practice of law for al least ten years.
" (Emphasis
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-
counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1),
ArticleIX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary,
3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling
and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any
line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D.
Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." 
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I
make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of
the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is
that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ —
I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result
in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in
the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement
of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on
the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to
this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of
the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms,
there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.
2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram,
op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to
litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of
both the public image and the self-perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.)
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen
whose concept of an attorney is one who principally
tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work
or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’
work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate
practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business
daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called
a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in
particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the
corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information
to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance
law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become
a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master’s or doctorate
degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate
finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers,
many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others
have in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing.
These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a
feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the
work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one
of the few opportunities available to corporate
lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small
number of companies and law firms. Because
working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the
lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit:
"A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly
needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to
the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy
sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization
process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for
are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who
are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in
decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained
a new role as a stockholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the
office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment,
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities
of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate
counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and
rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the systems
dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to
make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of
an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from
those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble
and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework
within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to
be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change
to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed
in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged
in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets
of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that
knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is
not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management
issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern
corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the
bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen’s Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the
House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
(Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating
panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such
as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a
country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into
five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2)
borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in
any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies
as key factors in maintaining their countries’
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency
for International Development, during the Session on
Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even
more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in re negotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in
the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance
of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must
not only define the responsibilities of both parties,
but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine
qua non for foreign loan agreements — an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power
and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on
the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as
in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,
1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without re appointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without re appointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion,
suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept
of the practice of law, which modern connotation is
exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a
week and would outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this
is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law
practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since
the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of
the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or
more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a

nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the

nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the

confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but

by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.

Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw

library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was

captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his
word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations
with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he
had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just
an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he
had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for
his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant
Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action
is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and
good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that
it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was
Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him
this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the
time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna
happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen.
And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this
fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that
he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,
Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand
the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate
petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law
since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He
justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake
of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado
may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at
the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of
his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was
the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission
to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto
has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with
the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll

of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a
FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law.
During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office

of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court

Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS
A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent
Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that respondent was administratively
charged by his sister-in-law, complainant Isidra Ting-
Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainant's
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for
the purpose of profiting from such forgery." 2 The
particular charges are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
According to the complainant, the respondent took
advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of
what was lawfully due them even if it involved the
commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
She attributes to the respondent the following acts or
omissions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and
failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his
wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when
they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two
made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the
late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting,
knowing fully well that the same was false. He
presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586
in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was
later sold to Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400.
Payment was already made to, and received by,
Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and
failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant's
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603
when he knew that she was in Italy at that time
working as an overseas contract worker. He even
presented the falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property
in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law
Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to
enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc.
Payment was received and misappropriated by
Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for
Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy. and
Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869
Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters
Marcelina and Felicisima on 24, October 1995, the
respondent made gross misrepresentation and
offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina
and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs
of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante
for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their
names. With the reconstituted title, and with the
express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and
Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel
Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the
sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial
payment was even received pending the
reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made
gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose
of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer
through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the
order of reconstitution would be released within a
month when he knew that it would be impossible
because he presented evidence in the reconstitution
case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the
release of the money, he even used the stationery of
the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an
employee.3
In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court
found merit in the complaint and, thus, held
respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of
violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
resulting in his disbarment from the practice of
law:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x x5
Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a
Motion for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid
Resolution, which the Court denied with finality in the
Resolution7 dated June 29, 2004.
Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion
for Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack
of merit in the Resolution9 dated November 9, 2004,
stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be
entertained."
On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that
compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed
upon him by the Court in that his disbarment be
lifted. The same was, however, expunged from the
records in a Resolution11 dated June 13, 2006.
Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to
former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga12 and
former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban,13 reiterating his pleas for compassion
and mercy. However, these letters were similarly
expunged from the records in a Resolution14 dated
September 5, 2006, considering the previous
directive that no further pleadings will be further
entertained in this case. These were followed by
numerous submissions either seeking his
reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his
penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of which
were either expunged from the records17 or
denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or
on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant
Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from
the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court's Ruling
"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement,
the Court should see to it that only those who
establish their present moral fitness and knowledge
of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though
the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the
Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as
to the general public to ensure that if the doors are
opened, it is done so only as a matter of
justice."19redarclaw
"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to
the practice of law is whether the Iawver has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy
of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or
her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement."20redarclaw
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid
down the following guidelines in resolving requests
for judicial clemency, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. There 'must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials
of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify
clemency.22 (emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds that the instant petition is not
meritorious.
While more than ten (10) years had already passed
since his disbarment on April 14, 2004, respondent's
present petition has failed to show substantial proof
of his reformation as required in the first guideline
above.

The principle which should hold true not only for
judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the
court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy
removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the
courts. Thus the Court will grant it only if there is a
showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and
a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable."23redarclaw
In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation
that respondent has presented is a
Certification24 dated June 5, 2015 signed by
Reverend Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative Pastor
of the Buenavista Evangelical Church in General
Trias, Cavite, which generally states that
respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has
been "assisting the poor and indigent litigants in our
community," and that "he has been very active in
spreading the [w]ords and gospel of the Almighty
God[,] being an active member of the Couples of
Christ FFL." Aside from these bare statements, no
other proof was presented to specify the actual
engagements or activities by which respondent had
rendered free legal services to indigents or had
ministered to the members of his community or
church, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form
of consistency in his supposed desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submits,
particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr., who
stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner,
[respondent] is humble, simple, and respectful to
fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding
Judge," and that "[h]e used to give free legal advice
and assisted indigent litigants in their court
cases,"25 and that of Atty. Manuel Medina, retired
City Prosecutor of Cavite, who stated that "[d]uring
my years as Prosecutor x x x I always met him in the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say
in all honesty and candor that he was an exemplary
officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared
in handling his court cases,"26 all relate to conduct or
attributions prior to respondent's disbarment; hence,
these are incompetent evidence to prove his
reformation which connotes consistent improvement
subsequent to his disbarment.
In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his
previous Motion for Reconsideration27 filed on May
20, 2004 which he now incorporates in support of
his present petition,28 is equally insufficient to
conclude that he has already reformed. This is
because all these testimonials were executed in May
2004.29 Thus, they can only attest to respondent's
conduct or attributions a mere month removed from
his disbarment on April 14, 2004.
More significantly, it should be discerned that the
root cause of respondent's disbarment was his
fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the
complainant herein. However, no proof was
presented to show that he had reconciled or even
attempted to reconcile with her so as to show
remorse for his previous faults. The dismissal of the
criminal complaint against him for Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, filed by
complainant is no proof of remorse since the same
was based on lack of probable cause.30  Likewise, its
dismissal,' could not prove that he was actually
innocent of the administrative charges against him,
since the parameters and considerations of an
administrative case are evidently different from that
in a criminal case.  As in this case, the lack of
probable cause against respondent as found by the
prosecutor does not negate his administrative
liability already adjudged by this Court. That the
prosecutor found that respondent "merely rendered
legal services to the Ting siblings"31 does not mean
that he rendered the same in accordance with the
lawyer's oath and ethical canons.
To add, no other evidence was presented in his
Petition to demonstrate his potential for public
service, or that he - now being 68 years of age32 -
still has productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were
neither complied with.
While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments
of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or
reputational in cause - it stands firm in its
commitment to the public to preserve the integrity
and esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case,
"in considering [a lawyer's] application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the
Court is to determine whether he has established
moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its
feeling of sympathy or pity."33 Ultimately, with the
above discussed guidelines not complied with, the
Court has to be objective and, therefore, denies the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
En Banc
July 11, 2017
A.C. No. 5161
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS
A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
ROLANDO S. TORRES, Petitioner
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition1 dated March 10, 2017
filed by Rolando S. Torres (Torres) who seeks
judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Records show that in a Resolution2 dated April 14,
2004 in Ting-Dumali v. Torres,3 the Court meted the
supreme penalty of disbarment on Torres for
"presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery
of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery,"4 thereby committing
gross misconduct and violating Canons 1 and 10 the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive
portion of the said Resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x x5
Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for
reconsideration,6 both of which were denied with
finality by the Court,7 which then stated that "[n]o
further pleadings will be entertained."8 This
notwithstanding, Torres: (a) filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Lift Disbarment9 dated January 26, 2006 begging
for compassion, mercy, and understanding;10 and
(b) wrote letters to former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban11 and former Associate Justice Dante 0.
Tinga12 reiterating his pleas for compassion and
mercy. However, these were ordered expunged
through the Court's Resolutions dated June 13,
200613 and September 5, 2006,14 considering the
previous directive that no further pleadings will be
further entertained in this case. Still undaunted,
Torres continued to file numerous submissions
either seeking his reinstatement to the bar15 or the
reduction of his penalty of disbarment to
suspension,16 all of which were either expunged from
the records17 or denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment,
Torres filed a Petition19 dated June 11, 2015 seeking
judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in
the Roll of Attomeys.20 In a Resolution21 dated
August 25, 2015 (August 25, 2015 Resolution), the
Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had
failed to provide substantial proof that he had
reformed himself, especially considering the
absence of showing that he had reconciled or
attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the
original complainant in the disbarment case against
him; nor was it demonstrated that he was remorseful
over the fraudulent acts he had committed against
her.22
Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant
petition, again seeking judicial clemency from the
Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
The principle which should hold true for lawyers,
being officers of the court, is that judicial clemency,
as an act of mercy removing any disqualification,
should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it
only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise
are indispensable.23 In Re: The Matter of the Petition
for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a
member of the Philippine Bar,24 the Court laid down
the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an SO ORDERED.
administrative case for the same or similar
misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of
non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the

imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must

show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself.1âwphi1

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as

intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and

circumstances that may justify clemency.25

In support of the instant petition for reinstatement,

Torres merely rehashed all the several testimonials
and endorsements which he had already attached to
his previous petitions, in addition to another
endorsement, this time coming from the incumbent
Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres "is a person
of good moral character and a law abiding
citizen."26 However, these testimonials and
endorsements do not prove whatsoever that Torres
had already successfully reformed himself
subsequent to his disbarment. Neither do they
exhibit remorse towards the actions which caused
his delisting from the Roll of Attorneys, i.e.,  the
fraudulent acts he committed against his sister-in-
law. In this regard, it is noteworthy to point out that
since the promulgation of the Court's August 25,
2015 Resolution, there was still no showing that
Torres had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile
with his sister-in-law so as to show remorse for his
previous faults.

Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence

to demonstrate his potential for public service or that
he - now being 70 years of age27 - still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to
good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines

for the grant of judicial clemency; hence, the instant
petition must necessarily be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No.7054               November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal
for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated
as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court
disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on
the following grounds: abuse of court procedures
and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to
falsehood and deception before the courts;
maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and
fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision
provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the
exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past
record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to
disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice,we believe and
so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He
is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of
everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice,
this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is
not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the
same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc.
and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before
the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent
this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson
from his past experience and since then has
exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis
to the respondent’s professional legal career for the
sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated
December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-
657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is
found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules
10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However,
we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold
that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the
practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on
humanitarian considerations, but the Court En
Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11,
2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the
penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that
Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that he committed
grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty
of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame
on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad,
General Manager of Kalayaan Development
Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming
that one of the charges leading to his disbarment
was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court
denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13,
2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s
forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson;
but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding
for lackof factual support. He appended to his appeal
proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership
dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the
Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was
denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a
letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En
Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the
order of disbarment. He alleged among others that
for more than three years that he has been disbarred
in the practice of law, he has never been involved in
any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself
in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister
leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on
the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches,
and has participated as monthly financial contributor
to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it
had already served its purpose. The plea was also
denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more
prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance
and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the
Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no
longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead,
devote his time and energy for its proper observance
and implementation. He also stated that for almost
three years of being disbarred from the practice of
law, he has never been involved in any unlawful,
dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to
maintain at all times a high degree of legal
proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to
the courts, clients, and the legal profession in
accordance with the values and morals embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court
denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a
letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration
of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012,
and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013
deniedthe motion with finality.16 On July 18, 2014,
the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He
stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already
taken its toll on his health; he has now become most
frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with
chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and
undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed
that in the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and
charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay
Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of
Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not
because he intends to practice law again, but to be
made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to
finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed
that his disbarment be lifted and that he be
reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part
of his petition, he submitted a Medical
Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic
kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City,
proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement,
the Court should see to it that only those who
establish their present moral fitness and knowledge
of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though
the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the
Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as
to the general public to ensure that if the doors are
opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice. 22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the
practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and
character.23 Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy
of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or
her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his
admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and
participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study
and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar,
the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to
his townmates who were inneed of legal service.
Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a
Municipal Administrator and had continued
extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and
participated in various community projects, through
the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as
President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he
served as a member, Director, and President from
1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the
respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal
for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to
him, he has long expressed deep remorse and
genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of
his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on
his professional conduct, to show remorse and
repentance, and to realize the gravity of his
mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent
continued lending assistance, and deviated his time
and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that
significantly contributed to his character
reformation.He professed that during his almost five
(5) years of disbarment, he has been an active
member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage
Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through
his affiliations with these groups, he had served in
the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary
Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage
Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St.
Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is
not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his
conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not
convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the
Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty.
Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed
from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him
sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to
repent. The Court also took into account the fact that
Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also
notedthat he had made a significant contribution by
putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his
religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and
Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind."
Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia
committed no other transgressions since he was
disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a CA decision) and considered the
period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-
searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice
law. In that case, the Court took into consideration
the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and
repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated
Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently
introducing the document in court) after considering
the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years).
The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian
and civic services, and retained an unblemished
record as an elected public servant, as shown by the
testimonials of the numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, and
members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct
of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement,
and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’
sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that
the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the
respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an
earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal
practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which
the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and
reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of
compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment
case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another
disbarment case against him still pending review by
the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied
that the respondent has already reformed. The
period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably
long considering the nature and perversityof the
respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still
early for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the

respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal
that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the
blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and
to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his
assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof
satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is
again worthy of membership in the legal profession.
We thus entertain serious doubts that the
respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the

respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we
stress that in considering his application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the
Court is to determine whether he has established
moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its
feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this
requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he
has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to
resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to
disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound

Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 6148               January 22, 2013
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY)
OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February
27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the
practice of law for having contracted a bigamous
marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a
third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while
his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still
subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral
conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise
ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that
he is supporting or has made provisions for the
regular support of his two children by complainant.
Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the
Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or
on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition
(For Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit
as a second motion for reconsideration and
accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December
18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this
Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-
evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the
substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials
of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the
applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession
and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness
from his children by complainant Teves and
maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown
by the herein attached pictures.11 Records also show
that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time
tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing
mother until her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of
Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/
Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which
office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he
is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan
Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School
Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an
active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondent’s
reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P.
Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government
Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare
Development Officer;19 (6) Certification from the
Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of
Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8)
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of
the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the
Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose
Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of
the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile
Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also
certified that respondent has no monetary
accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the
Office of the Human Resource Management Officer
attested that he has no pending administrative
case.27 He is not known to be involved in any
irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that
he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28
Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft
Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice.36 From the attestations and
certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could
significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and
even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is
its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways,38 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered
.reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however,
reminded that such privilege is burdened with
conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid
standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing
requirements.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is

duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former
and present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev. Fr.
Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to
and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the
Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a
regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital
squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant
suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support34 to his children in compliance with
the Court’s directive in the Decision dated February
27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had
elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer
product of Lemu National High School,35 and his
fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service
from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the
EN BANC
Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil
April 12, 2016
A.C. No. 10781
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2764]
COBALT RESOURCES, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD AGUADO, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI)  against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty.
Aguado)  before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
lawyer's oath.
The Antecedents
In its Complaint,1 CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010,
a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the
mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-
jacked its delivery van which was then loaded with
cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis
Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery
van, and his companions were all forcibly taken
away at gun point and were dropped at the Country
Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio
Angeles (Angeles),  the Security Director of CRI, who
immediately reported the incident to the Philippine
National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection
Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device installed
in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNPCIDU
tracked down the location of the cellular phones to
be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with
Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found
three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1)
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by
Atty. Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No.
ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-
1180; that when the PNP-CIDU approached the
vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was
chased by the police officers and was arrested; that
Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception
area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the
police officers knew, at that time, of his participation
in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU searched the
vehicles and found the cellular phones, the
Identification Card (ID) showing Atty. Aguado as
Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order
identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team
Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG.
CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its
delivery van used the fake mission order when it
flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order
identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team leader
and authorized the armed men to seize CRI’s
cellular phones; that the PASG issued a certification
stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty.
Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name
which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant;
and that this ID was likewise fake as evidenced by a
certification issued by the PASG.
Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2  dated
September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI
concluded that it was Atty. Aguado who prepared the
fake mission order and masterminded the crime as
he was the one who conceived it and laid down the
nitty-gritty details of its execution; and that it was he
who recruited the armed men who actually executed
the hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for
Robbery3 and Carnapping4 were filed against Atty.
Aguado and several others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer
but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory
conference.
In his Conference Brief,5 Atty. Aguado denied the
allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at
about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon," 6 his Toyota
Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped
along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his
driver; that he reported the incident to the police
authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was
awakened by relatives informing him that his name
was on the front page of several tabloids in a story
connecting him to the alleged hijacking; and that he
was indicted in the case because of the ID found
hanging in his carnapped vehicle.
In its Report and Recommendation,7 dated May 3,
2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD)  found Atty. Aguado liable for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct
in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as
the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team
Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD
recommended that he be suspended for
two (2)  years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty.
Aguado’s purported participation in the alleged
hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial
function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of the CBD, as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent committed
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct
by falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo
Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years.8
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for
reconsideration9 praying that the May 3, 2011 report
of the IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new
resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado
be issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved
the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification
of public documents was sufficiently established
and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the
hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion
for Reconsideration10 of the March 20, 2013
Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new
one be issued dismissing the complaint. He averred
that the charges of usurpation of authority and
falsification filed against him had been dismissed by
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; that
he could not be presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was never in possession of
the falsified ID and mission order; and that he never
used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty.
Aguado asserted that this case should, at the very
least, be suspended pending the resolution of the
robbery and carnapping charges against him.
In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the
IBP Board of Governors denied both motions and
affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.
Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, CRI filed a petition for review12 before the
Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be
meted out the penalty of disbarment for his
falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for
his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery
van and its cargo.
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review
insisting on his innocence and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
It must be emphasized that a disbarment
proceeding, being administrative in nature, is
separate and distinct from a criminal action filed
against a lawyer and they may proceed
independently of each other.13 A finding of guilt in the
criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of
liability in the administrative case.14 In the same way,
the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is
also a respondent in an administrative case, does
not necessarily exculpate him administratively
because the quantum of evidence required is
different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required.15 "In administrative cases for
disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant."16 Preponderance of evidence means
"evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."17
Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained
of as it was established that he was in possession of
a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of
the PASG and mission order identifying him as the
Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling
operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his
Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the
basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped
Toyota Fortuner,18 his counsel, Atty. Letecia
Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory
conference held on February 25, 2011,
acknowledged that the ID and mission order were
found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty.
Aguado, thus:
ATTY. HARON:
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same
person referred to in the document called mission
order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.
ATTY. AMON:
I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
I’m showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a
mission order marked as Annex "F"….
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Machine copy.
ATTY. HARON:
This is the copy.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Take a look, is that a machine copy?
ATTY. HARON:
Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald
C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the team
by mission order.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who
owns that document. He is not yet asking whether
that document is authentic or not.
ATTY. AMON:
Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
Yes, he is the one.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit that the
identification card and the mission order were
found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-
68.
ATTY. AMON:
Of which he is the owner, yes.
ATTY. HARON:
Admitted also, Your Honor.
ATTY. HARON:
Would the respondent also like to admit the
certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the
PASG are genuine and duly executed. I’m showing
counsel copies of the certifications, Your Honor,
marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the
seal of that office, Your Honor.
COMM. CACHAPERO:
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes
explicitly described Atty. Aguado’s participation in
the crime as follows:
xxx
2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong
kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng
nasabing ‘hijacking’. Bagamat may
partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam
na ang gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing
cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay
pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming paghuli
sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang
lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.
3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing
hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng
Cobalt na nakatalaga sa Delivery
Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi
nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.
4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero,
nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at
sinabi sa akin ng kung pwede ay i-monitor
ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at
ako ay bibgyan niya ng "budget" upang ang
kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng
‘seizure operations.’
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong
sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit
ako ay pinapanatag niya na lahat ng
dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa
ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang magbibigay
ng complete documents at Mission Order
dahil naka-direkta siya sa PASG
Malacañang para ma-flag down ang delivery
van".
6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil
sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming
abogado. Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa
mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa
Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard.
Nalaman ko kay James na may hawak
siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya
ako kay Eliseo De Rosas alias Nonoy na isa
ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na
Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may
plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon
ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-
monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may
warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.
8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton
Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P.
Tuazon Street kung saan may mga clients
ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang
delivery van na Mitsubishi L-300 ng Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang
pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng
Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang pag-monitor ay
napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng
gas ang nasabing delivery van sa Petron
Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano
Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni
Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.
Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap
naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak
naming ang ruta ng delivery van ay
nagpaschedule si James ng ‘meeting’ kay
Atty. Aguado.
10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi
sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue ay nag
meeting kami. Ang mga kasama sa meeting
ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at
Nonoy. Noong kami ay nandoon ay lumipat
ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe
Almonte at sila ay nagusap.
11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta
sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung
ano ang kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa
amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission
Order si Atty. Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin
daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake
upang i-flag down ang delivery van ng
Cobalt.
12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng
gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James,
Nonoy at Joe Almonte sa McDonald’s
Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi
ay tumawag si Atty. Aguado na nasa
Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue
daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya’t kaming apat
ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating
naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si
Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang
pulis.
13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty.
Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner
na may plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni
James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular"
ng lugar kung saan gagawin ang pag-flag
down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay
magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin
namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng
kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa
Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner
Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang
doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong
magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang
mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na
rin sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko
na raw ang delivery van ay agad akong
tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam
ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga
nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay
tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang
siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na
ipa-flagdown.
Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay
isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.
14. Kaya’t kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero,
alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa
nasabing Petron Station. Ngunit tumawag si
James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation
dahil kulang sa tao si Atty. Aguado.
15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay
muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald’s
Quezon Avenue noong ika-1 ng Marso alas-
7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay
dumating na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty.
Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-
usap sa labas ng Smoking Area
samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa
loob.
16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa
amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation
si Atty. Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng
Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming
ang feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado dahil
kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado.
17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2
ng Marso, alas-8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-
maya lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James
at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman
daw tuloy ang operation dahil hindi
nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado.
Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James
na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty.
Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho.
Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto
naman daw ang mga papeles at legal ang
gagawing operation.
18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa
akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy
na daw ang operation kinabukasan (ika-5 ng
Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng
umaga ay kailangan daw na naka-puwesto
na ako sa Petron Station.
19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8
ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron
Gasoline Station sa Boni Serrano corner
Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo.
Bandang alas-8:30 ng umaga ay dumating
naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet
na may plakang ZDW 764 at may kasama
pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."
Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang
Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko
na sakay ng nasabing Toyota Fortuner si
Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila
bumaba bagkus ay nagpakarga lamang ito
ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station.
Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila.
Sumunod namang umalis si James at Larry
sakay ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko
na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa
Petron upang ito ay magpakarga ng
gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit
ang aking cellphone at sinabi ko, "Nandito
na ang delivery van na white, may plakang
NKQ 734." Sumagot si James, "ok
nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa
area."
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez
Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng
delivery van upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit
ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling
nagtungo sa Benitez Street.
Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang
nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300
van na kulay blue-green na may plakang
DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake
na pawang armado at nakasuot ng
tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-
aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong
napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing
blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na
nabilang ang dami nila.
22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver
side), at binuksan naman ni James ang
bintana nito. Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na
parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot
siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang sila pag
malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka
susunod ."  Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na
sila.
23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong
nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan
ng delivery van. Nang makita ko itong
paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching
na. yang puti, yang puti."  Pagkatapos noon
ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing
lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery van.
Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na
itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong
lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery
van at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing
pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo
nitong pahinante at agad silang pinosasan.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that
Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as
charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up
to its execution. These falsified documents found in
his possession, as certified found in his possession,
as certified as evidenced by the PASG, were used to
facilitate the commission of the crime. The well-
settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who
used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification."21 Atty. Aguado failed to rebut
the allegations. Other than the police blotter showing
that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty.
Aguado presented no other convincing evidence to
support his denial of the crime. He also failed to
show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in
testifying against him whom he claimed to have met
only in February 2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner
cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard,
the Court quotes a portion of the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver
Cachapero. Thus:
He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping
of his Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking
was staged by supposed PASG personnel
suggesting that he was a victim and not a
perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard is
put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet,
Respondent reported that the carnapping took place
at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn
statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at
4:31 p.m. the precise time the supposed carnapping
was staged is too vital that Respondent could not
have overlooked the same in his narration of facts in
his counter-affidavit or in his statement before the
police authorities expecially because he supposedly
reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the
Complainant, even if the report on the time of the
carnapping incident would have been properly
made, the hijacking took place much earlier and
therefore the same does not negate the commission
of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the reporting
did not prove the fact of carnapping especially
where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was
presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal
case was filed.22
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar
is a privilege laden with conditions,23 and granted
only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers as
instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice.24 As officers of the courts
and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers are
burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and so mandated to behave at all
times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.25 They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also this high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.26

Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he

was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his
bounden duties as a member of the legal profession.
Because he failed to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of him, he proved himself
unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As
vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any
act or omission which might diminish the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of
the legal profession.27

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer

guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme
penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying
documents. In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi,  28 the
Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a
special power of attorney so he could mortgage and
sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe,
Jr.,29 the penalty of disbarment was meted out
against the lawyer who authored the falsification of
an inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado

is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN
OFF the roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant to be made part of his personal
records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016

THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANIEL
D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.
 DECISION the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without
prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to
BERSAMIN, J.: appropriate the building in accordance with Article
448 of the Civil Code.3
This administrative case against the respondent
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and
attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
relationship gone wrong between the parties but
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on
from the ejectment action in which the respondent
the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the
premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the
local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the
respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00.
Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC),
The writ of execution was issued on December 13,
whose church building and other structures were the
2013 and the writ of demolition on December 19,
objects of the action. After the defendants filed their
2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie
notice of appeal, the parties agreed to settle among
O. Ocasla, accompanied by the respondent and
themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the
elements of the Philippine National Police,
notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate
implemented the writ of execution and writ of
and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in
demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by
consideration of the respondent's financial
demolishing the church building and the pastoral
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving
house of the CSP-PLC.4
the respondent's financial assistance, the
defendants reneged on their end of the agreement;
Pante now insists that the demolition was done
hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court
without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
issued the writ of execution and the writ of
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were
demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the
forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had
defendants were ultimately demolished.
taken advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the
premature demolition of the structures sans the
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented
demolition order; that such taking away of the
by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring
dismantled materials constituted robbery and
the disbarment complaint against the respondent
malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his
based on his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit
disbarment.
in causing the demolition of the structures without
the demolition order from the court, violation of the
In response, the respondent denies any wrong
Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of
doing. He counters that the demolition was backed
the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal
up by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision
knowledge.
of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew
Antecedents
its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its
P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite his
church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico,
having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate
La Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria
the premises even within the grace period given to
Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas;1 that on
them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the
June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked
judgment, and his motion was granted by the
received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial
MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated November 21,
Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them
20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
against them by the respondent; that based on the
structures on the premises; that he consequently
allegations of the complaint (docketed as Civil Case
sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that
No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v.
the MTC issued the writ of demolition.10
Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons staying with
and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers
The respondent avers that it was not he but the
and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian
sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that
Spiritists in the Philippines, represented by Pastor
the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated
Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership
that the conduct of the implementation was peaceful,
of the land where the church of the CSP-PLC had
and that Pante and the other members of the church
been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer
personally observed the conduct of the demolition;
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the
and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante
Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
showed no defiance of the lawful order of the court. 11
absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by
The respondent submits that there was nothing
declaring the respondent to have the better right of
wrong in his appropriating the dismantled materials
possession; and that the MTC further declared that
to ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in
the demolition; and that the complaint for his
disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of
merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, provides as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person,
initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government
service. Provided, however, That all charges against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly
charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court; Provided, further, That charges filed against
Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall
immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any
of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same
to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960,
May 1, 2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney
may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the
IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the
attorney be filed directly with the Court, the
complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. The reference to the
IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the
charge may be contested or disputed, or may
require the reception of the evidence of the
complainant and the respondent attorney. After the
referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings
and recommendations on the complaint, subject to
the review by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may
dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve the
charge without delay. This happens particularly
when the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or
unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite
the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits
the direct filing with it of administrative complaints
against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as
the guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary
power of the Court is both a right and a duty. 13 Quite
recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-
B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of
the Court to directly receive administrative
complaints against attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint
of any person before the Supreme Court or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent
Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or
against lawyers in the government service, whether
or not they are charged singly or jointly with other
respondents, and whether or not such complaint
deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their
official functions. If the complaint is filed before the
IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be
filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the
same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator.
xxxx
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In
proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so
requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in
sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the
report of investigation shall be conducted directly by
the Supreme Court.
The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation, [bold
emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]
Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the
administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead
referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court
or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral
ensures that the parties' right to due process is
respected as to matters that require further inquiry
and which cannot be resolved by the mere
evaluation of the documents attached to the
pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever the referral is
made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other
authorized office or individual must conduct the
formal investigation of the administrative complaint,
and this investigation is a mandatory requirement
that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of
threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory
evaluation of the pleadings can determine.16
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory
when the administrative case can be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when
the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal
investigation would be redundant or unnecessary,
such as when the protraction of the investigation
equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may
even be directed at the outset should the Court find
the complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be
read as preventing the giving of speedy relief
whenever such speedy relief is warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer
the complaint against the respondent to the IBP for
the conduct of the formal investigation. The
documents he submitted to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of
the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to
establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well
as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the
structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-
1256.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the
order issued by the MTC on December 19,
2013.18 In the execution of the final and executory
decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs
dutifully discharged their functions. The presence of
the respondent during the execution proceedings
was by no means irregular or improper, for he was
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The
complainant was then represented by Pante and
some other members of the congregation, who did
not manifest any resistance' or objection to any
irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all,
elements of the Philippine National Police were also
present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the
writ of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all
criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away
the materials of the demolished structures. The
parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants,
including the complainant and Pante, opting to
withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the
premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in
exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the
P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in the
MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later
on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr.,
and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the
CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter reneged
on their part of the agreement without returning the
P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to
exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment
against them. It is notable that the judgment
expressly directed him "to exercise his option
pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this judgment insofar as the
improvements introduced by the defendants on the
subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code
granted to him as the owner of the premises, among
others, "the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His
act of taking the materials of the demolished
structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right
of appropriating them in light of the fact that the
P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance
was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed
builders in good faith.
The respondent has called attention to the letter of
the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,21 the
mother organization to which the CSP-PLC
belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing
knowledge of or participation in the disbarment
complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that
the complaint had been filed by Pante only for his
personal interest at the expense of the congregation.
The sentiments expressed in the letter manifested
the inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives
behind Pante's filing of the complaint against the
respondent. The proper outcome for such a
complaint is its immediate dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay
for its utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty.
Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to
comply with the requirements of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar
Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B.
Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this
Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in
his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,
and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
Complainant informed the Court that he inquired
from the MCLE Office about the status of
respondent's compliance and received the following
Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof.
Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's
Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of
IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply
with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the
following compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001
-April 14, 2004)
b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004
-April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007
-April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an
Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED
by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January
14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court
referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean
D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer
of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court
the rollo of the case together with the MCLE
Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the
MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice
Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and
Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001
to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007,
respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law"
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The
MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE
Governing Board noted that respondent neither
applied for exemption nor complied with the Third
Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April
2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court
directed the Second Division  Clerk of Court to
furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15
March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent
to file his comment within ten days from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February
2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a
copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He
stated that he was wondering why his application for
exemption could not be granted. He further alleged
that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing
Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano
was based on the letter of complainant who
belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the
law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo
family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
controlled Camiguin and had total control of the
judges and prosecutors in the province. He further
alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in
Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a
lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the
first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered,
immediately after she took over government in
February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme
Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory
crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my
silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of
CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the
results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING
CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally
resulted to the EDSAI revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now
SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the
national canvassing before the National Canvassing
Board when she ran for President against then
GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was
former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the
2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS
like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX
OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR
ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court
contesting the constitutionality and validity of the
2010 national elections, still undecided up to this
day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case
in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and
legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC
only decided after the Senate decided his case and
former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the
decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and
academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting
the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF
IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the
Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of
Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the
Opposition in Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for
impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty
years now with appearances before the Supreme
Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera
and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and
numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a
number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five
books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2)
Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3)
Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles
and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration
of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for
an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the
alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law
while complying with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred
respondent's Compliance and Comment to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25
November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent
applied for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in
law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request
on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a letter
dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that
according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order
to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to
expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his
expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC
reported that respondent failed to meet the
requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing
members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings
filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant
to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported
that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his
representation in a pleading that his "MCLE
Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in
2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar
Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the
MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of
the case and the striking out of the pleadings from
the records.7 The OBC also reported that under
Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to
comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60
days from receipt of notification to explain his
deficiency or to show his compliance with the
requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a
member who fails to comply within the given period
shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall
be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The
OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance
was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. The
OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the
MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases
be filed against respondent in connection with the
pleadings he filed without the MCLE
compliance/exemption number for the immediately
preceding compliance period and that the pleadings
he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in
his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off
from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be
declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty
of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The
OBC further recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for six months with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC
also recommended that respondent be directed to
comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE
Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is
administratively liable for his failure to comply with
the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to
undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was
from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14
April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was
from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's
letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the
Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14
April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that
respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent
filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board,
respondent's application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent
did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance
Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009 on the ground that the application did
not meet the requirements of expertise in law under
Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However,
the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the
application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE
Office only informed respondent, through its letter
dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano,
when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge
Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of
respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23
October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board
denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to
respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013,
signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter
No. 850. His application for exemption for the First
and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the
compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up
the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February
201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on
his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11 He
did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE
Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements
for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was
reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his
application for exemption. The OBC also reported
that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to
respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5)
of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent
has 60 days from receipt of the notification to
comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment
before this Court, respondent stated that because of
his involvement in public interest issues in the
country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar
Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014
and that he already registered with the MCLE
Program of the University of the Philippines (UP)
Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of
the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal
education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency
and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of
the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise
show compliance with the requirements. Such notice
shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE
FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER
AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE
LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF
OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete
his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit
units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior period requirement
unless units in excess of the requirement are earned
in which case the excess may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of
the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall
apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February
2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only
cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance
Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not
been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of
respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed
that his application for exemption, filed after the
compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the
status of his application but claimed that his
secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the
Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial
of his application for exemption when his motion for
reconsideration was already denied with finality by
the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013.
He had the temerity to inform the Court that the
earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February
2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required
under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, and without even indicating when he
intended to comply with his deficiencies br the
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods.
Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue
practicing law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case.
While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office
three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when
respondent indicated "MCLE application for
exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was
not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing
Board on his application for exemption. However,
after he had been informed of the denial of his
application for exemption, it still took respondent one
year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent
still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the
requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when
respondent indicated "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he
had not filed any motion for reconsideration before
the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent
member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should
recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the
listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is
nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline
erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the
IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not
be permitted to practice law until such time as he
submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has
notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and
to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the
requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is
later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves
to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not
limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties
within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to
be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter
had already been denied with finality by the MCLE
Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a
delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of
law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied
with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is
later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished
the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for
their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

EN BANC

January 26, 2016

A.C. No. 10952

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution1 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved
with modification the Report and
Recommendation2 of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P.
Salvado (Atty. Salvado)  from the practice of law.
The Complaint:
On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an
administrative complaint3 for disbarment against
Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime
in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel
Divina (Atty. Divina),  his childhood friend; that Atty.
Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a
businessman engaged in several businesses
including but not limited to the lending business; that
on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the
complainant to invest in his business with a
guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate
of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured
of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as
the latter had various clients and investors.
Because of these representations coupled by the
assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not place
his reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant
made an initial investment in his business. This initial
investment yielded an amount corresponding to the
principal plus the promised interest. On various
dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant claimed that
he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with
promises of high rates of return.
As consideration for these investments, Atty.
Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the
total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the
principal amount plus interests. All checks were
drawn from PSBank Account number 040331-
00087-9, fully described as follows:
Check Date Amount
Number Issued
006014 August P657 ,000.00
4 14, 2011
006014 Septembe P 530,000.00
r 29, 2011
7
006019 Septembe P60,000.00
0 r 29, 2011
006019 October P90,000.00
4 16, 2011
006020 October P2,
6 17, 2011 120,000.00
006019 October P1,060,000.0
1 29, 2011 0
006019 November P1,590,000.0
5 16, 2011 0
Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks
were dishonored as these were drawn from
insufficient funds or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written
demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly
communicated with him, assuring him that he would
not abscond from his obligations and that he was
just having difficulty liquidating his assets and
collecting from his own creditors. Complainant was
even informed by Atty. Salvado that he owned real
properties that could serve as payment for his
obligations. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado
began to avoid complainant's calls and text
messages. Attempts to meet up with him through
common friends also proved futile. This prompted
complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty.
Divina, for appropriate legal action.
On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally
served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado,
directing him to settle his total obligation in the
amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash
value of the first two (2) PSBank checks, within
seven (7) days from receipt of the said
notice.6 Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to
receive the said notice when Atty. Divina's
messenger attempted to serve it on him.
Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again
engaged the services of Atty. Divina, who, with his
filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to Atty.
Salvado's house to personally serve the demand
letter. A certain "Mark" who opened the gate told the
filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing
there and had been staying in the province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived
bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted
from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about
to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled,
Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his
debt and invited complainant to enter the house so
they could talk. Complainant refused the invitation
and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk
inside his vehicle where his companions were.
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured
complainant that he was working on "something" to
pay his obligations. He still refused to personally
receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle
his obligations.
For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing
worthless checks not only constituted a violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-
Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his
depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not
only refused to comply with his obligation, but also
used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal
prosecution. He had obviously instructed his
household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to
reject any correspondence sent to him. This resort to
deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit
to remain as a member of the Bar.
The Defense of the Respondent
On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his
Answer,7 denying that he told complainant that he
had previously entered into various government
contracts and that he was previously engaged in
some other businesses prior to engaging in the
lending and rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado
asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest
in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of
good interest that attracted him into making an
investment. He further stated that during their initial
meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still
needed additional investments; that it was Atty.
Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and
that complainant was fully aware that the money
invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his
clients and/or borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the
return of investment and accrued interest when due
– as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks
issued to complainant- could be delayed, whenever
Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or
renewal of their respective loans. In other words, the
checks he issued were merely intended as security
or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there
were instances when he would request complainant
not to deposit a check knowing that it was not
backed up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had
worked until the dishonor of the checks, for which he
readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina
City as collateral.
The Reply of Complainant
On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his
Reply,8 pointing out that Atty. Salvado did not deny
receiving money from him by way of investment.
Thus, he must be deemed to have admitted that he
had issued several postdated checks which were
eventually dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it
was complainant himself who prodded him about
making investments must be brushed aside for being
self-serving and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that
complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty.
Salvado should have easily refused knowing fully
well that he could not fund the checks that he would
be issuing when they become due. If it were true that
the checks were issued for complainant's security,
Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document
evidencing such agreement. His failure to present
such document, if one existed at all, only proved that
the subject checks were issued as payment for
complainant's investment.9
Complainant also clarified that his complaint against
Atty. Salvado was never meant to harass him.
Despite the dishonor of the checks, he still tried to
settle the dispute with Atty. Salvado who left him
with no choice after he refused to communicate with
him properly.
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their
respective mandatory conference briefs and position
papers.1âwphi1 Atty. Salvado insisted that he had
acted in all honesty and good faith in his dealings
with the complainant. He also emphasized that the
title to his house and lot in Greenheights
Subdivision, Marikina City, had been transferred in
the name of complainant after he executed a deed of
sale as an expression of his "desire and willingness
to settle whatever is due to the complainant."10
Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months for engaging in a conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law and for
behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing
checks without sufficient funds to cover the same
constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct
which undermine the public confidence in the legal
profession.
The IBP-BOG Resolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and
approved the recommendation with modification as
to the period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased
the period of Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6)
months to two (2) years.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-
BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was
filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the
entire records of the case for appropriate action with
the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory
and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to
par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.11
The Court's Ruling
The parties gave conflicting versions of the
controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been
lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his
businesses with the promise of yielding high
interests, which he believed because he was a
lawyer who was expected to protect his public image
at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied
having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed
had invested by virtue of his own desire to gain
profits. He insisted that the checks that he issued in
favor of complainant were in the form of security or
evidence of investment. It followed, according to
Atty. Salvado, that he must be considered to have
never ensured the payment of the checks upon
maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the
dishonor of the subject checks was "purely a result
of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the
unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of
failed lending transactions xxx."12
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and
adopts its recommendation in part.
First. A perusal of the records reveals that
complainant's version deserves credence, not only
due to the unambiguous manner by which the
narrative of events was laid down, but also by the
coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The
public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations
made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to
as a model citizen.13 A man, learned in the law like
Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful
representations when dealing with persons, clients
or otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG
had observed, complainant's being beguiled to part
with his money and believe Atty. Salvado as a
lawyer and businessman was typical human
behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to
believe that a person like the complainant would not
find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider.
Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of
the Bar had, in one way or another, influenced
complainant's decision to invest.
Second.  It must be pointed out that the denials
proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor
of the checks. His strained explanation that the
checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected
to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing
checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court ruled that
the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that
is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice
is proscribed by the law.
Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence"
deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado
is aware that promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary
obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless
checks, he discredited the legal profession and
created the public impression that laws were mere
tools of convenience that could be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In Lao v. Medel,15 the Court wrote that the issuance
of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct,
and put the erring lawyer's moral character in
serious doubt, though it was not related to his
professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered
by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business
relationship with complainant. His issuance of the
subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an
officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01
and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook
Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade
payment of his obligations.1âwphi1 Instead of
displaying a committed attitude to his creditor, Atty.
Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands.
He even tried to make the complainant believe that
he was no longer residing at his given address.
These acts demonstrate lack of moral character to
satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on
lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
The subsequent offers he had made and the
eventual sale of his properties to the complainant,
unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming
of a member of the Bar.
Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the
correctness of the Investigating Commissioner's
reliance on jurisprudence stating that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own
and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases, including violations of B.P. 22.
Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers is the respondent's
fitness to remain as a member of the Bar. The
Court's findings have no material bearing on other
judicial actions which the parties may choose to file
against each other.16

All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's

reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty
commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the
Lawyer's Oath.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P.

Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
and Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to the personal
records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10548               December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG),
dated January 3, 20131 and March 22,
2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found
Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1)
year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a
complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty.
Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his
Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the
counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of
the said conference addressed to complainant was
returned with the notation "unknown at the given
address." No new address was provided by the
complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit
their respective position papers. For this purpose,
Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The
Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez
(Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against
complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano,
Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron,
Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The
said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial
owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house located in Forbes
Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The
incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion
were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of
Incorporation, the above-named stockholders,
except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed
of assignment of their respective shares in favor of
complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only
₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its purpose
of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated
a loan from the complainant in the amount of
₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the
Forbes property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00
from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla
handed a check in the said amount which was
funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was
undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to
appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as
the purchase price was not reflected in the books of
Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua
assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue
of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997
shares were transferred to complainant based on a
deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share
was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These
transactions appeared in Clarion’s General
Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the
subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his
shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares
amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in
prison in the United States in 2004, he learned from
Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel),
approached the complainant and threatened her,
claiming that the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS)was about to go after their properties.
Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to
transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine
Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again,
this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco
that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her
co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes
property for sale sometimein August 2004. The said
property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of
₱118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s knowledge. This
sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per
the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez
that he was the one who received the payment for
the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed
all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in
the presence of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on
complainant’s alleged participation in the fraudulent
means in selling the Forbes property which was
acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s money.
Complainant was duty bound to remit all the
proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and
beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-
respondents, however, misappropriated and
converted the fundsfor their personal use and
benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty.
Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its factual
averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would
show the following claims and admissions, among
other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant
called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes
property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission
from Mark Jimenez and complainant
answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a
resolution authorizing him to negotiate the
sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an
account with Security Bank, San Francisco
Del Monte branch. When the cash payment
was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano
in the presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused
without any consideration. The transfer
taxes, however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the
Philippines, he was able to confirm that the
sale of the Forbes property was without his
knowledge and approval. The proceeds of
the sale had already been farmed out to
different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings
were premeditated in order to steal the
money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the
allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed
when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on
whom she relied as her personal lawyer and
Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion.
This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against
Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests.
According to her, she usually conferred with Atty.
Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the
principal documents relative to the sale and transfer
of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of
the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of
the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued
that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and
confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this
reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment of
Atty. Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez
initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park,
where he intended to live with his long-time partner,
the complainant; that the original incorporators and
stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares
in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in
the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also
pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the
corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he
prepared all the legal documentation togive effect to
the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of
the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004,
Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for
excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that
during this time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the
complainant, asked him again to changethe
ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the
attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion
case; that he acceded to the request on the belief
that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes;
and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s
ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine
Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter,
complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers
and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until
it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and
complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had
knowledge of the sale as they were in constant
communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false
when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and
discovered that the proceeds of the sale were
coursed through other corporations set up by
complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise
learned of the successive sale of his other
properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing
of the estafa case against the complainant and the
others. As a witness to the fraud committed against
Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit
narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding
the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither
the rule on disclosures of privileged communication
nor the proscription against representing conflicting
interests, on the ground that complainant was not his
client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal
counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He
might have assisted her in some matters, but these
were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him
authority to do so. Further, though he acted as legal
counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed, as a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality
from its shareholders. While he admitted that the
legal documentation for the transfer of shares and
the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by
him and notarized by the members of his law firm,
he averred that these acts were performed in his
capacity as the corporate secretary and legal
counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of
complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting
interests because it was not a "former client" and a
"subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in
litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was
indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here,
complainant failed to allege, muchless prove, the
requisites for the application of the privilege. When
Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the
complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship
indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to
do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the
estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts by a
witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v.
Cañete,9 where the Court ruled that "the fact that
one of the witnesses for the defendant had been
formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was
no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case,
he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of
complainant, in the course of which, he defended
and served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise
pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives
and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It
was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of
complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I.
dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found
Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and
recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year
from the practice of law. Initially, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of
desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case
did not affect the investigation conducted by the
CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted
compromises or withdrawals of cases. After
weighing on the claims of the parties, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing
in the records would show that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and
Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty.
Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal
counsel and corporate secretary of the said
corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did
not include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He
became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez
acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita
Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again
stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares
in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion
as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated
that it would appear that the latter permitted
misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership to be
reported to the SEC through its GIS. The
Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of
shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of
assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted
to have simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes
property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon
1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the
affidavit containing allegations against the interest of
Clarion and complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on privileged communication and engaged in an
act that constituted representation of conflicting
interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the
CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and
recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said
resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the
IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering
that in his more than three decades of practice, he
had never been involved in any act that would
warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon
him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez,
experienced a difficult crisis involving his children
and common-law partner that he experienced a
major upheaval in his professional life. He
apologized for his not being too circumspect in
dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco
reiterated that his participation in the execution of
the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes
property were all connected to his capacity as
Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not
to mention his ties with his client and friend,
Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion
and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to
the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus,
when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a
shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his
part. In his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted that
"Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for
reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal
services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing
Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that
Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed
Atty. Francisco to execute all the documentation to
show his ownership of these companies, including
Clarion. These documents were in the possession of
complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for
Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally
assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of
candidacy and the proceedings before the electoral
tribunals. While he was in prison in the United
States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told
him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then
facilitating the sale of one of his companies,
Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He
asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his
children’s betrayal and to wait until he could go
home. When he filed the criminal cases against his
children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
According to Jimenez, the people who committed
crimes against him were now exhausting all possible
means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent
the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG
denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every
lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of
his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide
by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that
is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to
the law not only speaks of his character but it also
inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the
part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of
conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited
or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to,
or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful"
conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.16 To be "dishonest" means the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity,
integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means
the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. 18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but
also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach,
inorder to promote the public’s faith in the legal
profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious,
but such statement can never be over emphasized.
Considering that, of all classes and professions,
[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,
it is imperative that they live by the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he
also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco
clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct
when he admitted to having allowed his corporate
client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC,
the significant matters regarding its corporate
purpose and subsequently, its corporate
shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the
SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned
the validity of these transfers of shares, making it
appear that these were done for consideration when,
in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit
upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The
Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing
out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment
which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long
practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the
law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of
Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register
valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to
advance the interests of his clientele with patent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes
property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat
the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore,
Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal
infractions and was content to have granted the
requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to
Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind
eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very
least, permitting untruthful statements to be
embodied in public documents. If the Court allows
this highly irregular practice for the specious reason
that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’
flawed scheming and machinations, the Court would,
in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would
undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the
court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers
that their support for the cause of their clients should
never be attained at the expense of truth and justice.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held within
the bounds of reason and common sense. His
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warranta course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show
that he lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon
10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court."
Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that
"a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow
the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are
officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of
our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and
the rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty
in all their dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated
his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely,
to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01,
Canon 1) and to actwith candor, fairness and good
faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso
desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood
nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged
representation of conflicting interests and disclosure
of privileged communication, the Court deviates from
the findings of the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."24 "The relationship between
a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on
an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy
and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the
lawyer’s duty in this regard isto avoid representing
conflicting interests…"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer
must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger a violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the
application of the rule on conflict of interest in this
wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires them to oppose. Developments in
jurisprudence have particularized various tests to
determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this
proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-
bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in
arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the
rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interest applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same actionor in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client
that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the
suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions
of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on
conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to
protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an
attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not
be precluded from accepting and representing other
clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the
lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a
party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco
violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of
the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the
complainant failed to establish that she was a client
of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s
client remains unsubstantiated, considering its
detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was
that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and
that complainant sought advice and requested
documentation of several transfers of shares and the
sale of the Forbes property. This was only
successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed,
drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction
and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion.
There was no detailed explanation as to how she
supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco
as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she
had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this
regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty.
Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of
his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion,
would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of
narrative details presented by the parties. Atty.
Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion
and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was
clearly established in a sworn statement executed by
Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in
comparison with her claims of being the client of
Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked
particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted
not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This
could have given her opportunity to present
evidence showing their professional relationship.
She also failed to appear during the mandatory
conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating
her residential address on record. Her participation
in the investigation of the case apparently ended at
its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers
enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove
the allegations in the complaint by preponderant
evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other. It means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of
Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider
the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of
the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts towhich they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid
stance in dealing with Jimenez’s children and
complainant. He could have been staunch in
reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in
his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s
indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding
that the totality of evidence presented by the
complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden
of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At
most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and,
based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez.
Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that
Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on
conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege
does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the Court
elucidated on the factors essential to establish the
existence of the said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer
are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does
not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines
the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells
the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and
for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in
confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not
raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent
ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by
a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and
delivered to the opposing party, an offer and
counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by
a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity, are not privileged communications, the
element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney
must not be intended for mere information, but for
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney
as to his rights or obligations. The communication
must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business
or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the
Court holds that the evidence on record fails to
demonstrate the claims of complainant. As
discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty.
Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in
confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a
recital of circumstances under which the confidential
communication was relayed. All that complaint
alleged in her complainant was that "she sought
legal advice from respondent in various
occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to
attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no
testimony as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such
confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of proving that the
privilege applies, failed in this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for
breaching the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of
which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.32 The
appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of

Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance
as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on

conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in
actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake
untruthful representations to the SEC and in other
public documents, still constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which
a suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B.

Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar offense in the EN BANC
future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to
the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the Philippines, for their information and
guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of
the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the
Court can determine the reckoning point when his
suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME
V. AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, who recommended the suspension
of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent)
from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid
obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda
Foster (complainant) against respondent for
“unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as
a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed
respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from
receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and
complainant sent a query as to the status of her
complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for
mandatory conference/hearing on November 16,
2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5)
days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant
together with her husband appeared. She submitted
a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of
which were furnished the respondent. The
Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties would
be informed if there was a need for clarificatory
questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted
for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that
respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or
after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her
Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of
the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077
and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant
therein] to pay complainant and her husband the
sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was
referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she
entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent
had notarized. After their discussion, complainant
agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of
the appropriate case in court, for which they signed
a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a
letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the
legal problem referred by complainant. He then
visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the
repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed
to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that
Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name
a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the
matter to respondent who recommended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract
with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant
the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited
the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the
service of the summons to the defendant
corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the
fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds,
complainant also discovered that respondent was
the one who notarized the document being
questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked
about this, respondent merely replied that he would
take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s
case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed
that: 1] the major differences in the documents
issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the
contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional
sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint
discussed the method of payment which was not the
point of contention in the case; and 4] the very
anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those
matters could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant,
requesting that the latter extend to him the amount
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of
urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the
request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to
complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in
exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant
expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she
eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which
was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is
understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be
paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff
Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent
insisted that the remaining amount be given by
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case,
because the judge was allegedly asking for the
balance. Yet again, complainant handed to
respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was
dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December
14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of
the office staff gave her a copy of the order of
dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited
complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant
went to see respondent and requested him to
prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty
on the motion for reconsideration; to include
additional facts because the Land Registration
Authority would not accept the documents unless
these were amended; and to make the additional
averment that the defendant was using false
documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered
to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be
included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the
same, however, complainant discovered that these
matters were not so included. On the same
occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on
respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the
value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told that oral
arguments on the case had been set the following
month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to
terminate the services of respondent as her counsel
and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her
friend gave her copies of documents showing that
respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty
since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the
amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent
never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72
years old and had been engaged in the practice of
law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP
Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He
admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees
therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have received
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the
behest of her husband, who willingly offered the
amount to him for his patience in visiting them at
home and for his services. The transaction was
declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry
about its payment. As regards the amount of
P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent
claimed that the said amount was suggested by the
complainant herself who was persistent in covering
the incidental expenses in the handling of the case.
He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court
would need the money for their hotel
accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved
of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied
having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having
received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also
denied having told her that the case would be
discussed with the judge who would rule in their
favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was
complainant who was bothered by the possibility that
the other party would befriend the judge. He never
said that he would personally present a bottle of
wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment
as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation
since complainant was fully aware that another
counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases.
Having been fully informed of the nature of her
cause of action and the consequences of the suit,
complainant was aware of the applicable law on
reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of
counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in
other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered
respondent’s defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that
respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the
complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long
before she met him. While respondent was
employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was
involved in the preparation of several documents
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest
Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty.
Complainant insisted that the amount of
P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never
considered as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the
Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding
probable cause against respondent for estafa. 23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and
Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and
recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the
balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution
on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition
thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been
filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the
practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to
three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered
to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and
16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the
conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also
differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established
that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the
filing fees for her case were worth more than the
prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved
and the extra expenses to be incurred by court
employees. In other words, he resorted to
overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity
and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of
P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same
amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it
was complainant who suggested that amount
deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued
with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial
resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to
initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is
likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the
actual amount due, consistent with the values of
honesty and good faith expected of all members of
the legal profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship
between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.”28 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not
used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As
pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them.
Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand,
he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His
possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand
excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when
he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of
the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a
receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded
and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly,
this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of
disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money
from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to
ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an
abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the
legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the
height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers
owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of
judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by
iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his
claim that the amount was given gratuitously would
not excuse him from any liability. The absence of
proof that the said amount was indeed used as a
bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s
actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in
the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed
as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty
as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the
court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his
client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards
complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that
he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the
CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not
just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The
first time, he visited his client in her home and
borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and
the next time, he implored her to extend to him a
loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of
urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts,
the authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly
unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but
were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant
because of the trust and confidence reposed in him
as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in
the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied
that these loans fell within the exceptions provided
by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and
P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of
the liberality of complainant and were, thus,
considered as “no loan,” does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and
receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the
present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations
to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers
are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of
“conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection
with the performance of the lawyer’s professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession,
would show him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must
be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation
of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s
“lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on
an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy
and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer
must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception provided in
the rules is a written consent from all the parties
after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP.
There is substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for representing conflicting interests in
handling the case of complainant against Tierra
Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered
services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the
fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the
deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainant’s case. While the
Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the
validity of the said contract, and that only the
intentions of the parties as to some provisions
thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the
purpose for which the proscription was made exists.
The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied
observations of the complainant as to the allegations
lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and
the clear admission of respondent that he was the
one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some
of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s
case, knowing fully that he was involved in the
execution of the very transaction under question.
Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation
of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from
such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was
retained by clients who had close dealings with each
other. More significantly, there is no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is
prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree, but also because of the principles of
public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client
and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused or violated the entire
profession suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of
which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.”36 The
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance
as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the
public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by
the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The
acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty
to his client, the courts and society render him unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of
the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the
Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary,
and for representing conflicting interests, respondent
deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return
the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the
Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private
capacity because its findings in administrative cases
have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The
only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have
no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent
of his right to appeal since administrative cases are to be circulated to all courts.
filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the
quantum of evidence required in civil cases is SO ORDERED.
different from the quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance
of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence
is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a
mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has
to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil
cases in contrast to administrative cases which are,
as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering

respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he
received from complainant, as this was intimately
related to the lawyer-client relationship between
them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00
which respondent received from complainant, as
representation expenses for the handling of the civil
case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of
wine for the judge. These were connected to his
professional relationship with the complainant. While
respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said
amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return
the same as it was borne out of their professional
relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent
was already adjudged as liable for the personal Republic of the Philippines
loans he contracted with complainant, per the small SUPREME COURT
claims cases filed against him. Manila

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the EN BANC

Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to
ensure the proper and honest administration of
justice by “purging the profession of members who,
by their misconduct, have proven themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime
V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda
Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00
and P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
A.C. No. 9872               January 28, 2014
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S.
PRESBITERO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for
disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad
P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero
(Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD,
we gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer
agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of
the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property
located in Bacolod which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also
included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s
late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
the sale of the retained areas of the property, and
the collection of the rentals due for the retained
areas from their occupants. It appeared that the
DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property
but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late
husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged
that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her
in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a
case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent
and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of
the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the
property, with the expenses to be advanced by
Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees.
Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero,
supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing
came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P.
Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to
handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot
located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan,
Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the
property. Respondent undertook to register the
property in consideration of 30% of the value of the
property once it is registered. Respondent obtained
₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration
expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration
decree over the property was already issued in the
name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she
would not have spent for the registration of the
property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of
₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed
that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b)
shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and
(c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a
property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688.
They also agreed that respondent shall issue
postdated checks to cover the principal amount of
the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent
delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and
signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional
loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as
the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a
messenger, postdated checks drawn against an
account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch.
Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about
securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of
₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA,
except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-
square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing,
Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated
checks drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-
square-meter property mortgaged under the third
MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real
estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel
of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property
he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the
additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few
months. He was able to pay complainants a total of
₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the
principal amount or the interest thereon. In
September 2006, the checks issued by respondent
to complainants could no longer be negotiated
because the accounts against which they were
drawn were already closed. When complainants
called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay
the agreed interest for September and October 2006
but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the
succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel
for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated
the services of respondent as counsel.
Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages executed by
respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that
the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious
and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them
to grant him loans by offering very high interest
rates. He also prepared and signed the checks
which turned out to be drawn against his son’s
accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity and
value of the property he mortgaged because he
showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent
mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was
engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was
Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to
extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that
Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw
sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest
rate and he agreed because he needed the money.
He alleged that their business transactions were
secured by real estate mortgages and covered by
postdated checks. Respondent denied that the
property he mortgaged to Presbitero was less than
the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the
property because the sale was actually rescinded.
Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged
to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth
more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay
complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar
went down and when the business with Victorias
Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because
Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied
that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who
owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to
December 2005. He denied making any false
representations. He claimed that complainants were
aware that he could no longer open a current
account and they were the ones who proposed that
his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent
further alleged that he already started with the titling
of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before
it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging
respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he
accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and
learned of his suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the
position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-
CBD found that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed
₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with
the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found that
based on the documents presented by the parties,
respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the
loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either
promised or agreed to pay the very high interest
rates of the loans although he knew them to be
exorbitant in accordance with jurisprudence.
Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled
Navarro and her husband regarding the identity of
the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000
but documents showed that its value was only
₱300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that
property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired
with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10%
commission and later claimed that they agreed that
Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000
from the amount he obtained from Navarro and
Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he
lost all the money he borrowed in three months
except for his claim that the price of sugar went
down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro
and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the
postdated checks, and there was nothing in the
records that would show that he informed them that
it would be his wife or son who would issue the
checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent
had not been transparent in liquidating the money he
received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with
DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting
regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which
was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the
account of his son as if they were from his
own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of
the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true
value of the 263-square-meter lot he
mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans
from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10%
interest on his loans although he knew that it
was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the
checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to
properly account for the various funds he received
from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from
a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected
or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under
suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records
were not clear whether the notice of suspension
respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final
decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be
meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with
modification by reducing the recommended penalty
from disbarment to suspension from the practice of
law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors
likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of
his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration,
praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead
imposed upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least
four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was
established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He
drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay
his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property
to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the
property for only ₱150,000, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that
the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract
from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to
the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he
issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose
name is similar to his name. He only claimed that
complainants knew that he could no longer open a
current bank account, and that they even suggested
that his wife or son issue the checks for him.
However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-
CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe
that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent
signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of
checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the
second batch of checks to Navarro and the third
batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger,
and complainants believed that the checks belonged
to accounts in respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled
that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to
the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity.2 The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were
done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot,
respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client
relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was
established that respondent misled Presbitero on the
value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral
for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero,
respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that
he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as
additional collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in
his private capacity with respect to complainant
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed
respondent to draft the terms of the loan
agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing
that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using
his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of
the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that
were drawn from his son’s account whose name was
similar to his without informing complainants.
Further, there is nothing in the records that will show
that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans
he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected
or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the
IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In
this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent
received various amounts from complainants but he
could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s
18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that
₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could
not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to
the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000.
Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing
fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again,
he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt.
As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had
been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he
received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s
property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether
respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had
since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the
clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed
out, the records do not show how respondent spent
the funds because he was not transparent in
liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly
accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero.1âwphi1 Indeed, his failure to return the
excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed
₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he
secured the loan, respondent was already the
retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was
secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent
misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not
drawn from his account but from that of his son.
Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the
MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the
interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because
the accounts were already closed. The interest of his
client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not
fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his
client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years.
Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to
deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD
imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment.
Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required
of him as a member of the legal profession.7 Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the
law and took advantage of his client to secure undue
gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the
practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP
Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering
respondent to return his unpaid obligation to
complainants, except for advances for the expenses
he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.9 Our only concern is the
determination of respondent’s administrative
liability.10
Our findings have no material bearing on other
judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer
receives money from a client for a particular purpose
involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for that particular purpose.12 If
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, he must immediately return the money to
his client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to
render an accounting, and he failed. He must return
the full amount of the advances given him by
Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M.

Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances

he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to
₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty
days from finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

February 23, 2016

A.C. No. 10945

(Formerly CBD 09-2507)

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES

ORZAME, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client

requires him to conscientiously act in advancing and
safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or
neglect to do so constitutes a serious breach of his
Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional
ethics, and renders him liable for gross misconduct
that may warrant his suspension from the practice of
law.

Antecedents
Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and
Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal
services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle
a case in which they were the defendants seeking
the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land
situated in the Province of Isabela.1
Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from
them, the respondent handled the trial of the case
until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in
their favor.1âwphi1 As expected, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief.
Upon receipt of the appellants’ brief, the respondent
requested from the complainants an additional
amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and
submission of their appellees’ brief in the CA. They
obliged and paid him the amount requested.2
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the
adverse decision of the CA which they only learned
about from their neighbors. They endeavored to
communicate with the respondent but their efforts
were initially in vain. When they finally reached him,
he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his
fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their
behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the
amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for
reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality,
eventually resulting in the loss of their property
measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of
P3,391,600.00.3
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this
administrative complaint against the respondent.
The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.4
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the
respondent did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did
they submit their respective evidence.
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his
findings to the effect that the respondent had
violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law
for one year.5
On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-829,6 whereby it
adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda
but modified his recommendation of the penalty by
increasing the period of suspension to two years, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification  the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," and for violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
aggravated by his disregard of the notices from the
Commission and considering the extent of the
damage suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S.
Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years.
Ruling of the Court
We agree with the IBP’s findings that the respondent
did not competently and diligently discharge his
duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by
which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of
the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust
and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-
client relationship commences, with the lawyer being
bound to serve his clients with full competence, and
to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care
and devotion.7 To accord with this highly fiduciary
relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be
always mindful of the former’s cause and to be
diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. 8 As an
essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship,
the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates
from the lawyer on the developments of the
case.9 The lawyer who neglects to perform his
obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.10
As a member of the Law Profession in the
Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously
failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his
knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to
his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he
gave his unqualified commitment to advance and
defend their interest therein. Even if he could not
thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of
the litigation, he reneged on his commitment
nonetheless because he did not file the motion for
reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from
them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that
purpose. He further neglected to regularly update
them on the status of the case, particularly on the
adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on
the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have
prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle
their case. As it happened, his neglect in that
respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were
then available. His various omissions manifested his
utter lack of professionalism towards them.
all the circumstances in this case, we approve the
recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for a period of
two years. Although the Court imposed a six-month
suspension from the practice of law on lawyers
violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,  15 the recommended
penalty is condign and proportionate to the offense
charged and established because his display of
disrespectful defiance of the orders of the IBP
aggravated his misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
EDGAR S. ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to

himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the
Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as
the national organization of all the members of the
Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the
orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to
appear in the administrative investigation of his
misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as
his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He
thereby exposed a character flaw that should not
tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. 11 He
should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer
demanded that he conduct himself as a person of
the highest moral and professional integrity and
probity in his dealings with others. 12 He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with
unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the
corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to
the Bar, and to the public in general. 13

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of

misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or
disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the
trust and confidence involved in his official oath and
is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity
that must characterize the members of the Bar in the
performance of their professional duties. 14 Based on
 EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657             February 23, 2004

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY,1 respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO SR., J.:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing

documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presented for resolution before this Court.

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-

Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck
prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E.
Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City.

The complainant alleged that prior to the

respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11,
1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:

Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly

commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984
but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular
basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI
starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th
of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further
January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987
and January 6th 1988 to December 31st
1989 but the records fail to show any entry
at the Clerk of Court after December 31st
1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his
Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.2
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant
pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and
to prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of
Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future
practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge
Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and
not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from
Judge Santos or any agency and or public
servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs
involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity
and fairness based on the premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk
of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the
following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the
records found and available in this office, the
following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is
listed as a duly commissioned notary public
in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31,
1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December
31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31,
1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of
notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos
submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was
submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b             February to April 1980
report - was submitted on June 6,
1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was
submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report -
submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no
entry
f. January to February 1981 - no
entry
g. March to December 1981 -
submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 -
submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted
on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 -
submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 -
submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of
transmittal of notarial documents under the
name Atty. Anthony Santos after December
1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial
commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos
was on January 6, 1988 until December 31,
1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent
judge categorically denied the charges against him.
He also submitted a certification5 from Clerk of
Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no
proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted
notarized documents/notarial register. The
respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the
documents notarized and submitted by the
respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his
rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized
documents and therefore not the proper party to
raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten
Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries,
Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance &
Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein
respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court
Administrator recommending the need to resort to a
full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of
the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution
dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the
matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b)
refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report
and recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and
February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that
the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice
Cruz initially denied the request but upon the
complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded
to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a
Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City
before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S.
Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003,
Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the
following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired
on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the
Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial
reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his
commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from
being commissioned as notary public, both for one
year, and his present commission, if any, be
revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the
respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense,
while the complainant presented documentary
evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did
not claim that he was commissioned as notary public
for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. He merely alleged that "there
was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the
submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register."
And, as already observed, he presented no
evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary
public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so
commissioned) and submission of notarial reports
and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows
that "there were only two Record Books available in
the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book
titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued
and Expiration of Commission of the notary public.
First entry appearing was made on December
1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983,
then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for
the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not
present said book. Neither did he present a
certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis
Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he
was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did
not submit a certificate of appointment for all those
years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such
certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the
Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor
General, together with the oath of office of the notary
public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on
the evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983
without being commissioned as a notary public
therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the
instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative
case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official
concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent
may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision
or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of
the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to
the new rule, administrative cases against erring
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative
cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the
foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment
Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the
respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant
prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts
constituting the ground for disbarment were
committed when the respondent was still a
practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the
judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not
for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a
member of the bar, with notarizing documents
without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and
shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said
facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person,
initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service:
Provided, however, That all charges against Justices
of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if
lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That
charges filed against Justices and Judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment
to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to
the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. 14
The investigation may thereafter commence either
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in
accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule
139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance
with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed
in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other
Court designated Investigator. Based upon the
evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the
Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together with the record and all
the evidence presented in the investigation for the
final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for
disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its
indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court
may refer the complaint for investigation, report and
recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer
of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the
Court will thereafter base its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the
judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the
bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining
arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 616of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent
was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such,
the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as
the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a
justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower
court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme
Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not
Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative
Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be
Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise
been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over
members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v.
Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing
of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded
or malicious administrative or criminal cases against
members of the judiciary for purposes of
harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-
SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It
reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by
the Office of the Court Administrator, an
administrative complaint against any Justice
of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or
any Judge of the lower courts filed in
connection with a case in court is shown to
be clearly unfounded and baseless and
intended to harass the respondent, such a
finding should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is
approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of
court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or
she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as
an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six
months before the compulsory retirement of
a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause
of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it
is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If
such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to
file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the
Court a report and recommendation not later
than 30 days from receipt of the comment.
The Court shall act on the recommendation
before the date of compulsory retirement of
the respondent, or if it is not possible to do
so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the
Court may order to be withheld, taking into
account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint
against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be
dismissed outright, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within
six months from the compulsory retirement of the
judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have
occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it
is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated
March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of the
Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The
respondent retired compulsorily from the service
more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002.
Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary
action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the
respondent’s separation from the service.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without
merit and intended merely to harass the respondent.
Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall
within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed
Before His Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the
judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself
recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown
that the respondent continued the doing of the act or
acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence
on record supports the charge on the respondent,
considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the
act complained of must be continuing in order for the
respondent judge to be disciplined therefor.
In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was
charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while
he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent
therein refused to turn over the funds of his client
despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even
after he was appointed as a judge. However, the
Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s
subsequent appointment as a judge will not
exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that
proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as
basis for administrative discipline against a judge if
he is not charged with immorality prior to his
appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume
that since he had wandered from the path of moral
righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and
walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is
beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate
knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high
price for that honor - his private and official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. ...27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant
failed to prove the charges by substantial
evidence.28 The complainant therein presented
evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous
indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no
evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the
latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was
exonerated in this case because the complainant
failed to present evidence that the indiscretion
continued even after the respondent was appointed
to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected
with public interest  that it is both the right and duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to
promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests
this power of control and regulation in this
Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite
Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If
Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary,
it is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public.31 Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission
as notary public must not be treated as a mere
casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a
lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also
the crime of falsification of public documents." 34 For
such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial
commission and disqualification from acting as such,
and even disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the
occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For
one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public
cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than
the public faith in the integrity of public documents is
at stake in every aspect of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported
By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s
formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating
Justice to decide the case on the basis of the
pleadings filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
The respondent merely alleged in his answer that
"there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the
submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register."
Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice,
the respondent presented no evidence of his
commission as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial
reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an
opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert
the evidence against him in a formal investigation.
When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant
was not a party in any of the documents so
notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby,
is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor which include
the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule
13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested
person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as
to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the
proper authority acts and doings of public officers
which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties
of the office and from which conduct the citizen or
the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of
The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good
standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry,
upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice
merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has
all the qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule
is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is
not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In re
Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the
Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s
recommendation that the charge for immorality
against the respondent be dismissed on the ground
that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that
the respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing.
Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the
respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to
show that her paramour was the father. The
complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999,
almost twenty years after the illicit affair
ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses
do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that an administrative complaint
against an erring lawyer who was thereafter
appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-
four years after the offending act was committed, is
not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise,
members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity
of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complained of
and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members
of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing
acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this
case, considering the seriousness of the matter
involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the
sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of
the administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes
documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The
Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled
principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar.52 By
his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to
such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of
the public on notarial documents and thereby
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite
notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for
it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is
mandated in this case, considering that the
complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-
four years after the commission of the act
complained of;56 that there was no private offended
party who came forward and claimed to have been
adversely affected by the documents so notarized by
the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is
a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full
measure of his well-earned retirement
benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is
justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E.
Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents
without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6490               July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION
TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a complaint for disbarment
directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn
Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and
1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn
Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a
total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land
located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, which consisted of several parcels
belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted
that under the government’s agrarian reform
program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast
tracts of agricultural land as she already owned
other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put
the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious
persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven
parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of
fictitious persons, as follows:
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang
decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in
need of funds for their medication and other
expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants
by offering the parcels to prospective buyers,
respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia
Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles
and after he failed to negotiate any sale,
complainants confronted respondent. Respondent
then told the complainants that he had lost all seven
titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants,
respondent advised them to file petitions in court for
re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the
"authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious
owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed
petitions for re-issuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public
prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of
the supposed owners that were affixed on the
Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly
executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public
prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the
court to have the supposed owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had
the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice
to their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of
petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious
owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look
more varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set
of petitions, respondent executed several documents
that included revocations of SPAs and various
affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the
parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused
the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of
the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices
where he represented himself as the owner of the
parcels and announced that these were for
sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the
seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00
from the proceeds of the sales.12
Alleging that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants
filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case
was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners
of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they
had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added
that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the
seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully
demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from
the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He
alleged that after she had been refused to be given a
"balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him
and seek his disbarment.13
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4,
2004,14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct
for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board
of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner
Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors
increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the
case was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The
Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence
presented by complainants were mere photocopies
and affidavits and that the persons who supposedly
executed such documents were neither presented
nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been
adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a
penalty as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were
conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July
18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006;
February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17
The complainants presented several witnesses. One
was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American
Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April
2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in
turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7)
parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They
agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at
₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only
₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company
withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia
Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse
claim and upon respondent’s failure to produce
Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty.
Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced
him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself
as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot
priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel
in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia
Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse
claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either
work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse
him. He added that respondent was unable to
produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the
parcel he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the
seven parcels, also testified for complainants.20 He
testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to
respondent who claimed that several parcels with a
total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned by his
mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for
the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash
and in kind (L-300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the
matters stated in the Complaint.21
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the
complainants to submit their Position Paper.
Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and
the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who,
respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to
cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was
"bent on prejudicing"22 him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following
this, the case was reassigned to Investigating
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s
approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of Procedure, it
was deemed proper for an Investigating
Commissioner to submit his/her Report and
Recommendation based on matters discussed
during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’
Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on
the results of clarificatory questioning (if such
questioning was found to be necessary). As such,
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, and he was required to file his Position
Paper.23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position
Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed
submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and
Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed
criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account
of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the
identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He
claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the
Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were
introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that
Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the
seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the
parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and
him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of
the public announcements (where he supposedly
offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and
Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the
signatures on such documents appearing above the
name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries
and crude duplications of his own signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August
23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found
respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of
the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was
absent in most of the hearings without justifiable
reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR. 26 He
recommended that respondent be disbarred and his
name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution27 adopting the Report of
Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.28
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the
IBP on August 8, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the
Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On
September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s
Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days
to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned
respondent that no further extension will be given.
Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions
for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and
the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which
were denied by the Court.
Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for
Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a
Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with
attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied
by the Court on April 17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not
respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his
disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court
concurs with and adopts the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and
the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that
respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and
affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself
the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang
herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s
own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate,
the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the
contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a
lawyer who is held to the highest standards of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately
and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and
skill of the law to prejudice and torment other
individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action,
he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to
injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon
respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the
following grounds:
deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
violation of the lawyer's oath;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is
proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property
rights of other persons. By way of examples:
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon
U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious
SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him
for administration.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents,
Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having
acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the
purported vendors and for taking advantage of his
position as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing
one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of
Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious.
In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred
respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having
converted to his personal use the funds that he
received for his clients.
Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done
with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v.
Moron:32
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is
evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious
misconduct, should no longer remain a member of
the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe – such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end
desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it
has been established that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De
Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other. It means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto."36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may
consider the following in determining preponderance
of evidence:
All the facts and circumstances of the case;
The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony;
The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and
The number of witnesses, although it does not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.
In this case, complainants have shown by a
preponderance of evidence that respondent
committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit
in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Specifically, complainants have shown not only
through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so
through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty.
Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:
respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of
or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise
dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent perfected the sales and received the
proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind –
of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization
of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales
to complainants.
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed
that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia
Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate
the identities of the supposed owners of the subject
parcels, he had failed to produce such persons or
even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this
regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty.
Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are
particularly significant in so far as they have been
made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is
contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse
claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to
rebut complainant's allegations.
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence
that the owners of the seven parcels were not
fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven
parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations
against him by flinging counter-allegations. For
instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had
unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the
proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that
after she had been refused, she threatened to
defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In
support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had
filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang. He
also surmised that the signatures on the subject
documents appearing above the name "Glenn C.
Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications
of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, 37 the
burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges
the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue.
Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and
allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of
his defense, the determination that he committed the
violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his
allegation that the supposed owners of the seven
parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he
failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities
and existence, much less produce their actual
persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia
Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the
forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they
remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to
aver facts and circumstances which support these
claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from
the documents which form the very basis of
complainants’ own allegations and which are
actually being assailed by complainants as
inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent
makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have
been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs 39 and
how he merely respected the title and ownership of
the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of
how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the
SPAs.41 However, respondent loses sight of the fact
that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs
and SPAs indicate and the deception they engender
that are the crux of the present controversy. In
urging this Court to sustain him, respondent would
have us rely on the very documents assailed as
fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up
with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving
allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained
the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of
his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it
is related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does
not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for
whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not
have confronted him to demand the return of the
TCTs and how he could not have told them that he
lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always
respects and recognizes the right of an owner to
keep in his custody or possession any of his
properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have
met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement
of his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because
legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there
was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn
income.45
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’
allegations, respondent merely embarks on
conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants.
He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of
twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale
of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame
him and to seek his disbarment after she had been
refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing
notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent
failed to adduce even the slightest proof to
substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia
Tabang had sufficient basis to file the present
Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even
foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by
repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings
without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court
to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply
with the much extended period given to him, thus
inviting the Court to be a party in delaying
complainants’ cause. For all his perversity,
respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C.
GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED
and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to respondent's personal
record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence

adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of
evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to
no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent
committed the acts of which he is accused and that
he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the

practice of law is imbued with public interest and that
"a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State – the
administration of justice – as an officer of the
court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly

short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the
contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the
law as well as took advantage of the credulity of
petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to
inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the
course of several years in a sustained and
unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous
wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable
offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From
how he has conducted himself in these proceedings,
he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6470               July 8, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by

Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the
following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer
of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant

before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June
2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent
had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of
a public market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the
mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government
unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two
contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease
agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the
lessees. However, complainant only found out that
the agreement had not been signed by the lessees
when she lost her copy and she asked for another
copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which
complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes
Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent
drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not
advise complainant that the property was still
covered by the period within which it could not be
alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her
complaint, complainant subsequently submitted
three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized
by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino
(Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The
SPAs were not signed by the principals named
therein and bore only the signature of the named
attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso).
Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s
allegations against respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the
Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe
mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant and that the latter had read it before
affixing her signature. However, complainant
urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract
was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar
file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase
"absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently
left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for
disciplinary action, because complainant constructed
the subject public market stall under a "Build
Operate and Transfer" contract with the local
government unit and, technically, she could be
considered its owner. Besides, there had been a
prior mortgage contract over the same property in
which complainant was represented as the
property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as
owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee
that it was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The perjury charge was even dismissed, because
the prosecutor found that complainant and her
spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same market
stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the
court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to
accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy.
Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new
one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the
lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in
lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant,
however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property
covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and,
therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of
that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not
present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned
nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly
stated that the property was the subject of a case
pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally,
respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by
complainant as additional evidence wereproperly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the
documents that the attorney-in-fact personally
appeared before respondent; hence,the notarization
was limited to the former’s participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the document
must be notarized in the principal’s place of
residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent
submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion for
Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs
naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs
that lacked the signatures of either the principal or
the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with
incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an
unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that
lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned
Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form
(Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned
Invitation Letter toa potential investor in Japan; (9)
an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned
Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the
parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did
not tackle the additional documents attached to
complainant’s Urgent Ex ParteMotion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
recommended the immediate revocation of the
Notarial Commission of respondent and her
disqualification as notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who
had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted
respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease
agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs
pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the
inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage
contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent
liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he
also recommended that she besuspended from the
practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously
adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the
additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without
observing the procedural requisites under Section 4,
Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex
ParteMotion of complainant was actually a
supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under
the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar
Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to
question those documents. Hence, the investigating
commissioner should have expunged the documents
from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating
circumstances be considered, specifically the
following: absence of prior disciplinary record;
absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and
emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make
restitution or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No.
XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012,
deniedrespondent’s motion for reconsideration for
lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the
IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago
– through a letter addressed to then acting Chief
Justice Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the
documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint
against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint
against respondent and the parties’ submissions in
this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of
the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges
against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of
some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A comparable argument was raised in
Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent
therein opposed the admission of the birth
certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of
his grossly immoral conduct, because those
documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned
as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible
when it isrelevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law or these rules." There could be no dispute
that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the
issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the
law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said
birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained
in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the ruleon confidentiality of birth records,
but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth
records in violation of said rule would render said
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand,
the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that: The Constitutional proscription
enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents.
The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot
be extended to the acts complained of in this case.
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a
co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records
as evidence against respondent, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures does
not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence
do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the
birth certificates inquestion, said public documents
are, therefore, admissible and should be properly
taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no
provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
consideredin evidence the other notarized
documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-
ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very
name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves
to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading.
Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify,
enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to
the same subject matter as the controversy referred
to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot
be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of
her charges against respondent is that the latter
notarizedincomplete documents, as shown by the
SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from
submitting additional evidence to strengthen the
basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court finds that she committed
misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a
notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot
be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedlystressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law,
entitled tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for
this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the
public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized
document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In
this case, respondent fully knew that complainant
was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall.
That complainant comprehended the provisions of
the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens
the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures,
she could have given complainant a certified
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease
agreement is not a rarityin respondent’s practice as
a notary public. Records show that on various
occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has
notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for
it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a
document be signed in his or her presence.26
A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed it are the very same
ones who executed it and who personally appeared
before the said notary public to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and
appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule
10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no
falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In
several instances, the Court did not hesitate to
disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious
to the solemnity of their oath as notaries
public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will
not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatmt
disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a
notary public warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary
public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public.
Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the

personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

March 10, 2015

A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN
E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for

disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez)
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27,
2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig)
and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and

Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s
when they were both students at the University of
the Philippines, but they lost touch after their
graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty.
Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that
time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez. 2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was

already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the
Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which
was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that
Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy
should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the
process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would
eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree
was lawful and valid and that there was no longer
any impediment to their marriage.5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child
whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her
marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the
Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted
Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured
Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also
promised to legally adopt their son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty.
Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty.
Catindig told her that he would still have to get the
consent of Gomez to the said petition.8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she
received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing
her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a
love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter,
Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his "impediment is
removed." Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able
to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August
13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr.
Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where
Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court
directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November
25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he
married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez
showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was
blessed with four children, their relationship simply
deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their
de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted
Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual
friend, on how the agreement to separate and live
apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested
that the couple adopt a property regime of complete
separation of property. She likewise advised the
couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have
and comfort it may provide them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its
laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce
by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican
Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the
foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed
by the Dominican Republic court does not have any
effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she
knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez
still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty.
Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage
to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only
married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he
was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr.
Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he
left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He
asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty.
Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an
affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed
in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s
romantic overtures; she told him that she could not
reciprocate his feelings since he was married and
that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her,
which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on
July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29,
2003. During the conference, the parties manifested
that they were already submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to
submit their respective position papers within 10
days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and
Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17,
200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr.
Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a
Report and Recommendation,28 which
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr.
Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly
immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that
warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct
was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a
professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior.
Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity
for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused
damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to
him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed
to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a
second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well
that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty.
Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo
be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed
to present clear and preponderant evidence in
support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the
December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating
Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that,
under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr.
Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention
of committing any felony; that he never concealed
the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty.
Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its
Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents
committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations
of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s
good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses
itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his
client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The
Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by
the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that
is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice –
a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In
1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into
his first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a
de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce
decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year.
Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at
that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away – a marriage that has at
least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that
the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our
jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly
married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew
unless his previous marriage be properly declared a
nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be
void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez.
The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral
values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our
laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court
that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his
previous marriage remained valid, the logical
conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in
the USA for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s
claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that
he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least,
so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez,
and despite the various legal actions he resorted to
in order to give their union a semblance of validity,
Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the
nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger
Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate
from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct,
such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of
Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him
a child.38
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests
a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty.
Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless,
in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations
against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he
indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably,
such admission provides ample basis for the Court
to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that
the respondents were indeed having an affair and
the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension
or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings
is preponderance of evidence.39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was
received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged
relations between the respondents; it does not prove
the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly,. the
supposed love letter, if at all, only provesAtty.that
Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his
love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the

records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen Republic of the Philippines
E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of SUPREME COURT
evidence. Manila

This Decision takes effect immediately. EN BANC

SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457              

February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr.

Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30
September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for

disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of
the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C.
No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married
Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children,
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and
Virginia separated. He became a dentist and
practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia
alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the
annulment of their marriage, which was eventually
granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan,

Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie
Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his
sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the
filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39
years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The
case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from
Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children
learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second
Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that
he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for
Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia
alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia
alleged that homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed
to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15
August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against
him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed
as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment
and desire for revenge because he acted as pro
bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the
Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29
July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment
against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged
that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733, and despite the facts that he is only on
parole and that he has not fully served his sentence.
Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to
engage in the practice of law despite his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the
directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his
verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging
basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged
that his sentence was commuted and the phrase
"with the inherent accessory penalties provided by
law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the
sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide
does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed
that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme
malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him
for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD
Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole
issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is
involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD
ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found
Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal,
this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and
sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July
2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of
his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment
or suspension. Citing International Rice Research
Institute v. National Labor Relations
Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that
homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD
reviewed the decision of this Court convicting
Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that
the circumstances leading to the death of the victim
involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion
Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of
respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor
his companion Christopher shown to have wronged
the respondent. They simply happened to be at the
wrong place and time the early morning of June 3,
1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano
solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of
moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme
Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be
slighted by a couple of drunks who may have
shattered the stillness of the early morning with their
boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of
drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s
inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken
men who were not even directed at respondent
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced
sense of superiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for
having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the
IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred
and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February
2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for
reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño
alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and
misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that
the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate,
distinct, and different from his case. He further
alleged that there was no condition set on the grant
of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was
restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally,
Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an
ambush, he already stopped appearing as private
prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia
and that he already advised his clients to settle their
other cases. He alleged that Garcia already
withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying
Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No.
08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the
Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the
Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction
for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19
dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-
2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states
that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This
Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to
society in general, contraryto justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.5
The question of whether conviction for homicide
involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court
in International Rice Research Institute v.
NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of
homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but
not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always
be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as
malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and
there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that
moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite
term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the
cases are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño
guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois
hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and
4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we
agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show
the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano
Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were
walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when
the latter, without any provocation from the former,
went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started
firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere
about five meters, more or less, from the gate of
Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of
the gate and when they turned around, they saw
Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and
Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An
eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled
that he heard shots and opened the window of his
house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly,
hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another
witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down
after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of
the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back
towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD
correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco
were just at the wrong place and time. They did not
do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing
done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of
Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the
executive clemency restored his full civil and political
rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to
bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was
granted "an absolute and unconditional
pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and political
rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases.
Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not state that
the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The
accessory penalties were not mentioned when the
original sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutation and they were also not mentioned in
stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By
virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence
of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted
by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme
Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00
is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive
clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the
President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency
merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term
of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment"
the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a
mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty
for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He
served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which
reason he was released from prison. More
importantly, the Final Release and
Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x
x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been
expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the
Parcasio case has no application here. Even if
Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing
in the records that shows that it was a full and
unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law
is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted only to
those possessing good moral character.20 A violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of
disbarment.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is
DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt
of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO
S. PAULMA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified
complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty
and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma
(respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005,
respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount
of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt.
Because of respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted
the check without question.3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for
payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids.
Respondent failed to make good the amount of the
check despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a
Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006 recommending the
filing of the appropriate information against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of
Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently,
said information was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2604.9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a
Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding
respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering
him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the sum of
P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check
with interest pegged at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum computed from the time of the
filing of the complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of
P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00 plus appearance fees of P1,500.00 per
hearing.11
Records show that respondent appealed his
conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal,
Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case
No. 346.12 In a Decision13 dated March 13, 2009, the
RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16,
2009, the RTC Decision became final and
executory.14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on
February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense,15 respondent denied that he
committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior
to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that
there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of
the check. Respondent claimed that he merely
issued the check in order to accommodate a friend
in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that
he did not personally benefit from the proceeds
thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and
respondent had no means by which to pay for the
amount of the check.17 He also claimed that
complainant threatened him and used his unfunded
check to the latter's personal advantage.18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated
November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
its investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
issued a Report and Recommendation20 dated June
26, 2013, recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as
well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude.21
It found that the offense for which respondent was
found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved
moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's
oath and the CPR when he committed the said
offense. Stressing the importance of the lawyer's
oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said
crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to
protect the administration of justice or that he is no
longer of good moral character"22 which justifies
either his suspension or disbarment.23
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP
Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24 adopting and approving with
modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation
dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for
having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as
well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude.25cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is
whether or not respondent should be
administratively disciplined for having been found
guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of
the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and
modified by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the
bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a
guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument
for the orderly administration of justice.26 As such, he
can be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, which renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court.27cralawred
In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the
purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation
to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this
case, to wit:
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account users. The gravamen of the
offense defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or
any check that is dishonored upon its presentment
for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks
with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime
against public order to be abated.
xxxx
to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that
membership in the legal profession is a privilege
burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to
observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions
whether acting in a public or private capacity.36 Any
transgression of this duty on his part would not only
diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also
erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a
whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the bar, for which he must suffer the
necessary consequences.

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the
objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not, he
was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the
law was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his
illegal act to public interest and public order. He
thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined
him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation
of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the
trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character
as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt
of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty.
Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of

BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been
indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact,
already become final. Consequently, respondent
violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and,
thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein

respondent from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years when the latter issued checks which
were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1
Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same
penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent
who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the
penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to
respondent for having issued bouncing checks,
among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya
II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to
pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's
trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in
the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in
view of the foregoing instances when the erring
lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years
for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10134               November 26, 2014

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT

EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its
President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C.
RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the complaint for suspension or

disbarment filed by the Philippine Association of
Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty.
Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008
against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz),
former National Treasurer of PACE, before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1

PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level

court employees in the Judiciary held its 11th
National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from
October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of
PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money
matters of PACE.

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the

11th PACE national convention was submitted by
Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th
PACE national convention in Iloilo City2; that during
the 12th convention, an election of officers was
conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of
National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on
the last day of the convention or on March 31,
2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty.
Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007
appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end
bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that
Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the
12th convention; that there was no turn over of
monies belonging to the association as a matter of
procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June
20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of
PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past
treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to
liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and
Iloilo conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had
filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th
national convention in Davao in less than a week
after the said convention; that it was duly audited by
the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net
proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted,
liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE
accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of
Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May
22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash,
checks and original receipts, were received by
Rosita Amisola and witnessed by former PACE
officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as
PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention
as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy
for Board Member of the First District of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the
₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her
solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board
of directors; and that she never sponsored the
bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and
seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah
Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not
privy to the disbursement of the said term-end
bonus.8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner
Elpidio G. Soriano. After an exchange of pleadings,
the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the
protagonists were directed to submit their respective
position papers. Thereafter, the case was re-
assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
(Commissioner Fernandez).9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz
violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28,
2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the
dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of
merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to
show that she was able to submit the liquidation
reports for the two aforementioned conventions of
PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael herself
acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty.
Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention.10 As
to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports,
this would be better resolvedthrough an audit rather
than in disbarment proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides,
Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the
position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE
to have any connection with her being as a lawyer.
Thus, according to him, she should be sanctioned in
accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a
disbarment case.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-
election in the PACE elections even though she was
no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that
the best evidence, which was the "certificate of
candidacy," was never offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz,
being a lawyer, knew that her bid for re-election
would be a useless exercise since she would not
beable to assume office if she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty.
Diaz’s assertion that she never sponsored the
appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and
that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a
collegial action among the Board of Directors. Again,
Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her
participation in the passage of the questioned board
resolution was not connected to her being a
lawyer.14
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the
complaint against Atty. Diaz.15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the
Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21, 2013,
granting the complainant’s motion for
reconsideration. It reversedand set asideits earlier
resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the
practice of law for one (1) year.17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding
(i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of PACE funds;(ii) her
running for re-election when she was no longer with
the Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end
bonus when she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of
questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its
June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone
should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a
privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy
this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and
continues to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is
the very essence of a practitioner's honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are
required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of
litigation and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts.
They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and
to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court
has held that the practice of law is granted only to
those of good moral character. The Bar maintains a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus,
lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach
at all times, whether they are dealing with their
clients or the public at large, and a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.20
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the
law and belongs to that profession which society
entrusts with the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an
exemplar for others to emulate and should not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting
in its demand for integrity and good moral character
from members of the Bar. They are always expected
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and to refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
this noble profession.21
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of
PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-
admission that she ran for said election as shown
not by her certificate of candidacy but by the
affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of the
questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers,
including herself even though she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the
candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be
desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is
found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court
Administrator for its distribution to all courts of the
land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be entered into respondent's personal records as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576               January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by
Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-
Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General
Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon
12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los
Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of
the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from
his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to
St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate
Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the
SEC a GIS for LCI for "updating purposes". The
GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business
transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008,
LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by
knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of
the Board and President of LCI when she knew that
he had already resigned and had never held any
share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD
or been President of LCI. He also never received
any notice of meeting or agenda where his
appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He
has never accepted any appointment as Chairman
and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the
SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of
the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the
GIS was provisional to comply with SEC
requirements. It would have been corrected in the
future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary
dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the
GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that
her certification served to attest to the information
from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a
stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13,
2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked
him to meet with her so hemay sign a Deed of
Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin
responded in the affirmative and said that he would
meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin,
however, neglected to show up at the arranged time
and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On
the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin
filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board
meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s
Certificates dated May 16, 20066 , May 22, 20067 ,
and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were
pending criminal complaints against the directors
and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-
respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los
Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In
those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that
the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or
perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when
the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await
the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
contradictory findings."11 During the mandatory
preliminary conference, however, both parties
stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas
was dismissed as to Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to
present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment.1âwphi1 She stated that merely
presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of
any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR
and thus recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for three months. It noted that
based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was
never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him
ineligible tobe a member of the BOD. Neither was
there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI
but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts.
This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los
Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate
directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was
aware that this procedure was not legally
permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she
allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely
certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman
and president of the company. The Secretary’s
Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin
presented were of no moment since inthese Guarin
merely acceded to become a signatory of bank
accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a
stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013
Resolution16 adopted in totothe CBD Report. Atty.
Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied
in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board
of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the
IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty
is to comply with the rules of procedure, ratherthan
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can
proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.1âwphi1 As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of
the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty
as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath."21
Grounds for such administrative action against a
lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations
of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the
corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold
a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed
and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in
the GIS. While she posits that she had made the
same in good faith, her certification also contained a
stipulation that she made a due verification of the
statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin
believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the
instrument. We also note that there was no
submission which would support the allegation that
Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not
conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.1âwphi1
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to
be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de
los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and
officers of the corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to
the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has
transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty.
Limpin's action m submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six
months suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine
A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766               August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative
Complaint1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008
filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant)
against respondent Pedro S. Diamante
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s
oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order,
and for failing to keep his client informed of the
status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a
recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to
pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement,
respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46
(RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The
complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in
an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of
action and insufficiency of evidence.5 While
respondent was notified of such dismissal as early
as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the
same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the
former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent
allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the
payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since
complainant could not produce the said amount at
that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given
the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of
the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal
before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan
handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent,
who on even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before
the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC
dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period provided for by law.
Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact
and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated
November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC
(November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission
of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to
the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the
notice. Considering the technical requirements for
such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline
for its submission. It was then that he discovered
that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as
certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant
also found out that, contrary to the representations
of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4,
2009, respondent alleged that it was complainant’s
failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to
pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing
of his appeal. According to him, he informed
complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period
to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the
same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant
"not for money or malice" but being a desperate
litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable
decision.16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated
September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable, and accordingly
recommended that the penalty of suspension for a
period of one (1) year be meted out against him. 18
The Investigating Commissioner found
complainant’s imputations against respondent to be
well-founded, observing that instead of meeting
complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the
issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the
partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved
on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues
at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not
find credence in respondent’s accusation that the
spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from
complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent
who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up
his lapses that brought about the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there
is still an available relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors unanimously adopted and approved
the aforesaid report and recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court
concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the
lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated
on the developments of his case as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney
to inform his client of whatever important information
he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He
should notify his client of any adverse decision to
enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed
of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in
the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client
in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the
client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon
his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to
be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August
14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal
of complainant’s partition case before the RTC.
Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform
complainant of such dismissal as the latter only
knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury,
respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing
complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007,
or way beyond the reglementary period therefor,
thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly,
respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and
diligence as men of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the
dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required
a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant’s
appeal had been given due course, when in truth,
the same had long been denied. In so doing,
respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and
unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant.
Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his
personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy
to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s
inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests
with utmost diligence and competence as well as his
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct in order to conceal such neglect should
never be countenanced, and thus, administratively
sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of
employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep
complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true
status through the use of a falsified court order
evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts
should not just be deemed as unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to
practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s
pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive,
viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are
disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral
flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices.
A lawyer’s relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor. This is the essence of the
lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the
office of an attorney requires that he should be a
person of good moral character. This requisite is not
only a condition precedent to the admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt
as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases
where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the
status of their respective cases, the Court
suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In
Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the
lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely
and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of
their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid,
Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer
who consistently failed to update his client of the
status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-
ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of
Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen
v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney in order to
mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in
Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was
meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in
existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of
falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in
his case, when in reality, his case had long been
dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus,
causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court,
respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his
violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his
moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties
as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather
than enhance the public perception of the legal
profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his
violations, as well as the damage and prejudice
caused to his client, respondent deserves the
ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is
hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

March 11, 2014

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT

OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY
JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON
Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting

judges truly degrade their judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for
indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating
the integrity and reputation of the judges and the
Judiciary.

AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative

complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q.
Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members
of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account
of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San
Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.

Antecedents

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey

condominium project located along Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack
Wack, Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the project’s
location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street
as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed
the consent of the Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent
a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the notice. Left
with no option, AMALI set up a field office along
Fordham Street that it enclosed with a temporary
fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field
office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s
construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file
a petition for the enforcement of an easement of
right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On
July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer for
the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium
project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be
known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s
petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved. 4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No.
65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a
petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to
enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No.
65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted
AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on
a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary
injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment.
AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also
served as its motion for partial reconsideration of the
July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011,
AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to
Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions
were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division,
which included Associate Justices Bueser and
Rosario, required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth
Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting
the petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on
certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack
Residents Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint,
alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with
the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F.
de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan,
in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that
the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad
faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to
favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to
AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross
misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so
will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack
of merit. This is because an administrative charge
against any official of the Judiciary must be
supported by at least substantial evidence.10 But
when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such
that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy
sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing
of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should
be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in
character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing
its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes
a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised
Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly
render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted
to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor
and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit
the offense, the offender must be a judge who is
adequately shown to have rendered an unjust
judgment, not one who merely committed an error of
judgment or taken the unpopular side of a
controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly
means "sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate
intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant
must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made
with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good
faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that
will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an
unjust decision.14 In other words, the judge was
motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other
similar motive in issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is,
therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the
judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the
judgment or final order that the judicial officer
knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such
determination and declaration be made in
administrative investigations and proceedings like a
preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor?
The answers to these queries are obvious – only a
superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate
or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions
involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or
administrative hearing officer may be usurping a
basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged
by the Constitution or by law elsewhere in the
appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the
validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner
reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled
litigants and their lawyers of resorting to
administrative charges against sitting judges instead
of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not
tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of
Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the
Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and
Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon.
Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of
Appeals,18 we emphatically held that the filing of
administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the
Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing
the administrative complaint was to take respondent
Justices to task for the regular performance of their
sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would
thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them
for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations
cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of
administrative investigation and prosecution made
against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his
regular performance of the judicial office always
subverts and undermines the independence of the
Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once
again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the
performance of his official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate
judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.
Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of
resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges
against judicial officers who rule against it in its
cases. That impression is not at all devoid of
basis.1âwphi1 The complaint herein is actually the
second one that AMALI has brought against
respondent Justices in relation to the performance of
their judicial duty in the same case. In its first
complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA
Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon.
Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI
accused respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross
misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court
dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it
centered on the propriety of the interlocutory orders
issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
118994. The Court appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the
parties’ respective allegations disclosed that the acts
complained of relate to the validity of the
proceedings before the respondent CA Justices and
the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No.
118994 which were done in the exercise of their
judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with
cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a
judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings
against justices do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous
orders or judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for
review on certiorari challenging the questioned order
of the respondent CA justices which is still pending
final action by the Court. Consequently, a decision
on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of
the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this
administrative proceeding would be premature.
Besides, even if the subject decision or portions
thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative
liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of
the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad
faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or
corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist
in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality
established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be
clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma
of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad
faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other
than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that
respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s
counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an
unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and
partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his duties
shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best
addressed to the evaluation of the Court in the
resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action
prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes
that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts’
dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must
not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse
of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their
rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first.
They are identical, with the complaint herein
containing only a few but insignificant changes in
relation to the first. Both were intended to intimidate
or to disparage respondent Justices in the
performance of their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints
by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an
outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of
this Court. Unfounded administrative charges
against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem
fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its
representative personally responsible for the
unfounded charges brought against respondent
Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do
so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of
respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest
of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have
thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment
of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they
have not stopped doing so even if the latter were
sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI
and its representatives would be to reward them with
undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude
towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or
apprehend being held to account or to answer for
performing his judicial functions and office because
such performance is a matter of public duty and
responsibility. The office and duty to render and
administer justice area function of sovereignty, and
should not be simply taken for granted. As a
recognized commentator on public offices and public
officers has written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by
authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of
damages by one claiming to have been injured by
the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction.
From the very nature of the case, the officer is called
upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter,
and the law holds his duty to the individual to be
performed when he has exercised it, however
erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may
appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient,
have been advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is
said of the judge: "His doing justice as between
particular individuals, when they have a controversy
before him, is not the end and object which were in
view when his court was created, and he was
selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are
created on public grounds; they are to do justice as
between suitors, to the end that peace and order
may prevail in the political society, and that rights
may be protected and preserved. The duty is public,
and the end to be accomplished is public; the
individual advantage or loss results from the proper
and thorough or improper and imperfect
performance of a duty for which his controversy is
only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to
the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if
he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may
be called to account by the State in such form and
before such tribunal as the law may have provided.
But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the
individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is
not admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s
authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its
Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of
the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized
Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in
writing why they should not be held in indirect
contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and
baseless charges against respondent Justices not
only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges
against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after
being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any
court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or
upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession,
or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference
with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under
section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer
of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a
person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as
to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative
or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of
court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts, and need not be specifically granted by
statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a
judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their
very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
The power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the
due administration of justice. The reason behind the
power to punish for contempt is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the courts
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E.
Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for
its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B.
Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA
Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized
Usita to bring the administrative complaint against
respondent Associate Justices to show cause in
writing within 10 days from notice why they should
not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices, and for interfering with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10681               February 3, 2015

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and

BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case that stemmed from a

Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses
Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S.
Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants)
against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa
(respondent), charging him with gross misconduct
for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that

from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent served
as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this
capacity, respondent handled many of their cases
and was consulted on various legal matters, among
others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop
business towards the end of 2005. Said business,
however, failed to materialize.4

Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact

from their failed business venture, respondent, on
March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount
of ₱2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with
interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his
wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would
be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the
aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued
three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s
name:6

Check No. Date Amount Payee
Elmer
03-23-
0000561925 ₱750,000.00 dela
06
Rosa
Elmer
03-23-
0000561926 ₱850,000.00 dela
06
Rosa
Elmer
03-23-
0000561927 ₱900,000.00 dela
06
Rosa
Total:   ₱2,500,000.00   Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a
piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the
checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received
the originals of the checksand that he agreed to
return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of
five percent (5%), within five (5) days.7 In the
afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks
were personally encashed by respondent.8
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised
to return the money, he failed to pay complainants.
Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding
payment but respondent merely made repeated
promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent
a demand letter9 to respondent, which the latter did
not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants,
through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica
dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to
respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied
borrowing any money from the complainants.
Instead, respondent claimed that a certain Jean
Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was
the real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to
the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The
parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental
Chapter received complainants’ letter-
complaint15 charging respondent with violation of
Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers
from borrowing money from clients unless the latter’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice.16
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing
₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that
Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that
complainants had been attempting to collect from
Nault and that he was engaged for that specific
purpose.19
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that
they extended the loan to respondent alone, as
evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name.
They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed
out that it defies common sense for them to extend
an unsecured loan in the amount of ₱2,500,000.00
to a person they do not even know. Complainants
also submitted a copy of the Answer to Third Party
Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party
defendant in a related collection case instituted by
the complainants against respondent.22 In said
pleading, Nault explicitly denied knowing
complainants and alleged thatit was respondent who
incurred the subject loan from them.23
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was
later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In the
course of the proceedings, respondent failed to
appear during the scheduled mandatory
conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated
and the parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers.27 Respondent, however,
did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his
Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a)
Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer
shall not borrow money from his clients unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which
provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the
checks were issued in respondent’s name and that
he personally received and encashed them. Annex
"E"30 of the Verified Complaint shows that
respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3)
EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the
₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of
five percent (5%), within five (5) days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault
was the real debtor was found to be implausible. The
Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true
that respondent was not the one who obtained the
loan, he would have responded to complainants’
demand letter; however, he did not.32 He also
observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly
signed appeared to have been prepared by
respondent himself.34 Finally, the Investigating
Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party
Complaint which categorically states that he does
not even know the complainants and that it was
respondent alone who obtained the loan from
them.35
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of
the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04
and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s
failure to appear during the mandatory conferences
further showed his disrespect to the IBP-
CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred and that
he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to
complainants, with stipulated interest.37
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by
the evidence on record and by the applicable laws
and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report
in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11,
2013,38 but reduced the penalty against the
respondent to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law and ordered the return of the
₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal
interest, instead of stipulated interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution
No. XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as
to its recommended penalty and its directive to
return the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal
interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from
complainants is amply supported by substantial
evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on
March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest Bank
Checks, in amounts totalling to ₱2,500,000.00, with
respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex "E"42 of the
Verified Complaint shows that respondent
acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to
pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated
interest of five percent (5%) per month within five (5)
days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show
that respondent personally encashed the checks on
the day they were issued.44 With respondent’s direct
transactional involvement and the actual benefit he
derived therefrom, absent too any credible indication
tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that
respondent was indeedthe one who borrowed the
amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which
amount he had failed to return, despite their insistent
pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor
hardly inspires belief. While respondent submitted a
document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment
of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer
to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied
knowing the complainants and incurring the same
obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants,
it would be illogical for them to extend a
₱2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security
to a person they do not even know. On the other
hand, complainants were able to submit documents
showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and their
encashment, as well as his agreement to return the
₱2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the
fact that the loan transaction was entered into during
the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
him and complainants,45 allowing the former to wield
a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust
and confidence inherently imbued in such
relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is
prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as
any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against
borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty.
Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared that
a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client
was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
same despite court order, and representing
conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater
amount involved in this case and respondent's
continuous refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems
it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for
three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation
to suspend him indefinitely.

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to
nature of the case and by independent advice. return to complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00
and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It comes
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.52 In
within those acts considered as abuse of client’s
such cases, the Court's only concern is the
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
determination of respondent's administrative liability;
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
it should not involve his civil liability for money
legal maneuverings to renege on her
received from his client in a transaction separate,
obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. In this case, respondent received the
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not
from complainants who were his clients and whose in consideration of his professional services. Hence,
interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, the IBP's recommended return of the
were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this
confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
on the former’s word that he will return the money
plus interest within five (5) days. However,
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa
respondent abused the same and reneged on his
is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04,
obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stem
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent warning that a commission of the same or similar
also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads: acts will be dealt with more severely. This Decision
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES is immediately executory upon receipt.
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants Administration for circulation to all the courts.
and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed
SO ORDERED.
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.

That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty

to be imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s return
directive.

