 1, 2012
 
DOCTRINE: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication under the Revised Administrative Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.
 
 
FACTS:
On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes, classifies wheat according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port
of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would then be classified either as food grade or feed grade with a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7% respectively.
 
On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Pinascontending that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
 
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that,
among others, was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
 
On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the basic
requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of the CMO.
 
Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of
petitioners and other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether CMO 27-2003 is valid.
 
 
HELD: No.
 
Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the CMO.
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date
of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons. Section 
 
Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
 
Acaac v. Azcuna
GR No. 187378
September 30, 2013
 
FACTS: 
PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects
within Misamis Occidental.PETAL built some cottages on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are
petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
 
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of
its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8, 2002 the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a
Municipal Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;and (b) the construction of any
structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.
 
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a
joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting
ingress and egress thereto.
 
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island.
 
Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO, injunction and damagesagainst respondents alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by the Local Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.
 
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland
and property belonging to the public domain.
 
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.
 
On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with
Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that
the subject ordinance is valid.
 
 
ISSUE: 
Whether the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners
 
 
HELD: Yes.
 
Though the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on fisheries and
aquatic resources of the SP, 30 days have already elapsed form the time the said ordinance was submitted for review by the SB. If no action has been taken by the SP within 30
days after submission of such ordinance, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and valid. Assumption that officials have done which the law requires them to do.
 
A public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Acaac, has the burden of proof, failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.
 
Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the SangguniangPanlalawigan.
 
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review,
copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
 
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniangpanlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to
the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of
ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by
the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision
 
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall
enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
 
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
 
B. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
Kasilag v. Rodriguez
GR No. 46623
7 December 1939
 
 
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The
said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents (Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the owners of the disputed
land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should
yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien.
 
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece
land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.
 
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no
knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith?
 
 
HELD: Yes.
 
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but unfortunately, private
documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to
know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and
different this is possible and excusable errors arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines
 
Even ignorance of the law may be based upon error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.
 
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition
regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion
that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may therefore, be the basis of good  faith.We do not give much importance to the change
of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of
possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have stated that the petitioner’s ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold
that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
 
Elegado v. Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. L-68385
May 12, 1989
 
 
DOCTRINE: CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE FROM COMPLIANCE THEREWITH; APPLICABLE WITH EQUAL FORCE AND
EFFECT ON TAX CASES; CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on
which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance? If
our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
 
 
FACTS:
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly residentof the Philippines, died in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left inthe Philippines, his
son Ward Graham filed an estate tax return. [Meanwhile, W.Graham designated executor, appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in-factfor the allowance of the will in the
Philippines.]On the basis of such return, the respondent Commission of Internal Revenue assessed the descendants estate in the amount of P96,509.35. The assessment was
protested by the law firm of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the estates which wasdenied by the Commissioner.Elegado as an ancillary administrator filed a second estate tax
return. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87 based on the SEC return, which was protested by the Agrava Law Office on behalf
of theestate. While the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet been paid
although the assessment had long become final and executory. Petitioner was denied contending that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return
filed for by lawyers.
 
 
ISSUE: 
Whether the first assessment is binding being filed for by lawyers.
 
 
HELD: Yes.
 
The Supreme Court held that Elegados contention is flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who
filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of
their ignorance?
 
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
 
C. RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
David v. Agbay
GR. No. 199113 
March 18, 2015
 
 
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.
 
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is a public land and part of
the salvage zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private
respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
 
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court. David filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same
was denied. Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that the latter’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an
information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court and a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then filed an Urgent
Motion for ReDetermination of Probable Cause, which was denied. David’s petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether David may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
 
 
HELD: Yes.
 
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2
and 3 of said law read:
 
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
 
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath (Emphasis supplied).
 
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is
qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino
citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
 
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3
is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 
 
This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention. Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the  effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
 
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
 
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
 
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
 
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-
born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said
law having no retroactive effect insofaras his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under
Article172, paragraph 1.
 
Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Elvin Chan and Court of Appeals 
GR No. 157547
February 23, 2011
 
 
FACTS: 
In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22. 
 
Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with a declared amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund the
check he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent. Despite notice insufficiency of his account s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the
value of the check within 5 days after receiving the notice. 
 
Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in Pasay City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00. 
 
On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to change plaintiff s attachment bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia as a consequence
of the pendency of another action between parties for the same cause. 
 
The plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, constituting an implied right
to initiate civil action. The Plaintiff also cited Rule 11 1 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action during the pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of
the CCP. The case falls under Art. 33 of the CCP.
 
On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simon s urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to charge plaintiff s attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2 001, the
RTC of Pasay City upheld MCTC s dismissal of Chan s initiated Civil Case. 
 
Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue; Whether or not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.
 
The CA over turned the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA recognized that civil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling o f a criminal case, the
following case falls under the exception under Rule 111 Sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for
review. 
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied retroactively. 
 
 
HELD:
The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on Jun e 25, 2002. Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2 000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
 
The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
 
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It  is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of
their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution. 
 
The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the cor responding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in eff ect when Chan commenced
Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any
new rules m ay validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of proced ure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if t hey permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is requi red at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity wo uld be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully
invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same intere st in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs pr ayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would , regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two
requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably sho ws that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the par ties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same.
Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued  Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
P336,000.00 payable to ca sh, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as we ll as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical
in al l respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily ba r the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Cas e No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that
the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
Pablo C. Francisco v. Court of Appeals and The Honorable Maximo C. Contreras
GR No. 108747
April 6, 1995
 
 
FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate information instituted by five of his employees,
each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
 
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the
five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime
committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie
Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the
offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties
imposed.
 
 
HELD:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.
 
The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.
 
Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to
a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
 
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.
 
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
 
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by
the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the
penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant
petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
 
Pesca v. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921
April 17, 2001
 
 
DOCTRINE: Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis.
 
 
FACTS: 
The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at
least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their
children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But
he didn’t. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence,
this petition.
 
 
ISSUE: 
Santos and Molina have retroactive effect in the case at bar in terms of identifying the meaning of Psychological Incapacity?
 
 
HELD: Yes. Court decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
 
The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legisinterpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
 
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied
D. MANDATORY OR PROHIBATORY LAWS
Nerwin v. PNOC
GR No. 167057
April 11, 2012
 
 
FACTS:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (“NEA”) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and
delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project.  
 
Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the
contract.  NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to
determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s requirements.
 
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921
entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation  v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No.
FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for
the wooden poles.
 
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were
not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.
 
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition
from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in
disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by
the Supreme Court, on government projects.
 
 
HELD:
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to
have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
 
E. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Consunji v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137872
20 April 2001
 
 
FACTS:
On November 2, 1990, around 1:30PM Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to
Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.
 
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and DelsoDestajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were
on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
 
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for
damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DMConsunji amounting to P644,000.
 
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
 
 
HELD:
The Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of
res ipsaloquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims
under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived  theirknown right of the
remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that
of which she already had.
 
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz
GR No. 19565
January 30, 1968
 
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children.  During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage
in various businesses.  The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties.  She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties.  On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his
frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business.  Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office
at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.  The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress
named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the
concubine.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether separation of husband from his wife constitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal partnership property.
 
 
HELD: No.
 
There was only mere physical separation and not real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement, moral and FINANCIAL desertion.
Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties
and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to
resume or claim one’s rights or interests.
 
Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give support despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to
return and resume his marital duties and rights. There was evidence that he supported the family and that the family was not living in want.
 
Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect the CP except if the husband abandons his wife without just cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage on
part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets. There is no strong
corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually increased the
value of their assets by over a million pesos
 
Dona Adela Export International Inc. v. Tidcorp & BPI
G.R. No. 201931
February 11, 2015
 
DOCTRINE:
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of
contracts. The rule is based on Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.
 
 
FACTS:
Petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. The case was docketed and raffled off to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211. The
RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. 
 
Thereafter, Atty. Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors
to submit proof of their respective claims. Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of
compromise. 
 
Petitioner through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed
to transfer a parcel of land with existing improvements situated in the Barrio of Hulo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement
bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement.
 
The creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement which contained some terms and conditions for their benefit. The RTC rendered the assailed
Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. 
 
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and
waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
 
In its Order, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and acquiescence to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while creditors BPI and TIDCORP
set it for hearing was tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto. Hence, this petition.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits
under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000?
 
 
HELD: No.
 
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil case is final, unappealable, and immediately executory.
 
However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise
agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment. In this
case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise agreement assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two
creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner was not a party. 
 
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its
representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner was waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank
deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who
was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
 
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its objection during the proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver
must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but must have been made
knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be construed as surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against the existence and validity of such waiver.
 
In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property, assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or
assignee. Thus, in the order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property,
monies, estate and effects with all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto, pursuant to Section 32 of the Insolvency Law. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the
assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. Corollary, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement that
petitioner waives its right to confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects
of petitioner have been assigned and conveyed to her and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.
 
While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement, she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted
by TIDCORP and BPI. In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP)
there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits. 
 
Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and
conformity of the receiver. The court held that the petitioner was not bound by the said provision.
 
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of
contracts. The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code, which provides that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. The sound reason for
the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie, which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation.
 
Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the
parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made
solely on the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.
 
Aujero v. Philcomsat
G.R. No. 193484 
January 18, 2012
DOCTRINE: Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present, the quitclaim executed by a party constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
 
FACTS:
Petitioner Hypte Aujero was the Vice President of respondent company Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat). After 34 years, he applied for an early
retirement which was approved. This entitled Aujero to receive his retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of
service. Aujerosubsequently executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. After 3
years, Aujero filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00. Aujero contends that the significantly
deficient amount he previously received was more than an enough reason to declare his quitclaim null and void. Aujero further claimed that he had no choice but to accept the
lesser amount as he was in dire need of money.
 
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Aujero and directed Philcomsat to pay the balance of his retirement pay. The LA maintained that Philcomsat failed to substantiate its claim
that the amount received by Aujero was a product of negotiations between the parties. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) reversed the decision of the LA and decided in favor of Philcomsat. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat
 
 
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
 
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their
legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.
Considering Aujero’sclaim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, the Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
 
That Aujero was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. Dire necessity
may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for
annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is the Court’s duty to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves
this Court to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws.
 
Aujero’s educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. The Court cannot
permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that Aujeroallowed
to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved
is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.

GR. No. 201931February 11, 2015

 

DOÑA ADELA EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), Respondents.

FACTS:

Dona Adela filed a case for Voluntary insolvency. During the proceedings, Dona Adela entered into a compromise agreement with TIDCORP to enter into a dacion en pago in

order to pay its obligations. The agreement which specified the details of the dacion, which importantly was negotiated by BPI and TIDCORP, and not with Dona Adela, included a

waiver of confidentiality of bank accounts under the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the GBL of 2000 regarding Dona Adela’s accounts, as well as those of its directors.

One of the affected directors, Epifanio Ramos, filed a manifestation challenging the waiver of the confidentiality over his bank account, claiming that he has a separate

personality from the corporation. Nevertheless, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Ramos’ MR was denied. 

Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dona Adela is bound by the waiver provision of the compromise agreement.

RULING:

No.
 The compromise agreement was entered into by BPI and TIDCORP, with Dona Adela not a party. The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits requires that waiver be by written

permission of the depositor. Here, Dona Adela did not give such written consent. BPI and TIDCORP were the parties. The provision on waiver as merely inserted into their

agreement. Thus, Dona Adela was not bound by the provision. 

Further, Dona Adela’s silence on the matter during the proceedings cannot constitute a waiver. Mere 

silence on the part of the holder of a right should not be construed as a waiver thereof.

G.R. No. 193484               January 18, 2012

HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, 

vs.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Hypte Aujero was the Vice President of respondent company Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat). After 34 years, he applied for an early

retirement which was approved. This entitled Aujero to receive his retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. 

Aujero subsequently executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. After 3

years, Aujero filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00. Aujero contends that the significantly

deficient amount he previously received was more than an enough reason to declare his quitclaim null and void. Aujero further claimed that he had no choice but to accept the

lesser amount as he was in dire need of money.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Aujero and directed Philcomsat to pay the balance of his retirement pay. The LA maintained that Philcomsat failed to substantiate its

claim that the amount received by Aujero was a product of negotiations between the parties. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) reversed the decision of

the LA and decided in favor of Philcomsat. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC. 

ISSUE: 

Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat 

RULING:

Petition GRANTED. 

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade

their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.

Considering Aujero’s claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, the Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

That Aujero was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. Dire

necessity may be an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee UST Law Review, Vol. LVII No. 1, November 2012 was

tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is the Court’s duty

to prevent the exploitation of employees, it also behooves this Court to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not contravene our laws. 

Aujero’s educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. The Court

cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that Aujero

allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being

aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.

G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, 

vs.

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in August 28, 1998 in Manila. They have a daughter name Sequeira Delle Francisco Thornton. After 3 years,

respondent wanted to return to her old job as a “GRO” in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but

she continued her carefree ways.

On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband and told the servants that she was bringing their daughter to Basilan

Province.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court in Makati City, but was dismissed the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to find the

respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there. The barangay office issued a certification that the respondent is no longer living there.

Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus in the CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. It was denied because of lack of

jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA, RA 8369 (Family Courts Act) impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 which granted the CA with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas

corpus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129

RULING:

No.

The CA did not lose its jurisdiction to issue writs of Habeas Corpus involving the custody of minors. There is nothing in RA 8369 which revoked it of such jurisdiction. The word

“exclusive” cannot be construed as automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. The jurisdiction of the CA and and the

Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of Habeas Corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, the CA can

issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty.

The literal interpretation of the word “Exclusive” will result in grave justice.

Furthermore, implied repeals are not favoured. Provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent that it revoked the CA and SC’s jurisdiction to issue writs of HC relating to

custody of minors. RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7902 and BP 129.

G.R. No. 196271               February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA

vs.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case assailed the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of

synchronization, this law postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August

2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President‘s power to appoint officers-in-charge to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the

terms of the elected officials.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054

RULING:

No.

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM

elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any

provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent

elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176,

RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision

of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.

Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second

Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the  provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.

Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
 From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the

Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section

1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. 

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in

Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

G.R. No. 207942               January 12, 2015

YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 

vs.

TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by

Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMIs portion (known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the

Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BDO). The Government then opened the area for

exploration. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986 onwards. 

In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section of

Regional Office No. V of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing

Agreement (MPSA)over the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay.  The application, which was amended in

1999, was granted on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the

portion of the mineral lands.

August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of

absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asias MPSA5. In September 14, 2007in Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it

would commence exploration works in Yinlus areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. Yinlu

replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration works on its own private property in the Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents.

TransAsia found out that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlus request to register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.

DENR Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to verify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu.a. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that

there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.  DENR Sec

Atienza ordered the amendment of Trans-Asias MPSA by excluding therefrom the mineral lands covered by Yinlus mining patents. DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order found

that the mining patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930 as evidenced by and indicated in PIMIs certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were validly transferred

to and were now owned by Yinlu. He rejected Trans-Asias argument that Yinlus patents had no effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them

pursuant to Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended.

He refuted Trans-Asias contention that there was a continuing requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake improvements in order

to have the patents subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute

imposition. He noted that the suspension of PIMIs operation in 1974 due to financial losses and the foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks (MBC/PCIB)

constituted force majeure that justified PIMIs failure in 1974 to comply with the registration requirement under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the basis

for issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the minerals covered by the patents to be segregated from the public domain and be considered

private property; and that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural resources, was adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The Office of the President affirmed the DENR Secs Order. Under the Philippine Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining

locations may only be subject to concession or lease. The only exception is where a location of a mining claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government

under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated, and according to the laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain, and the

locator is entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore. The right of the locator to the mining patent is a vested right, and the

Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition against alienation of natural resources. The right of the appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject mining

patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of appellant. The existence of the TCTs in the name of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents. Under

PD 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims or where none exists, the ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens

title becomes conclusive and indefeasible even as against the government. 

 The CA agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents

under PD No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463;

hence, the patents lapsed and had no more effect.

Yinlu asserts the following:

a. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 ,
1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and indefeasible
i. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: allowed citizens of the United States and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands 
ii. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: after the exploration and claim of the mineral land, the owner of the claim and of the mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals
found in the area subject of the clai
iii. its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession and prescription; 
b. substantive rights over mineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws
i. Constitution could not impair vested rights; 
ii. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 would impair its vested rights under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of Section 100 and Section 101 to vested rights.

ISSUE: 

Whether Yinlus mining patents constitute vested rights and could not be disregarded.

HELD: YES

A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for the said mining claim. Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation

of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited. The natural resources being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain,

but not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. Prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not

apply to a mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.

McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a

grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of the lands located. The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is

entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area

becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator.

A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United

States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is no

provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof.3. Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a

property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or

devise.

The mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come

within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed

by law. 

Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides that the

provisions of PD No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights under other mining laws

Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or

impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with order mining laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which

are procedural in nature shall prevail.

A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. It is the privilege to enjoy property legally

vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law or some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no

longer open to doubt or controversy.

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent

repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police powerc. 

It has been observed that, generally, the term vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected

against arbitrary State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

Republic v. Court of Appeals held that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested rights that

could not be impaired even by the Government. In the present case, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the

effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be

impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work obligations.
 

G.R. No. 136921       April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner 

vs.

ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to

perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a

habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,

respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children

themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she

returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for

about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their

marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, an held that petitioner failed to show proof that respondent was indeed suffering from psychological

incapacity that would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant.

The CA stated that “the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the

marriage and against its dissolution.” 

Petitioner would have the decision of the CA reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. CA, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. CA and

Molina should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be

merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial

court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. CA and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

RULING:

No, It should be taken to be merely to be mandatory in nature.

The “Doctrine of stare decisis”, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of

the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - “Legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”- that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the

force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed

would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,

that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the

familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural

guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and

Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

G.R. No. 191002               April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 

vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.

FACTS:
 The forthcoming retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 (7 days after the Presidential election) led Congressman Matias V. Defensor (an ex-officio member of the

JBC) to address a letter to the JBC requesting that the process for nominations be commenced immediately. The JBC in its meeting en banc passed a resolution that they

unanimously agree to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or

recommendation and published its announcement for that purpose.

Conformably with its existing practice,the JBC “automatically considered” the 5 most senior of the Associate Justices of the court: Antonio Carpio, Renato Corona, Conchita

Carpio Morales, Presbirito Velasco, Jr., and Eduardo Nachura (the last two declined their nominations). Other candidates either applied or were nominated.

In its meeting on Feb 8,2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn

complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filing of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the

President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.

The complied cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next

chief justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the “In Re Appointments” dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of branch 62, Bago

City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by

the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Valenzuela case is controlling in this case

RULING:

No.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are  settled. It simply means

that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same

jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of

appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria

that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like

ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being

invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. 

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow

blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the

United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly

followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court

in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. 

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is,

therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify

or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.

G.R. No. 187451               August 29, 2012

JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner, 

vs.

JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Basilan. His application was approved however years after. The land

was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 39 was allocated to Custodio, while Lot 140 was allocated to

petitioner Virtucio. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot nos.

139 and 140.

 The RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio that he is in possession of Lot 140. However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes is in possession of Lot 140.

Thus, Virtucio sought to reverse the ruling of CA on the ground that the CA gravely erred in disregarding the decision on CA- G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and

Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes, which contains some factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against Alegarbes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision in Custodio vs. Alegarbes should apply as stare decisis to the present case.

RULING:

No.

It must be noted the the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever

benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial

precedent. “The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by the lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that

once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.”

G.R. No. 199310               February 19, 2014

*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Remman Enterprises filed an application for judicial confirmation over two parcels of land in Taguig. LLDA filed its Opposition to the application for registration, asserting that

the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Republic also opposed, alleging that Remman failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. applies in this case

RULING:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any

ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 

Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:

(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; 

(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and 

notorious possession and occupation of the same; and 

(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., Court stated that in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency (such as the PENRO or

CENRO) that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the

land of public domain as alienable and disposable. Republic v. Tan Properties ruling applies retroactively, since it merely refers to the proper construction of an already existing

law. Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent’s application for registration should be denied.

G.R. No. 204039

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner 

vs.

SPOUSES WALTER UY AND LILY UY, Respondents

FACTS:

 
 Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of the KienerHills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener

Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily Uy (respondents)entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills.

PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers, which included respondents, of units in Kiener Hills to UCPB as PPGI’s partial settlement of its loan with

UCPB.

Respondents filed a complaint before the the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office (HLURB Regional Office) for sum of money and damages against PPGI

and UCPB. They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.

The HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to a refund in view of PPGI’ s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that UCPB

cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire condominium project.

UCPB appealed to the CA, in which the latter applied the decisions UCPB v. O’Halloran which by decided by the CA and not the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the CA erred in applying the O’Halloran case

RULING:

Yes.

The Supreme Court held that Stare Decisis applies only to cases that it decided.

As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 ‘Halloran arguing that it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v.

Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. Inc., the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts, to wit:

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:

xxxx

It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial

precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.

The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further

argument.

In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is

true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions

of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had

issued.

G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,

*I don’t know how the case is related to duty to render judgment

FACTS:

On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he

inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.

Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling.

Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply

embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago.

A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The RTC of Olongapo rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art. 4 of

the RPC: “He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the lower court acquitted Ritter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

RULING:
 No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As

evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from

that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her

vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.

However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil

liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, 

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share

by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area

corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son

Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own

complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.  Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within

thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.

Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

RULING:

YES. 

Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and

ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These

are the justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts]

defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.

G.R. No. 165287               September 14, 2011

ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner, 

vs.

DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO BERMILLO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Dolores Banas, an heir of bartolome Banas owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered

his lot for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The heirs of Banas contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to

redeem the property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was also mention that the Banas heirs failed to give the amount required for them

to redeem the lot.

Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that the Banas heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period

provided in Art. 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC decision to deny the Banas heirs of their right to legal redemption is valid.

 
RULING:

The court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Banas heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the

provisions of Art. 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a

written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised does not exist.

Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. 

There is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be

resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.  The law is clear in this CASE , there must first be a written notice

to the family of Bañas.

The Supreme Court found no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner.  The respondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger

of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation.

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees, 

vs.

WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the

transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata  went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery

wagon pass by.    However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the

plaintiff’s head.

The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable

cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to

the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses

causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.

From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is

appeal to reverse such decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

RULING:

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which,

in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act

that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice

to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the

judgment is therefore reversed.

G.R. No. 182434               March 5, 2010

SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner, 

vs.

HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR,Respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia and Ramia A. Musor, daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a District Court an action for

quieting of title docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97 against Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda Radia.The respondents alleged that, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, they

were the absoluteowners of the lot subject of the complaint; Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property onthe claim that he purchased the same from Mangoda Radia, who

claimed that he inherited it fromhis late father; in 1996, they were informed that the small houses built on the said land with their  permission were ordered by Tamawis to be

removed; they had been unlawfully deprived of their right on the land, and Tomawis’ actions had cast doubt on their title.
 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Shari’a District Court can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97

RULING:

The allegations as well as the relief sought by the private respondents to eliminate doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land are within the jurisdiction of the

Shari’a District Court. The said court has, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction over all personal and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143 (1)(d) which states that all

actions from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, except those for ejectment. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of

the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Private respondents’ petition in Civil Case No. 102-97 alleged the concurrent original of the SDC. On the other hand, BP 129

was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary.The concurrent jurisdiction of SDCs and the RTCs over cases involving only

Muslims is recognized by the Court. The SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arisingfrom contracts customary to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the

exception under PD1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Art.143 of PD 1083 , which states the jurisdictional conferment, is

applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

G.R. No. 184823               October 6, 2010

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs.
AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondent.
 

Facts:

Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and processing of steel and its by-products. It filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat

in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondent’s claim for refund/credit.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit

provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004

was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is

equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112and 229 of the NIRC.

Issue: WON respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 ofthe NIRC.

Ruling: 

Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be reckoned

from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the

Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal

maxim, Lexposteriori derogat priori.

IOW As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal

maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30,

2004. since it is filed on exactly Sept. 30, 2004, filing of the administrative claim was timely filed.

 
G.R. No. 162155.          August 28,2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
 

Caveat: I couldn’t find the fulltext of this case. But the principle seems to be clear

FACTS:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax Primetown paid in 1997.  In Yap's letter to

petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),he explained that the increase in the cost of labor

and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. As a consequence, while business was good

during the first quarter of 1997, Primetown suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.
According to Yap, because Primetown suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.Nevertheless, Primetown paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable

withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, Primetown was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. On May 13, 1999, revenue

officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to support its claim.  Primetown complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000,

it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for

filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

o Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax

hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have

been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be

maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2)

years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even

without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.

The CTA found that Primetown filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13

of the Civil Code which states:Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of

thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they

respectively have.In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of

the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,  Primetown's petition, which was filed 731 daysafterPrimetown filed its

final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Primetown moved for reconsideration but it was denied.Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA. On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.It ruled that

Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.

o In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365

days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Primetown’s petition was filed on time? – YES

HELD:

Primetown's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day Primetownfiled its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within

the reglementary period.

The conclusion of the CA that Primetown filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis,

however, is not. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return.

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In  National Marketing Corporation

v. Tecson: a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

However, in 1987, EO292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it

shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. 

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain."It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain

numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and

including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from

January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be

reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be  abolished.Thus, the provision above

only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law

encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods.

Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12

calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, Section 31,

Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

THEREFORE :Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time Primetown filed its

final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months 

 
Tenchavez vs. Escano
GR No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
 

Facts: 

Plaintiff Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were married on February 24, 1948 in Cebu City. Their relationship subsequently became strained. Vicenta then went to the United

States and filed a complaint for divorce on August 22, 1950 before a court in the State of Nevada. The complaint was granted and an absolute decree of divorce was  issued

on October 21, 1950. Vicenta subsequently married an American, Russel Moran, and acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958.

Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta, her parents, and the Catholic Church before the CFI of Cebu. In her defense, Vicenta presented the

decree of divorce issued by the Nevada court. The CFI decided to deny Tenchavez’s plea for legal sepation so he appealed to heSupreme Court.

Issue: WON the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court can be recognized in our jurisdiction

Ruling: No

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,

notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sough and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada,

on the grounds of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” At the time the decree was issued, Escano was still a Filipino citizen like her husband. She was then subject to

Philippine law and Art. 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 15
Laws relating to family right and duties or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of person are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
 

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its

restrictive policy on the matter in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery of the wife or concubine of the husband (act 271).

Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation and even in that case, it expressly prescribes that “the marriage binds shall not be severed”

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between

Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the

following:
Article 17
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country

Even more, the grant of effectively in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy

citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce decrees outside the Philippines. The

adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine

laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled

to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS vs. HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA
G.R. NOS. 95122-23
31 May 1991
 

FACTS

Santiago Gatchalian, an illegitimate child to a Chinese father (Pablo Pacheco) and a Filipino mother (Mariana Gatchalian), was recognized as a native born Filipino citizen following

the citizenship of his mother. He also declared that he has 5 children with his Chinese wife Chu Gin Tee. One of them was Francisco,

William Gatchalian’s father. On 27 June 1961 12-year old William, together with his father Francisco, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong. They had with them certificates of

Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong and they sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On 6 July 1961 Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 (BSI1) admitted William and his companions as Filipino citizens. The Secretary of Justice subsequently issued Memorandum No. 9

setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on appeal or on review. The Secretary of Justice asked the BOC to review all the

cases where entry was allowed on the grounds of the entrant being a Filipino citizen. Among those cases was that of William.

On 6 July 1962, the BOC reversed the initial decision of the BSI1 and ordered the exclusion of William  Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that the BOC decision

was final and executory.

Respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 filed a motion for re-hearing with the BSI.

Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda issued an order reaffirming the 6 July 1961 decision to admit Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. The warrant of arrest was also recalled.

Acting NBI Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of Justice recommending that William be charged with violation of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act. No. 613).An

order to arrest Gatchalian was issued. He later was released

BOC contends that William’s arrest follows as a matter of consequence the Warrant of Exclusion issued on 6 July 1962. On the other hand, William argues that the Mission Order of

Warrant of Arrest does mention that it is issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion

ISSUES:

W/N William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen based on the validity of his parents’ marriage abroad

HELD:

YES. His grandfather, Santiago Gatchalian, was born of a Filipina mother, despite being an illegitimate child. His father, Francisco Gatchalian, and he were certified as Filipinos by

the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong. However, this was contested by the BOC after the review. Petitioners claimed that William Gatchalian is an alien, despite the certification

signed by the Secretary of Foreign affairs and despite his having lived in the country for 28 yrs. thereafter. They held that the state could use police power in order to arrest and

then deport him. They pointed out that both his grandfather and his father married Chinese women in China and that no evidence was produced regarding the authenticity  nor the

existence of claimed marriages. There was no actual proof that these marriages in China were valid or even real; and if the contrary is true, Francisco Gatchalian and

William Gatchalian were never Filipino citizens because they would have taken the citizenship of the land (if jus soli applies in China) or the citizenship of their mothers, Chinese (if

jus sanguinis applies in China). The lack of evidence of the validity of these marriages in China is the focal point of the petitioners’ arguments. The court holds that it is not the

respondent’s fault that they weren’t able to produce any documentation regarding the validity of the marriages in China. The Citizenship Investigations Board, upon asking of proof

of said marriages, were satisfied with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Much more can this

deficiency be blamed on William Gatchalian, who was only a minor during his migration to the Philippines. Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian’s testimonies were admissible in

evidence as declarations regarding their family’s reputation. Any doubt to these declarations is cast aside by Art. 226, which leans toward the validity of the marriage. Therefore,

the testimonies are considered competent proof. Therefore, the marriages are considered valid and Francisco follows the nationality of his father, as a legitimate child of the latter.

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, vs.

AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy his children filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. The petition was opposed by

Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in China; the other oppositorsare the legitimate

children of the deceased with Yao Kee

After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:

(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee; (2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat and (3) Aida Sy-Gonzales,

Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego

The court held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased

On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court,

(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, TeresitaSy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an

unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:

(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and SzeChun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known

as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Keein China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China

Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals,

Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045.
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals.  This petition was initially denied by the

Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to

this petition.

Issue:

I. Won court erred in declaring the MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Ruling:

I. No

The evidence presented do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory"

The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local

custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7

Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also

be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.)

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question

of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and

published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or

by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate

that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul

general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be

considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to

testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage

between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this

Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia

Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat

was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, vs.

MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

Facts:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the

position of medical technologist under a two-year contract. Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by

Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not

having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. Respondent filed with the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by

petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

The Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held

that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her

contract.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners should be held liable because respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and

Regulations of Kuwait.

RULING:

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere

expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it,

as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and

assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract,

which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord

respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,

including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which,

in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for

termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating

to the termination of the employment of Gran.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach

or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we

apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a

copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Aznar vs. Garcia
GR No. L-16749

Facts:

Edward E. Christensen, a US citizen from the state of California, died in the Philippines while domiciled therein. He left a will where he bequeathed the  sum of P3600 to Helen

ChristensenGarcia and the rest of the estate to Mary Lucy ChistansenDaney. Helen is an illegitimate child who, under the laws of the Philippines, is entitled to receive

a legitime worth more than the sun that she received under the will. Helen opposed the project of partition of her father’s estate contending that it should be Philippine law that

should govern the distribution of his estate. The CFI ruled that “the successional rights and intrinsic validity  of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California,

in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires…”

Issue:

WON California Law or Philippine Law governs the testamentary dispositions of the deceased Edward E. Christansen

Ruling:

Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions of the deceased Edward E. Christiansen

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 16
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
 

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of

testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless

of the country wherein said property may be found.

The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the

NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON, which is California law since the deceased was Californian

Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is

governed by the LAW OF HIS DOMICILE.

These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s

domicile – the Philippines.

S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other

countries as provided by Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California.

The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the

conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2 states.

The Philippines must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the

internal law of California provides no legitime forchhildren while the Philippine laws. (Art. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally

acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them

Bellis vs. Bellis
GR No. L23678
June 6, 1967
 

Facts: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the United States from the state of Texas. He had five legitimate children from his first wife, the legitimate children from his second wife, who

survived him, and he also had three illegitimate. In his will, he bequeathed the amount of P120,000 for his three illegitimate children, $240,000 to his first wife, and the rest of his

estate to his legitimate children. Two of the illegitimate children opposed the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes. The lower court denied

the opposition and approved the project of partition on the ground that Texas law, which is the national law of the decedent and which did not provide for legitimes, governed his

successional rights

Issue I: WON the doctrine of renvoi applies in this case

Ruling

No, because the reference to laws will always be the laws of Texas. The aid doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of

law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of domicile) should govern..Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the

application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of

proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Tayag vs Bemguet Consolidated
GR No. L-23145

November 29, 1968

Facts:

Idonah Slade Perkins died on March 27, 1960 in New York City and left two stock certificates evidencing 33, 002 shares of  Benguet Consolidated County Trust Company of New

York was appointed domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased  while Tayag was designated the ancillary administrator in the Philippines. The CFI of Manila ordered

the domiciliary administrator to produce  he stock certificates but County Trust sis not obey the order. Upon petition by the ancillaryadministrator, the CFI issued an order

considering as lost the stock certificated, canceling the stock certificates, and directing the issuance of new stock certificates and their delivery to the ancillary administrator

Issue: WON Philippine courts have the power and authority over shares of stock held by domiciliary administrator

Ruling: Yes.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines 

Appellant Benguet Consolidated did not dispute the power the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decadent within the jurisdiction of

the Philippines. Nor could it. Such power is inherent in hi duty to settler her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is

a “general rule universally recognized” that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly “Extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it

was granted,” the corollary being “than an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country”

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her

name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject

to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the

corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if

it were so minded.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent
.

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. They were blessed with a son

named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.

Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of

Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never

gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife

established a business in Cebu City.

To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust

refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.

Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.

The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute

an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to

do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s

nationality."

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to

our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged

failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by

our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case

should be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

Ruling:

Yes

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce

decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since

Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on

support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family

rights and duties.

Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is

obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant

obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily

concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the

Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law

involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces

the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered

ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is

still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to

perform her marital duties and obligations.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under

Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.

The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are

to be served.
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura
GR No. 149177
November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd., enteredinto an Independent Contractor Agreement with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in

the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent shall extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to

work as the project manager in various projects in the Philippines. On February 28, 2000. Petitioner’s general manager, Hasegawa, informed respondent that the company would

no longer be renewing his ICA and that his services would be utlized only until March 31, 2000. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had already

expired.

Respondent subsequently sued petitioners for specific  performance and damages with the RTC of Lipa City. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,

asserting that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles

of lex loc celebrationis and lex contractus. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, a decision which was affirmed by the CA. The CA held that the principle

of lex loci cebrationiswas not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA upheld the lower court’s

application of the principle lex loci solutionis

Issue: WON the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courtsin civil cases may be assailed on the  principle of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractusm the state of the most

significant relationship rule or forum non conveniens.

Ruling: No

These are improper grounds for questioning the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts

The judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of

law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a

substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to

apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for

the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a

judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have

jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the

thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the

manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on

the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific

performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter

jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds

unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of  lex contractus  or lex loci contractus means

the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily

agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to

apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should

consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into

account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which

state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only

inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before

determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country

is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in

disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal

law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is

derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other

formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule

16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of

the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this

principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

 
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008
 

Facts

In 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent

Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government

projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for

the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

Respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged

nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.

Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the

Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26

November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory

Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the  (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as

defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated

the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the

commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had

combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any

arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of
the said companies.9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as

"Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory

counterclaim.

Issue: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction

Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of

the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and

the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute

necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law,

and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a

foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a

position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.28

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties

and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign

prerogative of the country where the case is filed.29

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether

or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of

contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,

jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other

foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause

a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both

parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the

trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum

and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Tamano vs Ortiz
G.R. No. 126603
June 29, 1998

Facts:

On 31 May 1958 Senator (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until

his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.

On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda  filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They

contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with

Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a

party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse,1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their

marriage.

Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zoraydawere both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the

sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the

action.

Issue: WON the Sharia court or the RTC have jurisdiction

Ruling:

RTC has jurisdiction

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,3 Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.4 Personal actions,

such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the

defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.5 There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and

correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.6 In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private

respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned

that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married

under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.

Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration

that Estrellita and Tamanowere likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a courtsjurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to

dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the

complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.

Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 10839 

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the

instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional

Trial Courts.

Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with

original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their

general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon

City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings

until terminated

G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
 
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under
a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since
then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
 
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
 
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.
 
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
 
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
 
The petition is DENIED.
 
 
G.R. No. 193902               June 1, 2011
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS: 
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmedytheShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree
of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship
of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested
primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranosincluding a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal
and disbarment from the civil service.

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to
hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of  Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was
governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

HELD: 
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'aCircuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
 
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,  Iligan City,
that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared
that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact
of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have supended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit
Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x xx, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its
policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadzand Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman,
was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

GRANTED
 
G.R. No. 188832               April 23, 2014
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his father HadjiKalam T. Mala, Respondents.
 
 
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
 
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note
for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
 
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff  P2.000 as actual damages
P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
 
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
 
HELD:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk
out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the
New Civil Code.
 
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly   acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
 
 
G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
 
FACTS:
ApolonioTanjancocourted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her
condition, she had to resign from her work. Because she was unable to support herself and the baby, and the Apoloniorefused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages,
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages.
 
ISSUE:
WON the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.
 
HELD:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and
such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.Plainly here there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces for a year.
 
 
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
 
FACTS:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral character and reputation, duly respected in her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987,
against GashemShookatBaksh, an Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.  The complaint for
damages is due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.
 
Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to marry her.  She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married.  They agreed to get married
at the end of the semester, which was October of that year.  They also visited Marilou’s parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.
 
Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him in Guilig, Dagupan City.  It should be noted that she was a virgin before she lived with him and not a woman of
loose morals.  A few weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, which result to injuries.  A confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig ensued
and Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
 
On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of the New Civil Code in its decision favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay PhP 20,000
moral damges, PhP3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.
Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court seeking for the review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said decision which was
also affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 
HELD:
The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, the Court rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our laws.   It was
evident from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”
 
In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith and honest motive when he proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou Gonzales.   He was merely
motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”
 
The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals pursuant to Aticle 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise to marry, but due
the fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the honor and reputation of the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the
morals, good customs or public policy.
 
 
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
34 SCRA 132
 
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations.  Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent.  As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.  Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.  The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action.  Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave
birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action”. 
 
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
 
HELD:
Supreme Court held  that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”.  The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Article 742.
 
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
 
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights.  
Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
 
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
 
 
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented
to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased child.
 
 
G.R. No. L-39110             November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
58 Phil 866
 
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23
years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop.  He got acquainted with Antonio and had an
amorous relationship.   As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. 
 
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.  On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he
wanted his name to be given to the child.  Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.  
The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. 
 
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.  When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.
 
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given
instead of Cesar SyquiaJr. that was first planned.
 
ISSUES: 
1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said IsmaelLoanco.
 
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.  The
mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.   
 
 “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's resolution to admit the status”.
 
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,  PacitaLoanco.  Finally, SC found
no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month.  They likewise pointed out that it is only
the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
 
 
G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA
NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
 
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
CBA. The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during
the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS
did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not
contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status
of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence,
according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.
 
ISSUE:
W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
 
HELD:
No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.   Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.  Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil
personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
 
ISSUE:
W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
 
HELD: 
Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks without depending upon its mother.
 
 
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, Petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, Respondent.

FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate
estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity
of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon
City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied
for is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the
certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the
judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the
commission.
 
 
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
 
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the
sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.  Defendants
failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. 
 
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960.  Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death.  The summons and copies of complaint was personally served
on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. 
 
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).  Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
 
ISSUE:
Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
 
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed.  The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that indeed
Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
 
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.  Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over
his person as far as Oria was concerned.  He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
 
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the
corporation.     
 
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale
of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.
 
 
 Case no. 1 | TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, et. Al., respondents G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
 
Facts: Vitaliana is the common life of the petitioner and the full blood sistrer of the private respondents. Sometime in 08/28/1988, Vitalianadied, leaving her brothers and sisters
unaware of her death. V was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by petitioner in his palace located at  Jasaan, Misamis Orienta. It was also alleged
that despite her desire to escape. Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time, vitalianawas 25 years old at that time and was living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio 
 
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the curt over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to
sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death
of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any
way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next
of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for
resolution on 21 October 1988.
RTC Decision: The Court, considering the circumstance that VitalianaVargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by
respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on
the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as welt of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows 
 
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
x x x           x x x          x x x
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305
and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show
that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The
amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that  this court has ample jurisdiction
to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case
was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . .  10
~01/23/1989 –a new petition was petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470) ~
Petitoner filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention of a live person.
 
ISSUE: W/on the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and sisters or her common law spouse.
Ruling:  Herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
"Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to
the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
The Penal Code article, Art. 332, it said that it makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband
and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 
The custody of Vitaliana’s dead by was correctly awarded to the private respondents. Sec.1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they
be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
Under 332, Art 332 of the RPC,
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-
vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Case no. 2 Marcos et. al. v. Hon. Manglapus et.al G.R. No. 88211 09/15/1989
Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of the family and
to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. 
The President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to thte Philippines is guaranteed 
The universal declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Issue w/on the president may prohibit the Marcoses
from returnin to the Philippines 
Issue: WON the President has the right to impair the Marcoses’ right to return to the Philippines 
Ruling: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right
to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated,
Service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. 
The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of he even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in
absolute terms, admits the limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests. 
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through
a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the
guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat
to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 
 

Case no. 3 | Valino v. Adriano, et al. G.R. No. 182894 04/22/2014

FACTS: Atty. Adriano, who married Rosario Adriano, on Nov. 15, 1955. They had 5 children during their marriage and one adopted daughter, al. The couple’s marriage turned sour

and eventually separated-in-fact.

Years later after the separation, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, herein petitioner, who was once of his clients. Eventually, they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite
such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents). 
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. During his death, the respondents were spending Christmas in the United States. None of the family members were present,
hence petitioner took upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she called petitioner and
requested that she delay the interment for a few days. Petitioner ignored her request. The remains of her husband was interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the
Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the burial.
With this, respondents commenced suit against petitioner for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains be exhumed and transferred to the
family plot.
In her defense, Valino countered that Atty. Adriano and Rosario had been separated for more than 20 years. She claimed that throughout their time together, he had introduced
her to his friends and associates as his wife. Petitoner also admitted that he never forgot his obligation to the respondents. She contended that unlike Rosario, she took good care
of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. In addition, despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario left for the United
States. According to petitioner, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum. She further claimed that she had suffered damages as
result of the suit bought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
RTC Ruling:  complaint filed by respondents were dismissed for lack of merit, together with the counterclaim filed by Valino as it found to be insufficiently proven. 
RTC opined that b/c petitioner lived with AA for a very long time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. The trial concluded that Rosario
did not show love and care for him, taking into consideration that Rosario left for the US at the same time he was fighting his illness. Given that petitioner performed all duties and
responsibilities of a wife, the RTC reasonably presumed that the wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum. 
RTC also noted that the exhumation and transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected.
CA Ruling: reversed and set aside RTC Decision
It directed Valino to have the remains of AA exhumed at the expense of the respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense to transfer, at their expense, the
remains of the decedent in the family plot. 
Explanation: Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Under Art. 305 of the NCC in re to Art. 199 of the Family Code, the
law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband.  Rosario was entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with AA at the time of the latter’s death, regardless of being separated for 30 years. 
However, all types damages were not rewarded due to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the US. 
ISSUE: WON who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of AA
RULING: Rosario, being the lawfully wedded wife of AA. Art. 305 of the OCC, also known as Art. 199 of the FC, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. 
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294.
In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
[Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Art. 308 of the CC:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases
supplied];
Moreover:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the
necessary expenses;
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
Authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
 To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the
same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her
legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative
of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s
keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.
~generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. (Dr. Tolentino~)

As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last

remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was

presented to corroborate it.

~The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals
and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed. 11 [Emphases supplied] (Dr.
Tolentino)

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to

those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one.
NCC 43 
Art. 43 The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the
court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his
or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the done contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said done are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance  policty, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and 
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) – (kk) (1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, conflagration, and it is not shown who died first,
and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of
the sexes, accd’g to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a)
Case No. 4 | Joaquin V. Navarro G.R. No. L-5426 05/29/1953
FACTS: This is a matter of question related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children. All of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by
Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of these persons to have accrued in order: 1 st the Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The CA concurred with the trial court except that, with re with regard to Angela
Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural
child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as
between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
applied. 
CA reasoning: Angela was survived by her son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later, the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
Total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. 2nd in declaring that
those fallen in the same battle are to be disregarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can operate in the source of combats.
No evidence is available on the point. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship  cwould be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like
these. Hence, the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec.
69, subsec (ii) ROC.
It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
ISSUE: WON Angela died first before Joaquin Navarro, Jr or the other way around; or both died the same time 
RULING: Neither of the 2 provisions is applicable for the following reasons: 
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular
circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
x x x           x x x           x x x
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent one from the other,the persons who alleges the prior
death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
It must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or
less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building.
The presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the
evidence. The opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very
strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded
that of her son.
3. Presumption of Capacity
Case No. 5 | Catalan v. Basa et al., G.R. NO. 159567 07/31/2007
FACTS: Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active service due to being unfit to render military service because of “schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates
him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce(sic) and pointless speech.”
A year later, he married Corazon Cerezo (one of the respondents).
06/16/1951 – Feliciano allegedly donated a parcel of land to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half of the real property  described. Consequently, it was registered
with the RD. BIR then cancelled the TD No. 2876, and issued TD No. 18080 to Mercedes for the land that was donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in
Feliciano’s name under TD No. 18081.
12/11/1953 – People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings before the CFI to declare Feliciano incompetent. 12/22/1953 the RTC issued its Order of Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. The next day, the RTC appointed PBTC as Feliciano’s guardian. (PBTC is presently known as
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
03/26/1979 – Mercedes sold the property in issue and in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. The deed of absolute sale was registered with RD of Pangasinan on 02/20/1992
and TD No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents
04/01/1997 – BPI, as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the respondents.
BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly
intended to give the property to her would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and therefore was incapable of giving consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute
Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basashould likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to
anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI
sought remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
08/14/1997 – Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute the heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
RTC Ruling -- the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed
of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of
the donation in question must be upheld.
CA Ruling – Affirmed RTC decision
Nothing of the infirmities which allegedl flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the
fact that the DAS was registered only in 1992, after the death of Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution. In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before
a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant
ISSUE: WON RTC and CA committed an error in holding that the petitioners failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of the late Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment
when the property in dispute was donated.
RULING: Petition is bereft of merit, RTC and CA findings are hereby affirmed.
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.30 Sufficientproof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on
December 22, 1953.31
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he
entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained
competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed
in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.32
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose.33 Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the
claim that Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of
Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to
Delia and Jesus Basa.
In view thereof, petition is denied, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners. 
  

 
(4) Restrictions on Capacity to Act

NCC 38 – 39, cf. NCC 1327

(a) Minority
1. Age of majority, RA 6809, FC 234, 236, 221, 225
2. AM No. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship
3. Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution [cf. Sangguniang Kabataan]
4. Marriage, FC 5; 14, 45 (1); 35 (1); cf. RA 6809; FC 79
5. Contracts 
i. NCC 1327 NCC 1390 (par 1), 1403 (par. 03) NCC 1397, 1399 NCC 1489 NCC 1426 – 1427

Case No. 6 | Mercado v. Espiritu GR NO. L-11872 12/01/1917

FACTS: Plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, are children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of Luis Espiritu (as Luis died

soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity being the administrator of the estate of the deceased).
■ Margarita died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares which hereditary portion had since then held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through
their father Wenceslao Mercado, the husband of Margarita. 
■ About year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, fraudulently succeded in getting the plaintiffs Dominga and Josefa to sign a deed of absolute sale of the land left by their mother, worth P400
whichwas then divided by 2 plaintiffs and their 2 sisters, Concepcion an Paz, notwithstanding the assessed value at P3,795 
■ The part belonging to the 2 plaintiffs can produce 180 cavanesof rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum
■ Luis had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death
■ Counsel asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu,
together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

The defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying said allegations. He alleged that the subject-matter of the complaint had an area of only

21 cavanes of seed rice, 

✓ On 05/25/1894, its owner, the deceased Magarita Espiritu, with due authorization of her husband Wenceslao, sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to
wit, an area such as is usually required fifteen cavanes of seed; 
✓ On 05/14/1901, Wenceslao, Margarita’s husband, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis at the price of P375 the
remainder of the said land to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao’s) children, and this amount being still insufficient, he successively borrowed from said Luis
other sums of money aggregating to P600
✓ On 05/17/1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be legal of age, executed with their sisters Maria Del Consejo and Maria Dela Paz, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro to
being sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they acknowledged having
received from the aforementioned purchaser.
✓ In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000had
been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the
land in litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them. 

CFI Ruling: plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. The motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper

bill of exceptions having been presented, and the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.

ISSUE: WON Luis Espiritu employed fraud in obtaining the signatures of the plaintiffs 

RULING: The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to

effect the sale mentioned.

There is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the
procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and
sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased
father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis
Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and
absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
To judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received through him, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans;
the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2, 000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by
their father makes all together the sum of P3, 000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land.Property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be
considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.
Case no. 7 | Bambalan v. Maramba G.R. No. L-27710 01/30/1928
FACTS: Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner of the land in equestion and that petitioner is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as
regards the said land. 
Defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation
made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not
decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he
signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants. 
RULING: As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from
contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well
known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no
amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was
contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in
the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.

Case no. 8 | Suan and Chiao vs Alcantara G.R. No. L-1720 03/04/1950

FACTS: On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons, Damaso and Ramon conveying to SiaSuan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was then

17 years, 10 months and 22 days old.

On 08/27/1931 – Gaw Chiao, Husband of plaintiff, received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor

and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao,

wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, SiaSuan sold one of the lots to

Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.

08/08/1940 – Action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the CFI of Laguna for the annulment of the Deed of Sale  as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land

covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was filed against the plaintiff spouses, against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, et. al

CFI Ruling: on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution

CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of RTC; the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the

ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced  Sia Suan to pay to Ramon

Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint)

Refused to apply doctrine of Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu, as contended by the appellants because they did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore

did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee’s father, Rufino

Alcantara. 

ISSUE: WON CA committed an error in reversing the decisionmade by the RTC 

RULING: In favor of the plaintiff souses

It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It

is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact. the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when informed

of appellant's minority, the appellees took no steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a

minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed."

In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the

contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid

consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and

void on any ground other than the appellee's minority.

The consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it

is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. 

Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The

suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or

could suspected appellee's minority.

 
 Case no. 9 Braganza v. Villa-Abrille G.R. No. L-12471 04/13/1959

FACTS: Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo, received from Fernando F. de Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and

promised in writing to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the Philippine Island two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has

been established in the Philippines", plus 2% per annum. Because payment had not been made, Villa  Abrille sued them in March 1949. After hearing the parties and their evidence,

the court rendered judgment in favor of de Villa Abrille. 

Braganza, claimed to have received P40,000 only—instead of P70,000 and averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note, filed a petition

to the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeals' decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2%  interest from October 30,

1944.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodolfo and Guillermo de Braganza are bounded by the promissory note considering they were minors, with the age of 18 and 16 respectively, when they

signed it.

RULING: Being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo de Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in the promissory note.

The SC did not agree with the Mercado case cited in the decision under review and specified it is different because the document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he

was of age; here the promissory note contained no such statement. The de Braganzas did not actively present themselves to be of legal age and the notion that they falsely

claimed their age is purely constructive, hence, they cannot be held liable. "The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of

full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient."  (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.) 

On the other hand, they may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, even if their written contract is

unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money they received.  (Art.  1340) There is testimony that the

funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to  the  extent

of the value  of such  money. 

Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 or P46,666.66, they should now return P1,166.67. Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, cannot be

enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability is presently declared without regard of the said promissory note, but solely in

pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo

and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed.

 
6. Criminal Liability
RPC 12 (2) – (3); RPC 3(2); PD 603 Secs. 189 – 2004 Also see: rule 3, section 5 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure Juvenile Justice Law, sec. 6 ug 7
Case no. 10 Atizado and Monreal v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of
one Desder, where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. After the shooting, they fled. For their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were at
 their family residence and drinking in. The RTC convicted Atizado andMonreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusionPerpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court
affirmed the conviction in 2005.It is important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at thetime of the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred infinding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonabledoubt for murder.
What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, aminor during the time of the commission?
RULING: Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended.
The witness positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault
against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for
murder is reclusion Perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed thelesser penalty of reclusion Perpetua on Atizado. But
reclusion perpetuawas not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at
the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years
of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the
commission. Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed to the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344: Section 7. Determination of Age.
- The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the Cpresumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and othergovernment officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the
age of the child in conflict with the law. Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire
period of Monreal’s detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his
immediate Release from the penitentiary.
(b) Insanity, FC 45 (2), NCC 1327
(1), 1328
1. Marriage, FC 45 (2), Art. 79
2. Contracts, NCC 1327 (1), 1328
3. Criminal Liability 
i. RPC 12 (1) Rule 101, Rules of Court
Case no. 11 | United States v. Vaquilar GR No. L-9471 and L-9472 March13, 1914
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was charged with two separate informationswith parricide, one for killing his while the other for killing his daughter. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been
submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these
crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and
subsequent to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is
not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say
anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people
are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other
wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the
defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.
ISSUE: WON these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.
RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane.  The appellant’s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at
the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.   The popular meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal terms
“insane”.  The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who
has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from  a perverted condition of the moral system where
the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility.  In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.

Case No. 12 | PP vs. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., G.R. No. L-54135 11/21/1991

FACTS: On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The

accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and had two children.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronayawas sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house. Attending to

the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and

went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that they should have intercourse, Ronaya refused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the

throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused

cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.  In the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the

accused learned what happened that night.

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial

court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived.

Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and

"oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 
 Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect

implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reason of insanity in this case is sufficient to relieve himself of criminal liability through exempting circumstance.

RULING: NO.

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that the acts without the least discernment; or that there be a

total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of

intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior

to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to

conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied

by hallucinations and delusions

In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is

critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted

by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of

intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and

convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused

should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did

not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of

the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
Case no. 13 | The Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Juan Codina Arenas and others, defendant; Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appellant
FACTS:
• Dec. 15, 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino(as principals) w/ Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and (the Chinaman) Siy Ho (as sureties) assumed obligation to
pay – jointly and severally – to the plaintiff-appellee the sum of Php 3,305.76, three months from this date, with an interest at Php 1 per month.
• •April 5, 1909: Standard Oil sued the five debtors for payment of sum, together w/ the interest thereon at rate of 1 per cent per month from date of assumed obligation (12/15/08)
and the costs; Defendants were summoned, w/ record that showed summons was served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17.
• May 12: Villanueva and Ho were declared to be in default, notified (14th for latter and 15th for former).
• Aug. 28: Court of 1st Instance (of the city of Manila) sentenced all defendants to pay (jointly and severally) to plaintiff company the aforementioned sum, w/ interested thereon at 1
per cent a month from Dec. 15, 1908 until complete payment of principal + costs.
• While judgment was in course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva (Vicente’s wife), appeared and alleged the ff:
• July 24, 1909: latter was declared to be insane by Court of 1st Instance (Manila);
he was appointed his guardian by same court;
Oct. 11: she was authorized by the court as his guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings in the present cause (issued in behalf of the plaintiff-appellee co.);
he as guardian was not aware of the proceedings had against Vicente and was only by chance informed of it, and;
When Vicente gave the bond, he was already permanently insane and was in such state when summoned and still continued to do so.
In conclusion, she petitioned court to relieve her husband from compliance, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence on his behalf, with respect to his capacity at
the time of the bond’s execution.
• Court granted the petition, thus trial was reopened for introduction of evidence (after due consideration); court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on 12/15/1908, executed
bond in question, he understood perfectly the nature and consequences of the act performed by him. As a result of such findings, court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay
of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied, and that said execution be carried out. After filing of an exception to the ruling, a new hearing was requested
“w/reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva” and upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of said appeal, submitted to SC and based on a single
assignment of error:
 
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant…does not imply incapacity to execute a bond…
ISSUE: Does the claim of defendant’s wife, w/respect to the defendant himself, on being exempted from court’s orders of paying jointly and severally (with other defendants)
the sum and additional costs, under the basis that he is mentally insane and therefore without capacity to enter such contracts, stand as valid?
RULING: “All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility…hence the confusion and the
doubt in the minds of the majority of authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some
who consider as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those other somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the
divers passional(?) states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty.” (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p.342.)
• *In the SC’s knowledge (at the time) of the state of mental alienation such certainty has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion – in a judicial decision – that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth…is really insane. In absence of a juridical declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he
executes an onerous contract. The bond executed by Villanueva on 12/15/1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until
07/24/09.*
• Civil Code, Art. 1277: In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor. 
ANALYSIS
• SC has not found the proof of the error, it would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that
there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of wealth, and that the
monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed.
• Witness testimonies from defendants’ physicians, Don RudesinoCuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, the first of whom had visited him some 8 times from 1902-1093, and the latter
only once in 1908; with regards to the defendant’s alleged monomania Dr. Cuervobelieves that if defendant were to be presented a document not concerning his houses, he would
be able to understand and comprehend the contents, while on the topic of sane intelligence, Dr. Ocampo stated that he is of “ordinary intelligence”, with knowledge on how to
read and write. 
• Meanwhile, Mr. F.B. Ingersoll (witness for plaintiff) testified that as a notary he had prepared the bond and received the signers’ statements and that he had explained to defendant
its contents and upon observation found the defendant to be normal and regular with nothing that would “indicate the contrary”, with the defendant being “quiet and composed
and spoke in an ordinary way…”. In addition, Hon. Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff as well and testified the same as many, in that he did not notice any particular
disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved. Court sides with opinion that it has not.
• Unclear why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of Areneas & Co. in Francisco Lara and Juan Arenas. In addition, appellant presented a note by the latter
addressed to his “friend”, Mr. Villanueva, on 05/13/09, which was two days before he was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference “for the purpose of treating of a
matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva…” It cannot be affirmed with certainty that defendant engaged in the business of giving bonds nor can it be sustained
that there was no other cause for the giving of bond in question than the mental disorder that dominated defendant’s intellect. There is no proof that the said bond was merely
the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth nor that he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting wealth. Here defendant’s wife stresses that she had no clue that
her husband engaged in the selling of bonds, and that with reference to the one concerned, she had only learned of it by finding to note wherein he was invited to engage in such
by Arenas.
• There is also no proof granting that he was a monomaniac, and that he was dominated by that malady upon the bond’s execution. It is a rule of constant application that it is not
enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time.
 

 
Cordora v. Comelec
 
FACTS: 
 
Cordora accused Tambunting of an election offense violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible
to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired
American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
 
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-
born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he
was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. 
 
ISSUE: 
 
W/N Tambunting is a natural-born Filipino
 
HELD: 
 
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition
for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the
other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
 
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
 
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states
 
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
 
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
 
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting
sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency
requirements prescribed by law.
 
 
Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec
 
FACTS: 
 
 Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Reyes on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically: 
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
 
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also
a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
 
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
 
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of America; and 
 
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. 
 
In her answer, Reyes countered that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Mandanas, there is no valid and binding marriage between them. As to her date of
birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent
resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.
 
During the course of the proceedings, Tan filed a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended list of exhibits   among others: 
 

1. A copy of an article published on the internet entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O. Reyes with affidavit of identification and authenticity of document which

provides database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Reyes is an American Citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; 

2. (2) a Certification of Travel Records of the petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that

petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.

 
Comelec First Division canceled Reyes’ COC. 
 
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has
not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted in dual citizenship, thus there is no need for
her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public. 
 
COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
 
Four days thereafter, Reyes was proclaimed the winner of the elections. COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.
Petitioner has yet to assume office. 
 
ISSUE: 
 
W/N Reyes is a Filipino citizen and therefore allowed to run as a candidate of the House of Representatives. 
 
HELD: 
 

NO. The Court herein ruled that Reyes was not a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy. To be a candidate of the House of Representatives, an individual should

be a Filipino citizen at the time of his or her filing of the COC and must be resident thereof (of the municipality he or she will be representing) for not less than 1 year. In the case at

bar, petitioner Reyes failed to prove that she had already renounced her American citizenship. Her contention that she already renounced the same cannot

be entertained. She stated that she already took her oath of allegiance when she was appointed as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. However, the said oath taking was not

in accordance with present laws. For a former citizen to be considered as a Filipino citizen again, he or she must conform to the rules stated in RA 9225. In this case, petitioner

Reyes did not comply with the said requirements. Moreover, her residency issue was also barring her candidacy. She failed to prove that she had intent to establish her domicile in

the Philippines. Her actions prove that she has no intention of leaving her domicile in the United States. PETITION IS DISMISSED.
 
 
David v. Agbay
 
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot
along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
 
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
 
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
 
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
 
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
 
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was
charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was
denied.
 
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225.
 
RULING:
 
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
 
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
 
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen.
 
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC, therefore, did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
 
 
Olaguer v. Purugganan
 
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer who is an activist against the Marcos administration was the owner of 60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of
P600,000.00. Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the
 
Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña had an unwritten agreement that, in the event, that petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioner’s family by
the continued
payment of his salary. Oleguer executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May 1979,appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of
selling or transferring petitioner’s shares of stock with Businessday. The parties acknowledged the SPAbefore respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate
Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City. On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue of an Arrest,
Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing arson.
In view of petitioner’s previous instructions, for such price and under such terms and conditions that the agents may deem proper. When the petitioner was detained, respondent
Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s shares, but nobody wantedto buy them. Petitioner’s reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and
discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. Respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares himself.
 
Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday caused value of the shares to plummet below par value, respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value.
The RTC found that petitioner consented to have respondent Locsinbuy the shares himself, through his wife received from respondent Locsin the amount of P600,000.00 as
payment for the shares of stock.
 
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA.
 
DECISION:
It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed;   will be held to grant only those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate
from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language willpermit, the
construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other
should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always be deemed to
give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil
Code and of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides
the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been
appointed toadminister the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already authorized agents todo specific acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the
appointment of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA ineffective.
Petitioner received from respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a total of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or
complaint. It was only four years
after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the shares. The petitioner’s claim that he did not
instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was
authorized, under theSPA, to negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the manner of payment. Moreover, had respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the
petitioner, as the latter suggested in this
petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties which were
confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank accounts of 
petitioner’s in-laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioner’s wife received these amounts
.
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not
be consideredexceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to the principal than that specified by him.
 
 
Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation
 
FACTS: 
 
This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Str., Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation, a company that is, in turn, wholly-
owned by ASB Realty Corporation.
 
Amethyst Pear executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl’s outstanding
capital stock from ASB realty making it the owner of the subject premises. 
 
In 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale. Their agreement
was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720. Upon the contract’s expiration on continued occupying the premises and
paying rentals. 
 
ASB Realty then served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June
2003. In asserting his right to remian on the property based on the oral lessee contract with Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was for a long
period of time”. Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that Umale did not
have to pay with the sale over the property as it has already been perfected between them. 
 
Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver
had been duly appointed. Under  the  Interim  Rules  of Procedure  on  Corporate  Rehabilitation  (Interim Rules),  it  is  the  rehabilitation receiver  that  has  the  power  to  "take
possession,  control  and  custody  of  the debtor's assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover
possession of the same.
 
ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for  Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with  Amethyst Pearl in 1999  because  Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996. 
 
MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not
Umale's lessor.  MTC  agreed with  Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file  suit to recover  ASB  Realty's property.  Havingbeen placed under receivership, ASB Realty
had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
 
RTC  reversed  decision  of  the  MTC.  It  found  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the conclusion that it was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract withUmale.  With
respect  to  ASB  Realty's  personality  to  file  the  unlawful  detainer suit, the RTC ruled that  ASB  Realty retained all its corporate powers, including the power to sue, despite the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim  Rules,  the  RTC  noted  that  the  rehabilitation  receiver  was  not  granted therein the power to file complaints on
behalf of the corporation.  Moreover, the retention  of  its  corporate  powers  by  the  corporation  under  rehabilitation  will advance  the  objective  of  corporate  rehabilitation,
which  is  to  conserve  and administer  the  assets  of  the  corporation  in  the  hope  that  it  may  eventually  be able to go from financial distress to solvency.
 
Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC  denied reconsideration  of its  Decision and granted  ASB  Realty's Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution. 
 
Umale then filed  his  appeal  with  the  CA  insisting that  the  parties  did  not  enter into a lease contract.
 
Pending  the  resolution  thereof,  Umale died  and  was  substituted  by  his  widow and legal heirs. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto. 
 
Issues:Can  a  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  (duly  authorized  by  the  Board  of Directors)  file  suit  to  recover  an  unlawfully  detained  corporate  property  despite  the  fact
that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?    
 
The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.There  is  no  denying  that  ASB  Realty,  as  the  owner  of  the  leased  premises,  is  the  real party-in-interest in
the unlawful detainer suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the  judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
 
What  petitioners  argue  is  that  the  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  is  incapacitated  to  file this  suit  to  recover  a  corporate  property  because  ASB  Realty  has  a  duly-
appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit.
 
Corporations, such as ASB Realty, arejuridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or
impliedly,  in  the  law.  Among  the  general  powers  granted  by  law  to  a  corporation  is  the power  to  sue  in  its own  name.  This  power  is  granted  to  a  duly-organized
corporation, unless specifically  revoked  by  another  law.  The  question  becomes:  Do  the  laws  on corporate rehabilitation —particularly PD 902-A, as amended and its
corresponding rules of  procedure —forfeit  the  power  to  sue  from  the  corporate  officers  and  Board  of Directors?    
 
Corporate  rehabilitation  is  defined  as  "the  restoration  of  the  debtor  to  a  position  of successful  operation  and  solvency,  if  it  is  shown  that  its  continuance  of  operation
is economically  feasible  and  its  creditors  can  recover  by  way  of  the  present  value  of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern
than if it is immediately liquidated." This concept of preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or
debtor-in-place.   This   means   that   the   debtor   corporation   (the   corporation  undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board  of Directors and corporate officers, remains in
control of its business  and  properties,  subject  only  to  the  monitoring  of  the  appointed  rehabilitation receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession  is carried out more
particularly in the SEC Rules,  the  rule  that  is  relevant  to  the  instant  case.  It  states therein  that  the  interim rehabilitation  receiver  of  the  debtor  corporation  "does  not
take  over  the  control  and management  of  the  debtor  corporation."  Likewise,  the rehabilitation  receiver  that  will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the
successful implementation of the rehabilitation  plan.  There  is  nothing  in  the  concept  of  corporate  rehabilitation  that  would ipso facto deprive  the  Board  of  Directors  and
corporate  officers  of  a  debtor  corporation, such as  ASB  Realty,  of control  such  that  it  can  no  longer  enforce  its  right  to  recover  its property from an errant lessee.
 
To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of
which involve  some  kind  of  disposition  or  encumbrance  of  the  corporation's  assets)  during  the pendency  of  the  rehabilitation  proceedings  but  none  of  which  touch  on
the  debtor corporation's right to sue. 
 
While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover  its property  and  the  back  rentals  from  Umale,  the necessity  of keeping
the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to closely  monitor  the  assets  of  ASB  Realty,  the  rehabilitation  receiver  has  to  be
notified  of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales
 
FACTS: 
Dr. Mariano Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven children When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-
law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of
his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children. 
 
Dr. Favis died intestate on 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren
with Juana. Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
 
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. Trial Court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have
had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. 
 
Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an
averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made as mandated by Article 151 of FC. 
 
ISSUE: W/N CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise. 
 
HELD: 
 
Yes. 
CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint of
petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought
before the Court of Appeals.
 
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did
not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court
unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint. The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of
Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore,
stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. Petition for review is 
 
GRANTED.
 
 
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
 
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the
place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree
of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that
Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jalosjos v. Comelec
 
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the
Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he
renounced his Australian citizenship. 
 
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the
application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.
 
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
 
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the
Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
HELD:
NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
 
The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
 
  (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

 
(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.
 
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On the
other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation
of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have
a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical
presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and
national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naldoza v. Republic
 
FACTS: 

Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two children. After a quarrel between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and never returned. He

allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana and other persons.

The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Zosima, on August

10, 1978, filed in the CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. The trial court

dismissed the petition.

Zosima appealed to this Court.

Issue: WON the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father and be allowed to use the mother’s surname?

Held: No.

We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. To allow the change of

surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only.

That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.

As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is

capable of selecting a name for

himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. 

 
 

Yasin V. Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986, 23 February 1995

FACTS:

On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to

the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not

properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order

alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of

her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied

the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman

and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the

Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by

adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the

case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but

only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's

surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her

to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
 
In re: Stephanie Garcia
 
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in
the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
 
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
 
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law  to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 
 
Remo v. DFA
 
FACTS: 
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was
denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married
woman to use her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary
explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of
annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband. 
 

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme
Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue
using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]
 
Issues: 
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage. 
 

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists. 
 

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an
obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change
her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. 
 

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husband’s surname. 
 

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. 
 

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage. 
 

Yasin case not in point 

 

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage
remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the
dissolution of one’s marriage. 
 

Special law prevails over general law 

 

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of
Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. 
 

Implied repeals are disfavored

 

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish. 
 

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport 

 

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from
requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. 
 

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government.
The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

TOPIC: RULES GOVERNING PERSONS WHO ARE ABSENT

Eastern Shipping vs. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425

Facts: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio Lucero Jr. was appointed as captain of the Ship Eastern Minicon of Eastern Shipping Lines. Under the contract, his employment was good for

one round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the

captain’s salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the following dates:

February 16, 1980 (7am), February 16, 1980 (3:30pm), February 16, 1980 (9:50pm). On the third message he stated that seawater was entering the vessel and they were preparing

to abandon ship. The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative. The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the company paid

the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept.

On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary allotment of her husband which the company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued

payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the

Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel’s arrival in Manila. The company refused to pay. The National seamen board

upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not Mrs. Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary.

