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EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2016

TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, NATO, RS, UNO, SR, YI, TU, CY
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND FRENCH NSA-EQUIVALENT
GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE DISCUSS RUSSIA-GEORGIA, RUSSIA-KOSOVO AND TURKEY-EU

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: EUR A/S Dan Fried’s December 7 meeting with presidential
diplomatic advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) focused largely on Russia,
with France in a defensive posture. MGM raised the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner
on the margins of the NATO Riga Summit, saying it had been instigated by
Russia, and portrayed France as having attempted to steer in a way compatible
with Latvian interests. In contrast to French Political Director Araud
(septel), he showed reluctance to see the Kremlin’s hand in the Litvinenko
poisoning, preferring to ascribe it to rogue elements. MGM claimed to support
Georgian independence while suggesting that NATO Article 5 obligations
precluded Georgian NATO membership. On Kosovo, he reviewed France’s plans to
persuade the EU to agree to offer Serbia an SAA agreement not linked to
fulfillment of its ICTY obligations but worried above all about Putin’s
explicit threat to veto a UN Security Resolution mandating independence; there
was a risk of instability and partition if the West did not exercise
sufficient care in managing the Russians. Fried countered that the West needed
to be prepared to proceed in extremis without the Russians, and warned against
allowing the Russians to hold up a decision through the threat of a veto.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT: On other issues, MGM reviewed the Franco-German proposal
for a review of Turkey’s implementation of its Ankara Protocol commitments
between 2007 and 2009, assured Fried that France wanted to avoid a train
wreck, but insisted it was incumbent on the Turks to make a gesture. Fried
reminded MGM of the strategic importance of keeping Turkey tied to EU; MGM
agreed in principle but insisted Turkey had to play by the EU’s rules and
noted the difficulties of managing domestically public sentiment against
Turkey. Fried and MGM agreed that France and the U.S. had worked well together
at the NATO Riga Summit. END SUMMARY.

¶3. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried, accompanied by the Ambassador and POL Deputy
(notetaker), met December 7 with President Chirac’s diplomatic advisor (NSA-
equivalent) Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) to discuss a number of European
issues that revolved largely around Russia. MGM was joined by Presidency
Middle East advisor Dominique Boche and strategic affairs advisor Laurent
Bili.

Putin-Chirac at Riga
--------------------

¶4. (C) Noting at the outset that he had been directly involved in the aborted
Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO summit, MGM assured Fried that
French actions had been above board. Kremlin advisor Pridhodko had originally
proposed that Putin meet Chirac privately at a Paris airport November 29 in
order to express his birthday wishes (MGM cited Putin’s meeting in Hannover
with former Chancellor Schroeder as a precedent). France had agreed, while
noting that the dates coincided with the Riga Summit. Pridhodko suggested
Riga, which France dutifully vetted with the Latvians with the understanding
that they would have to host such a dinner, and assuring the Latvians that
France was prepared to say “no” to the Russians if a meeting would in any way
cause them embarrassment. The Latvians were prepared to proceed, so long as
the Russians also agreed to a bilateral meeting, which MGM conveyed to
Pridhodko. Pridhodko had suggested that this could be “difficult” given
negative Russian public opinion toward Latvia. The Latvians told MGM that the
Russians had refused to meet at the official palace or residence, but were
considering the Latvian cultural center. MGM said he had encouraged the
Russians to accept the last offering, and they had proceeded as if it might be
acceptable. Late Tuesday, however, they balked, apparently because the center
was located about 200m from the Latvian museum of occupation.

¶5. (C) MGM concluded his presentation with the argument that such a meeting
would have been positive for Russian-Latvian relations and would have helped
to blur dividing lines between NATO and Russia. He complained over Latvia’s
going “public” with the cancellation by querying NATO SYG Hoop de Scheffer as
to whether “we are allowed to receive” the Russian president. He commented
that, had they remained silent, the cancellation would have been a non-event.
Fried countered that the Latvians had been right to inform NATO and thus avoid
a surprise. He contrasted the Russians’ clumsiness in managing the dinner with
the Latvians’ transparency, suggesting that it was time for the Russians to
accept the independence of the Baltic states. He added pointedly that the U.S.
would no longer accept putative Russian concerns about Latvian treatment of
their citizens at a time when they were still rounding up Georgians on the
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basis of ethnicity. MGM commented meekly that the timing had not been right
for the visit and agreed that the Latvian government no longer had a problem
of non-citizen ethnic Russians.

Litvinenko Case
---------------

¶6. (S) Fried commented that the short-term trend inside Russia was negative,
noting increasing indications that the UK investigation into the murder of
Litvinenko could well point to some sort of Russian involvement. MGM called
attention to Chirac’s statement encouraging the Russians to cooperate in the
investigation. He wondered aloud who might have given the order, but
speculated the murder probably involved a settling of accounts between
services rather than occurring under direct order from the Kremlin. Fried,
noting Putin’s attention to detail, questioned whether rogue security elements
could operate, in the UK no less, without Putin’s knowledge. Describing the
current atmosphere as strange, he described the Russians as increasingly self-
confident, to the point of arrogance.
Georgia-Russia
--------------

¶7. (C) Fried, noting he had discussed Georgia the previous evening with MFA
Political Director Gerard Araud (septel), said it was important to support
Georgian sovereignty against Russian pressure for three reasons: the situation
overall in Georgia was improving under Saakashvili’s leadership; violation of
Georgian territorial integrity would set a dangerous precedent; and Germany
and Central and Eastern Europe had a strong interest in ensuring that gas and
oil pumped from Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not travel exclusively through
pipelines owned or controlled by Russia. MGM responded that France supported
Georgia’s independence but wondered how to accomplish this within existing
structures. The heart of NATO was Article 5, and it was doubtful that NATO
would declare war on Russia over Georgia; it was therefore important to bypass
Article 5 and find a “specific way” that did not involve NATO membership. If
Georgia joins, Armenia may follow. Even in the case of Turkey, was its Kurdish
problem one for Europeans, MGM asked.