II.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer

depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.50

In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the

practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing
₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the
 G.R. No. 191247               July 10, 2013

FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,
PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, and ROSELLA DE
GUZMANBAUTISTA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the November
23, 20091 and the February 11, 20102 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila (RTC), in
Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong
v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de Guzman," denying the
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the
petitioner.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and

Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged
the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr.
(petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed
against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for
annulment of contract and recovery of possession
with damages involving a parcel of land in
Parañaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square
meters, more or less. Petitioner’s legal services
commenced from the RTC and ended up in this
Court.3 Spouses de Guzman, represented by
petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the
case was pending before this Court, Spouses de
Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter,
they were substituted by their children, namely:
Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman,
Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman
(respondents).4

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to

Determine Attorney’s Fees5 before the RTC. He
alleged, among others, that he had a verbal
agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman
that he would get 25% of the market value of the
subject land if the complaint filed against them by
Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he
had successfully represented them, respondents
refused his written demand for payment of the
contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he
was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent
of the value of the subject land on the basis of
Republic of the Philippines quantum meruit.
SUPREME COURT
Manila On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the
assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the
THIRD DIVISION ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated
that the said motion was filed after the judgment
rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this
Court, had long become final and executory on
October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering
that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case because a final decision
could not be amended or corrected except for
clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a
variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for
attorney’s fees would still be included.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
This petition is anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE
GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT IN A
VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID NOT
BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO
RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES.6
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged
his legal services and orally agreed to pay him 25%
of the market value of the subject land. He argues
that a motion to recover attorney’s fees can be filed
and entertained by the court before and after the
judgment becomes final.
Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased
spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon
which an action can be commenced within six (6)
years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil Code.
Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009,
he insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.7
For their part, respondents counter that the motion
was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer
be granted. In addition, the RTC had already
resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of
₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Respondents further
assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees
under a written agreement. The alleged
understanding between their deceased parents and
petitioner, however, was never put in writing. They
also aver that they did not have any knowledge or
information about the existence of an oral contract,
contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the
respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the
market value of the lot is excessive and
unconscionable.8
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court because of the denial of his
motion to determine attorney’s fees by the RTC.
Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong
remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule
45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 because this case involves an error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to
this Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this case,
petitioner should have first elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent
jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil
actions for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not
absolute and admits of certain exceptions, such as
in this case, when it is demanded by the broader
interest of justice.11
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed
a petition to prosper despite the utilization of an
improper remedy with the reasoning that the
inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of
procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of
justice. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this
Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as
having been filed under Rule 65.
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court
finds in favor of petitioner.
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is
necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s
fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its
extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to
the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party
as indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts
are similar in some respects, they differ from each
other, as further explained below:
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper
cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that
which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts
have many things in common that a treatment of the
subject is necessary. The award that the court may
grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee
is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in
prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his
cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the
party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances
authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s
fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the
compensation for the latter’s services. The losing
party against whom damages by way of attorney’s
fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his
liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the
prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount
stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however,
be taken into account by the court in fixing the
amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party
litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his
judgment recoveries against the losing party. The
client and his lawyer may, however, agree that
whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages
the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as
his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case,
the court upon proper motion may require the losing
party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the
prevailing party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in
other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite
to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of
professional services by a lawyer. As a client may
not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his
lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a
party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as
damages in favor of the winning party who enforced
his rights without the assistance of counsel.
Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control
and modification. And the rules governing the
determination of their reasonable amount are
applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being
claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation
for professional services rendered, and not as
indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment
from respondents for having successfully handled
the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de
Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in
the amount of ₱10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de
Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the
CA and this Court, is of no moment. The said award,
made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for
damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable
against the losing party and is to be paid directly to
Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents)
and not to petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s
motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result
in a double award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to
the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a
final and executory decision or variance in judgment.
The Court now addresses two (2) important
questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for
professional services be recovered? (2) When can
an action for attorney’s fees for professional services
be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is
instructive:
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the
recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR
Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent’s
present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially
after its earlier decision had been reviewed and
partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services of a lawyer had been
rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for
recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main
action may be availed of only when something is due
to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined
until after the main litigation has been decided and
the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the
court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises
when something has been recovered from which the
fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment is rendered, the determination as to
the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof
will have to be held in abeyance until the main case
from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may
arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination
to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed
before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied
or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a
lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim
for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was
well within his rights when he made his claim and
waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay
differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s
complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may
file a claim for fees in the same action only before
the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would
deprive him of his aforestated options and render
ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this
Court. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an
incident in the main action, which is permitted by the
rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court
holds that the questioned motion to determine
attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC
decision became final and executory on October 31,
2007.1âwphi1 There is no dispute that petitioner
filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on
September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1)
year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the
RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have
had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with the
deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil
Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years within
which to file an action to recover professional fees
for services rendered. Respondents never asserted
or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman
refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this
reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run
only from the time the respondents refused to pay
him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the case
of Anido v. Negado:17
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in
the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the
contract for legal services in October 1978, and his
filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or
more than nine years after his cause of action
arising from the breach of the oral contract between
him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the
six-year prescriptive period within which to file an
action based on such oral contract under Article
1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known
that he only had six years from the time petitioners
refused to sign the contract for legal services and to
acknowledge that they had engaged his services for
the settlement of their parents’ estate within which to
file his complaint for collection of legal fees for the
services which he rendered in their favor.
[Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, having established that petitioner is
entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim
well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy
is to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of the correct amount of attorney’s
fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only
contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the
controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the
matter would still be open for questioning before the
CA and this Court. In the interest of justice, this
Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and
simply resolve the matter at this level. The Court has
previously exercised its discretion in the same way
in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay:18
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees
between the attorney and his client, and the
intervention of the courts is sought, the
determination requires that there be evidence to
prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of
the services rendered, taking into account the facts
determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the
determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum
meruit is remanded to the lower court for the
purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to
now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both
attorneys in order that the resolution of "a
comparatively simple controversy," as Justice
Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be
needlessly prolonged, by taking into due
consideration the accepted guidelines and so much
of the pertinent data as are extant in the
records.19 [Emphasis supplied]
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the
claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered
view that he is deserving of it and that the amount
should be based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he
deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an
express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees
on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that
prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on
the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must
show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation
for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking
into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.20
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the
proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following
factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
 e) The probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar
services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of
compensation;
the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice, imposition or
fraud on the part of his client as the client against
abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the
court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a
proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see
that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital
consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt
on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth
the best in him to secure justice for his client he
himself would not get his due.22

i) The character of the employment, whether The Court, however, is resistant in granting
occasional or established; and petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's
fees based on the value of the property subject of
j) The professional standing of the lawyer. litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with
Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount
respondents’ deceased parents in the civil case for of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value
annulment of contract and recovery of possession of the property.
with damages. He successfully represented
Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to
17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty.
filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit,
of parties with entry of appearance and motion to the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of
resolve the case before this Court.21 As a the market value of the parcel of land, covered by
consequence of his efforts, the respondents were Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of
substituted in the place of their parents and were payment.
benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.
SO ORDERED.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense
counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and
respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The
Court is certain that it was not an easy task for
petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long
period of time, considering the heavy and
demanding legal workload of petitioner which
included the research and preparation of pleadings,
the gathering of documentary proof, the court
appearances, and the various legal work necessary
to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be
denied that petitioner devoted much time and energy
in handling the case for respondents. Given the
considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort
exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown
by him in ensuring the successful defense of his
clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded
reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered.
Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his
professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business

and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to
secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a
means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
 A.C. No. 9860               September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA,

MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-
BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP,
and KARENOROLA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment

complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph
Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all

surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip
(Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad
Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola
(Emilio).2

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the

daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and
Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of
the above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio.3

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before

the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18
(RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-
3639, the parties were represented by the following:
(a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and
in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary
Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b)
Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel
for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other
heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with
respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty.
Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of
Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of
Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings,
the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved
for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his
stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son,
Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an
Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order).
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent
Republic of the Philippines filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating
SUPREME COURT counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for
Manila the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6

SECOND DIVISION
Due to the respondent’s new engagement,
complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP),
claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code,
as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in
the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of
the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while
Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the
mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of
respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained
only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already
entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10,
2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose
such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was
not able to obtain their written consent as required
under the Rules.10
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned
charges, contending that he never appeared as
counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of
Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case
readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were
represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio
were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He
averred that he only accommodated Maricar's
request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their
counsel of record could not attend the scheduled
June16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his
appearances thereat were free of charge.12 In fact,
he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw
from the case as no further communications
transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he
consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent
Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he had no
knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other
heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information
was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of
record at any instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was
more of a mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that
since no settlement was forged between the parties,
he formally withdrew his appearance on December
6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions, respondent
submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty.
Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his
consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as
counsel for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation19 dated
September 15, 2008submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.(Investigating
Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests only with respect to
Karen as the records of the cases how that he never
acted as counsel for the other complainants. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the
express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen,
who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the
Code.20
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule
138 of the Rules as complainants themselves
admitted that respondent "did not acquire
confidential information from his former client nor did
he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in
the course of his previous
employment."21 Considering that it was respondent's
first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found
the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty
and, instead, recommended that he be severely
reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.22
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the aforementioned report in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December
11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding
the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules but
imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was
denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated
January 3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that
respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but
reduced the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer
is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.27 In
Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained
the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is" whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable
duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-
client relationship has terminated.30
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court
agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must
be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the
collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed
by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special
Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the
Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests.
Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent
Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement
as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked
against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio –
particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated
rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential
information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the
rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from
representation with respect to opposing parties in
the same case.1âwphi1 In other words, a lawyer
cannot change his representation from one party to
the latter’s opponent in the same case. That
respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf
of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any
credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if
the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.31
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his
engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than
a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement
among the family members render the rule
inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his
conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the
lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned
before he may act as mediator, conciliator or
arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably,
respondent failed in this respect as the records show
that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full
disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s
counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly,
Karen – and equally secure their express written
consent before consummating the same. Besides, it
must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such
in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the
parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s violation
of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is
warranted.
In this case, the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner was increased from
severe reprimand to a suspension of six(6) months
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that
the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors’
modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a),
Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates
that "the decision of the Board upon such review
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based."34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any
ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court is
wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce in plain
terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that
its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state
the facts and the reasons on which the same is
based is akin to what is required of courts in
promulgating their decisions. The reasons for
handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station
than any other portion of the ratio.35
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into
consideration the following factors:
first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is
undisputed that respondent merely accommodated
Maricar's request out of gratis to temporarily
represent her only during the June 16 and July 14,
2006 hearings due to her lawyer's unavailability;
third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had
no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other
heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually
acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be
said that he acted in good faith; and fourth,
complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor
did he use against them any knowledge obtained in
the course of his previous employment, hence, the
said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his
subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in
Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lakin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly
imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three months to the counsel
therein who represented parties whose interests are
hostile to his other clients in another case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador
Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115               September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-
NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty.
Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by
private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil
(Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella
Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter
of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci
ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201).
At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in
several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy
Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development
Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy
Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca,
through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate
halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to
comply with the court order in SP 95-75201
declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of
Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the
accounting and delivery of the dividends and other
proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s
stockholdings in the aforementioned
corporations.7 She added that respondent
mortgaged a commercial property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject
property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the
total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing
Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993
(subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in
his capacity as President of URCI, already
recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of
the same.10 Accordingly, she demanded that
respondent return the said property by executing the
corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor
together with an inventory and accounting of all the
proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. 11 In this relation,
Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2,
2005 or after she had already instituted various legal
actions and remedies that respondent and
URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her
pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s
allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of
forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that
Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single
issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust
agreement. He also contended that the parties’
transactions in this case were made way back in
1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed
until Bella came into the picture and instituted
various suits covering the same issue.14 As such, he
sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further
prayed for the payment of moral damages and
attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same
arose out of a misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a
Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the
charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding
respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the
penalty of suspension for a period of six (6)
months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to
withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further
consideration and investigation ofthe administrative
case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section
5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides
that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied
the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary
cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed
independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the
good moral character required from members of the
Bar when the latter failed to comply with the
demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and
deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property
without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was
found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the
above-stated penalty was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to
the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is
of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which
gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been
laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by
Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as
well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil
Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject
property’s alleged disposition in violation of the
subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his
failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca –
which she takes as an invocation of her rights under
the subject trust agreement – as well as
respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property
without the former’s consent, sprung from his own
assertion of the rights he believed he had over the
subject property. The propriety of said courses of
action eludes the Court’s determination,for that
matter had never been resolved on its merits in view
of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even
states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations
she had previously made arose out of a
"misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully
explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her
inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading
her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her]
complaint has no basis in fact and in
law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement
of facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold
water so as to support the finding of "serious
misconduct" which would warrant its recommended
penalty.1âwphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that
respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted, mortgaging the subject property,
notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim,
respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have
exposed himself even to the slightest risk of
committing a property violation nor any action which
would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily,
members of the Bar are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure,
respondent blemished not only his integrity as a
member of the Bar, but also that of the legal
profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser
extent as compared to what has been ascribed by
the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code.
Considering that this is his first offense as well as
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court
believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's
record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7360               July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I.
Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three
causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the
same case for which he previously appeared as
prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio)
for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted
Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct
bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP)
Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa
(Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the
first cause of action and recommended the penalty
of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP
twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first,
to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension
of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty.
Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v.
SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon
case), for the complex crime of double frustrated
murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the
private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with
Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and
requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty.
Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused
Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a
case where he previously appeared as public
prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also
alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa
and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias
in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused
numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by
arguing against the position of the private
prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo
Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty.
Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC
rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16
November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty.
Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the
accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending
finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for
frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was
a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of
the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical
injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa,
Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public
prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her
P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the
charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal
Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct
bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse)
filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the
execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s
father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas
still remained in detention for more than two years.
Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for
the dismissal of the case and for the release of
Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation
for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was
offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of
instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No.
27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M.
SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, up to three years,
six months and twenty days of prision
correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php
10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided
for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty.
Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from
the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial
court released its decision in the Esperon case on
16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s
bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was
only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail.
Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between
himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa
dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-
serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and
his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa
admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is
under probation, he asserts that "conviction under
the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude
since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a
crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in
respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for
which he was convicted falling under the category of
crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15
September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition
in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did
intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.
Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case
would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed
to have acquainted himself with the facts of said
case and has made himself familiar with the parties
of the case. Such would constitute sufficient
intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently,
[Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case
only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute
a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to
establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to
dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than
seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting
allegations are merely based on the word of one
person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of
witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated.
Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident
occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999,
[l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would
undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the
allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money
could not be ascertained and verified with certainty
anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points
out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which
[Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
[Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this
Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding
are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No
evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty.
Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the
practice of law for six months. In another Resolution
dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension
from the practice of law to two years. The Office of
the Bar Confidant received the notice of the
Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March
2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first
cause of action and modify its recommendations in
the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on
Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14
which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his
services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty.
Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement
in the same case on two occasions can only be
described as desperate. He claims his participation
as public prosecutor was only to appear in the
arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as
collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do
well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David: 4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in
his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor —
when he is listening to his client’s preliminary
statement of his case, or when he is giving advice
thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open
court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of
the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This
stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind,
it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests applies although the attorney’s
intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of
bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint
before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is
difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa.
Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the
records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to
bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed
her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed
bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty.
Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-
Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros.
Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty.
Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely
denied the accusation and dismissed it as
persecution. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him. He must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show
proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the
filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate
a respondent. Administrative offenses do not
prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed
from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by
any interested person. There can be no doubt of the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the
proper authority acts and doings of public officers
which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties
of the office and from which conduct the public might
or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section
1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person,
initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented
as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt
that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case
No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already
final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by
submitting documentary evidence of the
Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No.
27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his
interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude
is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section
27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review
a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise
or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift
or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act
must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do;
and
4. the act which the offender agrees to
perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third
element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept
a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust
act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the
duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in
general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of
the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and
duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude. (Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests
and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit
at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty.
Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct
bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty.
Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained
to impose a penalty more severe than suspension
because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to
flout the exacting standards of morality and decency
required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as
a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has
proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to the Office of the Court Administration for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116               August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that
respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter
would receive in representing Spouses Amable and
Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin
Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a
letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting
to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million.
Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July
16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same
after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the
payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not
lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife,
Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has
four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5 without the
required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he
accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed
the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
complainant's commission which he clarified in his
July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding
sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty.
Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the
Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10,
2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for
one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the same
in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on
a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a
single person without showing that such service is
made available to other persons on a consistent
basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent
is engaged in the business of lending.

28, 2010. Respondent moved for
reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution
No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that
forgery had attended the execution of the August 11,
1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter
admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainant's commission but passing on the
responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should
be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that
the power to disbar should be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of
the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal,
or committed under scandalous
circumstance,17 which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We
deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R.
PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9
of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active
practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the

accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four
children notwithstanding that his moral character as
well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of
Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb
the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal

money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some
 A.C. No. 7593

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA
LOZADA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August

2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada
(Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are

as follows:

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc

promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
"Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada"3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita

Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts

of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their
information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4

On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty.

Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction

with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed
as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled "Edilberto
Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.," where
complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto
THIRD DIVISION Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings
of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial
March 11, 2015 Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation,
complainant submitted certified true copies of the
minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July
3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada
signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as
the transcript of stenographic notes showing that
Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in
appearing as counsel while still suspended from the
practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the
resolutions of the Court which suspended her from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to
require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint
against him.8
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty.
Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of
her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute.
She claimed that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within
the prohibition to practice law, considering that she
is defending her husband and not a client.1awp+
+i1 She insisted that her husband is a victim of
grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at
stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.11
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9,
2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty.
Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the terms of her suspension from the practice of law
as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the report and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that
Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law
for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors
with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders
a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in
the instant case, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of
legal knowledge within the period of suspension.13
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience." It includes "[performing]
acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."14
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is
undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt
that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing
and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her
husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and
cross- examination, all constitute practice of law.
Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose
that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007
were done within the period of her two (2)-year
suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006.
It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty.
Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008.
Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for
and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-
V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings
therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year
suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to
convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two
(2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform
the court about it. Neither did she seek any
clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom
she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty.
Lozada should not forget that she is first and
foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to
obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor.1âwphi1 - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, SO ORDERED.
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.15

Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher

penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity,
families will always look out and extend a helping
hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a
spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her
husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it
proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty.

Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing
Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended
further respondents from the practice of law for six
(6) months for practicing their profession despite this
court's previous order of suspension, we, thus,
impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for
representing her husband as counsel despite lack of
authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to

purge the law profession of unworthy members of
the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and
honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme
Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so
in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of
its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a
less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire
of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita

S. Bautista- Lozada is found GUILTY of violating
Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant
a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts,

the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent’s record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the

date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can
determine the reckoning point when her suspension
shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

 LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is an administrative complaint for

disbarment or suspension filed by complainant
Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We
resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed
serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor
of several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-

Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The
Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De
Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the
latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-
payment of a loan.2

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman

involved in building cell site towers. She is
acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business
by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De
Vera.3

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed

500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of 20,000.00
per month until fully paid.4 However, Teresita did not
have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to
borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary
Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her
property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera
issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31,
2006 for 500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at
least two more checks to cover the interest agreed
upon.7

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera

obtained another loan from Teresita’s sister in the
amount of 100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan.
Atty. De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-
dated July 14, 2006 for 100,000.00 to Teresita.
Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount
borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the

checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced"
for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita
attempted to encash the checks for a second time.
However, the checks were dishonored because the
account was closed.9
SECOND DIVISION
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera.
March 16, 2015 However, she failed to settle her obligations,
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De
A.C. No. 8330 Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, Revised Penal Code.10
vs.
ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent. The Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office issued the
Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable
RESOLUTION cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest
was issued by the trial court.11
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that
Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.12
On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera
to comment on the Complaint.13
Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24,
2010. She presented her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006,
Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting
Project to Atty. De Vera’s group. The project
involved twenty-nine (29) Globe Telecom sites
across Northern and Southern Luzon.15
Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the
required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they
agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs
for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would
cover the costs for application of building permits.
Teresita, thus, owed her 195,000.00 per site.16
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the
downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time,
Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to
Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have
the funds required for the application of building
permits that costs around 100,000.00 for each cell
site.19
Teresita was constrained to borrow 500,000.00 from
Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty.
De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita
checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason
Teresita gave was that she had been frequently
arguing with her husband regarding the loan.20
Atty. De Vera denies the 100,000.00 loan from
Teresita’s sister.21 She only lent Teresita another
check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]"22
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not
drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value.
The checks were not meant to be deposited.23
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present
administrative case is baseless. She points out that
the proceedings before the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office were under reinvestigation since
she did not have the opportunity to answer the
criminal complaint.24
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint
for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint
was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in
any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or]
abused her position against the interests of the
complainant."25
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was
abused.26 In addition, "[a]ll the bare allegations that
[Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to
mortgage her property and that the checks issued by
[Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not
constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De
Vera]."27
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera’s
Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for "investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days
from receipt of [the] records[.]"28
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues,
stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits.29 Upon the
termination of the mandatory conferences, the
parties were "directed to submit their respective
verified position papers within a period of thirty (30)
days from receipt of the Order."30
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively
liable for serious misconduct and recommended the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the
practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner
ruled:
Respondent’s assertion that the checks she issued
to complainant were not security for the loans she
obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for
deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the
ordinary experience.
....
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d
substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent
incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and
she issued postdated checks to the latter as security
for the payment of the loans.
Assuming . . . that respondent’s version of facts
were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious
misconduct.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg.
22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless
check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt
— though not intended to be presented for payment
— has the same effect as an ordinary check and
would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
....
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law,
especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct.
. . . [A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice in connection with his profession, but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional
capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did
not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath
as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.34 The
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera
violated the following provisions:
Cannon [sic] 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.35
The dispositive portion of the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended
that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year
from the practice of law.37
In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated
May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors resolved to adopt the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above- entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent violated the
B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney’s
Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.39
(Emphasis in the original)
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors’ Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the
Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21,
2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-
24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties’
respective motions:
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for
Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings
of the Commission and the resolution subject of the
motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Moreover, respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his
Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited
pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted
to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus,
Resolution No. XX- 2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED.43
(Emphasis in the original)
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed
serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor
of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the
records of this case, we resolve to adopt and
approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by
arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by
Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a
guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also
raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint
in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings
considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct
[are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts
complained of."44
This is not a case of first impression. This court has
ruled that the lawyer’s act of issuing worthless
checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
constitutes serious misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent
lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-
dated checks that were dishonored upon
presentment for payment:
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent
Collado. We do not, however, believe that conviction
of the criminal charges raised against her is
essential, so far as either the administrative or civil
service case or the disbarment charge against her is
concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the
checks when she did not have enough money in her
bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it
cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was
charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in
violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes
serious misconduct on the part of a member of the
Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when
it is flagrant.48
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order
to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account users. The
gravamen of the offense defined and punished by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and
putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit
and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient
funds, or with no credit, because the practice is
deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public
order to be abated.
....
Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the
objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to
know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check
involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order. He thereby swept aside his
Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity.50 The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De
Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita.
Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to
Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by
denying the existence of the loan and claiming that
the checks were mere "show checks."51 However,
she failed to present evidence to prove those
allegations.
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita
civilly liable to Mary Jane for 540,000.00,53 and on
which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient
evidence to hold that there was no separate
transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The
Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by
Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely
claimed that she had no personal knowledge of any
transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed
out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her
checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human
experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed
to know the consequences of her acts. She issued
several post-dated checks for value that were
dishonored upon presentation for payment.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of
fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty
on his part would not only diminish his reputation as
a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be
removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for
the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him."'571âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628               July 1, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified
Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed
by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino)
against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando,
a lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages against his
own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom
Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando
stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC
x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893 /Issued on
March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time
of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s IBP O.R.
number should have already reflected payment of
his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and
that he should have finished his third Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance,
not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned
from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case
for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando ..
When Maximino was furnished a copy · of the
complaint, he discovered that, through text
messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that
he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "
x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will
impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court
records, never appeared even once, that's why you
lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as
[your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money
from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado
mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even
prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of
CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which
stated that Maximina "x x x has never done anything
to protect the interests of the defendants in a
manner not befitting his representation as a
seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging
enormous amount of professional fees and
questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted
services reached as far only in preparing and filing
uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to
Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed
the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation
of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar
Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for
the disbarment of respondent as well as the award
of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against
him and claimed that his late submission of the third
MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment
and that the Notice to Terminate Services of
Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made
upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was
declared in default in the aforementioned civil case.
Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive
language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was
used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and
were uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and
estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19,
2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty,
Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying
Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x. "14
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30,
2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a
transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement
is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the
IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so
gross or grave as to warrant any administrative
liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the
communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly
addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published
and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to
be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino
moved for reconsideration17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with
modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.19
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against
Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency
and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with
conditions before the legal profession, the courts,
their clients and the society such that a lawyer has
the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all
times, whether in public or private life, act in a
manner beyond reproach especially when dealing
with fellow lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as
Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.1âwphi1 The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v.
People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the
words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English,"
"stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to
another colleague as defamatory and injurious which
effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the
hurling of insulting language to describe the
opposing counsel is considered conduct
unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case,
the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent
to his brother Marcelo as casual communications
considering that they were conveyed privately. To
the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text
messages were clearly intended to malign and
annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the
word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence
that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of
Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct
against his colleague, in violation of the above-
quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of
guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal
case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents
and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure
from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer
to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that

membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions
directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such
conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private
lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon
them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that
the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's
brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando
should have been more circumspect in his words,
being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer
to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was
highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult
Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of

judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language.28 The Court has consistently
reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear
how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.29

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No.

1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE
compliance in the complaint for damages he had
filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as
the expunction thereof from the records.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.

Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing
with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed
by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty
and grave misconduct.

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant

charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately
and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the
Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate
to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent
refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint
filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato
Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File
Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action,
in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his
client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not

furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court
of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not
properly defend herself without a copy of the title.
She further claimed that the title presented by
respondent was fabricated. To support such claim,
complainant presented Certifications from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran,
allegedly confirming that there is no file in their
offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty

of conflict of interest when he represented the
occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family,
who previously donated a parcel of land to the
Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation
respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of

conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was
his former client in an administrative case, to rule in
his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the
outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed
EN BANC in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and
reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016 jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s]
x x x."
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v.
Complainant charged respondent with grave
ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent. misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of
his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as
Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute
DECISION of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law, which is a government
CARPIO, J.: institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation
of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his
The Case perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007,
respondent basically denied the charges against
him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File
Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-]
1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification
of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued
on May 9, 2001."
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title
was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case
No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel
was not furnished, respondent wondered why he
raised this matter only upon filing of the instant
complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of
donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed
that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings
favorable to his clients should be addressed to
Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for
defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the
service, respondent admitted that he accepted the
positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the
NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of
Law, which is a government institution. However,
respondent countered that he was no longer
connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus,
this issue had become moot. Respondent further
claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was
only temporary, and he had not received any salary
except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and
the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as
Associate Dean, and since there were no objections,
he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant
thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from
Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative
case against him, who interposed no objection to his
petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January
2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20
February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to
the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All
these submissions basically reiterated the respective
arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B.
Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in
his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent
described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man x x x before the wife of that married man died."
According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive
language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's
gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing
and character as an officer of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that
respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by
the numerous documents attached by complainant
in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent
committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct
(1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was
used in a complaint filed by complainant's brother
Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is
respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing
complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the
Comment respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and
receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the
accessory penalty of prohibition on reemployment in
any government office as a result of his dismissal as
a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
issued a Resolution adopting the IBP
Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution
reads:   
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's
counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man x x x before the wife of that married man
died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that
such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth
designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's
credibility in filing the administrative case."
We are not convinced. Aside from such language
being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution
of this case. While respondent is entitled and very
much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must
refrain from using improper language in his
pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings
must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings,
respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which
evidences the non-conciliation between the parties
in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a
complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is
no such certificate in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al.
Instead, what respondent submitted was the
certificate to file action in the complaint filed by
complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against
Fortunato Jadulco.
Respondent counters that what he used "when he
filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title,
etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9,
2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of
title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC
on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of
Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the
certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-
1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing
of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent
that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet
when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was
filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's
allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No.
B-1118 was brought before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action
was issued prior to the filing of the complaint.
Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood;
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of
title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not
furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the
free patent title, we find that it does not constitute
dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a
copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of
the title exists. There is no showing that respondent
deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel
with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant
should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a
motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy
of the title so she and her counsel could examine the
same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as
complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding
an examination of the parties' respective evidence.
Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this
administrative case, absent any clear and convincing
proof that respondent himself orchestrated such
fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds
certifications do not prove that respondent
manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents
merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in
their official records.
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of
interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of
donation of a parcel of land executed by
complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic
Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to
litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are
occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from
representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial
Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy
certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel
in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations
against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments
favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply
narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil
Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by
the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the
RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any
concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of
conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part
of the presiding judge should be filed against the
judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored
by the judge.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in
government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed
respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court
of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for
partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any
public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well
the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of
which is the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any
government office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified,
respondent accepted the positions of Associate
Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a
government institution, and received compensation
therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only
temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent
also claims that he furnished a copy of his
designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a
"gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from
the Supreme Court." He further avers that
complainant in the administrative case against him
(as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for
clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The
prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments.
Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further,
furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and
MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his
permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that
complainant in his previous administrative case did
not object to his petition for clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in
any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and
desisted from performing the functions of such
positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the
prohibition on reemployment in a public office
imposed upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer
"willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued
her law practice despite the five-year suspension
order," the Court held that failure to comply with
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's
suspension or even disbarment.
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for
(1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to
file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when
in fact there was none prior to the institution of the
civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil
Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his
pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's
prohibition on reemployment in any government
office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a
judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct,
we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B.
De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for two (2) years with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act or acts shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10687               July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. represented by
MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR.,
and MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A.
APUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for
allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests and
Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with clients.
The salient facts of the case follow:
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had
a Board of Trustees which was divided in to two
opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva
Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adecam Lydia
E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I.
Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban
Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I.
Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent
as its corporate secretary with a total monthly
compensation and honorarium of ₱6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized
Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and
Treasurer of the Complainant at that Time, and
Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for
Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with
the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch,
Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to
RBP to oppose the loan application because the
Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar
Echano, who were allegedly not registered as
stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the
complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees.
The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant
was having financial difficulties.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to
assure the latter of complainant’s financial capacity
to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application
in the amount of ₱200,000 which was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the
complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order
which nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra
and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members
of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a
result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the
latter of the SEC Order.
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the
complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC
Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order
was referred to RBP’s legal counsel, herein
respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only
upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that
respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased
the loan to ₱400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real
Estate Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for
Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the
present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness,
and loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the
complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued
that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garia Jr., and Ma.
Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainant in this disbarment case because they
were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to
file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that
he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of
interest which applies only to the legal counsel of
complainant. Respondent argued that he merely
served as the corporate secretary of complainant
and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third,
respondent argued that there was no conflict of
interest when he represented RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage because all the documents
and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and complainant were public record.
Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have
taken advantage of his position as the mere
corporate secretary of the complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating
Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests and recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one year. The Investigating
Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for
RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
his former client, the complainant herein. The
Investigating Commissioner cited cast
vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that
respondent was paid by complainant for his retained
legal services. According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent’s
claim that the complainant merely appointed him as
its corporate secretary. The Investigating
Commissioner also held that the personality of
complainant’s representative to file this
administrative case is immaterial since proceedings
for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu prprio or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the
IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704 which
affirmed the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and imposed a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one year against
respondent.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty
of representing conflicting interests when he entered
his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against
RBP.
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770
and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interest
in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new
clients whose interests oppose those of a former
client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases.6 based on the principles o public policy and
good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyer, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.7 in
Maturan v. Gonzales,8 we further explained the
rationale for the prohibition:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation
of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.1âwphi1 A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with
his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care. No opportunity must be given him to take
advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must
have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused the profession will suffer by the
loss thereof.
Meanwhile, Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the
test to determine the existence of conflict of interest:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will
be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to
situations where in a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his
present or former clients.10 it also applies when the
lawyer represents a client against a former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to
the subject matter of the previous litigations in which
he appeared for the former client.[11] this rule
applies regardless of the degree of adverse
interests.12 what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously represented
him.13 a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a
client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.14
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find
that respondent represented conflicting interests
when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant,
respondent’s former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent was compensated by complainant for his
retained legal services is supported by the evidence
on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001.
Clearly, complainant was respondent’s former client.
And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a
case filed by his former client against RBP. This
makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests since respondent failed to show any written
consent of all concerned (particularly the
complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts
representing conflicting interests.15
We also note that the respondent acted for the
complainant’s interest on the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant when he sent a
letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter
of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay
the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the
interest of the complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent’s claim, it is of no
moment that all the documents and information in
connection with loan transaction between RBO and
the complainant were public records. In Hilado v.
David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:
The principle which forbids an attorney who has
been engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the client’s opponent applies
equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client (Christian vs.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote
7, C. J. S., 828)
Where it appeared that an attorney representing one
party in litigation had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter
involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire
as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired
from his former client during that relationship, before
refusing to permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C.
330;286, F994)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from
appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary
that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which
the former client’s affairs might have a bearing on
the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on
the attorney’s knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7;51 Nev., 264)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that is has
been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting for his former client, he acquired
no knowledge which could operate to his client’s
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. 1.,
432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information
received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in
determining the existence of conflict of interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating
Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is
imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal
rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, [p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person. Thus, in the
present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto
I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya
can institute the complaint for disbarment even
without authority from the Board of Directors of the
complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered Resolution No.
XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of
the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year
against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and
EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every
State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The
fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
makes the law profession a unique position of trust
and confidence, which distinguishes it from any
other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse
but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that
proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty
to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are
herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to
as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which
included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where its members acted as incorporators,
or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the
law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the
shares registered in the client's name, and a blank
deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In
the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative
to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization
and acquisition of the companies included in Civil
Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion
of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on
his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended
Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more
than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization through
presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This
ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB
which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders.
On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended
Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the
acts with which their codefendants are charged, was
in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and
legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA
lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta,
became holders of shares of stock in the
corporations listed under their respective names in
Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as
such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in
the said shares of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was
one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid
Marketing Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint.
However, he has long ago transferred any material
interest therein and therefore denies that the
"shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from
ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them
(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set
for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the
following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity
of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering
their respective
shareholdings.9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented
supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent
to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant
in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent
Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous
request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG
Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989
executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment
to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the
Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated
September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in
behalf of private respondent Roco originally
requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination
of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its
Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity
of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for
whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case
No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity
of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they
have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has
apparently identified his principal, which revelation
could show the lack of cause against him. This in
turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power
both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5
of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v.  Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA
lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these
proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have
preferred not to make the disclosures required by
the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge
the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In
the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be
accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8,
1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by
Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by
the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED
for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the
above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as
nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the
law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated
and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities
of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or
had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a
substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection
clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism
and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are
not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other
privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping
of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own
motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent
Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113,
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners
in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent
Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of
his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his
client, giving him an advantage over them who are in
the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such
an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing
the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at
all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes
petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that
respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him
as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed
an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
Civil Case No.  0033 as to Roco 'without an order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal',"  14 and he has
undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded
by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy
is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a
deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege;  the existence and identity
of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they
have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on
December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA that their "so called
client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
those subscription payments in corporations
included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds
of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name
of particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to
establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one,
their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.
Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to these subscription
payments of these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers
executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the
shares are actually being held by the nominees for
the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this
is important to our claim that some of the shares are
for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos.
Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just
paper corporations. Why do we say that? One:
There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed
sets of directors at the time of incorporation and
even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not
only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They
really have no address on records. These are some
of the principal things that we would ask of these
nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in
for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis
of activities and services performed in the course of
their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners'
inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG
to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them from
the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised
on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services
are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for
hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a
friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a
contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained
by the contract to the person who requested
him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than
that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent
or servant, because he possesses special powers of
trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the
judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary
agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what
may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since
he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises
his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be
taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,
there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to
his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree
of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest 23 based on the
hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his
client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This
conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of
established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton
v.  Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life
involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more
honorably andfaithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the
sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the
duty of the court to administer them in a
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed
shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the
rights of the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old
Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the
Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority
of his client to reveal any communication made by
the client to him or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment." 28 Passed on
into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded
provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken
or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full discharge
of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that
the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand
of him for any client, violation of law or any manner
of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-
client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one
of the most sacrosanct rights available to the
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made
to choose between legal representation without
effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt
to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high,
or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the
right practically nugatory. The threat this represents
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right
to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one
seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be
circumscribed by limited information engendered by
a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client
which in turn requires a situation which encourages
a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order to
attain effective representation, the lawyer must
invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as
a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty
may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the
facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should
not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until
there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general
rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed
a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject
matter of the relationship was so closely related to
the issue of the client's identity that the privilege
actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in
confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe
to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed
that she had advised her client to count the votes
correctly, but averred that she could not remember
whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The
lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to
reveal his client's identity before a grand jury.
Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the
state supreme court held that under the
circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions
described above, even the name of the client was
privileged.
U .S. v.  Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same
exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in
those instances where a strong probability exists
that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury
proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal
importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the
gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of
1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and
information regarding payment received by Sandino
on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals,
upholding non-disclosure under the facts and
circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee
arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity
for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner,
279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this
rule as a matter of California law, the rule also
reflects federal law. Appellants contend that
the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the
principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege.
"In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra  sec.
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's
identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are,
in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v.  Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered
injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
brought action both against defendant corporation
and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that
when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the
name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a
client of the insurance company, prior to the
institution of legal action, came to him and reported
that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man was
the owner of the second cab. The state supreme
court held that the reports were clearly made to the
lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact
that the insurance company had hired him to defend
its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is
such cases is clearly the attorney for the
policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to
report an occurrence contemplating that it would be
used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel,
for the purpose of professional advice or assistance,
are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending
or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for
such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the
communication made, relates to a matter so
connected with the employment as attorney or
counsel as to afford presumption that it was the
ground of the address by the client, then it is
privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the
owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication. His client is
not seeking to use the courts, and his address
cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the
present action pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected. The
objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining
Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by a
lower court to disclose whether he represented
certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose
of the court's request was to determine whether the
unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved
in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the
question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the
lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients
the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by
the order appealed from, that he represented certain
persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it
has made progress in establishing by such evidence
their version of the litigation. As already suggested,
such testimony by the witness would compel him to
disclose not only that he was attorney for certain
people, but that, as the result of communications
made to him in the course of such employment as
such attorney, he knew that they were interested in
certain transactions. We feel sure that under such
conditions no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the
nature of the transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the
undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous
years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure
about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical
possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had
been previously assessed as the tax due, and
another amount of money representing his fee for
the advice given. Baird then sent a check for
$12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a
note explaining the payment, but without naming his
clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.
Baird refused on the ground that he did not know
their names, and declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found
guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to
reveal the names of clients who employed him to
pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued
on, and with no government audit or investigation
into that client's income tax liability pending. The
court emphasized the exception that a client's name
is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the
disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within
that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who
thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient
amount in income taxes some one or more years in
the past. The names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose — to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it
may check the records for that one year or several
years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates
a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest
or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of
taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment
and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney
here involved was employed — to advise his clients
what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist
other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if
it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal
problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the
attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to
be confidential, the identity of the client has been
held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would
be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and
the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding
the financial and corporate structure, framework and
set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,
petitioners gave their professional advice in the form
of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the
link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a
case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about
how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client
thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it.
The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege
because the same cannot be invoked for purposes
illegal. The second case falls within the exception
because whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name
cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads
to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution,
which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because
the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield
for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the
prosecution may not have a case against the client
in the second example and cannot use the attorney
client relationship to build up a case against the
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a lawyer to give
advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason
for the second has been stated in the cases above
discussed and are founded on the same policy
grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the
appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the
nature of the transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client." 49 "Communications made to an
attorney in the course of any personal employment,
relating to the subject thereof, and which may be
supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are
under the seal of confidence and entitled to
protection as privileged communications."50 Where
the communicated information, which clearly falls
within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal
activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would
sustain a charge except that revealing the name of
the client would open up other privileged information
which would substantiate the prosecution's
suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably
linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within
the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the
instant case, is consonant with the principal policy
behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of
promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors
by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure
from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception
has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What
these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the
exploitation of the general rule in what may amount
to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information
available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and
readily available source of information in the building
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of
the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to
sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors
and litigants which we cannot and will not
countenance. When the nature of the transaction
would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's
retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the
instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an
obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in
turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately
hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case
should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them  from their own sources  and not
from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
the name of their clients, information which
unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
transaction which may or may not be illegal. The
logical nexus between name and nature of
transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be
difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction in
question itself, a communication which is clearly and
distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges
of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer
and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing
to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility
to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained.
In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v.  Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the
plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its
fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's
former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit
only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The
Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary
relationship in any context comprise a special breed
of cases that often loosen normally stringent
requirements of causation and damages, and found
in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney,
Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A.  v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of
lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent
fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of
completion of his work, and sought
payment quantum meruit of work done. The court,
however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause
after he sought to pressure his client into signing a
new fee agreement while settlement negotiations
were at a critical stage. While the client found a new
lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the
client to settle for less than what was originally
offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously
attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US
Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for
cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the
protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination
of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by
lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual
and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not
prepared to accept respondents' position without
denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so
extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But
what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other
does one plunge so deep in the stream of life — so
share its passions its battles, its despair, its
triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is
not all. What a subject is this in which we are united
— this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a
magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives,
but the lives of all men that have been. When I think
on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to
speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here
know that she is a mistress only to be won with
sustained and lonely passion — only to be won by
straining all the faculties by which man is likened to
God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right
not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of
the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients,
because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the
identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their
clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that
the defendants therein, including herein petitioners
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy
funds the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM and others and that through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-
owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of
the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as
dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse
of official position and authority, flagrant breach of
public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the
identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer
relationship, as well as deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error,
respondents alleged that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his
admission that he acted merely as a nominee but
also because of his undertaking to testify to such
facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may
require, which includes . . . the identity of the
principal."59
First, as to the bare statement that private
respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee,
a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with
the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners
have likewise made the same claim not merely out-
of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel,
claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of
"legitimate lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated" in
this regard, public respondents must show that there
exist other conditions and circumstances which
would warrant their treating the private respondent
differently from petitioners in the case at bench in
order to evade a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the
primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent
as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However,
respondents failed to show — and absolute nothing
exists in the records of the case at bar — that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement
between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking
which is so material as to have justified PCGG's
special treatment exempting the private respondent
from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan
should have required proof of the undertaking more
substantial than a "bare assertion" that private
respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking.
Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of
which were mere requests for re-investigation and
one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners
(ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners and
private respondent rendered legal services while all
of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the
clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the
alleged questioned transactions.61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent
from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG
should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated
as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers
on the basis of a classification which made
substantial distinctions based on real differences. No
such substantial distinctions exist from the records of
the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection
clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which
provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of status and regulations. In the broader
sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would
be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall
within a particular class ought to be treated alike not
only as to privileges granted but also as to the
liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would
be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As
was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest.63
We find that the condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No.
33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
The condition also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.64 It is grossly
unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to
the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only
touches upon the question of the identity of their
clients but also on documents related to the
suspected transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one
looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at
the expense of such rights.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal
mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection
guarantee and the right against self-incrimination
and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May
21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor
P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No.
0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by

petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is
premature and that they should wait until they are
called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise
their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have
made their position clear from the very beginning
that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be
compelled to testify in view of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners

should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to
suffer the effects of further litigation when it is
obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose
from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as
a means of coercing them to disclose the identities
of their clients. To allow the case to continue with
respect to them when this Court could nip the
problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be
to sanction an unjust situation which we should not
here countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles
over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar,
petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on
December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's
motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S.
Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition.1
The records show that during the dates material to
this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of
Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario
in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was
a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in
1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent
over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public
Land Subdivision Survey. His application was
approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to
him, an original certificate of title was issued in his
favor for that lot which is situated in the  poblacion of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
action2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes'
patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment3 nullifying said patent and title
after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained
the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in
his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet
served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial
court, upon the subsequent complaint of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.6 On November 27,
1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the
dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were
terminated.7 In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent
Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter
haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former
position as Provincial Attorney to influence and
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act
on his application for free patent, he had violated
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes'
counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution8 recommending the criminal prosecution
of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for
his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for
reconsideration and, because of its legal significance
in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that
motion:
. . . respondent had been charged
already by the complainants before
the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to
jail on detention in 1984 under the
same set of facts and the same
evidence . . . but said case after
arraignment, was ordered dismissed
by the court upon
 recommendation of the Department
of Justice. Copy of the dismissal
order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the
Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus
the filing of this case will be a case
of double jeopardy for respondent
herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with
a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by
the defense was later granted in respondent court's
resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case was
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a
taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to
the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public
documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada,
in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents,
simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic
notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified
documents were annexed to respondent Paredes'
motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan
resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him,
in order to support his contention that the same
would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter
a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever
received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case;
and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño
that said perjury case in his court did not reach the
arraignment stage since action thereon was
suspended pending the review of the case by the
Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits,
but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated
the submissions he had made in his counter-
affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications, 15 respondent Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under
preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury
case had been dismissed by the trial court after he
had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later
filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-
respondents in this case in the house of respondent
Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did
so upon the instigation and inducement of
respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
way for his discharge as a government witness in
the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor
was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their
agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992,
the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification
charges against all the herein private respondents.
The proposal for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the
Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is
difficult to believe that a lawyer of
his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would
be unwittingly induced by another to
commit a crime. As counsel for the
accused in those criminal cases,
Atty. Sansaet had control over the
case theory and the evidence which
the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or
confession of Atty. Sansaet falls
under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer
and his client which may be
objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that
resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further
controversy, he decided to file separate informations
for falsification of public documents against each of
the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal
cases, 18 each of which named one of the three
private respondents here as the accused therein,
were filed in the graft court. However, the same were
consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the
People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was
submitted that all the requisites therefor,
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet
was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent
Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by
respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private
respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's
motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on
this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the
opposition was able to establish that
client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and
Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during
and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such
relationship, the facts surrounding
the case, and other confidential
matter must have been disclosed by
accused Paredes, as client, to
accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in
his professional capacity. Therefore,
the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on
the facts surrounding the offense
charged in the information is
privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been
likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to
this Court by the prosecution in an original action for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the
petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
whether or not the projected testimony of respondent
Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to
testify as a  particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled
that due to the lawyer-client relationship which
existed between herein respondents Paredes and
Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential matters
must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes,
as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer.
Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further
since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a
witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
without the latter's consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-
client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the
facts thereof and actuations of both respondents
therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will
first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs
in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a
confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos.
17791-93 for falsification before respondent court,
and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes
was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein.
Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness
the preparation of the falsified documents by
Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication, if not more, than verbal statements
being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and
purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to
"any communication," without distinction or
qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present
evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode
by which a confidential communication shall be
made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not
confined to verbal or written communications made
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire
process, considering their past and existing relations
as counsel and client and, further, in view of the
purpose for which such falsified documents were
prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes
and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal
act. The clincher for this conclusion is the
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter
filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to
the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary
investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the
parties during the period when the documents were
being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his
house and allowed him to witness the same except
under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of
Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal
act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction
must be made between confidential communications
relating to past crimes already committed, and future
crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to
believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a
past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to
testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is
flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true
that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be
testified to in respondent court are concerned, those
crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But
for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date
when the privileged communication was made by
the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other
words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney without
the client's consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter
or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks
the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed, made by
a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted
as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily,
the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney
and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be
elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in
the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes
to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of
a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator
in the commission of that crime of falsification which
he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted
upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order
that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain circumstances may
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for
respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice
in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the
consequential inquiry as to whether respondent
Sansaet qualifies, as a  particeps criminis, for
discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to
testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent
court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the
preceding issue, did not pass upon this second
aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution
which are now submitted for our resolution in the
petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose
likewise of some ancillary questions requiring
preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not
fully pass upon the query as to whether or not
respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state
witness need not prevent this Court from resolving
that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the
determinative facts and evidence have been
submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to
finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance
of the ends of justice and the expeditious
administration thereof to resolve the case on the
merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three
private respondents here stand charged in three
separate informations. It will be recalled that in its
resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
recommended the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against all the
respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed
but, reportedly in order to obviate further
controversy, one information was filed against each
of the three respondents here, resulting in three
informations for the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained
away during the deliberations in this case by the
following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide,
to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block
Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a
separate information. I suppose the three cases
were consolidated for joint trial since they were all
raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one
Division of cases arising from the same incident or
series of incidents, or involving common questions of
law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and
purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he
could be discharged as state witness. It is of no
moment that he was charged separately from his co-
accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly,
which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making
the three accused co-accused or joint defendants,
especially considering that they are charged for the
same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for
the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice
Francisco along the same vein, there having been a
consolidation of the three cases, the several actions
lost their separate identities and became a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the
same as if the different causes of action involved
had originally been joined in a single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to
the situation "(w)hen two or more persons are
charged with the commission of a certain offense"
was too broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint"
was added to indicate the identity of the charge and
the fact that the accused are all together charged
therewith substantially in the same manner in point
of commission and time. The word "joint" means
"common to two or more," as "involving the united
activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two
or more working together," or "shared by or affecting
two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the
accused should always be indicted in one and the
same information, the Rules could have said so with
facility, but it did not so require in consideration of
the circumstances obtaining in the present case and
the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be
achieved by consolidation of the cases as an
alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a
conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule
is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act
of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the
requirements for a state witness is that he "does not
appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be
the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed
or submitted. The query would then be whether an
accused who was held guilty by reason of
membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state
witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find
this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real
mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised
fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the
stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as
a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense,
including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made
them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et
al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in
three separate informations for multiple murder were
discharged and used as state witnesses against
their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-
conspirators was discharged from the information
charging him and two others with the crime of estafa.
The trial court found that he was not the most guilty
as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily
convinced by his two co-accused to open the
account with the bank and which led to the
commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of
respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as
guilty as his co-accused, and should not be
discharged as he did not appear to be not the most
guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took
into account the gravity or nature of the acts
committed by the accused to be discharged
compared to those of his co-accused, and not
merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty
is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not
explicity articulated found expression in People
vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez
does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a
co-accused to become a state witness. He argues
that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not
one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing
not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since
accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity
for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of
them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the
highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of
cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life
of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution.
Second, without his testimony, no other direct
evidence was available for the prosecution to prove
the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could
be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its
well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear
to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he
was only invited to a drinking party without having
any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway
robbery. But even assuming that he later became
part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most
guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are
less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we
mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and
not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed.  While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may
be considered least guilty if We take into account his
degree of participation in the perpetration of the
offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor
General that the rule on the discharge of an accused
to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his
actual and individual participation in the commission
of the crime, which may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.
Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for
the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery
except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said
then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty.
Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the
government is clearly warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed
upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense
is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their
minds and translated into concerted physical action
although of varying acts or degrees of depravity.
Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the
classical school of thought, it is the identity of
the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition
of the same penalty on the consequential theory that
the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should
not be equated with the procedural rule on the
discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device
is based on other considerations, such as the need
for giving immunity to one of them in order that not
all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the
candid admission of an accused regarding his
participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for
certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on
judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds,
that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present
and should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative
eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
before respondent court, and the prosecution is
faced with the formidable task of establishing the
guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly
deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence.
There is thus no other direct evidence available for
the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose
discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said
respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and
has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed
the substance of his projected testimony in his
Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on
its material points by reputable witnesses, identified
in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective
testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and
Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A.
Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who
initiated the criminal cases through his letter-
complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial
Governor to file the appropriate case against
respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who
obtained the certification of non-arraignment from
Judge Ariño.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not
appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent,
both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General strongly urge and propose that he be
allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that,
on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may
propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the
proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It
must be emphasized, however, that such discretion
should have been exercised, and the disposition
taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues
herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue
of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent

Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second
Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated
June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its
resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and
new members thereof 39 declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22,

1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was
penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate
Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been

already discussed and passed upon by the Second
Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after
going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-
General and re-assessing Our position on the
matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable
Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to
setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to
grant the prosecution's motion to discharge accused
Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority
of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of
the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is

hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs
sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 8108               July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G.
VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO,
JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano
liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending
to influence and/or giving the appearance of
influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and
Recommendation submitted by Commissioner
Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent
beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any
similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose
a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted
the said ruling on 16 April 2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No.
8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde,
while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty.
Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the
complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and
Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports
attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys")
werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal
sale and use of dangerous drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges
were dropped for lack of probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado
to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of
the case, several media outlets reported on incidents
of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in
investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the
House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its
own congressional hearings. It was revealed during
one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the
release order for his three clients using the
letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders
of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC),
sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to
drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They
argued that respondent had no authority to use the
DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts
unbecoming a member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on
respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent
showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-
ranking public official, even though the latter was not
a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case
No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a
Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for the
VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27
February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint
on the ground that a similar action had been filed by
Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court
referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as
well as for investigation, report and
recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint
Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his
clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the
resolution also ordered the immediate release of
Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high
hopes of the accused, together with their families,
came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to
release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of
his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to
prepare and draft the release order. Respondent
admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the
Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything
may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent
continues, the drafted release order was not signed
by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere
scrap of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING
COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints
remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint
of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified.
Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11
and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the
release order specifically for the signature of the
DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order
to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it
tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued
a warning not to repeat the same or any similar
action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may
conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of
initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is
basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real
question for determination in these proceedings is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified
Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac
v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case
allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x.
The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with
the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the
provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner,
states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court." We believe that other provisions in the
Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit
acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular
courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all
times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the
Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that
the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it
received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This
refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I
think my only recourse was to see the Secretary
himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a
person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political
also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that
day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that
Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila
maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was
very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan
na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did
was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff
to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing
authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just
sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho
yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other
Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I
said I will see the Secretary first with the parents of
Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to
see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon.
By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho
ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat
down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain
x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty
Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong
Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga
pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-
usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will
study the matter, those particular words, I will study
the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a
matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not
pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we
were discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with
Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that
"because of my practice and well, candidly I belong
also to a political family, my father was a
Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the
family and he knows my sister was a
Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in
Congress. In other words, I am not a complete
stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent
admitted that he was personally acquainted with the
Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua,
the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension
against a judge who likewise committed acts of
influence peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00
from complainant Santos when the latter asked for
her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz,
who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court,
because respondent judge was a former court
attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same
penalty is appropriate in the present case.

These statements and others made during the
hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he
personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite
the fact that the case was still pending before the
latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of
the draft release order on official DOJ stationery
despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in
view of "expediting the case."
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating
Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6)
months effective immediately. This also serves as an
emphaticWARNING that repetition of any similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a Let copies of this Decision be appended to the
clear intent to gain special treatment and respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator is
consideration from a government agency. This is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this
precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be suspension.
regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act SO ORDERED.
that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence,
the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s
faith inthe judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but

to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that end,
their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The
conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit
of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable
and unethical.22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet

activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Further, according
to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state or imply that
he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07,
mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause

must always be within the bounds of the law.23 A
self-respecting independence in the exercise of the
profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a
member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards.
Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere
slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8954               November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was
counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold
Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before
the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and
presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby
she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No.
1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores)
unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal
profession, but also to the bench and judges, would
amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of
law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a
member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to
the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for
appropriate investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal
administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and
Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine
Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the
antecedents of the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha
Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo
Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x,
respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and
was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May
24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial
Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it
was expunged from the records without prejudice to
the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the
required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked
for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times
(August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent
Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief
indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court
a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15
and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores
a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern
warning that failure to do so shall be considered a
waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a
Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010
stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of
the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice
and fair play. Do you think you are being
truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for
which reason even Erap was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1 But even worse
is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou
shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino
his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is
violative of the foregoing divine and human
laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief
bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place
of compliance. During the preliminary conference on
November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of
his MCLE on the following day. On December 1,
2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE
compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores
filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove
your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to
the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have
asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this
case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your
sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have
failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his
compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores
be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Judge.7
guarantee of freedom of speech which must be
exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries
with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must
not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the
confines of reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too
harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is
the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
we are not prepared to impose on the respondent
the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court
that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years.
Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to
remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to
obey and respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is

Our Ruling
FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the shall be dealt with more severely.
trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several
SO ORDERED.
opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of
laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to
that branc the Government to which they belong, as
well as to the State which has instituted the judicial
system."8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in

his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores
is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this
respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of