Ruling: The NLRC based its judgment on Art. 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died because under

the law, four years have not yet passed. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1)  A person on board vessel

lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; The Supreme Court ruled however

that a preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk

and the crew perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro, “where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does

not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.”

Hence, the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid. 

 
 Manuel vs. People, GR No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for

the crime of bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter

imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their

meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’sknowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky

and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being

that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that

he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6

years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in

good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to

ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

Issue/s: 
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php 200,000n as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake

of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an

excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legisneminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a

subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will

have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who

contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.

The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with

malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution,

good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming

moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

Pantollano vs. Korphil, GR No. 169575, March 30, 2011

Facts: On March 24, 1994, Korphil Ship management and Manning Corporation (Korphil) hired Vedasto C. Pantollano(Vedasto) as 4th Engineer on board the vessel M/V Couper

under a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) approved contract of employment. On August 2, 1994, Veadsto did not show up for his duty. The vessel then altered bits

course to search for Vedasto, the search and rescue operation lasted for about six hours, but Vedasto was not found. On August 3, 1994, a Report was issued by the Master of M/V

Couper declaring that Vedasto was missing. His wife, Imeldo Pantollano (Imelda), was likewise informed about the disappearance of Vedasto while on board M/V Couper. Since

then, Vedasto was never seen again.

On May 29, 2000, Imelda filed a complaint before the NLRC where she sought to recover death benefits, damages and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that the legal

heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the payment of death benefits and attorney’s fees. The NLRC reversed, stating that the death of Vedasto which was clearly shown by evidence to be

a case of suicide was not compensable under the clear provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. However, the NLRC reversed itself after.

Korphil appealed. The CA held that under Article 291 of the Labor Code, Imelda should have filed her complaint within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus,

Imelda should have filed her complaint within three years from Vedasto’s disappearance on August 2, 1994. Having filed her complaint only on May 29, 2000, the same is already

barred by prescription.

Issue: Whether or not the claim of Imelda for death compensation benefits filed on May 29, 2000 or more than five years from the time her husband  Vedasto was reported missing

on August 2, 1994, is already barred by prescription following the provisions of Article 291 of the Labor Code.

Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.

Labor Law & Civil Law: Period by which to claim death benefits arising from a person presumed dead.
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that Korphil is estopped from asserting that Imelda cause of action accrued on August 2, 1994. In a previous case involving Korphil, and which also

involved an earlier claim for compensation benefits filed by Gliceria (the wife of a seaman also presumed missing). Korphilclaimed that it was still premature because the death

of Vedastowas not yet duly proven and the period that must elapse before a seaman can be lawfully presumed dead has not been complied with. Consequently,  Korphil is

estopped from insisting in this later case filed by Imelda that Vedasto should be considered dead from the time he went missing on August 2, 1994 and therefore the claim was

filed beyond the allowable period of three years. Indeed, when Imelda claimed the benefits, Korphilinformed Imelda that it was still premature to claim the same and advised her

instead to wait four more years before her husband could be presumed dead thereby entitling his heirs to death benefits. Korphil is therefore guilty of estoppel. 

Korphil also posits that the three-year prescriptive period referred to in Article 291 shall commence to run from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., at the time  Vedasto died

on August 2, 1994. However, on August 2, 1994, it cannot as yet be presumed that Vedasto is already dead. A person missing under the circumstances as those of Vedasto may not

legally be considered as dead until the lapse of the period fixed by law on presumption of death, and consequently Imelda cannot yet be considered as a widow entitled to

compensation under the law.

The provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code state that a person “shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs when inter alia, the

person has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.” Thus, Vedasto can only be presumed dead after the lapse of

four years from August 2, 1994 when he was declared missing. Vedasto is thus presumed legally dead only on August 2, 1998. It is only at this time before her husband could be

presumed dead entitling his heirs to death benefits. Korphil is therefore guilty of estoppel.

Having already established that Imelda’s cause of action accrued on August 2, 1998, it follows that her claim filed on May 29, 2000 was timely. GRANTED.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Yolanda Granada, GR No. 187512, June 13, 2012

Doctrine: Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can

no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The

same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”

Facts: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus

went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her

brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC LipaCity. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision

declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had

failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case

on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not

appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for

declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the

parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

Issue/s: 

1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,

hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented.

Ruling:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finalandimmediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a

summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of

presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal

can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without

saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court
 of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the

Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party

may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise

of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA

on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the

aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced

the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code

for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the

present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an

overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably

founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and

are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate

question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether

the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be

drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While

her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s

testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese

Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed

to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her

“well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or

reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be

modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto Narceda, GR No. 182760, April 10, 2013

Doctrine: The judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial

court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The filing of a Notice of Appeal under

Rule 42 does not toll the running of the period for filing a Petition for Certiorari, the remedy available to assail the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding for abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts: Robert P. Narceda married Marina on July 22, 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years

and 4 months old. According to Robert, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since. There was never any communication between them. He tried to

look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw

his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.

In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, Robert filed with the RTC on May 16, 2002 a Petition for a Judicial Declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of

Marina. The RTC granted respondent’s Petition. Petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing

wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a “well-founded” belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for

the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and thus governed by Title XI thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the

judgment of the trial court in summary proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. 

Issues:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
2. Was respondent able to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead?

Ruling: The Court in this case agreed with the CA when pointed out that it lacked jurisdiction in the resolution of the petition. The resolution of a petition for the declaration of

presumptive death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are those enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code Articles 238, 247, and 253.

The judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s

judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an

aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. 

In this case, the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, but it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari

continued to run and was not toiled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that respondent has

failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.

Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Benjamin Estrada, GR No. 214792, March 18, 2015

Facts: On October 14, 2008, Teresita Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of Absence and Presumption of Death of her husband Diego before the RTC Malaybalay. She alleged

that she and Diego married on November 25, 1973 in Bukidnon that sometime in December 1976, Diego left their residence and never came back. He failed to communicate for

the past 32 years and never made contact with any of their children or even immediate relatives. Teresita also alleged that she made efforts to locate the whereabouts of her

husband but failed. She filed the present petition to declare her husband presumptively dead so that she could contract another marriage without impediment. 

The RTC Malaybalay granted the petition and declared Diego for all legal intents and purposes presumptively dead in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG

appealed in the CA the RTC’s decision alleging that the lower court erred in the appreciation of facts and circumstances of the death of Diego as well as the insufficiency of efforts

of Teresita in locating Diego’s whereabouts. 

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition.

Ruling: No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides, “A marriage by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of

the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.

In case of disappearance where there is a danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be

sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this

Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”

In this case, Diego’s absence for more than 30 years, which far  exceeded the law-required four years of absence, is more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all

legal intents and purposes. Further, it can be clearly gleaned from the totality of evidence that Diego had already died due to the prevalence of New People’s Army in Malaybalay. 

Therefore, the petition is denied and the RTC’s decision and CA’s resolution are hereby affirmed.

TOPIC: ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR

Dela Cruz vs. Garcia, GR No. 177728, July 31, 2009

Facts: Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave

birth. Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino. When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the following:

Certificate of Live Birth, AUSF together with Dominique’s father and brother, and Affidavit of Acknowledgement issued by Dominique’s father and brother. Respondent denied the

registration because the child was born out of wedlock. The trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR of RA

9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states that: “Private handwritten instrument must be signed by him where he expressly

recognizes paternity.” Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of paternity.

Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as recognition of paternity.

Ruling: Yes. Article 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Article

175 and 172. It is therefore implied. 

Special circumstances to the case:

• Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
• Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
• Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to the affected by their hereditary rights

The court then adopted the following rules: (1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict

compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent, (2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
 relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely

corroborative of such other evidence.

Braza vs. Registrar, GR No. 181174, December 4, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick

Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate

from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was

legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract

showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of

Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said

marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as

bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has

no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy

should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar?

Ruling: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify

marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The

proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which

is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name

that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be  allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all

interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes

of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should

be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only

in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas, GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work

commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbertreturned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on

January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but

was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according

to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

Issue: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

Ruling: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the

maritalstatus of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree

with confirmity to the alien's national law.

 The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed

to be void.

Iwasawa vs. Gangan, GR No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has

never married before." Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came... back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November

28, 2002. After the wedding,the couple resided in Japan.

In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his

shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed... away.

Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife's confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their

marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their

marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):

Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent

Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo

Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo

Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent. The prosecutor appearing on behalf

of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.

On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent's prior existing valid marriage to

another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC

ruled that petitioner's testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent's prior marriage nor of Arambulo's death which makes him a complete

stranger to the marriage... certificate between private respondent and Arambuloand the latter's death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner's testimony about the NSO

certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

Republic vs. Olaybar, GR No. 189538, February 10, 2014

Facts: Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract... the assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner

Republic of thePhilippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage

(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye

Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed

that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the

time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in HansaoPharma.

She revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. Her name

was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.

Respondent also presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed

celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not a respondent. A document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the

marriage contract was forged.

RTC granted petition.

RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous

errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the

alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Ruling: The SC denied the petition. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either

be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affectsthe civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it

is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

 Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedlyruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with

the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,

where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. As long as the

procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that

her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if

there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was

married to a certain Ye Son Sune. Shethen sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no

marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage

which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court  did not, in any

way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If

the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and

the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

In Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedlyruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with

the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.”

Barcelote vs. Republic, GR No. 222095, August 7, 2017

Facts: On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan in her relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not

able to register the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital.

To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On

24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible

criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City. When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school

admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa

Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after submitting

proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth

certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and

“Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.

Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation,

and for containing erroneous entries.

RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set aside the same.

Issue: Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by their father Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were

void.

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August

2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitiganand Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth

certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”

The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the express recognition of the children’s filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly

registered in accordance with law i.e. the subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children were not signed by their mother.

Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of

either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax

and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly

born child. (first paragraph)

 xxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.   The first

paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is legitimate since our law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of children. On the other

hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant

or only the mother if the father refuses. The fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate child and likewise underscores its mandatory character with the use

of the word “shall.”

Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his

or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this

provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the

parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificatesthat the mother did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth

certificates.Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from

the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are

also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code

requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s birth certificates.