¶8. (C) Fried assured MGM that the U.S. was not seeking membership for Georgia
soon, but it was important not to close the door in order to continue to
promote Georgian reform and development. It was incumbent on the West to
support Georgian sovereignty and maintain a united front against Russia, he
argued. He related that he had urged Saakashvili not to seek crises with
Russia, since crisis worked only for Russia, and time was on Georgia’s side so
long as it moved quietly. In five years, a burgeoning Georgian economy had the
potential to dramatically change the politics of the region. MGM agreed in
principle, but suggested one could differ on ways and means.

Serbia and Kosovo

-----------------

¶9. (C) Fried explained that the U.S. had decided to offer PFP to Serbia as a
means of supporting democratic forces in the upcoming elections; President
Tadic had made a strong case for Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic future. Similar
considerations had prompted the U.S. to support Ahtisaari’s recommendation to
postpone tabling his proposals on Kosovo status. But it was critical to move
quickly after January 21. Additional delay would encourage the Serbs and
others into thinking the West felt intimidated; it was time to push onward to
supervised independence. Fried said that while Russia could be expected to
cause difficulties, in the end he believed it would abstain on a UNSCR,
although he could not be certain. What was certain was that the Russians must
not be allowed to believe that the threat of a veto will work, because they
would exploit any opening. The West therefore had to send the signal that it
was prepared to move without them if necessary, because no signal would be
interpreted as tacit acquiescence in Russia’s raising the bar. This was a
terrible option, but paralysis was worse.

¶10. (C) MGM reviewed the history of French-Serbian relations (back to the
Salonika Front of WWI, on which MGM’s grandfather had served), judged PFP as a
positive offer, and said Chirac had proposed to Merkel that the EU move to a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, even in the event
of insufficient ICTY cooperation. Merkel had initially responded negatively,
citing Tadic’s failure to request it, but France continued to believe that
offering SAA could make a difference in the January elections. If the Germans
were not on board by early January, France would move on its own to propose
SAA. As for the Ahtisaari proposals, MGM said Putin had told the French
“Russia will not hesitate
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to veto any solution that does not enjoy the agreement of all the
stakeholders.” MGM urged great caution in moving forward, citing Putin’s
purported concerns about the risks of a partition and a merging of the north
with Serbia and the south with Albania, leading potentially to a radicalized
Muslim state in the heart of Europe.

¶11. (C) Fried responded that the Serbs and Albanians had been told that
Kosovo would be independent, and that it would be a mistake to turn back.
Perhaps the Russians were bluffing, but even if they were not, wavering would
lead to disaster, beginning with riots by Kosovars that risked turning KFOR
into an occupying force and could led to the very radicalization we had
successfully avoided so far. MGM said France was not advocating further delay,
but was nonetheless concerned that independence could have unintended
consequences. Public opinion could change, and Russia might become yet more
irrational in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections. Fried
agreed on the desirability of negotiating a UN Security Council Resolution
that would be acceptable to the Russians -- perhaps even leaving out the word
“independence” -- but the West needed to be prepared in extremis to move
forward without Russian support. Russia would seize on any paralysis to try to
raise the bar. MGM agreed in principle, but urged again finding ways to
“coddle” Russia.

Turkey-EU
---------

¶12. (C) During a discussion cut short by a summons from President Chirac,
Fried asked MGM how France planned to avoid a Turkey-EU train wreck. MGM said
France supported Turkey, but Turkey needed to play by EU rules and fulfill its
commitments. It was not the EU’s fault that the UN Cyprus plan had not been
approved by referendum, but this could not be used as an excuse for not
implementing the Ankara Protocol. It was critical that Turkey “start to
implement” the protocol through a gesture. MGM said that Chirac and Merkel had
agreed (on the basis of the Commission proposal) not to open eight chapters
and not to close any other chapters; but they had also agreed to insist on a
review of Turkish implementation -- to serve as the basis for a further EU
decision -- in the time frame between a 2007 Commission report and 2009
European parliamentary elections. Although Erdogan had told Merkel not to
expect any further Turkish gestures, MGM nonetheless hoped the Turks would
find a way, as they had so often in the past, to do something at the last
minute.

¶13. (C) Fried described the U.S. approach of encouraging Turkey to respond
constructively, expressed the hope that the EU would not be too one-sided in
its judgment of the Ankara Protocol implementation, but reminded MGM that the
EU also had not followed through on its promises (which MGM hotly denied).
Fried continued that the U.S. wanted to be helpful but was avoiding taking a
public stance. He reiterated that the stakes were high, given Turkey’s
strategic value.

¶14. (C) This message was cleared by A/S Fried.

Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON