Rule 66

Quo warranto is a special civil action brought by a verified petition in

the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) a person who
usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise; or (b) a public officer who does an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or () an association
which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without authority so to act.

The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions,

specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. 

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of

a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the
holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded,
or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." 21 Where the
action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove
that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

Distinguish Quo Warranto from Election Protest:

The ground in quo warranto is the disqualification or ineligibility of the

proclaimed candidate.

The proper ground of an election protest is irregularities in the conduct

of an election.

In quo warranto, if the respondent is found ineligible, the petitioner

will not automatically assume the office but may only recover the costs
of suit,such respective right to the position to be rendered only in a
further judgment.
In election protest, the protestant who prevails will assume the
contested office provided he had obtained the plurality of votes.

Distinctions between Quo Warranto in elective and in

appointive office:

1. Governing Law

In office, elective the governing  law  is  the election law; in appointive

office, the rules that govern are the provisions of the Rules of Court.

2. Issue

In elective office, the issue is the eligibility of the person elected; in

appointive office, the issue is the legality of the occupancy of the office
by virtue of a legal appointment.

3. Period of Filing

In elective office, the petition is filed within 10 days after the

proclamation of the results of the election; in appointive office, the
petition is filed within one (1) year  from the time the cause of ouster,
or the right of the petitioner to hold the office or position, arose.

4. Where to File

In elective office, the  petition  is  brought  in the Comelec, the RTC, or

the MTC as the case may be; in appointive office, the petition is
brought in the SC, CA or the RTC.

5. Who may file?

In elective office, the petitioner may be any voter even if he is not

entitled to the office; in appointive office, the petitioner is the entitled
to the office.

6. Judgment

In elective office, when the tribunal declares the candidate-elect as

ineligible, he will be unseated but the petitioner will not be declared
the rightful occupant of the office; in appointive office, the court
will oust the person illegally appointed and will order the seating of the
person who was legally appointed and entitled to the office. 

Distinguish Quo warranto and Mandamus:

Quo warranto  tests the title to one's office claimed by another and has
as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment,
while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try
disputed titles. 

Where here is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is

the proper remedy, Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil. 491, and that
where the respondent, without claiming any right to an Office,
excludes the petitioner therefrom, he remedy is mandamus, not quo
warranto

RULE 67

Expropriation

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to

appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public
welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power
grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare.12 The power of eminent domain
is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the
State and inherent in government. But the exercise of such right is not
unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Government's exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1)
that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner.13 These requirements
partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with
to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

Constitutional Provision in Relation to Expropriation

Art. III Sec. 9 : No private property shall be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation.
Meaning of compensable taking:

 It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation.36 Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of
acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still
amount to a taking.37 Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of
the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. 38 It is neither
necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his
property,39 nor material whether the property is removed from the
possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be

compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. 22 Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of
acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still
amount to a taking. 23 Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of
the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. 24 It is neither
necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his
property, 25 nor material whether the property is removed from the
possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.||| 

Expropriation must be for public use only:

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an

expansive meaning to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]." 41 If
the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal
situation should hold if the government devotes the property to
another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has
been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige
landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is
offensive to our laws.

No prohibition lie against expropriation:

There can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the

immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings
may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure
the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the
owner. 20 This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the
power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use,21 and the interest of the affected landowner is
thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State
decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial
review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to
determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to
the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their
just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the
remedy of prohibition become available.

Two stages of expropriation proceedings:

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. 19 It ends with an order,
if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint." 20 An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of
the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the
Merits. 21 So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the
Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be flied or heard. 22

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. 23 The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties
may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the
evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal
therefrom.

Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase

ends with an order of dismissal, or a determination that the property is
to be acquired for a public purpose. 32 Either order will be a final order
that may be appealed by the aggrieved party. 33 The second phase
consists of the determination of just compensation. 34 It ends with an
order fixing the amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders,
being final, are appealable.35

An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question

of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its
power of eminent domain.36 Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use
can no longer be questioned.

Just compensation:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the

property sought to be expropriated. 2 The measure is not the taker's
gain but the owner's loss. 3 The compensation, to be just, must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation
would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too
would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain

the market value of the property, to which should be added the
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. 4 If the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items
should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property
should be paid in every case. 5
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon
by parties willing but not compelled to enter into the contract of
sale6 Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a piece of property
would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would
agree to accept less, than what it is actually worth. The price agreed
upon in these cases would not represent the market value of the
property.

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair marker value

of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of
lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. 7

It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time

of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes
entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of the filing of the complaint.

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated

coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or
takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint for expropriation.

Power to decide just compensation lodged with the courts:

The power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of

lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts.  The jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court is not an less original and exclusive because
the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination.

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain. No

hearing is required in the issuance of writ of possession.
 Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is
limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the
compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use
character of the purpose of the taking.

No hearing is actually required for the issuance of a writ of

possession, which demands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency
in form and substance of the complaint, and (b) the required
provisional deposit. The sufficiency in form and substance of the
complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere
examination of the allegations of the complaint. 

Fair market value is determined at the time of taking. Meaning

of time of taking.

in ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the

expropriated property is determined as of the time of
taking. 60 The "time of taking" refers to that time when the
State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his
property, as when the State acquires title to the property 61 or as of
the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.

Civil Code provisions on easement of Right of way:

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use

may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of
its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is

due to the proprietor's own acts.

Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the

point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

Art. 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time.

The requisites for easement on right of way:

1. The easement must be established at the point least Prejudicial to

the servient estate;

2. Claimant must be an Owner of enclosed immovable or with real

right;

3. There must be no adequate Outlet to a public highway;

4. The right of way must be absolutely Necessary not mere

convenience;

5. The isolation must not be Due to the claimant’s own act;

6. There must be payment of proper Indemnity.

Can easement of right of way be acquired by prescription?

No, because it is discontinuous or intermittent.

What if the property is not the shortest way and will not cause
the least damage to the servient estate?

The way which will cause the least damage should be used even if it
will not be the shortest. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway is
the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails
over the criterion of shortest distance.
 REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of

when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates
to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment
if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University
of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of
the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a
Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there
was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9)
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of
UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she
supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has
certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11
SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the

position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the
applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to
December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further
provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private
sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she
became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most
of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was
no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the
JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012,
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon

against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her
SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for
determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the
chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of
Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to
P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior
years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN,
execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the
latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding
against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under
Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action
under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance
of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed
a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and
Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the
impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being
sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment
complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v.
Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.  OSG maintains that the phrase
“may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means
that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary

period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to
light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an
imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum
tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not
operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in
ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even
assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that
SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know
the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-
SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards,
tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical
violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political
question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno
failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of
the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The
failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office.
Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent
is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through

impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement
from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ
Antonio T. Carpio.  Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can
be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen
as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their
functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno
further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the
penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno
contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the
present case because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be
removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole
judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-
President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover,
on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo
warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before
the RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court
would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative
supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary
to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC
disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo

warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66

provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from
the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file
her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her
appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption
created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all
 administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question
which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are
missing cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11
SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC
that she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus
of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC.
Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only
required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that
“qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while
“characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are
mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno
against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the
instant petition for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed
with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in
a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an
impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of
the principle of separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of
prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the
sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination.
 partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory
and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement
for the position of Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file
her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs
are not filed properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as
required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to
submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as
Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by
the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto  officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the

proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the
third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by
those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests
on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement
on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common
desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the
Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in
the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be
filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not
sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant.
Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic.
It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because
disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival
claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be
proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at
the impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the
Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within
their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not
enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There
must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it
can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition
has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and
meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the
proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of
President Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for
being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between the
Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except
to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution.
It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly
met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and
positively be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body,
the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to
determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to
be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable

officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the
extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified
considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that
the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To
exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear
renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented
before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide
cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the
government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial

determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a
public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may
not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings.
usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it
public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within
his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and

impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as

these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable
rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum
shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The
crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of
whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered
as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is
for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office,
which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent
from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to
impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does
not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings

before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by
the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process
before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if
a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an

invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed
from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose

a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which
denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect,
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American
jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by
impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers
cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify
for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription
does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office
he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of
either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are
impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that
is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is
not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to
the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside
judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot
otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to
allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer
cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined
to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a
qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the
Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over
a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving

a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a
disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again,
the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized.
An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively
pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain
arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be
removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal
requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this
case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically
intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the
Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at
the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to
or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but
of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his
ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the
cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied
in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the
instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief
Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present
petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,

when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It
may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no
application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There
is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither
could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very
purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless
to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold
public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the
Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only
upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno
has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect
on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC
includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The
power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to
it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy
from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the
latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is
more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the
exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically
equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC
process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers.
While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not
accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the
same category as political questions that the Court is barred from
resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution

cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member
of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately
equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”
Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal
of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory
requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or

employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure
to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public
officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency
and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not
only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that  non-compliance with this requirement is
not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result
in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and

statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and
liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case,
those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits.
They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions
relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The
public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s

integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that
the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in
se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and
not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus
violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have

been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling
of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno
opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear
reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in
the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch
of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received
by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and
duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of
these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct
proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the
statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is
no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN
ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not
indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the
certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent
upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof
in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the
burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt
her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from
government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the
periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in
an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA
6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of

Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned
authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not
yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials
and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty
of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from
the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its
ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for
SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her
academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her
resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete

requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her
compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with
the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset.
Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno
eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs
was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees
and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her
SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements    .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to
dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being
accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when
she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on
intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected,
suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first
five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed
not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does
not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials
whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and
non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to
qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants
who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to
have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the
minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out
from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN
for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the
SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it
appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with
the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs:
that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only
in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her government
records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that
U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno
submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there
was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously
failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her
employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment
thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of
the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission
of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a
grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first
infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and
faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties
with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For
these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice
while in UP, her false representations that she was in private practice after
resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false
claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her
income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land
Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without
requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3 rd ASEAN Chief
Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules,
manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the
Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with
respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices,
manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis
Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security
against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs
for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her
application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is
eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting,
Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for
the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the
failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are
divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to
commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of
the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years
that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the
same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief
Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at
the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s
entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination
as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in
the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be
nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample
jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court
can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO.
he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although
the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in
the selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC
itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is

vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary
appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other
legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is
susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable

through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor

is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers
on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification,
Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of
an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of
Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
 

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of

UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and
the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and
nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from

the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why
she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice
rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.