his client full devotion to his client's genuine interest
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his
c1iticism within the context of the constitutional
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6332               April 17, 2012
IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED
28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Factual Background
This administrative case originated when respondent
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 20031 (the
subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated
petitions involving respondent that were pending
before the Court.2 This motion is directed against the
then ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in part:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA,
pro se, respectfully states:
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has
had to hurdle in his quest for justice against
Urban Bank and its officials, he has
remained steadfast in his belief that
ultimately, he will be vindicated and the
wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic].
What respondent is about to relate however
has, with all due respect, shaken his faith in
the highest Court of the land. If an anomaly
as atrocious as this can happen even in the
august halls of the Supreme Court, one can
only wonder if there is still any hope for our
justice system.
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear
that he is not making a sweeping accusation
against all the members of this Honorable
Court. He cannot however remain tight-
lipped in the face of the overwhelming
evidence that has come to his knowledge
regarding the actuation of the ponente of
this Honorable Division.
3. In the evening of 19 November 2002,
private respondent received a call from the
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Manuel R.
Singson (through his cell phone number
09189137383) who very excitedly bragged
that they had been able to secure an order
from this Honorable Court suspending the
redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the Urban Bank properties
sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by them,
more than two weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various properties
had expired. At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been
issued to the purchasers of the properties.
The only step that had to be accomplished
was the ministerial act of issuance of new
titles in favor of the purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and
tried to recall if there was any pending
incident with this Honorable Court regarding
the suspension of the redemption period but
he could not remember any. In an effort to
hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty.
Singson about bribing the ponente to get
such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in
fact explained that they obviously had to
exert extra effort because they could not
afford to lose the properties involved
(consisting mainly of almost all the units in
the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it
might again cause the bank (now Export
Industry Bank) to close down.
5. Since private respondent himself had not
received a copy of the order that Atty.
Singson was talking about, he asked Atty.
Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that
they had received. The faxed "advance"
copy that Atty. Singson provided him bore
the fax number and name of Atty. Singson’s
law office. A copy thereof is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
6. Private respondent could not believe what
he read. It appeared that a supposed Motion
for Clarification was filed by petitioners
through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002,
but he was never furnished a copy thereof.
He asked a messenger to immediately
secure a copy of the motion and thereafter
confirmed that he was not furnished a copy.
His supposed copy as indicated in the last
page of the motion was sent to the Abello
Concepcion Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law
Offices. ACCRA, however, was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the
counsel of some of the petitioners.
Respondent’s copy, in other words, was
sent to his opponents.
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus
resolved without even giving respondent an
opportunity to comment on the same. In
contrast, respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 19
November 2001 had been pending for
almost a year and yet petitioners’ motions
for extension to file comment thereon [were]
being granted left and right.
8. In view of these circumstances, private
respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an
Urgent Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion
for Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution). He filed a
Supplement to the said motion on 20
December 2002.
9. While private respondent was waiting for
petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two
documents that confirmed his worst fears.
The two documents indicate that this
Honorable Court has not actually granted
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They
indicate that the supposed 13 November
2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court
which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously
received were two copies of the official
Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the
date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies
(apparently secured from the office of two
different members of the Division, one of
which is the copy of the ponente himself), it
is clearly indicated that the members of the
Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion
for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This
makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution
(at least the version that was released to the
parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was
issued by the First Division granting
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real
Resolution arrived at by the First Division
which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes
"B" and "C."
11. At this point, private respondent could
not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was
bragging to him about. The clear and
undeniable fact is the Honorable members
of this Division agreed that petitioners’
Motion for Clarification would only be
NOTED but the ponente responsible for the
13 November 2002 Resolution
misrepresented that the same was
GRANTED.
12. Respondent is not just speculating here.
He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a
special interest in this case. Recently, he
also found out that the ponente made a
special request to bring this case along with
him when he transferred from the Third
Division to the First Division. Respondent
has a copy of the Resolution of this
Honorable Court granting such request
(hereto attached as Annex "D"). Indeed, this
circumstance, considered with all the
foregoing circumstance, ineluctably
demonstrates that a major anomaly has
occurred here.
13. In view of these, private respondent is
compelled to move for the inhibition of the
ponente from this case. This matter should
be thoroughly investigated and respondent
is now carefully considering his legal options
for redress. It has taken him seven years to
seek vindication of his rights against
petitioners, he is not about to relent at this
point. In the meantime, he can longer expect
a fair and impartial resolution of this case if
the ponente does not inhibit himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and
again emphasized the importance of
impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality on the part of judges and
justices. The ponente will do well to heed
such pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent
upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real
position on the 19 November 2001
Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted
that in order to obviate any further confusion
on the matter, respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as well as
the Supplement dated 19 November 2002)
should be resolved and this Honorable Court
should confirm that the stay order contained
in the 19 November 2001 Resolution does
not cover properties already sold on
execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty.
Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two
copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002
of the First Division of this Court, which he claimed
to have anonymously received through the mail.3 He
also attached a copy of the Court’s internal
Resolution regarding the transfer of the case from
the Third Division to the First Division, upon the
request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latter’s
alleged special interest in the case.4
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17
February 2003 to require Atty. Peña and Atty.
Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the
consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on
03 March 2003 for an Executive Session.5
The reason for the required appearance of the two
lawyers in the Executive Session is explained in the
Court’s Resolution dated 03 March 2003.6 It states:
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened the
executive session and then requested Associate
Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug
stated that the executive session was called
because the Court is perturbed by some statements
made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña involving
strictly confidential matters which are purely internal
to the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in
his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion."
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and
counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson
attended the session.
The matters under inquiry were how respondent was
able to obtain copies of the documents he used as
annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the
annexes are authentic.
The court also clarified that these matters were to be
taken as entirely different and apart from the merits
of the main case.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to
the three (3) annexes attached to the motion to
inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and "D," questioned how
the latter was able to secure copies of such
documents which are confidential to the Court and
for the sole use of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
First Division and the Justices concerned.
Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the
supplemental agenda of the First Division for
November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in
handwriting reading "10 AC" on the left side and
what appear to be marginal notes on the right side of
both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be a photocopy
of the same supplemental agenda of the First
Division for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes
on the right side of pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears
to be a photocopy of the resolution dated September
4, 2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant
case to the First Division (an internal resolution).
Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his
statements taken during this executive session were
deemed under oath. Atty. Peña acceded thereto.
Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any
personnel of the Court who could possibly be the
source. Atty. Peña replied in the negative and added
that he obtained those documents contained in the
annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his
residence in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
sometime in the second or third week of January
2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt.
He said Annexes "B" and "C" were contained in one
envelope while Annex "D" was mailed in a separate
envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but
promised the Court he would do his best to locate
them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña
admitted that the envelopes may no longer be found.
He was unable to respond to the observation of the
Chief Justice that the Court would be in no position
to know whether the envelopes he would later
produce would be the same envelopes he allegedly
received. Atty. Peña further admitted that his office
did not stamp "Received" on the envelopes and the
contents thereof; neither did he have them recorded
in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on
those annexes as grounds for his motion to inhibit
when the same were coursed only through ordinary
mail under unusual circumstances and that
respondent did not even bother to take note of the
postal marks nor record the same in a log book, Atty.
Peña answered that he was 100% certain that those
documents are authentic and he assumed that they
came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in
Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since
he assured the authenticity of Annexes "B", "C" and
"D", he should be willing to accept all the
consequences if it turns out that there are no such
copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn
out to be forged. Atty. Peña manifested that he was
willing to accept the consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had
seen the original that made him conclude that those
photocopies are authentic, he replied in the
negative, but he believed that they are official
documents of the Court inasmuch as he also
received a copy of another resolution issued by the
Court when the same was faxed to him by Atty.
Singson, counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon
receiving the resolution because he was not even
furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion for
clarification, which was resolved. He found out that
his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion
Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of
some of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the
motion for clarification was acted upon even without
comment from him, and he admitted that under said
circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a
joke.
As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of
record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna
denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp. 61 and 62
of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per
verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiago’s
copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex "B"
does not belong to any of the Justices of the First
Division. It was also pointed out that each of the
Justices have their respective copies of the agenda
and make their own notations thereon. The official
actions of the Court are contained in the duly
approved minutes and resolutions of the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both
Atty. Peña and Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3 and 4
of respondent’s "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion,
which contain the following allegations: "(Atty.
Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been
able to secure an order from this Honorable Court
suspending the redemption period and the
consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank
properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by then, more than
two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period
on the various properties had expired. In an effort to
hide his discomfort, respondent (Atty. Peña) teased
Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such
an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not
even bother to deny and in fact explained that they
obviously had to exert extra effort because they
could not afford to lose the properties involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a
copy of the resolution dated November 13, 2002 to
Atty. Peña and expressed his belief that there was
nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was officially
released and received by his office. He explained
that his staff merely copied the parties in the
resolution of February 13, 2002 when the motion for
clarification was prepared. Hence, the respondent
was inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit,
reasoning that all he said was about the suspension
of the redemption period which was the subject of
the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as
false the allegation of Atty. Peña that he, Atty.
Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the
suspension of the redemption period would be
granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña
admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson
when on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice
Carpio could have been bribed because he has a
new Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to
answer categorically whether Atty. Singson told him
that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty. Peña could not
make any candid or forthright answer. He was
evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña
consistently replied that his only source of the
documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the
Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno Peña
within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE
why he should not be held in contempt and be
subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will
not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he
made gratuitous allegations and imputations against
the Court and some of its members that tend to cast
doubt or aspersion on their integrity.
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit
within fifteen (15) days from today his response to
the allegations of Atty. Peña, particularly those in
paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondent’s motion to
inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from
the executive session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed its
regular session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases,
the Court Resolves to GRANT the motion by counsel
for petitioner praying that intervenor-movant
Unimega Properties’ Holdings Corp. be directed to
furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion
for reconsideration and intervention and that they be
granted an additional period of ten (10) days within
which to file comment thereon and require said
intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service
within five (5) days from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in
G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the
motion for reconsideration with intervention by
Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the
Court’s Order, where he stated that:7
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA,
pro se, respectfully submits the following explanation
in compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court dated 3 March 2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003
Resolution required respondent to show
cause why he should not be held in
contempt and be subjected to disciplinary
action as a result of the allegations he made
in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion" dated 30 January 2003. As this
Honorable Court stated during the 3 March
2003 hearing, the members of the Court
were "perturbed" by some statements
respondent made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to
apologize for the distress his statements
may have caused the members of this
Honorable Court. While such distress may
have been the unavoidable consequence of
his motion to inhibit the ponente, it was
certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the
3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that this
Honorable Court was most concerned with
how respondent was able to secure
Annexes "B" and "C" of his motion (referring
to the two copies of the Supplemental
Agenda of the First Division for 13
November 2002) and why respondent used
those documents as basis for his Urgent
Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he
received the two annexes by ordinary mail at
his residence in Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental sometime during the
second week of January. The sender of the
document was unknown to respondent
because there was no return address.
Despite efforts to locate the envelope in
which these documents came, he was
unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or
secretary at his residence. Since he is often
in Manila on business, it is usually the
househelp who gets to receive the mail.
While he had given instructions to be very
careful in the handling of documents which
arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for
Annexes "A" and "B" may have been
misplaced or disposed by the househelp
because it did not bear the stamp
"registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he
had absolutely no reason to doubt their
authenticity. For why would anyone bother
or go to the extent of manufacturing
documents for the benefit of someone who
does not even know him? The documents
contained a detailed list of the incidents
deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13
November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone
could have access to such information.
Moreover, respondent subsequently
received another mail from apparently the
same sender, this time containing a pink
copy of this Honorable Court’s 4 September
2002 Resolution (Annex "D", Urgent Motion
to Inhibit) transferring this case from the
Third Division to the First Division. The
receipt of this last document somehow
confirmed to respondent that whoever sent
him the copies of the Supplemental Agenda
really had access to the records of this
Honorable Court.
7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the
main basis of his motion to inhibit was the
information relayed to him by Atty. Singson
during their telephone conversation on 19
November 2002. As stated in respondent’s
Urgent Motion to Inhibit, while Atty. Singson
did not categorically claim that they had
bribed the ponente to secure the 13
November 2002 resolution, however, he
made no denial when respondent, in order
to obtain information, half-seriously
remarked that this was the reason why the
ponente had a brand new car. Atty. Singson
retorted that obviously, they had to take
extra-ordinary measures to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of the properties
sold as the bank may again close down.
Indeed, one would normally be indignant
upon being accused of bribery but Atty.
Singson even chuckled and instead justified
their "extra-ordinary" efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere
suspicion was not enough. An implied
admission of bribery on the part of Atty.
Singson, sans evidence, may not have been
sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit.
However, respondent did not have to look
far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not
denying the allegation of bribery is
considered an admission by silence, under
Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him
the "advance copy" of the 13 November
2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was
solid evidence and in fact to this day, Atty.
Singson fails to explain exactly when, from
whom, and how he was able to secure said
advance copy. The records of this
Honorable Court disclosed that Atty.
Singson’s official copy of the 13 November
2002 Resolution was sent to him by
registered mail only on 20 November 2002
(a copy of the daily mailing report is hereto
attached as Annex "A"). Why then was he
able to fax a copy to respondent on 19
November 2002 or a day before the
resolution was released for mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to
file a motion to inhibit. He only finally
decided to proceed when he received the
copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To
emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda
merely confirmed what Atty. Singson had
earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent
impression of this Honorable Court,
respondent’s motion is not primarily
anchored on anonymously received
documents but on the word of petitioner’s
counsel himself. The copies of the
Supplemental Agenda are merely
corroborative (albeit extremely convincing)
evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who
comes into possession of the information
relayed by Atty. Singson and the copies of
the Supplemental Agenda would bring them
to the attention of this Honorable Court. In
doing so, respondent was compelled by a
sense of duty to inform this Honorable Court
of any apparent irregularity that has come to
his knowledge. It was not done out of spite
but a deep sense of respect.
11. In all honesty, respondent had been
advised by well-meaning friends to publicize
the incident and take legal action against the
parties involved. Instead, respondent
decided that a motion to inhibit before this
Honorable Court was the most appropriate
channel to ventilate his concerns.
Respondent is not out to cast aspersions on
anybody, most especially members of this
Honorable Court. He had to file the Urgent
Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely
believed, and still firmly believes, that he
could not get impartial justice if the ponente
did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that
documents considered confidential by this
Honorable Court leaked out and assures this
Honorable Court that he had absolutely no
hand in securing them. Respondent just
found himself in a position where he had to
come out with those documents because his
opponent was crude enough to brag that
their "extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay
order from a certain ponente had bore fruit.
Respondent has devoted at least seven
years of his life to this cause. He almost lost
his life and was nearly driven to penury
fighting this battle. Certainly, he cannot be
expected to simply raise his hands in
surrender.
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved
that it was confirmed during the 3 March
2003 hearing that Annex "C" of his Urgent
Motion to Inhibit is a faithful
reproduction/"replica" of the relevant
portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN
dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on
record with the first Division. With this,
respondent rests his case. 8 (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his
Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July
2003,9 categorically denied having bragged to Atty.
Peña and that he did not employ "extra efforts" to
obtain a favorable suspension order from the
Court.10
After considering and evaluating the submissions
made by the two lawyers, the Court ordered that a
formal investigation be undertaken by the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of Atty.
Peña.11 The Court’s Resolution dated 28 April 2003
in the consolidated petitions, which is the subject
matter of this separate administrative case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M.
Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the ponente of
the instant case. Respondent Peña attached to his
Urgent Motion Annex "B", a copy of pp. 61-62 of the
First Division’s Agenda of 13 November 2002.
Respondent Peña claimed that Annex "B" bears the
recommended actions, in handwritten notations, of a
member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175
of the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent
Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner on 7 August
2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex
"B" for Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the
motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution on
13 November 2002 granting the Urgent Motion for
Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to Inhibit,
respondent Peña claimed that the Resolution of 13
November 2002 was forged because the
recommended and approved action of the Court was
to simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent
Motion for Clarification.
Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion
to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for
petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two
documents that confirmed his worst fears.
The two documents indicate that this
Honorable Court had not actually granted
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They
indicate that the supposed 13 November
2002 Resolution of this Honorable Court
which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
 10. What private respondent anonymously
received were two copies of the official
Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the
date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies
(apparently secured from the office of two
different members of the Division, one of
which is the copy of the ponente himself), it
is clearly indicated that the members of the
Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion
for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This
makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution
(at least the version that was released to the
parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was
issued by the First Division granting
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real
Resolution arrived at by the First Division
which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes
"B" and "C".
11. At this point, private respondent could
not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was
bragging about. The clear and undeniable
fact is the Honorable members of this
Division agreed that petitioner’s Motion for
Clarification would only be NOTED but the
ponente responsible for the 13 November
2002 Resolution misrepresented that the
same was GRANTED."
On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Peña
and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for petitioner
Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine, among
others, the authenticity of the annexes to respondent
Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex "B".
In the hearing, respondent Peña affirmed the
authenticity of the annexes and even manifested that
he was willing to accept the consequences if the
annexes, including Annex "B", turned out to be
forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First
Division) informed respondent Peña that the
handwritten notations on Annex "B" did not belong to
any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to whom
the case was assigned and the apparent object of
respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the
"ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002
Resolution," stated that his recommended action on
Item No. 175(f) was "a & f, see RES," meaning on
Items 175(a) and (f), see proposed resolution. In
short, the handwritten notations on Annex "B",
purportedly belonging to a member of the Court,
were forgeries. For ready reference, attached as
Annexes "1" and "2" to this Resolution are a copy of
pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpio’s 13 November 2002
Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpio’s
recommended actions for the entire 13 November
2002 Agenda, respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent
Peña to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for
submitting the annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In his
Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Peña
did not give any explanation as to why he attached
"B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his
Compliance, respondent Peña did not mention at all
Annex "B". Respondent Peña, however, stated that
he "just found himself in a position where he had to
come out with those documents because his
opponent was crude enough to brag that their ‘extra-
ordinary’ efforts to secure a stay order from a certain
ponente had bore fruit." In petitioner’s Opposition to
the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated that
he "categorically denied that he had bragged to
PEÑA about the Resolution of this Honorable Court
dated November 13, 2002 and that extra efforts
have been exerted to obtain the same."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
DIRECTS the Office of the Bar Confidant to conduct
a formal investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno
M. Peña for submitting to the Court a falsified
document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of the
confidential records of a member of the Court, in
support of his Motion to Inhibit that same member of
the Court. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed
to submit its findings, report and recommendation
within 90 days from receipt of this
Resolution.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys.
Peña13 and Singson14 duly submitted their respective
Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still pending,
some of the other parties in the consolidated
petitions – specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin
Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group),
the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 – manifested
before the Court other malicious imputations
allegedly made by Atty. Peña during the course of
the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved
that these be considered as sufficient and additional
basis to cite him for contempt of court.15 The Court
likewise referred this matter to the OBC.16
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by
the De Leon Group, respondent Peña denied having
used abrasive, insulting and intemperate language in
his pleadings; and argued that his statements
therein were privileged and could not be used as a
basis for liability.17 He also accused Urban Bank and
its directors and officers of violating the rule against
forum shopping by dividing themselves into separate
groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817,
145818 and 145822) against the same Decision of
the Court of Appeals with the same causes of
actions and prayers for relief.18
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein
respondent Peña and Atty. Singson appeared and
testified on matters that were the subject of the
administrative cases.19 Several hearings were also
held with respect to the additional contempt charges
raised by the De Leon Group. Thereafter,
respondent Peña filed his Memorandum.20
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the
instant administrative case and made
recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report).
As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at
length, nor even disclose the dispositive
recommendation of the OBC in administrative
investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty.
Peña, despite the fact that the OBC Report is
confidential and internal, has obtained, without
authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed
that this Court should apply to him the non-penalty of
an admonition against him, as recommended by the
OBC.21
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that
the present ponente of the consolidated
petitions22 from which this separate administrative
case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
would exclude or suppress material evidence found
in the OBC report from her ponencia in the parent
case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that
Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly
recommending her to the Supreme Court.23 The
specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one
Member of the Court to another, without any
extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too undignified
to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his
fears that Justice Sereno would participate in any
undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the
Court shall summarize and quote from the OBC
Report the four charges of professional misconduct
in connection with the instant administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against
members of the Court, the OBC found that
respondent Peña gave the impression that some
anomaly or irregularity was committed by the Court’s
First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution. According to respondent, Justice
Carpio, the then ponente of the consolidated
petitions, purportedly changed the action of the First
Division from simply "NOTING" the motion for
clarification filed by Urban Bank to "GRANTING" it
altogether. The OBC opines that although
respondent Peña may appear to have been
passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the
language he used is not to be considered as
malicious imputations but mere expressions of
concern based on what he discovered from the
internal documents of the Court that he had
secured.24 Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent
did not make a direct accusation of bribery against
Justice Carpio, and the former’s remark about the
latter having received a new Mercedes Benz was not
made in the presence of the court, but was uttered in
a private mobile phone conversation between him
and Atty. Singson.25 Respondent’s profound
apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance
by the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a
simple warning against any such future conduct.26
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the
second charge that respondent supposedly
submitted falsified documents to this Court as
annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically
Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the
agenda of the First Division on 13 November 2002
with some handwritten notes.27 It reasoned that the
submission of falsified documents partakes of the
nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent Peña
is not being charged with a criminal offense in the
instant case. The OBC noted the statement of the
Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session that Annex "B" does not exist in the
records.28
On the third charge for contempt against respondent
filed by the De Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests
the dismissal of the same. To recall, respondent
submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions
where he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having
used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena to
gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of his
clients.29 The OBC suggests that respondent be
acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and
disrespectful language against Members of the
Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless
recommends that respondent be advised to refrain
from using unnecessary words or statements in the
future.30
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on
the fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled by
respondent Peña against Urban Bank and the
individual bank directors. In his counter-suit,
respondent accused the bank and its directors and
officers of having violated the rule against forum-
shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and
filing three separate petitions to question the
unfavorable decision of the Court of
Appeals.31 However, since not all the parties to the
consolidated petitions participated in the hearings in
the instant case, the OBC recommends that
separate proceedings be conducted with respect to
this counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and
all of the concerned directors and officers, including
their respective counsel, to defend themselves and
present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their
cause.32
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC
submitted the following recommendations for
approval of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it
is respectfully recommended the following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
1. To DISMISS the charge on the
ground that the statements in his
Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not
constitute malicious imputations as
he was merely expressing his
concern of what he has discovered
based on the documents he has
obtained. However, let this case
serve as his FIRST WARNING,
being an officer of the court, to be
more cautious, restraint and
circumspect with his dealings in the
future with the Court and its
Member.
2. To ADMONISH respondent for
making such non-sense and
unfounded joke against Honorable
Justice Antonio T. Carpio the latter
deserves due respect and courtesy
from no less than the member of the
bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson should
also be ADVISED to be more
cautious in his dealing with his
opposing counsel to avoid
misconception of facts.
B. On the charge of falsification:
1. To DISMISS the charge of
submitting falsified documents on
ground of lack of legal basis. A
charge of submitting falsified
documents partakes of the nature of
criminal act under Art. 172 of the
Revised penal Code, and the
quantum of proof required to hold
respondent guilty thereof is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This is to
avoid conflicting findings in the
criminal case. The administrative
proceedings of the same act must
await of the outcome in the criminal
case of falsification of document.
C. On the contempt of court filed by private
complainant:
1. To DISMISS the charge
considering that the statements
cited by Atty. Peña in his pleadings
previously filed in related cases,
while it may appear to be offending
on the part of the complainant, but
the same do not categorically
contain disrespectful, abusive and
abrasive language or intemperate
words that may tend to discredit the
name of the complainant.
Respondent merely narrated the
facts based of his own knowledge
and discoveries which, to him,
warranted to be brought to the
attention of the court for its
information and consideration. He
must be ADVISED however, to
refrain from using unnecessary
words and statements which may
not be material in the resolution of
the issued raised therein.
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping
1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-
charge of forum shopping, as
embodied in the Comment dated 22
August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a
separate administrative case
against the petitioners and counsels
in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818
and G.R. No. 145822;
2. To FURNISH the petitioners and
their counsel a copy of the said
comment dated 22 August 2003 for
their information.
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and
their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ &
ASSOCIATES, represented by
ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON,
ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION
REALA & CRUZ represented by
ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D.
AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL ROSE
B. SEE to comment thereon within
ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.33 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES
In these administrative matters, the salient issues for
the Court’s consideration are limited to the following:
(a) whether respondent Peña made
gratuitous allegations and imputations
against members of the Court;
(b) whether he can be held administratively
liable for submitting allegedly "falsified
documents" consisting of internal
documents of the court;
(c) whether he can likewise be held
administratively liable for the contempt
charges leveled against him in the
Manifestation and Motion filed by the De
Leon Group; and
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual
bank directors and officers are guilty of
forum shopping.
OUR RULING
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless
Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing against a
Member of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on
this charge.
Respondent Peña is administratively liable for
making gratuitous imputations of bribery and
wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen
in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his
statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session, and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling
effectively the same imputations in his subsequent
pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member
of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent
Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers.34 They are to abstain from
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the court35 and must refrain from attributing to a
judge motives that are not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.36
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of foul and abusive language.37 Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.38 A
lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and
in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 39
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña
insinuated that the then ponente of the case had
been "bribed" by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban
Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
suspending the period of redemption of the levied
properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to
Inhibit reads in part:
4. Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and
tried to recall if there was any pending incident with
this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of
the redemption period but he could not remember
any. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent
teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to
get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact
explained that they obviously had to exert extra
effort because they could not afford to lose the
properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all
the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as
it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank)
to close down.40 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the
First Division of this Court, respondent Peña
explained that his reference to the bribe was merely
a "joke" in the course of a telephone conversation
between lawyers:
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:
Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on
[sic] when you made mention earlier of him saying
about Justice Carpio?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong
Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh."
CHIEF JUSTICE:
He said to you that?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said
about bribery.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. PEÑA:
First of all I would like to … everything that he said,
he told me that he got, they got a stay order, it is a
stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice
Carpio and then I gave that joke. That was just a
joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you
see, he was the one who told me they got a stay
order from the Supreme Court through Justice
Carpio, that was what happened …
CHIEF JUSTICE:
You mean you made a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
You Honor?
CHIEF JUSTICE;
You made a joke after he told you supposedly that
he got (interrupted)
ATTY. PEÑA:
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
And you say that is the reason why he got a new
Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
That is correct, you are making it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, I think, because how they got
(interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion
that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice
Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that
also another joke?41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then
ponente of the consolidated petitions with respect to
the issuance of the 13 November 2003 Resolution.
To respondent’s mind and based on his
interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which
he anonymously received, the First Division agreed
only to simply note Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned
Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by
facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence,
respondent Peña attributed the modification of the
action of the First Division to simply "note" the
Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent
Peña, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly
received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly
altered resolution.
However, as pointed out by the Court in the
Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has
his own respective copy of the Agenda, where he
can make his own handwritten notations on the
action for each item and case, but "[t]he official
actions of the Court are contained in the duly
approved minutes and resolutions of the
Court."42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by
respondent Peña, Justice Carpio had not altered the
action of the First Division in granting Urban Bank’s
Motion for Clarification in the consolidated petitions,
as in fact, this was the approved resolution agreed
upon by the Justices then present. The ponente of
the case had not recommended that the Motion for
Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred
to a separate resolution, i.e., "a) & f) – See RES.,"
disposing of the said item (F) including item (A),
which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice
Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official
minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session,43 Justice
Carpio submitted for the record his written
recommendation on the agenda item involving the
consolidated petitions, to prove that this was his
recommendation, and the minutes confirm the
approval of this recommendation.44
The Court, through a unanimous action of the then
Members of the First Division, had indeed adopted
the recommended and proposed resolution of
Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the
Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
completely wrong for respondent Peña to claim that
the action had been issued without any sufficient
basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so
with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is
not adequate to immediately justify the imputation of
such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a
Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of
specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of
bribery involving a member of this Court, in
exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave
accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be
"jokingly" alleged by parties, much less by counsel in
pleadings or motions. These suspicions or
insinuations strike not only at the stature or
reputation of the individual members of the Court,
but at the integrity of its decisions as well.45
Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection
and direct correlation between Urban Bank’s failure
to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification,
purportedly denying him an opportunity to refute the
allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt
means by which the unfavorable Resolution was
thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and
irresponsible. Had he simply confined the issue to an
alleged deprivation of due process, then there would
hardly be any controversy regarding his conduct as
a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported
lack of notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the
bank in the consolidated petitions could have been
raised as a valid concern for judicial resolution.
Instead, respondent Peña insinuates ill motives on
the part of Members of the Court imputing the failure
of a private party to give him due notice to be, in
effect, a failure of the Court. This merits the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary powers over him as a
member of the Bar. To allege that bribery has been
committed by members of the judiciary, a
complainant – especially, a lawyer – must go beyond
mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even
the plain silence of an opposing counsel.
Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03
March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña
appears to have been caught by surprise by his
telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who
informed him of the suspension of the redemption
period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order
over the execution pending appeal. The
astonishment of respondent would seem natural,
since he was caught unawares of Urban Bank’s
Motion for Clarification, which was the subject matter
of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. His supposed
joke, which he himself initiated and made without
provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it
suggested that the bank had obtained the Order
from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury
automobile.
Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and
accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation
and integrity of members of this Court, and for using
those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject
Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating the
veracity of Atty. Singson’s revelations, respondent
read too much into the declarations and the
purported silence of opposing counsel towards his
joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of
impropriety to a specific Member of the Court. Such
conduct does not befit a member of the legal
profession and falls utterly short of giving respect to
the Court and upholding its dignity.
Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of
bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio, Atty.
Singson and the petitioners was a "joke" fails to
convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the
charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his
alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a "joke"
between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone
conversation regarding the case. Although the courts
and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they
are not immune to criticisms nor are they beyond the
subject matter of free speech, especially in the
context of a private conversation between two
individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself
was responsible for moving the private matter into
the realm of public knowledge by citing that same
"joke" in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this
Court. In general, courts will not act as overly
sensitive censors of all private conversations of
lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the
duty to afford proper respect and deference to the
former. Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away
from exercising its disciplinary powers whenever
persons who impute bribery to judicial officers and
bring such imputations themselves to the court’s
attention through their own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of
bribery was only made in jest, respondent has never
backed down since he first made the accusation in
January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in
the consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio
purportedly changed the agreed action of the First
Division when he issued the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution, even after the Court in
the 03 March 2003 Executive Session had precisely
explained to him that no impropriety had attended
the issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions
to Inhibit dated 21 January 201046 and 22 August
2011,47 he repeatedly insists on the
"anomalous/unusual circumstances" surrounding the
issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned
Resolution, which was allegedly contrary to the
handwritten notes made in the copies of the Agenda
that he received. Respondent Peña most recently
capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification
supposedly committed by Justice Carpio by filing an
ethics complaint against the latter, where he alleged
that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a
copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division of this
Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting
"10AC" on the left side and marginal notes on the
right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this
Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for
Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this Honorable
Court merely "N" or "Noted" the Motion for
Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank and did not
grant the same.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a
copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required to
comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and
opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to
secure an advance copy of the assailed 13
November 2002 Resolution), the matter brought out
in the Executive Session and the admission made by
Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario
Davide and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard
to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division
of this Honorable Court which was sent to
respondent Peña was correct and that the Motion for
Clarification was merely "N" or "NOTED". However,
the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a Resolution
"Granting" the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the
13 November 2002 Resolution in an
anomalous/falsified manner and in clear
contravention of this Honorable Court’s Decision to
merely "Note" the same. A clear judicial
administrative violation.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself
initiated has gotten the better of him. Respondent
has convinced himself of the veracity of his own
malicious insinuations by his own repetitious
allegations in his subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual
penalties in administrative cases in the presence of
mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of
the infraction and the feeling of remorse.49 In this
case, the "profound" apologies50 offered by
respondent Peña for his insinuations against Justice
Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as seen by his
later actions. Although he expressed remorse for
having caused the Court distress because of his
statements,51 he refuses to acknowledge any
unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded
accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio
with respect to the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-
motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter
had recused himself from the case since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to
initiating unfounded and vicious attacks against the
integrity and impartiality of Members of this Court.
Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated
petitions, respondent assailed how retired Justice
Arturo B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon
Group, when the latter’s petition in G.R. No. 145822
was reinstated on a second motion for
reconsideration:52
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein
respondent that petitioner’s counsel has been
making statement to the effect that they could get a
favorable resolution from the Supreme Court, on
their second motion for reconsideration. In short,
petitioners’ counsel is practically saying that they are
sure to get the Supreme Court to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration even if it violates
the rules.53
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at
Justice Buena because it was he who penned the
challenged Resolution, which granted the second
motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It
was he who crafted, drafted and finalized the said
Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the violation
of the Rules. It was from Justice Buena’s office that
contents of the challenged Resolution was
apparently "leaked" to the petitioners’ counsel long
before its promulgation.54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what
phenomenon transpired? Why are herein petitioners
"very special" in the eyes of Justice Buena?55
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena
has been affected by his relationship with Atty.
Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts
and circumstances.56
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned
ponente, reinstated the petition without any
explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of
Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This was highly irregular by itself. But what made
reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that
even before the release of the Resolution reinstating
the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already
boasting that he would be able to reinstate their
petition. Obviously, even before the release of the
Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already knew
what Justice Buena’s resolution would
be.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In no less than six motions,58 he similarly accused
former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban of
prejudice based on his affiliation with the Rotary
Club, wherein some of the directors and officers of
Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed
that Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to meet
with some of the directors and officers, who
consulted him on the legal issues arising from
criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main
petitions, citing only an unnamed "reliable source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three
(Justice Panganiban and Urban Bank’s Arsenio
‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’ Borlongan)
went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of
fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times
going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted,
before the bank’s closure. Respondent has also
discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice
Panganiban was known to have been consulted, and
his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and
Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled
cases, while the same was still pending with the
Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4)
criminal cases filed the with the MTC [Municipal Trial
Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against
Borlongan, et al., for "introducing falsified documents
in a judicial proceeding". In the latter cases, it was
even Justice Panganiban who furnished a copy of
the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own
ponencia) to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the
purpose of giving his friends a legal basis in
questioning the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against Borlongan and the rest of his co-accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City
(now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No.
1 below).59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of
"unmitigated partiality" against retired Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the
latter resolved a separate case involving related
issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing
parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled
"Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M.
Peña, et al", are also the same petitioners in the
above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos.
145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the
above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562.
Under the circumstances, herein private respondent
is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias
and prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G.
R. No. 143591 would certainly be carried over to the
above-entitled consolidated cases.60 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere
remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery and
wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact
continually availed of such unethical tactics in
moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer
be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can
pardon given certain mitigating circumstances.
Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently
cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in
utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to
the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,62 the Court chose to
indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when the
latter imputed devious motives and questioned the
impartiality of members of the Court, despite its
earlier warnings:
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will
not denounce criticism made by anyone against the
Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive
effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion
of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone,
by those who have been privileged by it to practice
law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct
by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity,
and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar
disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot
be countenanced especially for those privileged
enough to practice law in the country. To be sure,
Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the
practice of law after showing sincere remorse and
having renewed his belief and respect for the Court,
almost eight years from the time the penalty was
imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Peña
be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for
his apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly
imputing unfounded motives and partiality against
members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal
Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC
with respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions
dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003, expressed
administrative concern over Atty. Peña’s behavior on
three points: (1) his submission of a falsified court
document, (2) his access to Supreme Court
documents that are highly restricted and confidential,
and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or
false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court
document, Annex "B," had illegal access to
confidential court documents, and made improper
use of them in the proceedings before this Court.
The Court directed the initial investigation by the
OBC based on the charge that respondent Peña had
submitted a falsified document to this Court.63 The
charge of falsification stems from his submission of
an alleged copy of the Court’s Agenda64 (Annex "B")
purportedly belonging to a member of the Division
handling the case. The pertinent portion of the
subject Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received
were two copies of the Official Agenda of the First
Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November
2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two different members of
the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente
himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’
Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to
Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED
contrary to what was stated in the 13 November
2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document
because it makes it appear that a Resolution was
issued by the First Division granting petitioners’
Motion for Clarification when in fact no such
Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at by
the First Division which can be gleaned from the
Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and
"C".65 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session,
respondent Peña expressed his absolute conviction
that the document attached as Annex "B" was an
exact copy of the Agenda of the then ponente of the
case.66 It was later discovered, however, that no
such copy existed, either in the latter’s records or in
those of any other member of the Division
concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is
concerned it was confirmed by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that
does not appear in the record, is not in the record
and that nobody, none of the members of the
division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your
pleading does not come from anyone of the
members of the division. That is the position of the
Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr.
Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with
that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come
from his office, was not based on the document in
his office and that is also true to each of the
members of this Division.67 (Emphasis supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant administrative
case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña submitted
to the Court a document he was absolutely certain,
at the time of such submission, was a copy of the
Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting the
subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the
Court by presenting a document that was not what
he claimed it to be. Contrary to the assurances
made in the same motion68 he made allegations that
were false and submitted documents that were not
borne out by the records of this case. Instead of
verifying the contents of Annex "B," which came to
him through dubious means, he unquestioningly
accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite
the Court’s own explanation that Annex "B" does not
exist, he continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities
exacted and expected from members of the legal
profession.69 Thus, lawyers shall commit no
falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.70 As disciples of truth,
their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of
the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions.71 Courts are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them.72 In the instant case, the
submission of a document purporting to be a copy of
the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of
dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of
respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent Peña would argue, however, that
falsification – as a criminal act under the Revised
Penal Code – was not judicially established during
the proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus,
he cannot be held liable for falsification. The
comparison of the present administrative and
disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of
falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is
confined to whether there is administrative liability
for the submission of a falsified document – namely
Annex "B," which respondent Peña claims (albeit
mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of
the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he
transgressed the ethical standards demanded of
lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their
dealings with and submissions to the Court. The
investigation clearly does not include the
determination of criminal liability, which demands a
different modicum of proof with respect to the use of
falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes no
definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of
respondent over his violation of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code regarding the use of falsified
documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that
what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of the
ponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion
to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was
later found to have been inexistent in the court’s
records. Regardless of whether or not Annex "B"
was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the
present disposition. What is now crucial is whether
respondent was candid and truthful in claiming
absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness
and authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Peña that the
typewritten contents of Annexes "B" and "C" appear
to be genuine and accurate is unconvincing and
cannot exonerate him from liability. Although Annex
"C" was determined to be in the Court’s
records,73 the bare similarity of its typewritten
contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him
from disciplinary action. Although the typewritten
contents of the two Agendas appear identical, the
handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are
different. Respondent, in fact, claims that the
handwritten notes come from two different members
of the Division, one of them the then ponente of the
case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the
veracity of the handwritten remarks – not on the
printed contents – which are allegedly contrary to the
substance of the Court’s 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson.
Respondent Peña cannot claim the genuineness of
Annex "B" (which is not in the records), based on the
apparent identity of its printed contents with those of
Annex "C" (which is in the records). The handwritten
notes are markedly different and, according to him,
made by two different members of the Court. In his
Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to substantiate
his assertion that Annex "B" and the notes made
therein belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent
Peña has not explained, to the Court’s satisfaction,
how he managed to obtain internal and confidential
documents.
Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that
he happened to obtain the two copies of the Agenda
(Annexes "B" and "C") and the internal Resolution
(Annex "D") in two separate envelopes anonymously
sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received them
sometime during the second or the third week of
January 2002 in his home-cum-office in Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental.74 He, however, failed to present
the envelopes containing the documents, but
explained that these may have already been thrown
away, since he had no system of recording incoming
communications in his home/office in the province.
The Court is not persuaded by his account of the
receipt of these restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as
the Resolution (Annex "D"), are internal documents
that are accessible only to court officers,75 who are
bound by strict confidentiality. For respondent Peña
to have been able to secure originals or photocopies
of the Court’s Agenda is disturbing because that
ability implies a breach of the rules of strict
confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the Agenda
purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items
for deliberation by the Court’s First Division for that
day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents
pertaining to his pending case. This circumstance
can hardly be considered as random, since the exact
item (Item No. 175) of concern for him – specifically,
the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification –was what had been sent directly to his
provincial home/office, and what he conveniently
acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential
court records just coincidentally and anonymously
appeared in the provincial home/office of respondent
Peña through ordinary mail. Also incredible is his
explanation that the envelopes that contained the
documents, and that could have led to the
identification of their source were opportunely
misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave
importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly
improbable that a personnel of the Court would
breach the rules of strict confidentiality 76 to send to
litigants or their counsel the Court’s Agenda,
together with handwritten notes and the internal
resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or
consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave
criminal and administrative penalties.77 Respondent
Peña’s account of having lost the envelopes appears
too convenient an excuse to assuage the Court’s
skepticism towards this breach of confidentiality
within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued
access – as recent as 2010 – to other internal and
confidential records in the proceedings of this case.
Despite the administrative proceedings leveled
against him for having "illicitly" obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Court’s First Division, he
brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior
by surreptiously acquiring no less than the
confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the
very administrative case of which he himself is the
subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February
2010,78 respondent Peña prayed that the questioned
13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled on the
ground that there was a mistake in its issuance
based on the copies of the Agenda he had
mysteriously received. In support of this motion, he
casually cited and attached a photocopy of the
confidential OBC Report.79 This OBC Report has not
been released to any party, and was then in fact still
under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the
attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to
the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it
actually appears in the rollo of the administrative
case.80 Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in
the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy
thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent,
his acquisition of the OBC Report from the Court’s
own records already speaks of an appalling pattern
of unethical behavior that the Court will no longer
ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
administrative case for obtaining confidential court
records, he continued to have access to other
internal documents of the Court. His actions have
established that he is incorrigible and not likely to
change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding
ethical standards and ignoring the rule of
confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less
than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the
profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit,
respondent Peña even tried to bolster his claim that
the then ponente of the case had a special interest
in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the
Court.81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions
(G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred
from the Third Division to the First Division, where
Justice Carpio was subsequently assigned.82 How
respondent Peña was again able to secure this
internal document is another disturbing mystery in
this case, especially since the resolution was sent by
the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First Division
Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial
Records Office only, and not to any of the parties.
Similar to the copies of the Agenda of the First
Division, respondent Peña again purportedly
received this Internal Resolution by mail.83 What is
more alarming in this instance is that he received not
just any photocopy of the Court’s Resolution, but a
pink copy itself, the very same material used for
such internal resolutions in the Court’s records. As
he himself admitted, respondent Peña could not
have gotten hold of the said internal Resolution,
which was on its face declared an internal matter,
without the assistance of a person who had access
to the records of his case in the Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the
case, which is being decried by respondent in the
subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross
misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various
Divisions due to the retirement of other Justices, the
cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge are
required to be transferred to the Division to which
the Member-in-Charge moves.84 Hence, in this case,
Justice Carpio, similar to other members of the Court
at that time, did not lose his case assignments but
brought them with him when he transferred to the
First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned
cases to the new Division are made by request from
the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo
of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will
be retained by a Division in which he is no longer a
member. Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated
petitions to the First Division that is being heavily
criticized by respondent Peña was simple
compliance with the established internal procedures
of the Court, and not attributable to any undue
interest or malicious intention on the part of the then
ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent
had raised "irresponsible suspicions"85 against the
integrity of the ponente without any understanding of
the Supreme Court’s processes in the transfer of
cases.
Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this
deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court records
to call for the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In
previously moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena,
he assailed how supposedly the retired Justice
violated the rules with respect to a second motion for
reconsideration when the latter reinstated the
Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No. 145822.
Respondent attributed the special treatment
extended by Justice Buena to his supposed
association with the De Leon Group’s counsel, Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To
establish this special treatment, he attached a
complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77
cases dismissed by the Court due to failure to pay
the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did
not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will
show that for the past several months alone,
seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the
Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the required
fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE
REINSTATED upon the filing of a SECOND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice
Buena willingly disregarded the Rules by reinstating
petitioners’ petition (De Leon Group Petition in G. R.
No. 145822) upon the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also
the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the very
least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if
only to show that he is not biased in favor of herein
petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however,
because those cases are not favored ones.
Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well
as the resolutions dismissing the aforesaid seventy-
seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached
hereto collectively as Annex "A".87
Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion
for inhibition the portions of the Court’s Minutes on
12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12 February 2001,
14 February 2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March
2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001, 16
May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August
2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05
September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08 October
2001 and others which were undated. The attached
Minutes pointed to specific cases which were
dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees,
among others. It was unclear if the cases were
specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if
respondent Peña represented any of the parties
therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained
confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to other
cases, which specifically dismissed or denied
petitions on the failure of the parties to pay
necessary fees. This could not have just been mere
coincidence again since it required some legal
understanding and familiarity with the cases in order
to be able to sift through and identify the kinds of
cases, which were dismissed or denied on such
grounds. Although the parties to these cases were
notified and given copies of the Court’s resolutions,
what respondent Peña obtained were the actual
copies of the Minutes that included other items in the
Court’s Agenda and that were not released to the
public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules, only
the Minutes pertinent to the parties are those that
are distributed to the parties concerned.88 Yet,
respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes of
dozens of cases to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that
were accessed by respondent – totaling 58 pages in
all – are not the subject of the investigation of the
administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as
2000 confirm in no uncertain terms his access to
internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but
of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that
respondent Peña would accuse his fellow lawyers of
allegedly having an "inside track" to members of the
Court, when he in turn, on record, had mysteriously
easy access to confidential court documents. That
internal documents of the Court (whether
voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise)
would suddenly find themselves in the hands of
respondent Peña through registered mail is too
incredible for this Court to attribute any good faith on
his part.
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of
credence to the unlikely story of how respondent
Peña came upon these internal documents, it looks
with disapproval upon his actions with respect to
those documents, which were supposedly sent to
him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent
official judicial records that are confidential in nature
and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for
them would be to make a candid and immediate
disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for
proper investigation, and not as proof to further the
merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself
acknowledged that reporting the "leaked out"
documents was a duty he owed to the Court 89 –
more so in this case, since the documents were sent
anonymously and through dubious circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his
continuing fitness to be a member of the legal
profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of
the "leaked" court documents, and nothing more.
Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the
suspicious circumstances of his having obtained
confidential court records; he even had the tenacity
to use the documents sent through suspicious
means to support his request for inhibition. As a
lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge
his motions and pleadings on documents of
questionable origins, without even verifying the
authenticity of the contents by comparing them with
sources of greater reliability and credibility.
If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the
veracity of the Division’s actions with respect to the
pending incidents in his case, as allegedly embodied
in the anonymous Agendas sent to him, then he
should have simply checked the records to verify the
genuineness of the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is
through officially released resolutions and decisions
that parties and their counsel are informed of and
guided by the Court’s actions on pending incidents,
and not by the confidential and handwritten notes of
the individual members of the Court. Respondent’s
wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda
purported to be those of individual members of the
Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly
misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in
fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon action
of the Division and the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions of
respondent Peña. He grounded the subject Motion
to Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent
copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for
Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be
noted,90 but it was instead granted by the Court. The
Court, however, made clear during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing
irregular about annotating the first item with "SEE
RES" (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the
incidents with "N" (Noted). In fact, these annotations
conform with the recommended actions submitted by
the ponente for that particular item.91 The Resolution
identified in the first item governs and contains the
actual disposition of two of the incidents in the
pending case.92 To be sure, what governs as the
final action of the Court en banc or in Division is the
minutes of the proceedings,93 which lists the
dispositions of the items taken up during the
session, reviewed by the members, and finally
approved by the Chief Justice or the Division
chairperson. Contrary to respondent’s suspicions,
the action taken by the Division in its 13 November
2002 Session was accurately reflected in the
questioned Resolution released by the Court.
Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but
himself, since he "allegedly," blindly and mistakenly
relied on "anonymously sent" unverified photocopies
of the Court’s Agenda, in order to support his call for
the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can
he rely on the alleged "bragging" of Atty. Singson –
which the latter denies – to impute ill motive to
judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson actually
exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the
suspension Order or freely divulged it in their
telephone conversation, respondent should have
been more circumspect in making grave accusations
of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic
evidence or proof to back up his claim.
Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using
confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in
bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal
court documents has not been properly explained.
The cavalier explanation of respondent Peña that
this Court’s confidential documents would simply find
themselves conveniently falling into respondent’s lap
through registered mail and that the envelopes
containing them could no longer be traced is
unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to
infer that laws and its own internal rules have been
violated over and over again by some court
personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids and
abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal
documents could have reached him. It is not
unreasonable to even conclude that criminal
liabilities have been incurred in relation to the
Revised Penal Code94 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the
same.95 Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other
penalty than disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more
justified by the earlier imposition of an indefinite
suspension. If taken together, these two violations
already speak of respondent Peña’s inherent
unworthiness to become a member of the Bar.
Although an indefinite suspension opens up the
possibility of future reinstatement after a clear
showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in the
case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be
incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion
of the Court. Not only has respondent thumbed his
nose on the integrity of the persons occupying the
Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and
wrongdoing, he has also showed disdain for the
sanctity of court procedures and records by his
haughty display of illegal access to internal Supreme
Court documents.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations of
wrongdoing and collusion between members of the
Court and another counsel.
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente,
respondent Pena’s allegations of collusion between
previous members of the Court and the counsel for
the De Leon Group are unfounded and contravene
the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his
fellow lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of
behavior that is disconcerting and administratively
punishable.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of
disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Peña, the
Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on
the third charge, as any possible administrative
liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is
not the proper subject of the present allegations of
administrative misconduct.
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been
made by respondent Peña against petitioners and
their respective counsel in his defense.96 However,
this is already beyond the scope of the subject
matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled
that he assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De
Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers
filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817,
145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court.
They all questioned therein the rulings of the
appellate court affirming the grant of execution
pending appeal.
Considering that this claim is the subject of
administrative penalties, and that other interested
parties did not participate in the investigation
conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity
dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the
meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and all
parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.
The charges of forum shopping are hereby
dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or
hearing of separate administrative
complaints97 against petitioners Urban Bank,
Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo
H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de
Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of
record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro
C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be
included in any future administrative action in
relation to these matters. On the other hand, Ben Y.
Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent
Peña and therefore, is not a real and direct party to
the case.
EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the
disorder caused by respondent Peña’s actions in the
administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort
to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future,
the Court finds the need to educate the public and
the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their professional
colleagues.98 They shall not, in their professional
dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.99 Lawyers shall use dignified
language in their pleadings despite the adversarial
nature of our legal system.100 The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of a judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which
lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in
a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded
accusations of unethical conduct or even
wrongdoing against other members of the legal
profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justness of
the cause with which they are charged.102
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that
respondent Peña has manifested a troubling history
of praying for the inhibition of several members of
this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another
Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded
accusations of partiality. A sampling of his
predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far,
eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to
shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January
2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice
Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena)
dated 28 October 2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban)
dated 18 February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15
March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente)
dated 30 January 2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban)
dated 28 December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo
Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December
2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice
Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03
March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura)
dated 07 January 2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate
Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio
T. Carpio) dated 02 June 2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-
Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio
Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated 04
August 2008;
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-
Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga
and Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-
Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion,
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio Morales,
Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28
August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio)
dated 21 January 2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re:
Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P.
A. Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22
August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated
01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio,
Jose Perez and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these
motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and
sparse relations between the parties and the
members of the Court to wild accusations of
partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For
example, respondent accused former Chief Justice
Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the
Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan,
then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an
officer.103 He moved for the inhibition of Justice
Sereno on the ground that she was "a close judicial
ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter,
according to respondent, was antagonistic toward
him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive
Session in this administrative case.104
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the
case re-raffled from the Court’s Third Division
because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member
thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court
through the endorsement of former Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of
the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former
President Fidel V. Ramos.105 He similarly sought the
inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close
professional and political ties with former President
Ramos.106 He likewise assailed the partiality of
Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law
school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then
Presidential Legal Counsel of former President
Ramos. Thus, according to respondent Peña,
"President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most
likely exercise his influence over the Honorable
Justice Brion."107
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice
Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban
Bank because of his decision in a related case108 and
his prior appointment as Undersecretary of
Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent
Peña impliedly prayed that his case be specifically
retained in the Court’s Third
Division.109 Respondent’s peculiar request, which
was not included in his other motions, gives the
impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura
inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless did not want
his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his
only intention was to raise the possibility of bias
against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not
matter whether his case remained with the Third
Division, with another member being designated to
replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another
Division altogether. Respondent Peña’s odd prayer
in his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to
shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to
him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned
against litigants’ contumacious practice in
successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in
order to shop for one who is more friendly and
sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the
integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of
public trust and confidence. But under the
circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary
inhibition of judges in a case would open the
floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering
that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN
had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of
prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would
justify petitioners’ apprehension about the practice of
certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly
and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.
As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation
for judges to disqualify themselves need not always
be heeded. It is not always desirable that they
should do so. It might amount in certain cases to
their being recreant about their duties. It could also
be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a
judge in the hope of getting another more amenable
to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the
multiple and successive requests for inhibition and
re-raffle filed by respondent Peña. Lest other
litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no
uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a
justice, most especially in the highest tribunal of the
land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the
reasons why this administrative case has dragged
on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and
disrepute to the members of the Court, but it likewise
delays the administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less
concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving
the case than about making sure that the "wrong" or
"unfriendly" Justices – in his perception – do not sit
and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the
protracted interruptions caused by his numerous
motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the
case languishing in this Court for years and clogging
its dockets. Respondent stands out for this
disorderly behavior and must be made an example
so that litigants be reminded that they cannot bend
or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their
causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than
the rules of basic courtesy in imputing sinister
motives against members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent Peña has violated several canons of
professional and ethical conduct expected from him
as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct,
demeanor and language with respect to his cause of
action – in this Court, no less – tend to undermine
the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well
as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow
lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his
uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal
court records and to use them shamelessly in his
pleadings in furtherance of his cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of
his inclination towards casually moving for the
inhibition of Justices of the Court based on
unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse
or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and
displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen
short of the ethical standards of the noble profession
and must be sanctioned accordingly.1âwphi1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8,
10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and
his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Peña’s personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to

INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure
copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda
dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First
Division, attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of
respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution
dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex "D" of
the same motion; (c) the Report and
Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as
Annex "5" of respondent Peña’s Motion to
Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the
Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages,
attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to Petitioners’
Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit)
dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Peña.
She is further required to SUBMIT such an
investigation report with recommendations on the
administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all
court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as
suggestions for protecting confidential and internal
court documents of pending cases within NINETY
(90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5581               January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated
January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty.
Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross
Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8,
1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate
of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage
with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting
marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court
resolved to require respondent to file a comment on
the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the
complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt
No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failing to file his
comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex
Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file
his comment on the complaint be deemed as a
waiver to file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed
that while it appeared that an administrative case
was filed against him, he did not know the nature or
cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus
Motion, he received no other pleading or any
processes of this Court. Respondent, however,
countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely
a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the
criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to
obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only
when he visited his brother who is occupying their
former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3,
Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he
also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion
when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the
family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but
she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him.
Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to
mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid
obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife
which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed
that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least
two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time
to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to
submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint
against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of
Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to
respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles
City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent
failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his
Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig
probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same
already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed
to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted
respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy
of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her
Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction
respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a
copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of
Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint
was mailed at respondent's residential address in
Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No.
3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show
Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by
registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and
unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No.
55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise
required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that
respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower
St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served
upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in
Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
respondent entered his appearance as counsel with
mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend
a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8,
Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to
comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this
administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of
five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment
required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it
appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7,
2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the
filing by respondent of his comment on the
complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and
(3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty.
Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated
June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of
compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise
resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24,
2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI,
showed that respondent cannot be located because
neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at
Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e.,
No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found
or located and there were no leads to determine
respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in
compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported
that as per their records, the address of respondent
is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd.,
Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the
mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices.
Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the
IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and
the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received
by respondent as evidenced by a registry return
receipt. However, respondent failed to take any
action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent
Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues
despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence
has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held
that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of
evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.
The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio
Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997
with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila,
states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen
Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first
marriage was still subsisting. We note that the
second marriage apparently took place barely a year
from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative
that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at
the time respondent contracted the second marriage
with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document
is a public record. – When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages
entered into by respondent. The certified xerox
copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes
of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first
marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without
addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his
comment on the complaint. This case has dragged
on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years,
the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have preselected only those he will take notice of
and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued
several resolutions directing respondent to comment
on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has
not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his
failure to comment on the complaint against him.
Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause
order, none of them have escaped respondent's
attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of
the complaint had not reached him, he cannot,
however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint
against him that is pending before this Court which
he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted
to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with
respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as
evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than
a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions
and complaint to different locations - both office and
residential addresses of respondent. However,
despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a
mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint.
When said excuse seemed no longer feasible,
respondent just disappeared. In a manner of
speaking, respondent’s acts were deliberate,
maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to
delay the disposition of the case and to evade the
consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard
not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in
the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7474               September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical
practice of filing frivolous administrative cases
against judges and personnel of the courts because
the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant
from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross
misconduct and gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered
his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William
Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City,
presided by complainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente
Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
for the accused. But aside from entering his
appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca
also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-
raffled to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering
the adverse incidents between the incumbent
Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding
Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersigned."2
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-
raffle through an order issued on February 14,
2007,3 viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed
from it just because of the personal sentiments of
counsel who was not even the original counsel of the
litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to
the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this
province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction
over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical
dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed
Administrative as well as criminal cases against this
Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the
Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is
why he should not have accepted this particular
case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in
this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It
is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in
a case but not to appear for a client to remove a
case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the
first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of
Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to
the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused
filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29,
2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative
of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as
new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is
likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter
complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing
Atty. Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his
appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse
incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a
regular administrative complaint, and required Atty.
Dealca to submit his comment.5
In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted
that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14,
2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully
deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due
process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge
Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion
to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued
against the accused; and that it should be Judge
Madrid himself who should be disbarred and
accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross
ignorance of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to
the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the
Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ,
entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and
Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon
City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge
Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for
allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case
No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v.
Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to
file administrative or criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel whenever decisions,
orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.9
In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon
Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation:10
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants
show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by
himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as
counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA
IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm.
Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5)
cases are factual evidence of the cases that
respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for
the complainants against court officers, judges and
personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and
incidents in cases that respondent had handled as
counselfor the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the
respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid &
Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP
Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the
court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe
unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members
that was adverse to the position of the respondent.
The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the
cases handled by respondent for the complainants
who failed to secure a favorable action from the
court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ
was a result of the case before the sala of Judge
Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs.
Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and
Damages, that was handled by respondent for the
complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an
off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph
H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against
defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his
appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of
an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was
also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled
"Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas,
with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most
Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party
defendant that was heard, tried, decided and
pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto
A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was
also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs.
Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the
sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the
adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to
the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing
administrative and criminal case against the judges
and personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the
complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service
Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs.
JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case
No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA
RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board
ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic)
merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in
Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs.
Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of
resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated
Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for
lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm.
Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida"
for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER
dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge
RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to
2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia
Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records"
which provides for the dismissal of the cases against
all the accused, do not show participation on the part
of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by
the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases
are pertaining to persons other than judges and
personnel of the court that are not squarely covered
by the present investigation against respondent,
although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent
had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of
the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia
Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter
case resulted in the administrative case of Atty.
Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister
member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence
from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the
"PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of
the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of
going through the procedures provided for by the
Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order
or decision of the court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended
that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty
of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period
of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be
ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration,
and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-
2012-545.14
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file
frivolousadministrative and criminal
complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical
practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of
initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the
administrative and criminal cases he filed against
judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid.
He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty
bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
personnel.15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately

submitted his Report and Recommendation11 finding
Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing
frivolous administrative and criminalcomplaints; and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from
the practice of law for one year because his motion
to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal
basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of

Governors modified the recommendation and
dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of
merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED,

the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge
Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of
Although the Court always admires members of the
Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to
weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges
and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any
acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by
any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble
cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not
advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed
our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any
trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for
initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his
proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner
Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges
against judges, court personnel and even his
colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed
from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients
or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was
thereby crossing the line of propriety, because
neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal
remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim
of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the
parties according to law, not to harass them.17
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and
duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by
an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath
exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his
duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has
also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have
impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly
impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and
caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard
himself against his own impulses of initiating
unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to
investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges
against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to
shield them from unfounded suits that are intended
to vex and harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his
mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission
because his filing of the unfounded complaints,
including this one against Judge Madrid, increased
the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in
good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against
judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did
not evince any good faith on his part, considering
that he made allegations against them therein that
he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully
deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s
precious time and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the
various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to
confront even the Court with the following arrogant
tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the
summary dismissal of cases filed against erring
judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e.
without even discussing the facts and the law of the
case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute
resolutions the Court could have promulgated in
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His
arrogant posturing would not advance his cause
now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of
the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The
minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt
dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the
Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack
of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood
that the challenged decision or order, together with
all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained
or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then
constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of
the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of
due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and
its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the
court a quo.26
The requirement for stating the facts and the law
does not apply to the minute resolutions that the
Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court
explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently
without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord
with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petition is
filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the
petition always gives the legal basis.
xxxx
The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was
the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that
the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article
VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice
Regalado, declared that resolutions were not
decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for
the former "merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it; and the petition to
review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence
there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s
decision." It pointed out that the constitutional
mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing
of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but
not where the petition was being refused due
course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating
the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court,
after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent
pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition
and stated that the questions raised were factual, or
there was no reversible error in the lower court’s
decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.30
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should
have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his
motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that
Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely
based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual
and legal bases.32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner
Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the
legal causes for their clients. As a consequence,
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations
upon them.33
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or haveno
materiality to the case.1âwphi1
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the
courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.34
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained
the following averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding
Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not
hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated
that judges could choose the cases they heard, and
could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility
existed between the judges and the litigants or their
counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have
been assiduously substantiated by him because it
put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges
in general. Yet, he did not even include any
particulars that could have validated the averment.
Nor did he attach any document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to
seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must
be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the ground of bias and
prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca
was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare
allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did
not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge
Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and the evidence and
without fear or favor should only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As
such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as
a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule
11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that
this is not the first administrative complaint to be
ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In
Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we
reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule
20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of
the same offense would be dealt with more severely.
Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court
imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the
Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca
from the practice of law for a period one year.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.
04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
year effective from notice of this decision, with a
STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8644               January 22, 2014
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and
CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a complain for disbarment1 on
grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and
dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos
(Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The
complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos
(Aida), and their children, Alistair R. Campos
(Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).
Antecedents
Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was
born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.
In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-
square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo
thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in
Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student without
an income and a capacity to buy the property. In
2006, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28258
covering the property was issued in Alistair’s name.
Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and
child likewise resided in Eliseo’s house until 2008.2
On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7,
a Petition3 for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
He alleged that both he and Aida are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with essential marital
obligations. He claimed that during the first few days
of their marriage, he realized that he finds no
gratification in engaging in sexual intercourse with
his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He
also averred that Aida experienced severe pain
when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no
longer wanted to bear children. He likewise ascribed
acts of infidelity to Aida.
On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an
Affidavit of Loss4 wherein he represented himself as
the owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-
28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the
owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his
files. On September 15, 2008, he caused the
annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT
No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No
Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise
inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted
Eliseo’s representations.
On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury8 against
Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT
No. P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was
aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and
maliciously asserted a falsehood.
In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is
the sole owner of the property covered by OCT No.
P-28258. Eliseo continued:
That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it
to be registered in the name of [Alistair], who was
still single, as I have some other properties (land)
under my name;
That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still
has a sister;
That when the title was released, it was kept in our
files;
That when I filed an annulment case against my wife
which is now pending before the [RTC] of Bayugan, I
offered to my wife as a settlement to have our
properties settled. One of [these properties] is this
lot, which I asked to be sold and its proceeds be
divided between us. I have learned that my wife
refused to have that property sold claiming that I
could not sell the house and lot as it is in the name
of our son, herein complainant Alistair R. Campos;
xxxx
That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit
that the Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the Lot has
long been in his actual, physical and personal
possession, is utterly false, as the title was
previously in our possession in our files as the
property is undersigned's own exclusive property. x
xx
That when I learned that together with my wife, he is
going to apply for a loan making the title of the lot as
collateral, I decided to file a petition for cancellation
of the title under my son's name Alistair R. Campos,
and asked Mrs. Azucena A. Ortiz, to get a certified
copy of the title from the Register of Deeds to be
used in the filing of a petition for cancellation of the
title in my son’s name;
That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by
the Register of Deeds, that I have to execute an
affidavit of loss so that I can be given a certified
copy. Since the title is not in my possession after I
left my residence and I cannot find it from my files, I
let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of loss and I signed
it. I have also instructed her to [cause the annotation
of the affidavit on the certificate of title] to protect my
interest as the real owner of the lot, to counter or
stop my wife and son from using the titles as
collateral of a loan;
x x x x.10
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable
cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against
Eliseo.11 The resolution, which dismissed the
complaint, in part, reads:
"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he
bought was missing and could not be found in his
files, he did the proper actions to protect his rights
thereto by executing an Affidavit of Loss.
x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to
obtain a loan using the title as collateral without his
consent and to protect his right as owner of the
property, he went to the Register of Deeds to cancel
his son’s ownership over the lot in question with the
intent to revert back its ownership in his name.
However, when asked to produce a copy of its
duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present the
same as it was already lost and could not be
retrieved from his files. To prove its loss, an Affidavit
of Loss was executed by [Eliseo] attesting to the fact
of its unavailability.
x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was
done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo] in
executing the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt
assertion of falsehood since there was a firm belief
that indeed, the title is not anymore found in his files.
It could not be located and the title is kept by
[Alistair] who took sides with [Aida] who has plans to
enjoy the benefits from the title using it as a
collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by
the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful to Eliseo, the
former could have informed the latter of the]
whereabouts of the title and could have sought
permission from his father when he took the copy of
the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing
[Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such
Affidavit and neither can he be found guilty of perjury
as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x
x x."12 (Citation omitted)
On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint13 for
Legal Separation, Support and Separation of
Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that
Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a
homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted
the said confession when he admitted to Alistair and
Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with
another woman. Aida likewise claimed that Eliseo is
temperamental and had stopped giving support to
their family.
On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
an administrative complaint14 for serious misconduct,
immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal
investigation was thereafter conducted.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned
administrative complaint against Eliseo, he resigned
from his judicial post on July 1, 2009.15
On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a
hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge Casals) called
the parties for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle
ensued inside the chamber. The police blotter filed
promptly after the incident indicated that Eliseo
choked Charmaine and attempted to box but failed
to hit Alistair.16
On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed
the instant complaint for disbarment17 against Eliseo.
They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of
dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in (a)
causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in
Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently misrepresenting
himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT
No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in the
Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008
that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is
missing despite his knowledge that the said title is
with Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit
admitting to his children that he has an intimate
relation with another woman; and (e) choking and
boxing his children on September 14, 2009.
After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he interposed
the following defenses: (a) the complainants are
engaged in forum shopping in view of pending
administrative and civil cases in all of which the
issues of immorality and homosexuality have already
been raised;21 (b) the complaint is instituted merely
to harass him as a consequence of his refusal to
provide a monthly support of Php60,000.00 to his
wife and children;22 (c) he has no extra-marital
relation but he once told Alistair and Charmaine in
jest that due to Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live
separately with another woman who may be more
caring and loving than his wife;23 and (d) to protect
his rights and prevent the complainants from using
as a collateral for a loan the house and lot covered
by OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of
Loss on September 10, 2008 as a pre-requisite to
his filing of an action in court for the registration of
the property in his name.24 Further, Eliseo refuted
Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the scuffle
which occurred on September 14, 2009 inside the
chamber of the judge hearing the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Eliseo insists that
if Alistair and Charmaine’s claims were true, they
could have presented independent witnesses to
corroborate their version of the incident, and medical
certificates to prove that they indeed sustained
injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what had
transpired:
[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment
case, the judge called the parties to his chamber for
a conference. [Aida] however was reluctant to go
unless her children would join her. The judge then
called all of them to the chamber. Once there, the
Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for
settlement. While [Eliseo] was explaining to the
judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising her voice
uttering unprintable words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo]
requested her to calm down reminding her that they
were still in court. But she continued her tirade at
[Eliseo] with greater intensity even calling him a bad
father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine
had already been ejected by the judge out of the
court for lack of decorum and respect. The order for
her removal arose after she interrupted the court
several times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was
already outside the court premises, she was even
heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that
[Eliseo] should watch out after the hearing as she
was going to attack him. The prior incident (where
she was thrown out of court) made her angrier in the
chamber. So when she continued with her
unpleasant and scandalous utterances by again
interrupting [Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to
talk about his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo]
walked to her and held her by her shoulder to put
some sense to her that she really had to calm down
out of respect [for] the judge. There was no choking
of Charmaine. But, this sight of holding Charmaine
by the shoulder was viewed differently by [Alistair]
who flung with force and recklessness a bag
containing an unknown hard object to [Eliseo].
[Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point, Charmaine
suddenly held [Eliseo] from behind so he could not
defend himself from the onslaught of Alistaire (sic)
who was poised to attack him. [Eliseo] was forced to
elbow Charmaine to break free from her hold. There
was a brief exchange of punches between Alistair
and [Eliseo] before the Presiding Judge broke the
fray. This incident could not have happened if not for
Charmaine’s own misdemeanor and initial
provocation.25
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the
hearing held on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener
Sansaet came to represent them. Eliseo appeared
on his own behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as
collaborating counsel.
During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the
allegations against him of (a) immorality and
psychological incapacity in having extra-marital
affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in the execution
of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved
anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since
they are already the subjects of other pending
cases.26 He also expressed his doubt that Alistair is
his biological son.27 He also alleged that Aida, who
had served for three terms as a Provincial Board
Member, had a lover, who was likewise a political
figure.28 Aida harbored the impression that Eliseo’s
filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage caused the downfall of the former’s political
career.29
The Report and Recommendation of the CBD
On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A.
Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted his Report
and Recommendation30 to the IBP Board of
Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended the
dismissal of the instant disbarment complaint against
Eliseo for lack of evidence. Commissioner Din, Jr.
ratiocinated that:
The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not
[Eliseo] committed serious misconduct sufficient to
cause his disbarment. The determination of
[Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the following: 1.
whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest with regards to
the statements he made in his Petition for
Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not [Eliseo] is
guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or not the
statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss concerning
the certificate of title of the Campos’ property were
untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo] choked his
daughter, Charmaine, during the amicable
settlement of the annulment case in the (sic) Judge
Casal’s (sic) chambers.
The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or
serious misconduct has been defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful and flagrant unlawful conduct
on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of a
cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a
predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose
(Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).
As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct
has been held to be "a ground for the imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment because
good character is an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty. Paita-
Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008).
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise
held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a
good condition precedent to the practice of law but
also a good qualification for all members of the bar
(Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564,
August 20, 2008).
In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of
[Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the
incongruence of his homosexuality and the
extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for
annulment compared with the complainants’
allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that he has a
mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and
the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite
knowledge of the fact that the certificate of title was
with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of the
subject property taken on their own is a valid ground
to find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.
However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and
every single allegation of the complainants making
the case at fore a battle of opposing narration of
facts.
More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented
by the complainants are insufficient to prove their
claim beyond the degree of evidence required of
them by law to satisfy and overcome.
Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of
proof is upon the complainant and the Court will
exercise the disciplinary power only if the former
establishes the case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence."
xxxx
In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the
complaint, no other evidence was presented by the
complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the
statements made in the complaint, no other
corroborative or collaborating evidence documentary
or testimonial from independent, third person was
presented to convince this Commission by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof that [Eliseo] is
guilty of the allegations contained therein.31 (Citation
omitted)
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the
findings of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the Extended
Resolution issued on March 20, 2013, the Board
suspended Eliseo from the practice of law for two
years. Thus:
[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records,
finds sufficient evidence to sustain misconduct on
the part of [Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing
an Affidavit of Loss of Title to Real Property which
Title was in the name of Alistair, his son, and which
was in the latter’s possession, substantiated with
annexes and affidavits. The same holds true for the
alleged choking incident in the Judge’s chamber
which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G".
[Eliseo] also admitted his infidelity albeit he
postulated the defense of homosexuality. All these,
taken together, fall short of the ethical standards set
forth for lawyers in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32
Issues
Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty,
immorality and serious misconduct in:
I.
Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258
in Alistair’s name;
II.
Subsequently misrepresenting himself as
the real owner of the lot covered by OCT
No. P-28258;
III.
Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit
of Loss executed on September 10, 2008
that the owner's copy of OCT No. P-28258
is missing despite his knowledge that the
said title is with Alistair;
IV.
Stating in his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual
albeit admitting to his children that he has an
intimate relation with another woman; and
V.
Choking and boxing his children on
September 14, 2009.
This Court’s Ruling
Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation
of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the
chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009
shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is
compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo
for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he conducted
himself in a manner not befitting a member of the
bar.
This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned for
his unbecoming behavior.
In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a
penalty of two years of suspension from the practice
of law, the IBP Board of Governors considered all
the three charges of immorality, dishonesty and
misconduct against the former.
However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon Eliseo
a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in
causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in
Alistair’s name when the subject property actually
belongs to the former. The charges of (a) immorality
in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b)
dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on
September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand,
dismissed by the Court after finding either the
evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the
issues raised being already the subjects of Eliseo’s
pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment
complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored
upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the
former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on
September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court
does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same
acts especially since they pertain to his private life
and were not actually committed in connection with
the performance of his functions as a magistrate
before.
In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized
what "automatic conversion of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall
also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance
with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled
"Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative
Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as
Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative
case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court official
concerned as a member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment
in both respects may be incorporated in one decision
or resolution."
xxxx
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith
be required to comment on the complaint and show
cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as
member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to
comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the
bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the
fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic
conversion" of administrative cases against justices
and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them
as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or
unnecessary replication of actions by treating an
administrative complaint filed against a member of
the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against
him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus,
a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is
impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative
case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court
of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a
first- or second-level court.34 (Citations and
emphasis omitted)
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of
instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer
when an administrative case had been previously
filed against him or her as a magistrate. Ideally
therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should
have been consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761.
However, it is well to note that Samson v.
Caballero35 was promulgated by the Court on August
5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant
disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while
all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are
replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the
last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition
to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the
said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.
In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare
accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears
stressing that not one of the parties had presented
even one independent witness to prove what
transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on
September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a
fact, but the question of who started what cannot be
determined with much certainty.
While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo
vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-
defense on his part.36
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s
narration of the incident, and understands that the
successive acts of the parties during the tussle were
committed at a time when passions ran high, he
shall not be excused for comporting himself in such
an undignified manner.
Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the
other hand, is instructive anent what constitutes
unbecoming conduct, viz:
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior
but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method."39
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was
to engage in a brawl with no less than his own
children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court
shall not countenance crude social behavior.
Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people
with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled,
and justice solemnly dispensed.40 Misbehavior within
or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and
dignity.41 Although Alistair and Charmaine were not
entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and
restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose
conduct failed to show due respect for the court and
lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the
legal profession.
Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court
views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the
hearing conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011
that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son. 42 As
a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing
illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted
for that specific purpose is nothing short of
defamation.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he
conducted himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his
own children in the chamber of Judge Casals on
September 14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his
doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during
the hearing before the CBD.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent
Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of
Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby
imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6281               September 26, 2011
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D.
Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda.1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the
owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square
meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for
the registration of the aforesaid property. The case
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275. During the course of the
proceedings, complainant engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case
when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez,
figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and
respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos
(PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two
Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee.
Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him,
as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter.
During the last hearing of the case, respondent
demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a
memorandum, which he said would further
strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus
twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject
property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand
for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover,
complainant co-owned the subject property with his
siblings, and he could not have agreed to the
amount being demanded by respondent without the
knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result
of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's
demands, the latter became furious and their
relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in
LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and
executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March
24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent
complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which
transmitted the decree of registration and the original
and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get
the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to
discover that the same had already been claimed by
and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On
May 4, 2000, complainant talked to respondent on
the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without
complainant's knowledge, consent and authority.
Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him
the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property
equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for
which, respondent would deliver the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant
refused the demand, for not having been agreed
upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant
reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000,
complainant made the same demand on respondent
over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his
previous demand and angrily told complainant to
comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if
the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April
6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on
the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the
agreement on the payment of his legal services was
20% of the property and/or actual market value. To
date, respondent has not returned the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his
co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the
same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the
appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant
invokes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
properties of his client when due or upon demand. x
xx
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his
alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not
turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal,
notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete
payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of
20% of the total area of the property covered by the
title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square
meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of
PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum
of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter
portion and that he was ready and willing to turn
over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should
complainant pay him completely the aforesaid
professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of
PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the amount
earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of
the current value of the subject lot. He alleged that
the agreement was not reduced into writing,
because the parties believed each other based on
their mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the
payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a
memorandum, since he considered the same
unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him
and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle
of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount being
demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9,
2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-
called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-
173,5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Pending the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for
review6 with this Court. The Court, in a
Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that the
case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition,
pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J.
Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated
December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated
December 17, 2005, with modification that
respondent is ordered to return the complainant's
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen
days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present
petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, which affirmed with modification the
findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees
that would legally give him the right to retain the
property of his client until he receives what is
allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and,
thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have
a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his
client, which have lawfully come into his possession
and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have
a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured
in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim
of such lien to be entered upon the records of the
court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the
presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of
the client's funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the
attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his
client, and applies to the documents and funds of the
client which may come into the attorney's
possession in the course of his employment.10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is
no such agreement for the payment of professional
fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject
property and submits that their agreement was only
for the payment of the acceptance fee and the
appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no
proof of any agreement between the complainant
and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an
additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the
total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement
between the parties only shows that respondent will
be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance
fees, which the respondent has duly received.
Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees that would entitle respondent to retain his
client's property. Hence, respondent could not validly
withhold the title of his client absence a clear and
justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to
complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's
fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of
the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by
no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all
justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and
property to his client when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer
by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the
title of the complainant, despite repeated demands,
in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional
professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over
the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant
fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." It
is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional
professional fees upon his client which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the
engagement of his services. At the outset,
respondent should have informed the complainant of
all the fees or possible fees that he would charge
before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for
the complainant to determine if he has the financial
capacity to pay respondent before engaging his
services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled
to the payment of additional professional fees on the
basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no
merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he
deserved' is used as a basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his
client."12 The principle of quantum meruit applies if a
lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for
his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to
receive what he merits for his services, as much as
he has earned.13 In the present case, the parties had
already entered into an agreement as to the
attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the
principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already
compensated by such agreement.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of
the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform

complainant that he will be the one to secure the
owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed
to immediately inform complainant that the title was
already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3,
2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to get the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be
surprised that the said title had already been claimed
by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000.
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his
clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.14 By keeping
secret with the client his acquisition of the title,
respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client.
Respondent could have easily informed the
complainant immediately of his receipt of the
owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in
order to save his client the time and effort in going to
the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the

property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said
title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors,
adopting and approving with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be
ordered to return the complainant's owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed.
However, the fifteen-day period from notice given to
respondent within which to return the title should be
modified and, instead, respondent should return the
same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the
complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY.
ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance
of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in
knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails
to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected
to perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged
respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent)
with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the
amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services.
She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal
services of the respondent to represent her in the
annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at
P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the
initial amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to
his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the
developments in her case, but he told her that he
would only start working on the case upon her full
payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only
learned then that what he had contemplated to file
for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for
the annulment of her marriage; that he further told
her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance
fee for the annulment of her marriage;2 that she
subsequently withdrew the case from him, and
requested the refund of the amounts already paid,
but he refused to do the same as he had already
started working on the case;3 that she had sent him
a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever
amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed
her demand letter despite his not having rendered
any appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his
constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her
to bring an administrative complaint against him6 in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March
20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent
alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee
sought his legal services to bring the petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that based on his
evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate
case would be one for legal separation anchored on
the psychological incapacity of her husband; that
she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00
for his legal services to bring the action for legal
separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00,
as evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for
purposes of the petition for legal separation he
required the complainant to submit copies of her
marriage contract and the birth certificates of her
children with her husband, as well as for her to
submit to further interviews by him to establish the
grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon
finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly
respond to his communications; that in May 2005,
she admitted to him that she had spent the money
that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his
professional fees; and that in June 2005, she
returned to him with a note at the back of the
prepared petition for legal separation essentially
requesting him not to file the petition because she
had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the
annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand
letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he
dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper
because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted
that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated
May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the
following:
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said
letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005
(Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ,
who unskillfully relied on an unverified information
furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
summoned the parties to a mandatory conference
on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and
her counsel attended the conference. On his part,
the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to
the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer. 11 Due to his
non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the
conference on the same day, but required the
complainant to submit a verified position paper
within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper
in the end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25,
2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De
La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's
insistence that he could have brought a petition for
legal separation based on the psychological
incapacity of the complainant's husband was
sanctionable because he himself was apparently not
conversant with the grounds for legal separation;
that because he rendered some legal services to the
complainant, he was entitled to receive only
P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as
acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of
the services rendered under the principle
of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should
be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
observed that the respondent's statement in the last
part of his answer, to the effect that the demand
letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the
complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper,
or should have been addressed "to the urinal project
of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he
opined that such offensive and improper language
uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer
violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
ultimately recommended as follows:
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully
recommending the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the
complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he
received for the purpose of preparing a petition
for legal separation. Undersigned believes that
considering the degree of professional services
he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he
received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient
payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds
for legal separation and annulment of marriage,
respondent should be sanctioned.
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for
using offensive or improper language in his
pleading, which was filed right before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be
sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid
repetition of the said misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most
respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita
D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the
former received as payment for his services because
it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for failure to show his
respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive
and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner
De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation
of the penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's failure to show respect to
his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and
improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.
The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors
denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated
March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are:
(a) whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b)
whether or not he should be ordered to return the
attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the
recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he
should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant
as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the
annulment of marriage for her. He required her to
pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the
filing fees and his appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the
sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his
professional relationship with the complainant as his
client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis
and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De
La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten
retainer's contract between the respondent and the
complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there
is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent
agreed to accept the case in the amount of
P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon
to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the
agreement is the payment of appearance fee, filing
fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the
P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for
the filing of the annulment case or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even
the latter is quite confused as to what action he is
going to file in court. The intention of the British
national and the complainant was to get married. At
that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is
still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez.
That considering that the two are intending to get
married, we can safely assume that the complainant
was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment
of marriage in order to free her from the marriage
bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that
the petition will be granted, that the complainant will
be free to marry the British subject. The legal
separation is but a separation of husband and wife
from board and bed and the marriage bond still
exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation
will be granted, one is not free to marry another
person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent
would show that he himself is not well versed in the
grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a
legal separation case for the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital
obligations developed or of their marriage on
February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal
separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds
are as follows:
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal
separation may be filed only by the husband or the
wife, as the case may be, within five years from the
time of the occurrence of any of the following
causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent;
or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what
respondent explained to the complainant, is not one
of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal
separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a
ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal
separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has
always been used for the purpose of filing a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family
Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal
developments and participate in continuing legal
education program (Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advise that respondent
gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he
should be able to distinguish between the grounds
for legal separation and grounds for annulment of
marriage. But as the respondent stated in his
answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic
provisions of the law.
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his
professional competence and skill to the
complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did
not know the distinction between the grounds for
legal separation and for annulment of marriage.
Such knowledge would have been basic and
expected of him as a lawyer accepting a
professional engagement for either causes of action.
His explanation that the client initially intended to
pursue the action for legal separation should be
disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated
by the parties and for which his services was
engaged, was no other than an action for annulment
of the complainant's marriage with her husband with
the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did
not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal
separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his
answer that he had prepared a petition for legal
separation, and that she had to pay more as
attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension
other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the
standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal
serviee which he knows or should know that he
is not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis
supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the
attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at
the special instance and request of his client. As
long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly
trying to represent and serve the interests of the
client, he should have a reasonable compensation
for such services.19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the
retainer's agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the
parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's
agreement between them gives to the client the
reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees.
Once the attorney has performed the task assigned
to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is
determined on the basis of what he and the client
agreed.21 In the absence of the written agreement,
the lawyer's compensation shall be based
on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he
deserved."22 The determination of attorney's fees on
the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized
"when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not
able to finish the case to its
conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes
the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the
engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the
parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all
compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every
case what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney
does not receive more than what is reasonable, in
keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement
as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall
be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation
for legal services rendered is not only for the
purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the
amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the
purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession.25cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the
engagement because as it was later revealed, it was
way above his ability and competence to handle the
case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence,
he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's
fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to
perform the contemplated task he undertook for the
complainant because it was improbable that the
agreement with her was to bring the action for legal
separation. His having supposedly prepared the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage was either his way of
covering up for his incompetence, or his means of
charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to
retain the amount he had already received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that
the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance
fee. His refusal to return the amount to the
complainant rested on his claim of having already
completed the first phase of the preparation of the
petition for legal separation after having held
conferences with the complainant and her British
fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating
Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the
respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the
P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered
some legal services to the complainant, specifically:
(a) having the complainant undergo further
interviews towards establishing the ground for legal
separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds
discussed during the interviews based on her
statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after
he could not understand the written statement
prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c)
requiring her to submit her marriage contract with
her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and
the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary
Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all
surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d)
finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8)
in the later part of April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la
Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent
deserved any compensation because he did not
really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if,
even based on his version, he would prepare the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to
accomplish the tasks he should naturally and
expectedly perform during his professional
engagement does not discharge his professional
responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The
respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may
be sanctioned according to the degree of the
misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered
to restitute to the client the amount received from the
latter in consideration of the professional
engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit,
if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of
his professional competence, and he is further to be
ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00
received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the date of this decision until
full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the
Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further
emphasized in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." this decision until full payment.
Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use Let copies of this decision be attached to the
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a
improper." member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our the Philippines and the Office of the Court
legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts
strong language in the advancement of the interest throughout the country.
of their clients.27 However, as members of a noble
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this
case, to represent a personal matter in court, with
courage and zeal but that should not be used as
license for the use of offensive and abusive
language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or
in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every
lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent
in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity
and respect not only towards his clients, the court
and judicial officers, but equally towards his
colleagues in the Legal Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the

demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed
by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the
MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose"
constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot
tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent

tried to justify the offensive and improper language
by asserting that the phraseology was not per
se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he
had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand
letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper
and should be disregarded. However, his assertion
does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety
of his language. He could have easily been
respectful and proper in responding to the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is

reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition
of the offense will be severely punished.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution

No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence to the
client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of
offensive and improper language towards his fellow
attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of
the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos

to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30)
days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of
 violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Notarial Law.

On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña,

former head of the Records Department of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed
an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty.
Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she
was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C,
Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang,
Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of
Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment
constructed thereon. She personally knew
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as
respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation
case, which she filed against her husband in 1974,
and the aforementioned property was her share in
their property settlement. Complainant stated that
she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as
she was respondent's trusted employee who did
secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was
always there whenever she visited respondent in
connection with her cases.

Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in

1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant)
apply for a loan from a bank to construct
townhouses on her property for sale to interested
buyers, and that her property be offered as
collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she
would work out the speedy processing and release
of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had
a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent
lent her the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest,
to pay the said loan. When her title was released by
the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent
who would handle the preparation of documents for
the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant
gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From
time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always
Republic of the Philippines assured her that she was still preparing the
SUPREME COURT documents required by the bank. Because of her
Manila assurances, complainant did not bother to check on
her property, relying on respondent's words that she
would handle speedily the preparation of her
EN BANC
application.
A.C. No. 4191               June 10, 2013
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited
her property, she discovered that her apartment was
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant, already demolished, and in its place, four residential
vs. houses were constructed on her property, which she
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent. later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D.
Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D.
DECISION Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted
respondent about what she discovered, but
PER CURIAM: respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her.
After verification, complainant learned that her
This is an administrative case filed against property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was the
Notary Public before whom the sale was
acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold
the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13,
1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not
sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its
favor nor appeared before respondent to
acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent
manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee,
Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and
that her signature was forged, as she did not sign
any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D.
Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office,
and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus
(Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent
denied that she suggested that complainant should
apply for a loan from a bank to construct
townhouses. She said that it was the complainant,
on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to
look for somebody who could help her raise the
money she needed to complete the amortization of
her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS
and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated
that she was the one who introduced complainant to
the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her
office. In the course of their conversation,
complainant offered the property, subject matter of
this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus
were interested, and got the telephone number of
complainant. Thereafter, complainant told
respondent that she accompanied the Spouses
Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of the
Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the
Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that
they had reached an agreement with complainant,
and they requested respondent to prepare the deed
of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the
Spouses Kraus went to respondent's office where
complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she
received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00)
from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that
complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the
understanding was that the complainant would, in
the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage,
and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of
title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses
Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance
of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told
respondent that she would inform respondent when
the transaction was completed so that the Deed of
Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no
knowledge of what transpired between complainant
and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she
was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of
title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244).
Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated
the sale of her property in favor of Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd. According to respondent,
complainant's inaction for eight years to verify what
happened to her property only meant that she had
actually sold the same, and that she concocted her
story when she saw the prospect of her property had
she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a
Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and
affirming the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18,
1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On
November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial
hearing, and hearings were conducted from March
21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the
reception of respondent's evidence were set, but
supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's
prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint,
and directed respondent to present her evidence on
October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was
subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 11, 1986, which
caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the
name of complainant and the issuance of a new title
to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the
Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1,
2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003,
respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from
Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the Register
of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated
that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C.
Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not be
located from the general file of the registry and that
the same may be considered lost. Hearings
continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005,
respondent was directed by the Investigating
Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to
submit her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP
on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed
against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36,
which estafa case was anchored on the same facts
as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a
Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case
No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case for
estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty.
Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for
insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence
of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that
would show that Anita Peña's signature therein was
forged and the transfer of the land was made
through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating
Commissioner was whether or not there was clear
and preponderant evidence showing that respondent
violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility
by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b)
conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto
Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject
property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a
falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his
Report and Recommendation finding that
respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by
complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while
she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of
title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious
deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there
was no evidence showing that respondent actively
conspired with any party or actively participated in
the forgery of the signature of complainant.
Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated that
complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that
her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated
November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be
produced notwithstanding diligent search in the
National Archives and the Notarial Section of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner
Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the
complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved
that the original copy of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title was delivered to
respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give
credence to respondent's denial that complainant
handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-
61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura
Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as
Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she
saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the
testimony of complainant that she gave respondent
her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to
enable respondent to use the same as collateral in
constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in
the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant,
respondent refused to return it.14 Yet, respondent
assured complainant that she was still the
owner.15 Later, complainant discovered that a new
building was erected on her property in January
1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was
unfathomable that after eight years, complainant
never took any step to verify the status of her loan
application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that
she sold the said property. Complainant explained
that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank
required the submission of her title in order to
process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent
enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land
to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was
evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244
with respect to the sale of the property described
therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for
₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant
signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her
office.19 However, respondent would neither directly
confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the
instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-
examination, she stated that she was not denying
that she was the one who notarized the Deed of
Sale.21 Estrella Kraus' affidavit22 supported
respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio
T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by
complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale,
and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed.
However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the
credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his
participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he
saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken
chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony
that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale
before her is proof of respondent's deception.
Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of
sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to
prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared
that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the
alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and
signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said
person did not participate in the execution thereof.
Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having
failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to
the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross
violations of the law made respondent liable for
violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and
her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately, and recommended that the notarial
commission of respondent, if still existing, be
revoked, and that respondent be perpetually
disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the
IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a
lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C.
Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and her name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial
commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual
Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary
Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of
Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction
imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent
was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, is different from this
administrative case, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and
2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in
civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a
criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a
separate and independent action for administrative
liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial
evidence. An administrative case can proceed
independently, even if there was a full-blown trial
wherein, based on both prosecution and defense
evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the
prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts
and the public from the misconduct of the officers of
the court and to ensure the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan
gave credence to complainant's testimony that she
gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate
of title to her property as respondent would apply for
a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the
subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura
Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's
office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent,
who stated that she saw complainant give her title to
respondent.35 Respondent admitted in her
Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the
request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of
Sale was notarized by respondent as evidenced by
Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-
61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented
in evidence, through no fault of the complainant,
nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of
complainant to prove her allegation that her
signature therein was forged and that respondent
defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of the
property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without
complainant's approval. However, complainant
proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region
her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,
when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial
Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,
states that every notary public shall keep a notarial
register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, among others, and, when the instrument
is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as
part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in
said records a brief description of the substance
thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's
commission is failure of the notary to send the copy
of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First
Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month
next following or the failure of the notary to forward
his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk
of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila
issued a Certification,41 dated February 22, 1994,
stating that respondent was duly appointed as a
Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year
1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to
the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the
month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale
was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy
of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of
Sale could not also be found in the National Archives
per the certification42 of the Archives Division Chief
Teresita R. Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis.
The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary
public to submit her notarial register for the month of
November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale
that was notarized by her on the same month is
cause for revocation of her commission under
Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for
any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was
in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate
of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in
Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly
prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant
denied having executed or signed, the important
evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's
signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the
sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of
the Deed of Sale could not be produced by the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be
located in the general files of the registry, and a
certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale
may be considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did
not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila
her Notarial Report for the month of November
1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was
executed on November 11, 1986. Hence,
Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it
appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the
copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent
complainant from getting hold of the document for
the purpose of handwriting verification from an
expert to prove that her alleged signature on the
Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent
to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her
Notarial Register/Report for the month of November
1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was
notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching
implications and grave consequences, as it in effect
suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said
Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of
respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed
by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in
the transcript of records that respondent would
neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized
the said Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct,
respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As
a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to
the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the notarial
commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still
existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out
the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA
UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R.
DE VERA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a
Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his
handling of the election protest case involving the
candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing),
daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK)
Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed
as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the
position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the
year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag
by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants
lodged an election protest and enlisted the services
of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007,
complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his
acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court
appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the
amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough
time to prepare and file the case but the former
moved at a glacial pace and only took action when
the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty.
De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the
election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are
the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony
Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera),
which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At
the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to
be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were
unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De
Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-
Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for
the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing
over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by
Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen,
respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the
documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification
and immediately disowned the signature affixed in
the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin
to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s
affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge
Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty.
De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out
that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this
error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of
Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed
that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De
Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed
the election protest with full knowledge that the
affidavits at hand were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the
complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified,
for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did
not offer any explanation as to why he was not able
to attend.
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and
asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained
that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo.
According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo
Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only
appear for the case if the complainants would give
him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to
Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and
confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations,
the complainants asked the former to withdraw as
their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00
in excessive fees he collected from them,
considering that he only appeared twice for the case.
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty.
De Vera’s disbarment.
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently
denied all the accusations lodged against him by
complainants. He averred that he merely prepared
the essential documents for election protest based
on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then
explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified
Affidavit was done without his knowledge and
likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who
should be indicted and charged with the
corresponding criminal offense. He added that he
actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of
Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he
could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty
and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing
incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the
case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his
Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
complainants executed a document entitled
“Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all causes of
action that complainants may have against him,
including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory
conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the
matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December
5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and
thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.
While no sufficient evidence was found to support
the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the
falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP
Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the
falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty.
De Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the
testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister –
attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked
if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid
recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its
signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De
Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and hard to
ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop in
which the allegations were made, i.e., that the
signing of the affidavits was done on November 7,
2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of
the election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was
really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the
odious act of advising his client’s campaigners
Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives
of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest
desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of
the profession.
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the
Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the
findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for
knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a
two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty.
De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11,
2014, affirming with modification their December 14,
2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of
suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De
Vera should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the
IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase
the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his
client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected
to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every
member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every
lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I
will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to
obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the
courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain
the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of
emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.”
After an assiduous examination of the records, the
Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by
the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De
Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified
affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his
desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for
filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the
Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-
Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing
appears on record to seriously belie the same, and
in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its
officers are in the best position to assess the
witness’s credibility during disciplinary proceedings,
as they – similar to trial courts – are given the
opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor and
comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera
authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is
rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De
Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion
for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific
denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one
who notarized the subject affidavits but another
notary public, who he does not even know or has
seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no
knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using
the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the
Court views the same to be a mere general denial
which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s
positive testimony that he indeed participated in the
procurement of her signature and the signing of the
affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of
Governors rendered its recommendation – is that
Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the
election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for
this Court, merit significant consideration as its
submission appears to be a mere afterthought,
prompted only by the discovery of the falsification.
Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De
Vera to have remained in the dark about the
authenticity of the documents he himself submitted
to the court when his professional duty requires him
to represent his client with zeal and within the
bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate
preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify
that the document captioned “Release Waiver &
Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-
Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all
causes of action that complainants may have
against him, such as the present case, would not
deny the Court its power to sanction him
administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official administration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a
falsified document before a court.
with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of further administrative penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte

v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer
therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for
filing a spurious document in court. In view of the
antecedents in this case, the Court finds it
appropriate to impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for

reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s
acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically
related to his professional engagement,41 for he had
actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer
before the IBP.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering

exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are

designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain
faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can
lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members
of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up
one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness
to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and
highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the
Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera
(respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice
of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or
similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to

complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing
the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly
received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement within ninety (90) days
from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10537               February 3, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-
MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our
courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their
clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or
defend the interests of their clients without need for
reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney
grants them the ability to warrant to their client that
they will manage the case as if it were their own.
The relationship between an attorney and client is a
sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the
flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only
because he or she was asked by an acquaintance.
The professional relationship remains the same
regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly
paying or pro bono.
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo)
inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the
case of her client not on the merits but due to her
negligence. She made it appear that the case was
dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to
file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not
discharge her duties of candor to her client.
This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by
Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier
Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated
capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found
that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon
17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 4 Consequently,
the Board of Governors recommended that Atty.
Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.5
In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo
Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty.
Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case
for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v.
Ramirez."7 The case was initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch
68.8
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him
on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a
friend of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty.
Margallo had offered her legal services on the
condition that she be given 30% of the land subject
of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees.10 It was
also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty.
Margallo ₱1,000.00 per court appearance.11
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court
promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12 Atty.
Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She
committed to file the Appeal before the Court of
Appeals.13
The Appeal was perfected and the records were
sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.14 On
December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed
Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified
Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one
prepared.15
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty.
Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty.
Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to
sign the documents necessary for the brief.16
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the
status of the brief, but he was told that there was still
no word from the Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed
Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied.18 She told
him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to
Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his
alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim.19 She also informed him that they could no
longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the
Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the
reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already
lapsed.20
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he
discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on
April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and
Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary
period.21
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Codeof Professional Responsibility. 22 By way of
defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed
to take on the case for free, save for travel expense
of ₱1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she
had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that
they only had a 50% chance of winning the
case.23 She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30%
of the value of the land subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have
taken on the Appeal except that the mother of
Ramirez had begged her to do so.24 She claimed
that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for
document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored
her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he
merely told her that he had been busy.25 Her failure
to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable
Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing
her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter
played with her phone and accidentally erased all
her contacts.26
Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines
The dispute was set for mandatory conference on
June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty.
Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory
conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties
then appeared and were directed to submit their
position papers.29 Commissioner Cecilio A.C.
Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be
reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern
warning that her next infraction of a similar nature
shall be dealt with more severely.30 This was based
on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed
the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief
to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted
to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means
possible to protect the interest of her
client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in
her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of
Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the
Court of Appeals.32
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of
Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of
reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. Ramirez seasonably filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the
Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of
Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for
Reconsideration and increased the recommended
penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2)
years.35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition
for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court.36 She alleged that the recommended
penalty of suspension was too severe considering
that she had been very careful and vigilant in
defending the cause of her client. She also averred
that this was the first time a Complaint was filed
against her.37 Ramirez thereafter filed an undated
Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration
previously filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition
for Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14,
2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty.
Margallo filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This court’s ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is
"imbued with utmost trust and
confidence."41 Lawyers are expected to exercise the
necessary diligence and competence in managing
cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to
review cases or give legal advice, but also to
represent their clients to the best of their ability
without need to be reminded by either the client or
the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree
of legal proficiency and attention remains the same
whether the represented party is a high-paying client
or an indigent litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a
lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his
absence in a scheduled preliminary conference,
which resulted in the case being submitted for
resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s
failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of
the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant
from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found
that these actions amounted to gross negligence
tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client
is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would
be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and
to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care
or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him
or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his
duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact
formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due
his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss
in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination
between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence
of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his
entire case and left him with no appellate remedies.
His legal cause was orphaned not because a court
of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a
person privileged to act as counsel failed to
discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her
assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer
interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse.
There was no proof that she exerted efforts to
communicate with her client. This is an admission
that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the
basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo
failed to exhaust all possible means to protect
complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to
what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal
profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to
manage the interests of another, use their authority
or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their
duties. In many agencies, there is information
assymetry between the principal and the entrusted
agent. That is, there are facts and events that the
agent must attend to that may not be known by the
principal.
This information assymetry is even more
pronounced in an attorney client relationship.
Lawyers are expected not only to be familiar with the
minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their
defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually
patent to the client. It can only be seen through
familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are
invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations.
More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It
is the lawyer that receives the notices and must
decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of
his or her client.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her
client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the
lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of
better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. its desire to increase the level of professionalism of
While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer our lawyers.
to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of
reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the
the client discovers the level of diligence, penalties imposed in order to address a current need
competence, and accountability of the counsel that in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated
he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical
the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer standard for its members' conduct is laudable. The
and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled
bear the full costs of indifference or negligence. with her lack of candor is reprehensible.
Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year
suspension is too severe considering that it is her WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board
De Saldivar, we observed: of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-
show that lawyers who have been held liable for Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
gross negligence for infractions similar to those of of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a
the respondent were suspended for a period of six repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
(6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed with more severely. This decision is immediately
to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due executory.
notice which resulted in the submission of the case
for decision was found guilty of gross negligence
and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of
Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who
did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the SO ORDERED.
pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six
(6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court
finds it proper to impose the same penalty against
respondent and accordingly suspends him for a
period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients

without procedural remedies. On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her
client having no further recourse in court to protect
his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the
utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied
on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be
tolerated. It is time that we communicate that
lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to
them. There should be no more room for an inertia
of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the

constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.46 Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent
with the constitutional powers of this court. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that
the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10583               February 18, 2015
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 10584
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER
CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
These cases involve administrative
Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15,
Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C.
Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-
Complaint4 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty.
Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and
subjected to disciplinary action.5
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his
aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty.
Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina
Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. 6
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to
-support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed
by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina
Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir
entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said
deceased who did not leave any descendant or any
other heir entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the
original underscoring supplied)
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla,
daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a
Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining
order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case
No. 09-269.12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that
Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests.15
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified
during cross-examination:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that
you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she
was about four years old.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,]
considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff,
isn’t it?
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla,
I was just recently married to one of her cousins.
....
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C.
Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge
of her relationship[s].
THE COURT
: What’s the name of the mother?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina
Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
A : Of course.
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr.
Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court
that you drafted this document which you requested
to be marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the
Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina
De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you
as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the
plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted
[sic] this Extra Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to
the question regarding my legal ethics because it is
not the issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two,
three, four and appearing to have been duly
notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with
document number 28, page number 7, book
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public
Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof
and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I
read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving
spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed
to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who
did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any
other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is
this particular provision that you have drafted into
this document . . . true or false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any
question regarding the matter that would impugn the
legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent
and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife
Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the
legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the
subject of my continuing objection from the very
beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document
as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the
floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . .
. properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your
Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have
referred to in marking the said documents, your
Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a
manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to
my objection on the materiality and impertinency and
relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing
objection before[,] and to be consistent with the
ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the
question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you
admit before this court that you have drafted a
document that caused the transfer of the estate of
the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you
said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five
years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . .
asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang
bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole
[sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos
by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal).
This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to
Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests.21 He also alleged that in representing
Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go
against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was
allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing
information or matters of fact occurring before the
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . .
[would] be unscrupulously utilizing information
acquired during his professional relation with his said
client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . .
or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos
violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against
the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states
that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla,
but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’
wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part
of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla
had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the
drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he
is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited.
Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos
was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for
the payment of the taxes due. There is some
peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and
wife team where the lawyer makes the document
while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges
for the payment of the taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been
mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de
Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or
any other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . .
[.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound
by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that
Rufina Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds
belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from
Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be
distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos
received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal
alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article
262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified
the death certificate.37 He explained that the death
certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were
given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not
aware that there was a falsified entry in the death
certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty.
Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla
was already dead.39 Further, "he [was] representing
Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in
her father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no
other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the
sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty.
Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had
different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained
that the funds used were being held by his client as
the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano
Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of
attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be
considered as "expenses of administration."44 Also,
payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was a matter
which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed
provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the
Civil Code is applicable because it was in force
when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty.
Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation
that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was
falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty.
Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted
funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision,
the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos
"knowingly cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The
various cases filed involved different parties and
prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed
with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The
Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission
on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically
proscribes members of the bar from representing
conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the
conflict of interests is remote or merely probable
does not make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent
represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of
pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the
witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly
states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu
Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter.
To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s
daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on
the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,]
which indicates that she is not only the daughter of
Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced
by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina
Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that
Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
inheritance and was deprived of the same because
of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for
Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing
to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a
position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only
heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the
findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in the Resolution57 dated March
22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court
through a letter of transmittal dated July 15,
2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the
Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred,
it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent
Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of
suspension of three (3) months from the practice of
law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of
the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However,
this court modifies the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from three (3)
months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the
fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from
their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to
encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the
facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this
court explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of
interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute
Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole
heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla.
Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only
heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on
Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness
stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil
Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with
the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called
the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him
what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala
kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked
me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication
wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for
himself." This very admission proves that the
respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a
legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception,
specifically, "by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the
facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano
Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of
interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while
respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was
unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still,
respondent did not present evidence showing that
he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously
represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in
executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the
allegation of conflict of interest against respondent
was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of
Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon
10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any
artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline
explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue
of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client
Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication
despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu
Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla,
the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a
member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in
failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not
only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath
but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis
in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to
uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their
dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from
being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla
had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and
March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is
wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is
vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this
court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys"70 and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the
Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the court and members of the Bar. The
Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems
from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as
well authority to regulate the practice itself of law.
Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental
to the proper administration of justice and essential
to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers
[sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations
omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court
emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice
of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the
constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent
with the constitutional powers of this court.
and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year
is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature,

recommendatory.74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings
for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . .
. upon the verified complaint of any person."
However, this authority is only to assist this court
with the investigation of the case, to determine
factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the
penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty.

Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the

practice of law is imbued with public interest and that
"a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State—the
administration of justice—as an officer of the court."
Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."76 (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of

the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is granted
by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by
this court.77 The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its
findings and recommendations should not be
equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by
this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule
15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10567               February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA.
J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY
UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY.
CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T.
PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and
ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a
complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed by
complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging
respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty.
Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip
Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-
Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris
G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr.
(Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica),
and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa;
collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the
rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that
he availed the services of the law firm Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan
Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which Attys.
Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz,
Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for
two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was
impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of
the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008
upon the agreement of both parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for
qualified theft was filed against complainant and his
wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE
Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta
(Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by
the law firm, the same law office which handled
complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant
filed this disbarment case against respondents,
alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they
indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica
Law Office, but explained that their association is not
a formal partnership, but one that is subject to
certain "arrangements." According to them, each
lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for
the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses
for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing,
mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer
separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the
lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other
lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a
case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim
that this has been the practice of the law firm since
its inception. They averred that complainant’s labor
cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty.
Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover,
respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa,
a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for
the firm after the termination thereof.8 Meanwhile,
Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled
complainant’s labor cases but averred that it was
terminated on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant
did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He
likewise explained that he did not see the need to
discuss complainant’s labor cases with the other
lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and
that the latter did not confide any secret during the
time the labor cases were pending that would have
been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He
also claimed that the other lawyers were not aware
of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did
they know that he was the handling counsel for
complainant even after the said cases were closed
and terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and
Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated
September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of
interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty.
Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.14 The
IBP found that complainant was indeed represented
in the labor cases by the respondents acting
together as a law firm and not solely by Atty.
Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of
interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty.
Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms,
created a connection that would injure complainant
in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination
of attorney-client relation provides no justification for
a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with
modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of
Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated March
23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12,
2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the
IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation,
with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents
for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2)
dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of
his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the
practice of law for one year, being the handling
counsel of complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the
CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR
provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the
concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases
in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
the performance thereof.20 Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey
P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T.
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon
new clients whose interests oppose those of a M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing
former client in any manner, whether or not they are conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon
parties in the same action or on totally unrelated 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for
public policy and good taste.21 In this case, the Court said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a
concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents repetition of the same or similar infraction would be
represented conflicting interests and must therefore dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case
be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ against Atty. Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in view of
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented his death.
complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further,
against complainant, its former client, and his wife. let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
to organize and implement a system by which it them to all courts in the country for their information
would have been able to keep track of all cases and guidance.
assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of,
among others, ensuring that every engagement it SO ORDERED.
accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of
interest. As an organization of individual lawyers
which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal
work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it
behooves the law firm to value coordination in
deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of
coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in
this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets
vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure,
eroding in the balance the lawyer-client
relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized,
all of its members, Atty. Dionela included, would
have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict,
thereby impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’
subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming,
herein respondents, as the charged members of the
law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned.
Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to
why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty
of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents
stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient
organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all
of them are meted with the same penalty of
reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction would be dealt with
more severely.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents'

pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the
labor cases against complainant had long been
terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The client's confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration
of professional employment.22

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No.
12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015
ARIEL "AGA"
MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY,
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012
filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach (complainant) charging
Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo
(EJ Arroyo), Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Jose
City, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law
and abuse of discretion.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar
Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando
Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jose-
Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the
exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach
(Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct
No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur.
The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.
On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San
Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily
recused himself from hearing the case on the ground
that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late
mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the
son-in-law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito
V. Patrocinio.1
Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the
raffle of the case among judges of the first level
courts within her administrative jurisdiction to
determine who among them will be assigned to try
and decide the case.
The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C.
Begino (Judge Begino).
In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino
set the case for hearing on 16 October 2012.
On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a
motion to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. 80.
In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the
Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order of
Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the
respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic)
himself from further trying and ruling of this case to
avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this court. 3
In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel
for Spouses Muhlach filed with MCTC, San Jose-
Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to
inhibit the Judge Begino; and 2) to re-raffle and
assign the case to another judge.
In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued
the assailed order which rendered ineffective the
order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed
Judge Begino to continue to hear and decide the
case. EJ Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses
Muhlach's oral motion failed to state'the grounds to
justify the inhibition of the judge. It likewise did not
explain why doubts as to the impartiality of the court
could exist.4
Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the
case and on 19 October 2012, resolved, among
others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent Motion to Inhibit
filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach. He ruled,
thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit being shown
by [Spouses Muhlach] for the Undersigned Judge
(Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and
deciding this case.
The movants miserably failed to show what judicial
actuations made by the Judge which may be
perceived that he has already predetermined the
facts and issues involved in this case. If, the judicial
actuations they are referring to is in connection with
the Order of the Judge denying their Motion to
Dismiss, the same is not sufficient for a Judge to
inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case
considering that the denial was based on law.
xxxx
All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief that the
Judge and his sibling Agnes are political allies of Mr.
Fuentebella is unfounded, untrue and baseless.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to Inhibit
the Honorable Presiding Judge Ricky C. Begino and
to Re-Raffle and Assign Case to Another Presiding
Judge is hereby ordered DENIED. The undersigned
Judge will continue to hear and decide this case with
the assurance to all parties concerned that he will
take his role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence without fear or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23 October
2012 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Orders dated 17 and 19 October 2012).
In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino
granted the petition for exclusion filed by Francisco
Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and
Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO MUHLACH and
CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the list
of voters of Precinct No. 10A Barangay, San Juan,
San Jose, Camarines Sur is hereby GRANTED. The
Election Registration Board is hereby ordered
to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS OF
PRECINCT NO. 10A BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN
JOSE, CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE THEIR
REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK OF VOTERS and
to ENTER THE ORDER OF EXCLUSION therein;
and thereafter, to PLACE THE RECORDS IN THE
INACTIVE FILE, for lack of residency requirement.7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo. He
accused EJ Arroyo of having issued the Order dated
16 October 2012 with abuse of authority and with
gross ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant
contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to
reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as
such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.
In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that
immediately upon receipt of Judge Begino's order of
inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was
improper or defective. She stressed that the
procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a
judge must be substantially followed, citing the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August
1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC.9 She averred that she
was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1
dated 28 January 1998 when she issued the
questioned order. Under the cited circular, the duty
of the executive judge is to appoint another trial
judge under his/her supervision to handle the
inhibited case or to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court. Considering that the inhibition order
issued by Judge Begino was "patently defective,"
she saw no point in referring the same to the Court,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, for
evaluation "because in the first place, there was
nothing for the latter to evaluate."
EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a
petition for exclusion of the names of Spouses
Muhlach from the list of voters which should be
decided within ten days from its filing as provided for
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189.10 In view of the
status of the Spouses Muhlach, EJ Arroyo claimed
that no judge would want to handle the case. Thus,
when she received a copy of Judge Begino's order
of inhibition, she felt that it was her duty as executive
judge to ensure that the case is decided, as much as
possible, within the period prescribed under the law.
She reasoned that if she were to approve Judge
Begino's inhibition order which, on its face, was
defective, nothing would stop other judges from
recusing themselves from the case on flimsy
grounds. She felt that it would result in an endless
cycle leaving the case unresolved.
EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for
the sole purpose of delaying the resolution of Spec.
Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino
decided the case in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the
voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision
to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided over
by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who
eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision
of Judge Begino. Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a
Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13
November 2012, after the instant complaint was filed
on 7 November 2012. EJ Arroyo submits that should
Judge Paulite grant the motion for inhibition, a
dilemma would arise because the case would be
assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding
judge, there being only two branches in RTC San
Jose. She claimed that such scenario would lead her
to inhibit from the case because of the administrative
complaint filed against her. Consequently, the case
will be referred to the nearest RTC and raffled
among the judges in that jurisdiction. She opined
that other delaying tactics may be employed, and
soon, it would already be elections day without the
case having decided.11
Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11
years and this is the first time that an administrative
case has been filed against her.
We find the charges of ignorance of the law and
abuse of discretion bereft of merit.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is
set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds
upon which a judge may be disqualified from
participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that
the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution,
specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which
requires that a hearing is conducted before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal because
unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All
the other elements of due process, like notice and
hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate
decision would come from a partial and biased
judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain
and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants.
We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge
Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge Begino
simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to
avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of the court.
Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge, such should still comply with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid
reasons. In the subject order, the reason for the
inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it
be determined from the motion of the Spouses
Muhlach's counsel since the motion was done orally,
in violation of Section 213 of the same rule.
When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order
of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way,
returning the case back to the presiding judge for the
latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance
of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. As EJ
Arroyo explained, she was aware that she had no
authority to revoke or disapprove the order of
inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme
Court. It was for that reason that she used the word
"ineffective." Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse
the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She
correctly asked that the Order be completed to
comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.
When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings,
it was a manifestation and admission on his part that
he can hear and decide the case with the cold
neutrality expected from an impartial magistrate. His.
subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion
filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed
EJ Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on
the basis of the oral motion was defective. The
assailed order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper
exercise of her administrative functions.
Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the
law, the judge must be shown to have committed an
error that was gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.14 Here, it was clearly established that the
only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the
case is decided expeditiously and within the period
provided under the law. There was no showing that
she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to
violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith
may be attributed to the complainant for filing
successive motions for inhibition.
While it was pronounced in relation to the
performance by judges of their judicial functions, we
find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it
can likewise be said that as a matter of public policy,
a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
premises, the instant administrative complaint filed
by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma.
Angela Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court,
San Jose City, Camarines Sur for ignorance of the
law and abuse of discretion is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405               January 12, 2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D.
DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D.
TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E.
LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L.
NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T.
TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B.
ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.,
Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose
Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and
serious violations of the Canons of the Code of
Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio,
Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo,
Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S.
Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos,
Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo, Igmedio L.
Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and
Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were
allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market
stalls in the public market ofOccidental Mindoro. The
Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor
Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted to demolish
the public market, so that the Municipality can use
the space to erect the new "San Jose Commercial
Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants
filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor
Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil
Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent’s
sala.
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour
validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the
determination of the propriety of extending the TRO
or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were
scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa
waived his right to present his evidence and
submitted the case for resolution.3
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none
of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed
inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012
hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500 members
accompanying complainants on that day were
allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the
Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the
courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was
scheduled to giveher testimony that day.6
Complainants claimed that the questions
propounded by respondent to their witnesses "were
all geared towards establishing" that they should
have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as "this
will be good for all and the progress and
development of the municipality."7
After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court
Order stating that "the Court is not inclined to extend
for seventeen (17) days the said TRO."8
At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor
Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call.
He exited through the door used by the judge and
the employees of the court.9 According to
complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone,
not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom.
Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when
respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had
to excuse himself for an important appointment.10
Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the
TRO.11
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on
2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued, berated,
accused, scolded, confused and admonished
petitioners without basis or justification."12 They
further claimed that respondent judge asked
complainants "confusing and misleading questions
all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging
to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the
cause of their adversary."13
Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge
to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, that respondent is beholden to Mayor
Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends,
and allies of the latter.14 They also alleged that all
cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor
Villarosa or his relatives, political allies, supporters,
and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor
or his relatives and supporters.15 Thus, complainants
filed the instant complaint charging respondent with
serious violations of the canons of the Codes of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and
cited several cases in which he issued an
order/ruling against Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s
supposed supporters.16
In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this
Court referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle
among the Justices thereat, for investigation, report
and recommendation." The case was raffled to CA
Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This
Court received his Report and Recommendation
(Report)18 on 9 June 2014.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of
Justice Corales.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that
respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough.19 Clear and convincing evidence is
necessary to prove a charge of bias and
partiality.20 The circumstances detailed by petitioners
failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence" in the discharge of his judicial functions,
as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he
issued the Order lifting the TRO.
This Court cannot accept the contention that
respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from
the mere fact that he did not allow the "more than
500 members" who accompanied petitioners during
the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in
the report, due to the standard sizes of our
courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge
group could have been accommodated inside.21 With
respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while
Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is
sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.22
We now go to the claim of petitioners that
respondent berated, scolded, confused and
admonished their witnesses without basis or
justification. According to the investigating justice,
respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes for
the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible
reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July
2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that
apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo
and making "abrasive and unnecessary statements
to her,"24 respondent also made the
following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy
statements"25 in open court:
1. Respondent declared that he no longer
wanted to go to the market, because he
might be mistreated by petitioners.26
2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke
na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman
nila alam ang kanilang ginagawa."27
3. He told Toledo while the latter was
testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma
na gawa naman ng abogado niyo."28
4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about
that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa
inyo,’ is that not a violation to your lease
contract that you are allowing somebody to
occupy your portion so that they can also
engage in business? Is this not an additional
earning on your part and you are violating
your lease contract? Is that not depriving the
coffer of the Municipal Government?"29 The
investigating justice found that the foregoing
statements "definitely imperiled the respect
and deference"30 rightly due to respondent’s
position.
We agree.
As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice
and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to
petitioners’ witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct
himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary,32 which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil
to all persons who come to his court,33 viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,
litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience,
prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must choose
his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.34
This Court likewise finds that respondent violated
Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be
so inview of a reasonable observer.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.1âwphi1 The above provisions clearly
enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance
of impropriety.35 This is because appearance is as
important as reality in the performance of judicial
functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not
only be pure and faithful, but must also be above
suspicion.36
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa
for not asking for the court’s permission to leave
while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to
serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by
declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the
Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an
important appointment to attend. Respondent does
not deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s
lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty
of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom
without asking for the court’s permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the
people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion
in their conduct, and should be free from any
appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their
official duties, as well as in their personal behavior
and everyday life.39
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished
public confidence and public trust in him as a
judge.1âwphi1 He gave petitioners reason to doubt
his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be
blamed for thinking that respondent must have
directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa.
Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain
that the Mayor could no longer return to attend the
hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own
lawyers knew that. Thus, respondent is also guilty of
violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal p
rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto,
Jr.,40 this Court has already found Respondent
Judge Jacinto liable for his failure to supervise his
personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed over
the phone. Judge Jacinto was found guilty of
violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing
to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official receipts
for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing
case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of
₱11,000 and was warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11(C),
paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a
light charge, punishable by any of the following
sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than ₱1,000, but not
exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; (4) admonition with warning.42
Considering that this is respondent judge's second
infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties
of a fine in the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition
with warning, as recommended by the investigating
justice, are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge
Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct
and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426               June 16, 2015
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this
case by disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:
1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of
undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted
for decision and in failing to resolve 101
motions within the 90-day reglementary
period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00), with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely.
2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the
service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE
the amount of ₱1,817,378.59 representing
the amount of shortages in her collections.
Her withheld salaries are to be applied to
her accountabilities. The Office of
Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED
to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits
and forward the same to the Finance
Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA
which shall compute the money value of the
same, the amount to be deducted from the
shortages to be restituted.
3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the
service. He is also ORDERED to restitute
his accountabilities in the amount of
₱58,100.00
4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of
duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which should be
deducted from her retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is
DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges
against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En.
Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.
SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the
facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting
presiding judge in both courts.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was
also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and
Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.
In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En.
Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team
found an unremitted amount of ₱18,702.oo
representing the court's collection from August 3,
2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was
deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by
the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines
account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable
forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property
Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for. Also,
the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) collection of ₱348,993.60 from January 1990
to August 2003. However, only ₱186,330.98 was
remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of
₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund
(CCGF) collections from January 1996 to August
2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of
₱30,411. 70; and as of August 31, 2003 the
Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of
₱1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from
1995 to August 2003.
In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred
by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled
₱2,057,378.59.
Salimpade, when asked about the shortages,
explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been
getting money from the JDF collections. She had
given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of
him. She also admitted that she lent her co-
employees money which she took from her
collections.
Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut
turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter
issued a certification stating that the former had
completely settled his monetary accountability to the
MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the
Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office
(CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip
evidencing the turnover of the ₱240,000.00.
The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to
regularly submit her monthly report of collections, as
required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93.
Consequently, Salimpade's salaries were withheld
effective August 2003 to the present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the
court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde,
Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash
on hand amounting to ₱59,545.oo. However, the
Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were
not accounted for. The said cash amount was
deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF
Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to
July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of
₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003,
Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank
accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage.
Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge
Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started
borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk
of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to
MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge
Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was
designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano
and continued the practice of borrowing money from
the collections of the court.
In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found
that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded
Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without
proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also
found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF
collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003,
remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said
amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant,
Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs.
Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of
Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court
instead of maintaining an account with Landbank.
Said account was closed on September 11, 2003
and an account was opened at Landbank, Bambang,
on the same date. A comparison of the court's
CCGF collections and remittances for the period of
November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of
₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his
incumbency a cash shortage of ₱430.00 while Mrs.
Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July 31,
2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs.
Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She
deposited the amount of ₱400.00 on August 23,
2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals
from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates,
totalling ₱243,900.00 for the refund and return of
cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by
any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not
acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded. The
Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996
to August 31, 2003 amounted to ₱2,064,978.00. As
of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of
₱846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde
and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages
incurred were of their own doing and they instead
pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.
Ramos related to the audit team the constant
requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him
money from the Fiduciary Fund
collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she
requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the
back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash
recipient. However, not all of the transactions were
evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos
further stated that Judge Balut also collected the
money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter
of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also
appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as
cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the
Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as
evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures
of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of the
former, as cash recipients, amounted to
₱193,500.00.
Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary
Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo were also given
to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class
of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for
Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge"
written by Ramos.
On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification
stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund
collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002
amounted to .₱207,774.42. However, before the
final report on the court's shortages was completed,
various amounts totalling ₱802,299.82 were
deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in
the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as
restitution/payment of part of the shortage of ₱846,
710.00.
As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the
balance of her accountability. On the other hand,
Esconde still had a balance of accountability in
MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of ₱58,100.oo which, as of the
time this case was submitted by the OCA for the
Court's consideration, has remained unsettled.
(Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent
Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine
for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions
without properly requesting for an extension. The
Court, however, did not rule on the administrative
liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of
the financial audit for the reason that he was not
given a chance to present his side on the matter.
Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), in its Memorandum,2 sought reconsideration
of the Court's decision stating that although Judge
Balut was not formally required to comment on the
findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in
the court collections, he was not denied due process
of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut was
able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated
December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-
opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge
Balut be required to comment on the findings of the
financial audit.
In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the
Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit
report and, upon the recommendation5 of the OCA,
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.6
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of
the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the
OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the
participation of Judge Balut in the financial
transactions of the courts. On his admission that he
borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA
opined that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in
its October 9, 2007 Resolution.
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the
recommendation of the CA.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.7 The standard of
substantial evidence is justified when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even
if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant.8
A review of the records shows that Judge Balut
actually messed with the court collections. The three
clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano
and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that
Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds
and executed certifications to that effect. They
separately reported that Judge Balut had been
borrowing money from the various funds of the court
collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk
of Court of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several
withdrawal slips9 where the back portions were
signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter,
Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash
withdrawn from the funds of the court. These
withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of
Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by
Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her
reminder that the money withdrawn were given to
Judge Balut.
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the
Certification10 stating that his cash accountability as
of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was
₱207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by
the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.
The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized for his admission that he had borrowed
money from the judiciary fund because the Court
already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is
erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court
categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for
undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within
the 90-day reglementary period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must
adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position,
a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest
degree of honesty and integrity and to observe
exacting standards of morality, decency and
competence.12 He should adhere to the highest
standards of public accountability lest his action
erode the public faith in the Judiciary. 13
Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing
money from the collections of the court. He
knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court
violate the circulars on the proper administration of
court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role
model of his staff and other court personnel in the
observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.
The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes
dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from the service even on the first
offense.15 For said reason, the respondent deserves
a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has
never tolerated and will never condone any conduct
which violates the norms of public accountability,
and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of
the people in the justice system.16
The Court has considered the recommendation of
imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however,
would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En.
Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong
and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who
were both dismissed from the service for the same
offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but
only because she had already retired from the
service. And it would send a wrong message to the
public that the Court has different standards - one for
the magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities
will not shield him from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the
Court collections deserves administrative sanction
and not even the full payment of his accountabilities
will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that
these personal borrowings were paid as what counts
is the fact that these funds were used outside of
official business."17
Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would
not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not
a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of
acts committed in a span of several years. In other
words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his
misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but
several times in three (3) different stations. In the
case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial
Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Koronadal City,18 it was written:
For misappropriating court funds in concert with
Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave
misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed"
money from court funds, the latter recounted that on
four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed ₱130,ooo
to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed
intermittently through the years, for reasons ranging
from the schooling needs of his children to the
illness of his parents. That he intended to repay the
amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds
should never be used outside of official business.
Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states:
"A judge or any immediate member of the family
shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from
anyone except as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that
"the judge is the visible representation of the law,
and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that
the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example
for others to follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge
Sardido has not only miserably failed to present
himself as an example to his staff and to others, but
has also shown no compunction in violating the law,
as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty,
gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law
tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have
warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it
not for the fact that he had already been dismissed
from the service in another administrative case.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut
GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby
imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except the money value of
accrued earned leave credits.
Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and
desist immediately from rendering any order or
decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any
case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of
this resolution.
This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it
that a copy of this resolution be immediately served
on the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-
3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE
MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and
Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City,
submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14,
2013 Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill
M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado
P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge,
Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
TheFacts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5,
2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct.  Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in
Political Law Review during the first semester of
school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern
University, Cebu City.  She averred that sometime in
August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella
Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of
Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City.  Judge Paredes also
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was
abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge
Tormis in his discussions not only once but several
times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said
to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis,
stating that he was a “court-noted addict.”4  She was
absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L.
Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of
her brother.  To avoid humiliation in school, Jill
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad
O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her
mother was suspended from the service for six (6)
months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash
bail bond for the temporary release of an accused
for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala.  Judge Paredes was the
one who reviewed the findings conducted therein
and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to
severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed
an offense worse than that committed by her
mother.  She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge
Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary
release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled,
“People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,”
docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6  then
pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City
(Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be
administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge
Paredes denied the accusations of  Jill.  He stated
that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases,
some of which he had investigated; that as a result
of the investigations, he recommended sanctions
against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill,
her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed
in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never
Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams
nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation
conducted by the Court; that he never personally
attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that
the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a
negative experience for all the judges and should be
discussed so that other judges, court employees and
aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds;
that the marriage scams were also discussed during
meetings of RTC judges and in schools where
remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he
talked about past and resolved cases, but not the
negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was
nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases
involving Judge Tormis because these cases were
known to the legal community and some were even
published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when
he was the executive judge tasked to investigate
Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she
resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still
his student, she did not complain about or dispute
his discussions in class regarding the administrative
liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern
University or of the local authorities; that he admitted
saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis
who was a drug addict and that drug dependents
had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested
that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was
appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis.  She is not an influential
person and it is the Supreme Court who determines
the persons to be appointed as court employees.  In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office
Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent
son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of,
Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted
a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary
release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011.  He
claimed though that the approval of the bail bond
was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of
A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive
judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days.  Judge Paredes explained that he merely
followed the procedure.  As Executive Judge, he
issued a temporary receipt and on the following
business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch
Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court.  The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt
of the cash bond and issued an official receipt.  It
was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in
the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions
relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis
could not be the subject of an administrative
complaint because it was not done in the
performance of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill
countered that her mother had nothing to do with the
filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to
leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law
studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear
the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her
classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’
frequent discussions in class of her mother’s
administrative cases; that her mother was indeed
one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams,
but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his
classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved
by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still
premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that
administrative cases were confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family
was evident when Judge Paredes branded her
brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.”
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge
Paredes asserted that it was not premature to
discuss the marriage scams in class because the
scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia
and was also written in many legal publications, and
that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the
Palace of Justice of Cebu City.
of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties presented
factual issues that could not be resolved based on
the evidence on record then.  Considering the
gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a
full-blown investigation should be conducted by the
CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of
the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the records.
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the
records were received by, Justice Diy.  Thereafter,
the appropriate notices were issued and the
confidential hearings were conducted.  Afterwards,
Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of
the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge
Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in
class where she was present was an open display of
insensitivity, impropriety and lack
of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive
conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of
behavior demanded of magistrates.  She asserted
that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not
be made administratively liable as the act was not
made in the performance of his official duties did not
hold water because a judge should be the
embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the
performance of his official duties but also in his
everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated
the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage
scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at
that time, the case was still being investigated; that
the administrative case relative to the marriage scam
was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge
Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC
when he received the cash bail bond in
the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the
executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before
accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion
of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption
judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City
Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts
complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes
reiterated the allegations contained in his previous
pleadings.  He added that the marriage scams
scandalized the Judiciary and became public
knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held
a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every
citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in
the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and
expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never
intervened in the present case; that if he indeed
made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis,
she should have filed a criminal action for oral
defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug
addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was
meant for the protection of the Judiciary.
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy
found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge.  She opined that his use of intemperate
language during class discussions was
inappropriate.  His statements in class, tending to
project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge
Paredes that his discussions of the administrative
case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his
right to freedom of expression.  She cited the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to
be models of propriety at all times.  She quoted with
emphasis Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like
any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.”
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position
that he could not be held administratively liable for
his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as
these were uttered while he was not in the exercise
of his judicial functions.  Jurisprudence,17 as well as
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he
conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the
discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his
other professional endeavors and everyday
activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge
Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge
Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
investigated.  She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes’
liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail
bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave
misconduct was not supported by sufficient
evidence.  She accepted Judge Paredes’
explanation that he merely followed the procedure
laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with
the following recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that
indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge.  Conduct unbecoming of a
judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court,
penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the
following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but
not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and
considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out
with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that
a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.18
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations
of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public officer.  The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.19
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have
a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties.20  Considering that
the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge
Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes
in his class discussions, they cannot be considered
as “misconduct.”  They are simply not related to the
discharge of his official functions as a judge.  Thus,
Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct,
much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is
another thing.
On subjudice  matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4.  Judges shall not knowingly, while a
proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process.  Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any
person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21  be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated
that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the
marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet
been concluded.  In fact, the decision on the case
was promulgated by the Court only on April 2,
2013.24  In 2010, he still could not make comments
on the administrative case to prevent any undue
influence in its resolution.  Commenting on the
marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of
the judges involved, was in contravention of
the subjudice rule.  Justice Diy was, therefore,
correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that
although the reasons of Judge Paredes for
discussing the marriage scams in his classes
seemed noble, his objectives were carried out
insensitively and in bad taste.  The pendency of the
administrative case of Judge Tormis and the
publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge
Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge
Tormis in his class discussions.  The publicity given
to the investigation of the said scams and the fact
that it was widely discussed in legal circles let
people expressed critical opinions on the issue. 
There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to
the wound,”25 as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and
unnecessary comments tending to project Judge
Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class
discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times.  Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1.  Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2.  As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might
and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner
that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
whole.  He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 
He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself.  In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas.  Furthermore, a magistrate should not
descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments.  He is required to
always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct and in language.

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed
to observe the propriety required by the Code and to
use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate.  Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated
conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and
included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy,
had no relevance to the topic that was then being
discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention
to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his
class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking
his right to freedom of expression.  Section 6, Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes
that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression.  Such right, however, is not
without limitation.  Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code
also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in
the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.  In
the exercise of his right to freedom of expression,
Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the
Judiciary of which he is a part.  He should have
avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his
discussions and should have been more
circumspect in his language.  Being a judge, he is
expected to act with greater circumspection and to
speak with self-restraint.  Verily, Judge Paredes fell
short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge
Paredes that he cannot be held administratively
liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and
Francis in his class discussions.  Judge Paredes
should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected
of him as a judge not only in the performance of his
judicial duties, but in his professional and private
activities as well.  Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the
Code mandates:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1.  Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2.  The behavior and conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary.  Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes,
whether committed in or out of the court, should not
be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. 
It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to
his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. 
There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is
also judged by his private morals.  The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.  A
judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence.  Thus, being
a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.  He should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service.  The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in
the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it
cannot be regarded as grave misconduct.  The Court
finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the
approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail
bond, was in accordance with the rules.  Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s
allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bail
bond in relation to the Guioguio case.  Judge
Paredes justified his action by stating that he was
merely following the procedure set forth in Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which
authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for
bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
Sundays, official holidays, and special days.  Said
rule also provides that should the accused deposit
cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge
receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a
temporary receipt therefor.  Considering that Judge
Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot
be held administratively liable for his act of receiving
the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive
the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.  Under
said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with
the court where the case is pending, or with any
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or
with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the
Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC provides that executive judges are authorized to
exercise other powers and prerogatives which are
necessary or incidental to the performance of their
functions in relation to court administration.  In the
instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising
powers incidental to his functions as an Executive
Judge since he was the only judge available when
Lita Guioguio posted bail.  Notably, Lita Guioguio’s
payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. 
In addition, the judge assigned to the court where
the Guioguio case was then pending and the
executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not
available to receive the bail bond.  Judge Paredes
was the only judge available since the practice was
for one judge to be present on Saturdays.  However,
there was no judge assigned for duty during
Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the

insinuation made by complainant Jill of any
irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2)
orders of release of different dates is not backed up
by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a

light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof
by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge

Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P.

Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively
liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge
and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the
complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc.
No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity
in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and
Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as shown by the
following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago

T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver
over SCP’s objections and despite serious
conflict of interest in being the duly
appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP
and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is
also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.

Republic of the Philippines 2. The respondent conducted informal

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200               April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative
complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria
(respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2,
Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints
arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to
have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed
under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the
Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan,"
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the
respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under
rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
meetings (which she termed as "consultative
meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007)
in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e.,
a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club
facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters
and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also
announced in the meetings that she would
prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted
by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the
respondent exceeded the limits of her
authority and effectively usurped and pre-
empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise
of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the
proceedings of the informal meetings be off-
record so that there would be no record that
she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank
(EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and
communications with EPCIB to discuss the
case without the knowledge and presence of
SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo
Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s
financial adviser and, at the same time, as
her financial adviser to guide her in the
formulation and development of the
rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at
SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-
 in-law of the managing partner of Atty.
Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to
raise complaints or accusations against
SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to
create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an
evidentiary meeting and to issue a
subpoena (so that SCP could confront
EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation
that there was a need for the creation of a
management committee), the respondent
denied SCP’s requests and delayed the
issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the
respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every
attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the
reglementary period prescribed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days
given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the
Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted
and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules
(the court’s power to approve the
rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest
and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and
rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to
inhibit herself and showed special interest
and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental
complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged
that the respondent committed an act of impropriety
when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted
her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for
the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She
also posed with her upper body barely covered by a
shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st
Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the
complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations
against her. While she admitted that she crafted a
workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for
SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render
fairness and equity to all the parties to the
rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if
indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan,
hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call
for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly,
she claimed that the administrative complaints were
premature because judicial remedies were still
available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not
prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the
contrary, she argued that informal meetings are
even encouraged in view of the summary and non-
adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings.
Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the
creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to
approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the
parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which
suggested that informal meetings be called and that
she only agreed to hold these meetings on the
condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary
period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by
law. She argued that the matter of granting
extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the
Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the
rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of
bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial
of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not
due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to
lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision
was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced
by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors
did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty.
Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because
she disagreed that the grounds the complainant
raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict
of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the
complainant’s allegations were not substantiated
and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not
gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules
on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically
states that the court may decide matters on the
basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she
maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent
also believed that there was nothing improper in
expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental
Complaint
8
In her comment  on the supplemental complaint, the
respondent submitted that the photos she posted in
the social networking website "Friendster" could
hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that
an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social
outfit under contemporary standards and is not
forbidden. She further stated that there is no
prohibition against attractive ladies being judges;
she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the
ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge
Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the
facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a
reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster"
account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation
of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the
Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-
Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda
by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and
Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled
that the complaints were partly meritorious. She
found that the issues raised were judicial in nature
since these involved the respondent’s appreciation
of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set
aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance
of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in
view of SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in
handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to
present any clear and convincing proof that the
respondent intentionally and deliberately acted
against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied
on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she
noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies
within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were
agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s
creditors. She also found satisfactory the
respondent’s explanation in approving the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period
prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-
Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering
with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her
exchanges and utterances were reflective of
arrogance and superiority. In the words of the
Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels,
she instead brushed off the matter with what would
appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of
her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of
decorum expected of a judge. Her statements
appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for.
xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals
in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires
judges to be temperate in their language at all times.
Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct
unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria
should be held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she
believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and
disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the
account) – even during these changing times when
social networking websites seem to be the trend –
constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be
legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this
type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge and that
judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May
16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941
finding that the respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the creation of a
management committee without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled
that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00.
She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and
judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the
OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully
recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of
Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-
Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria,
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas
City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be
ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
impropriety with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that
the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of
the law as the complainant failed to prove that her
orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and
partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the
respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to
observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of
grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence
are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on
allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations
that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos
in her Friendster account contravened the standard
of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice
Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a
fine on the respondent but modify the amount as
indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-
Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far
as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a
matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial
evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and
lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because
the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s
bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely
pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures
and suppositions. These, by themselves, however,
are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent
judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of
judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in
the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors
committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings but should be assailed instead through
judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality
on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth
about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be
determined by simply relying on the complainant’s
verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to the person, and to give
equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge;
mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative
and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by
the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and
surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce
proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to
decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of
evidence would have helped its cause. The bare
allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the
presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the
complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid,
and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and
partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every
error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the
respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The
court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the
total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan
submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan
viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the
plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively
usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We
find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives
in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of
gross ignorance of the law against her should be
dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that the decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must
also be proven that he was moved by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed
an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests
that the respondent was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering her decision approving the modified
rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the
complainant failed to substantiate his allegations
with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad
faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in
ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the
purpose, however, we find the error to be so
egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the
conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as
charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements
that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be
given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial
to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation
court should hear both sides, allow them to present
proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their
submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic
requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no
judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not
given at all the opportunity to present its evidence,
nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly,
the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the
respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to
disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice
Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in
creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, this does not mean that a judge
need not observe due care in the performance of
his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of
law is involved and when an error is so gross and
patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the
law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the
respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of
a management committee, without the benefit of a
hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the
reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find
the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation
plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial
hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond
this period only if it appears by convincing and
compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or
disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen
(18) months from the date of filing of the petition. 37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant
the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a
good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with
particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act
by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still
required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified
when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court
shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the
date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for
good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of
the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16,
2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the
rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no
basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension
she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner
that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself/herself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi
City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge should be
considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who
come to his court; he should always keep his
passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose
and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate
should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued,
ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words,
snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge
Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, his noble position in the
bench nevertheless demands from him courteous
speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient
and courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering
with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of
exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible
lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court
cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air
of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out
that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably.
She also failed to maintain the decorum required by
the Code and to use temperate language befitting a
magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that
[her] conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She]
must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct
unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of
social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos
communicate with each other.45 While judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from
taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status as
judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every
judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the
respondent in the charge of impropriety when she
posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of
Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social
networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes
that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes the
freedom to hold opinions without interference and
impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking
site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression.
The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is,
therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom
of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety
expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it
be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent
disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered"
suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing
through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate – regardless of whether
it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties – creates and contributes to the people’s
opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is
especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close
friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to
show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her
family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed
herself in a situation where she, and the status she
holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s
criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act
of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible personification
of law and justice, however, judges are held to
higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving
the judicial office and personal matters.1âwphi1 The
very nature of their functions requires behavior
under exacting standards of morality, decency and
propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond
reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard
of conduct when they take their oath of office as
magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as

amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance
of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a
serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all

or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and

other benefits for more than three (3), but
not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not

exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge

is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under
Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A
fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding
₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4)
Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never

been administratively charged or found liable for any
wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense,
the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the
penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I.

Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand
Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise
hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.